

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-83 (b) Based on or at USS SARGENT BAY (CVE-83) (c) Report No. 78
 (d) Take off: Date 3 April 1945 Time (LZT) 1515(I) (Zone); Lat. 26°-00'N Long. 129°-00'E
 (e) Mission LCAP over TU52.1.2 then engaged in supporting operations against Okinawa (f) Time of Return 1910(I) (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
FM-2	VC-83	8	4	0	Full ammo	

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
FM-2	VC-87	2	USS MARCUS ISLAND				

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
Jill	1	1	1747 (I) (ZONE)	26°-07' N 128°-52' E	Not observed	St'd. red disc
Zeke	1	1	1747 (I) (ZONE)	26°-07' N 128°-52' E	Not observed	St'd. red disc
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) Suicide dives on units of TU 52.1.2
 Did Any Part of
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? No If so, Describe Clouds _____ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 (j) Time of Day and Brilliance Day, Bright but late sun (k) Visibility 15
 of Sun or Moon _____ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			GUNS USED	(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER			
JILL	FM-2	VC-83	Lt(jg) P.M. KREBS, (A1)	4 X .50 cal.	Engine, port wing root	Destroyed
ZEKE	FM-2	VC-83				None

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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1		None		
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
		None		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
F4U-2	-	-	3.9	240	190		2660			4

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

- SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes
- URNS
- DIVES
- CEILINGS
- RANGE
- PROTECTION
- ARMAMENT

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

This squadron went through the entire Iwo campaign without having any of its pilots sight airborne enemy aircraft. The present report is the first report of aerial combat by pilots attached to this squadron.

TU 52.1.2 was engaged in furnishing aircraft support for the invasion of Okinawa. On 3 April, the second day after the landings on the island of Okinawa, the Task Unit was operating in the area approximately 65 miles east of the southern tip of Okinawa. Twelve VF were maintained as LCAP over the Task Unit and on the late afternoon flight eight of these VF were furnished by VC-83. There were two 4-plane divisions but only one is involved here. That division was led by Lt. BOOZER with Lt.(jg) F.W. KREBS as his wingman, Lt.(jg) FULLER as his section leader, and Ensign W. ROSSEN flying wing on Lt.(jg) FULLER.

At about 1732(I) (LST) there were many bogies on the screen and Lt. BOOZER's division was vectored out to a bogie bearing 350°, 25 miles, angels 12. The Fighter Director vectored the division right over the bogies and then gave them its position as 7 o'clock down. Lt. BOOZER flipped over quickly to the right and saw two planes below him at angels 7 and on a course of 170°. In flipping over suddenly he split his formation but FULLER joined up on him and ROSSEN joined up on KREBS. As the four planes dived down the bogies separated and took off on separate courses about 90° apart. BOOZER and FULLER started after the leader, which appeared to be a ZEKE, and KREBS and ROSSEN took the other plane, which appeared to be a KATE or a JILL.

The ZEKE headed for the water in a 60° dive with BOOZER and FULLER in pursuit. BOOZER opened fire at about 3000 feet altitude when about 500 yards from the ZEKE, but only one of his guns fired. The ZEKE leveled off about 100 feet above the water and headed away from the ships. BOOZER jettisoned his starboard droppable tank but a few seconds later ran out of fuel on his other wing tank and lost 8-10 seconds in switching to main. FULLER passed BOOZER and fired several short bursts during the chase but was probably out of range when he did so. The ZEKE turned north and slowly but steadily pulled away until BOOZER and FULLER lost sight of him under a low overcast. They finally gave up the chase about 50 miles from base. The ZEKE appeared to be doing 250 - 270 knots. There was some thin smoke trailing from the ZEKE, but both BOOZER and FULLER think this was from high r.p.m. and full rich mixture rather than from hits.

In the meantime KREBS and ROSSEN were chasing the JILL which also dived for the water. The JILL turned and got under KREBS and ROSSEN who kept doing flipper turns to keep the JILL in sight. Before leveling off low over the water the JILL turned and KREBS got in a good burst, probably hitting the engine because the JILL began smoking and after that never made over 140 knots. The JILL got about 50 feet over the water and KREBS and ROSSEN with two other FM-2's from VC-87 made many flat side runs. There appeared to be many hits but not in vital spots.

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KREBS and ROSSEN got on the JILL's tail finally but the Hip pilot began kicking rudder, jerking throttle and going up and down so that it was extremely difficult to get a head on him or even to stay with him. The JILL was also flying into the sun which didn't help matters. Nevertheless KREBS and ROSSEN stuck with the plane and got in many good bursts, with tracers observed going into the left wing root and engine. KREBS put his flaps down to keep from overshooting but still had trouble staying with the JILL which finally turned towards our ships. KREBS followed and although his guns had burned out due to hot ammunition and continuous firing at very close range, he kept shooting. As the JILL approached the screen KREBS called out on the radio, "Don't shoot. I am going to chop his tail off." The destroyers started shooting and the JILL pulled up, did a wing over and crashed into the water about 75 yards off the bow of one of the destroyers. The JILL was smoking from the time of KREBS' first burst and observers aboard ship reported that they could see it smoking before the destroyers opened fire.

Credit is given to Lt.(jg) KREBS for the destruction of the plane because his burst first damaged the enemy and caused the engine to smoke continuously until the plane crashed. The final crash of the plane was due either to the fact that it stalled and dove into the water trying to avoid Lt.(jg) KREBS' fire, or the pilot had been killed or injured, or the engine had been so badly damaged that it finally gave out, or the controls had been shot out.

At no time did the JILL shoot back and there appeared to be no one in the rear seat.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
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ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

While on patrol and shortly after take-off Lt. R. S. BOOZER test fired his guns. At that time his two outboard guns and his starboard inboard gun fired perfectly but he was unable to charge or fire his port inboard gun. As soon as he was vectored out after the bogey Lt. BOOZER turned on all gun switches but when he fired a few short bursts after making contact only one gun fired. Lt. BOOZER is not certain which gun fired but he thinks it was the port outboard gun. As soon as he landed all guns and electrical wiring were carefully checked but everything appeared to be in perfect mechanical condition. The Ship's Aviation Ordnance Officer has been unable to account for the failure of the three guns to fire.

The burning out of Lt.(jg) KREBS's guns is accounted for by the fact that the ammunition was belted with all hot rounds (1 tracer, 1 incendiary and 1 armor piercing incendiary) and by the fact that he was firing continuously in long bursts in an effort to shoot the JILL down before it got to the Task Unit.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

H. VERNON BNEY, Lt. USNR, AGI Officer.

B. V. GATES, Lt. Comdr., USN.

4-5-45

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

DATE

Squadron Commander