

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
APO 234 (PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 7 PLACE Tokyo  
(Obtain from G-2) DATE 1 Oct. TIME 1030

Division Of Origin Civilian Defense

SUBJECT: 1- Population Control and Statistics  
2- Labor and Manpower

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Mr. TATEBAYASHI, MIKIO - Held following positions in Civilian Defense Bureau of Air Defense General Headquarters, Ministry of Home Affairs:

September 1941 to April 1943 - Chief of Instruction Department.  
April 1943 to November 1943 - Chief of Administrative Department.  
November 1943 to end of war - Chief of Defense Section.

Where interviewed (office)  
Meiji Building.

Interrogator:  
Col. J. B. Warden

Interpreter:  
Lt. (jg) Lansner

Allied Officers Present:  
Brig. Gen. G. Gardner  
Vice Chairman Paul H. Nitze  
Lt. F. H. Lewis

Summary:

Civilian Defense measures were a function of the Ministry of Home Affairs but no serious organizational planning was done prior to the Doolittle raid of April 1942. Mr. Tatebayashi agreed to furnish a roster of war time operating personnel presently available for interrogation. He will supply, in addition, a chart describing the air raid warning system, regulations sent to governors of prefectures throughout Japan, directives issued by the Ministry for conduct during air raids, and plans for the protection of government operated factories. Protection of factories on the private industry level was the responsibility of the owner or operator. No funds being provided by the government, the government had no policy for the construction of shelters perhaps due to a lack of construction materials. No government policy of gas defense existed and it was believed that the U.S. would not resort to chemical warfare. The government encouraged but did not enforce evacuation of urban areas. Evacuation of essential war workers was prohibited. Air raid training charts for use by various prefectures and cities will be supplied. Mr. Tatebayashi was not very familiar with method of counter acting propaganda leaflets other than orders to destroy them and use of the press and radio to dispell their effect on the public. Statistics concerning loss of life and property damage from air raids will be supplied by Mr. Tatebayashi.

## INTERROGATION

Purpose: To secure basic information concerning the structure of national Civilian Defense in Japan, the key personnel who operated it during the war years, and to determine national policy toward civilian protection.

To secure such organizational charts and records and instructional pamphlets dealing with the civilian defense subject as may still be available.

1. Functional Responsibility for Civilian Defense at the National Level. Civilian protection was organized and operated under the (Ministry of Home Affairs). As early as 1937 the Japanese set up a separate research bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs to undertake the study of air raid protection measures, but not until after the first raid in April, 1942 (Doolittle) did they undertake any serious Organizational planning.
2. Information obtained from our witness indicates that many former division and section heads of the civilian defense organization and the Ministry of Home Affairs are still available in the Tokyo area for interrogation concerning operational details of various phases of civilian defense. Mr. Tatebayashi will deliver to this headquarters a roster of the war-time operating personnel together with their present vocation.
3. Air Raid Warning System was discussed by Mr. Tatebayashi, who also promised to deliver to this headquarters an informational chart describing its operation. Generally speaking, various warnings of approaching raids were received directly from the Army warning centers by telephone at the control centers located in large urban areas, from which point the air raid warning was sounded over the electric siren system or other suitable means to the public. Complete instructions for use of this warning system are also being supplied by Mr. Tatebayashi.
4. Air Raid Protection Regulations for the guidance and conduct of the general public throughout the Empire were prepared on the national level and offered to the governors of the prefectures in Japan as suggested procedure, allowing each prefecture to adjust the regulations to fit local needs. Copies of instructional information were requested and will be delivered by Mr. Tatebayashi.
5. Basic Laws: The basic laws and decrees from which directives were issued from time to time by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the conduct of the public during air raids appeared to be quite complete in their coverage according to the witness, and copies of same will be delivered to this headquarters.
6. Factory Air Raid Protection: Factory air raid protection in Japan was the responsibility of the owner and operator on the private industry level, and under the Munitions Ministry for government owned, leased or operated plants of primary importance to the war effort. The Ministry of Home Affairs prepared suit-

able plans and instructions for protection of war plants and disseminated such information to the Munitions Ministry and to private owners as a service only. According to our witness, the government did not provide funds or equipment for the protection of war plants owned and operated by private industry. It is yet to be determined to what extent the government assisted in the allocation of funds and equipment for the protection of industry under direct control of the Minister of Munitions.

7.

Air Raid Shelters: Apparently the Japanese government did not have an air raid shelter policy as much for the protection of its nationals. However, according to information developed during the interview, the government issued suggestions for the construction of certain types of protective shelter, construction of slit trenches and other elementary means in which the public could seek some degree of protection during air raids. The responsibility for such protection rested entirely with local communities and individual property owners. It is reported by the witness that many neighborhood associations and civic bodies constructed light shelters in various urban areas at their own expense, as did many individual property owners who could afford to construct shelters for the protection of their own families. The absence of an adequate shelter policy providing for the construction of heavy-duty structures that would provide adequate protection against fire and bomb-blast appears undoubtedly to be due to the shortage of materials such as steel re-inforcing and Portland cement, alongwith a calculated disregard for loss of human life. Copies of governmental-suggested design of shelters and construction methods have been requested and promised by Mr. Tatebayashi.

8.

Gas Defense: The government of Japan did not have any gas defense policy as such. According to the witness the Japanese felt that the United States would not use poison gas in its attacks upon Japanese territory, having observed the non-use of this weapon by the United States in the European Theatre of Operations. Consequently, very few gas masks were manufactured and available for use of the general public. The small supply that was manufactured was of the general utility type and were available for private purchase on the basis of one mask to a family of each six people. There appears to be no plan for the protection of essential factory workers against gas in Japan. Obviously instruction in gas defense was not undertaken and the public not advised even in the simple methods for protection against certain poison gasses due to the lack of gas masks and training material.

9.

Movement during Air Raids - Evacuation: Interrogation of the witness revealed that the national government fostered and encouraged the evacuation of children of school age to reception areas in the countryside. Also the removal from urban areas of potential target in importance of aged and indigent people. However, such persons could remain within the cities at their own peril. The government further encouraged the removal to the country-side of children up to six years of age, only when they could be accompanied by their mother or some other responsible member of the

family. The evacuation of essential war industry workers was absolutely restricted and controlled; they being required to remain in the areas providing their employment. In the reception areas prepared in the countryside, primary grade schools were established for the continuance of education of school children evacuated from nearby urban areas. Thus, with the exception of essential war workers and children of school age, there appeared to be no compulsion on citizens to evacuate the target areas.

Movement of persons after the first air raid alarm was permitted, and not until the bombers were overhead did the police and civilian defense authorities endeavor to force transients and pedestrians along the streets and highways to take shelter. Mr. Tatebayashi was asked if he could supply information concerning the evacuation plans prepared for such areas as Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe-Osaka and Kyoto. Being generally familiar with the plans in these areas he agreed to undertake the securing of this information for this headquarters.

10. Air Raid Protection Training: The witness was requested to provide an organization chart of the civilian defense organization designed on the national level for application in the various prefectures and principal cities, which he agreed to secure for us. The police forces within the cities appear to have been charged with responsibility for air raid protection training of the civilian populace, and during wartime all police were under the control of the national Ministry of Home Affairs. The police were assigned in this function by instructors drawn from the educational system, city firemen and medical authorities from the local communities. Training appears not to have been a requirement, but was offered to interested individuals who desired to have better information on the matter of protection of their own homes, and for those auxiliaries of the fire service, first aid stations and casualty stations, or other services requiring special skills. More detailed information concerning the training program can be obtained by field study and examination of a target city, a functional chart of the police system of Japan from the national level down to the local communities, showing chain of command and service, has been requested and promised by Mr. Tatebayashi.

11. Psychological Warfare: The witness was interrogated concerning what measures Japanese officials employed to mitigate the effect of propaganda leaflets, dropped from aircraft on urban areas. While Mr. Tatebayashi appeared not to be too familiar with this particular subject, he would estimate that it was officially the function of the Foreign Section of the Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with such matters. He stated that about as much as they were able to do to counteract the effect of the leaflets was to instruct citizens to gather them up as quickly as possible, and turn them in to the nearest police precinct station, and not to discuss their contents with their neighbors. The Japanese, of course, resorted to use of the public press and the radio in an endeavor to dispell the effect on the public of the leaflets, and to institute such other control measures as the local situation might dictate.

12.

Statistical and Narrative Accounts of Air Raids:

The witness appeared to be thoroughly familiar with statistics dealing with specific raids made on the urban areas of Japan from the Doolittle Raid in 1942 up to January, 1945. As air raids increased in intensity a general disintegration of communications resulted and many records were lost in the devastating fires. In many cities it was impossible for the Japanese to keep the national Minister of Home Affairs informed concerning loss of life and property damage inflicted because of these raids. However, the witness was preparing from his records a tabulation of all data for this headquarters, including the atomic bomb raids on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

13.

Mr. Tatebayashi was asked if he could supply information concerning the Japanese government's plan for the payment of War Damage Claims to citizens suffering loss in air raids. He stated he had a general working knowledge of the plan and would prepare for us in English a statement of the government policy on the subject, together with copies of governmental law and a statement as to what extent the provisions of the law and government policy were actually carried out during the war period.

The witness, by reason of his previous connections with the Home Affairs Ministry, was extremely well-informed on the subjects under interrogation, and he demonstrated a friendly desire and willingness to place at our disposal all records and information in his possession, or that which could be secured from sources in the Home Affairs Ministry, and generally was very cooperative throughout the entire interview. He volunteered to reappear at our headquarters on Saturday, 6 October, with several of his former assistants together with charts and data requested by us, and discuss more fully details of governmental procedure employed by different bureaus and sections to carry out Japanese civilian defense policies.

The interview terminated at 1240 hours.