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Political and Governmental History of the State of New York

VOLUME V



PARTY HISTORIES

Republican

BY

WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON

AND

RAY B. SMITH

Democrat

BY

WALTER W. SPOONER

Tammany Society

BY

WILLIS HOLLY

THE SYRACUSE PRESS, Inc.
SYRACUSE, N. Y.

1922

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Horace Greeley.

FOREWORD

Millions of our citizens have recently been enfranchised. The necessity for their speedy amalgamation into the body politic with a full understanding of the responsibilities involved in the exercise of the elective franchise as contemplated by the founders of our Nation has seemed to me to require the presentation in brief concise form of a history of the two great political parties, now charged by the people with responsibility for the conduct of our national affairs. This is essential if their power is to be exerted in support of established principles of government fundamentally necessary to a continuation of our institutions.

The questions necessarily arising and which must be fairly and satisfactorily answered are: Is it the duty of an elector to affiliate with and actively participate in the management of any political party? If answered affirmatively, why one of the two great national parties rather than a minor or independent party or body? If one of the dominant parties, which one and why? How do they differ in principle? What has each stood for and accomplished in the past? What can be reasonably expected of each in the future?

The first two queries are answered briefly in the introduction to the Republican article. The answers to the other questions will be found, I trust, after a careful perusal of the contents of this volume, supplemented, if more detailed information is desired, by reference to the respective party platforms contained in the volume dealing with "National Parties and their Platforms."

The article on the Republican party was published in advance as a separate booklet in substantially its present form and circulated to some extent during the campaign of 1920. With the Republican article before him, the Democratic article was written by Walter W. Spooner. A member of the well known Spooner family, a thorough student and careful writer, an intense and devoted Democrat, just and impartial in his estimate and treatment of those who differed with him, he regarded the preparation of this article as a duty he owed his party and the public. It was completed shortly before his death and was a fitting conclusion to a life devoted to literary and educational work.

A history of the Democratic party, state or national, would be far from complete without some special account of the Tammany Society of New York. Organized for patriotic and benevolent purposes, the Society soon became an influential factor in political affairs. Its position is unique in the history of our country as the one intra-party organization that for more than a century and a quarter has exerted at all times a powerful influence in shaping the policies of the party with which it was affiliated, and as such has been an important factor in political and governmental affairs. Willis Holly has briefly sketched its activities in a manner that will attract the interest of even those who have been taught to regard its influence with suspicion and distrust.

These articles have been written by men devoted to the principles of their respective party organizations. The purpose sought is clear. Their influence should prove helpful in obtaining a clearer vision and understanding of our government.

R. B. S.

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INTRODUCTION

THIS is a history, in brief, of the national Republican party. It is not a political treatise or special plea. It aims to present a concise, coherent narrative of events and achievements, with only such explanation and comment as may be necessary to make the relation of cause and effect clear to the reader's mind and thus to indicate what the Republican party has stood for in the life of the American nation, what it stands for to-day, and what it promises for the future.

Politics is the science of government. Nicholas Murray Butler has well said: "Politics is not office-seeking; politics is not the use of devious arts of the demagogue or the self-seeker to secure power over men. Politics is one of the noblest and finest words in our language. It is nothing but the doctrine of how to live together happily and helpfully in organized society. In an autocracy, whether imperialist or socialist, there will be no need for politics. In an autocracy our politics will be made for us by some one else. In a democratic republic we make our own politics. In a republic every good citizen is or should be an active politician, because free government will not take care of itself. American institutions will not preserve themselves. They need the care, they need the devotion, they need the protection of thoughtful, high-minded,

and patriotic men and women who are deeply interested in politics and deeply concerned about politics.”

American government is a government by political parties. It was so intended at the foundation of our constitutional system. The very genius of our institutions requires that there shall be two great parties, one to exercise the authority and bear the responsibility of conducting the actual government, the other to serve as check and critic, not obstructive but constructive, the two alternating in power as their respective policies and theories of legislation and administration may from time to time best serve the varying needs of the nation. It is in this way that the best results of constructive statesmanship have hitherto been attained and the greatest progress made in the science of government.

This system was gradually developed from the time of the Revolution until in 1832 it assumed its present form, with popular nominating conventions for elective officers and with party platforms, or declarations of principles and programs of action, announcing to the electorate the issues to be determined and the policies purposed to be pursued. This system of representative and responsible party government has become firmly established as fundamental to the American republic. It is true that our history teems with the records of “independent,” “third party,” or other like movements, some of which for a brief space have had more or less spectacular careers. But the great lesson which their record teaches is their general futility, if not at times actual mischief.

It is a literal fact that not one such party has ever

succeeded either in perpetuating itself or in justifying its existence by accomplishing its aims. Thus the Abolition party arose in 1840, but exercised no dominant influence in a single State. In 1844, however, it did draw enough votes away from Henry Clay to defeat him and to elect James K. Polk, thus actually injuring the cause that it professed to serve. It was left not for that or any like organization but for the Republican party finally to abolish slavery. So the "Anti-Masonic," the "Know-Nothing," the "Constitutional Union," and other parties before the Civil War ran their little courses, caused some agitation, often mere irritation, and at all times more evil than good. They disappeared without a single enduring and beneficent achievement to their credit. In like manner there have been many similar organizations or so-called parties since the Civil War, such as Greenback, Liberal, Silver, Populist, Socialist, Socialist Labor, and Prohibition. Not one of them has ever even approximated control of the government. Not one has ever achieved its purpose. One of the most notable and most recent examples has been that of the Prohibition party, which has existed for many years but which at the end entered into a decline and saw the very work that it had vainly striven to do performed by the two great parties against which it had indiscriminately waged its futile warfare.

With this instructive record of minor party inefficiency and failure before them, American citizens would be blind indeed if they did not perceive the path of duty. That duty is to choose intelligently and on principle between the two great parties which alone are

capable of patriotic efficiency; to affiliate themselves loyally with the party of their deliberate choice; and to participate actively in its management and conduct. It is generally recognized to be the duty of every American citizen to vote at elections. Similarly it is the duty of every one to participate in the primary elections of his or her party. If citizens of the republic were generally to abstain from voting we should expect the affairs of the country to be neglected and abused. So if members of a party abstain from interesting themselves in its direction it is bound to suffer abuse. It is from such neglect on the part of citizens that the evils of party management have arisen.

No rational and loyal American citizen thinks of asserting his "independence" of the republic or of setting up a rival government. Even if he wishes to have changes and reforms made in the government, he seeks to make them "from the inside." Since, then, it is the established principle of the nation that its government shall be conducted through the agency of two major parties, it becomes scarcely less incumbent upon citizens to recognize those parties, to exercise their political activities in them and through them, and, if ever they desire changes in them, to make them "from the inside." To assert independence of all party affiliation and to support only such party candidates and measures as may occasionally appeal to us would be only a little less illogical and reprehensible than to withhold complete allegiance to the government itself and to support it only when it particularly pleases us to do so.

The essential fallacy and futility of minor parties can be perceived in their very nature and purpose. They are designed to serve some special interest, either temporary or local. No governmental policy worthy of the name can be based upon such issues. It must be comprehensive of all parts of the nation and of permanent or at least enduring application. For example, the construction of a Pacific railroad or an Isthmian canal was a great project, worthy of advocacy in a national party platform. But it would manifestly have been absurd to found a political party upon such an issue. The same may be said of the various issues of the present day. They are of indisputable importance, but to base a party upon any one of them alone would be futile and absurd. They must be dealt with by a party which takes a comprehensive view of them all and which will not dispose of them in accordance with some special, local, or temporary interest, but will act in conformity with the general and permanent interests of the whole nation.

With this conception of the party and of the citizen's duty to the party before us, this history of the Republican party is presented in confidence that its facts of record will demonstrate the fitness of that organization, as one of the two great dominant parties, to be entrusted, as it has so greatly been, with the duties, powers, and responsibilities of American government whenever and so often as it receives the mandate of the electorate. Its very name is auspicious. There were others before it, two of them, that bore the same name—applied to them without special significance, as has been the case

with many other party designations. Jefferson called his party the Republican, in contradistinction to the Federalist, though indeed the names would have been far more logically and fittingly applied if they had been exchanged. Again the name was used for a few years by the party opposed to Jacksonian Democracy, until it was merged with the Whigs. Neither of those short-lived organizations had in its purpose or in its achievements anything particularly to justify its use of the name. That was reserved for the present party, which has now endured through a triumphant career twice as long as the united ages of its two predecessors.

Republican: The Party of the Republic. Republic: The *Res Publica*, the Common Wealth. The derivation of the name denotes its purport. It means a party not of a class or of a section or of a period, but of the general and lasting good of the whole people. It means a party which knows no sectional divisions on geographical lines, but has regard for North and South, for East and West, alike. It means a party which recognizes no distinctions of caste or class or social rank, but serves equally the interests of rich and poor, of employer and employe, of capital and labor, of domestic industry and external commerce; acting always upon the impregnable principle that the whole is greater than any of its parts, and that to promote the welfare of the whole nation is the best possible means of promoting the welfare of all the parts. It means a party which aims at once at progress in the arts of civilization and in all the beneficent conditions and circumstances of human life, individual and social, and

at the conservation of those fundamental rights of person and of property which are essential to the durability of all government and even civilization itself.

These are the things for which a party called Republican must unceasingly stand, if it is to be worthy of its name. It is for the reader of these pages to judge, from the record, how faithfully and efficiently the present Republican party has stood for them for now more than threescore years, how truly it stands for them to-day, and how trustworthy is its promise to stand for them in the future.


THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN

THE Republican party was organized in 1854. That was the time of the third great crisis in the domestic history of the nation. The first had occurred in the very establishment of our constitutional system. The second had its culmination in the Missouri Compromise of 1820, when, by giving formal recognition and assent to sectional lines, it was hoped to allay the rising menace of sectionalism against nationality. For a generation that compromise endured, though the inexorable logic of events was steadily working against its perpetuity. Its principle had been to divide the United States west of the Mississippi River on the geographical line of 36° 30' north latitude, with free territory at the north and slave territory at the south, and to admit a State from one side concurrently with a State from the other, so as to keep the balance even between the two at Washington. That seemed like an extension of the provision of the Ordinance of 1787, which made the Northwest Territory—afterward Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin—free soil, while leaving the southwest—Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Gulf States—to slavery.

Before a dozen years had passed, however, it became



REUBEN EATON FENTON

Reuben Eaton Fenton, 25th governor (1865-1868); born in Carroll, Chautauqua county, N. Y., July 4, 1819; studied law; engaged in mercantile pursuits; elected supervisor of the town of Carroll, 1843; governor of New York, 1865-1868; elected to congress and served from March 4, 1853 to March 3, 1855; reelected and served from March 4, 1857 to December 10, 1864, when he resigned, having been elected governor; elected to the United States senate and served from March 4, 1869 to March 3, 1875; appointed chairman of the United State commission to the international monetary conference in 1878; died at James-town, N. Y., August 25, 1885.



CHAUNCEY MITCHELL DEPEW

Chauncey Mitchell Depew, senator; born Peekskill, N. Y., April 23, 1834; graduated from Yale, 1856; member state assembly, 1861-1862; secretary of state of New York, 1863; appointed and confirmed U. S. minister to Japan but declined; defeated for lieutenant governor on liberal republican ticket, 1862; regent of the university of the state of New York, 1887-1904; declined election as U. S. senator, 1885; declined appointment as secretary of state in cabinet of President Harrison; delegate at large to republican national conventions of 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900; placed Benjamin Harrison and Levi P. Morton in nomination for the presidency; U. S. senator, 1895-1911; distinguished as an after dinner speaker.

apparent that there was more territory for free States north of the Missouri Compromise line than for slave States south of it. So Texas was annexed and a vast region was taken from Mexico to provide material for more slave States. But this operation proved disappointing. Texas remained one single State instead of being divided into the five that had been expected; California came in as a single free State instead of being divided into two, one free and one slave; and New Mexico and Arizona would obviously not be ready for statehood for many years. With Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, and other northern Territories rapidly preparing for entrance into the Union, each having claims based upon fitness that could not be denied, it was evident that the Missouri Compromise could not prevent the free States from soon outnumbering the slave.

Therefore in 1854 the pro-slavery party, with its control of Congress, enacted the Kansas-Nebraska bill. That measure was a virtual repeal of the Missouri Compromise in that it permitted slavery and slave States north of the line which the latter act had established. It did not, it is true, command the existence of slavery nor declare the power of Congress to require its extension in the northern Territories. But it established the principle of "squatter sovereignty," under which the residents, even temporary, of any Territory might determine whether it should be free or slave. This was in the face of the constitutional provision that Congress should make all laws for the government of Territories before their admission to the Union as

States, as well as in violation of the Compromise of 1820.

The result was the precipitation of the final conflict over sectionalism, with a complete breaking up of the old parties and a general political realignment. The Democratic party was rent asunder, a large proportion of its members in the north refusing to sanction the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The Whig party practically went out of existence. The Free Soil party survived in some strength, but its duration of life was very brief. It was too radical to obtain wide influence. Obviously the time was ripe for a new national organization which should grapple with the great issues rising dominant above all others, that had been matters of contention between Whigs and Democrats. These latter issues had, indeed, existed from the beginning of the nation and were in themselves of great moment. They included questions of the tariff, banking, internal improvements such as roads and canals, the power of the President's veto, and strict or liberal construction of the Constitution. Some of them dated from the days of Hamilton and Jefferson; some of them have persisted until the present time.

But at the middle of the last century far-seeing and thoughtful men perceived that all these were subordinate, for the time, to the two supreme issues of Liberty and Union. There was little use in debating what should be the policy of the nation until it was positively and permanently determined whether there was to be one nation or two. And if it was to remain one nation, all questions of economics must be held in

abeyance to that of whether it was to be a nation of free or of slave labor. So, during the protracted debate in Congress over the Kansas-Nebraska bill, there arose an immeasurably wider and more significant discussion throughout the free States of the north as to what should be done to meet the menace of that measure.

The logic of events drew together men of three parties: Democrats, Whigs, and Free Soilers; together with many humanitarians who had not been closely affiliated with any party. Among the Democrats were Nathaniel P. Banks and George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, Lyman Trumbull and John M. Palmer of Illinois, Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, Francis P. Blair of Missouri, Montgomery Blair of Maryland, and Preston King and William Cullen Bryant of New York. The Whigs contributed Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, Zachariah Chandler and Jacob M. Howard of Michigan, Henry S. Lane and Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, Jacob W. Grimes of Iowa; Thomas Corwin, Benjamin F. Wade, and John Sherman of Ohio; George Ashmun of Massachusetts, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, and William H. Seward, E. D. Morgan, and Horace Greeley of New York. From the ranks of the Free Soil party came Charles Sumner, Henry Wilson, Horace Mann, John G. Palfrey, and Charles Francis Adams of Massachusetts; Owen Lovejoy of Illinois; Joshua R. Giddings and Salmon P. Chase of Ohio; George W. Julian of Indiana, and David Wilmot of Pennsylvania. Cordially associated with these and lending to them their incomparable intellectual and spiritual influence were

the writers and thinkers of the age: Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Russell Lowell, George William Curtis, John Greenleaf Whittier, Henry Ward Beecher, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Julia Ward Howe. No other party was ever organized by so distinguished and authoritative an array of men and women as its leaders and directors.

Many of these men had been strong partisan opponents of each other. Abraham Lincoln as a Whig and Lyman Trumbull as a Democrat were rivals in a contest for the Senatorship from Illinois. But all were now agreed that in the presence of issues that overshadowed all their former party differences they must agree to hold these latter in abeyance and to unite for the settlement of the former. Yet to some extent they brought into the composition of the new party the best characteristics of the old ones. The Whigs, who formed not only a plurality but probably a considerable majority of the combination, impressed upon it their broad and liberal views of constitutional construction. The Democrats contributed a resolute loyalty to the Union, devotion to the legitimate rights of the States and a fine conception of the equal rights of all men under the law. The Free Soilers who, more than either of the others, had been a party of one idea, infused the whole with their passionate determination that there should be no further extension of slavery.

This last named principle was indeed the foremost and strongest in the minds of all. There was no purpose to interfere with slavery where it lawfully existed or where it might be lawfully extended under the terms

of the Missouri Compromise. Though all believed with Lincoln that the Union could not permanently exist half slave and half free, they had sufficient faith in the superior virtues of free labor to believe that in time the problem would be solved by the irresistible force of economic laws, and that the institution of slavery would perish through its own unsoundness. They were, however, inflexibly determined that slavery should not be extended into the Territories which had been dedicated to freedom. All through the spring and early summer of 1854 meetings were held and correspondence was conducted, culminating in a mass-meeting at Ripon, Wisconsin, at which it was formally resolved that if the Kansas-Nebraska bill was enacted they would "throw old party organizations to the winds and organize a new party on the sole issue of the non-extension of slavery." The chief organizer of that meeting was A. E. Bovay, who had been in correspondence upon the subject with Horace Greeley and who at that meeting proposed that the new organization be known as the Republican party.

It was of course necessary to adopt a new name. The Whigs were the most numerous members of the new body, but they could not expect the Democrats to call themselves Whigs. Neither, of course, would the Whigs consent to be called Democrats, even if that name had not belonged to the party which they were about to fight. Neither Whigs nor Democrats would be known as Free Soilers. In those circumstances the suggestion of "Republican" was most felicitous. Democrats remembered that it had been adopted by Jefferson.

Whigs recalled the use of it by the founders of their own party in opposition to Jackson. Free Soilers were reminded that Jefferson, in the Ordinance of 1787 which he drafted, was the pioneer Free Soiler who made the Northwest Territory free and would have made the southwest similarly free if his will could have prevailed.

The formal adoption of the name and organization of the party were reserved to a little later date. It was on July 6, 1854. The place was a grove of giant oaks at Jackson, Michigan. There a State convention was held of Whigs, Democrats, and Free Soilers opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Jacob M. Howard was chairman. A platform was adopted denouncing slavery as a "relic of barbarism," demanding that Congress restore and maintain the restrictions imposed upon it by the Missouri Compromise, holding in abeyance all other political issues and party differences until that paramount question should be settled, and pledging coöperation under the name of the Republican party. Similar action was taken at conventions in other western States a week later. It was suggested by some that a national convention be called, but Seward and others opposed such action as premature and it was not done. But throughout the free States of the north there were nominated for Congress either avowedly Republican candidates or Whigs and Free Soilers who were ready to coalesce with the Republicans.

The result was that at the elections in the fall of 1854 the new party, not yet six months old, polled a majority of the votes in about half of the States, secured

the election of a number of United States Senators, and elected a large delegation to the House of Representatives. When the House thus elected met for organization in the winter of 1855 it was divided among a number of factions, not one of which had a majority. But so numerous were the Republicans that with the help of some allies they were able, after a struggle which lasted from December 3, 1855, to February 2, 1856, on the 133rd ballot to elect Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts as Speaker. Banks, who had begun work as a bobbin boy in a cotton mill, had been a Democrat but, as already noted, had been among the foremost organizers of the Republican party and thus became the first Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives. He filled that difficult place in those supremely trying times with such ability and fairness that during his entire term not one of his parliamentary rulings was disputed. After this notable victory at the polls in 1854 there was some reaction in 1855, yet there was really much growth of party strength and confident preparations were made for a national campaign in 1856.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

THE Republican party was conspicuously a party of the people in both its origin and formation. Instead of being organized and promulgated from a national center, it began in local and community meetings. During the first two years of its existence these local bodies extended themselves to State conventions. Finally, in its third year, it essayed a national convention and a national organization. In this movement Michigan, which had been the scene of the party's birth and of its first State convention, fittingly took the lead. On the recommendation of the Michigan State committee the State committees of all the States in which the party had been organized issued on January 17, 1856, a call for a national convention to be held at Pittsburgh on February 22 following. This was not to be a nominating convention, nor one with a stated proportionate representation like the conventions of the present time, but rather a national mass-meeting for conference and counsel. It was largely attended by representative men from every State from Maine to California. There were Whigs, Democrats, Free-Soilers, Know-Nothings, and others, all now fully merged into the Republican party and called by no other name. The permanent chairman was Francis

P. Blair of Missouri, a former Democrat who had been one of the close friends of Andrew Jackson. An address to the nation was drafted by Henry J. Raymond and adopted by the convention, and a committee of which George W. Julian was chairman prepared and issued a call for a national nominating convention to be held at Philadelphia on June 17, 1856, the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill.

This first national nominating convention of the Republican party was organized on a basis of representation of three delegates from each Congressional district and six at-large from each State. Delegates were present from every northern State, and also from the three border States of Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky. The gathering was called to order by Edwin D. Morgan of New York, afterward Governor of the State and United States Senator. Robert Emmet, a nephew of the famous Irish patriot of that name, was made temporary chairman. Later in the day Henry S. Lane of Indiana was made permanent chairman. An informal ballot was taken for a candidate for President of the United States, with the very decisive result that Colonel John C. Fremont, the "Pathfinder of the Rocky Mountains" and one of the first United States Senators from California, received 359 votes; John McLean of Ohio, 190; Charles Sumner, United States Senator from Massachusetts, 2; Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, 1; and William H. Seward, Senator from New York, 1. A formal ballot resulted still more strongly in Fremont's favor and his nomination was then made unanimous amid great enthusiasm. An

informal ballot for Vice-President gave 259 votes for William L. Dayton, who had been a Senator from New Jersey; 110 for Abraham Lincoln, formerly Representative in Congress from Illinois; 46 for Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts; and a few for each of a dozen other men. Dayton was then formally and unanimously nominated, completing the ticket.

Before the balloting for President there was received a message from the managers of a faction of the American or Know-Nothing party asking for a conference with a view to coöperation and union. The American party had held a convention, had nominated Millard Fillmore for President, and had refused to commit itself against the extension of slavery. Thereupon a considerable faction, including most of the delegates from the New England States and some of those from Pennsylvania and the west, withdrew. Later the anti-slavery Know-Nothings had held a separate convention, adopted a platform against slavery extension, and nominated Nathaniel P. Banks for President; he ultimately retired in favor of Fremont. It was this faction that sought coöperation with the Republicans. Its message was considered by the Republican convention, which decided not to accept the overture for coöperation. The Republicans would have welcomed Know-Nothing support for their candidates, but they were absolutely unwilling to identify or associate themselves in any way with that party in its intolerant and proscriptive attitude toward citizens of foreign birth.

The platform which was adopted by this first Repub-

lican national convention, and on which the ensuing campaign was fought, made no mention of the Republican party by name but spoke of the "convention of delegates" and issued its call "addressed to the people of the United States, without regard to past political differences or divisions, who are opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, to the policy of the present administration, to the extension of slavery into free territory; in favor of the admission of Kansas as a free State, of restoring the action of the Federal government to the principles of Washington and Jefferson." It demanded the maintenance of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution and the preservation of the rights of the States and of the Union of the States. It took strong ground against the extension of slavery into the free Territories, against the terrorism and oppression that had been applied to Kansas in an effort to impose slavery upon that would-be State, and demanded the admission of Kansas to the Union as a free State. It denounced the notorious "Ostend manifesto" as a "highwayman's plea." Its only references to other political or economic issues were a demand for Federal aid for the building of the Pacific Railroad and for the river and harbor improvements needed by commerce.

The campaign that followed was marked with tremendous enthusiasm and excitement throughout the north and with general apathy in the south. The Democrats had nominated James Buchanan, and the remnant of the Whigs had accepted the Know-Nothing nomination of Fillmore. In the south the contest

was confined to these two candidates with a practical certainty that Buchanan would run far in the lead. All through the north, however, the tripartite contest was waged with a vigor never seen before, not even in the "Hard Cider" campaign for Harrison in 1840. Mass-meetings and marching clubs were everywhere, while the press and pulpit were as impassioned as the stump speakers. The Republicans were at first confident of success. But the October elections disappointed them, and in November they met with defeat. Many of the old Whigs voted for Fillmore, and while they carried for him only one State—Maryland,—in New Jersey, Illinois, and California they left Fremont in a minority, so that Buchanan got the Electoral votes of those States. Had the Whigs in the four States all supported Fremont and so given him the votes of those States, he would have lost by but a small number in the Electoral College. As it was he was decisively beaten, with only 114 Electoral votes to Buchanan's 174. The popular vote stood: Buchanan, 1,838,169; Fremont, 1,335,264; Fillmore, 874,534. In eleven slave States no votes were cast for the Republican ticket. The party had made no attempt to form an organization there.

The result was discouraging to some of the most sanguine members of the Republican party, but to the great majority it was an incentive to renewed and increased efforts for the next campaign. It also indicated the need of more expert leadership and a more comprehensive platform of principles. The party must not be so much a party of one idea. While it still

recognized the two paramount issues, it must pay some attention to others and present a program of constructive statesmanship. The battle-cry of 1856 had been "Free soil, free speech, free press, free men, Fremont!" That aroused enthusiasm. But something more than mere enthusiasm was needed to win over the rest of the Whigs and still further to rend the Democratic party asunder. This was made the more evident when, in March, 1857, the Dred Scott decision was rendered by the Supreme Court declaring that Congress had no power to prohibit the extension of slavery to the Territories, despite the constitutional provision that "the Congress shall have power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States." Obviously this decision practically outlawed the paramount issue upon which the Republican party had been founded and destroyed the party's reason for existence. It was folly to demand that Congress should prevent the extension of slavery into the Territories when the Supreme Court had decided that it had no power to do so. Republicans generally denounced the decision as unsound and an unwarrantable meddling by the judiciary in a purely political matter, and made it plain that they would seek its reversal. Nevertheless the decision had to be respected for the time and made it necessary for the party to put other planks in its platform.

Fortunately for the Republicans the Democrats persisted in the course that had provoked the revolt against them. In the Congressional elections of 1856 the Democrats secured a majority, so that the Thirty-

fifth Congress, which met in December, 1857, contained a strong Democratic majority in each house over Republicans and Know-Nothings combined. It there-upon proceeded with offensive pro-slavery legislation. Early in May, 1858, the spurious "Lecompton Constitution" was accepted by Congress as the basis for admitting Kansas as a State, and of course as a slave State. But in August following the people of Kansas overwhelmingly rejected it, preferring to remain out of the Union rather than be admitted with slavery fixed upon them. In the next year, 1859, occurred the abortive insurrection of John Brown at Harper's Ferry, the tragic outcome of which immensely intensified political passions on both sides and caused thousands of former waverers to ally themselves definitely and aggressively with the Republican party.

Highly important, too, was the schism in the Democratic party. Despite the defection from its ranks in the north that organization was still the most numerous and formidable of all. But when the Buchanan administration, not content with the Dred Scott decision under which it could admit slavery into the Territories and protect it there, endeavored to impose the Lecompton Constitution upon Kansas, there was a numerous revolt, led by Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, one of the ablest Democratic statesmen of that day. He professed to be indifferent to the question of slavery in and of itself. He stood squarely for the old Democratic doctrine of the right of self-government, and he resented and denounced the attempt to force upon the people of Kansas a government that they did not want. When

he openly defied the administration and made himself the leader of the "Anti-Lecompton Democrats" Buchanan warned him to remember how Andrew Jackson had crushed Democratic leaders who had dared to resist his policy. To this Douglas tartly replied that Jackson was dead. "I care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up," he said again and again, "but I do care about the right of Kansas to self-government. If she wants a slave-State Constitution she should have it, and if she wants a free-State Constitution she should have it—and shall have it."

In this Douglas did not by any means adopt the Republican doctrine. He did, however, rend the Democratic party afresh all through the north, aligning many of its best men against the Democratic administration and leading them into a position from which their next logical and practically inevitable step was into the Republican ranks. As for the Republican leaders, they held their ground resolutely against extension of slavery into the Territories even in the face of the Dred Scott decision, but at the same time they enlarged their platform, interested themselves in other issues, and gradually transformed what appeared at first to be a transient coalition for a single and temporary purpose into a coherent and permanent organization, intended not alone to cope with the great issues of that day but to render enduring service in all respects and directions to the commonwealth, to the *Res Publica* from which it had taken its name.

CHAPTER III

THE LEADERSHIP OF LINCOLN


THE crisis was at hand. The nation itself was at the parting of the ways. The Republican party also, after five years of partly tentative, partly formative endeavor, had reached the point where it must definitely "find itself." It must adopt in the second national campaign that was before it the policy which would determine all its future destinies. The danger was in multiplicity of counsels. We have noted that it was composed of former members of three parties and that it included a large number of men of authoritative leadership. But among these, save on one or both of the paramount topics, there was far more disagreement than harmony. The supreme necessity was that some commanding leader should arise whose personality would draw all to him and therefore to one another, and who would be able to propound a policy upon which all could agree.

That leader was not lacking. In that crucial year of 1858 he came irresistibly to the fore. He had been among the earliest organizers of the party, although by no means among the most conspicuous. Sumner, Seward, Trumbull, Giddings, Chase, Lovejoy, Bryant, Greeley, and others were far more widely known than he. They were more experienced in public affairs.



ROSCOE CONKLING

Roscoe Conkling, senator; born in Albany, N. Y. October 30, 1829; moved with his parents to Auburn, N. Y. in 1839; completed an academic course; studied law in Utica, N. Y. and was admitted to the bar in 1850; practiced in Utica; district attorney of Oneida county, 1850; mayor of Utica, 1858; elected to congress and served from March 4, 1859 to March 3, 1863 and from March 4, 1865 to March 3, 1867; reelected in 1866 but resigned before the opening of the congress; elected to the U. S. senate as a union republican in 1867; reelected and served until May 16, 1881, when he resigned with his colleague, Thomas C. Platt, largely because of differences in the administration growing out of the disposal of federal patronage in the city and state of New York; resumed the practice of law in New York city; in February, 1882, was appointed associate justice of the U. S. supreme court and was confirmed by the senate, but declined; died in New York City, April 18, 1888.



THOMAS COLLIER PLATT

Thomas Collier Platt, senator; born in Owego, N. Y., July 15, 1833; attended Yale university, 1849-1850; entered mercantile life and was president of the Tioga national bank at its organization; clerk of Tioga county, 1859-1861; elected to congress and served from March 4, 1873 to March 3, 1877; elected to U. S. senate January 18, 1881, but resigned with his colleague, Roscoe Conkling, on account of a disagreement with President Garfield; member and president of the board of quarantine commissioners of New York City, 1880-1888; delegate to the Republican national conventions of 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900 and 1904; member of the national republican committee; elected to the U. S. senate January 20, 1897; reelected and served from March 4, 1903 to March 3, 1909; died in New York City March 6, 1910.

But they were not to be the leaders. While they hesitated, with divided counsels, Abraham Lincoln strode forward with the confidence of genius. With a prescience far surpassing that of any of his fellows he divined the situation and its imperious needs and with a sure voice sounded the keynote of victory. "A house divided against itself," he said, "cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free." With characteristic directness he added that he did not expect it to fall and did not expect it to become all slave.

That utterance, one of the most epochal in the history of America, was made on June 17, 1858. It was made in the course of Lincoln's acceptance of the Republican nomination for the United States Senatorship from Illinois as the competitor of Stephen A. Douglas, who was seeking reëlection. Months afterward, on October 25, Seward adopted and repeated the same thought in a speech at Rochester, New York, in which he spoke of the "irrepressible conflict," which meant that the United States would "sooner or later become entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free labor nation." But in June Seward and others were not yet ready for that declaration. Nor were they inclined to approve Lincoln's candidacy against Douglas. They were so pleased with the revolt of Douglas and the Anti-Lecompton Democrats against the administration that they would have let Douglas be reëlected to the Senate without opposition that he might continue there his hostility to Buchanan and thus increase the dissensions in the Democratic party.

Lincoln was wiser. He discerned the desirability of opposing Douglas on moral grounds and also on grounds of the most practical political strategy. On moral grounds he did not purpose that the Republican party should permit a man to be elected to the Senate unchallenged on a platform of indifference to slavery. That was a subject on which no man had a right to be indifferent or neutral. So he meant to compel Douglas to commit himself on it in some fashion one way or the other. That he regarded as a moral duty. But he was shrewd enough and wise enough to see, too, that by thus compelling Douglas to commit himself he would immeasurably widen the breach in the Democratic party.

So he entered the race for the Senatorship against the judgment of Seward and Greeley and many others who could see in it nothing but defeat for him. Probably Lincoln expected nothing but defeat, but it would be a defeat in 1858 which would assure victory in 1860; and that was the victory he wanted to win. He not only entered the race but he also challenged Douglas to stump the State with him in joint debate. Douglas of course accepted. He could not have done otherwise. In that moment Lincoln might well have exclaimed, "The Lord hath delivered him into my hands!" In the graces of oratory and the tricks and sophistry of rhetoric Douglas was the master. He was, too, a master of plausibility and evasion. But Lincoln, direct and remorseless as fate, kept pressing at the fatal flaw in his armor until at last in the debate at Freeport he pressed the point home. He there extorted from Douglas the

admission, the declaration that, no matter what the Supreme Court might say, the people of a Territory had the power to exclude slavery by hostile police regulations.

It was enough. Lincoln had won the fight. True, he was defeated in the Senatorial campaign. That Freeport declaration strengthened Douglas with the Democrats of Illinois and they returned him to the United States Senate. It also strengthened him with the Democrats of the north generally and made it practically certain that he would be their candidate for the Presidency in 1860. But it made it absolutely certain that the entire pro-slavery south would repudiate and reject him. When this result of Lincoln's masterful leadership was appreciated by the Republican party throughout the land, and when Seward and others repeated the keynote of the conflict to which he had given voice, there was no longer any uncertainty as to the future. Lincoln was the destined leader of the new party and his policy was to be its policy.

In the Congressional elections of 1858 the Republicans made considerable gains. When the Thirty-sixth Congress met in December, 1859, the Democrats had control of the Senate, but the House was almost evenly divided. John Sherman was the Republican candidate for the Speakership, and for eight weeks there was a deadlock over the election. Sherman finally withdrew in favor of William Pennington of New Jersey, who was thereupon elected.

Then came the fateful year of 1860. In his commanding place as a Senator from the State of New

Douglas was the leading candidate but could not get the needed two-thirds vote for nomination, and after many fruitless ballots the convention adjourned to meet again at Baltimore on June 18. Meanwhile a large number of the southern delegates opposed to Douglas seceded, organized a rival convention, and adjourned to meet at Richmond, Virginia, on June 11. When the convention reassembled at Baltimore Douglas was eventually nominated. But there was another secession of administration Democrats who organized a rival convention and nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky for President. The other seceding convention at Richmond also nominated Breckinridge. The chief difference between the Douglas and Breckinridge platforms was in the planks relating to the extension of slavery. The Douglas platform referred the whole question to the Supreme Court and promised acceptance of its judgment. The Breckinridge platform insisted upon regarding the Dred Scott decision as conclusive of the whole matter. Both demanded enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law and urged the acquisition of Cuba and government aid for the Pacific Railway.

The Constitutional Union party held its convention at Baltimore on May 9 and nominated John Bell of Tennessee for President and Edward Everett of Massachusetts for Vice-President. It adopted no platform except a reaffirmation of the Constitution and an exhortation to its loyal fulfillment.

Then came the Republican convention. To it the whole nation had looked with an intensity of interest

far surpassing all that the others commanded. The Republican party had in 1859 carried every northern State in which an election was held except four. One was California, which was assumed to be hopelessly Democratic. The second was Oregon, which went Democratic by only 59 votes. The third was New York, where there was some dissension between Seward and Greeley and which the Republicans lost by fewer than 2,000 votes. The fourth was Rhode Island, where the Republicans were defeated by a fusion of all other parties. Taken all together the northern States had given a heavy Republican majority. In these circumstances there was general expectation that the Republican convention would name, as it did, the next President of the United States.

The convention met in a huge structure called the "Wigwam" in Chicago on May 16. Though the second national convention of the party, it was the first that called itself by the name of Republican. It was national in scope, containing delegates from slave States in the south as well as from free States in the north. All the free States were represented and also Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas. Although their citizens could have no votes, delegates were admitted from the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska as well as from the District of Columbia. The temporary chairman was David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, author of the famous "Wilmot Proviso" against slavery. The permanent chairman was George Ashmun, who had been a Representative in Congress from Massachusetts. A significant question was raised

early in the session as to whether a majority of the delegates present should be sufficient to nominate or there should be required a number of votes which would be a majority if all the States of the Union had been represented. The adoption of the latter rule would in that case have been practically equivalent to that which has always prevailed in Democratic conventions requiring a two-thirds vote to nominate. But the question was overwhelmingly decided in favor of the former principle, making a majority of the delegates actually in attendance sufficient. That principle of simple majority rule has ever since prevailed in Republican conventions.

The platform was adopted before the nominations were made. It called the convention "the delegated representatives of the Republican electors of the United States," and declared that the record of the last four years had demonstrated the necessity of the perpetuation of the Republican party and its peaceful and constitutional triumph. It reaffirmed the principles of the Declaration of Independence relating to the equality of men and their rights and the purpose of government to secure those rights. It demanded the maintenance of the Union and the rights of States to order their own domestic affairs. It scathingly condemned the Buchanan administration for its course toward Kansas, and by direct implication denounced and repudiated the Dred Scott decision. There was no hint of interference with slavery in any State where it already existed, but inexorable opposition to its extension into Territories was expressed and the reopening

of the African slave trade was denounced as a crime against humanity.

No fewer than five of the planks were devoted to matters other than those pertaining to the contest over slavery, indicating the purpose of the party to undertake the general work of constructive statesmanship for the nation. Of these the first related to the tariff. At that time the nation was suffering great distress and depression, due largely to the non-protective tariff policy of the Democratic party. The Republican platform called for such an adjustment of duties on imports as would "encourage the development of the industrial interests of the whole country" and for a policy which would secure "to the workingmen liberal wages, to agriculture remunerating prices, to mechanics and manufacturers adequate reward for their skill, labor, and enterprise, and to the nation commercial prosperity and independence." The second plank demanded a proper Homestead act for the distribution of public lands to actual settlers. The third condemned Know-Nothingism by implication, opposing any change in the naturalization laws or discrimination against naturalized citizens, and demanded equal protection for all, native and naturalized, at home and abroad. The fourth approved national aid for river and harbor improvements of a national character. The fifth called for the establishment of a daily overland mail to the Pacific coast and the construction of a trans-continental railroad as soon as possible. Thus at its first national convention held under its own name the Republican party committed itself to broad principles

of national welfare without discrimination as to geographical section or social rank or class. It emphasized its essential character as a national party devoted to the *Res Publica*, the common weal of all the people.

Upon this platform the nominations were made. No nominating speeches were made, but the names of several candidates were formally placed before the convention and then a ballot was taken. It resulted as follows: William H. Seward, 173½; Abraham Lincoln, 102; Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, 50½; Salmon P. Chase, 49; Edward Bates of Missouri, 48; William L. Dayton of New Jersey, 14; John McLean of Ohio, 12; Jacob Collamer of Vermont, 10; and scattering votes, 6. The whole number of delegates was 465, and 233 were necessary to a choice. On the second ballot Cameron was withdrawn and most of his votes with some others went to Lincoln, giving him 181, while Seward, gaining a smaller number, had 184½. On the third ballot about half the support of Bates and Chase and nearly all of Dayton's went to Lincoln and almost nominated him with 231½ votes to Seward's 180. Instantly four Ohio votes were transferred to him, giving him a majority, and other changes ran his vote up to 364. On motion of William M. Evarts, who had originally presented Seward's name, the nomination was made unanimous amid universal enthusiasm. A little later nominations were made for Vice-President, and Hannibal Hamlin, United States Senator from Maine, was chosen on the second ballot.

The electoral campaign that followed was by far the most fiercely contested that the country had ever

seen. The Republicans adopted the methods that had been used in the Fremont campaign and also in the Harrison campaign of 1840; of mass-meetings, torch-light processions of marching clubs, and similar demonstrations. There was scarcely a hamlet or cross-roads in the northern States where a mass-meeting or a parade was not held. In the south the Democrats—of the administration faction, supporting Breckinridge—worked furiously for victory but threatened to secede in case of defeat. In the north both Democratic factions worked hard. Efforts were made for a fusion of their Electoral tickets with an agreement that all the votes should be given to the candidate who came nearest to election. This course was pursued in several States.

The early elections in September and October foreshadowed Lincoln's success, and the November elections confirmed the forecast. The Republicans carried every northern State except New Jersey, where the result was so close that the Electoral vote was divided, Lincoln receiving four and Douglas three. Oregon and Minnesota had been admitted to the Union since the last Presidential election, and thus thirty-three States voted. Douglas carried only Missouri in addition to his New Jersey votes and had twelve votes in all. Breckinridge carried eleven southern States with 72 votes. Bell carried Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee with 39 votes. Lincoln carried seventeen States beside New Jersey and secured 180 Electoral votes. He had a large plurality, though not a majority, of the popular vote, which was divided as follows: Lincoln, 1,866,352; Douglas, 1,375,157; Breckinridge, 847,514; Bell,

587,830. At the same time Republican control of the next Congress was assured, a control which became overwhelming upon the withdrawal of Senators and Representatives from the seceding States. Thus the Republican party completed its formative period. It became a permanent, homogeneous organization. It adopted a policy for dealing with the transcendent issues of the day and also for serving the permanent interests of the country. It entered upon control of the executive and legislative branches of the national government at the most crucial crisis the United States had ever known. Its task was to save the Union, to free the slave, and to reconstruct the nation.

WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL WAR

“**L**IBERTY and Union” was Webster’s phrase, and Webster, had he survived until its organization, would have become a leader of the Republican party. It was fitting that the party should take to itself his war-cry, though the exigencies of the time made it necessary for it to reverse the order. Union and Liberty was the first program of the organization when it was entrusted with the government of the nation.

The first duty was to save the nation, to preserve and to vindicate the integrity of the Federal Union. Of this there was instant need since the southern Democrats, in fulfillment of their ante-election threats, began the work of secession before Lincoln was installed in the Presidency. This process was disapproved and deplored by Buchanan, but in fact he was powerless to prevent it even had he so desired. His theory, openly proclaimed, was that the Federal government had no constitutional power to “coerce a sovereign State,” that is, to restrain it from seceding from the Union. But, regardless of his personal opinion, with the imminent transfer of power and responsibility to a succeeding administration Bu-

chanan could have done but little to prevent or delay the schism between the north and south, which was inevitable. So during the closing months of his administration the work of dismembering the republic progressed without interruption. When, therefore, the Republican administration of Lincoln was installed on March 4, 1861, it was for the first time in American history confronted with the spectacle and problem of a dissevered Union.

The Republican theory and policy directly reversed that of Buchanan. Lincoln harked back to the principle enunciated by Monroe more than forty years before, the principle of self-defense, self-preservation. That principle, Monroe contended, was primal and essential as much for the state as for the individual. So the first Republican government of the nation held in 1861 that the nation had the fundamental and inalienable right of self-preservation. It was the right and the duty of the government to protect itself from dissolution. A government that could not or would not do that had no right or title to existence.

The first step, then, was to check secession and preserve the Union. To that end the first efforts of the administration were directed. For a year and a half that was Lincoln's consistent policy. As late as August, 1862, he declared: "My paramount object is to save the Union and not either to save or to destroy slavery." In that policy he was severely criticised by some leaders of his own party who would have made the destruction of slavery the first and chief object. But Lincoln was wiser than they, as the chief of his critics, Horace

Greeley, afterward gratefully confessed. He was right on the ground of morals and on that of logic; for obviously the whole, the Union, was of greater importance than any of its parts or issues, and it would have been folly to attempt the emancipation of the slaves unless first the nation could be maintained to protect them in their freedom.

But Lincoln was right, too, on the ground of practical political expediency, or perhaps we should, in so transcendent a case, say of national strategy. With surpassing prescience he anticipated the reaction of some of the northern States against his administration and realized the necessity, for the continued support of the government, of winning and holding the border States. He knew that these latter would be alienated and perhaps driven into the arms of the enemy by a premature emancipation proclamation. Instead, therefore, of taking precipitate and radical action, he wisely and justly sought other means of disposing of the slavery question, in which he was cordially supported by Congress and by the Republican party. Especially did he offer the coöperation of the national government with the States or with any State in a voluntary, gradual, and compensated emancipation of the slaves. To this generous offer, however, not a single State responded.

Finally in September, 1862, finding that the slave States would not accept the offer and realizing that slave labor was one of the chief economic supports of the rebellion, he deemed the time ripe for emancipation, explicitly as a war measure for the preservation of the Union. He had been willing to retain slavery for the

sake of saving the Union, but his offer had been rejected. Now he would destroy slavery for the sake of saving the Union. At first his announcement had a politically bad effect. It divided the north and united the south. All through the great free States of the north, where the clamor for emancipation had months before been loudest, men fell away from the support of the administration, declared the war a failure, and called for "compromise" with the seceding States. So serious was the defection of northern Democrats and the hostility of the Constitutional Unionists, that there was danger of the election of a House of Representatives that would oppose the administration and its further prosecution of the war.


But the border States saved the day. New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and other northern States went strongly Democratic. But Missouri and the other border States returned strong Republican majorities and assured the party continued control of Congress, though by a diminished margin. Lincoln's strategy was vindicated. And in his policy both of prosecuting the war and of emancipating the slaves he and his party resolutely persevered. At the third national convention of the Republican party in June, 1864, a platform plank was adopted declaring unequivocally that "as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, justice and national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic."

With the further details of the prosecution of the war we need not here concern ourselves. They do not



ELIHU ROOT

Elihu Root, diplomat and statesman; born at Clinton, N. Y., February 15, 1845; graduated from Hamilton college, 1864; law school of the university of New York, 1867; appointed by President Arthur U. S. district attorney for the southern district of N. Y.; served till July 1885; appointed secretary of war by President McKinley, August 1, 1899; appointed secretary of state by President Roosevelt, July 1, 1905; resigned January 27, 1909 upon election to the U. S. senate to succeed Thomas Collier Platt; member American boundary tribunal, 1903; counsel for U. S. north Atlantic fisheries arbitration, 1910; temporary chairman of the republican national convention, 1904; chairman of republican state conventions of 1908, 1910 and 1914; delegate at large to and president of constitutional convention of 1915.



WHITELAW REID

Whitelaw Reid, publisher; born near Xenia, O., October 27, 1837; graduated from Miami university, 1856; political speaker and writer in the first Lincoln campaign; legislative correspondent from Columbus, O., to Ohio newspapers; war correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette during the Rebellion; became connected with the New York Tribune in 1868; succeeded Horace Greeley as editor of the Tribune, 1872, and became principal owner in 1873; regent of the university of the state of New York, 1876; appointed minister to France by President Harrison, 1889; candidate for vice-president with Benjamin Harrison, 1892; died in Paris, December 15, 1912.

declared the war to be a failure, raged against the administration for despotically violating the Constitution and trampling upon the rights of the people, threatened violent resistance to the authority of the national government, and demanded an ending of the war through compromise. Although he accepted the nomination, General McClellan openly repudiated the platform, denying especially that the war was a failure.

The Republican convention was held at Baltimore on June 7. On the first and only ballot for the Presidential nomination President Lincoln received every vote save the votes of Missouri, which, under instructions from the State convention, were cast for General U. S. Grant. Of course the renomination of Lincoln was made unanimous. For Vice-President on the first ballot Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and United States Senator from Tennessee, was nominated. The Republican platform heartily approved the administration of Lincoln, and demanded the uncompromising prosecution of the war to a successful termination and the complete extirpation of slavery. It also urged the encouragement of immigration by a liberal and just policy, the completion of the Pacific Railroad, the faithful redemption of the national debt, and the unfaltering maintenance of the Monroe doctrine against the French aggressions in Mexico.

The electoral campaign was spirited, but the result was never at any time in doubt. The Democrats carried Kentucky overwhelmingly and New Jersey and Delaware by narrow majorities, securing 21 Electoral votes. The Republicans carried all the other States, with 212

Electoral votes. The popular vote stood: Lincoln, 2,216,067; McClellan, 1,808,725. Arrangements were made for voting by the soldiers in the army, and the result was: Lincoln, 116,887; McClellan, 33,748.

This was the first Presidential election at which a number of States did not vote on account of being in a state of war against the national government and of secession from the Union. The States thus unrepresented had a total Electoral vote of 88 (on the basis of the apportionment at the election of 1860). Had those States voted, and cast all their votes for McClellan, he would have had only 109, or but little more than half the number cast for Lincoln. There was, indeed, a pretense of holding elections in Tennessee and Louisiana, and there was a prospect that Congress would be confronted with an offer of Electoral votes from those States determined by a mere handful of men, largely mere adventurers. To deal with such a contingency Congress in January, 1865, in advance of the counting of the Electoral votes, adopted a joint resolution declaring the eleven seceding States not to be entitled to representation in the Electoral College and ordering that no votes from them be received or counted.

CHAPTER V

CONSTRUCTIVE LEGISLATION

THE achievement of "Liberty and Union," the preservation of the Federal Union, and the abolition of slavery would in themselves and alone have been a noteworthy performance, sufficient to entitle the first Republican government to everlasting renown. But such was by no means the full measure of its public services. Partly because of and partly in spite of the tremendous burdens and duties of the Civil War, it engaged in a number of works of constructive statesmanship of the highest importance. It realized that with its accession to power and with the disposition of the two great issues of the war a new era was dawning upon the United States, second in importance only to that which was ushered in by the adoption of the Constitution; and that to meet this era and to take advantage of its conditions and opportunities new laws, new methods, and new systems of administration were necessary. To the task of supplying these the Republican party through its official representatives at Washington committed itself.

One of the foremost of these needs was that of a reformed tariff system. The Democratic tariff of 1832 had been succeeded by the so-called "Compromise tariff" of 1833. In 1842 the Whigs repealed the 1833

tariff and restored that of 1832; this in turn was superseded in 1846 by the Walker revenue tariff, under which the country prospered until 1857, when occurred a serious business depression or panic, the responsibility for which was attributed by some to the tariff but which was in fact the logical result of a combination of industrial and economic conditions to which necessarily the tariff was closely related. To correct these conditions the Republicans of the House of Representatives in 1860 adopted a bill framed by Justin S. Morrill of Vermont restoring some of the features of the former Whig tariff. This was rejected by the Democratic majority in the Senate. The next year it was put forward again, and finally on March 2, 1861, became law. Later it had to be materially altered to meet the fiscal exigencies of the war. Its essential principle, however, remained unchanged for many years, and its effect was to cause a rapid development and immense enlargement of American industry. Great new industries were created to supply the American people with home-made articles of indispensable use for which they had formerly been dependent upon other lands. The American standard of wages and the American standard of living among wage-earners were placed and kept far higher than in any other country. American industrialists were protected against unfair competition of the poorly-paid labor of Europe; a fact which soon induced multitudes of European workingmen to migrate to the United States in quest of better wages and better conditions of labor and of life. In this way the Republican government at once supplied the revenue needed for paying

the extraordinary expenses of the war and enormously stimulated and expanded the profitable industries of the nation.

Another need was that of an improved banking and currency system. Formerly, because of Democratic hostility to a National bank, State and local banks had flourished and had issued their notes as currency. Some of these were of course sound and trustworthy institutions. Others were of the speculative and "fly-by-night" order. If such a bank failed its notes were worthless. The result was that banknotes as currency were worth not their face value but a varying sum, determined by the standing of the bank of issue and the distance from it at which the notes were offered. Commercial journals printed daily or weekly lists of the banks and the current value of their notes. The traveler setting out with a pocketful of bills worth a hundred cents on the dollar found their negotiable value diminishing as he proceeded on his journey until perhaps in some distant State they were at a discount of twenty-five or fifty per cent. or a notice of failure left him completely stranded.

The Republican party determined to reform all this, partly because the exigencies of the war required it and partly because it was obvious that "wild-cat" banking, as it was aptly called, was not only discreditable but also potentially disastrous to the commercial and business interests of the nation. Accordingly there was devised and enacted a scheme for the organization of a system of National banks, chartered and supervised by the Federal government, the notes of which, used as

currency, would be guaranteed by government bonds purchased by the banks and deposited by them with the Federal government as security. The act of February 25, 1863, with some subsequent amendments, was the beginning of the National bank system which has ever since prevailed and of which the London *Times*, not always a friendly critic of things American, said that "the genius of man has never invented a better system of finance." The creation of the National bank system was of great service to the government during the war inasmuch as it assured a certain market for the government bonds which were then issued. The National banks which were organized had to buy them as security for their notes. But in addition to that it rendered the people the inestimable service of providing them with a convenient banknote currency of stable and uniform value. It was not necessary to examine a bill to see what bank had issued it and then to look up its current value in the market reports. A dollar bill of any National bank was worth a hundred cents at any time and at any place. The bank that issued it might fail, but the note would still be good for its face value.

The National Bank act became law in 1863. In 1864 there were 508 such banks; in 1865, 1,513; in 1875, 2,088; in 1885, 2,714; in 1895, 3,712; in 1905, 5,757; and in 1915, 7,560.

Another fiscal measure of the Republican party, enacted at the same time with the National Bank act, was the Legal Tender act, which put into circulation as legal tender for all save certain specified purposes notes of the United States treasury, familiarly known as

“greenbacks.” This measure was bitterly opposed by the Democrats and its validity was contested in the courts. After much litigation the Supreme Court of the United States in 1883 fully sustained its constitutionality and validity. In a decision in which all but one member of the court concurred it was held that Congress had full power to provide for the issuance of such notes in time of war or of peace and thus to make paper money legal tender. These “greenbacks” and the notes of thousands of National banks have now*for a generation been the familiar and favorite circulating medium of the nation. The treasury notes and bank-notes are used indifferently and indiscriminately, and both are recognized as always and everywhere worth their full face value in gold coin. They form, in honor of the Republican party, one of the greatest monuments to constructive statesmanship that the world has seen.

In the very foremost rank of beneficent legislation of the Civil War era must be placed the Homestead act. As soon as Republicans secured an influential footing in Congress they moved for legislation which would make it possible for actual settlers to acquire farms in the public domain at a merely nominal cost, and thus develop the agricultural resources of the then unoccupied western prairies and plains. Such a policy was opposed by the southern pro-slavery Democrats, who did not wish the free States and Territories thus to be improved; and accordingly when, in 1860, the Republicans put the first Homestead act through Congress, President Buchanan vetoed it. But it was presently

repassed and went into effect simultaneously with the Emancipation proclamation, on January 1, 1863. Under this beneficent act any actual settler could acquire absolute title to a quarter-section, or 160 acres, of public land by payment of a registry fee of ten dollars and by then for five years occupying and cultivating the land in question. Within twenty miles of a railroad in a State, or ten miles in a Territory, only half that amount could be acquired because of the supposedly greater value of the land within such zones. A supplementary Timber Culture act provided that in regions lacking natural timber growth title to a tract of 160 acres could be acquired by planting ten acres of it in timber and keeping it in good condition for eight years, or a tract of eighty acres by planting and caring for five acres of timber.

It must be remembered that prior to the enactment of these measures public lands had largely been acquired in huge tracts by speculators, who then resold to actual settlers at high prices. The Democrats in Congress persistently opposed homestead legislation, because of the attitude of the southern plantation owners. When the first Homestead bill was put forward in 1859 every Republican voted for it and every Democrat against it. When it was brought up again in 1860 every Republican voted for it and every Democrat, with the exception of a few from northern States, against it, and the Democratic President vetoed it. The Homestead law and its results in the settling and development of the west must be credited, therefore, exclusively to the Republican party. What its results

have been may be partially estimated from the fact that in less than thirty years from the enactment of the measure there was thus taken up by settlers a total of 141,606,400 acres, or as much as the area of all the New England and Middle States and the State of Virginia united, these homesteads supporting a population of above six millions.

Nor must we overlook the act for land grants to agricultural colleges. As early as 1857 Justin S. Morrill introduced into Congress a bill for giving public lands for the founding of colleges of agriculture and the mechanical arts. This was passed by Congress in 1859 but was, like the Homestead bill, vetoed by the Democratic President. Mr. Morrill introduced it again in 1861, when there was a Republican President, and it was passed, signed, and became law in 1862. This great measure for the common weal gave to each State in the Union—east and west, north and south alike—30,000 acres of public land for each Senator and Representative that it had in Congress, the proceeds of the land to serve as a fund for creating colleges for instruction in agriculture and the mechanical and industrial arts. To States which had no public lands within their borders scrip was issued for lands located elsewhere. About seventy such institutions of practical learning have been established under that system, with a present attendance of probably more than 100,000 students; another incomparable monument to the constructive statesmanship of the Republican party.

Reference has hitherto been made to the Pacific Railroad and the recommendations in party platforms

that national aid be given to that necessary enterprise. Both parties made such recommendations, but it was the Republican party that gave them practical effect. It was under Republican government, on July 1, 1862, that the Pacific Railroad charters were actually issued, and it was under Republican government that bonds were issued to assist in the construction of the roads. The bonds issued aggregated \$64,623,512, and they were practically all repaid to the government, with interest, between the years 1897 and 1899. The great steel highways which connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continent are thus another memorial of the national services of the Republican party.

To save the nation from dissolution, to make it a nation of free men, to give it a stable and secure banking and currency system, to give millions of its people free homesteads, to conserve and enlarge its natural resources, to provide generously for the most useful education, to provide it with continent-spanning transportation facilities and to give it the industrial primacy of the world—these were the things for which the Republican party stood, and these were the things which it achieved in its first administration of the *Res Publica*, the commonwealth.

CHAPTER VI

SOME EXTERNAL INTERESTS

WHILE thus the Republican administration was efficiently serving the domestic interests of the nation, there were other matters of commanding importance that required attention in our relation to other countries. The Civil War itself profoundly affected our foreign relations. While the attitude of most of the nations was entirely correct, the government of one was persistently unfriendly, while that of another was unsympathetic and permitted itself to be used greatly to the disadvantage of the United States.

Never in all its history was American diplomacy more sorely taxed than it was in the first half of the war to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain and at the same time to vindicate the rights and honor of the nation; and never did it more victoriously acquit itself. The geographical situation of various British colonies and the commercial activities of the British empire gave that power peculiar interest in the struggle and made it natural that the southern States should look to it for aid. The adoption of the protective tariff system in the United States bore hardly upon British trade and industry and caused for a time a strong turning of British sympathy toward the free trade Con-

federacy. There was probably never any danger of British intervention. But British recognition of Confederate independence would have been a serious injury to the United States, while British aid to the Confederates, even such as could be given without openly violating the letter of the neutrality law, was only little less detrimental.

Against these adverse circumstances and influences Republican diplomacy worked with a fine blending of resolution and tact. On the one hand the President sent to Great Britain informally several representative citizens who were specially well qualified to make clear to both the British government and the British people the real causes and issues of the war, and to show them how directly and greatly they were in fact interested in the success of the national arms. The result of such work was soon manifested in a great revulsion of British popular sentiment in favor of the north. Even in the great industrial centers where unspeakable distress had been caused by the embargo on cotton, and where at first there was unmeasured hostility to the United States, there was developed almost as marked sympathy with and enthusiasm for the Federal cause as any American city displayed.

At the same time the sturdy Republican statesman who was Minister at the Court of St. James's, Charles Francis Adams, was as inflexible in his maintenance of our rights as ever his famous father and grandfather had been. At the supreme crisis of affairs, when the result of the war here seemed still trembling in the balance, and when the entrance of Great Britain on the

side of the south would have cast fearful odds against us, he did not hesitate calmly and imperturbably to say to the British Foreign Secretary concerning an act which the British government had apparently fully decided to do, "I need scarcely point out to your lordship that this means war!" It could have meant war, but it did not, because in the face of such Republican diplomacy the British government reconsidered the matter and withheld its purposed action. In such fashion did the Republican administration in those trying times uphold the interests and honor of the republic abroad.

Nor was Mr. Adams content with even so great services. He was incessantly alert and vigilant to detect infractions of the neutrality act. As early as 1863 he informed the British government that the United States would make claims against it for indemnity, and as soon as the war closed and the time was ripe for such a settlement he had in hand an overwhelming mass of evidence to prove our case and to substantiate our claims against the British government for the losses which we had sustained through its failure to fulfill its duties as a neutral power. There followed a few years of direct negotiation, culminating in the Geneva arbitration. That was the most notable case of international arbitration that the world had ever seen. It may truly be said to have founded the succeeding era of arbitration and adjudication of international disputes, opening the way to many other peaceful settlements of controversies which formerly would have led to war, as well as to the great Peace Congresses at The Hague. In that august international court of justice, thanks to Republi-

can principles and Republican statesmanship, the United States won a sweeping victory. Its contentions were upheld and it received a cash award of \$15,500,000, which was ample to cover the direct damages for which indemnity had been demanded. The event was acclaimed by the world as one of the greatest achievements for international peace and justice that history had ever recorded.

While Great Britain was thus largely unsympathetic and neglectful of duty, the French government, under the usurping Emperor Louis Napoleon, was almost undisguisedly hostile. Repeatedly it strove to get other European powers to join it in forcible intervention in behalf of the Confederacy. The emperor's object was plain. He was engaged in an invasion of Mexico, with the purpose of conquering and annexing that country, and he knew that to that end it would be necessary to get rid of the Monroe doctrine, and to do this it would be necessary to destroy the United States. If he could secure the success of the Confederacy he would have a clear field for the establishment of a French empire in Mexico. But he dared not intervene alone, and he could not get either Great Britain or Russia to join him, though he besought them both to do so; so he had to be content with giving Confederate agents all the hospitality he could show them, and giving to Confederate cruisers the freedom of his ports.

With the French campaign in Mexico it was not possible at once to deal. All our available troops were needed on our own side of the Rio Grande. But Republican diplomacy was not negligent. Seward,

Secretary of State, instructed our Minister at Paris, William L. Dayton, to make it quite clear to the French government that while we had of course no objections to France's collecting her just pecuniary claims against Mexico, that being the ostensible purpose of her invasion of that country, we could not acquiesce in any action which would change the form of government of that country or deprive it of its independence. Despite this warning Louis Napoleon persisted in his schemes and put the Hapsburg archduke, Maximilian, upon the throne of Mexico as a puppet emperor. The United States protested against this, refused to give Maximilian any recognition whatever, and maintained friendly relations with the native Mexican government, though its President, Benito Juarez, was a fugitive in the northern mountains.

But 1865 came at last. With the end of the Civil War the United States, with an efficient army in the field, was ready to enforce its diplomatic demands with military acts. The Republican administration promptly read the international riot act to Louis Napoleon, practically ordering him to withdraw his army from Mexico. He tried to temporize, offering to remove his troops if the United States would recognize Maximilian as emperor of Mexico. This the United States flatly refused to do, but instead it entered into closer relations with the Mexican republican government, which was then in the field waging vigorous war against the invaders. At that Louis Napoleon gave up his enterprise and withdrew his army from Mexico with all possible haste, the "empire" of Maxi-

milian collapsed in the tragedy of his death, and the independent republic of Mexico was restored.

Meantime a third great achievement of Republican statesmanship was in progress in the far north. Before the war there had been a futile proposal to purchase the Russian province in America known as Alaska, though with no notion of the real value of that country. During the war, and before the practicability of a transatlantic telegraphic cable was established, American attention was again called to that region through an attempt to build by way of Alaska and Siberia an overland telegraph line to Europe. Finally, at the close of the war, Russia indicated a readiness to sell the territory to the United States. The first great Republican Secretary of State, Seward, welcomed the proposal, partly because of its accordance with the Monroe and Polk doctrines and partly because of some strange prescience of the material value of the territory. Since under the doctrines mentioned the United States would not permit a European power to transfer its American territory to another European power, this country was morally obligated itself to take such territory off the hands of the power which wished to get rid of it. For that reason, if for no other, Seward would have purchased Alaska. But in addition he believed it to be a region of vast wealth, and he regarded the Pacific as "the ocean of the future" and deemed it desirable for the United States to establish itself as fully and extensively as possible upon its shores. Seeing that Alaska to-day has an import trade of \$45,000,000 and an export trade of \$75,000,000 a year, that its forest



FRANCIS HENDRICKS

Francis Hendricks, political leader; born at Kingston, N. Y., November 23, 1834; educated at public schools and Albany academy; removed to Syracuse; appointed fire commissioner city of Syracuse, 1877; president of the board two years; mayor of Syracuse, 1880-1881; member of assembly, 1884-1885; elected state senator in 1885 serving three consecutive terms; chairman of special legislative committee appointed to investigate municipal affairs in New York City; appointed collector of the port of New York 1891; state superintendent of insurance, 1900-1906; delegate to numerous republican national conventions; died in Syracuse, N. Y., June 9, 1920.



GEORGE WASHINGTON ALDRIDGE

George Washington Aldridge, party leader; born at Michigan City, Ind., December 28, 1856; moved to Rochester with his parents in childhood; educated in Rochester schools and Cary collegiate seminary at Oakfield; elected to the executive city board of Rochester which had charge of fire, water and police departments, 1883; chairman from 1885 to 1893; mayor of Rochester, 1894; appointed by Governor Morton state superintendent of public works, 1895; reappointed in 1897 and served until January 16, 1899; appointed secretary of the state railroad commission, November 1902; member of commission, June 1905; chairman of commission, 1907; defeated as a candidate for congress at a special election, 1920; appointed by President Harding as collector of the port of New York, May 16, 1921; died on the golf course at Rye, N. Y., June 13, 1922.

wealth is greater than that of all the rest of the American domain, that its mineral wealth is inestimably great, that its coastal fisheries are among the richest in the world, and that the agricultural possibilities of the "panhandle" region are greater than those of some States of this Union, there is in the fact that Seward purchased the whole territory outright for only \$7,200,000 a most impressive memorial of the shrewdness, the foresight, and the wisdom of the Republican statesmanship of that day. *

It is of interest and not without value to recall, however, that in that act Seward was far in advance of his time. Not only by the Democratic opposition but by many of his own party he was ridiculed and denounced for "squandering the people's money" in "purchasing an iceberg," and "Seward's Folly" was long a popular name for what was otherwise called, even by his supporters, "Our Arctic Province."

CHAPTER VII

RESTORING THE UNION

THE first great question before the nation at the close of the Civil War was that of the restoration of the southern States to a normal status under the Constitution. They had attempted to secede and withdraw entirely and permanently from the Union and the Constitution. But the north had insisted that they had no right to do so and that in fact they could not do so. Its contention in that respect was settled by the war. In its view the seceding States had not been out of the Union and therefore did not need formal readmission to it. But they had for four years ceased to be represented in the government of the nation, and a majority of their citizens had renounced allegiance to the Federal Union and its Constitution. The question was, therefore, through what process and on what terms and conditions they were to resume their normal relationship to the Union and their participation in its national government.

Before and preliminary to this, indeed, there arose the question of the authority to determine the terms and conditions of such restoration, and over that there arose a vigorous controversy. Andrew Johnson, who had succeeded to the Presidency on the assassination of

Lincoln, coming of Democratic antecedents and having an exaggerated estimate of the powers and functions of his office, regarded such determination as a purely administrative prerogative. During the recess of Congress in the summer of 1865 he put into effect a plan of his own devising, concerning which he had not so much as consulted Congress, and in December, at the opening of the session, he submitted it to Congress for approval.

This approval he did not receive. While some of its features were commendable others were decidedly objectionable. It was felt by the great majority of Republicans in Congress and throughout the country that it did not sufficiently confirm and safeguard the results of the war, either in invalidating secession or in protecting the emancipated negroes in their freedom. It did not, in brief, adequately guarantee fulfillment of Lincoln's resolution "that these dead shall not have died in vain." In addition to that, it was the Republican contention that this was a matter for Congressional rather than Presidential determination. It was something in which the whole people were intensely interested and in which they had a right to be heard through their chosen representatives. For the President to determine it would be an exercise of one-man autocracy repugnant to the principles of a democracy. During the war, under military exigencies, the President had exercised extraordinary powers, even to the temporary and local suspension of the right to the writ of habeas corpus. All that was permissible under his war powers as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. But with the ending of the war and the return

of peace these extraordinary powers must cease, and the affairs of the nation must be conducted according to the normal methods of the Constitution, with all laws made by Congress, interpreted by the judiciary, and executed by the President. That was the policy of the Republican party as against the attempted autocracy of the misguided President, and it was supported by the overwhelming mass of the American people. In the conflict which arose over it the House of Representatives presented a bill of impeachment against the President, and he narrowly escaped conviction and removal from office.

The Republican majority in Congress was sufficiently large to enable it to enact legislation over the President's veto, and it accordingly set itself to the task of reconstruction with little regard for his vagaries. His stubborn refusal to coöperate with Congress, however, and a certain unaccommodating spirit which his course had provoked and fostered in the lately seceding States, greatly added to the arduousness of a task which in any case would have been of enormous difficulty, with the result that the ensuing years of the "Reconstruction era" were marked with some regrettable incidents and circumstances not properly chargeable to the Republican government and party. On the other hand, as direct results of the application of Republican principles, those years were conspicuously marked with some of the finest achievements in reconciliatory and reconstructive statesmanship that the world has ever seen.

The first principle was to treat the lately seceding

States as having always remained members of the Union. There was no thought of altering their boundaries, their names, their divisions, their capitals. The map of the United States was to remain unchanged. Their citizens, too, were held always to have remained American citizens, though certain of their civil rights had been temporarily forfeited by their own acts. There was no proscription or attainder, there was no confiscation of property, there were no punitive measures. All that was required was that they should in good faith abandon their pretensions of secession and declare their loyal allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. On their doing this full amnesty was freely granted with the complete restoration of all civil and political rights. In consequence of this unprecedented generosity of treatment, in the course of a few years many seats in both houses of Congress, in the President's cabinet, and on the bench of the Federal courts were filled by men who had been commanders of the Confederate army and high officers of the Confederate government. In such a spirit of confident generosity did the Republican party through its Congress effect the reconstruction of the nation after the storm and stress of the Civil War.

There was something more to be done. After safeguarding the Union, there must be a safeguarding of the freedom which had been given to the slaves. The slaves had been set free, as an incident of the war, and their reënslavement would be forbidden by constitutional amendment. An amendment to that effect was proposed to the States by the Republican Congress on

February 1, 1865, and was ratified by the votes of the Republican States—some Democratic States refusing to ratify it—December 18, 1865. But Republican statesmanship did not contemplate merely setting the negroes free and setting them adrift to shift for themselves. They were ignorant, propertyless, helpless. Under President Johnson's ill-devised scheme of "reconstruction" they would have been subject to vagrancy laws which would have made their condition even more deplorable than it had been under slavery. Republicans held that it was not for such an end that the Emancipation proclamation had been issued and the war fought to a triumphant finish. The abolition of slavery had been an act of the nation. The anti-slavery amendment to the Constitution was an act of the nation. It was therefore incumbent upon the nation, and was not to be left to the States, to protect the men who had been set free, to safeguard their civil rights, and to give them a "square deal" and a fair chance to enjoy the privileges of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

In pursuance of this wise and humane policy the Republicans in Congress enacted, despite Democratic opposition, a bill establishing a Freeman's Bureau as a part of the national administration, thus giving national guardianship to the negroes as temporary wards of the nation. Following this came a Civil Rights law, which recognized negroes as citizens of the United States—they had long been citizens of many of the States,—safeguarded them in their rights of person and of property, and forbade discrimination against them by any State laws. The purpose was to extend to

the different races the same noble principle of democracy that the Republican party had adopted among individuals in society, of "equal rights for all, special privileges for none." The purpose was to require the States of this Republic uniformly thus to treat their citizens, regardless of the color of their skins. The fundamental principle of the Declaration of Independence was to be the fundamental principle of the nation of which that declaration was the primal charter. That was Republican statesmanship in dealing with the aftermath of human slavery.

In order to make this principle secure against any possible repudiation by a subsequent Congress of a different political faith, the next step taken was the incorporation of it in an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This Fourteenth amendment was proposed to the States by the Republican Congress on June 6, 1866, and its ratification was proclaimed on July 28, 1868. It was promptly ratified by the votes of twenty-three northern and Republican States; three Democratic border States and ten Democratic southern States at first rejected it, but the southern States afterward ratified it. This amendment provided that all persons born or naturalized in the United States should be citizens of the United States and of the States in which they lived; and that no State should abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen, nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. In this there was no reference whatever to "race, color, or previous condi-

tion of servitude" or to the right of suffrage; the latter being left for subsequent action.

In the same amendment, the most elaborate ever adopted, there were included several other important provisions for the permanent and immutable readjustment of national issues affected by the result of the war. One had to do with representation in Congress. According to the Constitution, Representatives in Congress were apportioned among the States according to their population and not according to the number of their actual citizens or of the votes cast; but the population was to be reckoned as consisting of all the free persons and three-fifths of the slaves. That arrangement was always repugnant to Republicans because it violated the principle of equality of suffrage, making the vote of a white citizen of a slave State much more powerful than that of a citizen of a free State. To retain that principle in the Constitution after the abolition of slavery would make the conditions still worse. For then representation would be based upon not merely three-fifths but the whole number of negroes in the former slave States, while the right to vote would be enjoyed by only the whites. Thus in a State in which half the population was black, each white voter would have two or three times the voting power of one in a State where there were few or no blacks. To cite precise figures: In a northern State there would be one Representative to every 127,000 voters, while in a southern State there would be one Representative to every 45,000 voters. The southern members of Congress would thus represent not only the white men who

actually voted for them, but also a larger number of negroes who were not permitted to vote.

This was obviously unfair. It gave the southern States an undue advantage over the northern. Accordingly it was provided in the Fourteenth amendment that if in any State the right of suffrage was denied to male adults for any cause save crime, the number of Representatives apportioned to that State should be correspondingly reduced. That meant that representation would be based not upon gross population but upon the voting population. It did not interfere with the right of a State to make its own suffrage laws and to exclude citizens from the exercise of that right, but it served notice that for such exclusion a State would have to pay a penalty in reduced Congressional representation. It made straight for what afterward became known as "equal suffrage," the principle that every responsible adult person should be a citizen in the complete sense of the term, that every citizen should have one vote and no more, and that all votes should be of equal value.

The third section of this amendment provided that no person should hold office under the United States or under any State who, having previously held office and having therefore taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, had thereafter engaged in insurrection against the Constitution or had given comfort or aid to its enemies. But, it was added, Congress might, by a two-thirds vote of each house, remove such disability. The real purpose of this section was embodied in the last clause. It was not so

much to impose the disabilities upon participants in the Civil War from the southern side as to vest in Congress, rather than in the President, the power to remove those disabilities; which the Republican Congress thereafter proceeded to do with a promptness and a completeness not approximated in similar circumstances by any other nation in the world.

Still another section had to do with public debts. It declared that the validity of the legally authorized public debt of the United States, including that incurred for bounties and pensions for the national soldiers in the Civil War, should never be questioned; but that on the other hand neither the United States nor any State should ever assume or pay any debt contracted in aid of insurrection against the United States, or any claim for loss through the emancipation of any slave. This was intended to prevent any attempt to secure payments of the debt incurred on the bonds issued by the late Confederate States, an attempt which, but for that provision of the Constitution, would doubtless have been made.

This formidable amendment, comprising these four topics, was purely of Republican authorship and advocacy. Proposed to the States in June, 1866, it was naturally the foremost political issue before the people in the Congressional campaign of that summer and fall, and was very widely debated upon the stump and in the press. The President, having broken with the Republican party, threw all the influence of his administration against that party, and in consequence of that circumstance the Republicans that year organ-

ized for the first time the Congressional campaign committee, which has in every second year since then played an important part in national politics. The contest was between the "Congressional party" and the "Presidential party," the former consisting of the great mass of the Republican party and a few "War Democrats," and the latter of the mass of the Democratic party and a few Republicans who followed the President. The result was an overwhelming Republican victory, that party securing a more than two-thirds majority of the new Congress. Obviously, the nation repudiated the President and his policy and approved the Republican party and its plans for reorganization.

The rejection of the Fourteenth amendment by the ten southern States temporarily prevented the ratification of that measure. It also indicated the revival of the sectional spirit which had in the past been so prolific of evil. The Republican leaders therefore determined to adopt more rigorous measures for the reconstruction of the south and the settlement of the issues of the war. Thus far the lately seceded States had been under governments and Constitutions approved by the President but never sanctioned by Congress, and they were implacably hostile to the proposed establishment of universal citizenship and equal rights. Congress accordingly set aside those governments and substituted a temporary military administration, which made it clear that the restoration of the States to their normal place in the Union was dependent upon their acceptance of the results of the war as set forth in the Fourteenth amendment. They must

establish equal manhood suffrage, without regard to race. This they presently did, and of course under such suffrage the Fourteenth amendment was promptly ratified by them. By 1870, five years after the end of the war, the last of the formerly seceding States was fully reestablished in its place in the Federal Union.

Meantime, another constitutional amendment was deemed needful to complete the work of reconstruction. The States had granted the suffrage to the former slaves, but there was lacking sufficient guarantee that they would not at some future time withdraw it. Accordingly the Fifteenth amendment was drafted by the Republican leaders, adopted by the Republican majority in Congress, and proposed to the States on February 27, 1869, and was proclaimed as ratified on March 30, 1870. It was brief and to the point, providing that "The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The southern States being then generally under Republican control, the amendment was ratified by nearly all of them. Tennessee did not act upon it at all. Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, California, and Oregon rejected it. New Jersey at first rejected but afterward accepted it. New York ratified it and then rescinded its ratification. With the secure embodiment of this amendment in the Constitution, the legislative work of the Republican party for confirming the results of the war and for adapting the nation to the new conditions which followed the war seemed to be complete.

MATERIAL INTERESTS

CHAPTER VIII

FINANCIAL INTEGRITY

DURING the period of political reconstruction occurred in 1868 the fourth Presidential campaign of the Republican party, with new issues before the nation. The vagaries of President Johnson had completely alienated him from the party that four years before had elected him to the Vice-Presidency and had so discredited him that the Democratic party did not regard him as an available candidate. He received a few votes in the Democratic convention, but that body, after a long contest, finally nominated Horatio Seymour, who had been Governor of New York during the latter part of the Civil War and had won unenviable notoriety by regarding the war as a failure and by cringing and catering to the criminal mobs which in New York City sought by rioting and arson to hamper the national government in its prosecution of the war. The platform was largely devoted to railing against the Republican party for its reconstruction measures in the south, declaring them to be "unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void," and demanded the taxation of government bonds in violation of the terms on which they were issued and the

regulation of the elective franchise by the States so that the former slave States would be able perpetually to exclude the negroes from the polls.

The Republican convention met at Chicago on May 20 and, on the first roll-call for the purpose, unanimously nominated for the Presidency General Ulysses S. Grant. For Vice-President, on the fifth ballot, it named Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, Speaker of the House of Representatives and one of the original members of the Republican party. The platform approved the reconstruction policy of Congress and the constitutional amendments, condemned the Johnson administration, and congratulated the south upon the readiness and loyalty with which its leaders were accepting the verdict of the war and were resuming their places in the life of the republic. It then specially emphasized the need of keeping scrupulously all national obligations and paying all national indebtedness in good faith, in the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted. It urged the gradual discharge of the great war debt to be extended over a considerable period of time, with such reductions of interest from time to time as might be made possible by the willingness of capitalists, in an era of increasing prosperity, to lend money at lower rates. Another important plank declared that the doctrine of some European powers that a person once a subject must always remain so "must be resisted at every hazard by the United States as a relic of feudal times" and that our naturalized citizens must be as fully protected in their rights as the native citizens. The assertion and maintenance of this

great principle by the Republican party effected a most salutary change in international law under which all powers were constrained to recognize the right of expatriation.

The ensuing campaign was an animated one, but the result was never in doubt. The immense popularity of General Grant, the equivocal attitude of Mr. Seymour on issues of supreme importance, and the protection afforded by the Federal government to the negro voters of the south assured a sweeping Republican victory. In the closing weeks of the campaign there was a noteworthy movement by business men, without regard to party, in support of the Republican ticket because of the sound declarations of the Republican platform concerning national finance. The result of the election was, with the three States of Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas not yet qualified to vote and with Florida choosing Presidential Electors through her Legislature, that Grant carried 26 States, with 214 Electoral and 3,015,068 popular votes, while Seymour carried only 8 States with 80 Electoral and 2,709,633 popular votes.

Apart from the political problems of southern reconstruction, already described, the foremost issue in national life now became that of finance. This was a complicated question. There was an enormous public debt, on much of which interest must be paid, and for the ultimate payment of which provision must be made. A part of this debt was, however, in the form of treasury notes or "greenbacks" which had been made legal tender for most purposes, and which must be made and kept at par with gold and be redeemed in gold upon

demand, and perhaps ultimately be thus retired from circulation. Then there was the task of "resuming specie payments," or of bringing the value of depreciated treasury notes and banknotes back to par with gold.

To these tasks the Republican party in Congress and in the administration after the inauguration of President Grant addressed itself with courage, efficiency, and consummate skill. It had to do so in the face of Democratic opposition. During the war Democrats had inveighed against the issuing of bonds, saying that they never could or would be paid. They had denounced the "greenbacks" as illegal and fraudulent. Now after the war they demanded that the bonds be taxed, which obviously would have been equivalent to reducing arbitrarily the rate of interest on them; and also that the principal of the bonds be paid at once with a fresh issue of "greenbacks" which, with "greenbacks" at a discount of ten or twenty per cent. or more, would obviously have been equivalent to partial repudiation of the bonds.

Against all such forms and degrees of repudiation the Republicans set their faces as a flint, insisting that the faith of the nation must be kept sacred at no matter what cost. The bonds must remain untaxed according to the understanding at their issuance; they must be paid, interest and principal, in gold or money at par with gold; and all currency must be brought back to par with gold. On March 18, 1869, a law was enacted pledging the payment of all government indebtedness in specie. In the achievement of this herculean task



WILLIAM ALMON WHEELER

William Almon Wheeler, vice-president; born in Malone, N. Y., June 19, 1819; attended the university of Vermont; admitted to the bar, 1845; for several years district attorney of Franklin county; member of the state assembly, 1850-1851; member of the state senate, 1858-1860; delegate to the state constitutional convention, 1867-1868; served in congress from March 4, 1861 to March 3, 1863, and from March 4, 1869 to March 3, 1877; elected vice-president of the U. S. on the Hayes ticket in 1876; died at Malone, N. Y., June 4, 1887.



JAMES SCHOOLCRAFT SHERMAN

James Schoolcraft Sherman, vice-president; born in Utica, N. Y., October 24, 1855; graduated from Hamilton college, 1878; studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1880; mayor of Utica in 1884; delegate to the republican national convention of 1892; chairman of New York state republican convention in 1895 and again in 1900; elected to the 50th, 51st, 53rd, 54th, 56th, 57th, 58th and 59th congresses; elected vice-president of the United States in 1908 and served from March 4, 1909 until his death in Utica, N. Y., October 30, 1912.

the Republican government was greatly aided by other features of the policies which it had adopted. The protective tariff system, which it had adopted before the war for the sake of American industry and the rates of which had been increased during the war to provide needed revenue, proved immensely successful. It caused the establishment of great new industries and the expansion of others; the maintenance of good wages for American workingmen; the supplying of the American market with American-made goods in place of foreign, often of better quality and at lower prices than the foreign; and at the same time an abundant revenue to be applied not only to the current expenses of government but also to the extinguishment of the public debt. Another copious source of governmental income was found in the internal revenue, especially the tax upon alcoholic liquors and tobacco. This had originated as a war measure, but it was generally recognized as highly desirable for continuance in time of peace. And although it was not until 1875 that a law was enacted providing for the resumption of specie payments, making "greenbacks" and national bank-notes as good as gold on January 1, 1879, such action was long before anticipated and the fiscal policy of the government was early directed to that end.

It was not all easy going. Back in President Johnson's administration an attempt had been made to reduce the volume of treasury notes in circulation. This meant contraction of currency, and that had an unfavorable effect upon business; wherefore Congress enacted a law forbidding any further such attempts.

Later, under President Grant, the contrary course was essayed. It was thought that business depression was due to lack of circulating medium, and a bill was passed providing for a considerable increase in the issue of "greenbacks." This was done in April, 1874, by the Republican Congress, many of whose Republican members joined with the Democrats in yielding to the clamor against "contraction of the currency." But President Grant rightly perceived that such further inflation of the currency would make more difficult, if not impossible, the ultimate resumption of specie payments and would really aggravate the trouble which it purported to be meant to relieve. He vetoed the bill, to the unmeasured gratification of business men throughout the country and of all believers in sound national finance.

Others raged against him, and there arose a so-called "Greenback party" or "Fiat Money party" whose members held that money could be created with the printing press and that the government, instead of seeking resumption of specie payments, which they insisted could never be effected, should print and issue vast quantities of treasury notes which were not to be redeemable in gold or silver and which were to be made compulsorily legal tender for all purposes. With these, they insisted, the government bonds should be paid off and the national debt extinguished. Some members of the Republican party became afflicted with this lunacy, but the overwhelming mass of the party remained steadfast for sound money, for resumption of specie payments, and for honest payment of the national debt

in gold. In this policy the Republican government was successful, and at the appointed time, without the slightest appreciable disturbance of the money market or of business, specie payments were resumed. "Greenbacks" and national notes everywhere throughout the United States became automatically worth their face value in standard gold coin and exchangeable for it upon demand. The superior convenience of paper money for ordinary uses made people, however, prefer it to gold and silver, and save in a few cases out of curiosity there was no inclination to make the exchange. Meantime the principal of the debt was being reduced rapidly, and was being refunded at much lower rates of interest, until its ultimate extinction seemed sure to occur in the near future. The fiscal reorganization of the country was complete, and the Republican party added to its credit a record of efficiency and public beneficence comparable with that made in the saving of the Union and the freeing of a race of slaves.

CHAPTER IX

PROGRESS AND REFORM

EARLY in President Grant's first term the Republican party had the opportunity presented for initiating the beginning of a most advanced and beneficent era in the international relations of the world. This was the recognition of the right of expatriation. Down to that time European nations had denied the right of their subjects to renounce their allegiance and to become citizens of the United States. When such naturalized citizens of the United States revisited their former homes they were often seized as deserters and subjected to penalties, or were subjected to the laws of those countries as though they had never left them. The Republican party, standing supremely for the rights of man, insisted from the outset that every man in the world had a right to choose for himself to what nation he would belong and to what government he would give allegiance. Both parties had made that demand conspicuous by unequivocal planks in their platforms. At an opportune time, in 1868, Congress enacted a law asserting that right and indicating the purpose of this government to enforce and to vindicate that right in behalf of all its naturalized citizens. The matter was one of high importance, for at that time the volume of immigration from various European lands

was great and was increasing, and nearly all of the immigrants purposed to become naturalized.

It was of course desirable to have that principle recognized by the nations which had theretofore denied it, by means of treaties or otherwise. In 1868 several such treaties were made with various German states and with Belgium, and in 1869 with Sweden and Norway. The German treaties were of little significance, however, since the German empire in 1871 practically repudiated them with respect to all male emigrants who could by any jugglery be charged with having evaded or failed to perform their full quota of compulsory military service. The really important establishment of the principle occurred in 1870, when there was promulgated a treaty which had been made in 1869 between the United States and Great Britain, in which the British government unequivocally recognized the right of its subjects or citizens to renounce their allegiance and become Americans, and to enjoy thereafter the same protection from the American government and the same consideration and respect from the British government that native American citizens enjoyed. After that it was only a question of time when every nation in the world was compelled to give the same recognition to that great Republican doctrine of the right of the individual man to self-determination.

It was in Grant's first year, too, on May 10, 1869, that another great work was achieved through the wisdom of Republican statesmanship and the energy of Republican enterprise. This was the completion of

the first Pacific railroad. On the day named the two roads which for several years had been pushed, the one from the Mississippi valley westward, the other from the Pacific coast eastward, met at Promontory Point, and the last spike was driven "with a silver hammer and a golden nail." The line was 1,914 miles long from Omaha to San Francisco, and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts were thus connected by a highway of steel and steam. There followed other comparable undertakings. It was in 1869 that the government began the gigantic work of removing the dangerous obstructions at Hell Gate in New York harbor, and in the following year it committed itself to the project of a trans-Isthmian canal at Darien or Panama.

The year 1870 saw all the southern States fully restored to participation in the national government, with the political rights of most of the former Confederates also restored, while the enfranchisement of the negro race was emphasized by the election of some of its members to both houses of Congress. Many of the stamp taxes and other domestic imposts of war times were abolished or reduced, and there were also substantial reductions of the tariff on imports, particularly on tea, coffee, sugar, and other articles of popular use. The army was reduced to a peace footing of only 30,000 men.

One of the greatest administrative reforms in the history of the government was begun in March, 1871, in the establishment of the merit system in the civil service. More than forty years before the Democratic party, under Andrew Jackson, had established the

spoils system under which there was a "clean sweep" at every change of administration and loyalty and usefulness to the party, rather than efficiency for public service, was made the requirement for office-holding from the highest places down to the most humble. The abuses which thus crept into the government were widespread and scandalous, but no serious and efficient attempt to correct them was made until the first Grant administration and the Forty-first Congress, both Republican. Then a law was made empowering the President to make rules for admission to the civil service of the nation. Under that law there was appointed the first United States Civil Service commission, consisting of George William Curtis, Alexander G. Cattell, Joseph Medill, D. A. Walker, E. B. Ellicott, Joseph, H. Blackfan, and David C. Cox. The keynote of the movement was that fitness for the place was to supersede political "pull." It was reserved for a later Republican administration and Congress to develop the system fully, but this first act was an irrevocable step toward the great reform.

In 1872 the great postal reform of issuing so-called postal cards was established; internal taxes on food were abolished, together with the import duties on tea and coffee; the income tax and most of the stamp taxes were repealed; the Geneva arbitration resulted in the award of \$15,500,000 indemnity to the United States for the damage done by Confederate cruisers through British negligence or connivance; and the San Juan boundary at the extreme northwest was established in favor of the United States through international arbi-

tration. Despite these great achievements of the Republican party for the profit and honor of the nation, however, there arose within its own ranks a certain dissatisfaction which increased to actual hostility. This was in part aroused because of the necessity of enacting and executing some strenuous laws for the enforcement of the new constitutional amendments and for the vindication of the equal civil rights of citizens in the south. A widespread and murderous conspiracy against such rights was organized, known as the KuKlux Klan, against which the national government was compelled to use much force. These disturbances made it inevitable that there should be further delay in removing all the political disabilities of some former Confederates. In addition to these things, the comparative inexperience of President Grant in civil administration and the too great trust which he, in his own transparent honesty, sometimes reposed in other men, led to some more or less serious acts of maladministration and even of corruption in the government, such as had been suffered by almost every preceding administration; and these were exploited and magnified for political purposes by the enemies of the President and his party.

As early as 1870 a number of disaffected Republicans in Missouri, calling themselves "Liberals," united with the Democrats and defeated the Republicans in the State election. The movement was extended to other States, and in consequence the Republican majority in Congress was somewhat reduced by that fall's elections. In 1872 various "Liberal Republican" conventions

were held, and finally in May a national convention of that faction was held at Cincinnati, at which, after much dispute and uncertainty, Horace Greeley of New York and B. Gratz Brown of Missouri were nominated for President and Vice-President. Mr. Greeley was one of the most eminent newspaper editors of the country and had been one of the founders of the Republican party. But his course had generally been eccentric. He had opposed his one-time political partner, Seward, for the Presidency in 1860 because of personal pique at Seward's having declined to advance his political and office-seeking ambitions; he had raised the untimely cry of "Forward to Richmond!" in 1861, which led to the disaster of Bull Run; he had bitterly opposed Lincoln's administration because Lincoln would not issue the Emancipation proclamation as soon as he wished; he had advocated the severest possible punishment for all the participants in secession; and yet, soon after the close of the war, he had gone upon the bail-bond of Jefferson Davis. Despite his great abilities as a political writer and the purity and benevolence of his character and motives he was obviously not a man of sound leadership. The platform of this convention was devoted chiefly to denunciation of President Grant and his administration. It expressed adherence to most of the principles of the Republican party, though in a somewhat equivocal manner, and was obviously intended to be so vague and neutral as to be acceptable, or at least not unacceptable, to all who were for any reason dissatisfied with or opposed to the

Republican party. Indeed, the prevailing cry at the convention was, "Anything to beat Grant!"

The Democrats met in national convention at Baltimore on July 9 and, realizing the hopelessness of running a ticket of their own, with little demur ratified the candidates of the Liberal Republicans; thus accepting as their leader the man whom down to that day they had most of all reviled and detested and who had been their bitterest foe and most scathing critic in the American press. They also adopted without change, save of party name, the platform of the Liberals. This provoked a revolt of many Democrats, who held another convention at Louisville, Kentucky, and nominated Charles O'Connor of New York for President and John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts for Vice-President on a platform of State rights, strict construction of the Constitution, and a tariff for revenue only.

Amid all these criticisms and attacks from varied sources the Republican party pursued the steadfast tenor of its way. It met in convention at Philadelphia on June 5, unanimously renominated President Grant, and named Henry Wilson of Massachusetts for Vice-President. The platform recounted the achievements of the party during its eleven years' control of the national government. It pledged the party to a comprehensive scheme of progressive and constructive statesmanship, including civil service reform; reservation of public lands for homesteads for actual settlers; a tariff for revenue so adjusted as to aid in securing remunerative wages for American workingmen and to promote

the industries, prosperity, and growth of the whole country; pensions for soldiers and sailors; the maintenance of the rights of American citizens abroad, naturalized as well as native; abolition of the much-abused franking privilege and reduction of the rates of postage; legislation to give protection and opportunity to capital, and to labor a just share of the profits of industry; and the restoration of American shipbuilding and ocean commerce.

In this platform, for the first time in a platform of either of the great parties, appeared a cordial recognition of the obligations of the nation to the women of America "for their noble devotion to the cause of freedom," an expression of satisfaction at their entrance into wider spheres of activity and usefulness, and a pledge of respectful consideration for whatever demands they might make for rights as citizens.

Various other conventions were held that year of minor parties and factions, serving chiefly to illustrate the futility of such movements. Among them were those of the Prohibition party, the Labor Reform party, and the Liberal Colored Republicans.

Greeley carried Maryland, Georgia, Texas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, with 66 Electoral votes, and received 2,834,079 popular votes. He died before the meeting of the Electoral College, and 63 of his votes were divided among other candidates, while three, from Georgia, were rejected as void because they had been cast for him notwithstanding his decease. The votes of Arkansas (6) and Louisiana (8) were rejected by Congress. Grant carried all

other States with 286 Electoral votes and received 3,597,070 popular votes. The "Straight-out" Democrats polled only 30,297 votes for Mr. O'Connor, and the Prohibition candidate got 5,627 votes. A strongly Republican Congress was elected at the same time.

Following this election the Forty-second Congress continued to the end of its term its work of constructive legislation. It abolished the franking privilege for members of Congress, which has since been restored; and it established the inestimably valuable Life Saving Service on the Atlantic coast. It also, early in February, 1873, took the very important action of discontinuing after April 1 the coinage of the standard silver dollar, confining silver coinage to subsidiary coins and to "trade dollars" for use chiefly in Asiatic commerce and not legal tender in the United States. This was the first step in the protracted controversy over the "silver question," which did not, however, become acute until a number of years later, when it convulsed the nation in two campaigns.

The Forty-third Congress, in Grant's second term, continued the good work. It abolished all duties on tea and coffee, and made great reductions of import duties. It provided for the sale of public lands containing coal to encourage mining; passed stringent laws for the protection of animals from cruelty while being transported on railroads or otherwise; required National banks to restore their capital when impaired; and encouraged the growth of timber on the treeless western plains. It authorized the establishment of public marine schools for instruction in navigation and

seamanship to encourage the American shipping industry. Then, near the end of its term, the Senate in December, 1874, and the House in January, 1875, enacted a bill, which President Grant signed on January 14, providing, as hereinbefore stated, for the resumption of specie payments on January 1, 1879. In both Senate and House every Republican voted for this measure and every Democrat voted against it. One of the last important acts of this Republican Congress was the appropriation of \$5,200,000 for the construction of jetties for the improvement of navigation at the mouth of the Mississippi River, an act of immense value to the commerce of the central part of the United States and of national importance.

Despite this record of usefulness, a serious financial panic, accompanied with widespread business depression in 1873, caused such political reaction that in the fall of 1874 the Democrats made great gains and elected a strong majority in the House of Representatives of the Forty-fourth Congress—their first majority in that body since 1859. The Republicans, however, retained a majority in the Senate.

CHAPTER X

PROMOTING AMERICAN INDUSTRY

WITH the return of a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives which met in 1875, the period of Republican control of the government ended, and thereafter authority and responsibility were divided between the two parties with the natural result of greatly diminished efficiency. The President continued his prudently progressive Republican policies, establishing in September, 1875, the system of fast mail trains which effected so great an improvement in the mail service; and later in the same year making a noteworthy recommendation for universal secular and compulsory education. He was, however, largely dependent upon Congress for support, and the two houses were seldom able to agree save on the most necessary routine matters. The Republican Senate was generally able, however, to thwart the reactionary proposals of the Democratic House, and to maintain the governmental policies which had proved so beneficial to the country.

A noteworthy enterprise of the Grant administration was the giving of national patronage to the World's Fair at Philadelphia, with which the one hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence was commemorated. This exhibition of the industry, com-


merce, and art of all nations was the most extensive ever thus far held in the world, and it had an effect of inestimable value in acquainting America and the rest of the world with each other and in stimulating our domestic industry and foreign commerce.

Meantime the question of the tariff, of protection or free trade, increased in importance and became more and more a direct issue between the two parties, the great mass of Republicans inclining toward a tariff for the protection of American industry and the great mass of Democrats toward a "revenue tariff" or free trade. In 1872 the Republican platform had declared plainly for a tariff which, while of course primarily for revenue, should be so adjusted as to favor American interests. The Liberal Republican and Democratic platform evaded the issue by remitting it to Congress for its determination—an equivocal course which was necessary because the majority of the Democrats were pronounced free traders, while their candidate, Mr. Greeley, was an extreme protectionist. In the platforms of 1876 more definite stands were taken. The Republicans declared that tariff duties, levied for the primary purpose of revenue, "should be adjusted to promote the interests of American labor and advance the prosperity of the whole country." The Democrats denounced the protective tariff as "a masterpiece of injustice, inequality, and false pretense," and demanded that "all custom house taxation shall be only for revenue."

In that year the Republicans, after a spirited contest among various candidates, nominated Rutherford B.

Hayes of Ohio for President and William A. Wheeler of New York for Vice-President on a platform which, beside the tariff plank, confirmed the results of the war and demanded resumption of specie payments, protection of the free public school system, the reservation of public lands for free homes for the people, the protection of American citizens impartially, whether native or naturalized, and the suppression of polygamy as a "relic of barbarism." It also recognized with approval the substantial advances made by various Republican State Legislatures toward the establishment of equal citizenship rights for women, and repeated the former pledge of respectful consideration for all demands for the further extension of those rights. The Democrats nominated Samuel J. Tilden of New York for President and Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana for Vice-President on a platform which denounced practically everything that the Republican government had been responsible for, especially its fiscal policy, and demanded the repeal of the act for the resumption of specie payments.

The ensuing campaign was comparatively spiritless. In a number of States gross frauds were committed, both in the voting and in the counting of votes and making of returns, and in consequence the result of the election was disputed. The controversy was made the worse by the lack of legislation for the canvassing of the Electoral votes and declaration of the result. A compromise was finally arrived at between the Republican Senate and the Democratic House, under which a special Electoral commission was constituted, con-



LOUIS F. PAYN

Louis F. Payn, superintendent of insurance; born at Chatham, Columbia county, January 27, 1835; was deputy sheriff of the county on his 21st birthday; appointed harbor master at New York by Governor Reuben E. Fenton in 1867; resisted successfully efforts of the faction headed by Roscoe Conkling to depose him as county leader, but supported Conkling at presidential candidate in 1876, voting for Blaine when Conkling's nomination was found impossible; appointed by President Grant United States marshal, February 1877, and served until March 1881, when the senate failed to confirm his reappointment by President Garfield; appointed by Governor Black state superintendent of insurance February 2, 1897 and served until January 31, 1900.



LEMUEL ELY QUIGG

Lemuel Ely Quigg, congressman; born in Cecil county, Md., February 12, 1863; attended the public schools of Wilmington, Del.; moved to New York City when 17 years of age and engaged in newspaper work; after a year of service as reporter on the New York Times obtained control of the Flushing, L. I., Times and conducted that paper for several years; joined the editorial staff of the New York Tribune in 1885; elected to the 53d congress to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of John R. Fellows; reelected to congress and served from February 14, 1894 to March 3, 1899; delegate to state constitutional convention of 1915; died in New York City, July 2, 1919.

sisting of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Justices of the Supreme Court to pass upon the whole matter and declare the result of the election. This commission contained eight Republicans and seven Democrats. After long and painstaking consideration, it finally decided that Hayes and Wheeler had received 185 and Tilden and Hendricks 184 Electoral votes, and that the former were therefore elected. Although bitterly protested against by Democrats, this decision was loyally acquiesced in, and its substantial justice has been strongly confirmed by the deliberate judgment of posterity. It may be added that of the popular vote the Democratic ticket received about 4,300,000 and the Republican ticket about 4,035,000 votes. The Greenback party, seeking payment of the national debt with irredeemable paper money, polled 81,740 votes for Peter Cooper of New York, and the Prohibitionists 9,522 for Green Clay Smith of Kentucky.

Soon after his installation as President, Mr. Hayes withdrew the Federal troops from the southern States, which had been used to protect negroes in their right to vote, and in consequence the negro vote was almost entirely suppressed by terrorism, force, and fraud, and the governments of the southern States and their delegations to Congress became and long remained solidly Democratic. In the first half of Hayes's term the Senate was Republican and the House Democratic, and in the second half, from 1879 to 1881, both were Democratic. In these circumstances there was and could be little profitable legislation. The Senate and President at first, and afterward the President alone, prevented

the Democrats from repealing the Resumption act or destroying the protective tariff system, while the Democrats of the House in a bitter controversy over the Federal Elections law did much to embarrass the President by withholding necessary appropriations and by employing other annoying devices. Following the great Republican triumph in the successful resumption of specie payments at the beginning of 1879, the State elections of that year showed that the Republican party retained the confidence of its members. The administration of President Hayes was clean, efficient, and progressive, despite the obstacles offered by Democratic obstructionists. The Republican party was united and encouraged and the whole nation was prosperous.

In 1880 the Republicans adopted a platform reaffirming their established principles, especially the maintenance of constitutional authority, the promotion of popular education, a tariff discriminating in favor of American labor, no further grants of public lands to corporations, suppression of polygamy, protection to American citizens, and improvements of rivers and harbors for the benefit of commerce. It also called for such action, through treaty-making or legislation, as would protect the United States from the evils of unrestricted Mongolian immigration. On this platform James A. Garfield of Ohio and Chester A. Arthur of New York were nominated for President and Vice-President. There was a strong movement in the convention for the renomination of President Grant, but it failed and the whole party harmoniously entered the campaign for the election of Garfield.

The Democratic convention adopted a platform denouncing the election and seating of President Hayes as a fraud and Mr. Hayes personally as a criminal usurper; demanding "honest money consisting of gold and silver, and paper convertible into coin on demand"; and "a tariff for revenue only." Its money plank was obviously an acceptance of the identical Republican principles which the Democrats had formerly opposed and denounced, and in various other details the platform substantially agreed with that of the Republicans. The chief difference was in respect to the tariff, which thus for the first time became the paramount issue of the campaign. On this platform the Democrats nominated General Winfield Scott Hancock of Pennsylvania and William H. English of Indiana.

The campaign was waged with great vigor, chiefly upon the tariff issue. The Republicans unequivocally advocated maintenance of the policy of protection to American industry, though of course with such modifications from time to time as circumstances might require, and they charged the Democratic demand for a "tariff for revenue only" with being tantamount to free trade. To this the Democrats could make no effective reply. Their candidate, General Hancock, a gallant soldier but quite unversed in statecraft, aggravated the case by trying to dismiss the tariff as an issue of only local interest. The result was that despite the arbitrary suppression of the Republican vote throughout the south, the Republican ticket was handsomely elected, receiving 214 Electoral and 4,449,053 popular votes, to the Democrats' 155 Electoral and

4,442,035 popular votes. The Greenback party, favoring "fiat" money and abolition of national banknotes, polled 307,426 votes for James B. Weaver of Iowa and the Prohibitionists 12,576 for Neal Dow of Maine.

With a Republican President and Republican control of Congress in 1881 the work of constructive and progressive legislation was resumed. A Tariff commission was appointed to study scientifically the whole question of duties on imports, to divorce the question from party politics, and to report a new schedule suited to the changed conditions of the country. It was obvious that the revenue needs of the war times were now past and that many of the industries which had been created and fostered by the protective system had become able to maintain themselves under lower rates of duty. The commission accordingly recommended an average reduction of duties of about 20 per cent. This report was considerably modified by Congress, but the new Tariff law enacted in 1883 did provide for some reduction of rates and an increase of the free list as well as a marked reduction of internal taxation. This refusal of Congress to carry out all the recommendations of the commission was due largely to the fact that the country did not generally desire any radical change in the tariff system. There was general prosperity, and it was felt that that prosperity in manufacturing, in commerce, and in agriculture was almost inseparably connected with the system of protection. Naturally there was reluctance to disturb it. President Garfield was shot four months after the beginning of his term, and was succeeded by Mr. Arthur, who con-

tinued the tariff and other policies that had already been entered upon, and especially promoted the merit system in the civil service and the rebuilding of the American navy.

The Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives in 1883 and in 1884 passed a "horizontal reduction" Tariff bill, arbitrarily reducing duties without any pretense at scientific discrimination. This was rejected by the Republican Senate, as was also another "revenue tariff" bill in 1888, and no further changes were made until the Republicans again secured control of all departments of the government.

CHAPTER XI

TARIFF CONTROVERSIES

THE administrations of Garfield and Arthur, from 1881 to 1885, were marked with comparatively little party rivalry, but the important laws enacted were Republican measures and were often passed by that party in the face of strong Democratic opposition. For example, the Civil Service Reform bill, which became law on January 16, 1883, and which fully established the merit system in the public service on its present foundation, although it bore the name of a Democratic statesman was supported chiefly by Republicans and was opposed by practically none but Democrats. Thus in the Senate all the five votes against it were cast by Democrats, while in the House 101 Republicans, 49 Democrats, and 5 Independents voted for it, and only 7 Republicans but 39 Democrats and one Independent against it. There were enacted by the Republican government, also, laws for the suppression of polygamy and for the regulation of Chinese immigration.

The Presidential campaign of 1884 was participated in by the usual number of ephemeral minor parties. There were two Prohibition conventions, a Greenback convention, an Anti-Monopoly convention, and an Equal Rights or Woman Suffrage convention which

last nominated Mrs. Belva A. Lockwood for President. The Democratic convention nominated Grover Cleveland of New York and Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana, on a platform devoted largely to denunciation of the Republican party but also to the adoption of many of its policies. On the question of the tariff it was verbosely non-committal. The Republican convention nominated James G. Blaine of Maine for President and John A. Logan of Illinois for Vice-President. Its platform was eminently explicit and progressive. It took strong ground for Federal regulation of interstate commerce, a national Bureau of Labor, the Eight Hour law, civil service reform, restriction of Chinese immigration, forfeiture of lapsed land grants and reservation of public lands for actual settlers, maintenance of the Monroe doctrine, and restoration of the American navy and commercial marine. The salient plank was, however, that relating to the tariff, which denounced the Democratic "tariff for revenue only" doctrine and demanded that "in raising the requisite revenues for the government duties shall be so levied as to afford security to our diversified industries and protection to the rights and wages of the laborer, to the end that active and intelligent labor, as well as capital, may have its just reward, and the laboring man his full share in the national prosperity."

The campaign was marked with much animation and energy, but unfortunately on both sides with regrettable personalities. A local quarrel in the Republican party in the State of New York caused some disaffection, and the result was that the Democrats carried that State by

an insignificant plurality and thus won the election, securing the Presidency for the first time since the Buchanan administration of 1857-61. The Republicans secured 182 Electoral and polled 4,849,680 popular votes; the Democrats 219 Electoral and 4,912,696 popular votes; the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly vote for Benjamin F. Butler was 133,824; and the Prohibitionists polled 151,830 votes.

During this Democratic administration the Senate remained Republican by a small majority, while the House was strongly Democratic. There was thus no opportunity for partisan legislation. The House in 1888 passed a bill abolishing or reducing many duties but retained high protection on sugar, rice, and other articles in which Democratic States were interested, but it was rejected by the Senate. The incident served, however, to assist in making the tariff the foremost issue in the next Presidential campaign in 1888. President Cleveland in 1887 devoted his annual message entirely to a plea for revision of the tariff in the direction of free trade, and the Republicans promptly responded to the challenge. In their platform in 1888 the Democrats inveighed at great length against the Republican policy and recommended the enactment of the Tariff bill then pending in Congress which, as already stated, the Senate rejected. They renominated Mr. Cleveland for President with Allen G. Thurman of Ohio for Vice-President.

The Republican convention adopted an aggressively protectionist platform, saying: "We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection.

We protest against its destruction as proposed by the President and his party. . . . We favor the entire repeal of internal revenue taxes rather than the surrender of any part of our protective system at the joint behests of the whiskey trusts and the agents of foreign manufacturers." It also condemned all combinations of capital, organized as trusts or otherwise, for the arbitrary control of trade, and recommended legislation to prevent such schemes. Upon this platform it nominated Benjamin Harrison of Indiana for President and Levi P. Morton of New York for Vice-President.

Conventions were also held by the Prohibition, Union Labor, United Labor, American, and Equal Rights parties, and candidates were nominated by them. But all the interest of the campaign centered upon the tariff fight between the Republicans and Democrats. That question was paramount in the candidates' letters of acceptance, and in the speech-making and the press. The result was a sweeping Republican victory. The Democrats carried the solid south, the border States, Connecticut, and New Jersey with 168 Electoral and 5,540,050 popular votes. The Republicans carried all the other States with 233 Electoral and 5,444,337 popular votes. The Prohibitionists polled 250,125 votes, the Union Labor party 146,897, the United Labor party 2,808, and the American party 1,591. The Republicans retained control of the Senate and secured the House by a substantial majority. But the second House in that administration, elected in 1890, was overwhelmingly won by the Democrats.

With the accession of the Harrison administration

the Republican majority in Congress, under the leadership of William McKinley, promptly proceeded to make a radical revision of the tariff and to adopt a new schedule frankly protectionist for the sake of protection. The result was the so-called McKinley tariff of 1890. This noteworthy measure placed sugar and other important articles on the free list, established a system of reciprocity in trade with various countries in South America and Europe, levied high duties on foreign goods which competed with American products, and greatly stimulated some important American industries. The natural reaction against the McKinley tariff and the rise of the "Populist" party in the west drew away many voters temporarily from the Republican party, so that it suffered defeat in the Congressional elections of 1890, though of course the new tariff remained in force.

In 1892 the Republicans renominated President Harrison, with Whitelaw Reid of New York for Vice-President, on a platform which reaffirmed the principle of protection, holding that "all articles which cannot be produced in the United States, except luxuries, should be admitted free of duty, and that on all imports coming into competition with the products of American labor there should be levied duties equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home." It also approved the policy of reciprocity. It also advocated the establishment of a general system of free delivery of mails, in country as well as in city. The Democratic convention again nominated Mr. Cleveland, with Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois for Vice-

President, on a platform denouncing the protective tariff as a fraud and demanding a tariff for revenue only. Conventions were held and candidates were nominated by the Populist, Prohibition, and Socialist Labor parties. The Farmers' Alliance was by this time merged in the Populist party. Because of the conditions already mentioned as prevailing in 1890, the Democrats won a sweeping victory. The Democrats secured 277 Electoral and 5,554,414 popular votes; the Republicans 145 Electoral and 5,190,802 popular votes; the Populists 22 Electoral and 1,027,329 popular votes; the Prohibitionists 271,028, and the Socialist Labor party 21,164 votes. The Democrats secured control of the Senate, also of the House by a large majority, and thus for two years had full control of the government in all branches for the first time since the years before the Civil War. But two years later, in 1894, the Republicans regained, by a still larger majority, control of the House, and also won a plurality of the Senate.

Having thus complete control of the government in 1893 the Democrats set about revising the tariff, and the result was described by their own President as one of "perfidy and dishonor." The Wilson-Gorman tariff, as it was known, was not at all a "tariff for revenue only" but was almost as much a protectionist measure as the one which it supplanted; only the duties were so shifted as to favor the industries of Democratic States. In addition it imposed an income tax that was declared unconstitutional. This measure was so objectionable to President Cleveland that he refused to sign it and let it become law without his approval. Its

effects upon the industry and trade of the country were decidedly unfavorable, and, coupled with the financial panic and business depression that had set in soon after the accession of the Democrats to power, it contributed largely to the political landslide which, beginning in 1894 and culminating in 1896, returned the Republican party to complete control of the government in all its branches for many years.

Bad as the Wilson-Gorman tariff was, however, it practically marked the decline, if not the close, of the tariff controversy between the two parties, in what was virtually—though of course not so admitted at the time—a surrender by the Democrats to the Republican principle of a protective tariff. Thereafter the only questions were the amount of protection needed and the industries to which it should be extended. Having themselves enacted a protective tariff in 1894 the Democrats in their national platform of 1896 demanded that it should be left undisturbed, and while declaring the obvious truism that “tariff duties should be levied for purposes of revenue”—which of course nobody ever disputed—they were careful to omit the word “only” which they had thitherto inserted. Upon that platform, the salient feature of which was something other than the tariff, they nominated William J. Bryan of Nebraska for President and Arthur Sewall of Maine for Vice-President.

The Republicans in their platform strongly reaffirmed the principle of a tariff so adjusted as to afford protection to American industrial development. They condemned the existing Democratic tariff for its sec-

tional character. Then they wisely closed the controversy by declaring that they were not pledged to any particular schedules; that the question of rates was a practical question, to be governed by the conditions of time and of production; and thus implied that the amount of protection afforded was to be determined by the need of it. They also strongly approved the policy of reciprocity as going hand in hand with protection. Upon this platform they nominated William McKinley of Ohio for President and Garrett A. Hobart of New Jersey for Vice-President.

The Populist, or People's party, nominated Mr. Bryan for President and Thomas E. Watson of Georgia for Vice-President. The Silver party ratified the Democratic nominations. A "National Democratic" convention, composed of Democrats who split from their party on the question of the monetary standard, nominated John M. Palmer of Illinois and Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky. There were also conventions and nominations by the Prohibitionists, by the National party which had split from the Prohibitionists, and by the Socialist Labor party. The campaign was fought with extraordinary zeal and spirit, almost exclusively on the monetary issue, and resulted in a great Republican victory. That party had 271 Electoral and 7,035,638 popular votes; the Democrats had 176 Electoral and 6,467,946 popular votes; the Prohibitionists polled 141,676 votes, the National party 13,968, the Socialist Labor party 36,454, and the National Democratic party 131,529. These figures, reported in each quadrennium, suggest the insignificance and futility of

such party organizations. The Republicans secured a strong majority in Congress, which was repeated in the next Congress, elected in 1898.

Resuming full control of the government in 1897, the Republicans proceeded promptly to the enactment of a new protective tariff, known by the name of its chief author, Nelson Dingley. This was a considerably modified version of the former McKinley tariff, adapted to the altered conditions of the country and so judiciously devised as to give general satisfaction and to remain in force for many years. The Democratic platform in 1900 denounced it in general terms and called for an enlargement of the free list as a means of combating trusts, but abandoned the old cry of "tariff for revenue only" and obviously treated the issue as of minor importance. On this platform Mr. Bryan was renominated for President, with Adlai E. Stevenson for Vice-President.

The Republicans in 1900 reaffirmed the policies of protection and reciprocity, but treated them as accomplished facts no longer open to political controversy and no longer leading issues of the campaign. They renominated President McKinley, with Theodore Roosevelt of New York for Vice-President. The People's party ratified the Democratic nominations. Tickets were also put forward by the "Middle-of-the-Road" People's party, the Silver Republicans, the Prohibitionists, the Socialist Labor party, the Social Democratic party of the United States, the Social Democratic party of America, the Union Reform party, and the United Christian party. The Repub-

licans won with 292 Electoral and 7,219,530 popular votes; the Democrats got 155 Electoral and 6,358,071 popular votes; the Prohibitionists got 209,166 votes; the Social Democrats 94,768; the "Middle-of-the-Road" party 50,232, and the Socialist Labor party 32,751. The votes of the People's party and the Silver Republicans are included in the Democratic total, and the remaining parties received small scattering votes.

In almost the last words uttered by him before his assassination President McKinley indicated the progressive and enlightened future policy of the Republican party in respect to the tariff. Protection was to be maintained. Reciprocity was to be encouraged and extended. "The period of exclusiveness is past," he said. "The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. If perchance some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad?" That statesmanlike utterance embodied and expressed the logical culmination of the principles and policies of the Republican party for the preceding forty years, and the future policy from which neither party would venture to depart. There was no further revision of the tariff until 1909, when the Payne-Aldrich bill was enacted by a Republican government—practically a mere readjustment of the Dingley law to meet changed industrial and commercial conditions.

An attempt was made in 1912 to inject the tariff controversy into politics, when the Democrats in their

platform again demanded a tariff for revenue only, on the ground that a protective tariff was unconstitutional—an absurd contention, the constitutionality of a protective tariff being all but universally conceded. But when they gained control of the government in that election, and President Wilson called Congress together in special session in April, 1913, for the purpose of enacting a "revenue tariff," the resulting measure proved to be a hybrid somewhat resembling the former Democratic tariff of 1894. It certainly was not a "revenue tariff," because it did not produce the needed revenue and it failed to tax various articles which might have yielded a large revenue; while on the other hand it retained some decidedly protective features. The average rate of duties imposed was about 28 per cent.

Finally, in their platform of 1916 the Democrats practically conceded the Republican principle by confessing that "tariff rates are necessarily subject to change to meet changing conditions in the world's production and trade." The Republican platform of the same year once more affirmed the principle of a protective tariff, adjusted to circumstances and calculated at once to give reasonable protection to American labor and to prevent undue exactions by monopolies or trusts. Both parties favored the Republican policy of a Tariff commission to secure information and suggest to Congress a tariff schedule based on scientific principles. With these utterances the triumph of the Republican theory of tariff legislation may be regarded as complete, and the situation was left practically un-



JACOB SLOAT FASSETT

Jacob Sloat Fassett, congressman; born at Elmira, N. Y., November 13, 1853; graduated university of Rochester, 1875; admitted to the bar, 1878; studied at Heidelberg university, Germany, 1881; in practice at Elmira since 1878; proprietor Elmira Daily Advertiser, 1879-1896; district attorney of Chemung county, 1878-1880; member New York state senate, 1884-1891; delegate to republican national conventions, 1880, 1892 and 1916; republican nominee for governor of New York, 1891; member of congress, 1905-1911.



EDWARD HUBERT BUTLER

Edward Hubert Butler, publisher; born in LeRoy, N. Y., September 5, 1850; attended the public schools and studied under private tutors; joined the staff of the LeRoy Gazette; moved to Buffalo and established the Buffalo Sunday News, 1873; established Buffalo Evening News, 1880; presidential elector, 1896 and 1900; delegate at large to the republican national convention, 1908.

changed by the party platforms of 1920. In that year the Republican platform prudently referred to "the uncertain and unsettled condition of international balances, the abnormal economic and trade conditions of the world, and the impossibility of forecasting even the near future," as precluding the formulation of a definite program to meet conditions a year later. But it reaffirmed "belief in the protective principle" and pledged the party to "a revision of the tariff as soon as conditions shall make it necessary for the preservation of the home market for American labor, agriculture, and industry." The Democratic platform reaffirmed "the traditional policy of the Democratic party in favor of a tariff for revenue only," and confirmed the policy of "basing tariff revisions upon the intelligent research of a non-partisan commission rather than upon the demands of selfish interests temporarily held in abeyance."

CHAPTER XII

SOUND MONEY

MENTION has already been made of the successful resistance of the Republican party to the various schemes for repudiating the fiscal good faith of the nation by paying the public debt in irredeemable greenbacks and by flooding the country with "fiat money" created by the printing press. Its final fight on those lines was against an equally pernicious scheme for flooding the country with depreciated silver. In 1873, as related, Congress dropped the standard silver dollar from the list of coins thereafter to be minted, and the next year limited to five dollars the legal-tender power of silver coins of any denomination. At that time silver dollars had not been in circulation for more than thirty years. The legal ratio of value between silver and gold had been 16 to 1, and in 1873 the commercial ratio was 15.92 to 1, so that there was no inducement to silver-owners to seek to have it coined. But then Germany demonetized silver and the commercial value of that metal began to fall until in 1876 the ratio was 17.87 to 1, and in 1880 it was 18.04 to 1.

When President Grant wisely checked greenback inflation with a veto in 1874, the inflationists began to consider increased silver circulation as a means to their

end. New mines in Colorado and elsewhere had enormously increased the output of that metal, and the mine-owners were eager to realize for it the old coinage value. The Democrats took the lead, followed by some Republicans, in seeking remonetization of the silver dollar, and in 1878 Congress passed a bill introduced by Representative Bland, a Democrat, providing for the purchase and coinage of \$2,000,000 to \$4,000,000 in silver every month. President Hayes vetoed it, but the bill was repassed over his veto. Thus the government, under that unfortunate policy, every month bought silver at more than its commercial value and coined it into dollars which nobody wanted to handle and which remained stored in the treasury vaults while paper certificates representing them were put into circulation.

This unsound system continued, with the commercial value of silver steadily falling, until 1890, when the Sherman bill was enacted providing for the continued purchase of a limited amount of silver bullion against which there should be issued treasury notes payable "in coin," which might be either gold or silver. Following this an attempt was made to pass a bill providing for the free and unlimited coinage of silver, which passed the Senate but was rejected by the House. Now, although the treasury notes might be paid in silver, the President rightly held that good faith required their payment in gold if that metal was demanded. In consequence the gold reserve in the treasury became nearly exhausted, a financial panic occurred, and in August, 1893, Grover Cleveland called Congress in special session to repeal the Sherman law and stop the

purchase of silver and the issuance of "coin" notes. Such repeal was effected after a struggle of months, in which the Republicans generally supported and the Democrats generally opposed the President, though both parties were divided on the subject.

This controversy made the silver question paramount in the campaign of 1896. The Republican platform of that year declared unreservedly for the maintenance of the gold standard and opposition to the free coinage of silver, unless under some international agreement with the principal nations of the world which would assure the maintenance of silver at its money value—an agreement which everybody knew it would be impossible to secure. Until that impossible achievement, that is perpetually, "the existing gold standard must be maintained." At this a faction of the party, chiefly in the western and silver-producing States, seceded and joined the Democrats. The Democratic platform demanded the "free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the ratio of 16 to 1" and that such silver dollars should be "full legal tender, equally with gold, for all debts, public and private." At that a faction of the party seceded and nominated an independent ticket, while many other Democrats openly supported the Republican ticket.

It was recognized throughout the nation that the Democratic free silver proposal meant the flooding of the country with silver "dollars" worth little more than half a dollar each, with consequent enormous losses to millions of persons. Every savings bank depositor would find his savings practically cut in half. Every

life insurance policy would be paid at a discount of fifty per cent. At such a prospect of repudiation and disaster the nation revolted and the Democratic ticket was overwhelmingly defeated. The Republican party saved the nation from financial dishonor and ruin just as truly as it had saved it from secession and dissolution a generation before.

Following this the Republican government in March, 1900, passed the Gold Standard act, which made gold the sole monetary standard and stopped the coinage of silver dollars. That practically ended the silver controversy and won the fight for sound money. In 1900, it is true, the Democrats perfunctorily repeated the demand for the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16 to 1, while the Republicans unequivocally denounced such proposals and reaffirmed their allegiance to the gold standard; but that campaign was fought on other issues. Finally in 1904 the Democratic platform was silent upon the subject, while the Democratic candidate in accepting the nomination for the Presidency explicitly declared his acceptance of and adherence to the Republican principle of a gold standard for the money of the Nation.

NATIONAL EXPANSION

CHAPTER XIII

NEW STATES AND TERRITORIES

THE Republican party has been prolific of additions to the Union and to the national domain. It came into existence in the midst of a struggle—and largely because of that struggle—over the creation of new western States, and through its far-seeing policies of granting homesteads to settlers, encouraging migration and immigration, and providing transcontinental railroads to make the remotest regions accessible, it promoted the development of wilderness Territories into populous and prosperous commonwealths. Several of the western States, thus fostered by Republican statesmanship, were actually received into the Union under Democratic administrations, but their fitness for such reception was to be credited to the Republican party; while all the States but one taken into the Union since the Civil War were brought in by Republican Presidents and Congresses.

Minnesota in 1858, Oregon in 1859, and Kansas in 1861 entered the Federal Union under a Democratic administration, though the Republican party was even then a powerful influence in effecting those results. Nevada in 1864, Nebraska in 1867, and Colorado in

1876 were Republican creations. The four States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington date from November, 1889, when a Republican President and Congress were in office. The same is true of Idaho and Wyoming in 1890. Utah in 1896 came in under Democratic rule. Oklahoma in 1907 and New Mexico and Arizona in 1912, completing the Union, were Republican admissions.

The outlying Territories belonging to the United States are also with a single exception Republican acquisitions. We have already seen how the great and rich Territory of Alaska was secured. The next addition to our territorial possessions was Hawaii, a group of mid-Pacific islands of almost incalculable richness and value. These were annexed without cost in 1898 by a Republican President and Congress against the bitter and persistent opposition of the Democrats. The next year, as a result of our little war with Spain for the liberation and independence of Cuba, we acquired Porto Rico, the vast and priceless archipelago of the Philippines, and the small but useful mid-sea islet of Guam. These were secured by a Republican administration against Democratic opposition so bitter that it made the matter the leading issue of the 1900 Presidential campaign, in which the Republican policy of "expansion" was overwhelmingly approved by the nation. The acquisition of Tutuila in the Samoan group in 1900 and of the Panama Canal Zone under a perpetual lease in 1904 were also purely Republican achievements. The purchase of the Virgin Islands, or Danish West Indies, in 1917, was indeed effected by a

Democratic government, though the policy of making that purchase was originally adopted, against Democratic opposition, by the Republicans.

In addition to such territorial expansion, an enormous extension of American political influence and commercial interests in all parts of the world was effected under Republican direction. It was under Republican administrations that the United States participated prominently and influentially in both of the international Peace Congresses at The Hague. It was a Republican Secretary of State, John Hay, under a Republican President, who enunciated the great principle of the "open door" in China and secured the acquiescence of all other nations therein. It was under a Republican government that the United States participated in the international expedition into China to rescue the beleaguered legations and to save that ancient empire from anarchy. It was a Republican President who successfully offered mediation between Japan and Russia for the termination of their war, and thus won the gratitude of both those countries and secured for the United States a commanding prestige in in the far East.

In the western hemisphere, too, Republican policies have been inestimably advantageous in international affairs. The Pan-American movement, which led to the formation of the Pan-American Union, or Bureau of American Republics, and which has been of the greatest possible service in promoting cordial and profitable relations between this country and the other American republics, was conceived, founded, and

developed to its present great usefulness by Republican statesmen. It was a Republican President, Mr. Hayes, who first enunciated the policy of making whatever canal should ever be constructed across the American Isthmus an American canal under American control; and it was another Republican President, more than a score of years later, who successfully executed that policy by acquiring the unfinished Panama canal and vigorously pushing it to completion. It was also a Republican President, Theodore Roosevelt, who, when the German Kaiser had fitted out a formidable naval and military expedition for the invasion and conquest of Venezuela, calmly but resolutely informed him that the German expedition on its arrival in American water would be met by the American battle fleet ready for action—at which announcement the sailing of the German expedition was promptly countermanded. It was under a Republican government that the dispute between this country and Great Britain over the Alaska boundary was settled through arbitration and the title of the United States to all that it had claimed was finally confirmed. The troublesome fisheries dispute with Canada was settled by a Republican President.

It was, indeed, because of Republican policies and under Republican government that the United States began to be spoken of as a "world power." The phrase was something of a misnomer, no doubt, for the United States had in theory and to a degree in fact been a world power since its foundation. But it was Republican statesmanship that so made the legitimate influence of this nation felt throughout the world as to

cause a general use of that designation and to emphasize its appropriateness.

The policy of the Republican party has, indeed, been notably that which was wisely established at the beginning of our national life by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and their compeers. It has been to develop to the full our own continental republic and to cultivate its territorial possessions; to vindicate the independence of American states against any European attempts at re-subjugation; to participate freely in the commerce of the world and in whatever international intercourse is calculated to advance the humane welfare of mankind; to lend the weight of our example and participation to the practice of arbitration and international adjudication, and to the supremacy of law and justice and peace among the nations; but to withhold this nation scrupulously from all wanton meddling with the affairs of other nations and from all "entangling alliances" which might compromise our own independence or impair our impartial standing.

CHAPTER XIV

“BIG BUSINESS”

AS THE nation grows, business grows. A century ago the supplanting of cottage workshops with large manufactories revolutionized the industrial world. In our own day a similar revolution has been wrought in the mercantile world by the replacing of a multitude of small individual establishments with a few very large ones, and the replacing of shops devoted to a single class or a few classes of goods with vast emporiums dealing in all classes. Similar combinations have been made in manufacturing enterprises and in public utilities. During the Civil War a dozen or a score of separate telegraph systems, each confined to a constricted region, were merged into a single system covering the whole country. Likewise a number of independent railroads have now and then been united into a single system or a continuous trunk line.

In such combinations there is obviously great advantage, or at least the “promise and potency” of great advantage to all concerned. There is also, however, the possibility of abuse and therefore of evil, and this possibility was more than once realized. Great business combinations, or trusts as they came to be called, unjustly and unwisely used their power to prevent competition and to compel retail establishments to

purchase supplies from them alone. About 1890 such practices became so marked and so offensive as to cause a widespread demand for their abatement and prevention. The result was the enactment in that year by the Republican Congress and President of the so-called Sherman Anti-Trust act forbidding the making of contracts in restraint of trade or commerce.

This beneficent act was at first held, notably by a Supreme Court decision in 1895, not to apply to manufacturing concerns but only to interstate commerce, and its utility was not as great as had been anticipated. But during the administration of President Roosevelt, in 1902, an attempt was made to have the act more liberally construed, so as to apply its prohibition to the "holding company" principle. The government selected as the object of its attack the Northern Securities Company, a trust incorporated in New Jersey for the purpose of purchasing and holding the stocks of two competing railroad systems in the northwest, the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific. It would not have been permissible for one of these roads to purchase and control the other, so it was sought to reach the same end by having a third corporation purchase them both. The government prosecuted the case with much vigor and won a sweeping victory, which not only nullified the Northern Securities Company but also established a precedent for numerous other like applications of the law.

The question of the governmental control of trusts and regulation of "big business" became a prominent issue in the Presidential campaign of 1904. The Demo-

cratic platform attempted to convict the Republican party of complicity with trusts and monopolies, and demanded that laws be made and enforced to prevent such combinations of capital from interfering with freedom of trade. The Republican platform, however, was able to point to the fact that a Republican government had enacted an effective law for that very purpose, that the Democratic administration had failed to enforce it efficiently, and that the Republican administration had secured its very effective application. The Republican convention nominated for President Theodore Roosevelt, who was then serving out the unfinished term of President McKinley, and for Vice-President Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana. The Democrats nominated Alton B. Parker of New York and Henry G. Davis of West Virginia for President and Vice-President, respectively. Tickets were placed in the field also by the People's or Populist party, the Prohibitionists, the Socialists, and the Socialist Labor party. The campaign resulted in an overwhelming Republican victory, the party getting 336 Electoral and 7,628,834 popular votes; the Democrats 140 Electoral and 5,048,491 popular votes; and the Socialists 402,460, the Prohibitionists 259,257, the Populists 114,753, and the Socialist Labor party 33,724 popular votes.

With this unmistakable vote of confidence from the nation, the Republican administration, backed by strong majorities in both houses of Congress, proceeded with the prosecution of various large corporations that were charged with violation of the Sherman act. Among these were the Standard Oil

Company of New Jersey, the du Pont de Nemours Powder Company of New Jersey, the American Sugar Refining Company of New Jersey, and the American Tobacco Company of New Jersey. The purpose was of course not to destroy those corporations nor to deprive the business of the nation of the advantages which manifestly might be realized from the conduct of affairs upon so extensive a scale, but to curb and check the abuses to which they were subject and to demonstrate the amenability of the largest and richest corporation to the law equally with the humblest and poorest individual. It was an application of the original principles of the Republican party, the equality of rights and equality of responsibilities before the law. It served notice that just as the slaveholding oligarchy of the south was not permitted to dominate the country, so no oligarchy of capital would be permitted to exercise undue influence to control the government or to defy the law.

The principles successfully pursued during this administration thus comprised the "square deal" of equal industrial opportunities for all law-abiding men and corporations, and equal punishment for all violations of law; such governmental supervision and regulation of railroads and other public service corporations as would assure their impartial and efficient service to all; development of the internal waterways of the country to supplement the service of the railroads; promotion of agriculture by facilitating and encouraging the acquisition of homesteads; conservation of the forests and other natural resources; conservation and

utilization of water-power for industrial purposes; and building of a navy adequate to the defense of our coasts, an undertaking much facilitated by the connecting of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts by means of the Panama canal. These were the things for which the Republican party stood during the Roosevelt administration, and these were the things which it achieved so far as it was possible to be done.

With this record, the party was well warranted in declaring in its platform in 1908 that the Roosevelt administration was an epoch in history. "In no other period since national sovereignty was won under Washington, or preserved under Lincoln," it continued, "has there been such mighty progress in those ideals of government which make for justice, equality, and fair-dealing among men. The highest aspirations of the American people have found a voice." In addition to the achievements of the administration, it was possible to point to an impressive array of beneficent Republican legislation by Congress, including an Emergency Currency bill, provision for a National Monetary commission, Employers' and Government Liability laws, measures for the greater efficiency of the army and navy, a Widows' Pension law, an Anti-Child Labor law, and laws for the greater safety of railroad engineers and firemen. It promised revision of the tariff to suit altered conditions and a general continuance of the enlightened and progressive policies of the Roosevelt administration. Upon this platform the party nominated William H. Taft of Ohio for President and James S. Sherman of New York for Vice-President.

The Democratic platform carped and railed against the Republican party, but in nearly all of its constructive planks was compelled substantially to imitate and adopt the policies which the Republican administration was engaged in pursuing and which the Republican Congress had enacted or was pledged to enact. The party nominated William J. Bryan of Nebraska for President and John W. Kern of Indiana for Vice-President. There were nominations also by the Populist, Prohibition, Socialist, Socialist Labor, and Independence parties. The Republicans won the election with 321 Electoral and 7,679,006 popular votes. The Democrats had 162 Electoral and 6,409,106 popular votes, the Socialists 420,820, the Prohibitionists 252,683, the Independence party 83,562, the Populists 28,131, and the Socialist Labor party 13,825 popular votes.

From the establishment of a sound monetary standard, Republican statesmen, in the face of Democratic opposition, went on toward the great improvement of the currency and banking system. The Republican Congress in 1908 enacted the Aldrich-Vreeland Currency bill, to meet a temporary emergency; a measure the effects of which were of great advantage to the country six years later, at the outbreak of the great war. It also provided for a Monetary commission, under the lead of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, to report a general and permanent plan of reform. The report of this commission reached Congress after the Democrats had secured control of the House, and was accordingly not directly acted upon. But it served as the source and origin, and provided the spirit and substance and much



TIMOTHY LESTER WOODRUFF

Timothy Lester Woodruff, lieutenant governor; born at New Haven, Conn., August 4, 1858; Yale, 1875; delegate to every state and local convention in the state of New York from 1885 to 1912; park commissioner of Brooklyn, 1885; delegate to the republican national convention, 1888; elected lieutenant governor in 1896, 1898, 1900; interested in large business enterprises; died October 12, 1913.



SERENO ELISHA PAYNE

Sereno Elisha Payne, congressman; born at Hamilton, N. Y., June 28, 1843; graduated from University of Rochester, 1864; admitted to the bar, 1866; practiced at Auburn, N. Y.; city clerk of Auburn, 1868-1871; supervisor, 1871-1872; district attorney Cayuga county 1873-1879; president of the board of education, Auburn, 1879-1882; member of congress from 1883 to 1887 and from 1889 until his death, which occurred at Auburn, N. Y., December 10, 1914.

of the actual language, of the Federal Reserve Banking act which was enacted by the Democratic party in 1913, and for which the Democrats have improperly attempted to claim the entire credit.

This important measure was amended in the fall of 1919 by the addition of a new section providing for the Federal incorporation of institutions organized for the purpose of carrying on international or foreign banking or other financial operations; all such corporations to be under the control and regulation of the Federal Reserve board and a majority of their stock to be American-owned. Approved and signed by President Wilson, a Democrat, this amendatory act was drafted by a Republican, Senator Edge, of New Jersey, and was enacted by a Congress Republican in both branches, and it may therefore properly be set down to the credit of Republican statesmanship.

CHAPTER XV

PARTY READJUSTMENT

PRESIDENT TAFT soon after his inauguration called a special session of Congress to revise the tariff, as the platform had promised. The result was the Payne-Aldrich tariff, which Mr. Taft approved and which undoubtedly had many admirable qualities, but which failed to meet the expectations of many members of the party, especially in the west, who complained that it was largely a revision upward rather than downward and that it favored too greatly "the interests," meaning great trusts and corporations. So considerable was the dissatisfaction with it that in 1910 the Republican party suffered defeat at the polls and lost control of the next Congress, which met in 1911. In the fall of 1910 Mr. Taft urged further tariff reform in the shape of a reciprocity treaty with Canada. Although that would have been in accord with established Republican policy, Congress failed to enact it. Thereupon Mr. Taft called a special session of the new Congress immediately upon the expiration of the old and renewed the proposal. It was readily passed by the House, the Democratic majority accepting the Republican doctrine; and it was also passed by the Senate, though by the aid of Democratic votes—the dissentient or "insurgent" Republicans opposing it because they thought it

would be unfavorable to the agricultural interests of the west.

This reciprocity measure did not go into effect, because of the retirement from power of the Liberal party in Canada which had favored it. But its adoption by Congress aroused the antagonism of the agricultural interests of the north and west, largely Republican, and revealed the presence of serious dissension within that party—the culmination of disagreements between its progressive and conservative wings, which had been increasing gradually for a number of years. The efforts of Mr. Taft to mediate between the two were unavailing, and when the time came to nominate his successor a disastrous schism occurred. The conservative wing of the party renominated Mr. Taft and Mr. Sherman on a platform reaffirming the established conservative principles of the party, and the progressive wing organized itself into the Progressive party and nominated Theodore Roosevelt for President and Hiram W. Johnson of California for Vice-President on a platform which in many details was substantially identical with the Republican, but which greatly emphasized the need of a more radical prosecution of the reforms that had been begun under the Roosevelt administration, and also contained declarations of a character so radical that they would not have been seriously considered except under the stress of a factional contest. It also contained an unequivocal declaration in favor of “equal suffrage to men and women alike.”

The Democrats, in a convention dominated by Mr. Bryan, nominated Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey

and Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana on a platform calling for a "tariff for revenue only," an income tax, and abandonment of the Philippines. Socialist, Prohibitionist, and Socialist Labor nominations were also made. A vigorous campaign was waged and the Republicans polled a large majority of the votes of the nation. But, owing to the division in their ranks, they were badly defeated and the Democratic ticket was elected. Mr. Wilson received 435 Electoral votes, Mr. Roosevelt 88, and Mr. Taft only 8. Yet Mr. Wilson received only 6,286,214 popular votes, while Mr. Roosevelt got 4,126,120, and Mr. Taft 3,483,922. If the two wings of the Republican party had remained united and cast their total vote for one candidate that party would have had 7,610,042 votes, or 1,323,828 more than the Democrats, and it would have had 379 Electoral votes to the Democrats' 152. In this election the Socialists polled 897,011, the Prohibitionists 208,923, and the Socialist Labor party 29,079 votes. The Democrats also gained control of Congress.

After the middle of the Taft administration, therefore, the Republican party had for a number of years no control of legislation, and after the close of that administration they also lost control of the executive for eight years. In 1916 the party was reunited on a basis of sanely progressive principles. Its platform spoke clearly for protection of American rights in all parts of the world, for maintenance of the Monroe doctrine, for a reasonable degree of military preparedness for the protection of the country, for a Tariff commission which should place the tariff system of the

country upon a scientific and non-political basis, for such regulation of business as should prevent abuses without crippling enterprise or impairing property rights, for exclusive Federal control of the railway transportation system, for restoration of the merchant marine, for the establishment of a budget system for the national treasury in the interest of economy and businesslike methods in government, for the careful husbanding of natural resources, for vocational education, laws against child labor, workmen's compensation and accident compensation laws, rural credits, extension of the rural free delivery mail service, full protection of naturalized citizens in the right of expatriation, and the extension of the electoral franchise to women equally with men.

There was less difference than usual between the two platforms. The Republican stood for the protective principle in the tariff, while the Democratic repeated the demand for a tariff for revenue only, though the tariff which a Democratic Congress had enacted at the dictation of the Democratic President was very far from answering that description. The Republican insisted upon keeping the faith of the nation which had been pledged in the treaty of Paris concerning the Philippines, while the Democratic advocated a policy of repudiating, scuttling, and abandonment. The Republican platform proposed specific constructive legislation and executive action for the "rigid supervision and strict regulation of the great corporations of the country" in the interest of the encouragement of legitimate business, while the Democratic made no proposals on

the subject save that for a general Trade commission. The Republican, perceiving intrastate and interstate commerce to be inseparably interwoven, proposed that all railroad legislation should be committed to the national government, so as to avoid the mischievous confusion which had often arisen between Federal and State control; while the Democratic was silent upon this immensely important subject. The Republican favored legislation which would promote the building of an adequate American merchant marine, while the Democratic favored the socialist plan of a marine owned and operated by the government.

The campaign of 1916 was conducted while the attention of the nation was supremely fixed upon the great war in Europe and while the issues of that war seemed paramount to those of our domestic affairs. The Democratic party pleaded for the reelection of the President on the specious and altogether insincere ground that he had "kept us out of war," and by that means gained many votes, particularly in the middle and far west. In a few of the States there were still some lingering traces of the Republican schism of four years before. Technically, as shown by the result, the immediate deciding circumstance that determined the election was the tactical error of permitting the Republican candidate to tour California, which was in the throes of a factional contest and where he incurred the resentment of the Johnson faction, costing him the election. The Republican candidates were Charles Evans Hughes of New York and Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana; the Democratic, President Wilson and

Vice-President Marshall. There was an attempt to put Theodore Roosevelt forward again as a Progressive candidate, but he declined and supported Mr. Hughes on the regular Republican ticket. The drift of popular sentiment was undoubtedly toward the Republican party. But owing to the circumstances mentioned, the Democrats won by the narrowest margin since the disputed election of 1876, forty years before. They got 277 Electoral and 9,129,606 popular votes, while the Republicans got 254 Electoral and 8,538,221 popular votes. The Socialist vote was 585,113, the Prohibitionist 220,506, and the Socialist Labor 13,403. The Democrats retained control of Congress.

Thereafter, for the first half of the second Wilson administration, covering the period of American participation in the great war, Democratic control of the government was complete and under it the President was invested with an autocratic and dictatorial power never before approximated or contemplated in American history. Shortly after his installation in the second term, to which he had been elected chiefly on the pretense that "he kept us out of war," the President was compelled by the logic of events to ask that the nation be plunged into the war. To that momentous step and all through the succeeding transactions for the prosecution of the war the Republican minority offered no factious opposition. With patriotic zeal it coöperated heartily with the Democratic government in every measure that was necessary to win the victory. In some important respects, particularly the legislation for creating and preparing a great army, the Republicans

gave the President more hearty support than did the members of his own party.

Nevertheless, as the war drew near its close and as the time approached for the election of a new Congress which would be in office during the period of peace-making and reconstruction, President Wilson repudiated the loyal support that the Republicans had given him and in October, 1918, took the unprecedented step of issuing a public appeal to the nation to elect a Democratic Congress that would be subservient to his will. It is possible, though not probable, that without that astounding performance he might have secured a Democratic Congress. But the last hope of his doing so was destroyed by the issuance of that appeal—which in spirit was in fact an imperious demand. The nation revolted against such a display of despotic partisanship, refused the Democratic government the vote of confidence which the President had solicited, and elected a Congress Republican in both houses.

This body was kept from meeting as long as possible, and then was greatly hampered and delayed in its work by the petulant and arrogant unwillingness of the President to cooperate with it, and by his insistence upon the Senate's ratification of his secretly-negotiated treaty of Peace and covenant of the League of Nations without any of the amendments or reservations which the Senate was constitutionally entitled to make, and which were necessary for the protection of American interests and for making the treaty accord with the Constitution and fixed policies of the United States. The desire of the Republican leaders to ratify the treaty

with proper reservations, acceptable to the other signatory powers, was finally thwarted by the President, who instructed his subservient followers in the Senate to kill the treaty rather than have it ratified with the reservations required by the Constitution and by the overwhelming sentiment of the American people.

The chief legislation before Congress in 1919 and 1920 had to do with settling the issues of the war, with readjusting the finances of the country, and with restoring to a normal peace basis the enterprises which had been disturbed by the war. Foremost among these tasks was the enactment of a bill for the government supervision and regulation of the railroads after their return by the government to private control. The period of government war control, under the Democratic administration, had caused a deficit of more than half a billion dollars in the railroad account and had greatly disorganized the roads and enormously increased their expenses. These circumstances made the framing of a satisfactory law a difficult matter, but in the task the Republican majority in Congress succeeded in a manner which won almost universal approbation. In this and other post-bellum legislation the Republican party showed itself thoroughly reunited and steadfastly intent upon pursuing those progressive policies of service to the public welfare, and at the same time those resolute conservations of the rights of the individual citizen, of property and of business, which had been characteristic of it from its foundation. Between it and the Democratic party intense animosity continued as of old to prevail, sometimes to an extent regrettably deterimen-

tal to patriotic interests. But within the ranks of the Republican party, enormously extended as they were in 1920, a greater degree of harmony prevailed than had been known in nearly a score of years. The former distinctions of "Standpatter" and "Progressive" had generally disappeared, and in the pursuance of its traditional policies, at once conservative and progressive, the party showed and continued to show that it recognizes no geographical divisions, no class distinctions, no discrimination of race or sex in the vindication of civil rights. North, south, east, west; black and white; rich and poor; employer and employe; man and woman, native and naturalized—all are the same to the party which in the fulfillment of its name is devoted to the progress and prosperity of the Common Wealth.

CHAPTER XVI

EQUAL SUFFRAGE

LATEST of all the great advancements made in the civic life of America and greatest of all the late reforms achieved under the influence and leadership of the Republican party, is the enfranchisement of women. It was eminently appropriate that this work should be done chiefly by Republicans because it was in logical accord with the fundamental principles of that party. An organization that came into existence for the vindication of the rights of man was unmistakably destined to become the champion of equal rights of citizenship for men and women. Between the Republican party and the early movement for Woman Suffrage there was indeed an intimate personal connection. We cannot say that all Republicans were suffragists or that all suffragists were Republicans. But it is a fact of record that many of the founders of the Republican party were advocates of Woman Suffrage, and that the great majority of suffragists were affiliated with the Republican party.

Some citations from the national platforms of the Republican party with reference to the rights of women have already been made. It will be profitable to review the record in detail. As early as 1872 the Republican national convention, which nominated

Grant and Wilson for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, declared :

“The Republican party is mindful of its obligations to the loyal women of America for their noble devotion to the cause of freedom. Their admission to wider fields of usefulness is viewed with satisfaction; and the honest demand of any class of citizens for additional rights should be treated with respectful consideration.”

That was a tentative and conservative utterance. But it was the first utterance on the subject that was made by any considerable political party. Again in 1876 the Republican platform, upon which Hayes and Wheeler were nominated, declared :

“The Republican party recognizes with approval the substantial advances recently made toward the establishment of equal rights for women by the many important amendments effected by Republican Legislatures in the laws which concern the personal and property relations of wives, mothers, and widows, and by the appointment and election of women to the superintendence of education, charities, and other public trusts. The honest demands of this class of citizens for additional rights, privileges, and immunities should be treated with respectful consideration.”

Again, in 1896, when McKinley and Hobart were nominated, the Republican platform said :

“The Republican party is mindful of the rights and interests of women, and believes that they should be accorded equal opportunities, equal pay for equal work, and protection to the home. We favor the admission of women to wider spheres of usefulness and welcome their coöperation in rescuing the country from Democratic and Populistic mismanagement and misrule.”

Naturally, when McKinley was renominated in 1900 the Republican platform again recognized the public services of women and expressed appreciation of their coöperation.

Then in 1912 came the climax. We have already told of the great Progressive movement of that year, when more than half of the Republican party temporarily separated itself from the general organization. The Progressive Republicans in their platform unequivocally declared for the complete enfranchisement of women. They said:

"The Progressive party, believing that no people can justly claim to be a true democracy which denies political rights on account of sex, pledges itself to the task of securing equal suffrage to men and women alike."

With the reunion four years later of the Progressives with the regular Republican party, that unequivocally expressed principle of the former was fully and heartily adopted by the latter, so that the Republican national convention of 1916 declared in its platform:

"The Republican party, reaffirming its faith in government of the people, by the people, for the people, as a measure of justice to one-half the adult people of this country favors the extension of the suffrage to women, but recognizes the right of each State to settle this question for itself."

Meanwhile, what of the Democratic party? While the Republicans at intervals during nearly half a century were making these half-dozen explicit declarations in favor of the rights of women, what did the Democrats say? Not one word. The subject of the civil and electoral rights of women was never so much as referred to in a Democratic platform until 1916 when, under sheer compulsion and most reluctantly, there was inserted this dodging and begrudging plank:

"We recommend the extension of the franchise to the women of the country by the States upon the same terms as to men."

That was all; a single utterance of fewer than two dozen words, without a hint at belief in the matter or of appreciation of the civic and partrotic worth of womanhood—that constitutes the entire record of the Democratic party on the subject of Woman Suffrage.

The declaration of the Republican platform of 1916 was, it is true, in favor of suffrage for women by State rather than by national action. But when a little later the issue was brought before Congress in the form of a proposal for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which would make equal suffrage a national and not merely a State right, Republicans readily accepted and supported it and it was by Republican votes that the amendment was adopted by both houses of Congress and recommended to the States for ratification.

This was not, it is true, the first presentation of the equal suffrage cause to Congress. As early as 1878 it was thus presented by no less authoritative a person than Miss Susan B. Anthony. The House of Representatives had at that time, however, a Democratic majority and Miss Anthony's earnest appeal fell upon unsympathetic ears. There was a similar result when the amendment was introduced into the Sixty-fifth Congress. That body was Democratic in both houses, and by Democratic votes it rejected the amendment. Happily for the cause of suffrage, however, in the fall of 1918 President Wilson made his extraordinary appeal to the country for the election of another Democratic Congress, to which the nation promptly responded by electing a Congress Republican in both houses.

To that Republican Sixty-sixth Congress, then, the amendment was resubmitted, to be speedily approved. Congress met in special session on May 19, 1919. Just two days later, on May 21, the House of Representatives, with a strong Republican majority, overwhelmingly adopted the amendment. The vote stood as follows:

Republicans—For, 200; against, 19.

Democrats—For, 102; against, 70.

A little later, on June 4, the Senate voted as follows:

Republicans—For, 36; against, 8.

Democrats—For, 20; against, 17.

Thus in the whole Congress, 236 Republicans voted for equal suffrage and only 27 against it; while only 122 Democrats voted for it and no fewer than 87 against it. It was emphatically and indisputably the work of the Republican party, therefore, that the so-called Susan B. Anthony Suffrage amendment to the Constitution of the United States was adopted by Congress for submission and recommendation to the States for ratification.

No less was it the work of the Republican party that ratification by the States was secured. The first eight States that ratified it were the staunch Republican States of Wisconsin, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, every one of which had, of course, a Republican Legislature. Of the thirty-six States that ratified it and made it a part of the Constitution, giving the franchise to nearly 27,000,000 women, no fewer than twenty-six had Legislatures Republican in both branches, and only seven

had Legislatures Democratic in both branches; while of the other three one house was Republican and the other Democratic. On the other hand, of the eight States that outrightly rejected the amendment seven were Democratic and only one was Republican.

The final contest was in the Tennessee Legislature, on August 13 and 18, 1920. That body was overwhelmingly Democratic, yet its favorable action was chiefly the work of the Republican minority, done in accord with the declaration of the Republican national platform and with the expressed wishes of the Republican candidates and party leaders. In the Tennessee Senate on August 13, eighteen Democrats voted for and three against ratification, and seven Republicans voted for and only one against it. But in the House on August 18 the Democrats were about evenly divided, 35 voting for and 34 against ratification, with one absent; while the Republicans voted 15 for and 12 against, with two absent. Thus the Republican minority was decidedly more favorable to ratification than was the Democratic majority.

Thus the Nineteenth amendment was ratified by the States by the following vote:

Republicans—For, 26; against, 1.

Democrats—For, 7; against, 7.

Divided Legislatures—For, 3.

Beyond all question or challenge, therefore, the granting of Equal Suffrage, both in Congressional initiative and in ratification by the States, was the work of the Republican party, successfully effected in the face of Democratic opposition.



WILLIAM BARNES, JR.

William Barnes, jr., publisher; born at Albany, N. Y. November 17, 1866; graduated from Harvard university, 1888 with degree of A. B.; publisher Albany Journal since 1889; member republican state committee, 1892-1914; chairman 1911-1914; in 1915 brought action for libel against Theodore Roosevelt which was tried at Syracuse, N. Y., and resulted in a verdict for the defendant.



WILLIAM RUSSELL WILLCOX

William Russell Willcox, ex-chairman public service commission, 1st district; born in Smyrna, Chenango county, 1863; education received at country schools and state normal school at Brockport; attended University of Rochester; taught at Webster academy and Spring Valley high school; graduated from Columbia law school and admitted to the bar in 1890; republican nominee for congress in New York City, 1900; park commissioner by appointment of Mayor Seth Low, 1901-1902; appointed postmaster of New York City by President Roosevelt, 1904; appointed chairman of the public service commission by Governor Hughes, July 1, 1907; chairman republican national committee campaign of 1916.



CHARLES DEWEY HILLES

Charles Dewey Hilles, chairman of republican national committee; born in Belmont county, O., June 23, 1867; educated at Oxford college, Md.; financial officer and superintendent of the Boys State Industrial school at Lancaster, O., 1890-1892; superintendent New York Juvenile asylum at Dobbs Ferry, 1902-1909; assistant secretary U. S. treasury, 1909-1911; secretary to President William H. Taft, 1911-1913; chairman republican national committee 1912, succeeded Herbert Parson as member republican national committee 1920.

CHAPTER XVII

NATION OR LEAGUE?

THE years 1919 and 1920 witnessed the greatest conflict in American history between the President and the Senate of the United States. The subject was the covenant of the League of Nations, which President Wilson had, as he himself declared, purposely so interwoven with the treaty of peace with Germany at the close of the Great War that the Senate would be compelled to treat the two as one, to be ratified or rejected together. Thus the Senate could not ratify the much-desired treaty of peace with Germany without also ratifying the covenant of the League of Nations, and it could not reject the covenant without also rejecting the treaty. Moreover, he made it plain that he would accept no "effective" amendments or reservations to the instrument modifying its meaning and effect in any way, such as the Senate had previously appended to other treaties, but that it must be either ratified or rejected just as it stood, practically "without the dotting of an *i* or crossing of a *t*." (That was not his phrase, but was the substantial purport of his declarations.)

The Republican majority in the Senate early made it plain that it would not ratify the covenant without a number of effective reservations. This is not the place for a detailed review of all their objections to that extra-

ordinary instrument, but a few of the foremost may properly be recalled. From July 14 to September 4 the Senate committee on foreign relations held hearings concerning it, and then reported it to the Senate. From October 2 to November 6 it was discussed in committee of the whole, and thereafter to November 18 the committee of the whole was busy with successive votings on proposed amendments. Finally on November 19 the Senate voted on it, and the requisite two-thirds could not be obtained for it either with or without the reservations. Again on February 9, 1920, it was taken up on motion of the Republican leader, and debate and votings continued until March 19, when as before it failed of the necessary two-thirds. On both occasions both parties were divided. The great majority of Republicans were in favor of ratification with effective reservations; a few were opposed to the covenant in any form, and one or two would have accepted it without reservations. Several of the Democrats voted with the Republicans for reservations, and a much larger number of them would have done so—it is believed, enough to give it a two-thirds majority—had the President not practically forbidden them to do so. It should be added that in the late summer of 1919, in order to bring popular influence to bear upon the Senate for ratification, the President undertook a long stump-speaking tour, to the Pacific coast and back, during which he suffered a severe nervous and physical collapse that compelled his return to the White House, where he was practically interned as an invalid for the remainder of his term of office.

The first serious objection was that if the United States entered the League, it would not be able to withdraw without the unanimous permission of the other members; and a reservation was proposed giving this country the right to withdraw on proper notice whenever in its own estimation it had fulfilled its international obligations and was thus entitled to withdraw.

The second objection was to Article X, which bound every member of the League to preserve and defend the territorial integrity and political independence of every other member; and a reservation was proposed freeing the United States from that obligation and from the obligation to use its military and naval forces under any article of the treaty for any purpose, except by the order of the American Congress, according to the provision of the Constitution.

A third grave objection was to a part of the covenant which apparently would submit to alien jurisdiction domestic questions relating to the internal affairs of the United States, such as the tariff, immigration, labor problems, and the like; and a reservation was proposed giving to this country exclusively the right to decide what questions were within its domestic jurisdiction and were not to be submitted to alien jurisdiction.

A fourth objection related to the covenant's treatment of the Monroe doctrine. The covenant did indeed declare that nothing in it should be deemed to affect the validity of "international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or *regional understandings* like the Monroe doctrine." But it was objected that this was so gross a misdescription of the doctrine as to constitute in itself

a repudiation of it; and also that the whole spirit of the covenant, calling for American participation in all the political and military controversies and wars of Europe, was absolutely opposed to the spirit of the Monroe doctrine, which pledges us against such meddling, so that adoption of the covenant would be essentially tantamount to abrogation of the doctrine. Accordingly a reservation was proposed declaring that the doctrine should not be affected by anything in the covenant, that the doctrine should be interpreted by the United States alone and should be kept entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the League, and that no question involving the doctrine should be submitted to the arbitration or even the inquiry of the League.

A fifth objection was to the provision of the covenant that no nation should increase its armament without permission of the League; and a reservation was proposed reserving to the United States the right, without awaiting such permission, to increase its armament whenever it was threatened with invasion or was engaged in war.

In brief, the fifteen reservations upon which the final vote was taken aimed at preserving the complete national independence of the United States and maintaining the integrity of its Constitution as the supreme law of the land. The final vote occurred on March 19, 1920, on the question of ratifying the treaty with the fifteen reservations which had been appended. The vote was: Yeas, 49; nays, 35. As a two-thirds vote was required to ratify, the resolution of ratification failed of passage. There were 84 Senators present, and 56

affirmative votes would have been needed to ratify the treaty. The votes in favor of ratifying the treaty with the reservations protecting the integrity and independence of the United States as a sovereign nation comprised 28 Republicans and 21 Democrats; and the votes against such ratification and against such reservations comprised 23 Democrats and 12 Republicans. There were in the whole Senate 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats. A decisive majority of Republicans therefore voted for the treaty of peace and the maintenance of American nationality, while a majority of the Democrats actually voting opposed the ratification of the treaty in that form.

A resolution rescinding the declaration of war of April 6, 1917, and recognizing the reestablishment of peace, leaving all readjustment of international relations to further negotiations, was passed by Republican votes in the House of Representatives on April 9, 1920, and in the Senate on May 14, but was vetoed by the President.

These proceedings remitted the issue of the nationality of the United States versus the League of Nations to the people for final determination. At the opening of the Presidential campaign of 1920, therefore, this was generally regarded, by both parties, as the paramount issue. The President had demanded a "great and solemn referendum" thereon, and the Republican leaders gladly accepted his challenge. The Republican national convention was held at Chicago early in June and with fine unity of spirit nominated for President Warren G. Harding, a United States Senator from

Ohio, who had distinguished himself in the Senate by his independent and constructive spirit, and by his resolute insistence that the treaty of peace and covenant of the League of Nations should be ratified only with effective reservations for protecting the independence and integrity of the United States and for maintaining the Constitution and established policy of this country. As he himself said, "We do not mean to shun a single responsibility of this republic to world civilization. We were not seeking to defeat a world aspiration; we were seeking to safeguard America." For Vice-President was nominated Calvin Coolidge, Governor of Massachusetts, who had distinguished himself in a great civic crisis by his resolute stand for the supremacy of law and order, of justice and of loyalty to American institutions. The platform, besides speaking clearly for "agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world . . . based upon international justice . . . without the compromise of national independence," took finely progressive ground for the betterment of industrial relations, recognizing the justice of collective bargaining; for taxation reform and a national budget system; for the improvement of roads and the development of inland waterways; for the promotion of education and health, prevention of the evils of child labor, and safeguarding the welfare of women in industry; and for dealing with all the pressing public issues of the time in a spirit of progressive and constructive statesmanship.

The Democratic national convention was held at San Francisco early in July, and after a prolonged and at times acrimonious contest it nominated for the Presi-

dency James M. Cox, Governor of Ohio, and for the Vice-Presidency Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy. The platform committed the party and its candidates to the President's scheme of a League of Nations without any effective reservations for safeguarding American national independence or for making the covenant conformable to the principles of the Constitution and the Monroe doctrine. It also declared for a "tariff for revenue only." On most other topics of importance it followed pretty closely after the Republican platform. Its outstanding feature was its unqualified endorsement of President Wilson's policy concerning the League of Nations, upon which Mr. Cox and the President a few days later declared themselves to be in absolute agreement.

The issue was thus joined between the two parties with singular clearness and precision. It was the question whether America should participate in international affairs and in the preservation of the peace of the world as a free and independent nation, as described by the Declaration of Independence, or as a fettered member of a semi-military alliance, subject to the dictation of alien powers. On that the Republican party and its candidates stood unswervingly for the side of the American commonwealth.

The campaign was on the whole a quiet one, with far less speaking, parading, and the like than in most of its predecessors in recent years. The Democratic candidates indeed did a vast amount of travelling about the country and speaking, but the other important speakers of their party were few. The Republican candidates

did little travelling and little speaking. The party press on both sides was animated and aggressive, but failed to arouse any considerable degree of popular interest. The result at the polls was never doubted by thoughtful observers. Some desperate and grossly ill-advised efforts were made by the Democratic candidates and press to divert attention from what their own President had declared to be the paramount issue, by making venomous attacks upon the integrity of the Republican managers and even of Mr. Harding himself. But these fell ludicrously flat, or recoiled with damaging effect upon their authors. The people of the United States had obviously made up their minds, without any persuasion of "spellbinders," to give a decisive judgment in the "great and solemn referendum" which the President had fatuously challenged.

And they did. The election occurred on November 2, and resulted in the greatest victory for the one party and the greatest defeat for the other ever recorded in American history. The Republicans carried thirty-seven States, including Arizona, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. It was the first time that they had ever carried Arizona and Oklahoma, and the only time they had ever carried Tennessee save in 1868. The Democrats carried only eleven States, namely: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia; and in most of these the Republicans made noteworthy gains, electing some Congressmen from the solid south for the first time in a generation. The Republicans thus scored 404 Electoral votes, and the

Democrats only 127—a Republican majority of 277, or more than twice the entire Democratic vote.

Still more impressive, if possible, was the popular vote, with its quite unprecedented majorities. The total popular vote was 26,674,171, its enormous increase over that of 1916 being due to the enfranchisement of women. It was divided as follows :

Harding, Republican, 16,152,200.
 Cox, Democratic, 9,147,353.
 Debs, Socialist, 919,799.
 Christensen, Farmer-Labor, 265,411.
 Watkins, Prohibitionist, 189,408.
 W. W. Cox, Socialist Labor, 31,175.
 Macauley, Single Tax, 5,837.

Mr. Harding's plurality over Mr. Cox was thus 7,004,847, a figure never before approximated. His share of the entire vote was more than 60 per cent, while Mr. Cox's was only a trifle more than 34 per cent. In many States Harding won by more than two to one. The vote by States for the two leading candidates in this phenomenal election was as follows :

	Harding. (Rep.)	Cox. (Dem.)
Alabama.....	74,690	163,254
Arizona.....	37,016	29,546
Arkansas.....	71,117	107,409
California.....	624,992	229,191
Colorado.....	173,248	104,936
Connecticut.....	229,238	120,721
Delaware.....	52,858	39,911
Florida.....	44,853	90,515
Georgia.....	43,720	109,856

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Idaho.....	91,351	46,930
Illinois.....	1,420,480	534,394
Indiana.....	696,370	511,364
Iowa.....	634,674	227,921
Kansas.....	369,268	185,464
Kentucky.....	452,480	456,497
Louisiana.....	38,538	87,519
Maine.....	136,355	58,961
Maryland.....	236,117	180,626
Massachusetts.....	681,153	276,691
Michigan.....	762,865	233,450
Minnesota.....	519,421	142,994
Mississippi.....	11,576	69,277
Missouri.....	727,521	574,924
Montana.....	109,430	57,372
Nebraska.....	247,498	119,608
Nevada.....	15,479	9,851
New Hampshire.....	95,196	62,662
New Jersey.....	615,333	258,761
New Mexico.....	57,634	46,668
New York.....	1,871,167	781,238
North Carolina.....	232,848	305,447
North Dakota.....	160,072	37,422
Ohio.....	1,182,022	780,037
Oklahoma.....	243,831	217,053
Oregon.....	143,592	80,019
Pennsylvania.....	1,218,215	503,202
Rhode Island.....	107,463	55,062
South Carolina.....	2,244	64,170
South Dakota.....	109,874	35,938
Tennessee.....	219,829	206,558
Texas.....	114,538	288,767
Utah.....	81,555	56,639
Vermont.....	68,212	20,919
Virginia.....	87,456	141,670
Washington.....	223,137	84,298

West Virginia.....	282,007	220,789
Wisconsin.....	498,576	113,422
Wyoming.....	35,091	17,429
Totals.....	16,152,200	9,147,353

Concurrently with this Presidential victory the Republicans secured greatly increased majorities in both houses of the Sixty-seventh Congress, giving them complete control of the government and assuring President Harding of unwavering support. In the Senate they secured 59 seats to the Democrats' 37, and in the House of Representatives 300 to the Democrats' 132 and the Socialists' 1. The event may well be esteemed as having marked an epoch in American political history.

It would require a far more extended survey than the present to give even a brief synopsis of the multitudinous acts of legislation and administration which the Republican party has performed for the good of the people through the national government, beside volumes to tell of its achievements in and through the various State and local governments. The present discussion has been confined entirely to national affairs and has perforce mentioned, even briefly, only a few of those great principles, policies, and specific acts that have indicated the general purpose of the party and have been the landmarks and mileposts of its progress.

We might have dwelt upon the reduction of postage rates, the establishment of the money order system, the

development of the railway mail service and the free delivery system, which have made our postal service the best in the world; the artificial propagation and distribution of food fish; the free distribution of seeds and other measures for the promotion of agriculture; the International Copyright law, which has removed from the publishing trade the imputation of piracy, and which protects at once the property rights of authors and the business interests of American publishers; the National Bankruptcy acts, which relieved thousands of unfortunate men of their burdens and enabled them to regain business prosperity; the Circuit Court of Appeals, which has greatly expedited and facilitated legal processes; the Pure Food law and inspection system and the meat inspection system for safeguarding the health of the people; the freeing from tax of denatured alcohol for use in the arts; and the national quarantine system against contagious diseases.

It was the Republican party that empowered the Interstate Commerce commission to fix railway rates, that penalized rebates and other discriminations, that prohibited the abuse of railway passes, that made sleeping cars, express companies, and pipe lines common carriers required to serve all patrons impartially; that built the Panama canal; that reorganized the consular service on the merit basis; that created a permanent Census Bureau; that brought the telephone and telegraph systems under government control under the Interstate Commerce act; that created the postal savings bank system; that incorporated the Red Cross; that conserved coal lands by reserving to the govern-

ment title to the deposits, while agricultural entries of the surface lands were permitted; that established the national forestry system; that provided for publicity of campaign contributions; and that promoted the irrigation of arid land areas.

Other Republican measures for the general good were the reorganization of the lighthouse service; the creation of a Bureau of Mines to lessen the dangers of operatives in that industry; the extended application of safety devices on railroads; the imposition of heavy penalties for the interstate white slave traffic; strong regulations for the prevention of accidents at sea; the parole of Federal prisoners whose conduct after conviction warrants clemency; the conservation of water-power sites; the creation of a Commission of Fine Arts; the creation of national parks. The record of Republican achievement is the record of the nation's progress.

Mention has been made of various minor parties that have disported themselves in every Presidential campaign. There have been many more, the very names of some of which are forgotten. They have run their little courses and passed away, like the "Quids" and "Hunkers" and "Barnburners" and "Silver Grays" and others that represented divisions in the major parties rather than separate organizations. The chief record that they have made has been one of vain futility. Free soil was secured and vindicated, but not by the ephemeral Free Soil party. Slavery was abolished, but it was not the Abolition party that did the great work. The Union and the Constitution were preserved, but not through the efforts of the Constitu-

tional Union party. After the stormy passions of the war had passed, liberal principles of reconstruction prevailed, but it was not the Liberal party that enforced them. Prohibition has been enacted, but the Prohibition party has never secured a single Electoral vote. Woman Suffrage has triumphed, but the Woman Suffrage party has never seriously figured in an electoral campaign.

The lesson is obvious and, as it was suggested at the beginning as something to be illustrated in this history, so it may be recurred to at the close as something that every chapter in the record emphasizes. The American government is a government through parties, and through two major parties and them alone. It is thus alone that responsibility can be fixed and stability assured. A multiplicity of parties, no one having a majority, is the regular political order of things in the continental European countries—with the necessary result of frequent changes of ministry. Under our system it might not cause changes of cabinets, but it would conduce to all manner of “deals” among the various factions, would diffuse instead of centering responsibility, and would make public affairs the subject of dicker and bargain.

The thoughtful American citizen will therefore affiliate himself with one or the other of the two great parties that have survived the births and deaths of scores of ephemeral organizations, the two great parties to which must be credited all the good and against which must be charged all the evil in our government for the last two-thirds of a century. “I have,” said Pat-

rick Henry, "but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but by the past." It is by that wise rule that thoughtful American citizens will judge the party whose record has here been briefly reviewed, to decide whether it is the party to which the future interests of the nation are most safely to be entrusted, with a serene assurance that so long as its principles and practices prevail "government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth."



GEORGE ALEXANDER GLYNN

George Alexander Glynn, born Oswego, N. Y.; educated in public schools; worked on Oswego newspapers until 1890, when he came to Syracuse as a member of the staff of the Syracuse Herald, of which he was city editor for 16 years and managing editor for two years, resigning his office to become executive secretary to Horace White when the latter took office as governor in October, 1910; superintendent of the bureau of water, Syracuse, N. Y., 1911-1912; executive auditor under Governor Whitman, 1915; chairman of the republican state committee, 1916—.



LAFAYETTE B. GLEASON

Lafayette B. Gleason, clerk of the senate; born at Delhi, N. Y., May 20, 1863; graduated Yale university, 1885; admitted to the bar, September, 1887; practiced in Delhi until 1891; since then has practiced in New York City; chairman of Delaware republican county committee, 1889-1890; journal clerk New York state senate, 1889-1891; 1894-1901; assistant clerk of the senate, 1901-1905; clerk, 1905-1910; chairman of the speakers bureau of the republican state committee since 1896; secretary of all state conventions of the republican party since 1892; since 1906 secretary of the republican state committee; attorney for the state comptroller, 1913-1921; attorney for the state tax commission 1921—



RAY BURDICK SMITH

Ray Burdick Smith, lawyer; born town of Cuyler, Cortland County, N. Y. December 11, 1867; educated district school No. 6, town of Lincklaen, Chenango county, DeRuyter academy, Cazenovia seminary graduating 1886, Syracuse university one year, Yale university graduating 1891, A. B., Phi Beta Kappa, Yale Lit. editor, John A. Porter prize, Cornell law school one year; studied law, admitted to bar, 1893; practiced since in Syracuse, N. Y.; committee clerk state senate 1894-1895 and state constitutional convention, 1894; supervisor 14th ward Syracuse 1896-1900; ass't clerk state assembly, 1898-1907; clerk, 1908-1910; ass't sec'y republican state committee 1906-1907; vice chairman and chairman Onondaga republican county committee 1896-1910; counsel legislative committees on revision of charter of second class cities and of Greater New York charter; delegate state constitutional convention, 1915.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

By

WALTER W. SPOONER

CHAPTER I

THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE

1791-1801

THE Democratic party has had an uninterrupted existence of one hundred and thirty years. Founded in 1791 with Thomas Jefferson as its chief sponsor, it attracted immediately the enthusiastic and affectionate support of the masses of the people, who were determined that the institutions and government of the United States should have the character of a democracy and not an aristocratic system based upon the superior presumptions and pretensions of a few. Its development was so rapid that at the national elections of 1792 it secured control of the popular branch of Congress and cast 55 of the total 132 Electoral votes for President and Vice-President. In 1796 it lacked but two votes of the number required to decide the result in the Electoral College; and in 1800 it won a triumphant victory, electing the President and Vice-President and also a marked majority of the members of each house of Congress. Thus established as the ruling power of the nation, it was so maintained by the people, nearly always by overwhelming majorities, for an unbroken period of forty years, when it experienced a temporary reverse without, however, any abatement

of its vitality or deviation from its original principles or character. Those principles and that character, distinguishing it as the party of the masses of the people in composition, instincts, action, and general acceptance, it has since preserved through all the vicissitudes of its fortunes.

Such are the outstanding facts of the origin, rise, and position of the Democratic party. Without the addition of another word they might well explain its great part in shaping the institutions and directing the destinies of the country, and its continuance in full vigor and prestige to the present day as an affirmative and aggressive force of politics and government. On account of its popular nature and following it spontaneously rose, flourished, still flourishes, and, its adherents on principle firmly believe, will continue to flourish so long as the American nation endures.

In this discussion of the record and claims of the Democratic party it is believed the reader will discover no illiberal spirit toward other parties, past or present, and especially none toward its successive great competitors, the Federalist, National Republican, Whig, and Republican parties. It is no derogation from any of these parties to say that without exception they had their beginnings in certain proposals of specific policy more or less circumscribed in capabilities of popular appeal, and either attended or in time reinforced by pronounced class tendencies with reciprocal class predominance in their control. The essential virtues of the Democratic party are that it sprang from no extemporization of particular policies, but from the

elemental and embracing conception of the equal rights of all; that this has uniformly been its cardinal doctrine; and that its course respecting public conditions and questions has characteristically been so independent of class control or favor as to render the party peculiarly unattractive to selfish special interests, as well as to those individuals who incline to the ancient theory of government as the rightful possession of "the rich, the well-born, and the able"—that is to say, the rich and well-born, with whom the able, according to that theory, are necessarily identified.

"The rich, the well-born, and the able." These were words used by John Adams (*Works*, Boston ed., 1851, IV, 290) in designating the proper sorts of people to be entrusted with the responsible powers of government. It was in complete harmony with their spirit that the Federalist party was established and always conducted. That organization was the first, and, for a time, the only national party of the United States. As indicated by its name, it claimed to be the embodiment of the forces that had fought so strenuously, and, in the end successfully, for the replacement of the old feeble Confederation of the States by a Federal government with a coördinated and solid system of central administration headed by a national Executive, the President. But the original Federalists of the Constitutional convention of 1787 comprised diverse elements representing conflicting principles of political thought, opposed views concerning the practical details of the national institutions to be created, and varying local interests and preferences. Of these diverse elements, some were

extremely conservative, almost monarchical, in their opinions and proposals; others were of differing degrees of liberalism, tending, in the main, to the idea of decided reservations of rights to the States and the people at large. The contest resulted in a variety of compromises; without them the Constitution could neither have been adopted by the convention nor ratified by the required number of States. The more liberal elements of the convention succeeded in impressing their principal ideas upon the Constitution; and the tendency of that instrument toward thoroughly satisfying popular desires was emphasized by the prompt addition to it of the first ten amendments, collectively known as the "national bill of rights."

After the ratification of the Constitution, accomplished in the summer of 1788 by the votes of all the States except North Carolina and Rhode Island (both of which ratified later), the differences of opinion that had marked the struggle were quickly composed, and even those who had actively opposed the Constitution, known as Anti-Federalists, became its loyal supporters. The Anti-Federalists never constituted a formal party, but were a potent factor in their brief day. Patriotically accepting the issue of the contest, they merged into the unanimous constituency that elected Washington to the Presidency in the early part of 1789 and that stood ready to participate, to the fullest extent permitted by the institutions of the time, in political action for the welfare of the united country and the happiness of its inhabitants.

It was natural that those who had been positively

concerned in framing the Constitution and securing its adoption should assume the responsibility of launching and administering the national government, and become the dominant force in the resulting party development. Washington desired to avoid all party associations and favor, and accordingly chose as his chief advisers two men of diametrically opposed views—Thomas Jefferson, whom he appointed Secretary of State, and Alexander Hamilton, who was given the post of Secretary of the Treasury. But the Federalist political organization, in entering upon its career as the party of the government, adjusted itself automatically and immovably to ideas that repelled not only the great body of the former Anti-Federalists, but also many of the sincerest and ablest of the original Federalists of the formative constitutional period—including James Madison, who had exerted the unquestioned predominating influence in constructing the Constitution.

These distasteful ideas upon which the Federalist party laid its foundations centered in the belief that a controlling aristocratic element was inseparable from any effective and stable scheme of government. The founders and leaders of that party, while agreed upon the general conception of a republic as the only possible system for the American commonwealth, favored a strictly aristocratic republic—one conducted by “the most important people.” They desired and expected the executive administration, the Senate, and the judiciary to be invariably constituted from the more “select” classes, and thus together to present an impregnable front to all attempted intrusions by the masses

into the sphere of government proper. Admitting to the full, however, the justice, and, indeed, the need of a certain popular balance as a check upon possible despotism and as a general preservative of active liberty, they conceded the lower house of Congress to the public at large. It was their firm understanding and express contention that a formally selective—amounting to an aristocratic—character for the executive, Senate, and judiciary was wholly intended, and practically in terms prescribed, by the constitutional provisions which kept the choice of those branches remote from popular action; while they held that the contrariety of the arrangement for electing the House of Representatives only accentuated the fundamental nature of the Federal institutions as aristocratic in all potent respects but with a “democratical mixture” for necessary dilution.

The reader will observe that the Federalist party’s proposed application of the American governmental system was an approximation to the underlying plan of the British constitution—notably in the particular of a rigid exclusion of the ordinary people from association with the more dignified and authoritative stations of power.

Alexander Hamilton, undoubtedly the strongest intellectual force of the Federalist organization, and also the most masterful personality in formulating and directing its basic principles and early policies, was deeply enamored of the British system, and regarded democracy as an unmixed evil. As a member of the Constitutional convention he submitted a plan of

government which proposed life tenure of office (subject to good behavior) for the President and Senators, appointment of the Governors of the States by the national administration, and an absolute veto power for each Governor. He was troubled by the thought that inherently the Constitution and government were too weak. After the downfall of the Federalist party he wrote (1802): "I am still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric [the Constitution]. . . . Every day proves to me more and more that this American world was not made for me." Horrified at the excesses of the French Revolution, he apprehended their repetition in America by the triumphant democracy. In one of his last letters (July 10, 1804) he referred to democracy as "our real disease"—the manifestation of a virulent poison.

John Adams, another of the preëminent Federalist fathers, maintained that the democracy should be admitted to participation in affairs only with great caution and severe constriction. An erudite scholar, he reinforced his arguments by an elaborate array of historical precedents and deductions, demonstrating that pure democracy had ever been incapable of becoming the foundation or inspiration of a powerful state. Descanting upon this theme in one of his ablest political treatises ("A Defence of the Constitutions of the Government of the United States of America"), he says: "It is no wonder then that democracies and democratical mixtures are annihilated all over [the continent of] Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inaccessible mountain, or an impenetrable forest." Yet

he considered it creditable and beneficial to England and America that they received and utilized democracy as a "mixture." This expressed the limit of Adams's condescension to democracy.

It expressed moreover the limit of the Federalist party's condescension. Condescension is the proper word; for in spirit the course of concession to democracy was purely expedient and never marked by tolerant recognition. The natural right of a few favorites of fortune and their satellites to be the controlling persons, was the supreme idea of all true Federalist partisans. Distrust and scorn of the masses of the people, in their political capacity, as "the vulgar," "the rabble," "the mob," and—most abhorrent name of all—"the democracy," were instinctive to the Federalist nature. To "curb the unruly democracy" was esteemed by the Federalists a primary necessity of sound and orderly government.

But the material out of which the American state was to be fashioned for the satisfaction and power of the superior classes as presumed by the Federalists, was exceedingly ill adapted to that undertaking. Traditions and precedents of government were quite incapable of practically interesting the populace or its many brilliant leaders, except as they were considered good or bad from previous actual experience in America itself. Aristocratic administration under the crown of England by royal Governors and Councils, with the merely nominal limitation of republican Legislative Assemblies, had been the uniform system in the Colonies and had produced nothing but grievances,

which finally became so many and extreme that the whole American people revolted, fought a successful war against its masters, and established liberty upon the principles of the Declaration of Independence. The improvisation of a national government so regulated in practice as to reproduce and perpetuate the most objectionable feature of the old discarded institutions, did not and could not appeal to general public sentiment.

It was also considered that while the plan of the British constitution was an admirable one for England, the arguments for its automatic imitation by the United States were not convincing. The measurable development of British liberty had been the tedious and difficult process of centuries, continually hampered by king, nobles, and that formidable number of the underlings and adorers of the great who exhibited the strange tendency, common to kindred spirits in all countries (not excepting the America of either 1790 or 1920), of being more royalist than the king and more aristocratic than the aristocrats. But American national institutions were merely in formation—they were not under the compulsion of ages of custom and constraint as to their character either presently or potentially. Was it desirable to have them rooted in the principle of slow and painful progression to larger popular rights after strenuous contests to wrest from a hostile central government one “privilege” after another? That was the question when Jefferson founded the Democratic party in 1791.

During the entire period of the developments

culminating in the organization of the government under Washington's Presidency—in fact, ever since 1784—Jefferson had been absent from the country as Minister to France. His observations and reflections derived from his contact with the tyrannical French monarchy and his constant personal investigations concerning the appalling distresses of its oppressed subjects, had intensified his hatred of all arbitrary rule and his passionate devotion to every principle and method of government calculated to be of advantage to the ordinary people. In letters written to friends he remarked that the people of France were “ground to powder by the vices of the form of government”; that such a government was one “of wolves over sheep, or kites over pigeons”; that the exalted persons who administered it were of the most astonishing vulgarity and incapacity; that the destiny of nineteen-twentieths of the people was utterly hopeless, etc., etc. He was in Paris throughout the prodigious events that ushered in the French Revolution, including the fall of the Bastille. Returning to the United States in the autumn of 1789, he was called by Washington to become the head of the cabinet, and in the spring of the following year he entered upon his new office.

Differences between Jefferson and Hamilton on account of the aggressive policies of the latter, all of which tended toward rigorous consolidation of the powers of the general government and amplification of its pretensions, led soon to a complete rupture. Both of those great statesmen, however, were far less concerned about immediate than permanent matters; and

Jefferson was too powerful an intellectual leader, as well as too wise a politician, to consume any energy or time in the small diversions of factious opposition. He knew that the popular forces of resistance to the spirit and designs of the Federalist party stood ready, and, indeed, were impatient, to be moulded into an affirmative and compact political entity. There was no ceremony, there were practically no preliminaries, in the formation of the Democratic party. It sprang into being, around the personality of Jefferson, on the aggressive and unalterable proposition that the government, in all its composition, scope, and business, was most certainly to be subject to the direct concern, scrutiny, approbation, and participation of the American people without distinction of class or calculation of favor. It was one of Jefferson's most characteristic traits that he was unimpressed by superficial personal fortune, and to him in that respect the Democratic party conformed its whole character and texture, refusing utterly to accept pretensions of superior political right, with the sufficient and sole explanation that it did not want to and did not have to.

At its beginning the new organization took the title of "Democratic and Republican party," which was presently shortened to "Republican party." The preference for the name Republican was due to the circumstances and emotions of the times. The French Revolution was at its height, and sentiment on behalf of Republican France was extremely pronounced among the American masses. Republicanism, from the French association, was at that day synonymous with

ultraism. This first settled name of the Jeffersonian organization was preserved throughout the existence of the Federalist party, and for a few years after. But the mighty element that it represented was always styled the Democracy—affectionately by its members, derisively by its antagonists; and it will so be called in our various mentions of the party for the period of its early career, extending to about the year 1828, when, under the leadership of Andrew Jackson, it assumed the name of the Democratic party, by which it has since been known.

The principles and doctrines upon which the Jeffersonian Democracy was constructed were of such irrefutable truth and resistless appeal that many of them have become axiomatic sayings. Perhaps the most famous of these is, "Equal and exact justice to all, and special privileges to none." Another is, "Implicit confidence in the capacity of the people to govern themselves." A republic was defined by Jefferson as "A government by citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority." He declared the will of the majority to be "the natural law of every society, and the only sure guardian of the rights of man"; and, explicating this precept, added: "Perhaps even this may sometimes err; but its errors are honest, solitary, and short-lived. Let us, then, forever bow down to the general reason of society. We are safe with that, even in its deviations, for it soon returns again to the right way."

Jefferson's formulation of the purposes, extent, and limitations of government, which became the accepted

Democratic creed, has been thus epitomized¹:

“First—Just government is a mere instrument for accomplishing certain useful and practical purposes which citizens in their other relations cannot accomplish, and primarily and chiefly, to protect men as, without trespassing upon others, they pursue happiness in their own way. Every effort, by ceremonial or otherwise, to ascribe to government virtue or intelligence or invite to it honor, not belonging to the men who compose it, is an effort against the public welfare.

“Second—The less the government does, the more it leaves to individual citizens to do, the better. Every grant of power to government ought, therefore, to be strictly and jealously construed as impairing to some extent the natural rights of men.

“Third—There should be the maximum of local self-government. Where it is doubtful between the Federal government and a State, or between a State and a lesser community, which should exercise a power, the doubt ought to be solved in favor of the government nearer the home, and more closely under the eye, of the individual citizen.

“Fourth—It follows that the expenditure of money by the government ought to be the least possible; the collection and disbursement by public officials of money earned by other men tends to corruption not only in the jobbery and thievery more or less attending irresponsible expenditures of money, but perhaps more seriously in its tendency to create in the minds of citizens a sense of dependence upon government.

¹Edward M. Shepard, *The Democratic Party* (1892).

“Fifth—To sum up all the rest, the government should make the least possible demand upon the citizen, and the citizen the least possible demand upon the government. The citizen should never suppose that he can be made virtuous or kept virtuous by law, or that he ought to be helped to wealth or ease by those of his fellows who happen to hold the offices, and for that reason to be collectively called ‘the government.’”

These declarations constituted the foundations of the Democracy in its bitter contest against Federalism. Considered as practical propositions of government, they were startling innovations at that time; to-day most people are disposed to regard them as mild generalizations illustrative of the elementary nature of early American political verities. Discussion of them would involve mainly theoretical questions that have long ceased to be subjects of difference between parties. It is sufficient to say that they defined the original position of the Democracy, led the party to success, and set it forward on its career with a character for identification with the masses of the people which was certain not only to prove its main reliance for the future, but to be insisted on as the permanent test of its merit in both prosperity and adversity.



SAMUEL JONES TILDEN

Samuel Jones Tilden, 28th governor (1875-1876); born at New Lebanon, Columbia county, February 9, 1814; entered first Yale college, afterward university of New York; graduated, 1837; admitted to the bar in 1841; member of state assembly, 1845; member of the constitutional convention, 1846; joined the free-soil movement, 1848; "soft shell" candidate for attorney general, 1855; made unrelenting war on the Tweed ring; founder of the New York state bar association and directed the impeachment of Judges Bernard and Cordozo in 1872; elected governor in 1874; nominated for president of the U. S. in 1876 and obtained a majority of the popular vote but was declared defeated by an electoral commission, which gave Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio the election; died Greystone, near Yonkers, August 4, 1886.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTER AND ABILITY

1801-1809

THE late Carl Schurz, certainly not a prejudiced witness on behalf of the Democratic party, referring to the change accomplished by the election of Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, wrote ("Life of Henry Clay"): "The American people for the first time became fully conscious of the fact that the government really belonged to them, and not to a limited circle of important gentlemen." The result of that great contest was as lasting in its effects as it was revolutionary in its immediate decision. Federalism, as a governing establishment, never came back. Its complete and permanent collapse was due to two overwhelming facts: First, the stubborn and studied refusal of the Federalist party either to adapt itself in spirit to popular ideas and aspirations, or to become reconciled for prudent reasons to the manifest invincibility of popular power and accordingly compete with the Democracy for the favor of the ordinary public; and second, the patriotism, energy, sound sense, and superb efficiency at once and always demonstrated by the Democracy in administering the government—virtues and qualities with which

were associated an entire popular predisposition and action.

Concerning the impossible situation in which the Federalist party elected to place itself by overweening pride and curious misconception of its capacity to successfully contend with the Democracy, it would be very unjust to animadvert in terms of stricture merely. The Federalist party is entitled to the everlasting respect of all Americans, and moreover to their gratitude to no small degree. It was conspicuously able in its distinctive membership, and singly and passionately devoted to the honor and welfare of the country. Its leaders—Hamilton, President Adams, John Jay, Rufus King, Fisher Ames, the Pinckneys, and a host of others—were illustrious statesmen and pure patriots. The revered Washington gave it his undoubted preference, and, after the failure of his attempt to maintain a biparty cabinet, surrounded himself with Federalist advisers exclusively. Under Federalist auspices the government was from its earliest organization distinguished by a masterly grasp of great questions and affairs, and conducted and sustained with distinction and dignity. By steadfast neutrality toward both France and England in the tremendous European struggle at that time raging; by the courageous negotiation of the Jay treaty with England and unwavering adherence to it in spite of terrific public clamor; by the vigorous suppression of domestic insurrection; and by firm, just, and successful insistence upon our chosen national policy in exceedingly serious disputes arising with France, the administrations of Washington and

Adams signally illustrated the governing ability of the Federalists in directive respects.

The direction of government, however, is secondary to the basis of government, and the basis of government rests upon the spirit and course of parties in their declared relations to public institutions and policy. It is no conclusive recommendation of a government or party to say that it is competent. In the case of a party, even the virtue of competence cannot safely be awarded until it is seen whether the party has the ability to react from defeat and maintain an intelligent and efficient opposition. As a recent example, the late Progressive party of Roosevelt was supposed to be preëminently competent until it failed to win the first and only election that it contested, when it died out almost as quickly as it had risen—entirely because it had not the power of endurance in opposition. The Federalists, with their undeniable merits, could not have failed to prove themselves continually valuable to the country if they had been content to assume the function of a true opposition; and it is impossible to revert to their melancholy history without regretting the stagnation into which their organization fell, and always languished, after its defeat in 1800. The services of its numerous excellent men were consequently either lost to the public or concerned with the merest futilities, such as detraction and invective, efforts to sow discord among the Democracy, fusions for temporary purposes with factional elements of the latter, resistance to the prosecution of the War of 1812, and general dissidence and obstruction unregulated by any important original

conceptions of policy. Thoroughly disliked by the people at large on account of its exclusive character, the Federalist party had become still further discredited by its enactment of the intolerant Alien and Sedition laws during Adams's administration. Those measures authorized the summary deportation of all foreigners and the punishment of all citizens considered politically objectionable by the government, and were especially aimed at French republicans and the aggressive newspaper writers of the opposed party. Unjustified by either the existence of a state of war or any other public necessity appealing to reasonable minds, they were felt to be not only despotic, but symptomatic of an ultimate unbridled assumption of dictatorial authority by the central government if the Federalists should be continued in power. The Democracy responded by adopting the famous Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798-99 in assertion of the rights of the States and the liberties of the people.

Following the victory of Jefferson, and the installation of the Democracy in complete control of the government in 1801, it was expected by the Federalists that the interloping and inexperienced new party would so misdirect and bungle affairs, confound public order, and dislocate approved institutions that the country would soon be eager to get rid of it. None of those results happened, but precisely contrary ones. The two administrations of Jefferson (1801-9) were of immense value to the country for their firm and enterprising statesmanship with its accomplishments of magnificent territorial development by the Louisiana purchase,

dispatch of the Lewis and Clark expedition to the Pacific, and enforcement of the honor and power of the nation by the war on the piratical states of the Mediterranean. But of even greater—inestimably greater—consequence, benefit, and blessing was the complete success of the democratic principle and system of government which those administrations established beyond all possibility of further dispute. The venerable conception of the indispensability of a superior governing element based upon social selectness and class egotism and solidarity, was thus made incapable of any continuing maintenance in the sphere of practical politics and dismissed forever to the private enjoyment of its only proper protagonists, that “limited circle of important gentlemen” referred to by Mr. Schurz. In its place was substituted, confirmed, and permanently guaranteed the principle of Character and Ability as the sole recognizable qualifications and attributes for acceptable public service or permissible public authority.

Character and Ability. Not Character, Ability, *and* formal “Importance.” Character and Ability, enough. These include all the rightful importance that can be ascribed to anyone, and they exclude all the superficial pretensions of importance that are arrogated or presumed on account of mere fortunate personal elevation. They are to be found in every variety and condition of men and women, and they alone are pertinent to a claim to position or influence under popular government. They always assume the concomitants of training, information, and judgment, of course in varying degrees,

as also is the case among the formally well-born, rich, and "important." They generally include personal success, and frequently personal wealth—of which the Democracy hoped to perceive, and in truth has ever perceived, an abundant share among its loving supporters.

The favor of the Democracy for "the masses of the people" was never designed, and has never been practically directed, toward setting up a distinction. This favor was designed to obliterate a distinction in the body politic, at once functioned successfully to that end, and has since continually operated politically to neutralize, so far as possible, those factors demanding distinctions on behalf of special interests which, as everyone knows, have always persisted and were never more self-conscious, more highly organized, or more active than at this present day. Representative of such special interests have been and are, on the one hand, the miscellaneous aggregations of theorists and particularists, and, on the other, the great and powerful forces by some called "predatory," by others "reactionary," that perpetuate the spirit of Federalism though by no means its blundering methods. Arrayed against all these interests—theoretical, particularist, and predatory—has stood, and stands now, the Democratic party as the party of the masses of the people, and therefore, considered in its permanent capacity, the major political constituency of the nation.

Again, the Democracy's inclination to the masses has at no time signified a superior preference for that particular division of the public, any more than for any other division. The masses were rejected by the

Federalists as not seriously to be considered in connection with the essential organization and business of government; but they were accepted and encouraged by the Democracy, the same as all other elements—not more, not less,—in the spirit of the words of the Declaration of Independence, “All men are created equal.” So created in the respect of natural rights, and so to be recognized and treated by government; what they make of themselves privately and for public value is another matter, dependent partly upon their individual natures and capacities, partly upon varied conditions. It became at once, and remained, a fixed determination of the Democracy to give and hold for the masses an equal place at the foundation of government, specifically as to the right of suffrage; to deny them nothing in the respect of preferment that they were qualified, by character and ability, to acquire; to have a favorable impulse toward them uniformly; but to expect them, equally with all others, to work out their own salvation.

Moreover, the Democracy in its influence with the masses has invariably been a zealous and strict conservator of traditional American institutions. Of course we all know that in the violent imaginings of some of its persistent detractors the Democracy seethes with diabolical instincts and designs contemplating the disruption and annihilation of the treasured system of the fathers. This is assuredly the very strangest of all strange obsessions, worthy of serious notice only in a History of Great Slanders and Defamations—a work that it is to be hoped will some

day be written. From the outset of the government there never has been a moment when the Democracy could not, if so disposed, have led a powerful attack upon that time-honored system both in particular and general. And there never has been a moment when the Democracy has not been heart and soul, to the uttermost extremity, its defender and guarantor. All historians have observed that a generally strict, as against a latitudinarian, construction of the Constitution was from the earliest days advocated by the Democracy in order to prevent not only arbitrary infractions of its terms but loose, hasty, and revolutionary political actions in contempt of them. During the sixty consecutive years when, with but two brief intervals, the party exercised national power, only one amendment to the Constitution (reforming the manner of electing the President and Vice-President) was adopted. Both in office and in opposition the Democracy's performance of its responsibilities has been characterized most of all by a steadying influence because of its assured possession, in all circumstances, of a concentrated vote, which, while not invulnerable to onslaughts by extremist opponents of one kind or other, has nevertheless been of such homogeneous character as to give it at least the equilibrium. Subject frequently to energetic pressure as to matters of policy, the party has at times shown divisions in its councils, naturally to be expected in the career of a great and intensely virile popular organization. But these divisions, so far as they have affected its course, have marked only conflicting opinions among its own elements, opinions in time reconciled by the

rule of the majority, whereupon the party has gathered new vigor, not as the resultant of any interaction with it by external forces, but by virtue of its indestructible vitality and positive position and leadership, which, appealing to dispassionate minds, have drawn to it new accessions.

The foregoing reflections, fundamental to a general view, description, and estimate of the Democratic party in its elemental character, pertain equally to its practical action in control of the government under its first President, Jefferson. One of the most conspicuous facts about the Democracy is, that it was not a gradual growth but attained substantially its perfect development immediately.

In his first inaugural (March 4, 1801) Jefferson said: "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know indeed some honest men have feared that a republican government cannot be strong—that this government is not strong enough. . . . I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth. I believe it the only one where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law; would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern."

The conduct of the government by Jefferson, his very able cabinet, and a Congress at all times heavily Democratic in both houses, gave such satisfaction to the

country that the Federalist opposition shrank to insignificance. Commenting upon this result he expressed serious concern, as he believed that a primary requirement of our institutions was a balanced party system, with vigilant and unrelaxing criticism of the party in power. In the interest of his own party, the Democracy, he took no means and sought no ends except those of service to the nation altogether uninfluenced by prejudice or passion and free from mere experiments and expedients. While abolishing the pomp and solemnity with which the Presidential office had been invested, and introducing simplicity into all the departments of administration, he left the constructive work of the Federalists undisturbed.

At the Presidential election of 1804 he was chosen for a second term by 162 Electoral votes to 14 for the Federalist candidate, Charles C. Pinckney.

The great question of those times centered in the embarrassments and difficulties of the national government consequent upon violations of our neutral rights by the belligerents in the Napoleonic wars. American maritime commerce was continually interfered with, especially by England, and there was an unprovoked attack on an American frigate by a British ship of war. Jefferson, disinclined to the extremity of hostilities, sought, with the support of Congress, a solution of the trouble by suspending intercourse with the warring European nations, and the noted embargo of 1807 was the result. Without reference to the question of the merits of that measure as a substitute for war in the circumstances, its adoption by the administration

established a new and highly interesting principle of Democratic policy—the principle of fearless assumption of responsibility and unhesitating action by the President and Congress in great emergencies. Under the doctrine of strict construction of the Constitution, resort to the embargo, involving complete paralysis of foreign commerce, was certainly a matter of questionable “granted power.” But the administration felt that a resolute government, adequate to the prompt decision of novel questions critically affecting the country, was more important than the refinements of caution. The people expect every efficiency on the part of the government; the one thing they will never endure is timidity. In case of over-exercise of authority by the government, or any responsible branch of it—Executive, House, or Senate,—they have a sure remedy at the next election.

Despite the unpopularity of the embargo, the Democracy’s supremacy had become so firmly established that at the expiration of Jefferson’s second term it was returned to power by a vote of nearly three to one in the Electoral College—James Madison, of Virginia, its regular nominee, receiving 122 votes; George Clinton, of New York, also a Democrat, 6; and Charles C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, Federalist, 47.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTIONARY PHASES

1809-1824

MADISON, like his predecessor, was given two terms in the Presidential office, throughout which both the Senate and House of Representatives continued Democratic by great majorities. At his second election, in 1812, the Federalists refrained from making a party nomination for President and endorsed the candidacy of DeWitt Clinton of New York (nephew of Vice-President George Clinton), who represented a wing of the Democracy that in no way diverged from the Madisonians in principle, or even in course concerning emergent matters, but sought power on the strength of its leader's claims and the argument that as Virginia had been honored with the Presidency for twenty out of the twenty-four years since the government was founded, it was time for her to step aside in favor of the great State of New York. Owing to the coalition of the Clintonians and Federalists, Madison was reelected by a much diminished majority; his Electoral vote was 128 and Clinton had 89.

At that period the modern system of nominating conventions, platforms, letters of acceptance by candidates, national party committees, etc., had not been devised.

Originally the Presidential nominees were selected by the "general agreement" of a few party leaders, and that plan was always pursued by the Federalists except when they took up Clinton with the hope of defeating Madison. The Democracy introduced the method of nominating the President and Vice-President by a Congressional caucus, composed of the party members of the House and Senate and coming together in the early part of each Presidential year. This was the nearest approximation to a representative and responsible national assemblage that was adapted to the early political conditions of the country. The suffrage was limited by property and other qualifications; it was the settled custom for the people to leave all current details to their qualified men who were prominent in public life; and as the facilities of travel were still primitive the holding of national conventions directly representative of the people would in practice have presented little attraction except to office-holders, certain persons of more or less factious disposition, defeated or disappointed aspirants, and the like. The Democracy, however, desired to keep in as close touch as possible with the people of the country at large, and on the great question of the Presidency the quadrennial Congressional caucus was the best practical agency to that end. The caucus, moreover, completely represented the States, and its members were under the continual scrutiny and instruction of their constituents.

To enlarge the scope of popular participation in the government at its source was one of the foremost aims of the early Democracy. It was the Democracy that

initiated and continually prosecuted the great and prolonged struggle in the States for extending the suffrage to all adult male citizens, subject only to local regulations as to residence, etc. Collateral to that struggle was the cause of free public education. Universal suffrage and the common school system were twin developments of the spirit of the American Democracy. In saying this, of course no exclusive claim is made in favor of the Democratic party. The advance of education, in particular, was an object dear to good citizens generally; universal suffrage was long held to be a quite different matter, but by the constant and uncompromising insistence of the Democracy it won its way to complete acceptance, and in the end had no stronger supporters than those who by both natural and party inclination had little in common with the masses. As universal suffrage meant more votes to be cast it was for the highest interest of all politically active to put themselves in a receptive attitude toward the voters.

It was wisely recognized by the framers of the Constitution that the basis of suffrage was not a proper subject of stipulation by the national government. But the democratic influences in the Constitutional convention insisted on and obtained a very important concession to the principle of a widely extended popular suffrage. In return for their consent to the choice of the President, Vice-President, and Senators by select bodies instead of popular vote, it was provided that the electors in each State for members of the national House of Representatives should have "the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the


State Legislature." Thus the sanction of national authority was given to any desired liberality of suffrage permission, no matter how extreme. This was purely a democratic measure, and upon its foundation the Democracy as a party, against strenuous opposition, fought for the abolition of property and similar artificial distinctions in the electorate until not a vestige of them remained. The contest lasted for fifty years. (For a dispassionate account of the various phases of the suffrage question, from Colonial times to the present, the reader is referred to the "Cyclopedia of American Government," article on Suffrage.)

Without discussing in this place the movements for further suffrage extension that have since developed, with results of commanding importance and interest, it may be remarked that none of them would have been to the slightest degree possible without the foundation of universal manhood suffrage for citizens that was secured by the persistent efforts of the Democratic party in State after State until every resistance was overcome. The great principle upon which the struggle was fought was that of the obligation of government to guarantee equal rights to all—that is, all possessing free citizenship and exercising it as an active personal function, unimpaired by offenses against the law, or by other disqualifications of uniform application and operation as to individuals, specified by competent authority. The question of citizenship for people not free, of course did not exist; and the question of the entrance of women upon the theater of political action had hardly been propounded. With the changes of later times it came to

pass, first, that there were no longer people not free; and second, that the women increasingly demanded the ballot. Each of these situations involved not merely peculiar, but extraordinary, special questions, considerations, and conditions as related to the grant of suffrage. In the case of the people formerly not free, a favorable decision was promptly made by the substantially imperative direction of a tremendously powerful political party actuated largely by the expectation of great advantage for itself; in the case of the women, the conclusion was approached very gradually, as in the case of the Democracy's struggle to fully establish equal manhood suffrage—a result which, because of the principle concerned, marks the starting-point of the whole practical claim to "Votes for Women."


Of high importance also in the list of popular reforms that attended the rise and progress of the Democracy, was the transfer to the individual voters of the real power in the election of the President and Vice-President. This power was at first exercised in a number of the States by the Legislatures, which reserved to themselves the appointment of the Presidential Electors and tenaciously refused to surrender the privilege. The pressure of public demand, however, brought a slow but sure change, and in 1828, when Jackson won his first election and the modern Democratic party entered upon its career, only one State, South Carolina, adhered to the old plan of legislative choice of the Electors.

With the entire popular success of the Democracy and the disproof of all the prejudiced arguments against it on supposed practical and prudential grounds, the



CHARLES O'CONNOR

Charles O'Connor, lawyer; born in New York City, January 22, 1804; admitted to the bar when 20 years of age; candidate for lieutenant governor, 1848; senior counsel for Jefferson Davis after the civil war and in conjunction with Horace Greeley went on his bail bond when he was indicted for treason; nominated in 1872 by a faction of the democratic party at Louisville for the presidency; retired from public and professional life in 1881 and settled at Nantucket, Mass., where he died, May 12, 1884.



SAMUEL SULLIVAN COX

Samuel Sullivan Cox, congressman; born in Zanesville, O., September 30, 1824; attended Ohio university, Athens and was graduated from Brown university in 1846; studied law; owner and editor of the Columbus O. Statesman, 1853-1854; appointed secretary of legation to Peru in 1855; delegate to the democratic national conventions of 1864 and of 1868; elected to congress from Ohio and served from March 4, 1857 to March 3, 1865; moved to New York City March 4, 1865, and practiced law; re-elected to congress from New York and served from March 4, 1869 to March 3, 1873; unsuccessful candidate of the democrats and liberal republicans for representative in the 43d congress; subsequently elected to the 43d congress to fill the vacancy caused by the death of James Brooks; elected again and served in all from December 1, 1873 to March 3, 1885; appointed speaker pro tempore of the house of representatives June 7, 1876 and elected speaker pro tempore June 19, 1876 and served until he vacated the office June 24, 1876; elected to the 49th congress to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of Joseph Pulitzer; reelected to the 50th and 51st congresses, serving from December 6, 1886 until his death in New York City, September 10, 1889.

surviving opposition of the Federalists became more and more narrowed to the elder generation of irreconcilables. The young men, of whatever antecedents and associations, upon engaging in political activity arrayed themselves, with but very few exceptions, on the side of the Democracy. Eminently representative of these were John Quincy Adams, son of President John Adams, and Henry Clay—both of whom, in full accord with the spirit and course of the Democracy, were among its vigorous and valuable champions and were by its power elevated to the most distinguished positions that they attained in their very long and ceaselessly active public careers.

Certain celebrated acts of the government during the Madison administrations (1809-17) evidenced the bold and independent attitude of the Democracy in the treatment of questions decidedly complex from the early constitutional point of view. In those days the determination of most large matters of policy was necessarily experimental. The important things were not such slight precedent as obtained after only some twenty years of experience, or studious applications of doctrine to realities for mere doctrine's sake, but freedom from rigidity and readiness to grapple with problems despite sharp divergence of opinion in the party. Marshall, the great Chief-Justice, was interpreting the Constitution along enterprising lines; and the Democratic government showed a comparable spirit of breadth, which, moreover, was undisturbed by apprehensions as to involvement in heresies to be pointed out and analyzed by surprised future commentators.

For in that Madisonian era the Democracy favored and established a United States government bank; aye, it favored and established a protective tariff. Both of these actions were taken in 1816. Five years before (likewise under Madison), Congress, after an exciting controversy and by a close vote, had refused to recharter the Bank of the United States which Hamilton founded in 1791 pursuant to his plans for centralization; but that Congressional action was now reversed, the Bank was recreated for a term of twenty years, and the Democratic President signed the bill. Regarding the tariff, a law was passed which also followed Hamiltonian conceptions; for the first time protective duties, as such, were laid. Thus the Democracy, in two particular matters of great moment, took a course very distinctly showing that it did not limit its scope of practical action by any set rule—not even the set rule of “strict construction.”

The Bank and Tariff acts of 1816 were measures incidental to the endeavors of the country to recover from the financial and commercial prostration caused by the war with Great Britain. They were believed to be on the whole wise and necessary in the prevailing conditions, and likely to prove sound in policy and effects provided the encouragement that they extended to special interests was not abused or made a pretext for undue future demands. They were in the same class with the two outstanding acts of Jefferson’s administrations—the Louisiana purchase and the embargo. Assuming the desirability of acquiring Louisiana in 1803, the necessity of meeting the dangerous foreign

emergency of 1807, and the wisdom of some positive remedies for the domestic ills of 1816, either prompt and conclusive governmental action had to be taken in each case, or the empowerment of a constitutional amendment, involving long drawn-out proceedings and therefore not available for the specific object, had to be awaited.

In the matter of the government bank, the Democratic party later found cause to terminate its sanction, and in consequence was emphatically sustained by the country at the Presidential elections of 1832 and 1836. As for the tariff, it consistently held to the protectionist idea for a number of years, strengthening its original legislation on the subject from time to time, particularly in 1824 and 1828; but in the end, regarding the previously "infant" industries as having been sufficiently cared for, it promulgated the historic doctrine of "tariff for revenue only," which received the general concurrence of the people until the Civil War.

Third in the line of Democratic Presidents was James Monroe, of Virginia, elected in 1816 by 183 Electoral votes to 34 for Rufus King, Federalist, of New York, and reëlected in 1820 by 231 to 1 for John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts. The Federalist party, always decrepit nationally since 1800, now gave up the ghost, and there ensued the famed "era of good feeling"—making a living reality of Jefferson's words, "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," because the formative work of the party of Democracy was completed and unanimously accepted.

That work, it cannot too frequently be remembered

and emphasized, consisted in, First, the organization, development, and firm establishment of the American nation as a successful, harmonious, orderly, and absolutely efficient democracy—a comprehensive result never paralleled in any other powerful country in the history of the world; Second, the administration of the government and the direction of all political action conformably to the principle of equal rights for all, with loving sympathy for the masses of the people and practical inclination toward them because of their much greater need for a champion than the classes enjoying a strong economic position and its associated advantages—in other words, for every reason and consideration of eternal justice; and Third, and chiefest accomplishment of all because it guaranteed the security of every other, the advancement of the party of Democracy itself to a position of predominating and ultimately undisputed influence and power by the virtue and force of its character and principles, its splendid record under the guidance of its statesmen, and its adequacy to that most responsible business of government, vigorous and fearless action on public questions.

Neither can it too frequently be remembered and emphasized that what the party of Democracy was in fundamental respects upon completing its evolution in Monroe's time, the Democratic party has continuously been since and is now. From the very nature of its original composition, precepts, and declared purposes its character was permanently fixed, and the successful substitution of a reverse nature was made permanently prohibitive. Casting its lot with the unpretentious

elements of the public—the merely normal average elements,—not for their artificial or forced exaltation but for their equal right and welfare, a controlling support for it from contrary elements actuated by class consciousness became necessarily forever impossible;—such elements instinctively and passionately want a different kind of party, have always chosen one, and will always have one. Yet the broad impartiality and comprehensive justice of the position taken and maintained by the Democracy secured and have preserved for it the whole-hearted coöperation of thoughtful and forceful people in all ranks of society. Its leaders have ever been strong, able, and noted for the most convinced belief in the plain truths that it proclaims. Upon the fundamental matters referred to there never has been the slightest division in the Democratic party.

Monroe's administrations (1817-25) were marked by several great events, foremost of which, for its world effects, was the declaration of the Monroe doctrine in his annual message to Congress dated December 2, 1823. Florida, embracing not only the present State of that name but the Gulf coast running west to Louisiana, was acquired from Spain by treaty (1819). The Missouri Compromise, which settled the political slavery question for a quarter of a century, was adopted (1820).

At the Presidential election of 1824, the Federalist party having become extinct and no new organization having arisen, the Democracy in the various States divided in support of four candidates, all of whom were men of eminent repute as leaders of the party—Andrew

Jackson, of Tennessee; John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts; William H. Crawford, of Georgia; and Henry Clay, of Kentucky. The Electoral result was as follows: Jackson, 99; Adams, 84; Crawford, 41; Clay, 37. As no one had a majority the decision was made by the House of Representatives, which, voting by States, chose Adams. This result was obtained by a combination of the Adams and Clay States.

CHAPTER IV
THE JACKSONIAN ERA

1825-1844

NOTWITHSTANDING the great excitement attending the Presidential contest of 1824, it was not fought on any questions or question of policy, but was altogether a personal competitive affair to decide for the immediate future the leadership of the Democracy, and therefore of the united political constituency of the nation. The result was indeed for the passing time only. Popular support had favored General Jackson more than any other of the contestants; and his character, traits, record, and well-known views combined to make him increasingly a popular hero, especially as he had been deprived of the Presidency by a union of the Adams and Clay forces, both of which, it was well understood, were likely to incline to programs and tendencies, and be susceptible to influences, differentiated from those that distinguished and controlled the radical Democracy. It was hence inevitable that the Jacksonians would insist upon the election of their leader in 1828. On the other hand, the one positive political idea marked out by the Adams administration (1825-29) was that of its own supposed title to the succession in 1828 and again in 1832; for Adams

expected a second term, and, recognizing Clay as his heir, appointed him Secretary of State. All the previous Democratic Executives had been reelected, and, after serving out their eight years, had been followed in the Presidency by their Secretaries of State.

But there is no dependable rule of succession in a democracy, or even of secure traditions or arrangements for personal aims—as numerous ambitious men have found to their grief. Jackson overwhelmingly defeated Adams in 1828, and won an even greater victory over Clay in 1832. The Electoral vote in 1828 stood:—Jackson, 178; Adams, 83. In 1832 Jackson received 219 Electoral votes; Clay, 49; John Floyd, of Virginia (South Carolina nullification candidate), 11; and William Wirt, of Maryland (Anti-Masonic party), 7.

With the first administration of Jackson (1829-33) the country again, and this time permanently, came under a two-party system. The ascendant Jacksonians discarded the old redundant title of Democratic-Republican party, and took that of Democratic party. Their opponents, the Adams-Clay following, organized under the name of National Republican party, which was retained until after the campaign of 1832, when that of Whig party was substituted.

Both the Democratic party and the National Republican or Whig party were absolutely and at all times non-sectional; no great sectional party, dividing the north and south, existed until the establishment of the modern Republican organization in 1854. A critical situation between the north and south, imperiling the

Union, had supervened in 1819-20, when the proposal to admit the Territory of Missouri to statehood with permission to retain the institution of slavery was under debate in Congress. The north strenuously objected, and the south strenuously insisted. By the efforts of great and patriotic men, the famous Missouri Compromise of 1820 was the result. Under that settlement Missouri was admitted with the permission of slavery, but slavery was thenceforth prohibited in all the rest of the as yet unorganized national domain lying north of Missouri's southern boundary, the parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$. The prescribed domain comprehended all the non-organized western territory (excepting Arkansas and what is now the principal part of Oklahoma) which the United States owned at that time and, indeed, until the annexation of Texas (1845). Both the north and south (so far as the political leaders were concerned) being satisfied with the Missouri Compromise, the sectional excitement totally ceased, and in the reconstruction of parties that eventuated from the schism in the Democracy in 1824 not a trace of sectional feeling, in the political regard, remained.

The National Republican-Whig party began its career with much confidence, which apparently had every justification. In the first place, its leader was the great Henry Clay, and many of the most powerful intellectual characters, including Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, Rufus Choate, Thomas Ewing, and John M. Clayton were conspicuous in its councils. Next, while enjoying the favor of those who had formerly been Federalists or who were Federalistically

predisposed, it rejected the discredited notions and avoided the strategic errors of the Federalist party, and, obedient in good faith to the popular will, was received and treated by the public with recognition accordingly. Withal, it prided itself upon being select in every creditable sense, and select it certainly was—even the majestic Republican party of our day is not one whit more so; it was accorded devoted support from among the honored families of the north and the aristocratic planters of the south, and its ordinary membership showed a shining array of the talented and efficient. And finally it possessed issues, very important and appealing issues, for which it fought with intense conviction and splendid ability.

But it did not have the votes. Except on rare occasions, when the Democratic party temporarily suffered popular discipline or defeated itself by scattering its forces.

Jackson launched forth upon an aggressively partisan rule. Everything had to be Democratic, and notably the incumbency of the offices, down to the postmaster-ships and clerkships. He introduced the spoils system, and, like everything else introduced by that mighty man, it lasted. When the Whigs came into power the spoils seemed good to them; and the Republicans in their time, as we all know, have never been happy without the spoils. We shall not concern ourselves with an exculpation of Jackson for his startling performances in the matter of the spoils (about which, truth to tell, most Democrats are now a bit sensitive), further than to remark that they represented primordial impulses of

human nature that were singularly strong in him—to be kind to one's friends, and as for one's foes, "treat 'em rough." We have happily lived to see the development of a more discriminating policy regarding the ordinary offices of the civil service—a policy with which, in its establishment, the name of another great Democratic President, Cleveland, is preëminently identified.

At an early period Jackson took a positive stand against renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States, on the grounds of the incompatibility with free institutions of the consolidation with the government of a great private moneyed corporation, the extra-constitutionality of such a policy, and the exercise by the Bank of sinister power and corrupting influences in connection with politics. A tremendous struggle was precipitated. Clay made the Bank question the chief issue in his Presidential campaign of 1832, and was crushingly beaten, as already noted; whereupon Jackson, soon after the beginning of his second term, went to the extremity of removing the government deposits from the Bank, although its charter was not to expire until 1836. The discussion continued to rage, but Jackson and the Democratic party stood immovable. The final results will be noticed in due order.

The State of South Carolina in those strenuous Jacksonian times harbored a serious grievance against the national government. The trouble had nothing to do with the slavery question, but was purely economic, about the homely matters of opportunity to get on in the world and the price to pay accordingly. Owing to

high protective excesses in the interest of northern manufacturers that had been perpetrated for some years, particularly under the tariff of 1828—the historic “tariff of abominations,”—the agricultural south was suffering. It was conceived by the South Carolinians that the proper thing was to “nullify” the Federal tariff laws—to refuse to permit them to be enforced so far as their State was concerned. Such a proceeding, if carried to its logical result, of course meant liberty of secession by South Carolina, or any other refractory State at its pleasure. The idea was at first put forth tentatively by means of certain intimations, with the hope that the Democratic President would consider it all right, or at least would not interfere. He was a stern and pragmatist man, and it was well to know what he would do. At a public dinner in honor of Jefferson’s birthday in April, 1830, Jackson arose and gave the company his celebrated toast: “Our Federal Union: It must be preserved.” This left no doubt as to his attitude. Nevertheless, South Carolina nullified (1832), trusting, it was afterward explained by John C. Calhoun (at that time Vice-President), that Jackson would tolerate a “peaceable secession.” But the President at once issued a proclamation (December 16) declaring that the tariff laws of the nation, like all others, must be obeyed, sent a naval force to Charleston harbor, and ordered General Scott to be ready to move the army if necessary. In his proclamation were these immortal words: “I consider the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the

letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.”

There was of course no armed conflict, although South Carolina took the result with no good grace. Calhoun, in protest, resigned as Vice-President, and in 1836 the State, still resentful, voted against the Democratic national ticket.

By this action Jackson coerced a sovereign State, as in the instance of the Bank he annihilated a powerful and entrenched government institution. The principle in each case was the same—the superiority of the common welfare to special interest.

The National Republican-Whig party was founded on two great issues:—First, thorough maintenance and application of the principle and system of tariff protection; Second, assumption and prosecution by the Federal government of internal improvements—*i. e.*, important works not undertaken, or likely to be, by the individual States, especially the building of avenues of interstate communication. In view of the logical sources of principal support for these two issues—the special classes who believed in governmental favors, benevolences, and stimulative initiatives in financial and commercial matters so long as these were devised and operated in certain directions of sufficient dignity and importance,—it was natural that the National Republicans and their successors, the Whigs, should welcome with great satisfaction the new issue presented to them in 1832 by President Jackson, that of the gov-

ernment bank, and become ardent partisans of the menaced institution.

On the subject of the tariff, the Whig party (we will now drop the National Republican name, which obtained only temporarily) was originally without any real argument except that of its resolve to defend the protective policy against all possible future acts of retrogression by the Democrats. A strong, in fact an ultra, protective system was in force, and the Jackson administration passed another protective law in 1832, which proved the last straw for South Carolina and precipitated the nullification. Then came a new embarrassment for the protectionist Whigs. A troublesome surplus revenue had accumulated from the tariff duties. The surplusage had to be stopped by tariff reductions and readjustments, and Clay and the other Whig statesmen joined in the necessary proceedings while cherishing in their hearts the principle of protection. In due time the Democratic party did the expected, totally reverted from the protective idea, declared for a revenue tariff, established the law of the land accordingly, and on that basis the government was conducted and the country prospered until the Civil War. Nothing lasting was accomplished by the Whigs with their protectionist doctrine, and the people were never aware of loss or hardship resulting from their failure. Yet it cannot be doubted that the people would have been heard from in any such case. There was at one time, as we have seen, an actual rebellion on account of a too high, and especially too discriminative, tariff. But who ever heard of any popular uprising, rage, or

disgust coinciding with or corresponding to deprivation of those protective largesses which in some quarters are considered so promotive of success and happiness?

Respecting internal improvements on a program of Federal assumptions and acts, the Whigs were equally unsuccessful. The Democratic party had by this time gone as far as it would permit itself to go in enactments presumptive of central authority concerning proposals and details that involved constitutional questions. Both Monroe and Madison, while favoring, on general principle, schemes of internal improvement by government action and at government expense, had considered such schemes improper practically unless authorized by a constitutional amendment. The balanced arrangement of Federal and State powers, responsibility, and obligations which was the distinguishing virtue of the Constitution, made it inexpedient for the national government to go into the States with improvement projects of its own. The States and the people locally, with the private business interests, were expected to be watchful over internal matters, to exert corresponding enterprise, and to take care of the expense and administration. State rights, for which the Democratic party stood, implied State duties. Against the Democratic opposition to internal improvements the Whigs were unable to make any headway, and there never was the slightest indication that the people were with them on that issue. Their two successes at Presidential elections (1840 and 1848) were followed by no positive results of any note for their party policies. The first Whig President, William Henry Harrison, died after only a month in

office; his successor, John Tyler, was recreant to the party; and the third, Zachary Taylor (who also died while serving), and fourth, Millard Fillmore, had to devote themselves to much more grave affairs than those of either internal improvements or tariff, and, moreover, never had the advantage of party control of Congress. It is interesting to speculate as to the probable results in relation to internal improvements if the Whig, instead of the Democratic, party had been dominant for the period, say, from 1833 to 1861. What would then have been the national policy about interstate railroad and telegraph construction, development, and control? Could the Whigs, with any consistency, have left those functions and operations altogether to private enterprise? It is a curious question.

With their third issue, favoring the government bank, the Whigs were no more successful than with their programs of protection and internal improvements. At the beginning of the great controversy about the Bank (1829) they appeared to have the advantage so far as representative public opinion was concerned. Although the Democrats were very largely in the majority in each house of Congress, the opposition by President Jackson to renewal of the Bank charter was so far from receiving concerted party support that when the recharter bill came up for action in the summer of 1832 it was passed. The President vetoed it, the ensuing campaign was fought on the issue which he thus made, and he was overwhelmingly sustained by the people. This decided the fate of the Bank, which, however, still had four years to run under its existing charter. But Jackson



DAVID B. HILL

David B. Hill, 32d governor (1885-1891); born in Havana, Chemung (now Schuyler) county, N. Y., August 29, 1843; graduated from the Havana academy; studied law in Elmira and was admitted to the bar in 1864; served from Chemung county in the state assembly in 1871 and 1872; president of the democratic state conventions of 1877 and 1881; mayor of Elmira in 1882; delegate to the national democratic convention of 1884; president of the New York state bar association in 1886 and 1887; chosen lieutenant governor of the state in 1882; became governor on the resignation of Grover Cleveland in 1885; elected governor in November, 1885; reelected in 1888; elected as a democrat to the United States senate; presented credentials December 17, 1891, qualified January 27, 1892 and served until March 3, 1897; resumed the practice of law; died in Albany, October 20, 1910.

had not ended with his war on the institution. By removing the government deposits (1833) he revived the dispute, and it now became even more bitter. He was charged with persecution of the Bank, and also with exercising dictatorial power. The Senate passed a resolution of censure against him, but after acrimonious debate lasting through still another Presidential contest that body voted to expunge the resolution from its records (January, 1837), and he accordingly retired to private life completely vindicated.

At the election of 1836 the stormy events of the preceding eight years, though attended by much agitation and dissension among the Democrats, left the Whigs quite spiritless. Unable to unite on a national ticket, they distributed their votes, according to State preferences, among three Presidential nominees of their party (William Henry Harrison, of Ohio; Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts; and Willie P. Mangum, of North Carolina), and in a portion of the south they adopted as their own a fourth candidate, Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, an anti-administration Democrat. In the Democratic party the personality and record of Jackson, conjoined with the strong position of the great majority in support of his course and policies, brought an end to the differences, except among some of the southern elements;—it may be remarked that as long as the Whig party lasted the Democrats had but an uncertain tenure in a number of the southern States. Martin Van Buren, of New York, Secretary of State under Jackson and a most sagacious and forceful leader of the party, was unanimously nominated for President by the

national convention. The Electoral vote stood: Van Buren, 170; Harrison, 73; White, 26; Webster, 14; Mangum, 11. For Vice-President, Richard M. Johnson (Democrat), of Kentucky, had 147 Electoral votes, just half of the whole number; he was afterward chosen to the office by the Senate—this being the only instance of failure by the people to elect the Vice-President.

While failing to show any approach to success on the Presidential result, the Whigs made substantial gains in the House of Representatives, lacking only a few votes of enough to control that body. The panic of 1837 followed, and a decided reaction on the subject of financial policy set in against the Democratic party. This, however, brought no reversal, so far as the Bank was concerned, during Van Buren's administration (1837-41). The Bank had been abolished for sufficient reasons; its resuscitation would mean simply a revival, in undoubtedly aggravated form, of the evil of a privileged central monopoly as a "regulator" of finance and politics; and neither Van Buren nor any subsequent Democratic Executive gave the slightest consideration to the appeals in its favor. Moreover, the Van Buren administration rejected all the importunate requests for loans to private citizens and interests during the panic, on the ground that in no emergency could the government, responsible to the people, permit itself to be used as a means of special support for individuals or their enterprises. An objection to Jackson's course with the Bank was that, while destroying the old system, he substituted only the tentative one of placing the government deposits with selected banking concerns. Van Buren set

forth without delay to perfect an affirmative measure concerning the deposits, and devised the plan of the "Independent Treasury," making the government itself the sole depository and thereby carrying to its logical conclusion the Jacksonian policy of the divorcement of the government from private financial and trade affairs and influences. In that effort he did not immediately have the coöperation of Congress, but an act was finally passed which he had the pleasure of signing on July 4, 1840, describing it as a new Declaration of Independence. This was repealed by the Whigs in 1841, but was reëstablished by the great Democratic administration of Polk in 1846—since which time the Independent Treasury with its Sub-Treasury ramifications has been retained without change by every successive administration and unqualifiedly commended by writers of all political beliefs as one of the splendid inheritances of the government and country from Democratic initiative and rule.

In 1840 the Democratic party met its first national defeat, William Henry Harrison, Whig, being chosen President by 234 Electoral votes to 60 for Van Buren, and the Whigs obtaining a substantial majority in each house of Congress. Before any legislative results could be accomplished by the Whig administration, President Harrison died (April 4, 1841), and the Vice-President, John Tyler, of Virginia, took his place. Tyler throughout his term (1841-45) went counter to all the plans of the Whig party: hence the familiar verb, tylerize—"to act against the party that has elected one to office" (Standard Dictionary). Though signing

the bill for doing away with the Independent Treasury he vetoed two measures designed to institute a government-controlled central Bank. After he had finished with the Bank scheme, the situation in which that whole ambitious project stood needed but a single word for its description—Finis. The people returned promptly to emphatic approval of the Jacksonian financial position, giving the Democratic party a majority of 63 in the House at the Congressional elections of 1842. Even the great Whig leaders who had most positively advocated the Bank's cause never ventured to renew the agitation. When Clay made his next race for the Presidency, in 1844, his platform was absolutely silent on the Bank subject.

The official position of the Democratic party concerning the Bank was continually expressed in the following words in its national platforms: "That Congress has no power to charter a national bank; that we believe such an institution one of deadly hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a concentrated money power and above the laws and the will of the people; and that the results of Democratic legislation in this and all other financial measures upon which issues have been made between the two political parties of the country, have demonstrated to candid and practical men of all parties their soundness, safety, and utility in all business pursuits."

In this declaration the words "national bank" meant, of course, a central privileged institution similar in

organization, powers, and tendencies to the old discarded establishment.

During the period reviewed in this chapter there was a radical change from the original ideas and methods of party organization, control, nominations, and operations. In preparation for the campaign of 1824 a Congressional caucus was called, mainly in the interest of Crawford, one of the Presidential aspirants, but the attendance was small and the action taken received no recognition from the Democracy at large; this was the last of the nominating caucuses. Four years later the personal issue between Jackson and Adams was squarely defined, and no national nominating ceremonies were necessary. But in 1832, with two great parties in the field and actively competing for general support, it was decided by the leaders of both to refer the nominations of President and Vice-President directly to the people through their representatives in special assemblages.

The first Democratic national convention was held in Baltimore, May 21, 1832, Robert Lucas, of Ohio, presiding. As Jackson's renomination unanimously was a foregone conclusion, no rule was adopted to govern the choice of the Presidential candidate, but it was decided that a two-thirds vote should be required for the Vice-Presidential selection. At the next national convention the two-thirds rule was applied to both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominations; and it has since been adhered to in every national convention of the party.

From the national nominating system was evolved the plan of precise formulation and declaration of party

principles and issues in platforms, and in 1840 the Democrats presented to the public their first national platform. The first national committee of the party was established in 1848.

The inception of minor parties, undertaking to compete on certain questions with the two powerful political organizations, dates from the campaign of 1832, when the Anti-Masonic party made its appearance on the fantastic issue of suppression of all secret oath-bound orders, and actually carried a State, Vermont, for its Presidential ticket.

In 1840 the Abolition, or Liberty, party, representing the radical sentiment of opposition to slavery, was instituted.

Concerning these and the numerous other sporadic parties that have since sprung up, it is needless to comment with any particularity. All of them have proved utterly futile, and their annals belong merely to the miscellanies, marginalia, and curiosities of politics. The genius of our institutions has required from the beginning, and requires to-day, a two-party system, and a two-party system only. The American people believe in positive politics conducted by two major forces, each of them strong enough fairly to balance the other, and each broad enough, from the viewpoint of inherited American standards and principles of government, to appeal powerfully to the comprehensive public. It has happened that a major party has become decadent and defunct; this may occur again. But no major party has gone into dissolution as the consequence of minor party pressure or pretension; and no minor party has

risen to the dignity of a major party or even a permanently weighty third party. There have been serious splits in the great parties, which have presented certainly the most favorable situations possible to be imagined for hopeful third party development; but in that direction nothing, absolutely nothing, has resulted except for the campaigns immediately in prospect. No teaching of American political history is more persistent or striking than that of the futility of minor party voting.

CHAPTER V
THE MEXICAN WAR AND THE
WILMOT PROVISIO

1844-1848

“**T**HE American Democracy place their trust in the intelligence, the patriotism, and the discriminating justice of the American people. We regard this as a distinctive feature of our political creed, which we are proud to maintain before the world as the great moral element in a form of government springing from and upheld by the popular will.”

With these words the early national platforms of the Democratic party began. In keeping with their spirit was an unflinching and consistent course, with which the characteristic disposition and action of the Whigs sharply contrasted. The inconsistencies of Henry Clay are proverbial. Resembling them were the frequent embarrassments and hesitations of his party. Neither the Whig party nor Clay lacked aggressiveness in maintaining an issue when once decided upon. But finding it impossible to make progress with the people on their issues after due endeavors, the Whigs had recourse to circumspection and expediency, hoping thus to win popular favor away from the positive

Democrats. Such has never proved the method of good politics in the long run.

In the latter part of Tyler's administration the Texas question became acute. Texas, adjoining the Louisiana Purchase at the southwest and belonging first to Spain and then, after the successful Mexican Revolution, to the republic of Mexico, had been largely penetrated and settled by citizens of our southern States, who, as was the custom of those times among southern Americans, owned negro slaves. These settlers revolted against Mexico and set up a separate Texan republic (1836). They next sought admission to the United State by annexation, which meant the addition of another slave State to the Union, and also war with Mexico on account of the claim of the Texans to a vast territory still in Mexican possession, extending to the Rio Grande River from its mouth to its source. Some years elapsed before the annexation proposal was definitely formulated. President Tyler favored it, and early in 1844 an annexation treaty was presented to the Senate, which that body held under consideration for several months and then rejected—the Whig members and a few northern Democrats voting against it.

Coinciding with the discussion about Texas was that in relation to settling the northwestern (Oregon) boundary dispute with Great Britain. The Oregon Country, so called (comprising the present States of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho), had long been under "joint occupation" by the United States and Great Britain, pending diplomatic adjustment of the boundary. Diplomatic negotiations were still in progress

throughout Tyler's administration. There was no indication as to the probable outcome. The people were impatient for a decision, and a large element demanded the full amount of the American territorial claim, reaching to the parallel $54^{\circ} 40'$.

Therefore at the opening of the Presidential campaign of 1844 two immensely important territorial questions, affecting the destiny of the nation, were under consideration. The Oregon controversy, no matter what boundary line should ultimately be drawn, would necessarily result in our acquiring title to a new domain at the north, from which slavery would be excluded. The Texas dispute involved the acceptance or refusal of a new domain at the south, in which slavery had already been established by its inhabitants. In both matters the rights and fortunes of enterprising and brave American pioneers and home-builders, who were looking to our government for sympathy and support, were at stake.

On May 27, 1844, five weeks after the submission of the Texas treaty to the Senate, the Democratic national convention met in Baltimore. The platform declared for both annexation of Texas and insistence upon our claim to the whole of Oregon. It had been supposed that Van Buren would again be nominated for President, and he had a majority on the first ballot, though far from the necessary two-thirds. He was known to be opposed to immediate Texan annexation, and his selection was therefore impossible. James K. Polk, of Tennessee, was nominated unanimously on the ninth ballot. The Whigs in their platform were silent on the

Texas question, besides ignoring the subjects of the Bank and internal improvements, and even referring to the tariff in only evasive terms. Their candidate, Clay, endeavored during the canvass to accommodate himself to various views concerning Texas, with the result that while many people were glad to credit him with "statesmanlike" intentions it was not clear how he would act if elected. It was generally understood, however, that the Whig policy was against war with Mexico. The election was decided by the vote of New York, which gave Polk a plurality of about 5,000—Clay's defeat being attributed to the action of the third party Abolitionists, who polled in that State 15,812 votes for their Presidential nominee, James G. Birney. The Electoral vote of the nation was, Polk, 170; Clay, 105. The Democrats elected a majority in each branch of Congress.

Following this decisive result there was no longer any question about Texas. Resistance in Congress to the Democratic program ceased to be of any avail, and when the Tyler administration went out of office (March 4, 1845) the annexation had been made an accomplished fact. The expected war with Mexico ensued, terminating with the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was proclaimed by President Polk on July 4, 1848, the United States acquiring all the huge territory westward from the Louisiana Purchase, with the Pacific coast from the south to the north line of California. Six years afterward the Gadsden Purchase, enlarging the southern bounds of Arizona and New Mexico, was added as the result of peaceful nego-

tiation with Mexico by the Democratic administration of Pierce.

As for Oregon, the aggressive attitude that had been expressed in 1844 by the Democratic campaign cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight!" gave way to a more moderate disposition under the responsibilities involved in the final treaty arrangements with England. The boundary was fixed at the forty-ninth parallel, in conformity to the irreducible claims of both countries. No dispassionate American writer has ever taken exception to that adjustment, except by way of regret that the Polk administration was debarred by the previous diplomatic course of our government from urging a claim to Vancouver Island.

It was under Democratic initiative and action that the United States secured the entire portion of its territory extending from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, as well as the valuable Florida cession.

The Mexican War led directly and instantly to a revival of the political slavery question, which, as we have seen, had been originally settled by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. That Compromise, based on the admission of Missouri as a slave State but the exclusion of slavery from all other western territory (as existing in 1820) north of $36^{\circ} 30'$, was of course inapplicable, except by new Congressional act, to the tremendous expanse added to the national possessions in the years 1845-48. Anti-slavery sentiment had greatly increased at the north, and was sternly opposed to any farther spread of the slave system; while at the south there was an unalterable resolve not only to maintain the slavery

institution, but to extend it into the new western regions so as to assure the erection of more slave States and preserve the south's relative political strength in the Union.

The south considered itself to have rightful opportunities and expectations of slavery development in the Union. But the great majority of the northern people refused to recognize any slavery rights except those that for necessary reasons could not be contradicted. It was not proposed to disturb or limit slavery in the States where it existed, but all the projects to extend it caused instant trouble.

The reasons for absolute non-interference with slavery in the States where it then existed were constitutional. They could not possibly be overcome save by forcibly disrupting the Union, which none wanted to do except the extreme Abolitionists of the Garrisonian school, who regarded the Constitution as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell." As a matter of fact, when finally slavery was abolished in the southern States, the Union had already been disrupted by force, and the only question respecting it was whether it could be restored by the same agency.

Moreover, the most essential and precious guarantee of our whole political system, that of the exclusive and inviolable right of the several States to the control of their local affairs, so far as powers had not been expressly surrendered to the Federal government, required that the Federal government should let slavery strictly alone in the States where it was an established institution. It was the separation of State rights and

functions from national powers and pretensions that alone had made democracy successful and ultimately given it such supremacy that any other institutional plan was unimaginable. Interference with slavery in the States that chose to have it was incompatible with guaranteed State rights; the matter was simply undebatable, except on the conjectural basis of a constitutional amendment nationally prohibiting or discriminating against slavery—and how could such an amendment, needing three-fourths of the States for its ratification, be procured with half the States surely against it?

But the positiveness and total irreconcilability of the conflicting opinions and preferences on the fundamental question of slavery made it imperative to find a political solution in relation to the future States at the west. Civil war was at that time not thought of; the idea was too monstrous; both sections were unanimously for the Union. The only solution was an agreement of some kind. Pending the official termination of the Mexican War there was much discussion in Congress, and various proposals were introduced. The only substantive results were the admission of Texas as a slave State (1845) and the organization of Oregon as a free Territory (1848).

From the Congressional debate, however, there was evolved an exceedingly striking measure of policy, the Wilmot Proviso, which, though abortive in the end, had a profound influence upon politics. This was a northern Democratic measure in its origin, but received substantial support also from the northern wing of the

Whig party. Introduced in the House (1846) by David Wilmot, a Democratic member from Pennsylvania, it passed on final consideration by 87 to 64 and was many times reaffirmed by that body, but was never accepted by the Senate. It was intended to be a joint resolution, authorized President Polk to initiate negotiations with Mexico, and added:

“Provided, That as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of the said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall be first duly convicted.”

The rival Presidential candidates in 1848 were Lewis Cass, of Michigan, Democrat, and General Zachary Taylor, of Louisiana, Whig. On the new slavery questions neither party had as yet a program of exact measures. Consistently with the indecisive results in Congress, party attitudes were still subject to deliberation, and every latitude was allowed to diverse views.

In previous Democratic platforms the general principles had been laid down that the Federal government was “one of limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution”; that it was “inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers”; that Congress had “no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States”; and that such States were “the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the Constitution.” These declarations

were now renewed, and their implications in relation to the slavery discussion were given increased significance by announcing that the party proposed to maintain, as a high and sacred duty, "a vigilant and constant adherence to those principles and compromises of the Constitution which are broad enough and strong enough to embrace and uphold the Union as it was, the Union as it is, and the Union as it shall be in the full expansion of the energies and capacity of this great and progressive people." In other words, the Democratic party declared itself to be strictly, absolutely, and unconditionally a Union party; and though the sectional subject was not specified in that connection everyone knew it was the sectional subject that was the occasion for the pronouncement.

Besides deciding to leave the details of the slavery question to the future, the Democratic convention of 1848 declined to enter into condemnations of particular propositions and party elements that were regarded with disfavor in certain quarters. It voted down a resolution that denounced the Wilmot Proviso as bad Democratic doctrine, and it also took an impartial course as between two contesting delegations from New York, one of which favored the Wilmot Proviso and the other opposed it—offering seats to both on equal terms. But neither of the factions was willing to accept such an arrangement, and New York was consequently unrepresented in the convention. The New York supporters of the Proviso—popularly known as Barnburners because it was said they were like the wrathful Dutchman who burned his barn to exterminate the rats and mice



DANIEL MANNING

Daniel Manning, secretary of the treasury; born at Albany, May 16, 1831; entered the employ of the Albany Argus as office boy at the age of 12; by successive grades rose to the presidency of the company in 1873; active in politics from 1872; delegate to every state convention from 1874 until 1884; secretary of the democratic state committee, 1879-1880; vice-chairman, 1881-1884; delegate to the democratic national conventions of 1876, 1880, 1884; secretary of the treasury under President Cleveland from March 1885 until April 1887, when he resigned; died at Albany, N. Y. December 24, 1887.



WILLIAM COLLINS WHITNEY

William Collins Whitney, ex-secretary of the navy; born at Conway, Mass., July 15, 1841; graduated from Yale college, 1863 and Harvard law school, 1865; admitted to the bar and practiced law in New York City; assisted in organizing the young men's democratic club, 1871; active against the Tweed ring; defeated for district attorney of New York county, 1872; corporation counsel of New York City, 1875; secretary of the navy in President Cleveland's cabinet, 1885; died in New York City, February 2, 1904.

that infested it—bolted the Democratic national ticket, and from that action resulted the call for the celebrated Buffalo convention which established the Free Soil, or Free Democratic, party and nominated Van Buren as a separate Presidential candidate on a platform of intense and comprehensive antagonism to slavery.

While the Democrats in 1848 were torn by factional differences, due to the bold maintenance of anti-slavery principles by an important part of their following, the Whigs were extremely, indeed minutely, careful to keep from even the appearance of being concerned about principles or disturbed by discordant elements of any kind. Their national convention adopted no platform. Although they had every hope of winning the election, they refused to do justice to their tried leader, Clay, denying him the nomination because they thought it safer to have a perfectly colorless candidate, General Taylor.

The Wilmot Proviso defeated the Democrats. In the pivotal State of New York their regular nominee, Cass, had only 114,318 votes; Van Buren, Free Democrat, had 120,510; and Taylor, Whig, had 218,603. New York had up to that time been a reliably Democratic State. So had Pennsylvania, which also went against Cass. Taylor carried seven northern and eight southern States, with a total Electoral vote of 163; Cass won in eight States of the north and seven of the south, and had 127 votes.

CHAPTER VI

THE PARTY OF THE UNION

1849-1857

A GREAT event brought to an end the mere experimental discussion and inconclusive Congressional treatment of the various phases of the slavery question, and inaugurated those positive measures which, with the constantly increasing embitterment of feeling that they produced, resulted in the Civil War. Gold was discovered in California in 1848, and that region of formerly sparse population and inconsequential development and enterprise was rapidly settled by as energetic and masterful a people as have ever wrought mighty and beneficent changes. In little more than a year California showed a sufficient number of inhabitants to be indisputably entitled to admission as a State of the Union. Without resorting to the dignified and leisurely preliminary of Territorial organization under Federal auspices, the people, in October, 1849, held a convention which adopted a State Constitution. This Constitution excluded slavery from the proposed State. It was popularly approved at a special election, the vote being 12,066 to 811, and application was made to Congress for admission.

At once it was seen that the granting of California's

application would involve two startling consequences: First, it would give the north sixteen States as against the south's fifteen, and therefore destroy the balance of the sections; and Second, it would make impossible the projection of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific, a proceeding favored by many statesmen of that day, and strongly urged by the south, as an ideal solution of the sectional problem. Thus the proposed admission would enhance the political power and prestige of the north and doubtless stimulate that section to seek still further gains against slavery. The south understood that the wish of California could not be denied consistently with democratic principles, yet was in no mood to yield advantages to the north without equivalents. The situation was full of danger for the Union. Although thoroughly desiring to stay in the Union on equal terms for slavery, or at least terms guaranteeing the future security and influential position of the institution, the south unalterably preferred disunion to sacrifice or imperilment of its own political power and fundamental domestic system.

The Compromise measures of 1850 were accordingly conceived, agreed to by the leaders of both political parties, and after long and strenuous debate passed by the two branches of Congress and signed by the Whig President, Millard Fillmore (formerly Vice-President, who had succeeded to the Chief-Magistracy upon the death of President Taylor, July 9, 1850). In brief, the Compromises provided as follows: 1. Admission of California without slavery and without reduction or division of its territory. 2. Organization of two new

Territories, Utah and New Mexico, out of the remaining part of the domain ceded by Mexico; these Territories, and the States later rising from them, to have the right to establish or exclude slavery without interposition by Congress. 3. A more effective Fugitive Slave law, to be strictly enforced by the Federal officials and courts, and requiring all the inhabitants of every State and Territory to assist slaveowners in recovering their escaped negroes. 4. Addition of a large part of Texas to New Mexico upon payment of a money indemnity by the Federal government to Texas. 5. Abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, but no disturbance of the existing status of that institution.

The gain for the south of the Fugitive Slave law and the right to an equal chance for slavery in the new Territories was regarded, so far as active anti-slavery opinion was concerned, as the commanding feature of the Compromises; and it was active anti-slavery opinion, incessantly opposing all gains for the south and insisting on Charles Sumner's dictum, "Freedom national, slavery sectional," that was to dominate the political situation ultimately. But in 1850 the overmastering desire of the country was for sectional harmony within and for the Union. Clay and Webster, the great leaders of the Whigs, were whole-heartedly for the Compromises, inclusive of the Fugitive Slave and Utah-New Mexico bills:—Clay was indeed the chief originator and foremost champion of the measures as a whole, and Webster, as the head of the cabinet, fully approved President Fillmore's signature of all the acts.

Nevertheless, the Whig party, by its vacillating, timid, and scrupulously expedient course had become a very uncertain factor; the only unquestionable thing about it was its relative weakness with the people. It had never really led the country, and all the successive events demonstrated that it never could. The Compromises were accepted by the general public, north and south, as settling the slavery controversy, and a consistent policy and administration for the future were therefore expected. The preservation of the Union was believed to be assured by the accommodations that had been made, provided there should be no reopening of the slavery question in a manner to provoke secessionist action at the south; and as the Democratic party had the complete confidence of the country for its representative position and effective strength in support of the Union, its triumph over the Whigs at the Presidential election of 1852 was so great as to resemble its early successes against the Federalists.

Yet the official attitude of the Whigs on slavery in the 1852 campaign was wholly identical with that of the Democrats. Both parties declared unqualifiedly for the Compromises as affording a final settlement of the controversy, and against all attempts to revive sectional differences; and the Whig platform added: "We will maintain this system [of the settlement] as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union." The people, however, as had always been the case save under certain peculiar temporary conditions, were much more strongly inclined toward the Democrats than the Whigs on the principal

issues of government. Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, the Democratic candidate, received 254 Electoral votes, against 42 for the Whig nominee, General Winfield Scott, of New Jersey. The only States carried by Scott were Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Vermont—two southern and two northern. The Democrats retained the Senate by a very large majority and elected more than two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives.

This result was not a sectional victory in any sense. The sectional question, on account of the absolute Unionism of both the great parties, was not at issue. It was a victory, of overwhelming proportions, for the Democratic party, after calm and fair consideration by the country of the relative merits of the rival organizations in view of the lack of any difference between them on the sectional question. The Free Democratic, or Free Soil, party declined greatly in strength. Its candidate, John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, received in the nation only 156,149 votes, as against 291,263 cast for Van Buren in 1848. If there had been a marked sectional spirit popularly, the Free Soilers would have benefited, as they were the only political sectionalists of that time.

The outstanding event of Pierce's administration (1853-57) was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the early part of 1854. This repeal measure was introduced and championed by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, and was supported by the administration Democrats and the conservative Whigs. It was maintained that as the Compromise legislation of 1850 had

given the south an equal chance for slavery in the Territories of New Mexico and Utah, a new national principle governing the question of slavery in the Territories had consequently been established—the principle of “popular sovereignty,” or decision by vote of the people concerned; and that the same principle should be applied to the still unorganized portion of the old Louisiana Purchase north of $36^{\circ} 30'$ —an extensive country lying west of Missouri, Iowa, and Minnesota, and stretching to the crest of the Rocky Mountains. It had become of urgent importance to extinguish the Indian titles and erect Territories in the Louisiana Purchase, not only as a matter of satisfaction to American settlers who wished the lands, but also for the security and advantage of the many emigrants crossing the plains to California and Oregon, who were entitled to the protection of organized government and the benefit of civilized settlement along their routes of travel.

An effort had been made at the Congressional session of 1852-53 (before the coming in of the Pierce administration) to institute a new Territory west of Missouri under the anti-slavery guarantee of the Missouri Compromise, but it had failed because of southern opposition in the Senate. The establishment of such a Territory could not be delayed, and it was certain the south would agree to its organization if the ban against slavery should be lifted. Altogether, the arguments for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise seemed convincing to Douglas, and the great influence that he exercised, combined with the active favor of the south,

carried the repeal measure through. The bill provided for creating out of the Louisiana Purchase two new Territories, Kansas and Nebraska, and was therefore known as the Kansas-Nebraska bill.

Strong opposition to the policy thus entered upon was at once developed at the north, and the issue was taken into all the State and Congressional elections of 1854. The movement resulted in the inception and organization of the Republican party, although for some time the opponents of the act were slow to assume the name of Republicans, preferring to be called Anti-Nebraskans. There was as yet no concerted plan of the diverse elements represented to combine themselves into a compact new party. The political situation just at that time was vastly complicated by the appearance of the Know-Nothing, or so-styled "American" party, on a program of comprehensive antagonism to the foreign-born elements of the population and to the Catholic church. This organization had not as yet formally entered the political field; and as it operated on the basis of a strictly secret "order" it remained an uncertain quantity throughout the upheaval that immediately followed the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act. At the fall elections of 1854 the Know-Nothings polled a formidable vote in several important States and elected a large number of members of Congress. Meantime the Whig party, while here and there making a valorous fight for life, fell into a state of general collapse that presaged its early end. It did not have the votes to maintain an effective existence for itself after parting with its many members who decided to

join, variously, the Republican or other Anti-Nebraska aggregations, the Know-Nothings, or the Democratic party as the party of the Union.

Into this confused condition of politics simplicity was gradually introduced as the result of the overshadowing interest in the great Kansas issue and the practical developments arising from it. The south was determined to secure Kansas for slavery, but northern sentiment was grimly resolved not to permit that outcome. A decision could be reached only by the weight of popular preference in Kansas itself after settlement had advanced sufficiently to admit of conclusive action by vote. For there was no possible question, in the existing political circumstances, of repealing the Kansas-Nebraska act or of summarily awarding Kansas to one side or the other by national intervention of any kind. Southern and northern emigrants consequently thronged to Kansas, and with them, of course, went interested politicians and agitators who stoutly maintained the claims of their respective sides and were ready at all times to seek and seize every advantage. The southern partisans were mostly from the adjacent State of Missouri, and, as rough frontiersmen who had thoroughly convinced themselves that they had a superior right to the Kansas soil, they did not hesitate to take high-handed measures. Neither did the northern settlers, for that matter, after duly experiencing the difficulties and dangers of the proposition before them. The natural results were premature and one-sided elections, rival governments, armed conflicts (the celebrated "Border Ruffian" wars), neighborhood feuds, murders

both unprovoked and retaliatory, and villainies of all varieties.

It should be always borne in mind that the Kansas issue and situation originated from the irreconcilable nature of the opposed views of the sections on the slavery question, which never had been a party question and which the Democratic party, as the responsible party of the Union, passionately desired should not be. On this point the most distinguished northern historians—notably that preëminent authority concerning the period in question, James F. Rhodes—have done justice to the Democratic party. The south and north equally made the issue—the south's contribution being its insistence upon a position of political equality in the Union, and the north's its refusal to concede national equality to slavery. Suppose the Missouri Compromise had not been repealed—what then? Would the south then have consented to the opening of a new free Territory in the Louisiana Purchase without the compensatory arrangement of a new slave Territory somewhere else? Certainly not. Moreover, and this is a still more interesting point, if the south had been debarred from a chance in Kansas, would it not have elected to adhere to its favorite project, at that time ready for execution, of annexing Cuba? It is the opinion of many historical students that the move to annex Cuba after an indispensable war with Spain in that connection, was stopped only by the concession to the south of the Missouri Compromise repeal.

In the clear light of history it is easy to see that the repeal was nevertheless a great mistake, especially so on

expedient grounds, and most particularly on the ground of the interest of non-sectionalism, which the Democratic party had earnestly at heart. It was an experiment which appeared logical, but of which the consequences could not be foreseen, any more than the results to flow from the formation of the sectional Republican party could be predicted by even the wisest participants in that epochal enterprise.

The House of Representatives of the Thirty-fourth Congress (1855-57) was organized by the Republicans, Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, being elected Speaker. A consolidation of all the Anti-Nebraska members was necessary to accomplish the result after unsuccessful balloting for two months. Not a single southern vote was given to Banks. Thus in its first national success the Republican party took on the sectional character that has always distinguished it.

At their first national nominating convention, held in Philadelphia on June 17, 1856, the Republicans selected as their candidates two northern men—John C. Fremont, of California, for President, and William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, for Vice-President. Their platform was mainly a presentation of the issue of non-extension of slavery as related to the Territories, and the immediate admission of Kansas as a free State was demanded. One of the resolutions asserted it to be "both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery"; and there were other references to slavery which signified condemnation of it as a system. Disunionism, however, was utterly and of course with the

greatest sincerity opposed, the declaration being made that "the Federal Constitution, the rights of the States, and Union of the States shall be preserved"; and the extreme anti-slavery proposals that previously had been urged by the Free Soil and Abolition parties were disregarded on account of the practical considerations against them.

Yet under the conditions that then existed a tendency of disunionism was marked out for the Republican party as inseparable from the nature of its organization and policy. Political sectionalism meant disunionism. It was so construed to mean by all the opponents of the Republicans in the canvass—the Democrats, the conservative Whigs, and the Know-Nothings. "The Union in danger" was a warning continually heard. Rufus Choate, the distinguished lawyer, wrote that the first duty was "to unite and dissolve the new geographical party calling itself Republican, to prevent the madness of the times from working its maddest act—the very ecstasy of its madness,—the permanent formation and the actual triumph of a party which knows one-half of America only to hate and dread it. . . . The triumph of such a party puts the Union in danger." And Mr. Choate prophetically added: "If the Republican party accomplishes its object and gives the government to the north I turn my eyes from the consequences. To the fifteen States of the south that government will appear an alien government. It will appear worse. It will appear a hostile government."

We shall not dwell on this subject; our sole purpose in discussing it is to present dispassionately, and in as

brief words as possible, the historical facts and the opposed points of view of those distressed times. There was a divided responsibility for the rupture of the Union, and neither the Democratic nor the Republican party knew or could estimate the actual bearings or consequences of its attitude. The responsibility of the sectional Republicans for the ultimate result was positive, so was that of the sectional south; while the Democratic responsibility was purely incidental and negative. In the case of the Republicans the fact of positive responsibility is not changed by saying that their party zeal prevented them from taking the menace of secession seriously—that indeed they were wholly of the opinion, as expressed by one of their chief leaders, Henry Wilson, that the southerners could not be kicked out of the Union; for a great party is as directly to be charged with responsibility for its misconceptions and miscalculations as it is to be credited for its wise or fortunate judgments and acts. On the other hand, the Democrats had no zeal of party for any sectional principle or course; their zeal was altogether for the Union; and their connection with the eventuality of disunion was solely that of physical inability to control the powerful and irreconcilable forces operating for the Union's inevitable destruction.

Regarding this matter of responsibility there remains the question of right and wrong on the slavery issue. That question, on moral grounds, admits of no argument; and on practical grounds it has long since, and everlastingly, been settled. At the period referred to it was, for the north, morally just as easy a question as

it is now. The north, having no slaves, could with perfect convenience take the one impregnable moral position—that the pretended right of any man to have a slave was simply unthinkable. But the south had slaves, hundreds of thousands of them, inherited from past generations, multiplying by natural increase, constituting the entire foundation of her economic and social structure. It was impossible for the south even to consider the proposal of emancipation—and there was no alternative proposal save that of retention of slavery that was practical. And to what substantial use would be the noble altruism of liberation? To this question, however attentively considered, there had been no answer, and none seemed possible. Henry Clay, residing in Kentucky, was a slaveowner. A man of more lofty, humane, and generous character never lived. Addressing a political meeting at Richmond, Indiana, during his 1844 campaign, he was interrupted by a Quaker, a Mr. Mendenhall, who asked him why he did not free his slaves. Mr. Clay replied that he had about fifty of them. Some were old and infirm, others infants—should he abandon them to the cold charities of the world? Others would not leave him—should he drive them away? He estimated his slaves to be worth \$15,000. If he would agree to lose that sum by liberating them, would Mendenhall and his friends agree to provide for them to the amount of \$15,000 after they had been given their freedom?

Hence the question of right and wrong had more than one side in practice. And no one at the north had any definite program for helping the south to a solution.

But as regarded by northern sentiment, slavery was intolerable. That was sufficient. The question of responsibility and consequences involved in the Republican sectional attitude became insignificant when slavery reached out to northern soil, as it was doing under the Fugitive Slave and Kansas-Nebraska laws. Such, stated with perfect dispassionateness, was the true Republican position. The Democratic position was, that the Union was all important.

In its platform of 1856 the Democratic party announced that, "claiming fellowship with and desiring the coöperation of all who regard the preservation of the Union under the Constitution as the paramount issue," it repudiated "all sectional parties and platforms concerning domestic slavery which seek to embroil the States and incite to treason and armed resistance to law in the Territories, and whose avowed purposes, if consummated, must end in civil war and disunion." James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, and John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, were nominated for President and Vice-President.

The Know-Nothings nominated former President Millard Fillmore, of New York, and Andrew J. Donelson, of Tennessee, on a platform asserting their special ideas and adhering to conservative views on the slavery question. An anti-slavery faction of the Know-Nothings sought to effect a fusion with the Republicans, but its offer was declined, although no condemnation of Know-Nothingism was embodied in the Republican platform. The Democrats, however, adopted a very strong plank in opposition to the Know-Nothing

demands for discriminations against the foreign-born and Catholics.

A national convention was held by the Whigs, which endorsed the Know-Nothing nominees.

Buchanan won, receiving 174 Electoral votes to 114 for Fremont and 8 for Fillmore. In the whole south the Republican popular vote was only 1,194. Buchanan carried fourteen southern and five northern States, Fremont eleven northern States, and Fillmore one southern State, Maryland.

The administration of President Pierce came to an end on March 4, 1857. In addition to the political events that have been narrated it is memorable for the great acceleration of the movement of homeseeking settlers to the far west; the acquisition of more territory from Mexico by the Gadsden Purchase (1854); the development of California, Oregon, and the new Territories; and the entrance of the government upon a policy for promoting American interests in the Pacific. During this administration occurred the opening of Japan to commercial intercourse with the world—destined to prove one of the most tremendous events in modern history,—as the result of Commodore Perry's expedition and the treaty concluded between the United States and Japanese governments in March, 1854.



D-CADY HERRICK

D-Cady Herrick, lawyer; born Esperance, Schoharie county, April 12, 1846; educated Albany classical school; studied law with Justice Rufus W. Peckham; admitted to the bar, 1868; democratic nominee for district attorney Albany county, 1877; elected 1880 and 1883; corporation counsel of the city of Albany, 1886-1891; justice supreme court of N. Y., 1891 to December 31, 1905; served as associate justice of the appellate division, 1894-1905; candidate for governor of New York, 1904.



SMITH MEAD WEED

Smith Mead Weed, lawyer; born at Belmont, N. Y., July 26, 1833; educated in public schools and worked in stores for five years; studied law and admitted to the bar, January 1, 1856; graduated from Harvard law school, 1859, and practiced at Plattsburg, N. Y.; member of the state assembly, 1865-1873; member state senate, 1867-1869; 1887-1889; 1890-1892; delegate at large to constitutional convention, 1867; delegate to several democratic national conventions.

CHAPTER VII

THE ISSUES AND ELECTION OF 1860

1857-1860

THE immediate events that brought on the Civil War were the natural developments of the irreconcilable political positions and sectional antagonisms which have been briefly reviewed in the last chapter. Probably the chiefest of these events, in the respect of intensifying feelings, was the decision in the Dred Scott case by the United States Supreme Court (March 6, 1857), declaring that Congress had no constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, and also practically affirming slavery to be a legitimate institution on fundamental grounds. Thus all for which the south had contended on the broad basis of asserted right was made the law of the land. It was impossible that the south could thenceforth fail to insist upon results to its own advantage; and equally it was impossible that northern anti-slavery sentiment could fail increasingly to seek the power of unhindered political action—a power transcending every other, and therefore able to find ways for effectively dealing with slavery in spite of technical difficulties on certain points.

Another outstanding development was the contest over the celebrated pro-slavery Lecompton Constitu-

tion of Kansas, an instrument which, from the circumstances of its inception and subsequent submission to the people of the Territory (1857), had excited the bitter opposition of the free-State party. President Buchanan regarded the Lecompton Constitution as the result of competent action taken under due legal authority; but many of the northern Democrats, headed by Douglas, condemned and repudiated it because they believed it was not representative of the popular will. The controversy was with reference to the admission of Kansas on the basis of this Constitution. At the national election of 1856 the Democrats had recovered control of the House of Representatives, besides retaining the Senate; they consequently had the power to enact the Lecompton bill and admit Kansas as a slave State. Douglas and his followers, however, prevented that consummation. A compromise measure, the English bill (introduced by William H. English, an anti-Lecompton Democratic member of the House from Indiana, who afterward, 1880, ran on the Democratic ticket for Vice-President), was passed and signed by the President (1858), which directed that the Lecompton Constitution be resubmitted to the Kansas voters, together with certain propositions concerning the public lands. The Kansans thereupon rejected the proposed Constitution by a majority of ten thousand. And so the final decision against slavery in Kansas was reached under a Congressional act of Democratic origin and Democratic administrative approval. It is true the measure embodied details unacceptable to Republican leaders; but it brought the main issue

before the people of Kansas in a manner creating a situation practically very different from that upon which the pro-slavery partisans had previously taken their stand.

With Kansas irrevocably lost to the south, the whole idea of popular sovereignty as a practical device for implanting slavery at the west was seen to be a delusion. It is indeed strange that the south could ever have seriously expected to be able to outvote the anti-slavery people on a great competitive effort in the Territories; and stranger still is it that the southern leaders could have taken the position of resting their case for the future upon the outcome in the single Territory of Kansas. In its last reduction the question of the political control of Kansas was a question of establishing on the soil the major number of settlers; and for economic reasons the unencumbered northerners were certain to outdo the slave-ridden southerners in the settlement contest. According to the historian Rhodes, there was at no time in Kansas a slave population of more than three hundred—this notwithstanding the proximity of the slave States of Missouri and Arkansas. Pro-slavery sympathizers of course went in large numbers; but the successful competitive taking up of Kansas lands for either immediate or future cultivation by slave labor was not a practical matter in the emergent case made by the inrush of homeseekers from the north.

And even if the south had won Kansas previously to 1858 the desired balance of the States, sixteen to sixteen, would have obtained only temporarily. For in 1858

Minnesota was admitted as a free State, and in 1859 Oregon, also free, was admitted. It is worthy of remark that both these admissions, giving the north eighteen States to the south's fifteen, occurred during the Democratic administration of Buchanan, when the sectional situation had reached its most critical stage. As both Minnesota and Oregon were deemed to have sufficient population, as their inhabitants unanimously desired admission, and as there were no complicating conditions locally on the subject of slavery, the national government welcomed them to statehood notwithstanding the aggravated political position as between the sections and the menace to the Democratic party. Moreover, before the going out of the Buchanan administration Kansas, too, was admitted (January 29, 1861).

The uselessness of any further struggle for slavery extension by the means of popular vote in the Territories had at last become perfectly plain. Yet there remained the facts of slavery's right to enter the Territories under the Supreme Court decision, the south's determination to yield nothing, and the certainty of a crisis in the event that the Republican party should come into full control nationally. Thus the fateful issue was made up for the campaign of 1860. Meantime there was an unmistakable growth in Republican strength. The elections of 1858 gave the Republicans a plurality over the Democrats in the House of Representatives, with the Know-Nothings holding the balance; and when the new House organized a Republican, William Pennington, of New Jersey, was chosen Speaker. This was the period of the rise of Abraham

Lincoln to a conspicuous position in the national political field as the result of his debates with Douglas in Illinois in 1858, followed by his remarkable address in Cooper Institute, New York City, on February 27, 1860. Thoughtful people began to realize that there could be but one logical conclusion to Republican success—that of progressive and in the end decisive action, regardless of southern opposition and of the necessary consequences, along the line of Lincoln's declaration made at Springfield, Illinois, June 17, 1858, "This government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free"; a declaration paraphrased by William H. Seward in his "Irrepressible conflict" speech delivered at Rochester, New York, October 25, 1858.

Officially, however, it was no part of announced Republican policy to take overt measures for putting an end to the half-slave status of the Union. Lincoln expressly disavowed any such radical design, saying in his Cooper Institute address that he did not mean to assert that the power of emancipation was possessed by the Federal government, and adding, "As to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States only. . . . Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation." He gave it as his understanding and conviction that the issue as to a Union either all slave or all free was wholly made by the aggressive and uncompromising attitude of the south; that the south would ultimately be satisfied with nothing short of abolition of all the free State Constitutions, so that slavery could

become national; and therefore that the responsibility for sectionalism, for the Republican party's position, and for the apprehended eventualities was altogether upon the south.

But this view was hotly resented by the south and totally rejected by the more conservative northern people, especially the Democratic leaders, who maintained above all things the practicability of a peaceable and harmonious final arrangement. In the historic Lincoln-Douglas debate at Freeport, Illinois, August 27, 1858, Lincoln propounded to his antagonist several categorical questions, one of which was: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that *States* cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political conduct?" Douglas with great warmth answered that he considered the interrogatory amazing; that there was "not one man, woman, or child south of the Potomac, in any slave State, who did not repudiate any such pretension"; and that the suggested Supreme Court decision, infringing upon State rights, would simply be a patent violation of the Federal Constitution. "Such a thing," he exclaimed, "is not possible. It would be an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could ever descend to." With equal intensity Douglas might have added that in the surmised case no northern Democrat of any influence would for a moment have tolerated the intrusion of slavery into the free States in contempt of the established and unanimous local public sentiment against that institution; and he might with great perti-

nence have reminded Mr. Lincoln of the sincerity, reliability, and enormous power and value of the northern Democracy as a factor for maintaining the integrity of the anti-slavery position of every northern State and moreover every Territory. Throughout all the exciting events incidental to the formation of the new commonwealths west of the Mississippi, the northern Democrats who had become settlers in them had not only been active participants on behalf of freedom, but had invariably formed the predominating element of the electorate. California up to 1858 had been uniformly Democratic. Iowa, Oregon, and Minnesota had begun their careers with Democratic popular majorities. Even among the free settlers of Kansas the supporters of the Democratic party originally outnumbered every other political element; at the noted free State Constitutional convention held in Topeka in October, 1855, the roll of delegates showed that 19 were Democrats, 6 Whigs, and 9 Independents, Free Soilers, and Republicans.

Lincoln's doctrine of the impossibility of the government's permanent endurance half slave and half free was perfectly expressive, however, of the sentimental conviction of an undoubted majority of the northern people that the country's destiny was bound up in the cause of resistance to slavery—resistance to such an extent and such a conclusion, at least, as fully to satisfy his demand that “the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it and *place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction.*” This was a far different matter

than the declared necessity of safeguarding the no-slavery system and rights of the northern States against the alleged menace of slavery intrusion. There was in fact no incertitude in the public mind, especially at the south, respecting the subsequent steps likely to be taken after slavery should be successfully placed and held in the positively restricted position desired by Lincoln. Every important Republican leader disclaimed any intention of prescribing limitations for the final program of the party. This significantly non-committal attitude was stated as follows by Seward in his Rochester speech: "One class say that they cannot trust the Republican party, that it has not avowed its hostility to slavery boldly enough or its affection for freedom earnestly enough. . . . Others cannot support the Republican party because it has not sufficiently exposed its platform and determined what it will do, and what it will not do, when triumphant. It may prove too progressive for some, and too conservative for others. As if any party ever foresaw so clearly the course of events as to plan a universal scheme for future action, adapted to all possible emergencies. . . . I know, and you know, that a revolution has begun. I know, and all the world knows, that revolutions never go backward."

The national party conventions of 1860 were confronted with the tremendous responsibility of dealing with the sectional problem in terms of finality. It was impossible that the uncertainty could continue through another Presidential administration. The commanding feature of the situation was the south's demand that the

country should accept unequivocally the dogma that the Constitution of its own force carried slavery into the Territories, and hence that slaveowners were fully entitled to locate with their "property" in any Territory without having their rights impaired by either Congressional or Territorial legislation, and that it was the duty of the Federal government to afford them ample protection accordingly. In that demand the northern Democrats refused to concur, asserting that there were differences of opinion in the party "as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, over the institution of slavery within the Territories," and that the whole subject was one of constitutional law for the decision of the Supreme Court. These conflicting views dividing the southern and northern Democracy represented, on the one hand, the interest of the south in maintaining to the utmost the right of slavery, and, on the other, the firm adherence of the northern Democrats to constitutional principles and processes without presumptions either for or against slavery claims.

It was inevitable that the south would stand by its interest. At the Democratic national convention which assembled in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 23, 1860, resolutions were adopted (April 30) in accord with the position of the northern wing of the party as above stated. Many of the southern delegates then withdrew. The convention proceeded to the nomination of a candidate for President, but after fifty-seven ballots was unable to make a choice under the two-

thirds rule, and on May 3 adjourned to meet again in Baltimore June 18. After it reassembled there was another split. The regular convention nominated Douglas for President and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, for Vice-President; the latter declined, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was named in his place by the national committee. A separate convention was held by the bolters (Baltimore, June 23), which nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon—candidates who were promptly endorsed by the original Charleston seceders in their adjourned convention held in Richmond, Virginia.

The differences in the Democratic party thus resulting were neither composed nor in any manner moderated during the campaign. No man in the country knew better than Douglas the terrible earnestness of the southern leaders on the slavery issue or understood more clearly the imminence of the Union's dissolution in the now expected event of the election of a Republican President. Though in former Presidential years ambitious for the honor of his party's nomination, he had on this occasion regarded the prospect of his elevation with entire diffidence, caring only for the maintenance by the platform of a middle course concerning slavery—a course which, he was perfectly convinced, would, if sustained by the people, appeal in the end to the practical judgment of the southerners and so save the Union. He had the support of the immense majority of the northern Democracy and some following in the southern States, but unfortunately for his

cause had incurred the strong disfavor of the Buchanan administration. President Buchanan never forgave him for his action on the Lecompton question, and disapproved his divergence from the views of the southerners on the issue of 1860. The President had been brought up in and always had adhered to the early school of extreme conservatism, was punctilious respecting his authority as the head of the party, and, in addition to his great temperamental rigidity, had the fixity of mental habit and predilection that usually attends advanced age and a life-long austerity of character. The whole influence of the administration was exerted in the interest of the southern candidate, Breckinridge. The south, on its part, continued uncompromising in its rejection of Douglas as the party spokesman. His popular sovereignty plan had not worked for its advantage, and his constant allusion to the institution of slavery as rightly subject to popular action was repugnant to southern feeling. The south also resented his frank declaration that "unfriendly legislation" could properly be brought to bear against slavery in the Territories whenever the people locally should object to its presence among them.

The Republican national convention of 1860 (Chicago, May 16-18) nominated Lincoln for President and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and in its platform repeated the declarations on the slavery question adopted by the party in 1856, with several additional expressions condemning the Democratic party, and particularly the national administration, in very severe language. The indiscriminating accusation

was made that Democratic members of Congress had often uttered or countenanced threats of disunion "without rebuke and with applause from their political associates"; this charge being manifestly intended to cultivate the impression that the Democracy in its responsible capacity (including the intensely and exclusively Unionist northern Democracy) was disposed to be indifferent, if not opposed, to the Union's continuance! Use was made of the word "sectional," as if the south alone, and by no means the Republican party, was sectional. (It may be noted as one of the most interesting facts in the history of politics that the Republican party, without the hope, at that day or the present, of any substantial support from the representative people of the south, has throughout its career been excessively sensitive on the sectional topic and meticulously denunciatory of all sectionalism.) There was a plank adverting to "the recent reopening of the African slave trade." No such reopening had occurred under affirmative or consenting action by the government, and the Republican party and every informed person knew none could occur because no administration or party would ever take the responsibility. There had been certain incidents showing that the damnable trade was still being carried on by piratical villains for the sake of profit, and that southern sentiment was opposed to enforcement of the laws against it. But no party issue could justly be made on the subject as against the northern Democracy. Douglas had declared his unalterable opposition to the trade. During the canvass he wrote: "I am irreconcilably opposed to the revival of the

African slave trade in any form and under any circumstances.”

It was still deemed important by the Republicans to observe discretion on certain points so as to do no injury to the prospects of party success. So far as the election chances in the fifteen southern States¹ were concerned, it would of course be immaterial how “sufficiently” (to use Seward’s expression) the party “exposed its platform”; for the vote of every one of those States was already lost. But the Republicans well knew that independently thinking people of the north cherished deep in their hearts the sentiment of national harmony, and that, while they were thoroughly in sympathy with the cause of non-extension of slavery, a generally provocative attitude toward the fiery southerners would not appeal to them. The warning voiced by the Democratic national platform of 1856 against “civil war and disunion” was not taken seriously by active partisan Republicans in the respect of suggesting obligations of actual concession on their part; but it had great weight with conservative voters, and moderation for discretionary reasons was therefore a Republican necessity.

The Chicago platform practically advocated nothing more on the slavery subject than preservation of the territorial *status quo*, confinement of slavery to the southern States as a “local interest,” admission of Kansas as a free State, and the country’s rejection of

¹Before the Civil War “the south” was understood to consist of all the slave States, including Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri in addition to the eleven States of the subsequent Confederacy. West Virginia as yet had not been detached from Virginia.

all the pretensions of slavery to an established footing in the Territories. The platform embodied several expressions and references of a general character designed to encourage the more positive anti-slavery people; but on a number of particular matters deemed very important at that period it showed great caution so as not to repel the conservatives. John Brown's raid of October, 1859, was condemned by the declaration that "we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes." There was no demand for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, no approval of the "Personal Liberty" measures that had been enacted in northern States to make difficult the recovery of escaped slaves, and no objection to the proposed acquisition of Cuba. Those were matters that had long been before the country. It was not because of reluctance further to antagonize the south that the Republican party refrained from taking a position concerning them. It was because of the political inexpediency of intensifying the already strong belief among northern voters that the south could be antagonized too far.

Northern Democrats have never denied that their organization was controlled in 1860 by expediency for the sake of the Union. It is a historical fact that the Republican organization also was expedient—expedient, however, for a different desideratum, that of judiciously limiting the "exposure" of its platform.

In addition to the Douglas Democracy, the Breckinridge Democracy, and the Republican party, there

was a consolidation of the old-line Whigs and the conservative Know-Nothings under the name of the Constitutional Union party. This organization was improvised by a convention held in Baltimore, May 9, which adopted a brief declaration disapproving "geographical and sectional parties" and asserting that it was "both the part of patriotism and of duty to recognize no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws," and which nominated for President John Bell, of Tennessee, and for Vice-President Edward Everett, of Massachusetts.

The contest was hopeless for both branches of the Democracy, as well as for the Constitutional Unionists, except upon the chance that enough northern votes could be carried against the Republicans to prevent a decision by the Electoral College and accordingly throw the result into the House of Representatives—in which eventuality the party differences represented by the opposed candidacies of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell would still exist and render it very doubtful whether a successful combination of States could be effected against Lincoln. Therefore the Republicans alone occupied a confident position in the campaign. Yet Douglas waged a most aggressive fight, which he carried into the south. Everywhere he maintained the supremacy and inviolability of the Union as the true Democratic doctrine. At one of his meetings he was asked: "If the southern States secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before he commits an overt act against their constitutional rights,

will you advise or vindicate resistance by force to their secession?" Douglas replied: "I answer emphatically that it is the duty of the President of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States as passed by Congress and as the court expound them. And I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President of the United States, whoever he may be, should treat all attempts to break up the Union by resistance to its laws as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers of 1832."


The result of the Presidential election was as follows: Electoral vote—Lincoln, 180 (all the votes of the free States, except 3 in New Jersey); Douglas, 12 (9 in Missouri and 3 in New Jersey); Breckinridge, 72 (all the votes of the eleven slave States of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas); Bell, 39 (the votes of the slave States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia). Popular vote—Lincoln, 1,866,352; Douglas, 1,375,157; Breckinridge, 847,514; Bell, 587,830.

In the fourteen slave States that chose their Electors by popular vote (South Carolina still held to the practice of choice by the Legislature), Lincoln had 26,430, Douglas 163,525, Breckinridge 570,686, and Bell 515,923—the combined vote of Bell and Douglas being 679,448, or 108,762 more than the Breckinridge vote,



HUGH McLAUGHLIN

Hugh McLaughlin, political leader; born in Brooklyn, N. Y., April 2, 1822; educated in public schools; learned rope-making trade; engaged in lighterage and later in fish business; master mechanic Brooklyn navy yard, 1857-1861; defeated for sheriff of Kings county, 1860; register of deeds, Kings county, 1861 and held office for three terms; many years democratic leader of Kings county; active in promoting construction of Brooklyn bridge and in establishing Prospect park; died in Brooklyn, December 4, 1904.



PATRICK HENRY MCCARREN

Patrick Henry McCarren, senator; born in East Cambridge, Mass., 1853; came to Brooklyn with his parents when 8 years old; educated in public schools; elected to the assembly and served in 1882, 1883 and 1889 having been one of the leaders of the floor in the latter year; state senator from 1890-1893, 1896-1909; identified with much important legislation and it was through his efforts that free text books were introduced into the public schools; also led to securing passage of original bill for a second bridge of the East River for the benefit of the eastern district of Brooklyn; died in Brooklyn, N. Y., October 22, 1909.

a fact of peculiar interest. On the paramount issue of the Union as against the policy of exclusive southern sectionalism maintained by the Breckinridge men there was an undoubted affinity between the Douglas and Bell followers, who proved themselves to be in a considerable majority in the south itself. The inference is plain that up to the election the south was far from agreed—to state the case moderately—upon a disposition of hostility to the Union. It was made measurably united by the national victory of the Republican party.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS OUTCOME

1860-1865

AFTER the Presidential election (November 6, 1860) a period of four months was to elapse before the change of administration. South Carolina took the lead in the southern secession movement, withdrawing from the Union on December 20, and was followed in January by Mississippi (9th), Florida (10th), Alabama (11th), Georgia (19th), and Louisiana (26th), and on February 1 by Texas. The Confederate government was organized in February at Montgomery, Alabama, with Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, as its head. Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee joined the Confederacy after the breaking out of the Civil War, and the southern capital was established at Richmond, Virginia. The border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri remained loyal to the Union throughout the war.

Preceding the beginning of hostilities it was the earnest desire of the northern political leaders, without distinction of party, to avert, if possible, the threatened conflict. At first there was a very general disinclination to form presumptions unfavorable to an

ultimate accommodation, and it was even hoped that Union counsels might yet prevail in the southern States with the exception of South Carolina. President Buchanan was desirous of giving no provocation. His circumspect course during the months of November and December, particularly in reserving decision as to reinforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor, has been the subject of much criticism. No doubt can be entertained of his preference for leaving to his successor, so soon to be inaugurated, the responsibility of a positive policy. He believed it was not incumbent on his expiring administration to take measures likely either to initiate war or accelerate secession. Assuming the probability of ultimate disunion and war, he was persuaded that the most important service he could render the national cause would be that of adding nothing to the incitements to separatism during the critical time of the labors of the secessionist leaders to consolidate southern support for their schemes and secure the more doubtful States for their Confederacy. It was well known, and was a fact that stimulated ardent hope at the north, that the States of Georgia, Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, absolutely indispensable to a powerful Confederacy, were in the balance on account of the Union sentiment with which they were permeated. Would it not, therefore, be the course of wisdom not only to stay the hand of the Federal government but abstain from any proceedings calculated to exacerbate southern feeling? Moreover, Congress was to be considered, and it was unquestionable that Congress, responsive to the general desire of

the northern people, would make strong efforts toward conciliation. These were some of the considerations that influenced Buchanan in the first few weeks after the election. As against the rigid view that the authority and prestige of the government ought to be maintained at all hazards, they were of course at best only specious; but few thinking people would have approved rigorous measures in conformity to that exclusive view, except on the question of the forts, in the terrible crisis that was upon the country.

In his annual message to Congress (December 4) Buchanan denied unqualifiedly the right of secession. On the subject of the forts he asserted the unquestioned authority of the United States, adding that the officer in command, Major Anderson, had received orders to act strictly on the defensive, and that in case of attack "the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the assailants." The ultimate course and spirit of the administration were wholly in accord with northern sentiment. At the end of December three Commissioners from South Carolina arrived in Washington to "treat" for relinquishment to their commonwealth of the "real estate" within its bounds which was occupied by the national government. The President refused to give them any official recognition. The real aims of the Commissioners were, First, to procure practical admission by the Democratic Executive of the right of South Carolina (and therefore any other State) peaceably to secede with all its territory including harbors and islands; and Second, to accomplish the greatly desired result of peaceable expulsion of the

United States military forces from Charleston harbor. Realization of those aims would have established the whole claim of legal secession and relieved the south of the necessity of military aggression. But Buchanan was firm in his Union principles and attitude. Upon the points of the impossibility of lawful dismemberment of the Union and the sole responsibility of the south for aggression, he never yielded to the slightest degree.

One of his most notable acts was his reconstruction of the cabinet. The names of his principal advisers—eminent Union Democrats—during the last two months of his Presidency are among the most illustrious in the history of the struggle against the Confederacy. Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, was Secretary of State; John A. Dix, of New York, Secretary of the Treasury; Edwin M. Stanton, of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General; and Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, Secretary of War.

Black was the dominating personality and the President's mainstay. Inflexible on the principle of resolute maintenance of the Union's integrity and pursuance of the government's duty, he was the embodiment of the administration's final policy—a policy which not only was irreproachable from every point of view, but was continued without essential change by Lincoln so long as peace with the south remained possible.

Stanton was afterward the celebrated War Secretary of the Lincoln administration.

Dix it was—acting in performance of his official duty under Buchanan—who wrote and sent the immortal dis-

patch to New Orleans: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot."

Early in January the administration undertook to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Sumter. The President was in favor of dispatching a powerful naval vessel, but was dissuaded by General Scott, commander of the army, and a merchant steamer, the "Star of the West," was sent instead. It did not reach its destination, being fired on by the shore batteries and forced to put back to sea. Although Major Anderson at the fort was a spectator of the affair, he kept his guns silent. The sentiment of the country approved his forbearance, and there was no general demand either for practical notice by the government of the South Carolina flourish of war or for repetition of the hazardous experiment in Charleston harbor pending Republican assumption of national control.

We have endeavored to write an unprejudiced account of the course of the Executive in the crucial period from the election until Lincoln's inauguration. This is due an administration so extraordinarily beset with difficulties. The facts are little understood generally. In broad respects they have been much misrepresented for partisan objects. Buchanan was not a great President. He made marked mistakes, which operated for the grievous injury of the Democratic party. But he was a devoted Union man, and he transmitted the government to his successor without blemish upon its honor or prejudice to its interest in principle, and moreover without any occasion existing either to reverse its position or undo its transactions.

It was from the country at large and Congress that all the noteworthy offers of compromise proceeded.

A national Peace conference was held, under the chairmanship of former President John Tyler, which adopted a series of recommendations. More important than the measures of that unofficial body were several undertakings and propositions directly on behalf of the controlling influences of political power at the north.

First, there was the Thurlow Weed Compromise, which proposed to extend the Missouri line to the Pacific, all territory south of the line to be open to slavery. The same arrangement was made the leading feature of the Crittenden Compromise, a Senate non-partisan measure that received strong support but failed to pass. The fact of its introduction and serious consideration after the plan that it represented had for twelve years been supposed dead, is a remarkable evidence of the anxiety for reconciliation.

By general Republican agreement, especially as expressed by a House committee headed by Thomas Corwin and by a meeting of Republican Governors held in New York, a movement was started and successfully prosecuted to repeal the State Personal Liberty laws that had been enacted in the interest of fugitive slaves. Thus the local measures of the north directed against the slave institution were sacrificed in order to propitiate the seceders.

The following proposed constitutional amendment was passed by two-thirds in each house: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will

authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." In other words, the right of undisturbed existence for slavery at the south was perpetually guaranteed. For this measure the Republicans were responsible, as at the time of its adoption they were in undisputed control of both the Senate and House owing to the resignations of southern members. A southern commentator¹ wrote: "This proposition, if carried out by the States, will remove the only real ground of apprehension in the slave States. It blows the Irrepressible Conflict doctrine moon-high, and received the sanction of the author of that doctrine himself." Lincoln gave his approval to the principle of the amendment in his first inaugural.

In addition, the right of slavery to enter New Mexico Territory was substantially conceded by the Republican Congress, and the new Territories of Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota were organized without slavery interdiction—a cardinal principle of the Republican party being waived in all these cases.

The striking measures to which we have referred were of course without fundamental party significance except as they illustrated, to the honor of all concerned, the suspension of party and sectional spirit in the great national emergency. None of them in any manner represented Republican policy as such or could have engaged the smallest Republican support before the election.

¹Thomas A. R. Nelson, at that time a member of Congress from Tennessee.

The Republicans simply came, at a late day, to the identical position in relation to inexorable facts in which the Democratic party had long stood on account of conditions and circumstances and their logical requirements that, as the result now proved, it had correctly estimated from the viewpoint of the Union's preservation.

Lincoln, assuming the Presidency on the 4th of March, 1861, announced in his inaugural address his adherence to the principle of an indivisible and indestructible Union and asserted the belief of the north in the moral wrong of slavery, but declared his purpose of impartially enforcing the laws inclusive of the Fugitive Slave law, his resolve in no way to interfere with slavery in the States, and his determination that there should be "no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere" beyond what should be "necessary to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts." In no respect of immediate treatment did his policy for the situation diverge from that of his predecessor. But there was the necessary difference that it was for Lincoln, and Lincoln alone, to speak the words of final decision for the government and point out to the seceders what they had to expect. His allusion to conditional force was construed at the south to imply eventual war, because any application of force within the seceding States for the objects that he specified would necessarily involve trouble with the Confederacy; and at the north, notwithstanding all his generous moderation, none

could doubt that he would pursue an active course against attack. Douglas, the great leader of the northern Democracy, occupied a conspicuous place at the inaugural ceremony. By all his declarations and acts until his untimely death (June 3, 1861) he thoroughly and ardently sustained the national administration.

When the crash came (April 12) it was the result of Lincoln's firm continuation, despite Confederate threats, of the occupation of Fort Sumter and his decision accordingly (which he caused to be communicated to the South Carolina Confederate Governor) to provision, though not militarily reinforce, its garrison. This time the fire was on the fort itself, an aggression against which both the retiring and incoming Presidents had given solemn warning. No longer was the issue of war to be compromised, and a united north rallied to the flag of the country for the mighty conflict.

The connection of the Democratic party with the question of slavery and the beginnings of the Civil War has for more than half a century been a favorite theme with its foes. Innumerable have been the prejudiced versions, condemnatory judgments, and rancorous denunciations. We have treated the subject with some particularity. The history is very extensive and intricate, and owing to the limitation of our space many details have been omitted; but it is believed the essential elements have been set forth with precision and reasonable proportion.

No Democrat need be ashamed of the record.

In its relations to the waging of the war, to the associated questions, and to the political settlements

that followed, the Democratic party was animated by singleness of devotion to the cause of restoring the Union, and—which it deemed to be an intimately related matter—the interest of ultimately reestablishing, so far as possible, fraternity between the north and south. At the outset there was no real issue between the Republicans and Democrats. Even party names were in a number of States discontinued, the new Union party being created and receiving cordial support from the followers of both old organizations. It was greatly due to the unselfish and fervidly patriotic spirit of the War Democrats that the splendid State administrations that contributed so much to vigorous prosecution of the struggle were elected and popularly sustained, and that the local disaffections springing up were repressed by the overpowering weight of public sentiment. At no time did any northern State waver in loyalty. In view of the extreme differences on principle concerning the sectional dispute that had previously obtained, the history of the conduct of the war presents no more notable aspect than that of the government's freedom from complicating difficulties within its own territory.

It is an indisputable fact that during the Civil War almost half the voters of the States remaining in the Union were strong, indeed uncompromising, supporters of the Democratic party on principle. Anyone taking the trouble to analyze the election returns for the four-years period will find this conclusion inescapable. At the Presidential election of 1864, when the general political conditions were more than commonly unfavorable to the Democracy and presumably only the

staunchest party men voted the ticket, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans was 4 to 5. Moreover, in 1864, not counting the votes of the four border States or of the newly admitted States of Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada, the Democratic Presidential ticket received 160,000 more votes than were cast in identical northern States for Douglas and Breckinridge combined in 1860.

Regarding the questions of national policy that grew out of the contest, the position of the party in general conformed to the noted Crittenden resolution of July, 1861, adopted almost unanimously by both houses of Congress. That resolution declared that the war was not waged for conquest or subjugation, or to overthrow established institutions of the southern States, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union. The more extreme war measures involving matters of gravely doubtful political necessity and wisdom, followed after the war by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments (providing for negro citizenship and suffrage), by the carpetbag governments, and by the long protracted military occupation of the south, were believed by the Democrats to be intolerant, oppressive, and in the interest essentially of partisan Republican control and its perpetuation by arbitrary means.

Thus the comparative concord that marked the beginning of the war gave way to an ever growing disagreement between the parties. The great majority of the Democrats were not long content to remain merged in the Union party, and that organization was

finally left to the Republicans, who in their national campaign of 1864 adopted its name in place of their own—a tactical proceeding to which they were influenced by the desire of retaining their large following of War Democrats and also by recognition of the inveterate prejudice against the Republican name among the loyal men in the border States, as well as in the States of the Confederacy that were being recovered with the progress of military operations. A further evidence of the appreciation by the Republicans of the Democracy's great popular strength and their anxiety in politic ways to gain Democratic votes, was their selection in 1864 of Andrew Johnson, a life-long Tennessee Democrat, as the running-mate of Lincoln in his second Presidential candidacy. There was no Republican party reason save that of campaign expediency for the nomination of Johnson; and if ever politicians merited embarrassing consequences from a course supposed originally to have been brightly conceived but presently found to have been a sad mistake, the Republicans fully deserved their unhappy experiences with Johnson when he became President.

It is of historical interest, illustrative of the great disturbances in political thought resulting from the Civil War, that at the opening of the campaign of 1864 a faction of Radical Republicans held a national convention which repudiated Lincoln and nominated John C. Fremont for the Presidency on a platform demanding "the confiscation of the lands of the rebels and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers." General Fremont in his acceptance referred to the work

of Lincoln as "politically, militarily, and financially a failure." Later he withdrew in Lincoln's favor.

The Democratic national convention met in Chicago, August 29, and nominated for President General George B. McClellan, of New Jersey, and for Vice-President George H. Pendleton, of Ohio. At that time the military situation did not promise a decision, and the Democrats were no more skilled than the discontented Radical Republicans in reading the future. As is customary in political platforms, the opposing party was arraigned with many specifications, one of which instanced the "failure to restore the Union" after four years of war; and resort to amicable measures for renewing "the Federal union of the States," was advocated. Assertion was made of the party's "unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution" for "the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both northern and southern." No objection was made in the platform to the proposed Thirteenth amendment (then before Congress), providing for the complete and permanent abolition of slavery throughout the United States.

The Democratic party never stood for irreconcilable hostility to the southerners as a prime matter, or for vindictive and oppressive treatment of the south after the war. Neither, it should be remembered, did Lincoln. He had solemnly averred that his whole object was to save the Union. Originally he was willing to save the Union by the extreme means of retaining southern slavery if necessary. As late as February, 1865, he prepared a message to Congress proposing payment to

the south of \$400,000,000 as the price of peace—his reasons being that the north was equally blameworthy with the south for the curse of slavery originally, that it was just to give an equivalent for manumission, and that cessation of war without any compromise being made of principle or national interest was worth the money. The cabinet disapproved the message, and he reluctantly withheld it.

If the Democratic party was culpable (as so often has been vehemently alleged) for its peace desire in August, 1864, not less was Lincoln culpable in February, 1865. Both Lincoln and the Democratic party would have welcomed peace with the south in brotherhood, but only on the basis of the Union's restoration.

The Electoral College in 1864 was divided as follows: Lincoln, 212; McClellan, 21 (3 in Delaware, 11 in Kentucky, and 7 in New Jersey). The popular vote stood: Lincoln, 2,216,067; McClellan, 1,808,725. Several of the important States were close. The Republican majority in New York was 6,700; in Pennsylvania, 20,000; in Connecticut, 2,400.

On April 15, 1865, Lincoln died by an assassin's bullet and Andrew Johnson became President, his term running to March 4, 1869.

From Lincoln's death until the Civil War issues ceased to be effective in national politics, the anti-southern extremists held absolute rule in the Republican party. They not merely ruled, they were in truth the whole of the real Republican party, as since their time the special interests have been.

When Lee surrendered his remnant of 27,000

soldiers at Appomattox Court House (April 9, 1865), not only was there no more fight left in the Confederacy, but there remained no remotest possibility that the southern people could again stand up in resistance to northern will. The north could do whatever it chose with the southern people everywhere, in every respect, and for all time. It chose to regard and treat the southern people, excepting those of the colored race, as enemies and as disqualified for free political action.

Concerning the constitutional measures on behalf of the colored race—those of emancipation, citizenship, and suffrage,—all intelligent people knew from the beginning that the ultimate results and uses (in beneficial respects) to come from the south's necessary acceptance of the measures, would depend in part upon the colored citizens themselves and in part upon the ability of the southern whites successfully to deal, in time, with the new and strange conditions and problems. Upon all grounds and considerations of fact the southern whites were the chief factor, and would inevitably so continue. And there could be no desirable permanent solution except along the line of the south's local interest as understood and directed, for certainly a long time, by the whites of the south.

But the Republican party had no friendly or tolerant spirit toward the southern whites, and never could acquire any. Because they had been rebels it cared nothing for their economic recovery and felt no kindly interest in their nobly energetic and wholly unaided efforts to make the best of their difficult lot



EDWARD MURPHY, JR.

Edward Murphy, Jr., senator; born in Troy, N. Y., December 15, 1836; graduated from St. Johns college, Fordham, 1857; alderman of the city of Troy, 1864-1866; mayor of Troy, 1878-1884, serving four terms; chairman of the democratic state committee in 1887 and reelected four times; elected to the U. S. senate and served from March 4, 1893 to March 3, 1899; delegate to the democratic national conventions of 1880, 1884, 1888, 1892 and 1896; died at Elberon, N. J., August 3, 1911.



DANIEL SCOTT LAMONT

Daniel Scott Lamont, secretary of war; born at Cortlandville, February 9, 1851; educated at McGraw union school and Union college; reporter on various newspapers; private secretary to President Cleveland, 1885-1889; secretary of war in Cleveland's cabinet, March 6, 1893, to March 3, 1897; died in New York City, July 28, 1905.

and rebuild their society in order, enlightenment, and industry. It dealt with them from the strict and sole point of view of successful Republican politics, forcibly imposing upon them arbitrary, ignorant, and villainously corrupt governments, which it propped up with bayonets as long as it dared in face of the growing northern revulsion against its selfish and merciless partisan course.

When finally the Federal troops were withdrawn from the southern States, in Hayes's administration, the Republican party as a national organization fell into decay in every one of them. More than forty years have passed. Two new generations of intelligent and loyal voters have grown up. Two foreign wars have been fought, in which the southerners have patriotically participated. For ten successive Presidential elections following the withdrawal of the troops, not one southern Electoral vote was ever given the Republican party.

The southern race question has long been dropped from national politics. It is a local question for the people of the south, purely economic and social as related to their lives in association with one another. No end useful to the country could possibly be served by national political interference. Agreeably to the south's convinced belief in the wisdom and necessity of suffrage discrimination, State laws have been adopted imposing educational and other qualifications. These have been tested in the courts and upheld. From time to time, however, Republican complaints are heard, with suggestions as to whether the conditional

penalty of the Fourteenth amendment does not apply. On that point an impartial writer has said:

“Congress is not likely to take upon itself the enforcement of the penalty, for the ratification of those [Fourteenth and Fifteenth] amendments was procured only by counting the votes of States which acted under duress, and the requirement of such ratification as a prerequisite to readmission is considered to have been of doubtful constitutionality. Moreover, serious doubt has been growing as to both the justice and the expediency of the suffrage conditions which the war forced upon the southern States. The foremost leaders among the negroes themselves have avowed their approval of both property and educational tests, if fairly administered, since each of them would serve as a spur to greater efforts on the part of the negroes in thrift and in education.”¹

¹George W. Haynes, *Cyclopedia of American Government*, article on Suffrage.

CHAPTER IX

TRANSITION AND NEW QUESTIONS

1865-1883

THE twelve years covered by Johnson's administration and the two administrations of Grant are of party interest chiefly as constituting the period of transition from the old politics of passion and hate on the sectional subject to the modern politics concerned with economic questions, important reforms, and the general progressive tendencies and demands of the people. They were years of bitter contention and uncompromising hostility between the parties, and were marked by many dramatic events. To readers desiring a discriminative history of this famous period we recommend the very able book of William Archibald Dunning, "Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877" ("The American Nation" series, vol. 22). A brief summary must here suffice.

President Johnson, as an old-line Democrat and a southern man, was devoted to the doctrine of the sanctity of the constitutional guarantees of State rights and liberties, and was a passionate believer in reconciliation as the best national policy. In the vacation of Congress at the opening of his administration he instituted an Executive program of reconstruction, mainly conform-

ing to Lincoln's understood ideas, which contemplated the reëstablishment of local government by the people of the south subject to their absolute acceptance of the results of the war and their submission to such Federal regulation and supervision as should be required. When Congress reassembled in December, 1865, there was at once developed a fierce and relentless opposition to the President on the part of the radical Republicans. The result was their historic "Congressional policy" for despotically dealing with the southern whites, which was made uniformly effective against the President's vetoes by their two-thirds control of both houses throughout his administration.

The Democrats upheld Johnson on the matters agreeing with their position in favor of national reunion in both spirit and fact governed by good faith on the part of the south as well as the north; though they in no way approved those of his ideas which they regarded as more pro-southern than national and which, together with certain expressions in his public addresses, very much injured his cause. They prevented the dishonor to the nation of his impeachment. At their national convention of 1868 a resolution was adopted commending him for his patriotic efforts, and a considerable complimentary vote was given him for the Presidential nomination on the first ballot. But the convention did not regard him as a party leader and was not inclined to the defensive course that his candidacy would have necessitated. Horatio Seymour, of New York, was nominated for President, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, for Vice-President.

General Ulysses S. Grant, of Illinois, and Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, were nominated by the Republicans.

At the election all the States voted except Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, which as yet had not been reconstructed. In the other southern States, under the operation of local laws disfranchising the ex-Confederates and granting suffrage to the freedmen, which had been enacted obediently to the Congressional reconstruction measures, the Republican ticket received the Electoral votes of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The only southern States carried by Seymour were Georgia and Louisiana. New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Maryland, Delaware, and Kentucky gave him their votes. Total Electoral vote—Grant, 214; Seymour, 80. Popular vote—Grant, 3,015,068; Seymour, 2,709,633.

With a President thoroughly devoted to their policy and maintaining it by all the agencies of the government, including the power of the army, the radical Republicans now became even more aggressive in prosecuting their southern schemes. The notorious Force bills of 1870-71, with other drastic measures of southern interference, were adopted. On account of President Grant's ill-chosen appointments and many evidences of his lack of adaptation to civil affairs, poor judgment, and proneness to be badly influenced, as well as his ready compliance with every demand of the extremists, his administration was early regarded with great dissatisfaction by many of the best men of the Republican party. The Liberal Republican movement was the outcome. It soon took on formidable

proportions, but owing to the high favor in which the President stood with the all-powerful radicals there manifestly could be no hope of dislodging him in 1872 by the means of regular action within the party. The Liberal Republicans accordingly set up a separate organization, which held a national convention in Cincinnati and nominated as its Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates Horace Greeley, of New York, and B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri. The platform opposed "any reopening of the questions settled by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments," and, consistently with the policy for regarding the sectional and race controversies as ended, demanded "the supremacy of the civil over the military authority," "State self-government," and "for the nation a return to the methods of peace and the constitutional limitations of power." Resolutions were adopted strongly urging reform of the civil service and "a return to specie payments."

The Liberal Republican nominees and platform were accepted by the Democrats in their national convention held in Baltimore. At that time Democratic desires and efforts were concentrated upon securing the renewal of peaceful order, contentment, and self-government at the south, and the settlement of the race question by the processes of local arrangement immediately since no other manner of settlement could possibly avail ultimately. It was therefore deemed both a patriotic and party duty to unite with the Liberal Republicans in the common cause. But the nomination of Greeley was unfortunate on account of his unaccep-

tability to the Democratic party at large, and also because of the rooted disbelief on the part of most people of normal ways of thinking in his capacity for either sound or discriminating official leadership. His selection once made by the Liberal Republicans, however, could not be repudiated by the Democrats without throwing away every chance of success for the policy of reconciliation.

A dissatisfied element of the Democratic party, known as the "Straight-outs," held a convention at Louisville, Kentucky, its nominees being Charles O'Connor, of New York, and John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts. This ticket received no support of any consequence, and polled only 30,297 votes.

President Grant was renominated by the Republicans, and for Vice-President their candidate was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts.

The election afforded striking proof of the uselessness, and indeed folly, of ill-assorted party coalitions and illogical nominations. Notwithstanding the eminent respectability and unquestioned earnestness of the Liberal Republicans, they were only an aggregation of dissidents perfunctorily organized and engaged in a merely temporary experiment. A very slender reed for the vigorous and unterrified Democracy to lean upon. As for the Democrats, they were quite without heart in the campaign, and by tens of thousands stayed at home on election day. Greeley did not carry a northern State and was successful only in the border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri and the southern States of Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas.

Grant had 3,597,070 popular votes, Greeley 2,834,079. Before the Electors met Greeley died. The result of the Electoral count for President was: Grant, 286; Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, 42; B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri, 18; Charles J. Jenkins, of Georgia, 2; David Davis, of Illinois, 1; not counted by Congress, 17.

Following this luckless adventure the Liberal Republican movement came promptly to an end. The Democratic party returned to its unaided fight against the Grant administration as if nothing discouraging had happened. Victory was not long delayed. In 1874 the Congressional elections showed a combined Democratic and Independent majority of 74 in the next House, although the then existing House (elected in 1872) had a radical Republican majority of nearly a hundred. Never had there been such an overturn. Besides, a notable gain was made by the Democrats of seats in the Senate. The immediate causes of the revolution were the country's extreme weariness of the single "Bloody Shirt" issue of the Republicans, its disapproval of further continuance of Federal tyranny over the southern whites, and its attribution to the party in power of responsibility for the terrible financial panic of 1873 and the consequent "hard times." It was moreover manifest that the laboring and agricultural masses—especially at the west,—who so long had been good-naturedly responsive to the strenuous appeals on behalf of the Republican party as possessed of superior elemental virtues and graces, were beginning to consider political questions from a new point of view, that of

their own interests as regarded and treated by the two parties contrastingly. Such a disposition on the part of the laborers and farmers was excessively inconvenient for the Republican politicians, who, owing to the nature of the controlling influences in their organization, were in no position to satisfy the new expectations and much preferred the simpler politics of eternal hate of the south and defamation of the Democracy accordingly.

The perennial troubles of the Republican party with the labor and agricultural votes—troubles which at the present day appear to be approaching their climax—date from the second administration of Grant.

Although the Democratic House of Representatives (Forty-fourth Congress) was powerless to establish anything affirmative in the respect of national policy because of the disagreement of the Republican Senate and President, it did great and salutary work in another direction. Forever memorable in the country's history are its investigations and the disclosures that resulted. Corruption in the government, in the forms of prodigious and systematic frauds on the revenue with official connivance, valuable grants of favor to special interests and individuals in return for political influence as well as for money equivalents and presents of stock in corporations, etc., was shown to be rampant and most astonishingly pervasive. Cabinet members, many subordinate office-holders, the President's private secretary, a former Vice-President, and the Speaker of the previous House were tainted by indubitable proofs. The country keenly felt the disgrace; and to the aroused public interest in the need of higher standards of

government conduct and official responsibility are traceable, to no small degree, the inception and development of the reform movements of the past forty-five years.

In the Presidential campaign of 1876 the Democratic leader was Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, his associate being Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana. Their Republican opponents were Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, and William A. Wheeler, of New York. There was also a Greenback party ticket, headed by Peter Cooper, of New York, and a ticket of the Prohibition party. Most of the Liberals of 1872 had by this time rejoined the Republican party.

The Democratic platform of 1876 (adopted at St. Louis), a model of masterly but concise presentation of issues, ranks with the most famous deliverances in the records of the party. Its keynote was reform. Among other matters, reform was demanded in the treatment of the southern States; in financial measures, on the basis of a true conservatism and specifically for the interests of a sound currency, restoration of the public credit, and maintenance of the national honor; in the tariff, for correction of the abuses that had "impoverished many industries to subsidize a few," and pursuant to the general principle of duties "only for revenue"; in the national expenditures, with a view to economy; in the policy relating to the public lands, a policy that had "squandered 200,000,000 acres upon railroads alone"; and in the civil service, to the end of appointments "for approved competency" instead of as rewards for party zeal.

The election resulted in 184 undisputed votes for Tilden—one short of a majority. These undisputed votes consisted of 70 from five northern States—Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and West Virginia; 38 from the four border States (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri); and 76 from the eight southern States of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The votes of Florida (4), Louisiana (8), and South Carolina (7) were technically disputed; but not in any just sense was Tilden's title to them disputable.

In the three States in question there obtained, at the time of the election and after, Republican governments that owed their being to the power of the Federal administration and were sustained by Federal soldiers. Without such conditions it was impossible that any one of them could have gone for the Republican party; in the circumstances of the race situation Republican success in Florida, Louisiana, or South Carolina would have been indeed as unimaginable as would be to-day the triumph of a Chinese or Japanese party in California save under the duress of irresistible external authority. This of course is not said by way of invidious allusion to any non-white race; it is merely a pertinent statement of incontrovertible American political fact.

Not only were the Republicans incapable of carrying any one of the three States except by outside force, but with all their power as conquerors they actually failed in Louisiana and Florida, while in South Carolina

their majority was very small and open to legal doubt. In Louisiana the returns gave Tilden a majority of over 6,000; in Florida the result was close, with a majority for Tilden, which the Republican State government proceeded to take from him. By "returning board" manipulations and arbitrary decisions the Electoral votes of both States were certified to Congress as having been cast for Hayes. Counter certifications on behalf of the Tilden Electors were sent from Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina, and a question was raised as to the legal qualification of a Hayes Elector in Oregon. The two houses of Congress, unable to agree in deciding the result of the election, committed the matter to an extra-constitutional tribunal called the Electoral commission, consisting of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. That body, though created for a purely judicial purpose, divided uniformly on party lines, eight Republicans to seven Democrats, awarded every disputed vote to Hayes, and so determined his choice as President by 185 Electoral votes to 184 for Tilden. Despite the deep-seated feeling of wrong throughout the country the Democratic House consented to the final award for the sake of national peace and the supremacy of law.

Tilden's popular vote was 4,284,757; Hayes's, 4,033,950. The Greenback candidate had 81,740 votes, and the Prohibitionist 9,522.

President Hayes early in his administration ordered the soldiers out of the south. Though entirely a party man his attitude on public questions was in general

more acceptable to the Republican liberals than the old-fashioned radicals and showed a becoming appreciation of the fact that the Republican party no longer stood in a position warranting arrogance. He was consequently regarded with much scorn by the lordly chiefs whose will previously had been supreme. Throughout his four years (1877-81) the House of Representatives remained Democratic, and in the Forty-sixth Congress (1879-81) the Senate also had a Democratic majority. No enactments on party lines were possible for either the Democrats or Republicans. The Bland-Allison Silver Purchase act, a non-partisan measure directing government purchase of silver for coinage purposes of not less than \$2,000,000 or more than \$4,000,000 monthly, was passed, vetoed, repassed over the veto, and so became a law (1878). The southern question, automatically settled by the removal of the troops, stayed settled. After securing control of the Senate the Democrats passed legislation for repealing the measures of the Grant regime that provided for Federal control of elections, but the repeal was vetoed by the President in deference to the sensitive Republican feeling that there had been quite enough yielding to the whites of the south. The obnoxious measures were not removed from the statute-books until the Democrats obtained full power in the government under Cleveland.

It was the desire of the Democratic party again to nominate Mr. Tilden in 1880, but he declined to be a candidate. General Winfield S. Hancock, of Pennsylvania, was selected as the standard-bearer, the Vice-Presidential nomination going to William H. English,

of Indiana. An eminently progressive platform was adopted, indicating the party's purpose to deal vigorously with new questions. The plank that attracted most attention was: "Home rule; honest money, consisting of gold and silver, and paper convertible into coin on demand; the strict maintenance of the public faith, State and national; and a tariff for revenue only." "Discrimination in favor of transportation lines, corporations, or monopolies" was condemned, the interests of labor were sympathetically referred to, and declarations were made in favor of "public land for actual settlers" and against further Chinese immigration. Opposition to the inflow of Chinese laborers was at that time intense on the Pacific coast.

The platform of the Republicans, though largely devoted to glorification of their party's past, showed that they also recognized the changing conditions of the times, and embodied promises of a new basis of action in certain matters as to which their former course had been very unpopular. One of these promises was that there should be "no further" grants of the public domain to any railway or other corporation. Their reluctance to abandon hostility to the southerners was evidenced by a pompous pronouncement against "the dangers of a Solid South." The south had indeed become solid in 1880, but no dangers from that result had developed—and, as all know, none have developed in the forty years since. A cautious declaration was made on the Chinese subject. The Republican nominees were James A. Garfield, of Ohio, and Chester A. Arthur, of New York.


The little parties of Greenbackism and Prohibition again took the field, James B. Weaver, of Iowa, being the candidate of the former, and Neal Dow, of Maine, of the latter.

Garfield was elected by the vote of New York, having in that State a plurality of about 21,000. Hancock carried New Jersey, West Virginia, Nevada, the four border States and eleven southern States, and had five of the six Electoral votes of California. The total Electoral vote was, Garfield, 214; Hancock, 155. Popular vote—Garfield, 4,449,053; Hancock, 4,442,035; Weaver, 307,426; Dow, 12,576.

The inauguration of Garfield (March 4, 1881) was followed at once by bitter quarrels in the Republican party consequent upon the Presidential appointments and related matters of patronage. He was shot by a crazed Republican factionist July 2, died September 19, and was succeeded by Vice-President Arthur. In spite of the hope that the new President would pursue a course with reference more to the general approbation of the country than to favor for any particular Republican element, the troubles were but little reduced except in superficial appearance; and the administration itself gave finally a signal demonstration of the prevalent spirit of willfulness by forcing the nomination of Charles J. Folger for the Governorship of New York against strong public sentiment—the consequence being the election of Folger's Democratic opponent, Grover Cleveland, by an unparalleled majority. There was a steady growth in support of the Democracy by the independents. Pennsylvania, which

had become Republicanism's greatest stronghold, elected a Democratic Governor, Robert E. Pattison; and that distinguished Democrat, George Hoadly, was chosen Governor in Ohio after an exciting contest with the aspiring Foraker. In the Senate the parties were tied during the first half of Arthur's administration, with one Independent holding the balance; during the second half there were 38 Republicans, 36 Democrats, and 2 "Readjusters." The House of Representatives, Republican by a small plurality in 1881-83, had a Democratic plurality of 79 in 1883-85.

It was in the Arthur administration that the tariff question came into prominence. From the operation of the protective system established during the Civil War and since continued by the Republicans without any attention to the needs for change in many details, serious evils had developed. These had been analyzed by the Democratic platform of 1876, which denounced the whole fabric of duties, levied upon four thousand articles, as constituting "a masterpiece of injustice, inequality, and false pretense." In addition, a large and for many reasons undesirable surplus revenue was accumulating. Congress in 1882 provided for a Tariff commission empowered to investigate and make recommendations. In the early part of 1883 (the Republicans being then in control of the House) a tariff bill was passed and signed which was remarkable for its artful construction in favor of various interests but gave no satisfaction in principle to reform demands. Thus was begun the long tariff contest with the Republicans arrayed for the special interests.



AUGUSTUS VANWYCK

Augustus VanWyck, justice; born in New York City, October 14, 1849; studied at Phillips Exeter academy; graduated at the University of North Carolina; practiced law in Richmond, Va.; removed to Brooklyn, 1871; chairman of the democratic general committee of Kings county, 1882; delegate to numerous national, state and local conventions of his party; judge of the city court of Brooklyn, 1884-1896; justice of the Supreme court, 1896-1898; candidate for governor of New York against Theodore Roosevelt in 1898.



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THOMAS FRANCIS GRADY

Thomas Francis Grady, state senator; born in New York City, November 29, 1853; educated at De Lasalle Institute and St. James' parochial school; studied law; admitted to practice in 1883; practiced in New York City; member of assembly, 1877-1879; state senator 1882-1883, 1889-1890; police justice, 1891-1895; again state senator, 1896-1912; democratic leader of the senate; delegate to democratic state and national conventions at which he was always a chief speaker; died in New York City, January 2, 1912.

The noted non-partisan Civil Service Reform bill was passed and became a law January 16, 1883. It will be remembered that by platform declarations made in 1872 and 1876 the Democratic party stood committed to the principle of reform in the civil service. Although without a majority in either house when the bill was brought up and acted on, and therefore not able to enjoy any part of the official credit for its enactment, Democrats in both Senate and House gave it substantial support. Probably its most active and effective promoter was George H. Pendleton, Democratic Senator from Ohio.

CHAPTER X

CLEVELAND AND AFTER

1884-1910

GROVER CLEVELAND was nominated for President by the Democratic national convention of 1884, which met in Chicago (July 8-11); and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, received the nomination for Vice-President. The presentation in the platform of the questions before the people was introduced by an admirable statement of the fundamental character and position of the party. No better statement has ever been written, or can be. As follows:

“The Democratic party of the Union recognizes that, as the nation grows older, new issues are born of time and progress, and old issues perish. But the fundamental principles of the Democracy, approved by the united voice of the people, remain, and will ever remain, as the best and only security for the continuance of free government. The preservation of personal rights; the equality of all citizens before the law; the reserved rights of the States; and the supremacy of the Federal government within the limits of the Constitution, will ever form the true basis of our liberties, and can never be surrendered without destroying that balance of rights and powers which enables a continent

to be developed in peace and social order to be maintained by means of local self-government."

The Republican party was circumstantially arraigned for its characteristic and resolute spirit of backwardness as to matters of popular demand; its subjection to special interests and degeneration into "an organization for enriching those who control its machinery"; its consequent permissions of "frauds and jobbery"; and its general preference for arbitrary government and unscrupulous political methods consistently with the nature of its representative direction and as the logical means for retaining its power.

As the exordium of the platform was a perfect expression of the spirit of the Democracy, so was this summary of the nature and tendencies of the Republican party perfect.

The Republican party had come to stand for special interests.

Special interests it has stood for since primarily and sturdily.

In this brief history, necessarily restricted to outstanding matters and their essential bearings, it is of course an impossibility to analyze with any formality platforms, political campaigns, or Presidential administrations, except (as in the cases of the slavery and Civil War questions and the great subjects of the present day) where a somewhat attentive examination of details is fundamental to our historical purpose—that is, to a presentation of the Democratic party's true record in at least the elements of its integrity. No distinction will be made in relation to the Cleveland or the imme-

diately subsequent campaigns and administrations, none of which involved matters of any particular complexity.

The Republican opponents of Cleveland and Hendricks were James G. Blaine, of Maine, and John A. Logan, of Illinois. Blaine's nomination was distasteful to the reform elements of the Republican party and the large class of independent voters. Such eminent Republicans as Carl Schurz, George William Curtis, and Henry Ward Beecher came out for Cleveland, and he had the powerful support of the *New York Times* and other conspicuous newspapers that previously had upheld the Republican cause. On the other hand, Mr. Blaine was regarded as representing in a most decided manner the old-time men of his party and their undisguised intention to hold to changeless ideas; and in the respect of partisan leadership the Republicans never have had a stronger candidate. Enthusiasm on his behalf took some extravagant forms. An incident was the ceremonious call on him, at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City, by five hundred clergymen, almost all of them Protestants, to counteract the prejudiced feeling in certain quarters occasioned by Irish Catholic activities in his interest. The spokesman of the deputation, Rev. Dr. Samuel D. Burchard, in his fervid address alluded to the Democracy as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," and Mr. Blaine omitted to take exception to the plain insult to the Catholics. The indiscretion of Burchard was doubtless one of the causes of Republican loss of New York and the election. A much more important cause was the candidacy on the Prohibition ticket of John P. St. John, formerly Repub-

lican Governor of Kansas, to whom many thousands of Republicans displeased with Blaine but unwilling to vote the Democratic ticket gave their support.

Cleveland's Electoral vote was 219, Blaine's 182; and of the popular votes Cleveland had 4,912,696, Blaine 4,849,680, St. John 151,830, and Benjamin F. Butler (Anti-Monopoly) 133,824. Cleveland carried New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Indiana, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia, in addition to every State of the south. In New York his plurality was 1,047.

During his first four years as President (1885-89) Cleveland had the coöperation of a Democratic House of Representatives, but the Senate was Republican. His administration was distinguished for vigorous and bold leadership, intellectual force, the loftiest standards of public duty, fearlessness in dealing with all questions and conditions, and reforms and efficiency in the public service. When he left office he fully retained the confidence and affection of the Democratic party, as well as the independents.

The tariff issue on its ultimate lines was directly made by President Cleveland. It is true the Democracy was historically associated with the policy of tariff for revenue only, a policy affirmed by the platforms of 1876 and 1880; but the platform of 1884, upon which he was elected, did not pledge a specific course. It declared, however, that all unnecessary taxation was unjust taxation, and demanded that taxation should be "exclusively for public purposes" and should not exceed "the needs of the government, economically administered."

Cleveland looked with great disfavor upon the system that was responsible for the ever increasing surplus, and it was on account of the fiscal problems presented by the surplus, as well as the favoritisms and wrongs fostered by the duties, that he urged Congress to undertake reforms and finally sent his famous tariff message of December, 1887, advocating thorough reconstruction for the objects of putting a stop to public plunder and remedying financial disorders. The Democratic Mills bill of reductions was passed by the House (July, 1888) and the tariff was made the dominating issue in the Presidential campaign then opening.

One of the great results of the first Cleveland administration was the creation (1887) of the Interstate Commerce commission with important powers over the rail-ways, especially for preventing discriminations and requiring uniformity in rates. Another valuable measure was the Presidential Succession law, which embodied provisions for preventing future dangerous disputes. The work of reforming the civil service on the basis of the merit system, and so enabling government employes to be independent of party politicians and no longer under the necessity of contributing to campaign funds, was undertaken in good faith and showed gratifying progress.

The Democratic national convention of 1888 (St. Louis, June 5-7) renominated President Cleveland unanimously and named Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, for Vice-President. Their Republican opponents were Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, and Levi P. Morton, of New York. Cleveland's attitude on the tariff, which

was strongly endorsed by the Democratic convention, and the convincing proofs generally that the Democracy was altogether committed to popular ideas in resistance to political control by the "interests," caused a decided manifestation in Harrison's favor by those powerful influences of concentrated wealth actuated by determination to own the government and use it for the suppression of all liberal tendencies, that to the present day have been the main reliance of the Republican party—or rather, as already remarked, have constituted the whole of the real Republican party. Previously to the campaign of 1888 the ancient southern issue had been the main basis of Republican appeal, but the devotion of the Republicans to the special interests had long been well understood, and particularly in the contests of 1880 and 1884. Not until after President Cleveland's tariff message of 1887, however, did the autocratic powers of special interest assume active charge of the operations.

By the lavish and corrupt use of money collected from the beneficiaries of protection, their congeners, and their admiring friends among the great public—those ever eager to follow the lead of powerful wealth as quite the correct and "refined" thing to do, and moreover the most convenient as disposing of the trouble of independent thinking,—the doubtful States were carried for Harrison. This was the campaign of the "Blocks of five" in Indiana. It was the first of the Republican "Fat-frying" campaigns. In New York there were local complications on the liquor question, which were turned to Harrison's advantage by the

means of sacrificing the Republican State ticket; but his plurality was only 13,000.

The Electoral vote stood: Harrison, 233; Cleveland, 168. Popular vote—Cleveland, 5,540,050; Harrison, 5,444,337; Clinton B. Fisk (Prohibition) 250,125; Alson J. Streeter (Union Labor), 146,897. Scattering votes were cast for smaller parties. The northern States that went for Cleveland were Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

Under Harrison, with both houses Republican from 1889 to 1891, policies were pursued that gave great offense to the country. As has always since been the case when the controlling directors of the genuine Republican party have come to power, temporary election success was interpreted to mean license to "go the limit." Civil service reform was treated with contempt and the former practices were revived; a new despotic Force act, intended to stir up race troubles, passed the House to the accompaniment of violent expressions of detestation of the southern whites; Speaker Reed established in the House of Representatives his oppressive rules against the minority; there were vast wasteful expenditures, so that for the first time the country had a billion dollar Congress; and the high protective McKinley Tariff law was put into effect (October, 1890). In consequence the Democrats secured an immense majority in the House at the Congressional elections of 1890, and further Republican partisan legislation was made impossible for the rest of Harrison's term.

The radical silver movement meantime gained marked development. In this period the doctrine of silver was decidedly under Republican patronage. The President and the Republican leaders in Congress feared the silver vote—but at the same time wished to escape responsibility. That was impossible because of the strength and insistence of the silver people; and the Sherman law, ordering the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces of the metal annually and the issue of treasury notes against the bullion, was passed by the Republican Senate and House and signed by the President (July, 1890).

In 1892 Cleveland was for the third time nominated by the Democracy, the national convention assembling in Chicago on June 20; Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, was nominated for Vice-President. The Republicans were again led by Harrison, and their Vice-Presidential candidate was Whitelaw Reid, of New York.

The campaign was fought on the tariff question, with special reference to the McKinley law, which had now made its effects felt. Mr. Cleveland's ultimate object had been greatly misrepresented by the Republicans, and they had persistently accused him and the Democratic party of free trade designs. In his letter of acceptance, while opposing the theory that revenue laws should be passed for the purpose of granting discriminating governmental aid to private ventures, he added: "We believe that the advantages of free raw materials should be accorded to our manufacturers, and we contemplate a fair and careful distribution of necessary tariff burdens rather than the precipitation of free

trade." During the canvass occurred the memorable Homestead strike, occasioned by the Carnegie company's reduction of wages and refusal to recognize organized labor. The steel industry had been most carefully nurtured by the tariff; and its inability—or unwillingness—to maintain wages satisfactory to its employes and to live in peace with them was widely regarded as an object lesson of the purely one-sided operation of the protective system in its final reduction—that is to say, as applied to the laborer at the discretion of its enriched corporate beneficiaries. The self-evident fact that the pampered interests would necessarily take care of themselves first, and probably exclusively, was brought home to the people.

Cleveland swept the country. Harrison was the worst beaten candidate since Greeley. In the north, Cleveland received all the Electoral votes of Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; and also 8 of the 9 votes of California, 5 of the 14 of Michigan, 1 of the 3 of North Dakota, and 1 of the 23 of Ohio—total for Cleveland, 277; for Harrison, 145; for James B. Weaver (Populist), 22. Popular vote—Cleveland, 5,554,414; Harrison, 5,190,802; Weaver, 1,027,329; John Bidwell (Prohibition), 271,028; Simon Wing (Socialist Labor), 21,164.

A significant feature was the formidable strength of the Populist party, an organization holding radical views and especially favoring the free and unlimited coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, and government ownership of monopolies. Its principal follow-

ing was in the agricultural States of the west and south. Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada were carried by its candidate, who also was voted for by one Elector in North Dakota and one in Oregon.

The election of 1892 gave the Democrats complete control of the government for the first time since 1859. Their majority in the Senate of the incoming Fifty-third Congress (1893-95) was, however, very slight—only three over the combined vote of the Republicans and Populists. Two questions, silver and tariff, engrossed attention; and the action upon each can be correctly understood and appraised only by due appreciation of the interaction of the forces in a political situation so exceedingly close mathematically and so very tense on account of positively opposed views and aims, which, however, peculiarly lent themselves to accommodations between the elements, as invariably happens when one proposition can be played off against another.

President Cleveland, on economic grounds, was unalterably opposed, and always had been, to the silver movement. He uncompromisingly and determinedly took up the issue as made by the Republican administration of Harrison, and urged the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase law, calling Congress to meet in special session in August, 1893. After a most bitter fight the repeal bill was passed by both houses, with an amendment to the effect that the government would endeavor to secure bimetallism by means of international agreement. A financial convulsion, superinduced by the problems and uncertainties, had seized the

country soon after his inauguration; this has been maliciously called the "Cleveland panic"; it was really one of the inheritances from the preceding regime.

The tariff question came up in the regular session, which opened in December, 1893. It was complicated in Congress by the animosities engendered in the silver contest, the related matters as between members primarily concerned about silver and those primarily concerned about tariff, the activities of the "interests" and the reaction to Republicanism at some State elections in the fall of 1893, and the absence of unity, or rather the growing tendency toward cleavage, in the Democratic party. The resulting measure—called the Wilson bill for its author, William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, chairman of the Ways and Means committee of the House—was greatly changed in the Senate and loaded with a rider providing for an income tax. Cleveland declined to approve it, but permitted it to become a law without his signature. The Supreme Court, after a hesitant course, pronounced the income tax unconstitutional.

In December, 1895, the country was thrilled by the President's action in vigorously asserting the accountability to the United States of the British government for violation of the Monroe doctrine in Venezuela. The matter related to territorial aggression in the interest of the British colony of Guiana, and all diplomatic efforts for settlement, particularly on the basis of arbitration, had failed. Accordingly the President notified Congress that the government's policy was to appoint a United States commission with power to fix the bound-

ary, and to hold itself in readiness to accept the consequences if the result should prove unacceptable to Great Britain. "I am firm in my conviction," he said in his special message, "that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking people of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded a people's safety and greatness." The nation acclaimed the President's stand, and would have supported him to any extremity. Ultimately Great Britain acceded to arbitration, and the difficulty was amicably adjusted. The precedent established proved of the greatest pertinence and importance in stimulating the world movement, which before long began to develop, for maintaining peace by international arbitration and coöperation.

The silver forces were in control of the Democratic national convention of 1896 (Chicago, July 7-11), which nominated William J. Bryan, of Nebraska, for President, and Arthur Sewall, of Maine, for Vice-President, and declared for "the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation." Bryan was endorsed by the Populists, who, however, named for Vice-President a candidate of their own, Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia. A National Silver party convention endorsed both Bryan and

Sewall. The Gold Democrats, taking the name of the National Democratic party, met at Indianapolis and nominated John M. Palmer, of Illinois, and Simon B. Buckner, of Kentucky.

William McKinley, of Ohio, and Garrett A. Hobart, of New Jersey, were the Republican nominees. A silver faction in the Republican national convention, headed by Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, bolted on account of the party's attitude for a single gold standard.

Upon the issue of the campaign McKinley was not a little embarrassed by his record in Congress. He had voted for the Bland-Allison bill in 1878, and also had advocated the Sherman bill of 1890 on the ground that it was the next best thing to free coinage. "We cannot," he said, "have free coinage now, except in the manner as provided in the bill. To defeat this bill means to defeat all silver legislation and to leave us with two millions a month only, when by passing this bill we would have four and a half millions a month of treasury notes as good as gold." The political situation, however, had radically changed, and McKinley was a faithful representative of his party.

Bryan received 176 Electoral and 6,467,946 popular votes, being successful in the eleven southern States and in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, and having one Elector in California and one in Kentucky. He carried twenty-two States; Mr. McKinley carried twenty-three, counting California and Kentucky. McKinley's Electoral vote was

271, and popular vote 7,035,638. Popular votes cast for other candidates were: Palmer (Gold Democrat), 131,529; Levering (Prohibition), 141,676; Matchett (Socialist Labor), 36,454; Bentley (Nationalist), 13,968.

At the next three Presidential elections (1900, 1904, and 1908) the Democratic and Republican candidates, and the Electoral and popular votes, were as follows:

1900

Democratic.—Convention met in Kansas City, July 4-6. President, William J. Bryan; Vice-President, Adlai E. Stevenson. Both candidates were endorsed by the Populists and the Silver Republicans.

Republican.—President, William McKinley; Vice-President, Theodore Roosevelt, of New York.

Electoral vote.—McKinley, 292; Bryan, 155 (Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada, in addition to the south).

Popular vote.—McKinley, 7,219,530; Bryan, 6,358,071; Woolley (Prohibition), 209,166; Debs (Socialist), 94,768; Barker (non-fusion Populist), 50,232; and scattering.

1904

Democratic.—Convention met in St. Louis, July 6-9. President, Alton B. Parker, of New York; Vice-President, Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia.

Republican.—President, Theodore Roosevelt; Vice-President, Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana.

Electoral vote.—Roosevelt, 336; Parker, 140 (the south, with Kentucky and 7 of the 8 in Maryland).

Popular vote.—Roosevelt, 7,628,834; Parker, 5,084,491; Debs (Socialist), 402,460; Swallow (Prohibition), 259,257; Watson (Populist), 114,753; Corrigan (Socialist Labor), 33,724.

1908

Democratic.—Convention met in Denver, July 7-10. President, William J. Bryan; Vice-President, John W. Kern, of Indiana.

Republican.—President, William H. Taft, of Ohio; Vice-President, James S. Sherman, of New York.

Electoral vote.—Taft, 321; Bryan, 162 (the south, with Colorado, Kentucky, 6 of the 8 in Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oklahoma).

Popular vote.—Taft, 7,679,006; Bryan, 6,409,106; Debs (Socialist), 420,820; Chafin (Prohibition), 252,683; Hisgen (Independence), 83,562; Watson (Populist), 28,831; Gillhaus (Socialist Labor), 13,825.

Mr. Bryan's leadership of the Democracy, commencing with the Presidential campaign of 1896, identified the party with advanced political ideas and convictions that had come to be strongly held at the west but were not acceptable to the leading influences in the great eastern centers of population. These ideas and convictions were representative of the sympathies and aspirations of people who were not concerned about maintaining the fixed course and circumscribed arrangements of things political agreeably to old patterns, but who favored a decided amplitude with vigorous action accordingly. The great eloquence, tireless energy, ability, integrity, and sincerity of Mr.



WILLIAM F. SHEEHAN

William F. Sheehan, lawyer; born at Buffalo, N. Y., November 6, 1859; admitted to the bar, 1880; member of state assembly, 1884-1891; speaker in 1891 and minority leader for 5 years; elected lieutenant governor in 1891 and served for three years; chairman of the democratic state committee; caucus candidate for United States senator, 1911; delegate constitutional convention, 1915; died at Buffalo, N. Y., March 14, 1917.



MORGAN J. O'BRIEN

Morgan J. O'Brien, born in New York City, April 28, 1852; attended public schools; graduated from Fordham college, 1872, and from the College of St. Francis Xavier, 1874; Columbia college law school, 1876; corporation counsel, New York City, 1886-1887; elected justice of the supreme court 1887; reelected 1901; presiding justice appellate division, 1st department; retired from the bench, November 1906; delegate to constitutional convention, 1915.

Bryan secured and held for him a most devoted following. His second nomination, in 1900, was unanimous; and it was a significant evidence of the progressive spirit of his cause that among the convention delegates on that occasion were women. In 1904 he was not a candidate for the nomination, but retained his eminence as a party champion. His third nomination, by the convention of 1908, was made on the first ballot, 892½ of the 1,008 delegates voting for him.

The silver attitude taken by the Democratic party in 1896 was reaffirmed in 1900. Financial questions in American politics have occasionally involved exciting popular agitations, which have operated sometimes against the Democrats, sometimes against the Republicans. In 1874 the general dissatisfaction with financial conditions was one of the chief reasons for the crushing Republican defeat at the Congressional elections; in 1896 and after the Democrats suffered from the unsuccessful silver movement. On the other hand, no great and responsible party has ever permitted itself to prosecute a merely schismatic course in relation to the delicate subject of the country's finances—a subject which, indeed, never should divide parties for any longer time than is absolutely necessary to reach a conclusive settlement. The issue most vital to the Whigs was at one period that of their dear United States Bank; but when the final decision was registered they patriotically ended the discussion. At the election of 1900 the silver question was settled unfavorably to Mr. Bryan's views, and the Democratic party at its next convention accepted the result in concord with its

Presidential nominee, Judge Parker, who said: "I regard the gold standard as firmly and irrevocably established." It belongs to the nature of a powerful party, measuring up to its responsibilities and emulating the greatness and generosity of the country, to accept results—subject, of course, to conclusive evidence of the people's mature determination.

While on this topic it would be ungracious not to observe that the Republican party likewise has done itself honor by accepting results. It accepted the result about government at the south—very reluctantly, it is true, yet with completeness. It accepted the results of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth amendments. Even on the money question (which it has always regarded as its specialty), it has lately accepted a result—that of the Democracy's splendid reconstruction of the nation's banking and currency system under the Federal Reserve law of the first Wilson administration, a measure enacted after dismal Republican failure to accomplish urgently needed reforms.

Finally concerning finances, let it be remarked that there was a panic in 1907 to add to those other memorable monetary results of Republican rule, the Silver law panic of 1893 and the panic of 1873.

The elimination of the silver issue from politics after the year 1900 in no way affected the Democratic party's advanced position (except to accentuate it by simplification) in relation to new questions concerning labor; the treatment of favored business aggregations in the respects of their pretensions and operations; economic and social matters touching the lives of the people;

humane legislation; and participation of the citizens more directly in party affairs and governmental action.

Following the famous times of the Republican return in 1897, the enactment of the Dingley tariff, and the joyous pursuit of "simple politics" (so simple as to be practically automatic) under the domination of those mighty bosses, Marcus A. Hanna, Thomas C. Platt, Matthew S. Quay, and Joseph G. Cannon, there came into the Republican party and the government a new master and a new order. Theodore Roosevelt, constitutional successor of the murdered McKinley (1901), and afterward President by his "own right" (1905), embarked upon an aggressive leadership, with the result that all direction and power were soon concentrated in his person. As long as he continued in office the Republican organization fully retained its compactness and discipline, for there was no disputing authority with him, and as an exceedingly wise and discriminating politician he ruled without repelling the old bosses, who indeed discovered no reason for dissatisfaction in such respects of detail as most substantially interested themselves. On immediate administrative matters and the large concerns of policy, however, they were not consulted, but only told,—to the great and always increasing entertainment and approbation of the country. Forward looking, his sympathies with the public at large, intimately understanding that the great and haughty "interests" had had enough and more than enough at the hands of the government and the Republican party, and well recognizing the onward sweep of progressive sentiment in harmony

with the spirit and demands of the Democracy, President Roosevelt initiated a course of decided action against the corporations that were violating the laws, and by that daring departure from his party's treasured traditions, as well as by many utterances of pith and proceedings of moment in the direction of liberalizing its character and deeds, gained enthusiastic popular support. The defeat in 1904 of the Democracy's splendid candidate, Judge Parker, was the natural result of Roosevelt's established position of leadership along the unique lines of Republicanism that he had marked out and that he expected the party to follow; and the same may be said of the defeat of Bryan in 1908 by Taft, who was Roosevelt's chosen heir. Both the 1904 and 1908 results were tributes to Roosevelt personally—nothing else.

"The great fact of the Taft administration," says an able historian,¹ "was the failure of the President, of the Republican majority in Congress, and of the Republican party at large to rise to the situation by giving the country the progressive legislation which it demanded. . . . The people could not make up their minds to like a rubber-tired administration." It will live in history as the Standpat administration. From an early day of its succession to the strenuous Roosevelt regime, the forces of autocracy and privilege saw and embraced their opportunity to resume power; and since that day not once has their strangle hold upon the Republican

¹Frederick Austin Ogg, *National Progress*, 1907-1917; vol. 27 of *The American Nation* series.

party been relaxed. The enactment of the Payne-Aldrich higher tariff law (1909); the failure to give the country any financial reform measure; the arrogant attitude and transactions of the Cannon oligarchy in the House; the feebleness of the government's acts in matters under the Anti-Trust law and the final abandonment of prosecutions; the reactionary course as to conservation; and the conspicuous evidences of Stand-pat contempt and loathing for all progressivism, caused the great "Insurgent" action by liberal Republican members in Congress and culminated in the catastrophic defeat of the party at the country-wide elections of 1910, notwithstanding efforts by Roosevelt himself to stem the Democratic tide in several States—notably (but successlessly) in his home State of New York, and in Ohio as against Governor Judson Harmon. In the House of Representatives a Republican majority of 47 was changed to a Democratic majority of 66, and the Democrats made a net gain of 19 votes in the Senate.

And Woodrow Wilson and Thomas R. Marshall were elected by the Democracy as Governors in the States, respectively, of New Jersey and Indiana.

CHAPTER XI

WILSON

1912-1920

THE Presidential campaign of 1912 was ushered in by a fierce struggle for the Republican nomination between President Taft and former President Roosevelt, which terminated in the success of Taft at the national convention held in Chicago (June 18-22), after the necessary resort to "steam-roller" methods in awarding seats to contesting delegates in the latter's interest. Vice-President Sherman was renominated. In protest against the arbitrary doings most of the Roosevelt delegates withdrew from the convention upon its organization, and following its adjournment they, with numerous sympathizers, held a meeting and launched the new Progressive party, which met in Chicago in national convention August 5-7 and nominated Roosevelt for President and Hiram W. Johnson, of California, for Vice-President, on a platform advocating various advanced measures—prominent among which was that favoring popular review of judicial decisions by means of the referendum.

Woodrow Wilson received the Presidential nomination of the Democrats, forty-six ballots being taken by the convention, which met in Baltimore June 25 to

July 3. Thomas R. Marshall was made the Vice-Presidential candidate by acclamation after two ballots.

From the time of the Republican split there was no doubt as to Democratic victory at the polls. Wilson, however, was not content to bide the assured result at leisure, but made an active speaking campaign, powerfully presenting the matters at issue. While treating specific questions, particularly those of tariff, business, human interests, etc., with frankness and lucidity, his addresses were of chief note for the promise of a purposeful program, indicating comprehensive aims.

Wilson received 435 Electoral votes; Roosevelt, 88, consisting of the full votes of Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota, and 11 of the 13 in California; Taft, 8, furnished by Utah and Vermont. The popular vote was: Wilson, 6,286,214; Roosevelt, 4,126,120; Taft, 3,483,922; Debs (Socialist), 897,071; Chafin (Prohibition), 208,928; Reimer (Socialist Labor), 29,079. On account of the peculiar nature and circumstances of the contest, with Democratic triumph a foregone conclusion and an active yet only extemporized third party in the field, the popular figures were valueless for the purpose of basic party comparison. Not so the results on members of the House and Senate. The new (Sixty-third) Congress was politically divided as follows: House—291 Democrats, 127 Republicans, 9 Progressives, 7 Progressive-Republicans, and 1 Independent; Senate—51 Democrats, 44 Republicans, and 1 Prohibitionist. It was manifest that the Roosevelt popular vote was primarily personal, and that as a factor for the future

the Progressive party was insignificant compared to the old Standpat organization.

Corresponding to the national result was the general Democratic success on State tickets. Twenty-one of the thirty-five Governors elected were Democrats. One of these was James M. Cox in Ohio.

The Democratic purpose of instituting and carrying out a comprehensive program, as declared by Mr. Wilson in the canvass, was undertaken without delay, prosecuted with system, diligence, and unprecedented party unity, and for both its magnitude and detailed benefits showed a wonderful record of achievement. There is in American history no other record of valuable party performance within a similar space of time that will bear comparison with it.¹ April 7, 1913, a special session of Congress convened pursuant to the President's call, and began the great constructive work by framing and enacting the Underwood-Simmons Tariff law, a measure which fully met the Democratic promises to the people and was distinguished for economic soundness and great fairness. The first Income Tax law under the newly adopted Sixteenth amendment to the Constitution² was passed; and the great Federal

¹George Harvey, in an article on "Six Months of Wilson" (*North American Review*, November, 1913) said: "All that has been predicted of the effectiveness of Woodrow Wilson has been realized. No President of the United States has demonstrated greater capacity for true leadership. None, barring Lincoln, was confronted at the outset by a larger number of perplexing problems. None has met his difficulties with more sagacity or resolved them more skillfully."

²Also early in Wilson's first term the Seventeenth amendment, providing for the election of United States Senators by the people, became effective. It

Reserve system of banking and currency was formulated at the special session and established as law at the regular session, the act being signed by the President December 23, 1913. Next came the Federal Trade commission law, in the interest of fair methods in trade competition; and the Clayton Anti-Trust law, based on just restraints with real meaning and force back of them, as well as on vital principles affecting labor, and especially on the truth that the labor of a human being is not to be regarded merely as a commodity or an article of commerce—or, as more pithily expressed by the Democratic platform of 1920, "Labor is not a commodity; it is human." The President's cabinet was enlarged by the organization of the Department of Labor, and the first Secretary of Labor was appointed (1913).

Among the numerous other domestic measures of the government under President Wilson, primarily connected with the Democratic party program and therefore separated from the exigent conditions attending the war in Europe and our later participation in it, are to be mentioned new acts on rural credit, child labor, agricultural education, highway improvement, and seamen's protection, and revisions of the statutes relating to public lands, conservation, and reclamation. At an early period of Democratic control a farm loan system with land mortgage banks was created, and following that important work attention was given to other

was mainly due to the demands and activities of the Democrats that both the Sixteenth and Seventeenth amendments were proposed to the States and ratified by the required number.

matters for the welfare of the agricultural interests, one of the conspicuous results being the Smith-Lever Agricultural Extension act. With a view to removing the tariff question so far as possible from politics by committing its details to the dispassionate consideration and advice of experts, the non-partisan Tariff commission was established (1917).

Some of the most important governmental decisions and acts in the eight years of Wilson's Presidency were concerned with our external relations and interests in connections altogether apart from the World War. The Mexican question, never more difficult or serious than during the two Wilson administrations, was dealt with on discriminating principles and in a spirit of enlightened forbearance which time and events have approved. The law exempting American coastwise shipping from tolls in the Panama canal was repealed because it violated the provision of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty that the canal should be open to the vessels of all nations on "terms of entire equality." A treaty was negotiated for the just settlement of the claims of Colombia, but on account of Republican opposition in the Senate it failed of ratification. In order to remedy anarchic conditions in Hayti and the Dominican Republic the administrative affairs of those countries were taken over by the United States. Great progress was shown in the peaceful development of the Philippine Islands. The important Virgin Islands, in the West Indies, were acquired by purchase from Denmark. The "dollar diplomacy" of the Taft administration governing our dealings with certain backward peoples, particularly

those of Central America and China, was terminated. Treaties pledging and requiring arbitration of differences before resorting to war were entered into with many countries.

In 1914 the country's endorsement was given the administration at the Congressional elections, 232 Democrats being returned against 194 Republicans, 7 Progressives, 1 Independent, and 1 Socialist. Seats were gained by the Democrats in the Senate. *

Wilson and Marshall were renominated, both by acclamation, by the Democratic national convention of 1916, held in St. Louis June 14-16.

The Republicans (Chicago, June 7-10) chose as their candidates Charles E. Hughes, of New York, and Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana. Theodore Roosevelt was nominated by the Progressives, who met in Chicago at the same time as the Republicans, and for the Vice-Presidency they named John M. Parker, of Louisiana. Mr. Roosevelt declined, advising his followers to support the Republican ticket. The Progressive national committee decided not to substitute anyone in his place, whereupon the party, which had begun its career so ambitiously in 1912, came to an end.

In the contest of 1916 many new and confusing elements and questions were involved. Sympathies and considerations for and against the administration were largely determined by varying individual views concerning its treatment of the problems of the World War. The subject, on account of the President's tremendous responsibilities, the gravity of the situation for the United States in every aspect, and the solemnity

of the question as to our future duty, had no relation to party; it belonged solely to the sphere of earnest and conscientious thought—except as influenced in certain quarters by the sinister influences of anti-Ally hate and conspiracy, with the substantial result of disloyalty in the circumstances, to which President Wilson referred in his noble retort to O'Leary. There was much intemperate declamation by individuals, but both parties, to their honor, abstained from making any issue as against each other respecting the delicate matter that depended altogether on future events. Mr. Hughes, the Republican candidate, bore himself with eminent dignity, seeking no unfair advantage, and thereby afforded little satisfaction to the more pronounced foes of the Allies, although unquestionably they gave him their votes in the main on the principle of anything to beat Wilson.

Wilson had 277 Electoral votes, Hughes 254; the deciding State was California (with 13 Electors), in which the result was considered doubtful for two days, when Wilson was seen to have a plurality of about 4,000. Notwithstanding heavy Hughes pluralities in several of the great eastern States, Wilson's national plurality was nearly 600,000. Thirty States went for Wilson (including eleven of the twelve where women were admitted to the suffrage), and eighteen decided for Hughes.

Wilson States:—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-

homa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming; in addition, 1 Elector in West Virginia.

Hughes States:—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia (7 Electors of the 8), and Wisconsin.

Popular vote of the nation:—Wilson, 9,129,606; Hughes, 8,538,221; Benson (Socialist), 585,113; Hanly (Prohibition), 220,506; Progressive Electors, 41,894; Reimer (Socialist Labor), 13,403.

During the first twenty months of President Wilson's second term the country had no politics in the party sense. No issue, consideration, or calculation of party—in the respect, at least, of essential division between the Democrats and Republicans—was concerned in any of the matters leading up to the declaration of war on Germany (April 6, 1917) or connected with the war's prosecution.

There had been a carping spirit in relation to "insufficient preparedness"—as if preparedness of the huge sort that alone would be of use were simply a matter of logical and automatic performance by the government during a state of peace and moreover without the indispensable authority of a policy actually anticipatory of war having been favored by the country, or by either of its responsible political parties, in the Presidential campaign or subsequently pending the development of events. Anticipation of war in the manner of personal conviction of its coming was easy for all of us; but to

go to Congress and the people with a program of official war arrangement and the necessary colossal expense would have been a seriously different proposition under the peace conditions and policy.

But when the war came it was found that the administration was ready with matured plans, wise measures, a coördinated program, and a most extensive and powerful organization. Moreover, the war, from the government's standpoint, was to be no little war, no mere comfortable war principally for the supply of the Allies and quite passive militarily on our part until the Germans should come over to invade us. It should be a war of absolute and entire national consecration, to which all our resources should be devoted not only, but all the mighty offensive power of our fighting men. In powerful and enthralling addresses Wilson pledged it, and every act of the government corresponded to his resolute spirit and immense energy. We did not wait to discuss the draft as Britain in deadly peril had done, but voted it at once under the Selective Service law, one of the truest democratic measures ever adopted. Wisely planned measures covering every possible phase of war and related activity were continually brought forward, adopted with the applause of the whole country, and administered (very often for pay of a dollar a year) by the ablest men and women. The people coöperated with exalted emotion, abounding zeal, and noble sacrifice. The boys thronged to the recruiting offices to have the honor of voluntary service.

In mid-autumn of 1918 the war was won. It remained only for the Allies and the United States as their

associate to make preliminary stipulations to the Germans and enact peace. The President had far-seeing views respecting the basis of peace, views that all the world knew. They centered in the principle of a peace to end war. He fully understood that there would be fundamental conflicts of interest and opinion at the Peace conference, and that questions of the greatest importance would arise in the United States. In his work as the nation's leader it would be of the first consequence to have the agency of a party majority in the House and Senate, an agency without which, under our system of government, there never can be assurance of the successful functioning of administrative policy; and he therefore requested the people to choose a Democratic Congress at the elections in November. This was refused, and both houses passed out of Democratic control. The subsequent results have well justified his appeal.

The vote of 1918 was not on any defined question of the policies and measures to follow the war. There obtained at that time no war or peace question dividing the parties. It remained for the Republican party to make one.

Soon after the signing of the armistice (November 11, 1918), President Wilson announced his decision to participate in the Peace conference in Paris on behalf of the government of the United States. In the official announcement it was stated that he considered his presence necessary "in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty, about which he must necessarily be consulted." He purposed to assume and


exercise personally and on the spot his full constitutional duty as the Executive of his country. Charged with the obligation of negotiating treaties (an obligation which, so far as the initiatory and immediately determinate steps were concerned, rested upon him alone), and animated with the most intense conviction as to the indispensable nature of the "greater outlines" that should distinguish the final treaty for the future peace of the world and the good of all humanity, he deemed it incumbent on him to perform the labors directly instead of delegating his authority. ~~His~~ His position before the world indeed required that decision and action. It had been thoroughly agreed by the Allies that the peace should be based on the principles of President Wilson, and he had been the world's spokesman to Germany. The principles of President Wilson were the principles of American democracy, and were universally known to have their concrete expression for the coming great occasion in the proposition of an effective League of Nations—a proposition as to which there had arisen not the slightest dissent.

Sailing from the United States on the 4th of December he arrived at Brest on the 13th, and the next day in Paris delivered an address to a deputation that waited on him in which he said: "This has indeed been a people's war. It has been waged against absolutism and militarism, and these enemies of liberty must from this time forth be shut out from the possibility of working their cruel will upon mankind. In my judgment it is not sufficient to establish this principle. It is necessary that it should be supported by a coöperation of the



NORMAN EDWARD MACK

Norman Edward Mack, publisher and political leader; born July 24, 1858; educated in the public schools; established in Buffalo the Sunday Times in 1879 and Daily Times in 1883, of which he has since been both editor and publisher; has represented his party in local and state conventions for over 35 years; attended first national convention as delegate in 1892; elected six times as member of democratic national committee and when present term expires will have held the position of national committeeman for 24 years; elected chairman of the national committee in 1908 and served four years and retired after conducting the affairs of the party during the national convention at Baltimore in 1912; held the position of chairman of the national committee, member of the national committee and chairman of the democratic state committee in 1911 and 1912; appointed New York state member of Panama Pacific Exposition commission in 1912 by Governor John A. Dix, and elected chairman and held that position until the expiration of the commission in 1915 during which time he spent a year in San Francisco.



WILLIAM CHURCH OSBORN

William Church Osborn, lawyer; born Chicago, Ill. December 21, 1862; graduated from Princeton, 1883, Harvard law school, 1889; practiced law in New York City since 1889; delegate to New York state constitutional convention, 1894; legal member New York state commission in lunacy, 1899; legal advisor to Governor Dix, 1911; chairman market committee of state food investigating commission, 1912; chairman democratic state committee, 1914-1916; candidate for democratic nomination for governor against Alfred E. Smith in democratic primaries, 1918; resident of Garrison, Putnam county.

nations which shall be based upon fixed and definite covenants and which shall be made certain of effective action through the instrumentality of a League of Nations. I believe this to be the conviction of all thoughtful and liberal men."

The Peace conference held its first session on the 18th of January, 1919, the opening address being made by the President of France, Raymond Poincaré. It is well to recall the weighty and unequivocal words with which M. Poincaré defined for the whole Allied world the chief predetermined object of the assemblage—as follows:

"You will, in conformity with the fourteenth of the propositions [President Wilson's Fourteen Points] unanimously adopted by the great Allied powers, establish a general League of Nations which will be the supreme guarantee against any fresh assault upon the rights of peoples. You do not intend this international association to be directed against anybody in the future. It will not of a set purpose shut out anybody, but, having been organized by the nations that have sacrificed themselves in the defense of right, it will receive from them its statutes and fixed rules.

"It will lay down conditions concerning present or future adherence, and as it is to have for its essential aim the prevention as far as possible of the renewal of wars it will above all seek to gain respect for the peace which you will have established and will find it less difficult to maintain in proportion as this peace will in itself imply the greater realities of justice and safer guarantees of stability.

“By establishing this new order of things you will meet the aspirations of humanity which, after the fearful convulsions of the blood-stained years, ardently wishes to feel itself protected against the ever possible revival of primitive savagery. An immortal glory will attach to the names of the nations and the men who have desired to cooperate in this grand work in faith and brotherhood and who have taken pains to eliminate from the future peace causes of disturbance and instability.”

In exact conformity to the decision and plan thus authoritatively declared, the covenant of the League of Nations was formulated by the representatives of the principal powers and, after amendment, was embodied in the treaty of Versailles with Germany. The same covenant was later incorporated in other treaties. Its objects are stated in the preamble in these noble words: “To promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war; by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations; by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments; and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.”

Pending the development of the settlements of the Peace conference—indeed, as early as a single month after the opening of that body, when the many questions of the peace were still under only preliminary consideration,—several of the controlling Republican members

of the United States Senate began a determined attack on the proposed League, alleging that its constitution amounted to a surrender of the rights and sovereignty of the United States. Speeches in condemnation of the League were delivered in the Senate by Mr. Poindexter (Washington) on February 19, Mr. Borah (Idaho) on February 21, Mr. Lodge (Massachusetts) on February 28, and Mr. Knox (Pennsylvania) on March 1; following which thirty-nine Republican Senators signed a statement declaring: "While it is the sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed should not be accepted by the United States."

Meantime President Wilson had returned for a brief period, and by his invitation a number of the Senators called on him and gave him their views. On March 13 he was back in Paris, where with his colleagues of the other nations he resumed the arduous and delicate task of developing and perfecting the treaty. Serious opposition in the conference to the League covenant ceased; in particular, M. Clemenceau, representing France, who originally had doubted the efficacy of the League as a means for assuring security to his country, now changed his opinion and heartily favored the covenant.¹ Aside from the complaints of the American Senatorial combine and the Wilson-hating Republican press, the only utterances of dissatisfaction were from the defeated Germans, who were inveterately antagonistic

¹See *Current History* magazine, April, 1919, pp. 100-101.

to the League because it would militate against their starting a war of revenge, and from the Socialists, whose schemes in the interest of the "proletariat" for "an international commonwealth" to confiscate property and standardize individuals would necessarily be brought to naught by a League founded on the principles of democracy and administered without reference to special interest. Various amendments to the covenant recommended by its critics in the United States were duly urged at Paris by President Wilson and were adopted.

Considering the plain facts of the League's origin and nature, the great disputation concerning it that has so agitated the American people can be rightly connoted and examined only in the narrow partisan relation from which sprang the essential opposition to the covenant—and ultimately to the entire Versailles treaty. The world-wide demand for and acceptance of the League cannot be questioned, and neither can the utter inadequacy and futility of all devices alternative to the League of Nations that have been suggested for the object of guaranteeing peace.

In the times before the Kaiser's emprise of world conquest—how far away they seem—there obtained the amiable Hague "conventions" of 1899 and 1907, which assuredly represented the "best minds," as well as the best possible endeavors, of all governments in the absence of a formal League. To revert to the Hague plan would be manifestly preposterous in view of its omission to apply binding arrangements and the experience resulting from it.

The alternative of an International Court, so hopefully proposed by some Americans, would involve defects very similar to those of the Hague experiment unless the court should be instituted and should function under precisely those political "commitments" of the nations which the Republican party has professed to regard with such indignation and horror. At the time these words are written (October, 1921) an International Court, with a distinguished American as one of its Judges, has recently been set up by the League of Nations—and there can be no room for another court so long as the League continues.

Another alternative to the plan of the League of Nations is the project of conferences at the initiative of the United States, to be participated in by invited powers and to consider certain limited objects—every one of which objects meantime engages the earnest and constant efforts of the established League. Such conferences of course would be contributory to the League's great aim, the promotion of peace. But with the League at the same time existent and eager to admit us to membership an essential motive of our government in calling the conferences would be the merely expedient one of meeting the demand for world concord by an approximation to the League's ideals and policy. An approximation is good, but not enough.

There remains at last the alternative of waiting for the occasion to arise before entering into a concert of guaranteed peace—that is, waiting for "the next war," and meantime maintaining armaments, perpetuating the spirit of arbitrariness throughout the world, and

with light heart toying with the factors of popular discontent ever becoming more aggressive on account of unbearable taxes and living conditions, the prospect of other exterminating wars, and the administration of government by men in no way interested in the progressive tendency of the times except to resent and resist it. This policy is in fact the one consistent treatment of the whole matter if an effective League is barred.

It became the treatment favored by the Republican party so far as that organization ventured to declare itself to the understanding of the country.

In the fight against the League and the treaty the Republicans at no time offered any constructive proposition whatever. They only brought forward a series of reservations that were designed to be destructive of the treaty by preventing its ratification and in some particulars were even worded with the palpable intent of affronting the Allies. The reservations accomplished their purpose; whereupon the Republican leaders in Congress turned to the project of effecting a separate peace with Germany by the preparatory means of a declaration terminating the state of war—to which end the Knox joint resolution was passed by the Senate on May 15, 1920, and by the House on May 21. The measure was vetoed by the President, and thus ended the proceedings relating to the treaty for the term of the Wilson administration.

After the coming in of the Republicans (March 4, 1921) the Knox resolution was reintroduced in amended form, passed by both houses of the Republican Congress, and approved by the Republican President;

whereupon a separate treaty of peace with Germany, retaining for the United States the advantages conferred by the Versailles treaty but repudiating our obligations under the covenant of the League of Nations, was negotiated with the German government, signed in Berlin August 25, 1921, and ratified by the United States Senate October 18.

It should be particularly remembered, as a most material part of the record, that the Anglo-American agreement for the security of France, which President Wilson signed in Paris, was totally discarded by the Republican Senate and administration.

The Republican arguments against the League of Nations, which so successfully served their purpose for the passing time and occasion of their strenuous employment, have come to the substantial test of their validity and merits. Already have some of the principal contentions been found utterly without weight. The first session of the League Assembly opened in Geneva November 15, 1920, forty-one governments being represented, and continued until December 18; and the second session was held in Geneva September 5 to October 6, 1921, with forty-eight member-governments represented. On both occasions all the proceedings gave evidence that the League possessed to an eminent degree the qualities of vitality and energy. Very marked was the spirit of resolute independence on the part of individual nations; and in the collective capacity of the Assembly one of the most pronounced tendencies shown was that of entire freedom from domination in any particular national or group interest. Notice was given and

registered of proposed amendments to the covenant, some of which were acted on; everything was done in dignity, good faith, and mutual comity, yet with decided and at times vigorous interchanges of opinion; and at the close of each session it was the belief of the members, and of dispassionate people throughout the world, that the League, through its representative body as also through its Council and secretariat, was excellently fulfilling its mission.

Is it probable that any harm would have come to the great United States in such illustrious and honorable company?

And looking to the future is it probable that the great United States, if sitting in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, could in any contingency suffer the remotest interference with its sovereignty, experience the slightest limitation upon its discretion, be drawn into undesired commitments in the least manner or proportion, or become either a supine victim of or consenting party to an arrogant super-government? Those who know the United States, and at the same time have an understanding of the interests and position of the world as related to the United States, must consider such questions merely frivolous to the extent that they are not supremely ridiculous. The outstanding lessons of the German War are that the United States won the victory and has the potentiality to win the next victory if another world conflict occurs. There can be no question of a super-government exercised upon the United States from any quarter—and least of all from

the League of Nations, the world's delegated agency for the service of humanity.

The League of Nations proposal has in no respect been negated except most casually, tentatively, and superficially on the part of a temporary political majority in the United States secured mainly as the result of internal circumstances and conditions not at all related to the merits of the League debate. History has continually demonstrated that nothing is more delusive or transitory than a party majority however huge, even if gained on a wholly uncomplicated issue of the time being. After the glittering party triumph comes the matter-of-fact party responsibility, with the merciless test and proof of the party position and proposition.

The final determination of the question depends on the course and logic of events. It was to serve the purposes of discrediting President Wilson and achieving a party success that the opponents of the League pictured it to the public as a monster of so frightful mien, kin to the fabled "gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire." The permanent realities of the matter will prove to be not the vituperations of an unscrupulous campaign or the private hates of vindictive individuals, but the necessities of the world for a secure and an ordered peace and the obligations resting upon every great people in that relation.

Either the present League of Nations will successfully continue with or without entrance of the now absent governments, or the fundamental policy that it represents—the policy, to use Mr. Wilson's words, of "a coöperation of the nations which shall be based upon

fixed and definite covenants and which shall be made certain of effective action"—must, sooner or later, be taken over and enforced by some other world instrumentality. It is only trifling with great matters to maintain the alternative policy of "staying out" "till the occasion arises"—the necessity to make certain of effective action is too tremendous, the inevitable consequences from failure to do so are too terrifying. It is a truism—rather, a mere platitude—that the recent war was scarce a rehearsal to the next, assuming that a next is to be permitted; and it cannot too emphatically be insisted that the question of a next is exactly and altogether a question of permission. Even under strict and compulsory engagements, arrangements, and supervision through the concerted action of the world there cannot fail to be apprehension of the possibility of sudden and exterminating war by secret preparation. The following is from an official report of testimony lately given by D. B. Bradner, Chief of the Chemical Research and Development division of the United States Army Chemical Warfare Service:

"Mr. Bradner:—Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Warfare Service has discovered a liquid approximately three drops of which, when applied to any part of the skin, will cause a man's death. Much smaller amounts than this, or even vapors from the liquid, cause very slow-healing burns.

"The experience of the World War proved it is possible for an airplane to fly within 100 feet of enemy troops and machine-gun them with practical impunity. The opinion of men well-informed on aerial warfare is that the only defense against airplanes is attack by airplanes.

"If, instead of carrying machine guns, attacking planes were equipped to carry a tank of this liquid for discharge from nozzles

similar to the ordinary street sprinkler, so that it would fall like rain, killing everything in its path, then you would have a weapon which would absolutely destroy troops, cities, or non-combatants unless they were protected by a superior air force.

"During the Argonne offensive in the past war the entire First American Army of a million and a quarter men occupied an area approximately forty kilometers long by twenty kilometers wide. If Germany had had 4,000 tons of this material and 300 or 400 planes equipped in this way for its distribution, the entire First Army would have been annihilated in ten to twelve hours."

No constraint upon the legitimate aspirations of peoples is contemplated by the League of Nations, and neither is any interference with their needful contests to assert and maintain their rights. But manufactured and unprincipled wars must cease; and they can be made to cease only by eliminating their artificial provocations consequent upon prodigious armaments, the system of rival balances of power, and the separate ruthless pursuit of exclusive interests, and by negating and penalizing their artful and devious preparations. This is the true Wilsonism.

Admittedly the League of Nations is in its inception and in its brief progress to the present an experiment. An experiment very similar to the Constitution of the United States at the origin of that instrument. Should the League prove a failure and no other agency take its place, then the liberal spirit that called it into being must bide a further experience of the familiar results of the old order. It has survived an attack from the political party of reaction, standpatism, and special interest in the United States that was expected to be annihilating. The Democratic party is its friend, and looks hopefully to its future.

CHAPTER XII

THE COX CAMPAIGN—WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE FUTURE

THE Democratic national convention of 1920 was held in San Francisco, June 28 to July 6. Its first act after organizing was to adopt a message of greeting to President Wilson, in which the great achievements of his administration were applauded and a feeling personal tribute was paid him. Reference was made particularly to his illness resulting from overwork in the cause of securing a just peace, and to the vindictive personal spirit of his enemies.¹ "We deeply resent," said the message, "the malignant onset which you have most undeservedly been called upon to sustain from partisan foes, whose judgments are warped and whose perceptions are obscured by a party malice which constitutes a lamentable and disgraceful page in our history." A notable act of the body was its refusal of a delegate's seat to one of the President's bitter opponents.

¹The records of American history afford no parallel to the persistent campaign of venomous and vituperative abuse waged by the Republicans against President Wilson. It seemed that his illness was hailed as providing an opportunity for new and more ingenious calumnies and malignities.

On September 27, 1919, the day after his breakdown at Wichita, the New York *Sun* printed an editorial in which it was plainly intimated that his

The convention was thoroughly and enthusiastically in accord with the policies of the administration, and in its platform referred with great strength to the splendid measures and results of Democratic rule during the previous seven years, and sustained the principles and course of the President in embarking upon and conducting the war and in negotiating the settlements of peace. On the League of Nations subject the following declaration was made: "We advocate the immediate ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair its essential integrity; but do not oppose the acceptance of any reservations making clearer or more specific the obligations of the United States to the League associates." This had been the position of the President and the Democratic party throughout the

reported illness was only a sham. The "hope" was expressed that his abandonment of his speaking tour might be taken as "indicating nothing more than the prudence of sagacious advisers in the political sense"—because the public had so far observed no "disturbing symptoms" as to the President's condition except "such as might be inferred from an increasing tendency to bitterness of denunciation, and a looser and less characteristic tone of argument, manifested in his later speeches."

On October 12, 1919, there was published a statement by George H. Moses, Republican United States Senator from New Hampshire, purporting to give the country the exact facts of Mr. Wilson's condition. Mr. Moses exultingly added: "Of course he may get well—that is, he may live, but if he does he will not be any material factor in anything." The President on his sickbed learned of this heartless comment and jocosely remarked to a visitor that "the Senator could be reassured, although he might be disappointed."

Toward all his foes, no matter how slanderous and vitriolic their denunciations of him, the President maintained from first to last calm self-control. If he replied it was in terms of reason, with very sufficient strength but never any recrimination; and this equipoise was what most enraged his slanderers (especially the more scholarly and intellectual Republican Senators and editors) and drew forth their choicest billingsgate. It will readily be recalled how little patient and restrained some of his predecessors were under criticism.

final struggle in the Senate—on the principle of all practicable concessions to accomplish the one result of overcoming destructive opposition. But while willing, with the President, to make such expedient concessions, the convention emphasized the main contention always insisted on by Mr. Wilson, that the League covenant as formulated was wholly incapable of being construed as limiting (under any circumstances) the proper and independent action of the United States,—and that the Republican representations to the contrary merely raised a false issue.

On the forty-fourth ballot James M. Cox, Governor of Ohio, was nominated for President. For Vice-President the nominee was Franklin D. Roosevelt, of New York, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy.

The Republican convention, held in Chicago June 8-12, was opened with an address by its chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge, in which he declared that “the defeat of the present administration and *all it means*” was the prime issue, and most bitterly denounced the President—alleging that he was for that “which is not American” and adverting to “his dynasty” and “autocracy.” Previously to President Wilson’s labors at Paris Mr. Lodge, with many other eminent Republican leaders (including former Presidents Taft and Roosevelt), had uniformly stood for the principle of concerted action of the nations to maintain peace. In an article in the *Forum* for June, 1918, he had discussed the war from the American point of view and had especially, in the strongest terms, opposed resort to a separate peace with Germany, which he asserted would be “a crime which nothing can

justify" and would "brand us with everlasting dishonor." But when the Democratic President and administration entered upon the policy of establishing an effective League and treaty in conjunction with the Allies, Mr. Lodge became the head and front of the Republican obstructionists; and ultimately he supported the Knox resolution looking to a separate peace. It would seem that before assailing President Wilson or anyone he should have set his own record straight by at least the means of adjusting his former principles to some specific program for the future. He did not, however, advocate any definite program whatever, and neither did the convention; concerning the League the sole policy was that of opposition to it as Wilsonian. Senator Warren G. Harding, of Ohio, was nominated for President, and Governor Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President.

Of the other parties in the field the Socialists opposed the League of Nations, while the Prohibitionists favored it.¹ The Farmer-Labor party made no declaration as to the particular subject but advocated a "league of free peoples" on a vague plan; and therefore that

¹Socialist platform:—"The government of the United States should initiate a movement to dissolve the mischievous organization called the 'League of Nations.' . . . The United States should immediately make peace with the Central powers."

Prohibition platform:—"The League of Nations is now in existence and is functioning in world affairs. We favor the entrance of the United States into the League by the immediate ratification of the treaty of peace, not objecting to reasonable reservations interpreting American understanding of the covenant. The time is past when the United States can stand aloof from the affairs of the world. Such a course is short-sighted and only invites disaster."

organization is to be classed with the Republicans and Socialists as against "Mr. Wilson's League."¹

While all the accumulated events of the preceding year had sharply defined the issue of the Versailles treaty as the dominant one for the Presidential campaign, it was on the part of the Republicans made only incidental to the program of comprehensive denunciation of President Wilson. The Republicans in fact preferred that the discussion concerning the League of Nations should be conducted strictly on the proposition of repudiation of the League without any other argument than that confidently asserting it to be "un-American" and prejudicial to our "sovereignty." So far as they presented the issue they relied mainly upon alarmist appeals and a variety of catchy expressions such as "Are you an American?" "Down with Wilsonism!" "No more autocracy!" and "Do you want your boy to go and fight for the King of the Hedjaz?" But looking to the decisive result of the contest they placed their principal reliance upon the consolidation of several very numerous and influential elements of the electorate to "down Wilson" from diverse motives of special prejudice, hate, revenge, and interest.

There was primarily the vote of those disgruntled about the war, inclusive of many who never had heartily approved it and the far greater number who looked only at its results personal to themselves in so greatly in-

¹In the campaign all the speakers for the Harding ticket received the following instruction from the Republican national committee: "In referring to the League of Nations it should always be spoken of as 'Mr. Wilson's League.'"



JOHN B. STANCHFIELD

John B. Stanchfield, born at Elmira, N. Y., March 30, 1855; attended public schools; graduated from Amherst college, 1876; Harvard college of law, 1877; studied law later with David B. Hill; elected district attorney of Chemung county, 1880 and reelected in 1883; elected three times mayor of Elmira; member of the assembly, 1895 and 1896, being majority leader in 1896; democratic candidate for governor, 1900; for U. S. senator, 1901; delegate to state constitutional convention of 1915.



FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, lawyer; born Hyde Park, N. Y., January 31, 1882; graduated from Harvard, 1904; Columbia law school, 1907; member New York state senate, 1910 to March, 1913, when he resigned to become assistant secretary of the navy, which office he held until 1920; Democratic nominee for vice-president, 1920.

creasing prices and disorganizing all the former conditions. It was their ready conviction that Wilson was responsible, and their convenient deduction that his party should be chastised accordingly. The reasons and explanations of things were to them of little weight as against their prejudices—prejudices diligently stimulated by the Republican leaders, orators, and writers, who at all times referred to the war principally in terms of fault-finding and took scrupulous care to deny that credit of any kind was due the Democratic government. Mr. Harding in his addresses dwelt on return to “normalcy” as the matter of foremost consideration and concern. It was known to all that he had never been an “idealist” about the war. He had voted in the Senate for the destructive reservations to the treaty and for the Knox separate-peace resolution. As early as June 8, 1917—only two months after our entrance, when the noble sentiment which produced that result was still at its height and all questions as to the administration’s proper conduct of the war were still for the future,—he had said in a speech in the Senate: “I have believed the Liberty Bond campaign hysterical and unseemly. . . . Much of the sentiment uttered concerning our part in the war is balderdash.”¹

Of conspicuous note as contributory to the outcome was the intense opposition to the Democratic ticket, for reasons purely of “revenge on Wilson,” by several of the more numerous groups of voters of foreign birth or ancestry.

Owing to the President’s action at the Peace confer-

¹*Congressional Record*, June 8, 1917.

ence in opposing the outright award of Fiume to Italy and insisting upon due consideration of certain phases of the Adriatic question, the Italian-Americans unitedly espoused the cause of his Republican enemies. The leading Italian language newspaper of the United States, *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*, of New York City, said: "Not to vote for the adversary of Mr. Cox—the legatee of Wilson—is a betrayal of the Mother Country. Let Italians bear this well in mind and consider the day of the Presidential election as a day of sacred and imperative revenge."¹

All the active promoters of "pro-Germanism"—according to the common understanding of that cult before, during, and after the war—were strenuously against Cox and Roosevelt and for Harding and Coolidge. A "Committee of Ninety-six" was formed, representing every existing German organization in the country, to throw the solid German support to Harding; and it was stated by George Sylvester Viereck, the leading spirit of the committee, that the number of votes expected to be controlled was between five and six millions.²

In the respect of the concentration of large groups of naturalized citizens in favor of a single political party for the avowed purpose of displaying attachment to foreign countries, the campaign of 1920 was unique in our history.

¹Translation from the *New York Evening Post*, October 29, 1920.

²*New York Times*, September 5, 1920. The resolutions of the German Committee of Ninety-six expressed the strongest "opposition to the League of Nations and the perfidious foreign policy of the present [Wilson] administration."

The Democratic party from its very origin has been noted for its liberal spirit toward the foreign-born of all stocks represented in the composite citizenship of the country. It has welcomed them without discrimination, has sought to give them the best advantages of our civilization and institutions, and in its influence with them has, for their own chiefest good as well as the common good of all the people, taken an especial interest in their becoming and being Americans and Americans only. Discriminatory action against the Democratic party by elements of the foreign-born electorate is a singular thing to record—but the campaign of 1920 was singular in every respect from the necessary operation of the spirit with which it was conducted by the Republican party and from the excellently well understood adaptation of that organization, for the occasion, to voters of all views, including great numbers (so great as to have constituted in the aggregate probably the major part of Mr. Harding's phenomenal plurality in the nation) who very distinctly were not for "America first."

It would of course be beside the subject to speculate as to the possibility of a continued action of foreign elements of the electorate in the interest and for the control of the Republican party. Certainly such an eventuality cannot be desired by Republican leaders. Heretofore the most serious handicap of the Republican organization has been its reputation for being sustained primarily by great group votes—specifically the group votes of, first, the special favored "interests," and second, the colored citizens. While the possession of these particular group votes has afforded it all the

net advantage that it has at any time enjoyed for the half-century period dating from 1870, the fact of that substantially solid possession, as noted and meditated upon by people outside the groups in question, has uniformly operated to its injury; and although it has generally won Presidential elections notwithstanding, its successes have been at the constant cost of a reputation for dependence upon and subjection to class and specialized favor. Consequently there are few States of the north that have not frequently passed out of its control, while the whole south, from the sheer necessity of local circumstances and a deep sense of the special inflictions that would necessarily attend unbridled Republican power, has rejected it utterly. The people at large are and always will be sturdily resentful of attempts to discriminate against a great party on the mere ground of its non-conformity to the demands of solidified special groups that conflict inevitably with the claims of other citizens at least equally to be considered; and as a matter of expediency alone the Republican party could ill afford to take over, on the basis of reciprocal acceptance and service, any group of voters animated by superior devotion to a foreign country—for such an acquisition would partake more of the nature of a liability than an asset. Moreover, no Democrat disputes for a moment either the exclusive American patriotism of the Republican party or its incapability, equally with the Democratic party, of acting, when charged with the responsibility of power, for even incidental foreign interest of any kind from the despicable incentive of an equivalent in votes. Foreign policy has

never yet been a matter of permanent difference between the parties in their ultimately responsible capacities and never will be, whatever the passions and persuasions of the passing election times.

A brilliant speaking campaign was made by Governor Cox and Mr. Roosevelt, with the whole-hearted coöperation of the Democratic party, which never was more united or energetic. On the dominant issue of the League of Nations valuable assistance was received from many former supporters of the Republican and Progressive parties, distinguished educators, clergymen, and reformers, and numerous organized agencies representing the moral and forward-looking sentiment of the country. The eminent career of Mr. Cox in the Governorship of Ohio for three terms and previously in Congress, his consistent identification with the cause of Progressive Democracy for many years, the impressive record of the results achieved in that cause under his leadership, and his unqualified advocacy of the great policies of the national administration and powerful maintenance of the same policies for the future, gave him the unquestioned advantage of affirmative and logical position in the campaign, which was the more decidedly marked by the evasive course of the Republicans throughout except in the respects of abusive attacks on President Wilson and mere negations as to questions of principle. The resulting votes for the Democratic party were understanding and positive votes, and will so remain to the pride of every man and woman by whom they were cast.

Concerning the subjects of labor and progressive in-

terests generally, the position of the Democratic party declared by its San Francisco platform and urged by its candidates was in harmony with the liberal ideas of the times as exemplified by the uniform spirit and acts of Mr. Wilson's two administrations. These subjects were mainly given but perfunctory attention by the Republicans, agreeably to their program of winning the election as the only one seriously to be considered. But the reactionary forces were in full control of the Republican party, as indeed had been perfectly manifest from the transactions of the national convention at Chicago and particularly from the selection of Mr. Harding as the nominee.

Early in the campaign Governor Cox in his speeches presented evidence that the Republicans were systematically raising enormous sums of money to influence its result—his calculation showing that an aggregate of not less than \$8,000,000 was contemplated. On March 1, 1921, there was filed at Washington a report by a special Senate committee appointed to investigate the expenditures of the two parties during the Presidential contest, which showed the following totals: Republicans, \$8,100,739; Democrats, \$2,237,770.¹

The Electoral vote of the nation was: Harding, 404; Cox, 127. Cox carried the States of Alabama, Arkansas,

¹In addition to the campaign expenditures, the sums paid in the pre-convention contests to promote the interests of the various Presidential candidates were set forth, the totals being: Republicans, \$2,857,551; Democrats, \$120,482.

The Senate committee—representing, of course, both political parties—said in the report: "The committee have discussed remedies to limit the amount of campaign expenditures, for they feel that the expenditure of these vast sums is a present and growing menace to the nation."

Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. The popular vote was: Harding, 16,152,200; Cox, 9,147,353; Debs (Socialist), 919,799; Christensen (Farmer-Labor), 265,411; Watkins (Prohibition), 189,408; W. W. Cox (Socialist Labor), 31,175; Maccauley (Single Tax), 5,837.

During the first few weeks after the national conventions of the two parties occurred the final struggle to secure the necessary thirty-sixth State for ratification of the Nineteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, granting enfranchisement to women on the same terms as men. Efforts to accomplish the result proved unsuccessful in the Republican States that up to that time had failed to ratify. On August 18 the victory was won by the favorable action of the Legislature of the Democratic State of Tennessee.

The certainty of early complete triumph for Woman Suffrage dates from the New York State election of 1917, at which the vote on the Suffrage amendment to the State Constitution was: yes, 703,129; no, 600,776; majority yes, 102,353.¹ But the amendment would have failed if its fate had been left to the "up-State" counties of inveterate Republicanism. The great majority of 103,863 in the rock-ribbed Democratic city of New York carried it, every borough of the city voting favorably. After the New York result nobody of the least political acumen doubted the success of the movement nationally within a very brief period.

¹*New York Red Book*, 1918, p. 470.

One of the outstanding facts of the Presidential campaign on the Democratic side was the whole-hearted reception of the women on terms of complete political equality. In the national convention of the party at San Francisco the women delegates and alternates were very numerous. The national committee was organized on the basis of an equal representation of women in its membership. President Wilson and Governor Cox gave unqualified and energetic support to the efforts to secure the final State for ratification of the Woman Suffrage amendment.

When the suffrage provision on behalf of the colored race was added to the Federal Constitution (1870), the movement for Woman Suffrage had long been in progress, and appeals were made for extending the vote to women as well as to the freedmen. No action was taken; and although the Republicans at many times subsequently had full power, both nationally and in the States, to grant the requests of the women, it was not until after the great development of progressiveness among the people, springing from the advanced demands of the Democracy on public questions, that the women's cause began to show real progress.

The Republicans base very much of their expectation of woman's support upon their ingenuous belief in their own "superiority," especially in the class respect—a belief that recalls the old pretensions of the "important" Federalists. No "superior" pretension is made by the Democratic party. It is content to leave its cause to the independent scrutiny and consideration of women, as of all citizens, upon the merits of its record of one hun-

dred and thirty years of identification with the ordinary interests of the people, intimate sympathy with them in their aspirations, and conscientious and consistent performance accordingly.

In relation to the course of women as an equal element of the national electorate, one prediction may be made with absolute certainty. They will be for things affirmative and for results that will last.

Respecting the forward spirit of the times, the Republican party of standpatism and special interest is wholly negative in its attitude and proposals, and the things that it seeks are the things that do not last. It recognizes no change from the "good old days of Mark Hanna," when the great power that the party held was assumed to be for the primary object of negating every progressive demand. It forgets the revolt of its liberal constituency against its narrow leaders, and remembers only that the absolute authority of those leaders as to real Republican policy has never been successfully disputed.

The future of the country is with the progressives of both parties. In the Republican party progressive sentiment is sincere and strong, but is in subjection to the forces of privilege. In the Democratic party it controls wholly, with a noble record of achievement and a program for consistent and positive continuance.


October, 1921.

TAMMANY:

A GLANCE AT SOME OF ITS REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITIES,
AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ITS POLITICAL CHARACTER

By

WILLIS HOLLY



THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; engrossed copy, whose frame tops the door casing and nearly reaches the lofty ceiling in the office of Tammany Hall. One of the most notable examples of pen work in the country. By William V. Peacon.

INTRODUCTION

TAMMANY HALL, as it is known colloquially, is really a duality and consists of a Society instituted with patriotic and benevolent purposes and an organization which is avowedly political and partisan. At this writing (1921) the Society is one hundred and thirty-two years old in its present shape, not counting some four years in which it was in the formative stages, though functioning. For nearly all that time it has been the backbone of a political and partisan force in the city of New York upon the foundation of principles from which it has never deviated; and very often its influence has reached into State and national affairs to an extent that is phenomenal when its purely local character and membership are considered.

In its early days, as was also true throughout the country during the first administration of President Washington, there was no cleavage on party lines to separate the sons of Tammany. Recruited as they were from the ranks of American patriots as opposed to the royalists and tories, they were so thoroughly in accord on the great questions of the times that there was no room for differences on other matters. But in Tammany, as in the States, party divisions began to appear in 1791, when the conflicting doctrines of Hamilton and Jefferson set against each other those who believed that

the aristocrats and the wealthy should control the government and those who held for popular rule and equal rights. The tenets and the membership obligations of the Tammany Society were in perfect accord with the views of the Democratic-Republicans, as the Anti-Federalists were then styled. And so fully was this recognized by the majority of the members that all the actions of the body became more and more clearly Jeffersonian and the Federalist element gradually faded out of the membership. The Society reflected in its intensest form the fervor of public interest that was shown in the French Revolution. When Democratic societies dedicated to the equal rights of men were started in 1794 all over the land under the inspiration of Citizen Genet's message of the new conditions in France, it was found that the membership in New York was almost identical with that of the Tammany Society. This gradual assumption of a political complexion and this first affiliation with partisanship are of a piece with Tammany's partisan position to-day, and an echo of its early utterances is found in its continued practice of advertising its ticket as Democratic-Republican nominations.

It is not the purpose of this article to present a chronological history of Tammany, but only to touch upon some phases, mostly in an epitomizing and generalizing way. Such a manner of treatment certainly should not lend itself to the adulation of the zealots who insist vigorously that Tammany is all good. Neither should undue heed be given to the disparagement of those who just as sturdily declare that there is no good

in Tammany. Yet it is with every propriety that the question should be raised whether the indiscriminate, all-inclusive denunciation and absolute finality of condemnation of the organization in campaign times does not inexcusably and unnecessarily damage the city of New York in the eyes of the rest of the country to an extent that is not justified by the purpose of putting out one set of office-holders and replacing them with another, even in the name of reform. It can be veraciously recorded that there are many honest and well-meaning citizens deeply attached to their city and taking pride in it who deplore a policy of abuse and defamation for political purposes and who believe that it should be treated as a great wrong when it involves a violation of the commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness."

Nearly fifty years have elapsed since the downfall of the Tweed ring closed a chapter in the annals of New York which is a reproach to the city and a blot of infamy on Tammany's record. Its most disgraceful feature, not forgetting the sordid thievery of millions, was the debauchery of justice—the debasement of the bench—revealed with the other disclosures of shame. No such condition has existed since. No such condition exists to-day. For campaign uses, however, Tammany men complain, this condition still lives in the minds of irresponsible and reckless apostles of defamation.

Recently a Citizens' Committee, in behalf of a judicial candidate whose reelection they favored, advertised this bald and bold statement: "Judge — has

many times stood against those who would rob the city, and for this the Tammany leaders denied him a re-nomination." Men of affairs and men of intelligence such as those who composed that committee ought to or must know that the charge could not possibly be true. There is no way that those who might wish to rob the city could be either helped or hindered by a Supreme Court Judge, or who could escape the vigilance of the press and be left to be discovered by an ephemeral campaign organization. There is certainly no Tammany-controlled press in New York; the press of the city is rather aggressively hostile to Tammany. Indeed, the Judge referred to would have been the first to disclaim the possibility of the thing charged if any attempt had been made to hold him responsible for the statement. Otherwise, as the Tammany men point out, he would have put himself in a very equivocal position. Either he would be making the claim that he suffered an experience that was individual and peculiar to himself—which would invite the belief that he was suspected of susceptibility to improper influences, a suspicion so firmly held that he had to repel the suggestion many times,—or he would be making a reflection upon the majority of the Supreme Court bench, as most of the Judges were, like himself, elected on a Tammany nomination. The implication would be inescapable that all these were subject to importunities to stand out of the way of those who would rob the city, and he would leave it entirely to conjecture whether they, or any of them, stood with his Spartan courage against the temptation. Worse, much worse,



JOHN PINTARD

John Pintard, philanthropist and "father of historical societies in America"; born in New York City, May 18, 1759; entered Princeton college but left it in 1776 to serve in the American army when the British occupied New York, returning to take his degree the same year; as clerk for his uncle, Louis Pintard, commissary of American prisoners, he became convinced of the importance of conserving printed and written records of public events; alderman New York City, 1789; member of assembly, 1791; founder of the Massachusetts historical society, by efforts in interesting prominent citizens of Boston, 1793; 1791 established a museum in connection with the Tammany society, of which he was the first sagamore; first city inspector New York City, 1804; organized the first savings bank in New York City, 1819; died in New York City, June 21, 1844.



JOSIAH OGDENN HOFFMAN, 3D

Josiah Ogden Hoffman, 3d, Grand Sachem of the Tammany society of New York (1791-1792); born in New York City, 1767; member of state assembly, 1792-1794; attorney general of New York state, 1795-1802; recorder of City of New York, 1809-1810; judge of supreme court from 1810 to the time of his death; died in New York City January 24, 1837.

he would put all of them who were not so near the age of retirement as to interfere with their consideration for renomination to be suspected of a corrupt subserviency to the leaders of Tammany. Such a condition could not be hidden from the bar and the press for sensational campaigners to unearth and reveal. The campaign managers of the regular ticket considered the story so ridiculous that they paid no attention to it, and the prompt abandonment of its use as campaign powder proved that it was recognized as an abortive effort, even by the amateurs who put it afloat. Yet the fiction may have found credence in some quarters of the world, and that possibility is a matter of real concern to those of every party who have civic pride.

In connection with this oblique effort to influence the election, it is interesting to reflect that the result was really decided by the votes of naturalized citizens on questions entirely unrelated to the city judiciary or its municipal administration. New York as a melting pot has done wonders, but it seems to have been fed raw material too rapidly for complete amalgamation. The Democratic candidates in 1919 for President of the Board of Aldermen, President of the Borough of Manhattan, and Justice of the Supreme Court were defeated because so many voters with Irish, Italian, or German sympathies were disgruntled against President Wilson. The city election hinged on government in Ireland, the Adriatic question, and other matters that the officials would never have anything to do with. There is food for thought in this.

Campaign practices based upon the calculated effect

of willful misrepresentation are bad enough, but what shall be said of a resort to such tactics in cold blood when far removed from the turmoil and the heat of election time? To plan such an activity, careless of individual good repute, reckless of community good name, indifferent to civic fame, and blind to its concomitant features of encouragement to disorder and its devotees, is difficult to excuse by professions or pretenses of good intention. The Rosenthal grand jury inquiry and the coincident Aldermanic committee investigation of the Police department seem to be put in this category by their developments or lack of developments. These inquisitions were aimed at the administration of Mayor Gaynor, and they were obviously inspired by the expectation that Tammany would nominate him for a second term. No voice could be raised against them as investigations if undertaken in good faith and for the purpose of finding out what influences were responsible for the dastardly murder and its disquieting suggestion of worse than police laxity, and with the intention of doing something corrective and constructive with the information secured.

The progress of the double inquiry did not give much indication of this requisite of good faith or much promise that anything of benefit would come from it. It was announced and published, however, day after day, that the inquisitors were on the eve of astounding disclosures, that the thugs and gamblers were tumbling over each other in their eagerness to turn State's evidence, and that a procession of Tammany men, members as well as leaders, would soon be started

for State prison. The announcements were so indiscriminate, so wholesale, that there was no escaping the purpose to make the inference plain that all Tammany was affiliated with vice and crime and owed subsistence to relations with the sinister forces of the underworld. The inquisition was successful in that it created the impression on the public mind that a veritable crusade was on and that the valor of the knights of Fusion and Reform furnished the only chance for salvation, moral, temporal, and political, that the sorely beset city could hope for. Under that belief a Mayor and a District Attorney were elected in one year and in the next a Governor was put in office. All were sworn enemies of Tammany. All were committed to the press-agen- ted scare over the alleged criminality of Tammany's organization and personnel. Here were the combined forces of the State, the county, and the city arrayed, with all the police power, prosecuting strength, and detective facilities of three great potential agencies and a record of frightful accusations and direful threats to be justified. No prosecutions were even attempted. This failure to make good on the expectations that had been raised is urged by Tammanyites to be a confession of judgment against the prosecution and a certificate of good character for the organization. In presenting these facts, which are matters of public record, the desire is simply and wholly to leave with the reader the question asked at the beginning, whether considerations of public policy should not be sufficient to curb and control political detraction.

To understand the Tammany of all its one hundred

and thirty years we must follow and understand the spirit of the times in all its varying phases in the passing years. When we find in the time of Tweed that Tammany sank to almost incredible depths of disgrace and reproach, we find that morality in political life and even in business life was at a distressingly low level. Inflation, speculation, extravagance, and attending evils growing out of the Civil War are the generally assigned causes. The results were exemplified by many more instances than those furnished by Tweed, Ingersoll, Connolly, and company. Washington had its Boss Shepherd; Philadelphia was disgraced by election conditions and political bossism as bad as New York's, but by the opposite party. The Credit Mobilier and the Star Route national scandals evoked caustic newspaper criticism, and the gold and Erie stock-gambling operations of Fisk and his like were a menace to normal and legitimate commercial and financial undertakings.

Quite the most exhaustive research, as well as the ablest handling of the whole subject of Tammany, has been at the hands of Edwin Patrick Kilroe, and his analysis and appreciation of the institution is herewith quoted for its intrinsic value:

"The Tammany Societies in the United States exercised a powerful influence in shaping the destinies and in crystallizing the principles of our government, and have contributed much to the development of our present extra-constitutional system of party government. The importance of this influence has been inadequately recognized by students of American history. The societies bore the standards of equal rights and popular rule like the powerful Jacobin clubs of the French Revolu-

lution, and were the rallying-points of Republican activity until the complete annihilation of the Federalist party. Under the favoring leadership of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison the movement flourished, and in its organized activities foreshadowed the establishment of national political machines. With the passing of the Federalists the issues which had stimulated the movement disappeared, and one by one the societies succumbed to the lethargy resulting from the cessation of violent partisan controversy. The New York Tammany Society alone remained, presenting the most curious phenomenon in the history of American politics in its development from a patriotic and fraternal institution to an organized force or machine in party politics; in which position, for three-quarters of a century, it dominated the public life of the American metropolis.

"The Order has participated in numberless movements of social, political, and civic import. Every epoch, every year has seen its affirmative acts; and its position has been writ large in infinite bitter controversy. That the record of its achievements and of its activities, both useful and pernicious, should form the basis for an impartial judgment of its worth, is the postulate from which a compendious history of the Society should proceed."

Mr. Kilroe's passing reference to Tammany as dominating the public life of the metropolis "for three-quarters of a century" calls forth more than equally casual treatment by the friends of Tammany in their special pleading for their beloved organization. They point to the proportion that the mentioned seventy-five years bears to the life of the metropolis since the beginning of its phenomenal growth. How is it possible, they ask, that New York could have progressed to its acknowledged and proud preëminence on this continent, if not in the whole world, if it was ruled for so much of the time by a gang of thieves and corrupt politicians such as Tammany is described

to be by its political enemies? And they complacently declare that the question in its asking answers itself.

One of the severe critics of Tammany, L. P. Gratacap, supplies an analysis of the institution which will interest all who desire to reach an intelligent and fair verdict. His prelude and conclusion follow :

“The city of New York is an enormous charge, its interests are numerous, its expenditures princely, and Tammany Hall is the representative expression of an organized body of men who appreciate the pecuniary benefits of ruling it. They move together with an instinct of unanimity born of self-interest. They have that duplicity of temperament which deceives alike the confiding and the shrewd, and they disarm the vigor of their enemies by the affectation of humility and candor. In short, Tammany Hall exists for political power, and it will retain political power, for it has all its parts so made, so educated, so paid as to render dislodgement impossible, and it has shrewdness enough not to permit itself to sink so low, or to play so fast and loose with public interest, as to weaken the adhesion of its admirers or dismay their confidence. . . .

“The machine is unavoidable in the politics of this country, and in itself represents a mechanical regulation of the public acts of government, and nothing else. Accidents, circumstances, race conditions give the running of the machine to various men and sets of men, and the ulterior results are good or bad, public-spirited or selfish, reputable or disreputable, patriotic or treacherous. Tammany Hall controls the ‘machine’ in this city, and is now running it, we think, with an improved sense of its responsibilities and, beyond cavil, at least with a determination to make and keep this city a safe and a salutary place to live in. Tammany can never be as bad as it once was, is by no means as bad as it is painted, and is succumbing already to influences which, if progressively strenghtened, may make the ideal machine.”

PART I

ORIGIN AND EARLY PHASES

THE Tammany Societies which originated in Philadelphia and flourished in New Jersey and in States of the nearer south previously to 1879, do not bear much more relation to the Society of Tammany or Columbian Order of New York than their Indian forerunners do to the one hundred and ten millions of the people of this country. They may be considered in passing, however, for their indication of some of the spirit of their time and for the influence they had in the beginning of the institution. In their earlier Colonial days they were of a social character and their gradual assumption of political activities was part of the general feeling of dissatisfaction and unrest over Colonial conditions and of the American and national sentiment which was to grow out of those feelings. The features they adopted from Indian forms, ceremonies, and costumes were chosen as an indication of this belief in the fullest maintenance and expression of aggressive Americanism and their separation in habits of thought from those who clung to the form and substance of old world ideals and conditions.

The legendary Indian chieftain chosen as the tutelary saint of the Tammany Societies, and the vague and various traditions of his heroism and his wisdom, need

not concern us in connection with this record. There is too much of confusion and contradiction in them to justify the hasty acceptance of any of their phases, and they have too little relation with the history of the Society in New York to warrant the labor and effort of sifting out the truth concerning him either as a warrior or a philosopher, as a friend of the white man or the out-traded and out-bargained representative of the red.

Mr. Kilroe gives considerable credence to the theory that the great Iroquois Hiawatha and his works have been largely confounded with Tammany and his accomplishments. He writes:

“In contrast to this remarkable figure, Tammany stands as a mere name, leaving no memorial of epoch-making accomplishment or institution of permanence among his people. Through the arbitrary selection of his name by writers of romance, and through the blunders and confusion of the early missionaries, and perhaps the Delawares themselves, the glory and fame of right belonging to the talented Hiawatha have been attributed to Tammany. The real Tammany, it must be concluded, was a chief of ordinary attainments, who made little or no impression on his white contemporaries and whose conduct in no wise influenced the history of the land in which he lived. His notable virtues and fancied deeds are wholly incongruous with his recorded characteristics and achievements, and the eager veneration bestowed upon this pagan saint finds no warrant either in historic fact or in relevant legendary to any extent commensurate with the dignity and grandeur of his fame.”

The plan for the formation of a Tammany Society in New York seems to date back to the latter part of 1785 or early 1786. The Marine Society of New York at a dinner on January 25, 1786, toasted “St. Tammany and the New Constellation.” The plan and this

recognition are probably traceable to the influence of John Pintard, who was prominent in the Marine Society and had been formerly a conspicuous member of the Sons of St. Tammany in New Jersey before he became a resident of New York. In May, 1787, as the Tammany Society, the organization appears with a dinner of its own at Mr. Talmadge Hall's tavern, 49 Cortlandt Street. The list of toasts and their similarity in language and sentiment with those of previous celebrations of the New Jersey Society indicate the active interest of Pintard. They were as follows:

- "1. The Day, and all who honor it.
- "2. The Land of Liberty.
- "3. Congress and their Allies.
- "4. The State of New York, and all who wish it prosperity.
- "5. His Excellency, the truly great and virtuous George Washington, Esq.
- "6. Louis XVI, King of France, his amiable Queen and Royal Family.
- "7. Perpetual Unanimity and prosperity to the Sons of Tammany throughout the world.
- "8. The noble patriots who fell in the cause of American Liberty.
- "9. May the war hatchet be buried and the pipe of peace be smoked till time shall be no more.
- "10. May the industry of the Beaver, the frugality of the Ant, and the constancy of the Dove be perpetual characteristics of the Sons of St. Tammany.
- "11. The daughters of St. Tammany and their papooses.
- "12. May the American chain never be tarnished by the rust of discord.
- "13. May honor, virtue, a true sense of liberty, and a detestation of slavery be the characteristics of Americans and all their adopted brethren."

The new organization, though apparently without an abiding place, continued in some fashion, and in May, 1789, it announced a dinner, tickets for which were to be had at Aorson's tavern. The newspaper reports of the dinner show that it was enjoyed in a marquee erected on the banks of the Hudson about two miles from the city. It was further described by three daily newspapers as "an elegant entertainment." They all printed the toast list. A contemporary comment had this prophetic paragraph: "The number which attended at this festival was very respectable, and affords, to the first Institutors of that Society, a happy presage of its growing importance and respectability."

This successful demonstration of the assured status of the Society was followed in a few days by the publication of a notice for a meeting of the members of the Society of St. Tammany "at the usual place" for business of importance. This would indicate that it was regularly established and had a home. It was confirmed by the appearance in the "New York Directory and Register," published later in the year, of a description of the organization and a list of the officers, whose election was likely enough the business of importance before referred to. That publication said:

"St. Tammany's Society, or Independent Order of Liberty.—This being a national society consists of American-born, who fill all the offices, and adopted Americans, who are eligible to the honorary posts of warrior and hunter. It is founded on the true principles of patriotism, and has for its motives charity and brotherly love. Its officers consist of one grand sachem, twelve sachems, one treasurer, one door-keeper. It is divided into thirteen tribes, which severally represent a

State; each tribe is governed by a sachem, the honorary posts in which are one warrior and one hunter. Officers for the present year:—Grand Sachem, William Mooney; Sachems, White Matlack, Oliver Glean, Philip Hone, John Burger, Jonathan Pierce, James Tylee, John Campbell, Gabriel Furman, Abel Hardenbrook, Cortlandt Van Buren, Thomas Greenleaf, Joseph Gadwin; Treasurer, Thomas Ash; Secretary, Anthony Ernest; Doorkeeper, Gardner Baker.”

In its original period it is evident that the Tammany Society of New York was a pillar of support to President Washington and his administration. This attitude was both understood and avowed. The necessity for and the significance of it are found in the fact that the city, while the seat of the new national government, was also the head and center of the reactionary influences of the pro-British, the tory, and the aristocratic enemies of the proclaimed popular sovereignty. It is undeniable that the organization, with its spectacular features to catch the eye and excite the imagination, and its alert and active assertion of its Americanism, was a tower of strength to the Federal authority.

The names of many of the officers, as well as of those who were on the roll of membership in the new society, are also to be found in the lists of the Sons of Liberty or “Liberty Boys,” and some confusion has arisen from the fact. It has even been mistakenly said that the Tammany organization grew out of the other. Yet it is not too much to say that Tammany was the legitimate heir and successor of the Sons of Liberty, who raised Liberty poles and rallied round them in the Revolutionary days and the pre-Revolutionary days when love of country and devotion to liberty were the

main inspirations that moved the majority of the people, as they were in our late days when the World War spirit united even those ordinarily divided by all sorts of differences and cleavages. The organizations were alike the outgrowth of patriotic American sentiment. Both were recruited from among those who opposed bitterly, and sometimes turbulently, the aggressions and oppressions of the British and the Tories and were stirred to fury by the insolence of the red-coats. The Sons of Liberty took their name from a catch phrase uttered in debate on the question of the Stamp act. Charles Townshend, the Acting-Secretary of State to the Colonies, had referred to the colonists as ungracious and ungrateful, terming them "children of England's planting." Colonel Barre ridiculed Townshend's position and scoffed at this description of the colonists, declaring, "The Americans are Sons of Liberty."

The aggressions of the red-coats and the manifestations of the instinct of defense by the Liberty Boys and the Tammany men often centered around the Liberty pole on The Common, now City Hall Park. The resulting turbulence led to a prohibition of such poles on the Common, and the patriots were forced to buy a lot at Broadway and Murray Street, where the Postal Telegraph building now stands, to put one up to replace that torn down by the British soldiers. The Society of Tammany recently voted to place a memorial tablet on the building recalling this historic incident.

The first Liberty pole in New York was raised by the Sons of Liberty in 1766; it was pine mast or staff. The last one was erected on the same spot in City Hall Park,

on Flag day, June 14, 1921, being presented to the city by the New York Historical Society and the Sons of the Revolution of the State of New York—delegations from the various patriotic societies, including Tammany, participating in the impressive ceremony. Another recent Liberty pole raising was in Union Square on the Fourth of July, 1917, under the auspices of the Society of Tammany in connection with the regular Independence day celebration at the Wigwam. A parade, music by the navy band, and speeches by national celebrities were incidental to what proved to be the high water mark of the patriotic spirit of our great war time. This high level of inspiration was kept up in New York City until the end of the war and culminated in the wild turmoil of Armistice day and the enthusiastic welcomes extended to the returning soldiers.

The Liberty pole is essentially an American institution, and thus commended itself to Tammany. No mention of it appears in other history. In the earlier days no hamlet was too small in numbers or too weak in public spirit to have its Liberty pole or tree, which was always the center of gatherings with a patriotic or political purpose. The general use of the cap of liberty in connection with these poles has sometimes been thought to have been adopted at the time of the French Revolution. This is not true, and neither can the use of the cap in the ceremonies of the Society of Tammany be traced to any French origin or be found to be due to the suggestion of sympathy with the transatlantic devotees of "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality." It is a Phrygian cap, and when placed on the head of a manumitted slave

whose freedom had been secured by gift or purchase was the symbol that the former slave had become a free man. Very naturally it became the badge and symbol of the Sons of Liberty and of their Tammany colleagues and successors. It is very true, though, that the French revolutionists used the liberty cap and that both Tammany and the Liberty Boys sympathized heartily with the struggle for liberty in France. But for twenty years before the French Revolution the cap of liberty was familiar, with the Liberty pole or tree, all along the Atlantic seaboard of America.

The prominence of the name of William Mooney, who appears as grand sachem in the above list of the officers of the Tammany Society elected in 1789, is to be noted as a continuing aspect of its annals for many years. Yet it is apparent, on scanning less superficially, that the guiding mind of the organization and the real inspiration that brought it into being were furnished by John Pintard. William Mooney, an upholsterer with a store in Nassau Street, was an energetic and patriotic man—with a genius for self-advertising. His carefully connoted activities are not to be lost sight of by anyone who even skims the record of the early days of the Society. Indeed, by reason of this fact and the further fact of his acquaintance and relations with Aaron Burr, Mr. Mooney in later years was credited with being the creature of Burr and the latter's instrument in the formation of the Society for Burr's political purposes. Some support for attributing power in Tammany to Burr, avowed or hidden, is found in the fact that the organization and the individual for quite a period

shared in devotion to the cause of Jefferson. But Tammany was among the first, and among those most bitter, who turned against Burr when he tried to nose Jefferson out of the Presidency though his campaign had been made as a candidate for Vice-President. The most stirring and sensational political situations familiar to the present generation do not give us any counterpart of the excitement over that action. It can be imagined, however, if it is recalled that there was a tie in the Electoral vote for Jefferson and Burr, and though the ballots for both were cast for the office of President the custom was to give that place to the man who had the highest vote and to name for Vice-President the one with the next highest vote. Burr's action was so thoroughly unpopular that to it may be traced the beginning of his rather rapid loss of public standing, which the killing of Hamilton in a duel made complete and irretrievable.

The particulars of the connection between Mooney and Burr seem to show that the alliance was somewhat one-sided. Mooney was undoubtedly an admirer of Burr, and just as certainly counted himself as one of the friends of that brilliant but not well-balanced politician. That the friendship was not exactly returned or at all well requited is shown by the condition of the estate of Mooney, whose executor found a lot of valueless notes of Burr's for goods sold and for money loaned to him. The interest in this consideration of the relations of Burr and Mooney lies in the revelation that the name of Aaron Burr does not appear on the roll of the Tammany Society, which is intact from the signa-

tures of Mooney and his colleagues on the first roster of officers down to the signatures at the last regular meeting. It is quite likely that the lampoon writers attacking Burr would appeal to the enemies of Tammany and charge him with connection with it in the effort to thus discredit him. Then the diatribe aimed at Tammany would, in turn, be weighted with the accusation that it was Burr's machine so that the enemies of Burr would be rallied against Tammany. So history is sometimes made.

John Pintard's activities in connection with the new Society were in distinct contrast to Mooney's. His work, as became a merchant and a scholar, was accomplished quietly, and a characteristic modesty that was almost timidity precluded him from public appearances as a speaker. His language and his habits of thought are in evidence all through the written material that has come down to us. The toasts at the annual celebrations, the ritual, the constitution, and the proclamations of purposes are alike in this showing. An example is in the second paragraph of the constitution: "It shall connect in the indissoluble bonds of patriotic friendship, American Brethren, of known attachment to the political rights of human nature and the liberties of this Country."


In James Grant Wilson's "Memorial History of the City of New York" Tammany's position in 1790 as "a power to be reckoned with" is attributed largely to Pintard in these words:

"Probably Jefferson, who had assumed his duties as Secretary of State on March 21 [1790], had something to do with the rapid devel-



JOHN KELLY

John Kelly, Tammany leader; born in New York City, April 21, 1821; attended the common schools; pursued the mason's trade; elected alderman in 1854; elected to congress and served from March 4, 1855 until he resigned, December 25, 1858; sheriff of the city and county of New York, 1859-1862 and 1865-1867; defeated for mayor of New York City in 1868; appointed comptroller of New York in 1876 and served three years; delegate to the democratic national conventions of 1864, 1868, 1872, 1876, 1880 and 1884; died in New York City, June 1, 1886.





LOUIS F. HAFFEN

Louis F. Haffen, born November 6, 1854 at Melrose, Westchester county; entered St. Johns college, Fordham, 1868, Niagara university, 1870; returned to Fordham and graduated, 1873; graduated from Columbia school of mines, 1879, as a civil engineer; worked in New York City and in the West; employed in the department of parks, New York City; elected commissioner of street improvements in the Bronx, 1893; delegate to constitutional convention of 1895; elected 1st borough president of the Bronx, 1897 and reelected for four terms, serving in all 12 years.



RICHARD CROKER

Richard Croker, political leader; born at Clonkilly, county Cork, Ireland, November 23, 1841; came to America as a boy and studied the machinist's trade; entered politics in 1865; alderman in New York City, 1868, 1870 and 1873; coroner, 1873-1879; opposed the Tweed ring and fought bitterly against its domination, 1873-1874; fire commissioner, 1883; city chamberlain, 1889-1890; leader of Tammany Hall for 17 years; retired from politics and went abroad purchasing a country place in Ireland, where he occupied himself with horse racing; died in Ireland, April 29, 1922.

opment of the Society. The sagamore was a vigorous Jeffersonian. This was John Pintard, the Tammanyite of highest social position; also a scholar. Pintard was editor of the *Daily Advertiser*, assistant-assessor of the City Council, and Assemblyman. Under his leadership the Society could lose no opportunity, and one presently offered, for making a fine impression on the public mind."

Wilson goes on to give a circumstantial account of the aid given by the Tammany Society in the reception of the Creek and Oneida Indians, which was regarded as of vast importance in paving the way to peace and stopping Indian aggressions. The Tammany men attended in Indian costume, deferred to the forms and ceremonies of Indian diplomacy, and wound up with smoking the pipe of peace. This history is not alone in giving the Willett-McGillvray Creek Indian reception incident a considerable value in fixing the relations of the settlers with the red men. It concludes the account with a reference to the President which verifies the assertion that the occasion was important:—"The ceremony ended with a song of peace in which all, including the President [Washington], joined. The Sons of St. Tammany, in costume, managed the business, and the Society had made its mark."

John Pintard's other activities dovetailed very effectively with his purposes and interests in connection with the Tammany Society. He took his prominent though strangely silent part in social, political, charitable, and civic movements of all kinds as fast as they were started, and even started many of them himself. The New York Historical Society was established in 1805, identified with it being such notables as Mayor DeWitt Clinton,

Judge Egbert Benson, Samuel Bayard, Anthony Bleecker, Peter Gerard Stuyvesant, Rufus King, Daniel D. Tompkins, and all the clergymen of the city. Yet Mr. Pintard was undoubtedly the untiring force that brought it about, and his collection for the Tammany Museum, begun in 1789, was the nucleus of the one assembled by the new body. Lamb's "History of New York" groups Tammany's American Museum and that of the Historical Society together and says: "To Pintard is due the honor of originating both; indeed, he may with justice be pronounced the father of historical societies in America." He was also the forceful pioneer in the establishment of the first savings bank in the city, as well as of the American Bible Society and the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

Pintard's influence appears to have waned in the following years as the Sons of St. Tammany became more and more interested and active in the politics of the city, State, and nation. He was unable to make any effective impression on his colleagues of the Society in favor of the Erie canal project, which he ardently championed from the very beginning. An admirer and warm friend of DeWitt Clinton, he possessed, as did that great man, the vision to foresee the value to the State and city of the water highway to link the Great Lakes and the sea. While Tammany was actively and aggressively against the canal and added to the opposition of its members in the Legislature a campaign of ridicule against "the big ditch," Pintard is credited by a contemporary, Dr. Francis, with distinguished service on the other side. He says: "The first meeting of our citizens in favor of

this vast measure was brought together through the instrumentality of John Pintard at a time when to give it any countenance whatever was sure to bring upon the advocate of the ruinous project the anathemas of certain of the political leaders of the day and official proscription. I remember well how cautiously and secretly many of these incipient meetings in favor of the contemplated canal were convened, and how the manly bosom of Clinton often throbbed at the agonizing remarks of the opposition, muttered in his hearing, and the hazard to his personal security which he sometimes encountered."

The record of the Tammany efforts to defeat the canal measure is undoubtedly one of the things that the protagonists of the organization would be glad to obliterate. While it mirrors accurately the purblind attitude of the majority and exactly reflects public opinion of the day, it is quite a stumbling-block in the way of the Wigwam spellbinder who would claim that Tammany was ever and always at the front in public works that make for progress. There is no comfort to him or credit to the Tammany leaders of that time in the explanation that there was a good deal of small politics in their position. It was in part due to their antagonistic feelings toward DeWitt Clinton, against whom they waged many a bitter contest in the first two decades of the Nineteenth century. They recanted, though, when the canal was an accomplished fact, and vied with other political and civic organizations in the celebration of the completion of the great work in 1825. The members of the order were no inconspicuous feature of the cere-

monies of that occasion, whose pomp and pageantry were the marvel of the time and whose poetic sentiment and the imagery of the union of the waters are stirring reading to-day.

The record of Tammany during all this time of fruitless opposition to the canal and of factional strife for office and influence in the city government is far from being devoid of constructive effort and accomplishment. An interesting example is furnished by the story of the contest over the adoption of the Constitution of 1821. That instrument was the result of long striving, and Tammany's part in securing through it the admitted boon of manhood suffrage is very interesting. The culmination of the efforts is so ably treated of by Hon. Robert Ludlow Fowler that nothing more enlightening could possibly be written on the subject. Judge Fowler's contributions on the Constitutional and Legal History of New York in the Wilson Memorial History are recognized as among the most valuable and interesting in that four-volume work. He says:

"During the entire period between the enactments of the State Constitutions of 1777 and 1821 there was great dissatisfaction with those provisions of the former document which related to the property qualification of electors and with the other provisions which vested such transcendent powers in the Judges of the great courts of record. The popular dissatisfaction for some time took the usual form of protests in the newspapers of the day. But in August, 1820, Tammany Hall, as the representative of the dissatisfied element of the population, initiated a movement for a convention to amend the State Constitution. The subsequent legislative bill providing for the convention promptly met with the disapprobation of a majority of the Council of Revision, who vetoed it, Chancellor Kent writing the opinion for the

Council with all the conservatism of a trained lawyer. No veto in the history of the State has met with greater censure than this action of the Council of Revision. The Council was openly accused of wishing to defeat the will of the people, and of conspiring to retain the State in the hands of the lawyers and landholders who, from its foundation, had carefully guided its political fortunes."

Judge Fowler's other references to the constitutional provisions which provoked so much dissatisfaction are added to make plain the great importance of this action of the Tammany Society. He says:

"While this Constitution [1777] contained a most explicit statement of the rights of popular sovereignty, the practice was not coextensive with the enunciation, the suffrage being confined to such as were freeholders in the Province or freemen in the cities of New York and Albany. It was reserved for a later day to give fuller effect to the political emancipation declared by the American Revolution."

Further and fully to understand the important and far-reaching effect of this successful agitation of the Tammany Society and its potent tendency toward real government by the people, it should be recalled that in the year 1790, out of 13,330 males resident in the city of New York only about 1,303 appear to have had sufficient property to qualify them to be electors for State Senators under the State Constitution of 1777. At that time, it is said, there were 93 freemen of the city (probably included in the 1,303). Continuing with Judge Fowler, the study of the old Constitution sheds even brighter light on the action of Tammany.

"The main provisions of the fundamental charter of the new government bore an astonishing resemblance to the former crown government, except in the source from which the political authority emanated. That was the new political institute, but one long dreamed of by philosophers and at last realized. The realization was the

legitimate inheritance of those who had left old institutions and worn-out forms for the politically formless regions of the world. It is true that it had been said by political writers of ancient Greece that all forms of government proceed in cycles, and are constantly changing from free forms to forms less free or from absolutism to anarchy, and that no form of government is stationary, entirely novel, or perfect. The new form of government of New York, however, contained several features new to the history of political societies—absolute religious toleration, and the declaration, rather than the realization, of a complete popular supremacy absolutely unalloyed with difference in status, for no mention was made of African slavery in the Constitution, and its total abolition was evidently contemplated by the founders of the new State.

“The Constitution of the new State did not indulge in a triumphant denunciation of the past, nor did it destroy those old and well-worn forms which experience had demonstrated could coalesce with liberty. On the contrary, it perpetuated those institutions of the Province and of the common law of all English-speaking people which had been fully consistent with equality, liberty, order, and justice. The only revolution was in the source of political power, which was declared to be founded on the will of the people. How great this single revolution indicated was, it took some generations to comprehend; for at first the force of the ancient legal formulæ and the tyranny of custom rendered the political emancipation to some extent a phrase, and it was not until subsequent to 1800, when a new generation of lawyers had come upon the scene, that the State entered on the phase of really popular institutions. The effect of the change in the common law wrought by a combination with republican institutions then became more apparent.”

That this early and typical action of Tammany went right to the seat of the principles of popular government and vitally concerned the foundation and future of the State and the United States, is again shown by Judge Fowler’s masterly analysis of the legal effect of the American Revolution upon the question of the sov-

ereignty which Tammany did so much to crown the whole people with.

“Successful rebellion always transfers the sovereignty from the unsuccessful to the successful. Thus, in the eye of the publicist, individuals living in the Province of New York succeeded to the entire political authority of the former government in New York, and they also succeeded, in common with the warring people in all the other Colonies, to the subverted general authority of the crown in its relations to the other seaboard Colonies. There was no question that the people of a particular Colony succeeded to the former sovereignty over that Colony; the real question related to the manner in which they succeeded to certain imperial prerogatives of the crown, of far more general extent. A close analysis will perhaps demonstrate that the subverted imperial authority was ultimately vested by the people of all the Colonies in the new general or Federal government, and that the subverted sovereignty of a particular Colony was transferred by its recipients to the new State government. If we may act on this rigid analysis, it may be said that the original Articles of Confederation failed to express the real partition of the subverted political power, while the Federal Constitution of 1787 accurately expressed the relations which the people in all the original Colonies antecedently bore to the new order of things.”

So it may be truly said that it depended upon the Constitution of 1821, the movement for which was initiated by the Tammany Society of New York, to express the real partition of the subverted political power which was won from the crown in the war of the Revolution.

Three other conspicuous examples of Tammany's patriotism and public spirit shown in the first half of the century, were its action in paying reverence to the Prison Ship martyrs, its stirring part in the War of 1812 both before and after the outbreak of hostilities, and the abolition of imprisonment of debtors (1831).

Its part as one of the great representative organizations of the city in all the public functions, parades, celebrations, dinners, and what not need not be recounted. Sufficient is it to say that none among these demonstrations would have been considered complete without Tammany, and a large proportion of the Sons of Tammany who participated in whatever was afoot were costumed as native American Indians and wore their distinctive badge of the bucktail. The occasions included the wonderful peace parades of the Revolution's end and at the close of the War of 1812, the Erie canal festivities, the celebration of Washington's birthday anniversaries, Evacuation days, always the Fourth of July, as well as the Washington and Hamilton funeral processions and other public obsequies which were accompanied by any processional demonstration.

The Tammany Society had tried in vain to make a national concern of the care of the relics of the Prison Ship martyrs and the erection of a suitable memorial. An appeal to Congress invited the coöperation of the people of the whole country, and various efforts were made to collect funds for the purpose by voluntary subscriptions. Then the Society took the work upon itself and furnished the means to build a vault, the original corner-stone of which, bearing the inscription, is now in the keeping of the Long Island Historical Society. With solemn ceremonials the memorial was dedicated on the 6th of April, 1806. The honored relics of the Prison Ship martyrs are now at rest on the Heights of Fort Greene (Washington Park) in Brooklyn. A plaza,

terraced masonry, and a dignified and impressive stone column mark the spot and seem destined to form a memorial with everything of permanency that human effort can insure. The members of the Society of Tammany paraded in full force on the occasion of the dedication of the beautiful new monument, November 14, 1908, and President-elect William H. Taft, the orator of the day, paid them a graceful compliment for their appearance and eulogized the Tammany men who, a century before, had first performed the patriotic duty of doing honor to those heroic dead.

Another instance of the spirit which manifested itself in patriotic effort was in 1814, when the War of 1812 was drawing to its close. Tammany took the lead in the voluntary work of the citizens in erecting the much needed fortifications in Brooklyn to supplement the defenses of New York. This movement was a repetition of similar activity, in which Tammany was equally prominent, during the war scare in 1794 when hostilities with England were expected to break out again. The work then was done at Governor's Island.

Tammany's record in connection with the establishment of the first free school in New York is of special interest, showing alike the progressive attitude of the Society on the great question of public education, its high standing in the community, and the status of its personnel in the best business and social circles. John Pintard, of course, was a leading spirit in the enterprise that marks the beginning of the work—the organization in 1805 of "the Society for establishing a Free School in the City of New York, for the education of such poor

children as do not belong to or are not provided for by any religious society." This school was conducted in quarters donated, rent free, in Bancker (now Madison) Street, and accommodated forty pupils. It soon proved inadequate to the demands, and Colonel Henry Rutgers, a member of Tammany, generously donated a site for a new building in Henry Street. The city also presented a site to the Society, and both were in time utilized. In Bourne's "History of the Public School Society" the importance of this first step toward our school system is recognized by the publication of the names of all who contributed to the erection in 1809 of the pioneer free school building. In the list are included nine members of the Tammany Society: Henry Rutgers, Josiah G. Pierson, Thomas Smyth, John Youle, Forman Cheeseman, J. Sherred, William Post, Ebenezer Bassett, and Peter Fenton, Jr.

The Tammany Society took an equally prominent part in membership in the Public School Society of the City of New York, the successor to the Free School Society and the real parent of the public school organization of our day with its 550 school-houses, 24,000 teachers, and 800,000 pupils. In March, 1826, the free schools having increased in number to six and grown away from any distinctive charitable purpose, the Legislature at the request of the school trustees incorporated the Public School Society. Here were the public schools as we know them open to all without regard to any distinctions of circumstances, religious belief, or nationality. Here, again, the historians have felt called upon to record the names of the "original corporators,"

and among them are found the following members of the Society of Tammany: Samuel Russell, Samuel Torbert, William Boyd, Benjamin Egbert, Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchell, Mayor DeWitt Clinton, Brockholst Livingston, Jacob Morton, Daniel D. Tompkins, John Pintard, William Johnson, and Adrian Hegeman.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 was the occasion of a signal demonstration of the ever-ready national patriotism of Tammany. By its representation in the Board of Aldermen of the city of New York the organization was supreme in the city's government. Nearly all the members of that body were Tammany men. On April 19, 1861, the board adopted a resolution appropriating one million dollars toward raising and equipping troops for the war. Major-General Sickles, himself a member of Tammany, received this tribute of appreciation from President Lincoln a few days afterward: "Sickles, I have here on my table the resolution passed by your Aldermen promising to do all in their power to support the government. I have their resolutions appropriating a million dollars toward raising men for the war. When they were handed to me I felt my burden lighter. I felt that when men break through party lines and take this patriotic stand for the government and the Union all must come out well in the end."

The impressive monument on the battlefield of Gettysburg, with all that has been written about it, and the record of the Forty-second New York, make it a work of supererogation to devote space here to the story of Tammany's part in the Civil War. That regiment fought in thirty-six battles and engagements, Antietam

and Gettysburg being the most notable both for their military results and the losses in life. The story of the Forty-second, however, makes up only part of Tammany's record in the great conflict. Several other regiments and brigades were credited almost entirely to the organization. General John Cochrane's chasseurs, General Thomas Francis Meagher's brigade, General Corcoran's force, which included the Sixty-ninth regiment, and the Excelsiors (five regiments) of General Daniel E. Sickles are all classed as Tammany contributions to the man power of the north in those dread times.

PART II

ASPECTS OF RECENT HISTORY—SPIRIT AND CHARACTERISTICS

THE story of the Tweed ring has already, with the greatest frankness, been adverted to as the story of the deep and dark disgrace of Tweed-Tammany corruption and robbery. Time and distance of standpoint, with the comparative effect of our every-day talk of figures of millions merging into billions, have taken away the impression of colossal looting that stunned the minds of the people of the early 'seventies. The varying estimates of from \$30,000,000 to \$75,000,000 do not stir the imagination much these days. But nothing can ever lessen the degree of the offense. It was a colossal crime—colossal in conception, colossal in audacity, colossal in insolence, and colossal in stupidity. It is hard to realize how any sane mind could expect, or even hope, that such a structure of fraud could endure. So much has been written concerning it, and the denunciatory campaign references to it are so continually with us, that it will be excusable to refer here to only one aspect. No one seems to recall in these latter-day allusions that even the Committee of Seventy apportioned the odium of the mess and did not put it all on Tweed and Tammany. To all fair-minded critics, but

more especially to the self-righteous and the partisan poison-tongued and the confiding believers in the superior morality of up-State, a reading of the following utterance of that committee is commended :

“But you of the country [*i. e.*, up-State] must help us. This is your city as well as our own. We are your factors and business agents. If we are overburdened with taxes, you have to pay us more for doing your business. The corruption of our municipal government could not have grown to its present gigantic proportions had our leaders of the ring not found active support and willing material in bribable members of the Legislature elected by the rural districts. You must help us in our efforts to purify our political life, and the one efficacious manner by which you can come to our relief is to elect honest men only to the next Legislature. If our city is disgraced by a Senator who dominates among weaker villains by a mere magnitude of scoundrelism, he has found willing tools among the false representatives of districts where one year of his stealings would be regarded as enormous wealth.”

Again, Samuel J. Tilden, recognized as the potent force in the activities which accomplished the downfall of the ring, made this point in his famous letter to the *New York Times* under the title, “The New York City ‘Ring’—Its Origin, Maturity, and Fall Discussed”:

“It is but just to say that the Democracy are not responsible for this sort of statesmanship, which considers the equal division of official emoluments more important than the administration of official trusts or the well-being of the governed. In the Assembly of 1857, of the 128 members the Democracy had but 37, of the 32 Senators it had but four; and it had not the Governor. In the thirteen years from 1857 to 1869 it never had a majority in the Senate, in the Assembly but once, and had the Governor but once. The Republicans had all the legislative power of the State during all that period, as they and their Whig predecessors had possessed it for the previous ten years. The ‘Ring’ was doubly a ring. It was a ring between the six Republican

and the six Democratic Supervisors. It soon grew to be a ring between the Republican majority and the half-and-half Supervisors, and a few Democratic officials in this city. The Republican partners had the superior power. They could create such institutions as the Board of Supervisors, and could abolish them at will."

Another aspect of the post-Tweed days that is ignored in the partisan attacks on Tammany is the addition to its rolls and to its councils of many of those who were most active in bringing the ring malefactors to justice. That this would presage a reform in the organization as marked and as thorough as the reform that had been accomplished in the city government is so apparent that they studiously neglect to supply the premise. Compare the following lists drawn from the Society's roll of officials:

1871.—Grand sachem, William M. Tweed; sachems, Richard B. Connolly, Peter B. Sweeney, A. Oakey Hall, Joseph Dowling, Samuel B. Garvin.

1872.—Grand sachem, Augustus Schell; sachems, Charles O'Connor, Samuel J. Tilden, John Kelly, Horatio Seymour, August Belmont, Abram S. Hewitt.

The transition indicated by this notable change in the personnel of the board of sachems was the result of a movement within the organization. Tweed and his followers of the vulgar and ostentatious Americus Club, with the hangers-on and dependents of his associate-thieves, strove sturdily to retain their hold upon the Society. It was John Kelly's fearless war of opposition that defeated the efforts of the ringsters still to dominate Tammany. When the night arrived for the election of officers for 1872 Mr. Kelly found that the hall had been

packed in the interest of the gang that stood at bay. He forced through a motion to adjourn before the other side divined his purpose. At the adjourned meeting the doors were manned and no one but members admitted. The anti-ring element was thus able to put through its ticket. This made John Kelly the new leader. His ascendancy lasted until the advent of Richard Croker, who succeeded to the power of the "boss" really by the favor of Kelly.

Croker's regime was also to be well described as a reign. He exercised more absolute power over the organization than had ever been shown before. It became the invariable custom to consult him on all matters of interest to the faithful, and his approval was necessary for any appointment or nomination concerning which Tammany had the say. Sheriff and Sachem Thomas J. Dunn, one of the most popular leaders in the Croker days, is credited with a saying that illustrates the situation more fully than any long story could do. One of his fellow-leaders confided to "Tom" that he was about to get married. "Have you seen Croker?" he asked, with an appearance of tremendous solicitude lest the seeker after domestic happiness might have omitted a very necessary step in the important matter.

Croker's successor was not so easily settled upon. He installed a sort of a regency when he began to spend much of his time abroad, and John C. Sheehan was the regent. Croker took up the reins again, however, in the campaign for the election of the first Mayor of the Greater city. Mr. Sheehan was hesitating between Congressman Amos J. Cummings and William Sohmer



Charles F. Murphy

Charles Francis Murphy, political leader; born in New York City, June 20, 1851; educated at public and parochial schools; began working as a wire worker and later was a street car driver; became leader of the 18th assembly district, New York City 1892; served four years as commissioner of docks and ferries and treasurer of the board; chairman, sachem and recognized as sole leader of the Tammany Society since 1902.



JOHN CHARLES SHEEHAN

John Charles Sheehan, lawyer; born at Buffalo, N. Y. August 5, 1848; educated at St. Joseph's college and the Commercial college of Buaffalo; removed to New York City and practiced law there; police commissioner New York City, 1892-1895; prominent in councils of Tammany Hall; died at New York City, February 9, 1916.



JOHN R. VOORHIS

John R. Voorhis, former state superintendent of elections; born at Pompton Plains, Morris county, N. J., July 27, 1829; resident of New York City since 1830; attended private schools from 1834 to 1841; in 1842 entered the law office of John Jay; apprenticed to the stair building trade, 1844, foreman, 1851 and master stair builder, 1858; appointed commissioner of excise by Mayor William F. Havemeyer, 1872; commissioner of police, 1874-1879, under Mayors Havemeyer and Edward Cooper; appointed commissioner of docks by Mayor William R. Grace, 1881-1885; commissioner of police, 1885-1892 under Mayors Grace and Abram S. Hewitt; police justice under appointment of Mayor Hugh J. Grant, 1892 until 1895, when the office was superceded by that of city magistrate; appointed commissioner of elections by Mayor Robert A. Van Wyck, 1901, reappointed by Mayor Seth Low, 1903, and by Mayor George B. McClellan, 1905; appointed superintendent of public buildings and offices by Borough President John F. Ahearn in 1908; state superintendent of elections for the metropolitan election district, 1911

in declaring his choice of a candidate. Croker put himself in the hands of a clique that was opposed to Sheehan and yielded allegiance to John J. Carroll. This interest succeeded in effecting the nomination of Robert A. Van Wyck. During the Van Wyck administration and that of Mayor Low, who succeeded him, Mr. Croker's continued absences from the country affected his restored hold on the organization. Though Carroll's power was very great, yet the nominal headship of Tammany passed along from Sheehan to Lewis Nixon and to a triumvirate of whom Charles F. Murphy proved to be the strongest member and who therefore advanced to its leadership and to the leadership of the organization. Leader Murphy's first great test was met by the nomination of his choice for Mayor in the person of Congressman George B. McClellan. His strength and daring and resourcefulness were further exemplified by putting through his plan of taking two candidates from the Mayor Low administration and giving McClellan Grout and Fornes as running-mates. Against a united hostile press and a campaign of unexampled vigor the new leader elected McClellan and made his seat in power so firm that after eighteen years he seems better established than ever. The ever recurrent cry, "Murphy must go," which a newspaper, a committee, or an individual so often raises for the purpose of attracting attention, is now regarded as a moss-grown political joke. A recently launched political satire attributed to the *Tribune* of 1950 a news story and some snappy editorial comment under the heading, "Murphy Must Go."

Leader Murphy has varied the methods of his predecessors Kelly and Croker. There is little of the autocrat in his attitude. He keeps in almost daily touch with the district leaders, and the functions of the leadership, as he exercises them, seem to be considered as a sort of weighing up of different proposals and opinions in regard to men and measures. The executive committee has become rather of the order of a clearing house where he considers with the other members the claims and the suggestions from the different districts. His friends even complain that he is too easily turned from the conclusions of his own judgment and permits decisions to be reached which he knows time will show to be wrong.

It is no great secret, and you do not have to penetrate very far into the inner circles of the organization for the revelation, that Gaynor and Sulzer furnish the two most notable instances where Leader Murphy's judgment was subordinated to great disadvantage. All during the summer of Mayor Gaynor's last year in office Mr. Murphy stood for his renomination. His insistent inquiry was, "What's the matter with Gaynor?" and he argued against objections of any character when they were evoked by the question. It is more than likely that his opinion would have prevailed that time if things had moved in their ordinary course. But at the psychological moment Mayor Gaynor was jockeyed into an unpopular position in a fight between the District Attorney and the police about keeping a west side resort open after one o'clock in the morning. The opposition to Mayor Gaynor was so strengthened by this incident

that his renomination by Tammany was rendered impossible. As to the Sulzer matter, it is thoroughly understood Mr. Murphy and Tammany wanted Dix and did not want Sulzer. They took him to keep harmony in a Presidential year, and there was an element in the party up-the-State that believed in Sulzer from not knowing him as well as he was known in New York.¹ Mr. Murphy was not among the Tammany men who were in love with the idea of impeaching Sulzer, either. He was won over to the opinion of some of the lawyers and legislators that there was nothing else to do on the law and the facts. As a district leader and as the head of the organization, Mr. Murphy's policy has been to keep as far away from the dangerous police question as possible. The lessons of the Lexow revelations and of the Mulberry Street conditions under Mayor Van

¹On the subject of Sulzer's nomination the following was said by *Harper's Weekly*, October 12, 1912:

"Meanwhile has no one a good word to say for Boss Murphy? It is universally admitted that he voluntarily waived his authority and played fair throughout. That could not have been very easy to do when he was being lambasted from all points of the compass. Really, his conduct does not seem to us as being that of a 'selfish, stupid boss' who 'must be an ass.' His fix was far from being imaginary. Looking first one way and then another, he beheld an organization ready to turn him down if he showed himself a quitter, an aggrieved and disappointed Governor, a highly sensitized Presidential candidate, an obstreperous bunch of up-Staters ready and eager to bolt, a corps of scolding newspapers, and a very strong public feeling against dictation or even suggestion from him or from his advisers. Out of this mess evolved harmony, general satisfaction, and a ticket that will be helpful instead of a drag. We have been expecting to see the *World* toss the boss a bouquet in recognition of the way he met its severe requirements, but since it seems to be indisposed to do so we take it upon ourselves to say that Mr. Murphy acquitted himself most handsomely, far more like a tactful and competent leader than a stupid and inconsiderate boss. Is it not so?"

Wyck were not needed for his district practice, for he never had dealt in that sort of thing. But for the organization he wanted no Police Commissionerships, and he would not permit the leaders to attempt to influence appointments, transfers, or promotions in the department.

The celebration of each recurring anniversary of the nation's birth has ever been a distinguishing feature of the Tammany Society in all its one hundred and thirty years. Careful research fails to disclose any other organization with a similar unbroken record for this patriotic observance. The character of the exercises conducted by the Society, and even the language of the invitations to the public, are admirably calculated to inspire and strengthen patriotic sentiment. A sample of the Fourth of July invitation, used over and over, year after year, presents this epigrammatic and tabloid announcement of the attitude of the Society and the spirit of the celebration:

"All friends of liberty are invited to participate with us in renewing our pledges of fidelity to the Constitution under which we find protection and security for our civil and religious rights. While we meet for a political purpose, we do not meet as partisans. We recall with deep gratitude the sufferings and the unwavering devotion to the cause of liberty of the fathers of the Republic, who won our independence, and we offer the homage of our grateful hearts to their memory for the republican institutions which they bequeathed to us, the crowning glory of their sacrifices and heroic courage."

This utterance deserves to rank with "The American Creed," a remarkable writing by William Tyler Page, of Friendship Heights, Maryland, of just an even hundred simple words, which took the prize in a competi-

tion for the best summary of the political faith of this country and was adopted and accepted by Congress, as follows:

"I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign Nation of many sovereign States; a perfect Union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes.

"I therefore believe it is my duty to my Country to love it, to support its Constitution, to obey its laws, to respect its flag, and to defend it against all enemies."

The reading of the Declaration of Independence and the singing of the Star Spangled Banner are never omitted from the Wigwam Fourth of July observances. And in the quiet years between the close of the Civil War and the days of our entrance into the World War it was often that more than one twelvemonth elapsed when the national anthem was not heard in a public chorus outside of Tammany Hall. Orators and statesmen of national renown from all over the States were heard from on these interesting occasions, and many of them expressed themselves as feeling that they were pilgrims to a sacred shrine by reason of the record of unbroken devotion to the day that had been made by the Society.

That Tammany is in possession of a forward-looking membership is frequently attested by the character of the utterances at its gatherings on such occasions as lend themselves to declarations on national subjects, partisanship being always suspended at these times. On

July 4, 1913, the following resolution was offered by Sachem Charles F. Murphy and unanimously and enthusiastically adopted:

“Resolved, That the Society of Tammany, at its Independence day celebration, July 4, 1913, recommends to the Congress of the United States the needs of the United States navy, with the urgent necessity of restoring this arm of our national defense to its proper place among the navies of the world.”

Again, referring to the subject of preparedness—at a time, it will be remarked, before the World War made that topic engrossing—the voice of Tammany was heard on July 4, 1914, in the adoption of this resolution:

“We, the citizens of the United States and of the State of New York, in mass-meeting assembled under the auspices of the Society of Tammany on the anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, in order to secure action by Congress and the State Legislature on measures deemed necessary for the security and prosperity of the republic, for the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine, the policy of the open door in China, the policy of ultimate freedom to the Philippines, and the reestablishment of democracy in Mexico and for the preservation of law and order, do hereby

“Resolve, That until world peace is reasonably certain of realization, the United States must provide for an adequate army and navy as a means of defense of its principles and institutions; that Congress and the administration be urged to institute an immediate inquiry into the defenses of the nation to determine the expediency of enlarging and strengthening the army and navy of the United States and the National Guard of the States, and the organization of reserves for the several branches of our naval and military forces.”

Tammany has never been lacking in that form of public spirit that manifests itself in benevolence when the call comes from any stricken city or community. The sufferers from any sort of calamity, the famine or plague-ridden people of any clime, those devastated by

flames when great cities are fire-swept, and those rendered destitute by convulsions of nature have all, in turn, been the recipients of its contributions. Instances could be multiplied indefinitely of this feature of the organization's liberality. But space will permit of the mention of only a few in these pages. For the San Francisco earthquake victims, \$5,000 was contributed. For the population overwhelmed in the Galveston flood, \$2,500 was sent. For the destitute survivors of the Messina earthquake, \$2,500 went in cabled funds. For the Russian Kisheneff victims, \$2,500 was forwarded in the same way. The poor of the city in the stress of the hard times of 1898 received \$20,000, and in the same year a subscription of another \$20,000 was made for the Cuban Freedom fund. In 1899 the same spirit of readiness in the work of relief was exemplified in the contribution of \$15,000 toward paying off the mortgage and saving the home of the family of Parnell.

Tammany's boasted attitude as a champion of equal rights and popular sovereignty did not move the organization to any active part in the agitation for Woman Suffrage. In fact, its record on that question is distinctly to be described as one of opportunism. There was a fair share of suffrage advocates in the ranks of the organization, but no official action in support of the movement was ever taken. Indeed, it may be said that considerable care was exercised to keep clear of any commitment in favor of the extension of the franchise. But when the law was passed and the fair sex was admitted to a share in the duties and privileges of the ballot, Tammany was far from slow in putting plans in motion

to secure and retain the votes of the daughters and wives and sisters of the braves of the tribe. In nominations and appointments to office, and in apportioning a share in the personnel of the party machinery, it was alert and even aggressive. For the national Democratic convention of 1920 the assignment of two places out of four to the sex on the ticket for delegates-at-large from New York State was the result of Tammany's influence on the deliberations at Albany. This recognition was further accorded in the Congressional district delegations elected at the Tammany primaries. The thing was evened up, however, in a different way. For delegates the men were given nineteen and the women five. For alternates the women were given nineteen and the men five.

The district committees and the membership in the county committee have comprised as good a share of the women voters as could be induced to take an interest in political activity. The selection of executive members has been made along the same lines, and in pursuance of the provisions of the Primary Election law, as in the case of the men.

The question of the consolidation of the governments of the metropolitan district within the boundaries of the Empire State and the establishment of the Greater city, was another one as to which Tammany took no position as an organization. The legislators and officials affiliated with the organization were left free from any action by the Society or the executive committee that would guide or influence them, and each followed his individual judgment. Curiously enough, indifferent

Tammany was entrusted with the onerous task of organizing the administration of Greater New York. Some day, perhaps, history will recognize the stupendous character of the work. It was understood in Albany, when the new charter was passed, that the act was far from perfect and that the difficulties of administering the city government under it would be well-nigh insurmountable. Conflicting jurisdictions that overlapped, jurisdictions that met but did not join, diffused powers in some directions and too greatly centered powers in other directions were features that led one legislative expert to declare that there were at least one hundred vitally necessary amendments to be passed before any administration could hope to give satisfaction. The first Mayor of the Greater city, however, happened to be a Tammany man, while the Legislature was of the opposite party. One single amendment to the much criticised charter was vouchsafed to the city. It provided that the Fire Commissioner could designate an Acting-Commissioner, in the event of his absence or disability, to avoid the risk of that important department being entirely paralyzed by such a happening.

All such omissions and defects, though, were as nothing compared to the confusion concerning the finances of the new municipal giant. The outlying districts that were annexed, and even the adjoining great city of Brooklyn, had signalized the approach of consolidation by extravagant public expenditures and their accompaniment of bond issues. It was almost a year and a half before it was definitely settled whether or not the new municipality was inside or outside the consti-

tutional debt limit and whether it could issue and sell bonds. Robert A. Van Wyck, the first Mayor of the New York of to-day, was a straight-out Tammany man. He believed in and carried out the Tammany theory that a responsible political organization behind an administration made for successful and efficient government. When the drawbacks and complications under which he labored are fairly considered, it will be found that his administration was a wonderful success. And this in spite of the undeniable fact that his Police department was open to serious criticism. It seemed that the "System," supposed to have been done away with for all time by the results of the Lexow committee's investigation, again climbed into the saddle and that there was a recrudescence of shameful conditions under which some of the force profited by an alliance with vice and crime. It is difficult to see how it could be possible for the most hardened police "crook" to relapse into the belief that he never could be held to any accountability for squeezing money out of the criminal and the disorderly. But that is just what happened, and the burden of the police machine was the principal factor in the ensuing election that resulted in the defeat of Tammany.

This was a repetition of the political history of the closing years of the old city, comprising the territory now included in the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. Tammany had been returned to power over the ruins of the County Democracy by the nomination and election of Abram S. Hewitt to the Mayoralty. The Hewitt administration had been succeeded by two terms

of Mayor Hugh J. Grant and one of Thomas F. Gilroy, both Tammany nominees and Tammany men. Grant's term had been signalized by the putting of the electric wires underground and by an all-round efficiency that continued under Mayor Gilroy. The latter's election was won almost without any serious opposition, so popular and satisfactory was the record of that Tammany regime. There was every appearance and indication that the organization was due for a long continuance in power. This prospect was upset by the disclosures of the Lexow committee involving the corruption of the police machine, the "System" alluded to above in connection subsequently with Mayor Van Wyck's administration. Tammany, as the party in power in the city administration, was positively execrated in the public mind by reason of the revelations of police conditions. The fact that the Police department was ruled by a bipartisan commission was entirely lost sight of, and no attention was paid to the further fact that Republican police officials were in the majority of those found to be smirched in the filthy mess. Tammany nominated Nathan Straus to succeed Mayor Gilroy, but in the course of the campaign he had some misunderstanding with Governor David B. Hill and retired from the race. Ex-Mayor Grant took up what was well understood to be a forlorn hope and stood on the Tammany nomination, only to be overwhelmingly defeated by William L. Strong. Though a Republican, Mayor Strong recognized himself to be the product of a fusion of that party with other political elements, and felt that he was bound to do without the backing and support of the tangible

and responsible party machine. His administration proved unsatisfactory, and the only thing remembered to its credit is the street-cleaning record made by his Commissioner, Colonel Waring.

Tammany's seasonable activity in stirring the patriotic impulses of the people was evidenced on a notable public occasion in the early days of American participation in the World War. It was on April 25, 1917, and the proceedings were remarkable alike for the patriotic fervor of both speaker and auditors, for the scholarly offering of the orator, and for the representative character of the assemblage. President Wilson's great address declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and the German empire was impressively read by Alexander I. Rorke. An address by the Rev. Dr. Howard Duffield, pastor of the Old First Presbyterian Church, followed. Dr. Duffield began by calling attention to the printed volume of a sermon delivered to the Tammany Society on July 4, 1793, by Rev. Samuel Miller, at that time officiating in the pulpit of the Old First. The sermon referred to was on the truth that Christianity is the surest basis of political liberty. "To this choice of a subject," said the Rev. Mr. Miller, "am I led by the recollection that the respected Society to which this discourse is in a particular manner addressed hold up as the great object of their attention everything that may tend to promote the progress of civil liberty, and to transmit it pure and undefiled to the latest posterity."

Dr. Duffield's stirring eloquence was followed by the adoption of resolutions pledging patriotic support to

the President and to the government. They were transmitted to President Wilson and evoked a very feeling expression of gratitude and appreciation from him that is among the most treasured things in the Wigwam.

The ulcerous growth of ideas inimical to the declared purposes of the Society of Tammany or Columbian Order, and subversive of our system of government, excited a great deal of discussion in the meetings of the Society all through the days of the late war and during the period after its close. It was early determined that the institution was bound to do and say everything within its power to combat and counteract the insidious agitation against the Constitution and against law and order. At the meeting of December 1, 1919, a resolution was adopted calling for the appointment of a committee to consider what could be done by the Society to the best advantage in the matter. This committee reported to the February meeting, and its report was adopted, as follows:

“Whereas, A dangerous and destructive element has been endeavoring to gain a foothold in our country, has been planning to delude our people with emissaries of false promise, and has been attempting to create in our land of freedom, of plenty, and of opportunity the conditions of horror and havoc which exist in Russia, and are there perhaps explicable as reactions against ages of autocracy, repression, and oppression, but here are exotic and only possible as the results of fraud and deception, or of enemy foreign force; and

“Whereas, The Columbian Order or Society of Tammany is committed by its constitution and constrained by its record of nearly one hundred and fifty years to active and energetic efforts for the preservation of our form of government, and is pledged to fidelity to the Constitution of the United States, under which we find protection and security for our civil and religious rights; and

“Whereas, The sturdy common sense and sound public conscience of the American people can be relied upon to stand firm against the most insidious propaganda of destruction aimed at the fabric of our government and based on the advocacy of murder, arson, and pillage; therefore be it

“Resolved, That the Columbian Order or Society of Tammany hereby renews its declaration of uncompromising opposition to any and every propaganda or activity aiming at, or tending to, the subversion of our system of government or the destruction of our institutions of law and order; and be it further

“Resolved, That a public meeting be called of the citizens of New York, irrespective of party or nationality, in the Great Wigwam, 145 East Fourteenth Street, or some other suitable place, for Sunday, February 22, the anniversary of the birthday of the Father of the Country, to create, arouse, and avow sentiments of patriotism, and that the county committees of the Republican and Democratic organizations, and all political county committees favorable thereto, be invited and urged to unite with and assist the Columbian Order in making this demonstration effective and impressive; and be it further

“Resolved, That the officers and members of all other patriotic societies and organizations and individuals be and they are hereby invited and urged to join with this Society in this meeting, and in this movement as a whole, to the end that all the forces in opposition to an avowed attack upon government, society, religion, and morality may be united to more effective work; and be it further

“Resolved, That a campaign of education through the medium of circulated printed matter, addresses in public schools, halls, club-rooms, etc., be instituted and conducted by this Society and all other societies and persons who may be pleased to join with us, to enlighten the misguided and misled who may have been won or who are in danger of being won away from their patriotic allegiance to our glorious country, to teach anew to its people the lesson that the forefathers taught, that ‘Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,’ to counsel the careless and unthinking that those who would undermine and destroy our free institutions, whether they be native or naturalized in nominal citizen-

ship, or are confessedly foreigners, are really alike all aliens in heart and mind and thought; and be it further

Resolved, That the spiritual leaders and revered teachers in the pulpits of all sects and denominations be respectfully requested to take their stand with the other forces ranged on the side of law and order, of decency, of righteousness, and of security, and against rapine and blood-letting, and that proclamations, posters, and advertising mediums be employed for proclaiming and promulgating the truth on these vital subjects."

The meeting authorized under these resolutions was held in Cooper Union and proved to be one of the most notable public demonstrations ever made, even in that hall with its great record of historic gatherings. Sachem Wauhope Lynn called the meeting to order, and turned it over to Grand Sachem John R. Voorhis as the presiding officer. Thomas R. Marshall, Vice-President of the United States, was the principal orator, and his address was most stirring in its patriotic fervor and convincing in its logic as applied to the fallacies of the agitators against our government of the people.

Ogden L. Mills, Jr., formerly a Republican member of the State Senate, made as great a hit as the Vice-President. He presented a scholarly and conclusive array of figures showing the great wealth of our country and the remarkable and general distribution of that wealth among home and farm-owners, savings bank and building loan depositors, and owners of business and manufacturing outfits, Liberty bonds, and all sorts of securities. Though weighted with statistical information Senator Mills's address was so skillfully handled that he held the absorbed interest of the audience to the last word and the last figure.

Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York, himself a member and a sachem of the Tammany Society, followed with an address on the same lines of argument, that the record of the country and its people, the marvellous prosperity that they shared, the participation in its office-holding responsibilities and emoluments by rich and poor alike, proved that equality of opportunity and absence of oppression were its distinguishing features. He deduced the assurance that the structure based on such solid foundation was secure against attacks which could only be based on deception and misrepresentation.

The other speakers, of scarcely less interest than those who had gone before, were Very Rev. John J. Dunn, chancellor of the R. C. diocese of New York, Bishop James H. Darlington, of a diocese in Pennsylvania of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Rev. Dr. Joseph Silverman, Rabbi of Temple Manu-El, City of New York, and Colonel Henry M. Bankhead, of headquarters, department of the East, United States Army, representing General Robert Lee Bullard, in command.

Robert L. Luce read the following resolutions, which he had drawn up for the committee, and they were enthusiastically adopted by the meeting:

"Whereas, The menace to civilization which was turned against us by the enemy in the World War is still being directed to efforts to destroy our form of government and to supplant law and order with force and violence, and is now, as then, the product of alien influences; and

"Whereas, The supporters of civilization rallied to its defense all the nations of the earth which recognized the truth and vitality of the principles of civil liberty enunciated in the Declaration of Inde-



LEWIS NIXON

Lewis Nixon, shipbuilder and Tammany leader; born at Leesburg, Va., April 7, 1861; graduated at U. S. naval academy 1882 and sent to the Royal naval college at Greenwich, Eng., by the navy department; designed three battleships in 1890 and built 100 vessels in six years; appointed by Mayor VanWyck as president of the East River Bridge commission 1891; succeeded Richard Croker as leader of Tammany Hall in November, 1901, and resigned in May, 1902; chairman of the finance committee of the democratic congressional campaign committee, 1902; delegate to democratic national conventions in 1900, 1904, 1908; appointed by President Taft as a delegate to the Pan-American conference.



TIMOTHY DANIEL SULLIVAN

Timothy Daniel Sullivan, political leader; born in New York City January 6, 1863; educated in the public schools; engaged in the real estate and theatrical business; elected to the state assembly in 1886 and served until 1893; member of the state senate, 1894-1902; elected to congress and served from March 4, 1903 until July 27, 1908, when he resigned; reelected to the state senate in 1908 and served until 1913; killed by a train in New York City October 24, 1913.



THOMAS F. SMITH

Thomas F. Smith, secretary; born in New York City; educated at Manhattan college and received the degree of LL.B. from the New York law school; clerk of the city court of New York, 1897-1917; secretary of the democratic county committee for 25 years; secretary of the Tammany Society for 22 years; delegate to the constitutional convention of 1915; delegate to the democratic national conventions of 1916 and 1920; elected to congress April 12, 1917 to fill the unexpired term of Michael Conrey, deceased; re-elected and served from March 4, 1919 to March 3, 1921; public administrator New York City, 1921—.

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pendence, and for the preservation of which our Union was formed and our Constitution was framed; and

"Whereas, Those attacks are made openly, and the enemies of our government are daily conducting a system of proselyting to gain adherents to the cause of violence and disorder; therefore be it

"Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that immediate steps be taken to counteract the efforts of the advocates of violence and disorder by a comprehensive system of public instruction in American patriotism and American institutions and history.

"Resolved, That the chairman of this meeting appoint a committee composed of the members from the various patriotic organizations participating in this meeting to coördinate, conduct, and direct the system of instruction in American patriotism, institutions, and history.

"Resolved, That this committee extend a cordial invitation to all other loyal patriotic organizations desiring to assist in this work of Americanization to join us in this cause of patriotic education.

"Resolved, That this committee be empowered to arrange for the organization of such schools as it may deem proper and necessary to effect the objects of this meeting; to prepare a course of instruction; engage and discharge the persons to conduct such schools; to secure the use of such school-houses, clubs and club-houses, halls, and other suitable places for holding such schools of instruction; and to arrange for the attendance of such persons as may require instruction or are willing to receive instruction in the principles of civil liberty and our American institutions."

As of to-day, the Society of Tammany or Columbian Order is a secret organization with a sign, a grip, and a password, whose membership is cemented by a solemn obligation and whose ritual, initiation, and other ceremonies are not made public. The obligation bears no resemblance to the bloody and terrible oaths used by some organizations. It is inspired by no vengeful or dire purpose. Its every word and sentiment support and encourage patriotism and loyalty instead of making

them subordinate, as is the case with the socialism and sovietism which are as foreign to this land as are the Mafia and the Tongs. The mystic forms and ceremonies that were necessary for the protection of the brothers in the earlier days, and doubtless were of value in recruiting interest in the movement, are now of only historic concern and only treasured as a link connecting with a glorious past. This must not be understood as involving any weakening in the force of the obligation as it applies to the support of our form of government, to fidelity to the Constitution of the United States, and to devotion to the principles of law and order. Nor does it imply any defection from the standards represented by the slogan, "Freedom is our Rock."

Taking the Society and the political organization together, it is a matter of constant marvel to those who look at it from the outside to note the spirit of loyalty to the institution that inspires the rank and file. And the earnestness and sincerity of the officers furnish an example to the devoted of whatever cause. For an exemplification of this fact we can draw much of information as to the body and spirit of Tammany from an address by Thomas F. Smith, member of Congress, the long-time secretary of Tammany. Representative Smith was asked to talk about Tammany before an audience on an occasion that was half political and half social. Newspaper men from abroad in the land were among those present. The impression made by the Tammany spokesman was so great that his remarks were reported and sent out all over the country. Many thousands of readers must have had their preconceived

notions of Tammany very materially modified, as Mr. Smith spoke as one having authority and his utterances had the force of irrefutable fact. Some portions of the address have so much of the loyal spirit above referred to, and all of it presents so much of information, that it may well be quoted from liberally for the present writer's purpose of conveying an understanding of the institution, its aims, its spirit, and the character of its organization. No better use could possibly be made, of the same space to show what Tammany is, what Tammany does, and what Tammany thinks.

Mr. Smith began by recalling Mayor Gaynor's advice to be careful about believing all you read in the newspapers, and said:

"Most of our New York citizens usually follow Mayor Gaynor's advice when reading some of the preposterous tales told now and then about Tammany. The time-proven facts are that while it is the best abused political organization in the world, that while slander has been hissing at it during all the long years of its existence, that while its foes have come and gone, old Tammany still lives and flourishes in all its pristine strength and glory. The simple truth is that Tammany has always relied upon the wisdom, good sense, and fairness of the people to judge between the true and the sham. This is the reason why no fusion Mayor was ever known to succeed himself, while Tammany administrations have so often succeeded each other. In other words, when deception and vilification win the day and the so-called reformers are favored with the administration of city affairs, the people soon think of the lesson

taught by the well-known epitaph upon the churchyard tombstone :

“ ‘I was well, I wanted to be better.
I took physic, and here I am.’

“The time-honored Society has stood the test of one hundred and thirty years despite all the abuse, the scoffs, and the calumny that partisan rancor could inspire. It needs no defense. Its glorious history speaks for itself. It stands to-day the strongest political organization on earth. Of all such institutions it alone has fought the fight and kept the faith undiscouraged and undismayed whether in sunshine or in storm, with patronage and without patronage, in victory and in defeat.

“Tammany is the home in the metropolis of the Democracy of the brave and dauntless kind. Its slogan is, ‘Fight for the Democratic ticket, the whole Democratic ticket, and nothing but the Democratic ticket.’ Its partisan foes never tire of calling it a corrupt political machine run by politicians and ruled by a ‘boss.’ They speak the truth and they compliment the organization by calling it a machine, but their further characterization is an outcropping of envy, hatred, and malice. An effective political organization in a Democratic community should be and must be a good machine, for the working of its different parts is absolutely essential to the performing of its duty and its function of promoting Democratic success. A machine is usually one of the most wonderful products of the human brain. His invention and utilization of machines is a more distinctive sign of the difference between man and the lower animals than any other that can be cited in morals

or in physics. No machine—no political machine—was ever invented that in discipline, regularity, patriotism, and service to the people has surpassed the Tammany one. Certain it is that we have had none in our city that has excelled it in helping to give the people wise, honest, and economical administration of the city government. Of course it is necessary to have men to run the machine, and in many cases they are men who seem to become fascinated with the work and in a manner become parts of the machine and sink their personalities in its workings. They are known as the workers, the district captains, and the leaders. They do the work because they like it and because they believe that there is only one loyal, militant democracy in their section, and that it is represented by time-honored Tammany.

“Now as to the development of the leader. There are those who believe or pretend to believe that the district leader springs up overnight and takes his leadership by force. As a matter of fact, the law regulates his selection and he is chosen directly by the enrolled Democrats of his district. As a general rule he has lived in the district most all his life. His neighbors know him and respect his character. He must be intelligent, energetic, courageous, patient, tolerant, kind, and sympathetic. He must have a heart, and it must always be in the right place. It is really the heart that counts more than the head or anything else, and holds him safe in the affections of his people. He must be intensely human. He need not be a student of the classics, but he must be of human nature. He must have an infinite supply of patience and a ready sympathy. He must be

at the beck and call of his constituents all hours of the day and night. As a dispenser of charity he is usually a wonder. Sermons are preached about the poor and their woeful condition, and sometimes there are those who make quite a fuss and flutter about the necessity for relief. That seems to satisfy their consciences. In the meantime, and while the talk is going on, it is commonly found that the Tammany leader has quietly gone about the work of caring for the needy and distressed. It was of such that it was written :

“There are those who come when black Sorrow’s your guest,
To weep with you over your dead,—
Friends who seem in the midst of your heartache’s unrest
To know just what ought to be said.
But the prince of them all, when grim trouble stalks by
And your heart can do nothing but bleed,
Is the fellow who comes when there’s no one else nigh
And whispers: “How much do you need?”’

“The Tammany leaders are chosen by the Democratic electors of their districts once a year. The law provides that each party must elect a district committee annually. There are twenty-three Assembly districts in New York county, and therefore twenty-three district committees. All these committees together, nearly twelve thousand members, constitute the Democratic county committee, and this political product of the laws governing the people’s representation for the Democratic party in New York county is the Tammany Hall of to-day.

“The law further directs that within ten days after their election these committees must meet in their re-

spective districts and organize by electing officers. Executive members or leaders, men and women, are among the officers so elected to manage the affairs of the organization in each district and to represent it in the councils of the party in Fourteenth Street. There the executive members so chosen sit as the executive committee of the Democratic county committee, and this is the body which elects the leader of the general organization, the man who is known colloquially as the 'boss' and who thus becomes automatically the target for abuse and vilification from those who oppose him in other factions of his own party or in other parties. You will see, though, that the leader of the organization, and the district leaders as well, directly represent the voters and cannot hold their positions any longer than the voters in their party wish them to.

"Tammany has been particularly fortunate in having had, with few exceptions, able and upright leaders. Mr. Kelly, Mr. Croker, and Mr. Murphy are alike in having come up from the ranks to the head of the organization. Mr. Murphy, though called to the general command eighteen years ago, has never relinquished his district leadership.

"When the district leaders select the head of the organization they usually choose a man because of his political foresight, his integrity, sagacity, honesty, tenacity of purpose, firmness, uprightness, and prudence. Indeed, he must have all of these qualities in a generous degree to last any length of time. He must be impervious to unjust assaults on his character, deaf to calumny and the grossest kind of misrepresentation. Otherwise

he will develop heart trouble and go to an early grave. He must also be reasonably reticent and not easily tempted to answer every ridiculous charge. His chief satisfaction must be in being head of the oldest, the strongest, and the best Democratic organization in the land—an organization that has been serving the people for over a century,—and in the realization that the majority of the great electorate of his city still have confidence in its integrity and efficiency. Mr. Murphy has held the leadership much longer than any of his predecessors.

“Politics is an interesting and absorbing science. Its pursuit takes brains, ability, and training of no mean order. The politician is the man trained in the school of politics. He is usually a man born with a genius for the game. He is not necessarily or always an officeholder. He must, however, recognize the fact that politics is but the necessary instrument to effect government by the people, that it is a requisite means to an end. The people who believe in and support Tammany recognize, in this same way, that there is a necessity for a compact and efficient organization that is able to advance and apply the principles they believe in and consider for the best interests of the community. They have the conviction, which they have so often effectively voiced at the polls, that an organization like Tammany is the inevitable outgrowth of government administered as a republic. They believe that the management of a majestic city like ours is a tremendous and serious problem, one which should only be committed to a re-

sponsible and efficient organization which the people can find and hold responsible.

“History shows that in all ages and in all climes it has been the fate of successful leaders and successful parties to be maligned and most atrociously misrepresented. The better and more successful the leader and the organization, the more bitter and the more virulent the attacks. Success is ever the target. Judging from this standpoint it must be admitted that Tammany has achieved some monumental successes. Fortunately it is also true that abuse and accusations levelled against leaders and organizations must be backed up with proof if they are to serve any purpose beyond that of furnishing an ephemeral sensation of the hustings. Thirty years of virulent partisan attacks on the Tammany leader of his time, with the appellation of ‘boss’ relied upon to strengthen and flavor the slanderous messes, have marked and marred the campaigns for city offices. Sometimes the voters have been deluded and these tactics have succeeded. But the elected officials have never followed up their campaign charges with any proof or found themselves able to carry out their preëlection promises and threats to convict Tammany men and send them to prison. And so Tammany survives and so Tammany comes back.

“It is well to recall an accompaniment of this thirty years of partisan electioneering based upon a grand chorus of howls against an alleged corrupt organization and its corrupt leaders. During much of that period we have had Republican Governors, Legislatures, and Attorney-Generals, not to speak of actively hostile Dis-

trict Attorneys and investigating committees. They tried hard enough, their will was good. They wanted, badly enough, to send some Tammany man to jail. But it remains to be said that their combined efforts did not succeed in bringing to the door of Tammany Hall, to any Tammany leader or to any high Tammany official, any evidence of official peculation or of moral depravity.

“Malice, bigotry, envy, and disappointment are often concealed under the cloak of reform. Hypocritical cant about the corrupt machine and the corrupt ‘boss’ is a ready weapon for political assault, but the fact stands out that nothing is ever proven to support this structure of defamation. Usually the charges are mere campaign fakery. Even when the voice of the campaign liar is heard above every other voice it rattles only for a short while and then dies away into the nothingness from which it was evoked by partisan rancor. Do not understand that Tammany quarrels with those who, in the belief that evils and abuses exist, honestly try to unearth them and try in good faith to find a remedy for them. But wildcat allegations from political humbugs are not to be confused with honest differences of opinion on governmental affairs. And worse than all else are the political bushwhackers who adopt the theory that Josh Billings once elucidated, that ‘A lie well stuck to is as good as the truth.’

“In defaming Tammany so indiscriminately they reflect upon the morality, intelligence, and integrity of the citizenry of the foremost city of the world. The supposition is too absurd for a moment’s consideration that a

great city like ours would tolerate for so many generations or permit for so many years that its government should be controlled and manipulated by dishonest men whose objects were plunder and the fostering of immorality. I regret that there are pages in Tammany's history that I wish were not there. But at no period in the one hundred and thirty years of Tammany's life have we claimed any special exemption from the frailties of human nature. And why condemn the many for the faults of the few? With an unreasoning inconsistency partisan libellers, who claim a monopoly of piety, virtue, and morality, are ever ready to paralyze the usefulness of our organization because of the faults of the few, whereas for a sinner guilty of more atrocious offenses in other walks of life they reverse the rule. It recalls the lines:

“ ‘In men whom men condemn as ill
I find so much of goodness still,
In men whom men pronounce divine
I find so much of sin and blot,
I hesitate to draw the line
Between the two, where God has not.’ ”

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