MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 5, 1973
8:05 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Schlesinger: Let's talk about the Cambodian Air Force improvement plan. It will require help from CIA and State.

What about the hotline to Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: Early warning too?

Secretary Schlesinger: It can be added to this plan easily.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's add the warning element. But hold it close. It would start a war if it got out.

Secretary Schlesinger: Can I tell Carrington about the British Ambassador in Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: It wouldn't do any good.

Secretary Schlesinger: The French are getting into giving arms to the Saudis and we have to move out.
Secretary Kissinger: No problem. I just don't want Clements and Moorer going over.

We must not overwhelm them with an ardent embrace. Why don't I raise this when I am in Jidda? Clements just can't be low profile. I suspect he has something else in mind when he gets there.

Secretary Schlesinger: He is enthusiastic.

Secretary Kissinger: We shouldn't have anyone running around there in light of these messages. [He had given Schlesinger the messages earlier.]

It is important what we say to Yamani. I think they are afraid of being left alone with the radicals.

The abject behavior of the Europeans has had just the opposite effect. The Japanese told the Arabs not to give us oil. They're giving the Arabs all kinds of aid.

Secretary Schlesinger: It's too bad we can't get the oil turned on for us first.

Secretary Kissinger: I probably will go to Algeria also. I'll have to drop two hours off Cairo.

Show Jim the President's letter to Faisal. Yamani is bright but not influential. He must not know what Fahd is doing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Clements is inclined to apologize to the Saudis.

Secretary Kissinger: The Europeans have nothing to offer the Arabs. They have no threats. Try to keep Clements under control, but you see Yamani so if Clements goes off the reservation, you can straighten it out.

Tell Yamani that they are blowing their best opportunity. The U.S. is now willing to do something in the Middle East.

Let me tell you about Sadat. I was gloomy when I went there. I told him that Nasser was a fool because he confronted the United States. I said, "You can get the October 22 line if you want a brawl, but then the Israelis
will be able to mobilize opposition." He finally bought it, then fell off last week. I wrote him, and he fell off again. We'll have a tough time with the Israelis at the conference.

Secretary Schlesinger: Less than you would think. Israel realizes they had a hard time strategically.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should increase a presence in the Indian Ocean.

Secretary Schlesinger: I want to withdraw the amphibious group to refit.

I think we should think about putting 5-6000 Marines in Bahrein.

Secretary Kissinger: They will never agree.

Now about Europe.

I will be very tough at NATO. I will say we are for European unity and NATO but things are tough. The energy crisis proves our point -- we can operate alone, they can't. We will make no other proposal.

Heath gave two statements. In the second speech he said if the Europeans hadn't been united they couldn't have withstood the United States. Heath knew every detail of our plans except the timing. He says we object to negotiating with the Dane. That is crude. We object to an instructed delegate.

Secretary Schlesinger: The biggest problem is with the U.S. -Soviet nuclear war agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: You tell Carrington we are fed up because Brimelow drafted the nuclear agreement and then didn't back it. The French want a statement about the nuclear agreement in the declaration. I refused because it indicates a question about it.

There should be no difference between the Nine and NATO. Why should they be different as a group than their initial positions?

We should stand back to back on this though. They have to understand we are tough.
Secretary Schlesinger: My theme has been that we take NATO security seriously and they must take it seriously.

Secretary Kissinger: The French theme that we have to defend Europe no matter what is crap.

Will you send me a message of what you pick up?

Secretary Schlesinger: They are contradictory -- they say we are bound to protect them but that we are deserting them.

Secretary Kissinger: I sent Walters to Galley. I told the Ambassador that after leaning over backwards, we would reluctantly have to take them on. They said we screwed them on nuclear cooperation. We don't want to let loose yet, but if we give them negative guidance, is that increaseable?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit.

That is crap that they turned on us because of a refusal on negative guidance. It was the other way around.

Secretary Kissinger: I regret about the French because theirs is the only serious defense effort. Once the Europeans face the defense problem it will drive them against the Soviet Union. Once the Europeans realize they can't get our cooperation if they attack us.

Only the French have the guts to stand up against us -- but they don't have de Gaulle, a special relation to the Soviet Union, etc. But I would like to back them down without breaking them.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am planning to extemporize mostly.

Secretary Kissinger: I have refused to give a lead-off speech at NATO.

Secretary Schlesinger: Remember that most of the countries are for us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. I want our friends to go to the French to say look what you have done to us. I will have bilaterals only with the ones who have been good.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not see the Germans.
Secretary Kissinger: If Scheel asks, I will have to, but only then.

Secretary Schlesinger: Jackson-Nunn: If OMB can do its job, the German offset already covers the deficit. But we have to keep Treasury and Commerce in line.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's draw a NSSM on offset. Have an SRG on it. Work it out with Jim.

Secretary Schlesinger: The balance of payments impact is not so dependent on where the forces are.

I do not want acquisition policy in the interagency process.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will do it directly with you.

Secretary Schlesinger: NSSM-171. It is based on Dulles' view of China.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's review it, but we can't expose one real reason for our forces in Asia, that is, China policy.

Secretary Schlesinger: We need to have a long word with Canada. They are doing nothing in NATO, nothing in NORAD, free import of cars.

Secretary Kissinger: What do we want?

Secretary Schlesinger: We want them to put a brigade back in NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: They'll never do it. But I believe in putting our policy on reciprocity. But there we have to have objectives which are attainable. You can take a run at the brigade but he has domestic problems.

Secretary Schlesinger: That was Trudeau's decision.

Secretary Kissinger: Politicians always go after the incremental 10 percent and lose their whole constituency. The whole European political scene is this. This is Brandt's problem. Only the British have been firm and they are the same now.

Did you give Mahon the cuts?
Secretary Schlesinger: I got that money back.

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want SALT-related items jeopardized.

Secretary Schlesinger: Only Trident, and we don't need it. Zumwalt agrees. We are fat.

McClellan said he would cut us $3 billion but would agree to a supplemental for that much.

I want to fly an SR-71 over Cuba rather than a U-2 because we don't need the protection.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay.

Brezhnev said, "Can't we stop deploying new systems?" If we are willing to pay Trident, we need a price which is commensurate. I don't think they will give up MIRV testing.

Secretary Schlesinger: We shouldn't air the price we pay throughout the community.

Secretary Kissinger: Let Lodal circulate his papers. It is useful, but not my view.

Secretary Schlesinger: Trident is an albatross.
WASHINGTON

S - Nixon has a five point plan.
    We'll agree to help from 11th State.
    If not, I can go to Peking.

K - Early morning, too.

S - Can be added to this plan easily.
    K - Let's call him. He's an old friend.
    S - Would you warn me if he's coming.

75 - I would like to meet Khmer.
    Can I talk to you about this?

K - Would he? Do you want me to.

S - Can we get together again? I've heard
    there's a problem.

K - We're both interested in it.

S - Smears shitting with avenue. Sometime
    there's a problem.

K - I thought of an interesting plan.
    I think I can build this.

K - That's not clear. I thought about
    changing the idea of this. (redacted)

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AUTHORITY

BY  DEA HARA DATE  0973
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[Handwritten text that is not legible due to the quality of the image.]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nixon was a fool to come to go back
that you want a hand, but that I will
we're still at war, so he's done it. He finally
took it, from fall of last week, hand
think he fell off of your. Will have a

[Signature]

I have them you would think. I realize
they had a hard time, strictly.

N - I think we should have put an
amphibious

K - I think we should think about

K - They will

N - Time Europe.

I will be very tough at NATO. I

N - This week in Europe, NATO, but

The energy crisis

We will have another

preparations for.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25 June 1974

Mr. Secretary,

I just wanted to confirm our meeting of today with President Ford. I am writing to inform you that he will be unable to attend the meeting tomorrow as previously arranged.

Heath was informed of the postponement by phone during our meeting yesterday. However, he did not object to postponing it. We agreed that the meeting should be held as soon as possible.

Heath expressed his appreciation for the efforts made to accommodate his schedule. He understands the importance of the meeting and regretted the delay.

I have enclosed a letter from Heath expressing his thanks for the consideration shown.

Please let me know if there is anything else I can assist you with.

Sincerely,
[Your Name]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K - He should stand there & look on
these things. They dont understand
us or things.

5 - My friends here are taking movile
safety seriously. They must take it seriously.

K - French things that they have to
absorb. I see no matter what is
right.

Will you send me myself
what you pick up?

5 - They are traumatic - very much
traded to protect them, not what
are our children them.

P - I cant understand it all. I told
them they had been in pacific area
with unbelievable home to take them
on. They told we needed them on
other days. We can never let them
out, but all we can say is that is
impossible.

5 - Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1. I have a friend who wants a job. I want to help him find one. He needs to talk to you. I'll have him come see you when I'm in town.

2. I should not see him now.

3. If you need me, I'll be here, but only then.

4. You know I'm busy, so I can't help you now.

5. My friend wants to talk to you about a job.

6. We need to keep in touch.

7. He's my best friend.

8. I don't want you to come over.

9. We'll talk about it later.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S-NClM-178

President: I have in mind... of China.

K: That's serious, but I want the two sides to have... in the Middle East, Iran and Iraq.

S: Need to lay this out. Can we... in the G-54 summit.

K: I don't think that's... in the G-54 summit.

S: We want them to just... in NATO.

K: I'm not sure that's... in NATO.

S: That's not... But I believe in putting our policy on... to have objectives which are... and can take... in the G-7.

K: That was... in the G-7.

S: Politicians always go... an... influence 10% to 15%.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Which constituency. Work Every Herzog's term is too. This is only pattern. Only object
has been from time to time now.

K: Did you give them any votes?
S: Yes, I did money to;

K: I just want SSA-related
items purchased;

S: Andy think we don't need
it. Emmett agrees we are not
S: We'll have to wait until 1987. But
we will, but we need to agree to
compromise for third much.

Want to fly S-87 in 1988
if not, that 5-2 because we
and willpetition;

K: OK.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I don't think they will pick up more testing.

S. D. said, "Have that am. porn. on my
anniversary." Community.

K. was asked, "It is your, but it is not my
brain.

S. Trident is all about."