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d. The Emperor, like the British King, can summon a cabinet of any political complexion. If the Emperor after the alienation of the militarists, summons a liberal cabinet and openly supports a democratic program, the people are likely to accept it and support it whole heartedly. If Allied Military Government attempts to impose a democratic program, democracy will be associated with the rule of the conqueror and will be discredited with the people.

e. The continuation of the Imperial rule with the Allied Control Commission remaining in the background should reduce the possibilities of friction and disturbance to the minimum and permit the earliest withdrawal of Allied Occupation Forces, and of the Allied Military Council. The Allied Military Government, particularly with the quality of personnel available, would almost inevitably create situations that would require a more protracted military occupation than the American public will accept.

f. The United Nation's machinery, backed by the Armed Forces at its disposal, promises to be the most effective instrumentality for exercising continuing supervision over the Japanese Government. It should be our objective to turn the problem over to this instrumentality at the earliest possible date. This method of policing Japan will be far more acceptable to the American public than direct occupation and control. It will be less expensive and have a greater chance of success.

~~SECRET~~VAN SLYKE DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy
Toward Japan.

1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:

a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.

b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.

2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:

a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American Forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.

b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either extending and tightening control or withdrawing without accomplishing the desired objective.

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority: 440 750086
By: CO/AD NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

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g. The conquering nation cannot impose its form of government ideals, or way of life upon a conquered nation except by permanent military occupation and immigration.

3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:

a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.

b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between the victor and the vanquished.

4. It would appear desirable in the light of the above:

a. To retain the Emperor and the civil administration. As part of the terms of surrender the Emperor would be forced to dismiss the present cabinet and call a liberal cabinet excluding representatives of the military and naval forces. It would also be part of the surrender terms that the Imperial House would be retained only so long as it cooperated fully with the Allied Control Council.

b. To set up a Supreme Allied Council which would in fact be the supreme authority in the country but which would function and issue its directives through the regularly constituted government.

c. To give every encouragement to the Japanese to undertake under their own leadership the development of

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democratic institutions and the ~~elimination~~ elimination of the spirit of military conquest.

5. The following arguments are advanced in support of such a program as compared with the establishment of Allied Military Government in place of the Emperor:

a. The retention of the Emperor will probably insure the immediate surrender of all Japanese forces outside the home islands. It is assumed that the surrender terms would require the Emperor to order all Japanese Armed Forces wherever located to cease resistance and to prepare to return to the home islands.

b. Allied Military Government is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision, training and ability to carry out the task effectively.

c. There would appear to be a strong probability that the Japanese will be ripe, if permitted to direct it themselves, for a genuine democratic movement:

(1) The Japanese are essentially an imitative people.

(2) Like all Orientals, they have great respect for power.

(3) Having seen what we as a democracy have accomplished, they are quite likely, as in 1867, to attempt to imitate us.

(4) Whether or not we invade Japan before her surrender the Japanese military will have lost "face" and been completely discredited.

(5) Prior to 1931 the democratic elements in Japan were increasing in strength and, with the military discredited, could probably be revised.

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SUBJECT: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy
Toward Japan.

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b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.

2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:

a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American Forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.

b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either extending and tightening control or withdrawing without accomplishing the desired objective.

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086By CR/HR NARS, Date DEC 6 1974~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

Be Mr. Cox
Mr. Moseley
Mr. Gardiner

WAR

Car Colonel McCarthy
Major Field
W Lt. Massa

NAVY

Am Commander Richardson
W Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
CS Lieutenant Geilfuss
Ensign Whiteside

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REMARKS:

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1/73528
DWB/edm

WDGAP 383.6
Jap Trtmt

27 MAR 1945

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

Japan

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am inclosing a copy of a translation of certain captured Japanese documents which direct the execution of prisoners of war and describe the proper time and method for so doing.

These barbarous and inhuman instructions are in flagrant violation of the accepted rules of land warfare among civilized nations. It is requested that these orders be protested to the Japanese Government in the most vigorous possible terms, through the usual diplomatic channels.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Acting Secretary of War.

Inclosure

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086

By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC. 6. 1974

9

Copy for Secretariat, SWNCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

224

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

- Mr. Cox
- Mr. Noseley
- Mr. Gardiner

WAR

- Colonel McCarthy *agree*
- Major Field
- Lt. Massa *MSB*

NAVY


- Commander Richardson *agree*
- Lt. Condr. Rockefeller
- Lieutenant Geilfuss *agree*
- Ensign Whiteside

- Note
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REMARKS:

I see no reason why this matter should come before SWNCC until and unless State-War-Navy views cannot be coordinated by existing channels.

As.



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

Mr. Cox
 Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR

Colonel McCarthy *agree*
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa *MSB*

NAVY

Commander Richardson
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
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Note
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matter should come before SWNCC
until and unless State-War-Navy
views cannot be coordinated by
existing channels.*
CS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WAR PROBLEMS
SPECIAL DIVISION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 23, 1945

EUR - Mr. Moseley *CS*

The subject of the
underlying papers may come be-
fore SWNC and for that reason
you may wish to have them avail-
able for consultation. SWP will
be glad to provide any additional
information which may be desired
at any time.

E. A. P.
by [signature]

SWP:AEClattenburg:BB

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) & (E)
NND 750086
By *CS* NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

WAR PROBLEMS
/

March 22, 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

An informal meeting was held on March 22, 1945 at the Pentagon under the chairmanship of Lieutenant Colonel Murray C. Bernays of G-1, acting as chairman of the informal Repatriation Committee to discuss means of reactivating negotiations with the Japanese for exchanges of nationals. The outcome of the meeting is very succinctly stated in the underlying memorandum to General Henry, prepared by Colonel Bernays.

SWP will present the matter to the British Embassy tomorrow informally and will obtain from SD the necessary information regarding the two vessels concerned.

SWP:ABClattenburg:BB

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750088By CP/SP NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

⑧

(COPY:SWP:JBF)
(COMPARED:BB)

22 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HENRY:

Subject: United States-Japanese Exchanges.

1. There is in contemplation a proposal to the Japanese for further exchanges of civilians and sick and wounded U.S. prisoners of war on the basis described below.

2. The basic factors are:

- a. The Japanese have no shipping for this purpose.
- b. The Japanese take the position that before there can be another U.S.-Japanese exchange, there must be a British-Japanese exchange.
- c. The Japanese will not allow even a neutral vessel, manned by a neutral crew, to sail waters controlled by them.

3. The plan is to utilize the Drottningholm (which is under charter to the British) and the Gripsholm in the following manner: The Drottningholm will sail from a European port, carrying Japanese for exchange purposes. It will stop in at India and Australia and pick up further Japanese. It will sail to the proposed exchange point, to be designated by the Navy or Army, depending upon what exchange point is selected. The Gripsholm would sail from U.S. with Japanese to be repatriated, and might stop in at Saipan on the way, where there are several thousand Japanese civilians interned. At the exchange point the Drottningholm would be taken over by a Japanese crew and would shuttle between the exchange point and Japan, carrying Japanese repatriates on one leg and United Nations repatriates on the other. The first trip from Japan to the exchange point would carry British and European repatriates. The next trip would carry North and South American repatriates, and thereafter this would be continued on alternate trips.

4. The selection of the exchange point will be governed by the fact that the Drottningholm has a limited radius, and by military and logistical considerations. Detailed data regarding the Drottningholm and the Gripsholm capacities, the sailing radius of each of them, etc., are being procured by State Department and will be furnished shortly.

5. a. A prime problem is getting a Japanese crew to the exchange point to take over the Drottningholm. Navy is wiring to find out whether there are trained personnel at Saipan who could be used for this purpose. State will arrange with the British to get similar information regarding the Japanese held in Australia. When the information is in, State, War, Navy and the British will meet further regarding this project.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086

By CO/RAH NARS, Date DEC. 8 1974

b. Captain

b. Captain Tonseth, Navy, thinks that the necessary crew for the Drottningholm can be picked up from among the Australian and Saipan internees. As an alternative, it may be feasible to train the necessary crew from among the Japanese repatriates while the ship is enroute. These and other possibilities will be considered at the next meeting.

6. Navy has heretofore suggested Bikini Atoll, in the Marshalls, as the exchange point. This is approximately 2,000 miles east of Manila. An inquiry is being sent by Navy regarding the plan in general, which will cover, among other things, possible other exchange points farther to the westward, and supply problems for whatever exchange point is selected.

7. As has been customary heretofore, we should like to arrange for the exchange vessels to carry relief supplies and PW and internee mail.

8. I do not think we need query General MacArthur until we have further details to go on.

MC.B.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

 Mr. Cox
 Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR

 Col. Whitson
 Col. McCarthy
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa

NAVY

 Comdr. Nutting
 Comdr. Richardson
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
 Lt. Geilfuss
 Ens. _____

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 File

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

FEB 28 1945

The Honorable,**The Secretary of State.****My dear Mr. Secretary:**

I have your letter dated February 19, 1945, SWP 711. 11H114A/11-1344, with which you transmitted for the approval of the War Department drafts of two protests to the Japanese Government against atrocities committed in connection with the sinking of a Japanese prisoner-of-war ship on September 7, 1944 off Mindanao. I note that these protests are based on information contained in a report on this subject which was forwarded to you under cover of my letter of November 13, 1944.

The protests as drafted are considered entirely satisfactory.

Sincerely yours,**(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON****Secretary of War.**

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6

1974

INFORMATION COPY FOR SECRETARIAT, SWNCC

~~**SECRET**~~

⑦

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

✓ Mr. Cox
✓ Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR

✓ Col. Whitson
✓ Col. McCarthy
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa

NAVY

 Comdr. Nutting
 Comdr. Richardson *KW*
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller *JDM*
 Lt. Geilfuss *yes*
 Ens. _____

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 File

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

the Secretary of
the Navy

Serial 165013

2 17 54

Op-13-1A/mj

20 Feb. 1945

28 FEB 1945

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter SWP 740. COL15 PW/1-2345 of 14 February 1945, enclosing a copy of the telegram which the Department of State proposes to send, concerning visitations to prisoner of war and civilian internment camps.

In consideration of the points raised in your letter, the Navy Department approves, in principle, the contents of the telegram you propose to send. The suggestion is made, however, that assurance be sought that all camps in Japan proper, Formosa, China, and Manchuria are not only being regularly visited at the present time, but that they will remain open to visitation at regular intervals in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph A. Bard
Acting Secretary of the Navy

Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Secretary of State.

cc: ✓ SWNCC Secretariat

Prepd by Capt. Tonseth,
Central Division, Operations

6

G-1
DWB/jic/73528WDGAP 383.6 Jap Trtmt
(15 Aug 44)

FEB 22 1945

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter dated February 14, 1945, SWP 740.00115 PW/1-2345, requesting the comments of the War Department with respect to an inclosed draft of reply to the Japanese Government's proposal concerning visits by neutral representatives to prisoner of war and civilian internee camps in territories occupied by the United States and Japanese Governments respectively.

I note that you are in substantial accord with my views on this matter as expressed in my letter to you of January 12, 1945. I believe, however, that it would be advisable to state with greater particularity in the proposed reply what additional assurances and information are desired from the Japanese Government, and what action the United States Government is prepared to take upon receipt thereof.

In line with this view, I suggest that the first paragraph on page three of your proposed reply be amended so as to state the desire of this Government for an assurance by the Japanese Government that the International Red Cross Committee or the protecting Power will be permitted, upon request, to inspect the mentioned camps. Evidence that the camps are actually being inspected can best be obtained through the reports of the representatives who make the inspections, and assurances by the Japanese Government in this respect would be of no value.

I suggest further that consideration be given to indicating in the last paragraph on page three of the proposed reply that the United States Government, upon receipt of the desired assurances and of affirmative answers to the questions presented in the second paragraph of page three, is prepared to arrange for the mentioned inspections. In my opinion there is a greater likelihood of reaching an agreement with the Japanese Government in this matter without prolonging the negotiations, if the present reply were revised along these suggested lines.

Information copy for Secretariat, SWNCC

(5)

Your courtesy in giving me this opportunity to comment on your draft of reply to the Japanese Government is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

Copy to
Mr. Murphy
Room 1702

February 14, 1945

In reply refer to
SWP 740.00115 PW/1-2345

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of January 12, 1945, with regard to the opinion of the War Department concerning the Japanese Government's proposal to authorize visits by representatives of the International Red Cross Committee to the Santo Tomas civilian camp in the Philippine Islands, the prisoner of war hospital in Thailand and the prisoner of war camp in Singapore on condition that the United States offers reciprocity for visits to the camps on Saipan, New Caledonia, Guam and Tinian where Japanese nationals are held. The Department of State agrees with the War Department that the Japanese proposal offers the United States very little. With the liberation of the Santo Tomas camp by our forces the reciprocity offered to the United States is still further restricted. I note that you recommend that the United States press for complete reciprocity in the matter of camp visits.

Large numbers of British prisoners of war are, however, involved in the Japanese Government's offer to authorize visits to the prisoner of war camp at Singapore. The offer is contingent on the United States Government offering visits to Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, and making arrangements with the French authorities for visits to New Caledonia. The British Government is anxious that the door should not be closed to the Japanese Government's proposal. There have been several conferences between representatives of the British Embassy and the Department of State. I understand that members of the British Army Staff at Washington and representatives of the War Department have also discussed the matter.

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

The

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-2-

The Department is of the opinion that the British situation in Singapore should be taken into consideration. Since the reciprocity desired by the Japanese Government is reciprocity to be offered by the United States Government, it should, however, be used to obtain some benefits also for our American nationals in Japanese hands.

The Department in making its representations to the Japanese Government was primarily concerned that the prisoner of war and civilian camps in the Philippines should be visited. The civilian camps are now being liberated. Most of the prisoners of war from the Philippine Islands have, however, been transferred to Japan. The Department has recently learned that many of the camps where American prisoners of war are held in Japan have never been visited and their location never reported. It is the Department's opinion that the United States Government should endeavor to obtain assurances from the Japanese Government that all camps in Japan proper are regularly visited.

It was the consensus in the discussions with the representatives of the British Embassy and the British Army Staff that the reply to the Japanese offer embody the following points: The change in the Philippine situation has greatly restricted the reciprocity offered by the Japanese Government. Assurance is desired that the camps in Japan proper are being regularly visited and clarification of the Japanese Government's offer is requested as to whether authorization for visits to the camps where American prisoners of war are held in Thailand and to the civilian internment camp at Singapore, where American civilians are held, is included. The United States Government is to reaffirm that, on receipt of these requested clarification and assurance, it is prepared to extend the reciprocity desired by the Japanese Government.

I am enclosing a copy of the telegram which the Department proposes to send and shall be interested to have your comments with regard to it. I am also sending a copy of the proposed telegram to the Navy Department and to the British Embassy for comment.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
Telegram to Bern.

A true copy of
the signed original.

SWP:AW:lmv

2/8/45

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE ✓

✓ Mr. Cox
 Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR ✓

 Col. Whitson
 Col. McCarthy
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa

NAVY ✓

 Comdr. Nutting
 Comdr. Richardson
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
 Lt. Geilfuss
 Ens. _____

 Note
 Circulate
 File

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

Copy to
Mr. Mandy
Room 178

February 14, 1945

In reply refer to
SNP 740.00115 PW/1-2345

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of January 22, 1945, with regard to the opinion of the Navy Department concerning the Japanese Government's proposal to authorize visits by representatives of the International Red Cross Committee to the Santo Tomas civilian camp in the Philippine Islands, the prisoner of war hospital in Thailand and the prisoner of war camp in Singapore on condition that the United States offers reciprocity for visits to the camps on Saipan, New Caledonia, Guam, and Tinian where Japanese nationals are held. The Department of State agrees with the Navy Department that the Japanese proposal offers the United States very little. With the liberation of the Santo Tomas camp by our forces the reciprocity offered to the United States is still further restricted. I note that you recommend that the United States press for complete reciprocity in the matter of camp visits.

Large numbers of British prisoners of war are, however, involved in the Japanese Government's offer to authorize visits to the prisoner of war camp at Singapore. The offer is contingent on the United States Government offering visits to Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, and making arrangements with the French authorities for visits to New Caledonia. The British Government is anxious that the door should not be closed to the Japanese Government's proposal. There have been several conferences between representatives of the British Embassy and the Department of State.

The

The Honorable

James V. Forrestal,

Secretary of the Navy.

(9)

-2-

The Department is of the opinion that the British situation in Singapore should be taken into consideration. Since the reciprocity desired by the Japanese Government is reciprocity to be offered by the United States Government, it should, however, be used to obtain some benefits for our American nationals in Japanese hands.

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It was the consensus in the discussions with the representatives of the British Embassy that the reply to the Japanese offer embody the following points: The change in the Philippine situation has greatly restricted the reciprocity offered by the Japanese Government. Assurance is desired that the camps in Japan proper are being regularly visited and clarification of the Japanese Government's offer is requested as to whether authorization for visits to the camps where American prisoners of war are held in Thailand and to the civilian internment camp at Singapore, where American civilians are held, is included. The United States Government is to reaffirm that, on receipt of the requested clarification and assurance, it is prepared to extend the reciprocity desired by the Japanese Government.

I am enclosing a copy of the telegram which the Department proposes to send and shall be interested to have your comments with regard to it. I am also sending a copy of the proposed telegram to the War Department and to the British Embassy for comment.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Acting Secretary


Enclosure:

Telegram to Bern.

SWP:AW:lmv

JA

2/7/45



SECRET

10 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CIVIL AFFAIRS, WAR DEPARTMENT.
Attn: Lt. Col. D. G. Fahey.

Subject: State Department Studies.

1. The attached studies are forwarded to you at the request of Mr. Dooman of the State Department.

For the Secretariat, SWNGC:

V. F. FIELD,
Executive Secretary.

4 Enclosures
(3 parts to each enclosure)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

SECRET

(3)

SECRET

10 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY, PACIFIC AND FAR EAST SUB-COMMITTEE,
Room 6162, New War Department Building.

Subject: State Department Studies.

1. The attached studies are forwarded to you for distribution to the members of the Pacific and Far East Subcommittee for use in connection with their study of SWNCC 16.

For the Secretariat, SWNCC:

V. F. FIELD,
Executive Secretary.

3 Enclosures
(3 parts to each enclosure)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086By CD/AM NARS, Date DEC 6 1974~~SECRET~~

18

SECRETSTATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Washington 25, D. C.

3 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

**Subject: Directives for Military Government
in the Japanese Outlying Islands.**

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for the Secretaries of War and Navy, dated 31 January 1945, same subject.

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee acting for the Secretaries of the three departments, concurs in your approval of the subject directives.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretarycc: Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy

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By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974~~SECRET~~

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local people to be severe but determined in large part by their behavior; local population to be moved or interned if necessary; essential governmental functions to be continued; local governmental machinery to be used where feasible; local laws to be suspended if necessary; high ranking, and untrustworthy officials to be removed; military courts to be established if required; political, patriotic and secret societies to be dissolved; unauthorized political activity to be prohibited; militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda to be forbidden; control to be taken of property owned or controlled by the Japanese government, the Imperial family or agencies of the government.

4. The economic directive provides for: Maximum use of local resources and facilities for the purpose of (1) supporting the military operations, (2) assuring food and other supplies for the civilian population to the degree necessary to prevent disease and unrest, and (3) minimizing the importation of supplies. It further provides for: the establishment of rationing and price control; the fixing of wages at prevailing levels; the furnishing of supplies for emergency relief; the establishment of adequate controls over all economic activities; and the encouragement of local production of food and other essential commodities.

5. The financial directive provides for: Use by U.S. forces of supplemental military yen; a provisional exchange rate of 10 yen to the dollar for military and accounting purposes; use of U.S. dollars in case of emergency; impounding of all gold and foreign currencies in the area; foreign financial transactions to be prohibited; financial institutions to be closed or controlled; accounts of enemy governments and hostile elements to be blocked; issuance of currency without military approval to be prohibited; moratoriums to be declared if necessary; loans to be made in local currency if required; revenue to be raised for cost of local administration if feasible; Basic Accounting Instructions to be followed by both Army and Navy.

6. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed immediately of the concurrence of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the State Department in the directives.

R. KEITH KANE

~~SECRET~~ENCLOSURE (A)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

31 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Directives for military gov-
ernment in the Japanese out-
lying islands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the attached
directives and request your concurrence therein before they are
issued.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ R. S. Edwards

R. S. EDWARDS,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

Enclosures (3).

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

ENCLOSURE (B)~~SECRET~~

PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 26 OF ENCLOSURE "A" OF J.C.S. 1231. INDICATING
AMENDMENTS MADE BY J.C.S.

"18. You will assume control of censorship of the press, printing, publications, mails, wireless, radio, telephone and cable, as may be necessary. Censorship of civilian communications (mails, wireless, radio, telephone and cable) will be conducted as directed in J.C.S. 873/3."

"26. All property ~~belonging to~~ owned or controlled by the Japanese Government, the Japanese Imperial family, the Japanese Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Japanese Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and property ~~belonging to~~ owned or controlled by any country with which any of the United Nations are at war will be treated as having the status of public property. Such property will be controlled directly or indirectly as military requirements may dictate, subject to use thereof as you may direct. If there is any doubt as to the public status of any property (e.g. property of quasi-official companies or of private companies in which the Japanese Government has a dominant interest), it should be treated as public property. Adequate records should be kept of any such property taken or utilized to facilitate later settlement of any legitimate private claims."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority 440 7500 86By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

3 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War
Mr. Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Air

Subject: Directives for Military Government in the Japanese
Outlying Islands (Bonin, Izu, LooChoo and Kurile
Islands).

Reference: (a) Enclosures "A", "B" and "C" to J.C.S. 1231.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of Secret memo from JCS to SecWar and
SecNav, above subject, dtd 31 Jan 45.

(B) Copy of pars. 18 and 26 of Enclosure "A" to
J.C.S. 1231 indicating amendments made by
J.C.S.

1. Concurrence in the directives for Military Government in the Japanese outlying islands should be considered as a matter of urgency and immediate clearance, without the necessity for reference to the ad hoc Committee, would greatly aid the Navy.

2. Enclosures "A", "B" and "C" to J.C.S. 1231 (reference (a)) are, respectively, political, economic and financial directives for the guidance of CinCPac and CinCPOA in the matter of Military Government in the subject areas. The directives were presented for J.C.S. approval by Admiral King. Prior to presentation they had State, War and Navy Department concurrence and the financial directive had Treasury Department concurrence in addition. All three have now been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with certain minor amendments and, by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been forwarded to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy by Enclosure (A) for concurrence. The only amendments made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in paragraphs 18 and 26 of Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1231 (the political directive). A copy of these paragraphs, indicating the amendments, is attached as Enclosure (B).

3. The political directive provides for: establishment of military government with supreme authority vested in CinCPac and CinCPOA; military administration to be stern but just; attitude toward

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E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority

By W/O 750086 NARS, Date DEC. 6 1974

local people to be severe but determined in large part by their behavior; local population to be moved or interned if necessary; essential governmental functions to be continued; local governmental machinery to be used where feasible; local laws to be suspended if necessary; high ranking, and untrustworthy officials to be removed; military courts to be established if required; political, patriotic and secret societies to be dissolved; unauthorized political activity to be prohibited; militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda to be forbidden; control to be taken of property owned or controlled by the Japanese government, the Imperial family or agencies of the government.

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5. The financial directive provides for: Use by U.S. forces of supplemental military yen; a provisional exchange rate of 10 yen to the dollar for military and accounting purposes; use of U.S. dollars in case of emergency; impounding of all gold and foreign currencies in the area; foreign financial transactions to be prohibited; financial institutions to be closed or controlled; accounts of enemy governments and hostile elements to be blocked; issuance of currency without military approval to be prohibited; moratoriums to be declared if necessary; loans to be made in local currency if required; revenue to be raised for cost of local administration if feasible; Basic Accounting Instructions to be followed by both Army and Navy.

6. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed immediately of the concurrence of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the State Department in the directives.

E. KEITH KARR

ENCLOSURE (A)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

31 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Directives for military gov-
ernment in the Japanese out-
lying islands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the attached
directives and request your concurrence therein before they are
issued.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ R. S. Edwards

R. S. EDWARDS,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

Enclosures (3).

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority

140750086

By

NARS, Date

DEC 6

1974

ENCLOSURE (B)PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 26 OF ENCLOSURE "A" OF J.C.S. 1231, INDICATING
AMENDMENTS MADE BY J.C.S.

"18. You will assume control of censorship of the press, printing, publications, mails, wireless, radio, telephone and cable, as may be necessary. Censorship of civilian communications (mails, wireless, radio, telephone and cable) will be conducted as directed in J.C.S. 873/3."

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referred to the Ad Hoc Committee on Saudi Arabia. After discussion it was further determined that the Ad Hoc Committee should review various political, economic and strategic considerations and agree on tactics before the State Department has its preliminary discussion with members of Congress. Mr. Kane remarked that Secretary Forrestal had expressed a desire to talk with Messrs. Acheson and Clayton on the subject, and Mr. Kane was requested to ask Mr. Acheson if he wanted such a meeting at this stage or later. Mr. Kane also said that Mr. Bard was very much interested in the matter. If such a meeting is held with Secretaries Forrestal, Acheson, Bard, and Clayton, the War Department should be invited to have its representatives present if desired. Colonel Brownell will be asked to call Mr. Kane in this regard.

8. PACIFIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES

Mr. Kane stated that proposed directives for military government in the Japanese outlying islands (JCS 1231 series) have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Admiral King after agreement thereto by the State Department and other appropriate departments and agencies of the Government. Admiral Willson stated that he understood that these directives had already been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with minor changes and that a joint letter had been sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Navy to this effect.

Mr. Kane raised the question as to the proper procedure for clearance of such changes when made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, after discussion, it was agreed that it is appropriate for

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Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC. 6 1974

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for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to clear changes which alter political, economic or financial policies for military reference with departments concerned, using machinery of the SWNCC where appropriate.

9. PROPOSED ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMAN TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. McCloy raised for discussion the question of action to be taken by this Government in protesting to the German Government concerning the atrocities against Allied prisoners of war. The problem was discussed at length but no action was taken.

10. INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIPS

On motion of Mr. McCloy, it was agreed that discussion of this matter in detail be deferred until the next meeting. Mr. Dunn stated that the Department of Interior desires to participate in discussions on this subject and that Secretary Stettinius has requested that the Interior Department be invited to attend meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Pacific and Far Eastern Areas whenever the question of international trusteeships is to be discussed. This was agreed to.

11. ISLAND BASES IN THE PACIFIC

Mr. Kane reported that at Mr. Dunn's request he had been looking into the problem of the resolution which has been introduced in the House of Representatives on the subject of island bases in the Pacific and which has been referred to a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee, headed by Representative Drewry. It was agreed that the SWNCC should keep in touch with the progress of this matter but that action with respect to the matter should be left to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and designated representatives of the Navy Department.

END

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END

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7th Milg

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