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Vol. 40

Congress of the United States

~~# 196~~

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

~~# 196~~

January 19, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages 7480 to 7690

NATIONAL { 4266
4267
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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

KIMMEL, Rear Admiral Husband E. (Resumed)

7481

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

126

7482

127

7483

128

7483

74-A

7484

113-A

7590

113-B

7590

129

7683

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International Prosecution Section 7480

S. Con. Res. 27

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Saturday, January 19, 1946

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John
E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining Admiral
4 Kimmel. Proceed.

5 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U.S. NAVY (Ret.

6 (Resumed)

7 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

8 The Chairman: I think before you begin counsel have two
9 or three documents they want to make a part of the record.

10 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, I find in checking the
11 transcript on the three dispatches that were read into the
12 record yesterday, the third of which appears on page 7316,
13 I neglected to state the date of the dispatch. In order
14 that that may be clear on the record I would like to state
15 that that is Dispatch No. 282301, dated November 28, 1941.

16 As Exhibit 126 we would like to offer three documents
17 which have been distributed to the committee this morning,
18 the first of which is dated February 3, 1941 and is entitled
19 "General Order No. 143, Organization of the Naval Forces of
20 the United States", signed by Frank Knox, Secretary of the
21 Navy; the second is a single page containing excerpts from
22 Navy regulations; the third is a document entitled "Pacific
23 Fleet Staff Instructions, 1941".

24 All of these have to do with the general duties and
25 responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific

1 Witness Kimmel

2 Fleet and his staff. We would like to offer those as
3 Exhibit 126.

4 The Chairman: I don't see any paper here that contains
5 only one sheet.

6 Mr. Masten: It is the third page of the collection of
7 documents the first of which is entitled, up in the upper
8 left-hand corner, "General Order No. 143".

9 The Chairman: I am talking about those others.

10 Mr. Masten: It is the third page of that collection,
11 Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman: Oh, I see.

13 Exhibit 126 will be filed.

14 (The documents referred to were
15 marked as Exhibit No. 126.)

16 Mr. Masten: As Exhibit 127, we would like to offer a
17 collection of several letters and memoranda having to do
18 with the air situation in Hawaii after December 7, 1941.
19 At page 77 of Exhibit 113 there is a letter dated January 7
20 from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet to the
21 Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet regarding the
22 aircraft situation in Hawaii.

23 We would like to offer these as additional information
24 regarding the situation after December 7, 1941.

25 The Chairman: Without objection they will be filed as

Witness Kimmel

1 Exhibit 127.

2 (The documents referred to were
3 marked as Exhibit No. 127.)

4 Mr. Masten: As Exhibit 128, we would like to offer a
5 collection of letters and memoranda, six in all, having to
6 do with the prosecution of Japanese consular agents in
7 Hawaii. This matter came up at page 6966 of the transcript
8 and these letters or memoranda are the only documents that
9 we have thus far discovered in this general connection.

10 The first is a letter dated June 4, 1941 addressed to
11 the Attorney General and signed by the United States Attorney
12 for the District of Hawaii. We would like to offer those
13 as Exhibit 128.

14 The Chairman: It will be so filed.

15 (The documents referred to were
16 marked as Exhibit No. 128.)

17 Mr. Masten: And finally, at the request of Senator
18 Ferguson we would like to offer as Exhibit 74 (a) a memorandum
19 dated December 4, 1941 to the Secretary of State signed by
20 Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, regarding a conversation between the
21 First Secretary of the British Embassy and an officer of
22 the Far Eastern Division on December 4, 1941. We would
23 like to offer that as Exhibit 74(a). Exhibit 74 has to do
24 with warnings to nationals.

25 The Chairman: It will be so filed.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

(The document referred to was
marked as Exhibit No. 74(a).)

Mr. Masten: That is all we have.

The Chairman: All right, Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, there has been quite a deal
said in the record about establishing the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor and as to whether it should have been or should not
have been. I think it is pertinent to read into the record
at this time a report of the United States Congress on why
Pearl Harbor was established.

Now reading from "U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Naval Affairs - Establishment of a Naval Base at Pearl Harbor
in the Hawaiian Islands", dated 1908:

"The Committee on Naval Affairs, having had under con-
sideration the bill (H.R. 18120) to establish a naval station
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, report the same with the recommenda-
tion that it do pass without amendment.

"The Hawaiian Islands afford the only possible location
for a strong naval base in the central Pacific Ocean for a
distance of over 4,000 miles from our western coast.

"Pearl Harbor is beyond question one of the best, if
not the best, natural harbor in the world. It has a depth of
water of over 60 feet and an area of nearly 10 square miles,
and capable of floating the combined navies of the world. It

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2 is not only landlocked, but, by reason of the topography
3 of the surrounding ground, ships lying in this harbor are
4 out of view from the open sea. It is the only practicable
5 site for a naval base in the Pacific Ocean, and is the re-
6 cognized key to naval supremacy in those waters. Its
7 equipment as an operating base is a prerequisite to the most
8 successful operation of our fleets whether offensive or
9 defensive.

10 "For over sixty-five years the United States Government
11 has officially recognized the strategic importance of the
12 Hawaiian Islands and the necessity of preventing their
13 occupation by any other nation.

14 "Beginning in 1842 President Tyler gave notice to all
15 European nations that the United States would never consent
16 to their occupying Hawaii or establishing any naval base there.

17 "This 'Monroe Doctrine of the Pacific' was reiterated
18 by Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, in 1851, and by
19 William L. Marcy, the great Democratic Secretary of State,
20 by James G. Blaine, and by William McKinley.

21 "Captain (now Admiral) A. T. Mahan, writing in 1893,
22 came to the conclusions:

23 "To anyone viewing a map that shows the full extent
24 of the Pacific, * * * two circumstances will be strikingly
25 and immediately apparent. He will see at a glance that

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2 the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves in a state of
3 comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and
4 again, that they form the center of a large circle whose
5 radius is approximately the distance from Honolulu to San
6 Francisco. * * *

7 'This is substantially the same distance as from
8 Honolulu to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, and Society
9 Islands, all under European control except Samoa, in which
10 we have a part influence. * * *

11 'To have a central position such as this, and to be
12 alone, having no rival and admitting no rival, * * * are
13 conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist.***
14 But to this striking combination is to be added the remarkable
15 relations borne * * * to the great commercial routes traversing
16 this vast expanse.

17 'Too much stress cannot be laid upon the immense dis-
18 advantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station
19 well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of every point of our
20 coast line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many
21 others available we might find it difficult to exclude from
22 all. There is, however, but the one. Shut out from the
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23 Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back
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25 or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming - an impediment

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 to sustained maritime operations well nigh prohibitive. * * *
3 It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or
4 defense of a coast line - of a sea frontier - is concentrated
5 in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly
6 imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can. '

7 "Twenty-two years ago, by the reciprocity treaty with
8 King Kalakaua, the United States acquired the right to
9 establish a naval base on Pearl Harbor.

10 "Ten years ago this nation, foreseeing the likelihood
11 that they might fall into the hands of an Oriental nation,
12 annexed the Hawaiian Islands. This momentous action was
13 taken primarily because of the strategic value of the Hawaiian
14 Islands and for the purpose of establishing a strong naval
15 base on Pearl Harbor.

16 "Since that time a magnificent site for a naval station,
17 consisting of over 600 acres of land, has been purchased by
18 the Federal Government, and a 30-foot channel has been
19 dredged through the channel bar.

20 "The War Department has also acquired ample sites for
21 fortifications at the channel entrance, and the first battery
22 is now under construction.

23 Up to the present time no beginning has been made
24 toward the actual construction of a naval base on Pearl Harbor.
25 Year after year the needs of the Naval Establishment in other

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 directions have been permitted to crowd it out of the
3 naval bills.

4 "In the judgment of your committee the new developments
5 on the Pacific and among the nations that border its shores
6 make it imperative that a strong operating base be established
7 for our Navy at Pearl Harbor without further delay.

8 "A naval base at Pearl Harbor is not designed primarily
9 for the protection of Hawaii. Its main purpose is to form
10 a buffer of defense for our entire Pacific coast and to
11 make possible our naval supremacy upon the Pacific.

12 "An enemy in possession of Hawaii could harass and
13 threaten our entire western coast. On the other hand,
14 with our own fleet operating from a well-equipped base at
15 Pearl Harbor, no fleet from the Orient would find it
16 practicable to threaten our coast, because of the stronghold
17 left in their rear and of the prohibitive distance from
18 their coaling base.

19 "The equipment of Pearl Harbor is therefore a matter
20 of national prudence and not of extravagance. It affords
21 the nation's least expensive way of defending our Pacific
22 coast it will constitute one of the strongest factors in
23 the prevention of war with any power in the Far East.

24 "Your committee has received memorials from all of
25 the strongest commercial organizations on the entire Pacific

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 coast, urging that the development of Pearl Harbor be provided
3 for at this session of Congress.

4 "The national importance of this measure is emphasized
5 by the fact that commercial bodies from the Central West
6 and from New York City have also memorialized Congress on
7 this subject during this present session.

8 "The question of a naval base in Hawaii is not comparable
9 with the same problem in the Philippines. Hawaii is both a
10 permanent organic part of our nation, and is also a source
11 of revenue; during the past eight years Hawaii has paid more
12 than \$9,000,000 into the Federal Treasury.

13 "Every consideration, whether of national honor or
14 policy, demands that Pearl Harbor be made impregnable and
15 equipped as a naval base immediately.

16 "With a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii would be
17 our great defensive outpost; in the hands of an enemy it
18 would double the nation's cost for naval defense."

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Shefner
follows
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fls LaChar
10:15

International Proceedings Section
7490

Witness Kimmel

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Murphy: I will be glad to yield.

Mr. Keefe: As I understand the procedure Admiral Kimmel was under cross examination. I am wondering whether the counsel is now presenting testimony or whether we are going on with the examination of Admiral Kimmel. If he is making out a case for himself of some kind here we ought to know about it and all of us can spend the rest of the next week introducing excerpts from opinions of this person and that person and the other person. I did not think there was any dispute about the facts that have been set forth here in that Naval Report of 1908 as to Pearl Harbor. I just wonder how far counsel is going to go in reading all this material into the record at this time.

The Chairman: Well, the chair cannot answer that question. It occurred to the chair that instead of reading the document it might be printed as a part of the transcript at this point so that it will be in the record. It is not my understanding that there is any controversy over the fact that Congress established Pearl Harbor as a naval base.

Mr. Murphy: Are you through, sir?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that my reason for putting this in is not to destroy my voice nor to take the time of the committee. If I did not think it was

Shefner
fls LaChar
10:15

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 pertinent I would not have put it in, and the fact is that
3 there has been a great deal in this record, as well as through-
4 out the country, about some unusual situation that the Presi-
5 dent of the United States had ordered the Fleet to Pearl Har-
6 bor and there has been testimony of Admiral Richardson as well
7 as Admiral Kimmel as to why the Fleet should be at Pearl Har-
8 bor and this is the basic document as to why the United States
9 Congress established the base at Pearl Harbor and if it is
10 not interesting to the gentleman from Wisconsin it may be to
11 the American people. It is to me.

12 The Chairman: Well, the only point is whether a docu-
13 ment that is admitted as an official record of Congress should
14 be read rather than printed as a part of the transcript.

15 Mr. Murphy: My only reason, Mr. Chairman, in reading it
16 is so that the other members of the committee will know what
17 I am putting in the record, - of course they can read it later,-
18 and so that Admiral Kimmel will know what I read and I expect
19 to ask some pertinent questions about the matter that I read.

20 The Chairman: All right.

21 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree,
22 I would like to say, with the gentleman in the importance of
23 this thing and we have, I think, - and I would like to say
24 this as a member of the minority, - that we have shown con-
25 siderable latitude to members of the majority in introducing

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 what they deem proper and pertinent and I should be reluctant
3 to see any restrictions imposed upon any individual member
4 as to what they deem to be pertinent.

5 The Chairman: There has been no restriction imposed upon
6 any member whether he is a member of the majority or minority.
7 The only point is whether these official documents should be
8 read or put in the record for the sake of the record.

9 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, if the Congressman wants
10 to ask questions on this I think he should read it into the
11 record so that the witness will be familiar with the text
12 of it and then he will be in a position to answer questions.
13 I assume that counsel is going to ask some questions.

14 The Chairman: Well, it has been read and therefore it
15 is all done and he can proceed to ask questions about it if
16 there are any, and I presume there are.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
18 direct the committee's attention to a report on the inspec-
19 tion of the naval shore establishment in 1929 and 1930 by
20 Ernest Lee Jahnoke, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. I am not
21 going to read the report but there were recommendations at
22 that time back in 1930 that the nation was slow in getting
23 Pearl Harbor in the condition it should be in which to meet
24 the enemy. I won't read that. Anyone who wants to read it
25 can read it.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to an exhibit
3 which was placed in the record this morning referring to the
4 aircraft scouting force and dated December the 8th, 1941.
5 Will you kindly look at that?

6 Mr. Mas ten: It is exhibit 127, Mr. Murphy.

7 Mr. Murphy: Exhibit No. 127. I direct your attention,
8 Admiral, to page 2, on the second page of the exhibit.

9 Admiral Kimmel: May I have an opportunity to read this
10 a moment, please, sir?

11 Mr. Murphy: Yes, surely. I am referring particularly,
12 Admiral, to the letter of the 22nd, on the second page of the
13 exhibit, dated December 22, 1941 and signed "C. L. Tinker."

14 Admiral Kimmel: What is that, sir?

15 Mr. Murphy: I say I am referring particularly to the
16 letter of the 22nd, on the second page of the exhibit, dated
17 December 22, 1941 and signed C. L. Tinker, T-i-n-k-e-r,
18 Brigadier General.

19 Admiral Kimmel: I see it.

20 Mr. Murphy: I would like to go over with you the items
21 in that letter and go down first to paragraph 1, Section "f".
22 On December 22, 1941 the order directed that all planes be
23 camouflaged. Were the planes camouflaged before December 7th?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I think you had better ask General Short
25 about that.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: I am asking about Navy planes. Were the
3 Navy planes camouflaged?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I read a letter into the record the other
5 day dated in September in which I directed the dispersal of
6 all Navy planes in Oahu and to proceed with the camouflage
7 measures. I am not familiar with the steps that were taken.
8 I presume they were camouflaged; I do not know.

9 Mr. Murphy: You do not know yourself whether or not the
10 Navy planes were camouflaged --

11 Admiral Kimmel: I do not.

12 Mr. Murphy: (Continuing) -- prior to the morning of
13 December 7th?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, paragraph 1, specification "a":

16 "Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes,
17 supplies and personnel."

18 And that is exactly what you had done with the Navy planes,
19 isn't that so? I say that is exactly what you had ordered for
20 the Navy planes?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

22 Mr. Murphy: Paragraph "b":

23 "Directed surveys to be made of additional fields
24 for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.

25 "c". Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Field area for more positive protection in the event of
3 adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

4 "d. Moved" --

5 Admiral Kimmel: Are you asking me about paragraph "b"?

6 Mr. Murphy: No, no, I am reading it into the record,
7 Admiral, because it pertains to the Army.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, I see.

9 Mr. Murphy: Paragraph "d":

10 "Moved obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field
11 to eliminate the airplane congestion at Hickam Field.
12 A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

13 "e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to
14 further relieve congestion at Hickam Field."

15 Paragraph "f" is about the camouflaging of the planes
16 already referred to.

17 "g. Directed plans be completed for air transport
18 of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of
19 dispatch on two hours notice.

20 "h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

21 "1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1 1/2) hour
22 before sunset to 30 after sunset 1/3 Army Pursuit and
23 Navy fighters in air."

24 That was not done prior to the seventh? I say that
25 plan was not in effect prior to December 7th?

1 Witness Kimmel .

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Kimmel: No, that plan was not in effect prior to
3 December 7th and my information is that they tried this for
4 a few days and were forced to abandon it because the planes
5 and crews could not stand up.

6 Mr. Murphy: We will go into that. I am glad to have
7 your information.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Isn't that correct, sir?

9 Mr. Murphy: I don't know. I never saw this before. You
10 say that this plan of the 22nd was put into effect and
11 abandoned?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I am talking about this particular sec-
13 tion which you have just read.

14 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

15 Admiral Kimmel: In regard to having the planes in the
16 air and warmed up and ready. My recollection is that in a re-
17 port submitted by the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
18 he reported that they had tried that and that they had to
19 abandon it after a short time on account of wear and tear on
20 both crews and planes.

21 Mr. Murphy: I ask for a copy of that report. We cer-
22 tainly ought to have it. It is pertinent.

23 Admiral Kimmel: I have seen it somewhere. I cannot put
24 my fingers on it at the moment.

25 Mr. Murphy: I am going to request the Navy liaison to

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2
3 produce that report so that it can be made an exhibit and until
4 such time I will proceed reading, Admiral:

5 "All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit
6 excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready
7 to take off."

8 That was not done prior to December 7th, was it?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot speak for the Army planes.

10 Mr. Murphy: The Navy?

11 Admiral Kimmel: No.

12 Mr. Murphy: Paragraph 2:

13 "Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

14 1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

15 1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and
16 ready to take off.

17 "All other Army and Navy planes including fighters
18 excepting searching planes on one hours notice.

19 "3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before
20 sunrise 1/4 planes on one (1) hours notice, three-quarters
21 on four hours notice.

22 "e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made
23 ground reconnaissance of areas where additional air-
24 dromes are to be located, have discussed tactical opera-
25 tions, administrative problems, morale and rewards with
all major commanders.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and
3 expect to submit to the Department Commander within
4 twenty-four hours revised plans for the employment of
5 the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

6 "k. I have directed that plans be made and they are
7 well under way for the use of certain elements of the
8 Air Force in offensive operations.

9 "l. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing,
10 directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 B-17's
11 available at all times."

12 In connection with that, Admiral, it would be difficult
13 to have 18 prior to December 7th when they only had 6 in
14 commission, isn't that right?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I did not follow you.

16 Mr. Murphy: Will you read it, please?

17 (Question read.)

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: It is a fact they only had six in commis-
20 sion on the 7th, is that right, Admiral?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That was my understanding and my be-
22 lief at the time, yes.

23 Mr. Murphy: Paragraph "m":

24 "Directed that a positive system of aircraft and
25 surface ship identification be arranged."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Admiral Kimmel: I think this will be all right, sir.

Mr. Murphy: All right, Admiral. Now then I read
paragraph "m":

"Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface
ship identification be arranged."

It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you had asked for
that equipment before December 7 but was unable to obtain
it?

Admiral Kimmel: I have lost you, sir. I do not know
where you are right now. I am trying to keep up.

Mr. Murphy: I am now referring to paragraph "m" of
the same thing I was reading, Admiral.

Admiral Kimmel: "m"?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I see.

Mr. Murphy: Reading:

"Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface
ship identification be arranged."

The fact is that you did not have the equipment at Pearl
Harbor but had requested it before December 7, is that right?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Mr. Murphy: I ask to have spread on the record at
this point, Mr. Chairman, from Exhibit 112, a letter dated
January 7, 1942, and I refer particularly to page 4 thereof,

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 paragraph 7.

3 Admiral Kimmel: Let us catch up, please, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Page 4, paragraph 7, Admiral, which
5 is page 80 in the exhibit.

6 Admiral Kimmel: I have it now.

7 Mr. Murphy: A letter from the Commander in Chief,
8 United States Pacific Fleet, to the Commander in Chief,
9 United States Fleet.

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have it.

11 Mr. Murphy: And I would like to read, Admiral, in
12 connection with what you said that there was a change in
13 the plans that were recommended, in Exhibit 127 the following,
14 paragraph 6 on page 3:

15 "With these it is not possible simultaneously and
16 effectively to maintain necessary long-range search operations,
17 to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet
18 constant requirements for special missions, such as covering
19 submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure,
20 without having on hand for search alone at least three times
21 the number of planes that are needed for search on any given
22 day. There is no way of getting around this if material
23 and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the
24 other can do more."

25 Then paragraph 7, which describes the search actually

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 being made and that it had to be reduced to the following
3 basis, which is therein outlined. That would be in accordance
4 with what you said before, would it not?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Probably this is what I was
6 talking about.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral, I am referring to Volume 35
8 of the testimony in this case and particularly to page 6489.
9 The reason why I am referring to this is at page 6489, which
10 was while Admiral Stark was on the stand and during the course
11 of the morning hour, the distinguished Senator from Michigan
12 had read into the record several messages about the bomb
13 plot and about the report, regularly and irregularly, at
14 Pearl Harbor to which you have referred.

15 Incidentally, I think you should have gotten that
16 information, but in order to show what was before the people
17 at Washington, at page 6489 and at 6490 I refer to the
18 general situation, referring to Puget Sound, to San Diego,
19 to the Panama Canal and to Alaska and the Philippines.

20 Did you know, Admiral, or do you know now that there
21 were messages about those particular areas that were not
22 ship location messages?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I have heard -- I have not seen the
24 messages, all the messages, but I have been informed, and
25 I believe that in no one of those localities were there

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 messages of the same character and content as those that
3 were requested by the high officials of the Government of
4 Japan, nor did the high officials of the Government of Japan
5 show any such anxiety as to the location of ships in other
6 localities.

7 Mr. Murphy: I would agree with you, Admiral, that
8 there was no other message which talked about the plans as
9 to berthing ships, but I ask you to refer to Exhibit 2, at
10 page 34, if you will.

11 Admiral Kimmel: I have it.

12 Mr. Murphy: That is a message from Buenos Aires to
13 Tokyo -- or to Panama, rather, --

14 Mr. Keefe: From Tokyo to Panama?

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman on the
16 left has made a statement before I started a question and
17 he was going to try to cut me off. We are all men. Now
18 let us not have this needling going on. I want to conduct
19 a fair examination and I do not propose to be cut off.

20 The Chairman: The Chairman did not hear the remark.

21 Mr. Murphy: I did.

22 Mr. Keefe: I did not hear any such remark as that at
23 all, and if he did he does not hear well. That is all I
24 have got to say about it.

25 The gentleman has asked a question which I did not

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 understand, and I wanted to understand it. I ask the reporter
3 to read the question so that the members may know what the
4 question is.

5 The Chairman: Yes, the reporter will read the question.

6 Mr. Keefe: Let us see what it is.

7 Mr. Murphy: I ask to have it stricken.

8 Mr. Keefe: I should like to have it settled, Mr. Chairman,
9 because the gentleman has caustically referred to my interruption
10 and I think the interruption was thoroughly justified.

11 If the gentleman wants to throw the question out and
12 start over again, I have no objection to that.

13 The Chairman: Let us proceed, gentlemen.

14 Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral, I am referring to Exhibit 2,
15 page 34, and to the message which is on that page. It is
16 from Buenos Aires to Tokyo, and dated the 23rd of September,
17 1941. It is circular number 146. Then it says, "Buenos
18 Aires to Tokyo #416.

19 "Strictly secret; C.O.R.

20 "When Minister Yamagata was in Panama he was asked
21 by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts
22 of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then,
23 we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and
24 upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian
25 Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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copies of them.

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"Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

8

9

10

"The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?)

11

12

13

"Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report."

14

15

16

That would be an inquiry which would be rather pertinent whether they wanted maps of the Panama Canal, wouldn't it, Admiral?

17

18

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Admiral Kimmel: I see nothing which indicates that the Government of Japan wanted maps of the Panama Canal. That follows the pattern of Japanese espionage over many years.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: You say if you saw the one about Pearl
3 Harbor, in the month of September and translated on October
4 10, about the bomb plot, that would have changed your
5 whole plan?

6 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

7 Mr. Murphy: This is one in September also, looking
8 for maps of the Panama Canal, maps and charts.

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: Would that indicate a special interest
11 in the Panama Canal?

12 Admiral Kimmel: The difference I think is that in
13 the one case this was information which had been gathered
14 by the local espionage units in the ordinary course of
15 their duties, and was being sent to Tokyo. I can see
16 nothing in this message, and any other messages that I
17 have had access to, where the Government in Tokyo was
18 seeking and demanding this information at that particular
19 time.

20 Now, incidentally, I think this message might well
21 have been supplied to me as well as the others. I did
22 not mention it at the time.

23 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, Admiral, as I understand you,
24 the distinction you make is it is significant if Tokyo
25 asked for it, but not significant if it is supplied to

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2
2 Tokyo?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Significant that Tokyo asked for
4 it and related information on several occasions.

5 Mr. Murphy: Let me come again to the Panama Canal.

6 At page 36, from Panama to Tokyo. This is a message
7 dated October 2, 1941.

8 "Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts
9 to the Pacific Area the 'Panama Air Depot' located at
10 France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immed-
11 iately adjacent to Albrook Field).

12 "Rear Admiral SANDLER, Commander of the 15th Naval
13 District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific
14 end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to
15 the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies
16 a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be
17 completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading
18 pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the
19 existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry
20 dock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore,
21 the petroleum supply tank at Boca on the Pacific side
22 and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line
23 branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side
24 (recently it is believed that these tanks have been
25 camouflaged) have been taken over.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 "There are intelligences at hand concerning the
3 construction of a food storage depot at Corozal which
4 would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal
5 Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes
6 between this point and the United States are severed."

7 Would that mean anything to you if you were at
8 Washington and you had these series of messages about that
9 particular area?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I think this is in the same category
11 as the previous message.

12 Mr. Murphy: They are talking about camouflaging oil
13 tanks and the like, and giving certain vital military
14 information to Tokyo there, are they not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: They are giving military information
16 to Tokyo.

17 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

18 Do you think that you should have had that message
19 also?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I see no reason why it should not
21 have been supplied to me.

22 Mr. Murphy: You were awfully busy as it was without
23 reading hundreds of additional messages, were you not?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I had a sizable staff out there.

25 Mr. Murphy: All right.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

2 Now, I refer you, Admiral, to page 122 of the same
3 exhibit 2, this being a message from Tokyo to Mexico,
4 from the Tokyo Jap Foreign Minister to Mexico, Koshi,
5 dated 23 June, 1941. No. 106.

6 "Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama
7 Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make
8 an official trip to Panama. (It might be well to have
9 secretary Yoshimizu accompany him).

10 Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato,
11 the Naval Attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he
12 returns.

13 Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their
14 #62* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip
15 get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival.
16 (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant.
17 There are also some suspicions that they read some of our
18 codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution
19 in accomplishing this mission. Also any telegrams exchanged
20 between you and Panama should be very simple.**)"

21 Would not that show an unusual interest on the part
22 of Tokyo in the Panama Canal?

23 Admiral Kimmel: That shows an interest, yes.

24 Mr. Murphy: And would not that have been before the
25 authorities in Washington when they were wondering where

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

2 the Japanese were going to strike, if they were going
3 to strike?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I presume it was before them.

5 Mr. Murphy: Don't you think that adds a chapter, at
6 least, to your impression about the bomb plot message,
7 that that directed that the attack was going to happen
8 at Hawaii?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I see nothing here requesting speci-
10 fic information of ships in the harbor, or their location
11 in the harbor, and that type of information is good just
12 so long as the ships remain where they are. This informa-
13 tion is information of more or less permanent installa-
14 tions which will be good for a long time.

15 Mr. Murphy: The fact is, Admiral, however, that the
16 authorities in Washington, on deciding where the Japs
17 were going to strike, did have this before them, as well
18 as the bomb plot message?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, I presume they did.

20 Mr. Murphy: I would like to now refer you, Admiral,
21 to page 125 of the same exhibit. This is a message from
22 Vladivostok to Tokyo, dated July 3, 1941.

23 "Report on recent naval activities in this area.

24 "Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the
25 naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

2 are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various
3 exercises to meet any eventuality. However, naval exer-
4 cises are limited to only one section of the force for
5 there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evident-
6 ly the preparations are intended for defense against
7 Japan."

8 I am wondering, Admiral, if that kind of a message
9 had been sent by Japanese espionage from Hawaii to Tokyo,
10 if there would have been an attack on Hawaii? They say
11 there the Russians are prepared to meet any eventuality.
12 They could not have said that about Hawaii, could they?
13 You were not prepared to meet any eventuality on Hawaii,
14 were you?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I think you are a better judge of
16 that, or the committee is a better judge of that, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you had nothing at all to
18 take care of an oncoming air raid by way of reconnaissance,
19 did you, or any radar working at the time, or any watchers
20 on the hills, at the observation posts, or any pursuit
21 planes in the air, or any ships out scouting to the north
22 from which they came, you did not have that, did you?

23 Admiral Kimmel: The evidence answers all of those
24 questions very conclusively.

25 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, there was a message from

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h7

2 Hawaii to Tokyo saying that there was still a good chance
3 as I recall it, that there was no reconnaissance being made
4 and still a good chance for a raid on Hawaii. That was
5 a message sent to Tokyo, wasn't it, before the attack?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Which was translated after the
7 attack.

8 Mr. Murphy: It was, at any rate, sent to them?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I think some such message was
10 sent.

11 Mr. Murphy: So that as to Hawaii, they had a message
12 that there was still a good chance for an attack, but as
13 to Vladivostok they had a message that the Russians were
14 prepared to meet any eventuality, did they not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I did not read that.

16 Mr. Murphy: Well, it says -- let me read it to you

17 --

18 Admiral Kimmel: --" by enforcing various exercises
19 to meet any eventuality."

20 Mr. Murphy: Yes, "by enforcing various exercises to
21 meet any eventuality."

22 Admiral Kimmel: I cannot read there anything except
23 exercises.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, we may differ on that, but at any
25 rate it says there, "to meet any eventuality."

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h8

2 Admiral Kimmel: I only speak of the language here,
3 that is all.

4 Mr. Murphy: It says, "-- in naval preparations by
5 enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality."

6 Of course, that may not mean what I think it does,
7 but it is English, and we can both interpret it.

8 Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the fact

9 --

10 Admiral Kimmel (interposing): Certainly in the
11 Hawaiian area we had had exercises designed to meet any
12 eventuality.

13 Mr. Murphy: You had exercises right along up to
14 November 20, and after November 20 you had no more exercises,
15 did you?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: With the army. You did not have any
18 exercises after November 20, did you, with the army?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall those details, but
20 we had exercises designed to meet any eventuality, up to
21 and including December 7th.

22 Mr. Murphy: The fact is that you had no exercises
23 with the Army after November 20, did you, of 1941?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know. You have some records
25 on that which I presume are correct.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: I am just putting this in the record. I am
3 referring to page 6491 of the printed record at which refer-
4 ence is made to page 38 of Exhibit 2.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Page 38?

6 Mr. Murphy: Yes. That is another message from Panama
7 to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1941:

8 "The result of my investigations, as I reported in
9 my secret letter #142, are as follows:

10 "1. The airplane bases which the United States is con-
11 structing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province,
12 (please refer to part 4 of my #149) Chitre in Herrera province,
13 Monsabo in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu
14 in Chiriqui province.

15 "2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which
16 will be converted into military establishments are the ones
17 at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya outside the limits
18 of Panama City.

19 "3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of
20 the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed,
21 are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos' province and at
22 eight other projected points."

23 Does that also show an additional interest on the part
24 of Tokyo in the defenses of Panama?

25 Admiral Kimmel: They were always interested in the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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defenses of Panama.

Mr. Murphy: Now I would like also to refer to page 39 of the same exhibit, from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, where the statement is made:

"In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th."

And again:

"I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications."

Admiral Kimmel: I have lost you, sir.

Mr. Murphy: I will read the whole thing. I have been reading only the high lights.

Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

Mr. Murphy: I will read the whole thing:

"Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

"Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

"Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

"In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect
3 the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid
4 rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications.
5 Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses
6 for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to
7 accommodate 200 men each.

8 "At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family
9 officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing
10 completion."

11 That again would show an active interest of Tokyo in
12 the Panama Canal area, would it not?

13 Admiral Kimmel: It shows an interest, yes.

14 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I direct your attention to an
15 entry on page 40, from the Panama Canal, or from Panama to
16 Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, and you will find in that
17 particular message, Admiral, without my reading it, a refer-
18 ence to gun emplacements at Panama.

19 Admiral Kimmel: A reference to what kind of place?

20 Mr. Murphy: Gun emplacements.

21 Admiral Kimmel: I presume so. I haven't read it.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 51.
23 That particular message, while it is dated November 22,
24 1941, it is translated December 25, 1941. Of course that
25 was before the Japs but not before Washington, but I think

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 it shows the course of conduct of the Japanese.

3 You will find the following:

4 "The United States Government is going on the assumption
5 that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and
6 sea."

7 Do you see that, Admiral?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I see it.

9 Mr. Murphy: I would like to direct your attention to
10 page 52, a message from Panama to Tokyo, dated November 22,
11 1941:

12 "The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now
13 being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are
14 anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area,
15 patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in
16 the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to
17 Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits
18 extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands."

19 That would seem to divide up Panama a bit, wouldn't it,
20 as to air defenses, and as to what they have in each section?

21 Admiral Kimmel: The message speaks for itself there.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, Admiral, they talk about anti-aircraft
23 defenses on lock 1, and again on lock 3, and then talk about
24 the naval defense area, don't they?

25 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, on page 6493 of the record, in order that the committee, or whoever desires to read in the record the messages which are along the lines which I have referred at the Panama Canal, covering Alaska, covering the Philippines and the other areas, are referred to by me by page numbers.

The stenographer has copied into the record all of the entries referred to by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, but he has not copied into the record the references which I have given, but only shows the page numbers.

I ask that at this point in the record the entries on the pages referred to on page 6493 be spread in the record.

The Chairman: Without objection it will be so ordered.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

Hook follows

1 Witness Kimmel

2 From: Manila

3 To: Tokyo

4 August 20, 1941

5 #532

6 Re your Circular #1793^a.

7 I am reporting to you below information which I have
8 been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

9 1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to
10 the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It
11 is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been
12 placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been
13 placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually
14 seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of it), the
15 (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo
16 Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce.
17 Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of
18 the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, etc.
19 (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their
20 possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings
21 in the city).

22 2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter
23 part of July, 3 anti-aircraft guns being transported to
24 Camp Murphy.

25 a - Not available.

ARMY

21461

Trans. 8/26/41 (6)

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fls
AL

J. D. HODGKINS, JR., JUN 6 1941

1 Witness Kimmel

2 From: Manila (Nihro)

3 To: Tokyo

4 September 22, 1941

5 #623

6 Re my message #618^a.

7 The Phoenix left port the morning of the 22nd.

8 a - See S.I.S. #22772

9 ARMY

22771

Trans. 9/27/41 (6)

10 -----
11 From: Davao (Kihara)

12 To: Tokyo

13 September 26, 1941

14 #135

15 Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the
16 following report concerning Zamboanga^a:

17 Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyer
18 and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every
19 Saturday. After they have lain at anchorage for one or two
20 days they leave again for the South. In summing up the
21 statements of members of the crews of these boats, it
22 appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo^b to
23 Tawao^c and Tarakan^d on the island of Borneo.

24 a - A city on the island of Mindanao.

25 b - Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group.

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Witness Kimmel

to Borneo.

c - Town in British North Borneo.

d - In Netherlands Borneo.

ARMY 24468 Trans. 11/7/41 (6)

From: Tokyo

To: Davao

October 2, 1941

#62

Re your #105^a.

Please wire me the location and movements of
fishermen and ---- since your last report.

a - Not available .

ARMY 25697 Trans. 12-4-41 (6)

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Manila

October 4, 1941

#318

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense
works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island
of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also
please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

ARMY 23207 Trans. 10/8/41 (6)

W. D. MONTGOMERY, JR. WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

h4

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo

1 November 1941

(RE your #318)

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino - - - - -

- - - - - (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

h5

2 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more
3 than 3000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the
4 various projects. However, there are not more than 300
5 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

6 On the 27th, what I estimated to be between
7 2000 and 3000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed
8 north. Their destination may have been the above place.
9 It is being investigated at present. It appears that three
10 airports are being built there and the docks are being
11 enlarged.

12 In the Bataan area the surveillance is
13 particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of
14 Filipinos is prohibited.

15 3. Work is being rushed on the road be-
16 tween Dingalan and RAARU (Laur ?) and by the middle of
17 October there were less than two kilometers that had not
18 been completed and this will be finished in the near future.
19 The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to
20 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the
21 progress is amazing.

22 4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter
23 planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of altitude
24 planes (?) it is said.

25 Details by Mail.

Witness Kimmel

h6

*JD-1: 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

(SIS #23207)

JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41(S-TT)

24382

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

From: Manila (Hihro)

To: Tokyo

November 4, 1941

#726

PISU, HON, BERU D-8, S-13 and M-3 left on the afternoon of the 3rd, destination unknown and D-1 are now in Haku (Brazil ?)

ARMY 24691

Trans. 11/13/41 (6)

From: Manila (Nihro)

to: Tokyo

November 4, 1941

#727

Intelligence.

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown

1 Witness Kimmel

h7

2 soldiers have been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks.
3 The number at present is about two or three thousand. In
4 view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they
5 may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very
6 friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly
7 investigating where they have come from.

8 2. Taraiac^a. Recently the Miguel Air Field
9 has been extended to forma rectangle about 1,000 meters
10 long.

11 3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway
12 between Taraiac and Lingayen^b have been replaced with
13 concrete bridges.

14 4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north
15 of Teraiao (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about
16 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new
17 barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

18 5. From what I hear the American soldiers
19 stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude
20 toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or
21 three cases of assault on Filipinas, the Filipinos are
22 furious.

23 a - Tarallo, Camarines Province.

24 b - Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on
25 Lingayen Gulf.

ARMY 24626

Trans. 11/12/41 (6)

1 Witness Kimmel

h8

2 From: Tokyo

3 To: Manila

4 5 November 1941

5 #355

6 For Secretary Yuki.

7 The Naval General Staff has requested that
8 investigation be made on the following items. Please
9 arrange as you think best for the same:

10 These items in regard to each port of call:

- 11 (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
12 (2) Types of planes at each, and number of
13 planes.
14 (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to
15 land forces.
16 (4) State of progress being made on all
17 equipment and establishments.

18 JD-1: 6424

(F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41(6-AR)

19 24696

20 -----
21 From: Manila (Nihro)

22 To: Tokyo

23 November 12, 1941

24 #754

25 According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese

1 Witness Kimmel.

h9

2 who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some
3 fourteen or fifteen years, the following has been ascer-
4 tained.

5 1. At the present time there are approximately 400
6 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed
7 in Laoag^a. It is being rumored, however, that the Philip-
8 pine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700.

9 At the present time they are constructing additional bar-
10 racks.

11 2. There seems to be no indication that they plan
12 the expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag (length
13 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor are they stationing
14 any military planes at that field. Aside from a recon-
15 naissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area
16 in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in
17 progress.

18 3. Though it is said that Claveria^b and Burgos^b
19 are being equipped with -----, the details are unknown.
20 (I am continuing my private investigations in this connec-
21 tion.)

22 a - Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island
23 of Luzon, P. I.

24 b - Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P.I.

25 ARMY 25064

Trans. 11/21/41 (6)

1 Witness Kimmel

h10

2 From: Manila (Nihro)

3 To: Tokyo

4 November 12, 1941

5 #755

6 A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines
7 Norte^a is as follows:

8 1. In that area at the present time there does not
9 seem to be many troops stationed. Only about 60 members
10 of the Philippine Patrol organization, with headquarters
11 in Daet^b, are located in that area. Every day five or
12 six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to
13 Paracale^c and Jose Panganiban^d.

14 2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used
15 at the present time. Insofar as the military air field at
16 Daet is concerned, though one or two military planes landed
17 there during February of this year, from that time to this
18 there has not been a single military plane alight on this
19 field. As this field is located right on the beach,
20 should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could
21 land in the shipping lane just off the beach as well.

22 3. On the point of land, San Muricio^e, north of
23 Jose Panganiban it is rumored that they are equipping -----
24 with -----, but this has not been verified. (I am con-
25 tinuing my secret investigations.)

Witness Kimmel

hll

4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batgasan^f to Hondagua^g.

ARMY 25162

From: Tokyo

To: Manila

15 November 1941

#368

Strictly confidential.

Re your #746*

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

(SIS #24850)

*JD-1: 6545. Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines.

JD-1: 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Kimmel

hl2

2 From: Manila (Nihro)

3 To: Tokyo

4 15 November 1941

5 #767

6 1. It has been ascertained that the ship
7 of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the
8 AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy,
9 (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board).
10 Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th,
11 destination unknown.

12 2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 des-
13 troyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.

14 3. Ships in port on the 15th:

15 A Manila:

16 MADDO

17 Portland

18 BUKKU

19 BERU

20 BERU**

21 HON

22 WOHOTOSU

23 8 destroyers

24 20 submarines

25 1 minelayer

25237

1 Witness Kimmel

h13

2 b. Cavite:

3 TON

4 PASU

5 SIS #24780

6 * JD-1: 6503. Re movements of U. S. Naval and British
7 Naval craft in Manila area.

8 **BERU repeated.

9 JD-1: 6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR)

10 -----

11 From: Manila

12 To: Tokyo

13 15 November 1941

14 #767

15 We are retransmitting our machine telegram
16 of the 14th with indicator 97720 because of a mistake on
17 the plug board, as follows:

18 The following is from a report of a
19 Japanese resident of Cebu.

20 1. At present there are about 300 American
21 and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are
22 four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600
23 soldiers.

24 2. The airport has an area of about 196
25 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor).

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

hl4

2 About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine
3 Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13
4 American Army planes (monoplanes - whether they were scout
5 planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed
6 there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in
7 the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes.)

8 3. The headquarters of the former patrol
9 force are being used as the commissariat storehouse and all
10 sorts of provisions are being stored there.

11 4. On the 22nd of September, about 20
12 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the
13 Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two des-
14 troyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this
15 month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a
16 camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered
17 port and anchored for two or three days. It has been
18 recognized that occasionally two or three American ships
19 anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

20 5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA
21 (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to
22 10,000 tons.

23 JD-1: 6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

1 Witness Kimmel

hl4

2 About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine
3 Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13
4 American Army planes (monoplanes - whether they were scout
5 planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed
6 there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in
7 the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes.)

8 3. The headquarters of the former patrol
9 force are being used as the commissariat storehouse and all
10 sorts of provisions are being stored there.

11 4. On the 22nd of September, about 20
12 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the
13 Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two des-
14 troyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this
15 month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a
16 camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered
17 port and anchored for two or three days. It has been
18 recognized that occasionally two or three American ships
19 anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

20 5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA
21 (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to
22 10,000 tons.

23 JD-1: 6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

WLC

1 From: Manila (Nihro)

2 To: Tokyo

3 November 22, 1941

4 #785

5 1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or
6 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on
7 the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5
8 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

9 On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the
10 President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number
11 unknown) and material.

12 2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

13 Manila -- Portland (entered the port on the
14 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu^a; one
15 mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

16 Cavite -- Houston (?); Canopus.

17 a - Kana spelling.

18 ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

19 -----

20 From: Manila (Nihro)

21 To: Tokyo

22 November 24, 1941

23 #789

24 1. Putting together various reports, it appears that
25 a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port

WASH DC . NOV 24 1941

WLC2

1 area" during the "black-out" on the night of the 21st. Forty
 2 or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila
 3 Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district.
 4 Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded
 5 with troops.

6 2. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the
 7 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun two _____) and 20
 8 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These
 9 light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped
 10 near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It
 11 is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats
 12 recently entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin"
 13 of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and
 14 ammunition trucks had left at four and six o'clock on the
 15 afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan
 16 Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that
 17 these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final desti-
 18 nation of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.

19 3. At present it is seen that there are two or
 20 three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which
 21 have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmos-
 22 phere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in?)
 23 the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforce-
 24 ments. Feeling among the people in general has become tense.

25

ARMY 25530

Trans. 12/1/41 (6)

1 From: Manila (Nihro).

2 To : Tokyo

3 26 November 1941

4 #790

5 1. On the 23rd a camouflaged
6 submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently
7 a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

8 2. On the 24th, 5 submarines
9 left port, destination unknown.

10 3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers
11 left port, destination unknown.

12 *Probably the U.S.S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons).

13 JD-1: 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

14 -----

15 From: Manila (Nihro).

16 To : Tokyo

17 27 November 1941

18 #797

19 The Portland, BUKKU*, 2

20 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 26th (?).

21 Destination unknown.

22 *Probably Black Hawk

23 JD-1: 7082 25782 (H) Navy. Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

24 -----

25

1 From: Manila (Nihro)

2 To: Tokyo

3 November 28, 1941

4 #799

5 Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one
6 flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level
7 scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in
8 the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the
9 city independently. Though in the morning and evening the
10 weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

11 ARMY 25764

Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, was it not your feeling while
3 you were Commander in Chief of the Fleet, that you had an
4 attack force mission to perform and that you should not be
5 obliged to participate in the defense of the Hawaiian
6 Islands as such; I mean the base itself?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I felt, and I believe all the Navy
8 felt, that the real mission of the Pacific Fleet was
9 offensive, and I think that nothing has ever occurred to
10 change that conviction in the minds of any responsible
11 Naval officers.

12 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, I would like to refer your
13 attention to a letter which you wrote, and in which you
14 objected to having the combined houses for the Army and
15 Navy.

16 By the way, there was a proposition, was there not,
17 that the Army and Navy Commanders, the Commanding General
18 and Commander in Chief of the Fleet at Hawaii be housed
19 together in the same building? That was made prior to
20 December 7, was it not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection of that is that that
22 referred to an information center.

23 Mr. Murphy: No, I think you will find it is beyond
24 that.

25 Mr. Masten: Mr. Murphy, that is Exhibit 123.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Will you get that exhibit for the Admiral please?

(The document was handed to Admiral Kimmel.)

Mr. Murphy: Do you have Exhibit 123 before you?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have Exhibit 123.

Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to the second page of that exhibit, being a letter from the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Kimmel: Wait a minute. Will you say that again?

Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to the second page of the exhibit, a letter dated November 3, 1941.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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ALΘ-1

7539

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: From the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval
3 District, to the Chief of Naval Operations, by way of the
4 Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

6 Mr. Murphy: Paragraph 1 says:

7 "It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present
8 time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building
9 as proposed in reference (a)."

10 That was a plan to combine how much of the Army and
11 Navy, Admiral?

12 Admiral Kimmel: My recollection of all this is that
13 that was a common information center. Under date of the
14 15th of October, 1941, you will see a dispatch. He says:

15 "Your dispatch 140400 to BUDOCKSX request consideration
16 be given to construction of combined operating center suffi-
17 cient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency
18 staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army
19 and Navy in Hawaii such as CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN
20 COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activities of Army. CNO
21 considers contemplation of Army and Navy activities in one
22 building of proper construction constitutes great advantage
23 for emergency operations. Comment with recommendations
24 including location and estimate of cost requested."

25 Mr. Murphy: Was not that to combine all of you in one

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 building?

3 Admiral Kimmel: It is a combined operating center.

4 Mr. Murphy: It says, "operating activities *** of
5 CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN". Would not that put you and Admiral
6 Bloch together in the same building?

7 Admiral Kimmel: If that had been carried out, yes.
8 That is what it says.

9 Mr. Murphy: I say that is the recommendation, is it not?

10 Admiral Kimmel: It would not necessarily put me and
11 Admiral Bloch in the same building. It would put the operating
12 staffs necessary for the Army and Navy together in the building.

13 Mr. Murphy: In the November 3rd letter Admiral Bloch
14 says:

15 "I do not believe that the Commander in Chief or the
16 Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common
17 office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant,
18 Fourteenth Naval District."

19 That was his version of it there, wasn't it, at the
20 bottom of the page, in paragraph 5, about the fifth line up
21 from the bottom?

22 Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

23 Mr. Murphy: Referring to the letter of November 3, 1941,
24 paragraph 5, the fifth from the last line.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. What about it?

(9)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: It says there, "I do not believe that the
3 Commander in Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted
4 by being in a common office building with the Commanding
5 General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District."

6 So that his impression apparently was that they were
7 discussing putting all three of you in the same building,
8 isn't that right?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they were discussing that.

10 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

11 Admiral Kimmel: The operating agencies.

12 I might shorten up your work here if you want to, however.

13 Mr. Murphy: All right. You mean by saying it was
14 adopted after December 7?

15 Admiral Kimmel: It was adopted?

16 Mr. Murphy: Yes, wasn't it, after December 7?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Not in that form, no. I do not know
18 what was done after December 7 definitely, because I have
19 not been out there since, and I haven't talked it over with
20 people, but my general feeling at the time, and as I have
21 expressed it in here, I think I have expressed it in some
22 of these letters -- I have not had a chance to read them
23 recently -- but the Fleet Commander should not be concerned
24 with the immediate operation of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
25 You had a Naval Admiral and an Army General, and a Fleet

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Commander in my opinion should have been free to do other
3 things besides concern himself with the details of the defense
4 of Hawaii.

5 Mr. Murphy: That is exactly what I am coming to. In
6 other words, that was your feeling on December 7, and prior
7 thereto, and in your letter of November 3rd, the first en-
8 dorsement dated November 3rd on page 2 in that exhibit, under
9 paragraph(f), I mean paragraph 3, subparagraph (f).

10 "In objecting to a combined operating center for the
11 Army and Navy", you say --

12 Admiral Kimmel: Wait a minute.

13 Mr. Murphy: Excuse me. That is paragraph 3(f).

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

15 Mr. Murphy: You say there, "In objecting", and so forth,
16 paragraph 3. Then you say, "On the other hand, there are
17 manifest disadvantages among which are the building," and
18 then I go down to (f), "It would have at least a psychological
19 tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks."

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

21 Mr. Murphy: In other words, you did not feel that the
22 planes of the Fleet should be used for the purpose of defend-
23 ing that base, did you? You felt that Admiral Bloch should
24 have his own planes and the Army should have their planes,
25 that absolutely and primarily it was an Army obligation and

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 that you should be left to go on with your preparation to
3 fight, because that is what you thought you were out there
4 for, isn't that right?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but I made plans to utilize
6 every facility, every naval facility that happened to be in
7 Pearl Harbor in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I think that
8 the plans that I made show that most conclusively.

9 Mr. Murphy: You did object to Washington to the fact
10 that you had to do that, did you not?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Certainly I objected, and I objected
12 because I wanted to have those planes free for other things,
13 and I knew that even with all the planes and everything we
14 had that we were forced to make a choice as to what we could
15 and should do.

16 Mr. Murphy: You complained to Admiral Stark and Admiral
17 Stark, in effect, kind of agreed with you but said, "There
18 is no choice. We have to do it," did he not?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20 Mr. Murphy: That was an old problem, because it existed
21 back in 1940 with Admiral Richardson, did it not?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, it existed always.

23 Mr. Murphy: I would like to read into the record from
24 a letter dated November 28, 1940, a letter to Admiral Stark
25 from Admiral Richardson. I would like to refer to the second

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 paragraph, Admiral, which reads as follows:

3 "With regard to the first of these matters, I will take
4 this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This fight
5 on the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and
6 I think it can easily be provided for. I think torpedo nets
7 within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The
8 area is too restricted and ships at present are not moored
9 within torpedo range of the entrance."

10 In that connection I would like to direct your attention,
11 Admiral, to the discussion of the torpedo nets at Hawaii.

12 Mr. Masten: That is Exhibit 116, Mr. Murphy.

13 Mr. Murphy: Exhibit No. 116. Do you have your copy
14 of it?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, there was a letter in February
17 that gave you the impression that there was no danger of a
18 torpedo attack at Pearl Harbor. Do you recall that?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Gave me definite data, which was con-
20 clusive, that there was no danger of torpedo attack in Hawaii
21 or in Pearl Harbor.

22 Mr. Murphy: Right. By the way, there was reference
23 made, when counsel was questioning you, to Whitehead torpedoes
24 that were purchased by the Japs. Is it not a fact that
25 the Japanese had perfected those torpedoes in 1931 for the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 specific purpose of being used in an attack on Pearl Harbor?

3 Of course we did not know about that.

4 Admiral Kimmel: Of course I did not know about that,
5 but if that be true, this is the first time I ever heard it.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, it is my impression, and only an im-
7 pression, that in the record a statement is made that the
8 Japanese perfected this torpedo for use against Pearl Harbor
9 in 1931. Of course the Navy did not know about it, and I
10 am not criticising the Navy.

11 Admiral Kimmel: No.

12 Mr. Murphy: But I am putting it in the record.

13 Admiral Kimmel: I think you are a little bit in error.

14 Mr. Murphy: All right.

15 Admiral Kimmel: My understanding, although I do not
16 know, is that they took some Whitehead torpedoes that were
17 manufactured in 1931 and shortly before Pearl Harbor they
18 succeeded in so altering them as to make them suitable for
19 use in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

20 Mr. Murphy: It may be so.

21 Admiral Kimmel: I think that is the correct statement.

22 Mr. Murphy: I am glad to have you say that. My only
23 reason for going into it, Admiral, was I was wondering if the
24 Japs were plotting an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1931. Some
25 people in this country would have us believe that they started

(11)

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 to prepare on November 26, 1941.

3 I am referring, Admiral, to this group of letters in
4 Exhibit 116, and you have already covered the letter written
5 in February that led you to believe that there was absolutely
6 no danger from torpedoes.

7 This reference has been made to the letter in June. Do
8 you remember that?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

10 Mr. Murphy: The letter of June 13.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

12 Mr. Murphy: Where they discussed Taranto. Now both
13 the opinion of Admiral King and a great many opinions are
14 to the effect that the idea was then abandoned.

15 I now direct your attention to the letter of September
16 16, 1941.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Wait a minute. It appears I haven't
18 got that letter.

19 Mr. Murphy: You say you do not have the letter?

20 Mr. Masten: Is it in the same exhibit?

21 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

22 Mr. Masten: What is the date of it?

23 Mr. Murphy: September 16, 1941, a letter from Admiral
24 Ingersoll.

25 Mr. Masten: I think you will have to read from the one

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 you have.

3 Mr. Murphy: Under date of September 16, Admiral.

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

5 Mr. Murphy: A letter was written from Admiral Ingersoll,
6 Acting Chief of Naval Operations, to the Bureau of Ordnance,
7 and in paragraph 1 the following may be found:

8 "It is suggested that in order that progress may be made
9 in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a
10 small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned
11 exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs
12 and to development and experimental work."

13 Then again in paragraph 2:

14 "In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations
15 indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and
16 development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a
17 lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and
18 removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and
19 which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes
20 fired from planes."

21 At any rate, that indicates that the Chief of Naval
22 Operations in September 1941 was trying to get a net that
23 could be used, isn't that right?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Which could be what?

25 Mr. Murphy: Which could be used if they had perfected

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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one?

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Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes. I knew nothing of this letter. I never saw it until recently.

4

(12)

5

Mr. Murphy: Do you also find, Admiral, a letter in October following this?

6

7

Admiral Kimmel: I presume so.

8

9

Mr. Murphy: I wonder if you would be kind enough to read the October letter? It is lost in my exhibit. It is a short letter.

10

11

(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

12

13

Mr. Murphy: I find a letter dated October 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, and paragraph 2 reads as follows:

14

15

"Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure.

16

17

The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required."

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You did not know about that letter either, Admiral, did you?

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Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not know about it.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: My reason for putting it in the record
3 is to show that the Navy had a very active interest in
4 perfecting a net and that the Navy should not be subjected
5 to the criticism which they have received from some quarters
6 that they were derelict in not trying to get a net for Pearl
7 Harbor.

8 Admiral Kimmel: They were obtaining nets to be used
9 in all harbors, I presume. Their efforts were not confined
10 to Pearl Harbor by any means.

11 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

12 Admiral Kimmel: And the fact that that letter is in
13 existence shows that they were working for a net. It doesn't
14 show where they were going to put the net. I presume they
15 would have sent some to Pearl Harbor. I don't know.

16 Mr. Murphy: It showed they had an active interest in
17 the development of a good torpedo net; isn't that correct?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

19 Mr. Murphy: I would like now to refer to a letter
20 dated December 30, 1940, from Admiral Bloch to the Chief
21 of Naval Operations, in which he says in paragraph 1:

22 "In view of the inquiries contained in references (a),
23 (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter
24 to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval
25 District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the equipment and forces at hand."

Then I desire to read only a part of paragraph 2, in which it states:

"The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers."

Again at the end of the paragraph:

"For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet."

I would like also to read from a letter dated January the 4th, 1941, from Admiral Richardson as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 2:

"As neither the increase anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of an attack by hostile aircraft."

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches. That would be Exhibit No. 37.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 I direct your attention, Admiral, if you will, to a dispatch
3 in that exhibit where you were notified that the Japanese
4 were going to proceed to attack sometime prior to November.

5 Yesterday we were discussing the significance which
6 you attached to the messages about the destruction of the
7 codes and you said at that time that the reason why you didn't
8 pay particular attention to the first message about the codes
9 was that it said that only some, not all, but most of the
10 codes were being destroyed; do you recall that?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I do.

12 Mr. Murphy: Now, you did have a subsequent message,
13 however, which did say that the machines were being destroyed,
14 didn't you?

15 The first dispatch of December 3 said that they were
16 told to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

18 Mr. Murphy: There was also a dispatch on the 3rd which
19 said that they were to destroy the machine.

20 Admiral Kimmel: There was a qualifying word in there
21 and it referred to a particular machine.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, I will read it exactly.

23 "CIRCULAR 2444 FROM TOKYO 1 DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON X
24 HONGKONG X SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE XX BATAVIA
25 MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO XX DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY X ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS X
3 AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS XX BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY
4 REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."

5 Wouldn't that be a highly important and significant
6 message in view of the developments at that time, to you?

7 Admiral Kimmel: You will note on your copy that the
8 word "purple" was inserted by Mr. Gesell on December 17, 1945
9 and "there no longer being any necessity for maintaining it
10 a secret". Gesell's amendment is found in Volume 26, page
11 4559.

12 Mr. Murphy: I am talking what was before Admiral
13 Kimmel before December 7.

14 Admiral Kimmel: And I am trying to show exactly what
15 was before Admiral Kimmel and what was before Admiral Kimmel
16 was that the Japs had ordered the destruction of one particular
17 machine which was by no means all they had.

(2) 18 Mr. Murphy: I take it then that when you heard about
19 the purple code, which was their most precious one, their
20 ultra code, you didn't know what "purple" meant, was that it?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't know what purple meant.

22 Mr. Murphy: Did you ask Washington?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No. I asked my Intelligence Officer.

24 Mr. Murphy: Did he know?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, he didn't know.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Did you ask Washington then?

Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't. My Intelligence Officer finally found one officer on the Island of Oahu who told us it was one of the Japanese very secret machines, which one I did not know at the time.

Mr. Murphy: Well, wouldn't that, in view of the war warning, indicate to you that trouble was afoot and that war was coming?

Admiral Kimmel: It was a step but it was by no means a conclusive step.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, you had other messages too about the destruction of codes, didn't you, from your own Intelligence Officer?

Admiral Kimmel: On the afternoon of December 6 my Intelligence Officer came to me and told me that they were burning papers outside of the Japanese consulate. Such report had been made to me three or four times in the course of the year. The first time I received such a report I was considerably concerned and attempted to find out all I could about it and on succeeding reports of that nature I also attempted to find out about it.

When this report was made to me I knew nothing about any information that the FBI may have obtained and I did not see the dispatch that was sent by the Commandant of the District

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 until after the attack.

3 Now, whether or not they were destroying codes, I do
4 not know. There was nothing definite that came to me that
5 they were destroying codes. The report that came to me was
6 that they were burning papers once more.

7 Mr. Murphy: Did the FBI man talk to you before you went
8 to the hotel that night, the night of the 6th? There was
9 an FBI man who I understand talked to General Short before
10 he went into Schofield Barracks. I was wondering if that
11 same FBI man talked to you before you went to the hotel?

12 Admiral Kimmel: He did not.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, you did have reports besides the one
14 of the 6th about the destruction of codes, from your own
15 Intelligence Officer, didn't you, Admiral? Didn't you have
16 messages showing you that they were being destroyed at other
17 posts in the Pacific?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I had some, and I had a message
19 authorizing me to destroy codes on the outlying islands.

20 Mr. Murphy: Did you know, Admiral, that the Navy code
21 was much more difficult to break than the Army code?

22 Admiral Kimmel: You mean our own Navy code?

23 Mr. Murphy: Yes, your own Navy code, was a much better
24 code and harder to break than the Army code?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't know it at the time. I

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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had an idea that the Navy code might be better. I thought

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we had a better communications system than the Army had.

4

Mr. Murphy: The Army says so.

5

At any rate, you did have a message from Batavia about
6 them destroying codes and machines there?

7

Admiral Kimmel: That is the message I just read, I think.

8

Mr. Murphy: No, the one of the 6th was the one from
9 Honolulu. I am now talking about one of a couple of days
10 before December 1st. You had a message from Batavia about them
11 destroying codes, in your Intelligence Report?

12

Admiral Kimmel: Where is that?

(3)

13

Mr. Murphy: I will get it for you. It is in the Fleet
14 Intelligence Report. The one that goes up to December 2,
15 as I recall it.

16

Lieutenant Hanify: I have that exhibit, sir. It is
17 Exhibit 115.

18

Mr. Murphy: From 27 October to 2 December 1941.

19

Lieutenant Hanify: I haven't found the reference yet.

20

Admiral Kimmel: In this message that we have just been
21 discussing, the one of 3 December 1941, it talks about the
22 destruction of the purple machine. "Batavia machine already
23 sent to Tokyo". Is that what you are referring to?

24

Mr. Murphy: No. There is a separate message in your
25 Intelligence Report.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Lieutenant Hanify: The last item in that, sir?

Mr. Murphy: Yes. On December 2nd --

Lieutenant Hanify: U. S. Ambassador at Bancock?

Mr. Murphy: Yes. On December 2, 1941 the Intelligence Report that was placed you shows the United States Ambassador at Bancock on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. That showed that our Ambassador there was quite concerned about war coming, did it not?

Admiral Kimmel: Bancock is in Thailand. He was concerned that they might get his code down there when they attacked Thailand. I might say that was the least significant of all of them.

Mr. Murphy: Didn't it indicate to you that he felt down there that war was coming on December 2? You said yesterday that when nothing happened in several days the importance of these things started to become minimized in your mind.

Admiral Kimmel: That was a precaution that he might well have taken.

Mr. Murphy: You don't see any particular significance to that?

Admiral Kimmel: You will recall the information I had about the conspiracy of the Japs to induce the British to come into Thailand and attack them. That was all part of that picture.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Yes; that was also in that same group of
3 messages, wasn't it? That was placed before you within two
4 or three days of this other one.

5 Admiral, you have the intrigue message?

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have it here.

7 Mr. Murphy: That was just a few days before, wasn't it?

8 Admiral Kimmel: The day before.

9 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, you speak in your statement about
10 the winds code and the winds code execute. You knew the
11 details of the winds code, didn't you?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I knew the winds code had been set up.

13 Mr. Murphy: You knew that we were looking for it and
14 trying to find out if there was an execute message?

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

16 Mr. Murphy: You had a dispatch on the 28th of November
17 giving you that in detail, didn't you?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

19 Mr. Murphy: Telling you exactly what it would mean
20 and showing, if there had been an execute, it would mean that
21 there was a rupture in diplomatic relations; isn't that right?

22 Admiral Kimmel: At least that, yes.

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, it is your opinion, is it not, that
24 there was an execute message? You say so in your statement.

25 Admiral Kimmel: My opinion, yes. I took my opinion

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 from the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. I quoted
3 them on it. I don't recall that I gave any opinion.

4 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the assertions in your state-
5 ment which led you to believe that you had been misled were
6 based in part upon the belief by you now and at the time you
7 made your statement that there had been a winds code execute;
8 isn't that right?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I based that on the findings of the
10 Naval Court of Inquiry who heard all the evidence.

11 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, if there had not been an
12 execute message it would considerably alter your statement
13 to that effect?

14 Admiral Kimmel: It would not alter my statement that
15 the Naval Court of Inquiry found as a fact that the winds
16 message execute had been received.

17 Mr. Murphy: If it is a fact, Admiral, that there was
18 no execute message, would it alter your statement that you
19 have made to this committee that you were misled to that
20 extent?

21 Admiral Kimmel: If I became convinced that the Naval
22 Court of Inquiry was in error and they had conclusive evidence
23 that it never had been received it would alter my statement
24 to that extent.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, speaking about the Naval Court of Inquiry,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 were you given a fair trial there?

2

3 Admiral Kimmel: I was, indeed.

3

4 Mr. Murphy: Were you given a fair hearing before the
5 Roberts Commission?

5

6 Admiral Kimmel: I was permitted to testify before the
7 Roberts Commission. I didn't have any counsel.

6

7

8 Mr. Murphy: You had somebody beside you, didn't you?
9 Didn't you have Admiral Theobald with you?

8

9

10 Admiral Kimmel: He was assisting me with the papers.
11 He was not counsel. And he said he was not counsel.

10

11

12 Mr. Murphy: He said he wasn't counsel, but he did volunteer
13 quite a little information?

12

13

14 Admiral Kimmel: And Mr. Roberts said he wasn't counsel.

14

(4)

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16 Mr. Murphy: But he was at your side, getting papers
17 and making statements occasionally to clarify the picture,
18 wasn't he?

16

17

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, for which he was -- all right.

18

19

19 Mr. Murphy: They asked him to be sworn?

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20 Admiral Kimmel: They asked him to be sworn so that he
21 would be a witness.

21

22

22 Mr. Murphy: Yes; as long as he was giving information.

22

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23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

23

24

24 Mr. Murphy: There were some distinguished Admirals on
25 that Board, on the Roberts Board, were there not?

25

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel: There were two Admirals on the Board,
3 yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, did you have any reason, Admiral, to
5 feel that they weren't able Admirals?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon?

7 Mr. Murphy: Up to the time that you saw their report
8 did you have any grievance against them or any criticism to
9 make of their capacity to sit? Up to the time you saw their
10 report and differed with it, had you any particular criticism
11 of the ability of those two gentlemen?

12 Admiral Kimmel: They were able officers.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, were they competent to sit on this
14 Board?

15 Admiral Kimmel: They were.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, the Army Board, you appeared before
17 that, didn't you? The Army Pearl Harbor Board, you testified
18 before them, didn't you?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: Were you treated all right there?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes. I was not permitted to hear
22 the testimony of other witnesses before the Army Board not
23 to introduce evidence. I merely testified before the Army
24 Board.

25 Mr. Murphy: The Navy Board, how were you treated there?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Kimmel: The Navy Court of Inquiry?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I was permitted to have counsel, I was permitted to introduce evidence, I was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, I was permitted to confront witnesses.

Mr. Murphy: That was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy and you were given every right that you wanted to demand, that you required, or that you requested, except that it was not made public?

Admiral Kimmel: I was given full facilities to present my case to the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Murphy: Now do you know of any reason why Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal would differ as they did, and The Adjutant General of the Navy differ as he did, with the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral Kimmel: I do not.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Roberts Commission. I direct your attention -- do you have it?

Lieutenant Hanify: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Can you make that available, Counsel?

In the meantime I will read -- would you prefer to have a copy before you? I am going to ask you some questions. I think in fairness to you you ought to have a copy before you.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think I ought to have a copy.
3 I would like to see what it is you are reading from.

4 Mr. Murphy: While they are going downstairs to get a
5 copy I will go into some other things, Admiral.

6 Admiral, in your statement you complain, apparently,
7 about the tenor of the messages that were sent to you from
8 Washington, first the messages about the economic sanctions
9 in July, and then the messages in October about the change
10 of Cabinet, and then the other messages in November, and you
11 say that each of them were in effect a war warning.

12 Wouldn't you think the responsibility was more on the
13 Japanese than it was on the officials at Washington for that
14 series of messages? Wasn't it the conduct of the Japanese
15 that prompted those different messages which appeared to be
16 war warnings?

17 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to say.

18 Mr. Murphy: It is a fact that you did expect to be
19 told about the change in Cabinet and what might happen in
20 October, October 16?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I expected full information, yes. I
22 was glad of any information I could get.

23 Mr. Murphy: You certainly expected to be told about
24 the economic sanctions in July, didn't you?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Certainly.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: And on each of those occasions they would have to have a message of pretty serious import to describe that occasion to you, wouldn't they?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Would Washington be to blame for the series of messages or the Japanese?

Admiral Kimmel: I didn't blame anybody for the series of messages. I set forth what I had.

Mr. Murphy: Except that you seem to complain about having had some messages prior to the war warning message.

Admiral Kimmel: Well --

Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if it wasn't the Japanese that caused that instead of somebody in Washington.

You did have a message from the Chief of Naval Operations about code machines or codes being destroyed, before, Admiral, didn't you?

I refer to a message in July, July 17, 1941, reading as follows --

Lieutenant Hanify: Which exhibit, sir?

Mr. Murphy: 37, page 9:

"17 July 1941.

"FROM: OPNAV

"ACTION: CINCAF

"INFO: CINCPAC

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"THE TIME HAS COME BLANK TOKYO TO VICHY TWELVE JULY TWO SEVEN FOUR AND TWO SEVEN FIVE LIST SIX TERMS OF ULTIMATUM TO BE ANSWERED BY TWENTY JULY X JAPAN WILL SEND NECESSARY ARMY NAVY AIR FORCES TO SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO CHINA X FRENCH TURNOVER NAVAL AND AIR BASES LISTED IN JONAB OR SEVEN JULY X EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO HAVE RIGHT TO MANEUVER AND MOVE ABOUT FREELY X FRENCH WITHDRAW FORCES AT LANDING POINTS TO AVOID POSSIBLE CLASHES X VICHY AUTHORIZE FRENCH INDO CHINA MILITARY TO ARRANGE DETAILS WITH JAPANESE EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER LANDING X COLONY TO PAY JAPAN TWENTY THREE MILLION PIASTRES ANNUALLY TO MEET COST OF OCCUPATION XX TOKYO TO VICHY FOURTEEN JULY TWO EIGHT ONE ARMY NOW PLANNING ADVANCE ON OR ABOUT TWENTY JULY XX TOKYO TO SAIGON AND HANOI SIXTEEN JULY CIRCULAR ONE FIVE ONE EIGHT FORMAL DEMANDS PRESENTED TO VICHY ON FOURTEEN X REPLY ASKED BY TWENTIETH X JAPAN INTENDS CARRY OUT PLANS BY FORCE IF OPPOSED FOR IF BRITISH OR UNITED STATES INTERFERES X KANJU MARU BEING HELD AT SAIGON TO EVACUATE ALL JAPANESE THERE SAILING EARLY DAWN TWENTY FOUR JULY X BURN CODES X JAPANESE IN NORTHERN AREA EVACUATE OR MOVE INTO HANOI END OF THIS."

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Follows

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions By: Mr. Murphy

2 Would that indicate that since war was coming in that
3 direction that the Japanese were ordering the codes be
4 destroyed and wouldn't that indicate --

5 Admiral Kimmel: Let me say, I haven't seen this
6 message for a long time.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, the only part I am interested
8 in is the fact that they seem to be going to advance.

9 Admiral Kimmel: I am trying to find out what he is
10 talking about.

11 Mr. Murphy: Well, it is a Navy message.

12 Admiral Kimmel: Who is to burn codes, and how? Can
13 you make out?

14 Mr. Murphy: My assumption is that OPNAV is telling
15 what has happened between Tokyo and Vichy. They are talking
16 about what they are going to do. They are going to make an
17 advance, and before they make their advance --

18 Admiral Kimmel: There must be something missing,
19 because I can't see that it makes any sense, so far as
20 the burning codes business is concerned. I don't know what
21 that is.

22 Mr. Murphy: My only purpose is to ask you, as between
23 an ordinary layman and an expert, if it wasn't a fact that
24 the advance at that time meant war?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Your command of language is better

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fls
AL

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.