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PROF. ALEXANDER ZIWET



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*Alexander Zivox*

THE SYMPOSIUM  
OF  
PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, CRITICAL NOTES  
AND COMMENTARY

BY

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## PREFACE

PLATO'S *Symposium* is undeniably one of the masterpieces of classical literature. The subtlest and most brilliant of Greek artists in prose has left us no finer, no more fascinating specimen of his skill than this dialogue in which, with the throbbing pulse of life for his theme, he matches that theme by the dramatic verve and vigour of his style. The interest of the book is not merely literary or philosophical: it appeals also to the wider circle of the students of culture and of life and of the "criticism of life" by its richness of suggestion and by its vividness of portraiture. To mention one point alone,—nowhere else, not even in the *Phaedo*, does the personality of Socrates shine before us so full and clear, "in form and gesture so express and admirable," as in the pages of the *Symposium*. To miss reading it is to miss the enjoyment of a veritable *ἑστίαμα λόγων*, blended and seasoned with curious art.

In the preparation of this edition I have been indebted mainly to the labours of continental scholars, for the sufficient, if surprising, reason that no English commentary has existed heretofore. It was, indeed, this singular fact, together with the recent publication of an interesting Papyrus fragment of the text, which chiefly moved me to attempt a commentary myself. On many of the interesting questions connected with the literary form and philosophical substance of the dialogue much more might have been said, but I have thought it best to keep both the Introduction and the Notes within a moderate compass. In the framing of the

text, although I have ventured on several innovations of my own, I have been more conservative than the majority of the foreign critics, a considerable selection of whose "restorations" will be found in the Critical Notes in addition to the evidence of the leading MSS. and of the Papyrus: in all doubtful cases I have cited also the opinion of Schanz and of the Oxford editor, Prof. Burnet, whose admirable recension has been before me constantly and has aided me much. For expository material I must acknowledge in special my indebtedness to the useful and scholarly edition of A. Hug.

To gild with comment the refined gold of Plato's work is at the best a temerarious task; but if my book helps a single reader more justly to appraise the gold it will not have been wrought wholly in vain.

R. G. B.

*October 4, 1909.*



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## INTRODUCTION

### § I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

#### I. *The Preface*: 172 A—174 A.

Apollodorus, in reply to the enquiry of some friends, explains the occasion on which the supper-party at Agathon's was held, when Socrates and others delivered Discourses on Eros. The matter is fresh in his memory and, as a φιλόλογος himself, he is quite ready to repeat the whole story as he had it from Aristodemus,—an eye-witness and an intimate disciple of Socrates,—just as he had repeated it a few days before to his friend Glaucon.

#### II. *Aristodemus's Prologue*: 174 A—178 A.

Aristodemus meeting Socrates smartly attired expresses his surprise at so unusual a circumstance. Socrates explains that being invited to dine with Agathon he feels bound to go "in finery to the fine"; and he presses Aristodemus, although uninvited, to accompany him. On the road Socrates, immersed in thought, lags behind, and Aristodemus arrives at Agathon's alone. Not till they are half-way through the meal does Socrates appear; and Agathon rallies him on his devotion to σοφία. The proposal of Pausanias to restrict the potations, in view of yesterday's banquet, and that of Eryximachus to dismiss the flute-girl and amuse themselves by λόγοι, are unanimously agreed to. Then Eryximachus propounds an idea of Phaedrus, that Eros is the best possible theme for encomia, and suggests that each of the party in turn, commencing with Phaedrus, should now deliver an encomium on Eros. This suggestion is applauded by Socrates. Of the encomia the most noteworthy were the following:—



### III. *The Discourse of Phaedrus*: 178 A—180 B.

*Prologue*: Eros is a great and wondrous god.

(a) He is wondrous in origin, being *eldest* of gods and unbegotten—witness what Homer and others say of him.

(b) He is the supreme *benefactor* of mankind, (1) as inspiring a high sense of honour in private, civic and military life; (2) as inspiring self-sacrifice, which wins divine favour (*e.g.* Alcestis and Achilles, contrasted with the cowardly Orpheus).

*Epilogue*: Thus Eros is most ancient, venerable, and beneficent.

### IV. *The Discourse of Pausanias*: 180 c—185 c.

*Prologue*: Eros being not single but dual, we must begin by defining which Eros is to be our theme.

(a) The dual nature of Eros follows from the dual nature of Aphrodite: as there is an Aphrodite Urania and an Aphrodite Pandemos, so there is Eros Uranios and Eros Pandemos.

(b) From the principle that no action is in the abstract good or bad but derives its moral quality solely from the manner of its execution it follows that Eros is bad or good according to the kind of love-making to which it prompts.

(c) The *general characteristics* (1) of Eros Pandemos are that it is directed to women as well as boys, to the body rather than the soul, to unscrupulous satisfaction of lust; (2) whereas Eros Uranios shuns females and seeks only such males as are noble and nearly mature both in mind and body. It is the followers of Eros Pandemos who have brought paederastia into disrepute.

(d) *The varying νόμοι concerning Eros* may be classified thus:—

(1) In all Greek states except Athens the νόμος is *simple*, either (a) approving paederastia, as in Elis and Boeotia; or (β) condemning it, as in Ionia and states subject to barbarian rule, where it is held to foster a dangerous spirit of independence (*e.g.* Harmodius and Aristogiton).

(2) At Athens the νόμος is *complex*. (a) Eros is approved, and its excesses condoned, when directed towards superior youths approaching manhood. (β) It appears to be condemned, in so far as parents forbid their boys to hold converse with “erastae.” The explanation of this ambiguous attitude must be sought in the principle laid down above,

that the moral quality of an act depends upon the conditions of its performance. The Athenian νόμος provides a test for distinguishing between good and bad forms of Eros: the test of time shows whether or not the right motive (desire for ἀρετή) actuates both the lover and his object. This motive alone justifies all erotic pursuits and surrenders, even mutual deception: hence we conclude that καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἐνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.

*Epilogue:* This Eros Uranios, which inspires zeal for ἀρετή, possesses the highest value alike for the individual and for the State.

#### V. *The first Interlude:* 185 C—E.

It was the turn of Aristophanes next; but being seized with a hiccough he called upon Eryximachus either to cure him or to speak in his stead. So Eryximachus, having first prescribed a number of remedies, spoke next.

#### VI. *The Discourse of Eryximachus:* 185 E—188 E.

*Prologue:* Pausanias was right in asserting the dual nature of Eros; but he failed to observe that the god's sway extends over the entire universe.

(a) The body, with its healthy and diseased appetites, exhibits the duality of Eros; and *medicine* is "the science of bodily erotics in regard to replenishment and depletion." It is the object of "the Art" of Asclepios to produce the Eros which is harmony between the opposite elements—the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, etc. Eros is, likewise, the patron-god of *gymnastics* and *husbandry*.

(b) Similarly with *music*. The "discordant concord" of Heraclitus hints at the power of music to harmonize sounds previously in discord, and divergent times. Thus music is "the science of Erotics in regard to harmony and rhythm." It is less in the pure theory than in applied music (metrical compositions and their educational use) that the dual nature of Eros comes to light; when it does, the Eros Pandemos must be carefully guarded against.

(c) Again, in the spheres of *meteorology* and *astronomy* we see the effects of the orderly Eros in a wholesome temperate climate, of the disorderly Eros in blights and pestilences; for astronomy is "the science of Erotics in regard to stellar motions and the seasons of the year."

(d) Lastly, in *religion*, it is the disorderly Eros which produces the

impiety which it is the function of divination to cure ; and religion may be defined as "the science of human Erotics in regard to piety."

*Epilogue* : To Eros, as a whole, belongs great power ; to the virtuous Eros great influence in effecting human concord and happiness.—If my eulogy is incomplete, it is for you, Aristophanes, to supplement it, if you choose.

VII. *The second Interlude* : 189 A—C.

Aristophanes explains that he is now cured of his hiccough, as a result of sneezing according to Eryximachus' prescription. He makes a jocular allusion to Eryximachus' discourse, to which the latter retorts, and after some further banter Aristophanes proceeds to deliver his encomium.

VIII. *The Discourse of Aristophanes* : 189 C—193 D.

*Prologue* : Men have failed to pay due honour to Eros, the most "philanthropic" of gods, who blesses us by his *healing* power, as I shall show.

(a) *Man's original nature* was different from what it now is. It had three sexes—male, female, androgynous ; all globular in shape and with double limbs and organs ; derived respectively from sun, earth and moon.

(b) *Man's woes* were due to the pride of these primal men which stirred them to attempt to carry Heaven by assault. In punishment Zeus sliced them each in two, and then handed them to Apollo to stitch up their wounds. But, because they then kept dying of hunger, owing to the yearning of each for his other-half, Zeus devised for them the present mode of reproduction, altering the position of the sex-organs accordingly. Thus Eros aims at restoring the primal unity and healing the cleft in man's nature.

(c) Each of us is a split-half of an original male, female, or androgynon ; and the other-halves we seek in love are determined accordingly. Courage is the mark of boy-loving men and of man-loving boys, as both derived from the primal male. In the intense passion of Eros it is not merely sexual intercourse that is sought but a permanent fusing into one (as by the brazing of an Hephaestus) ; for Love is "*the pursuit of wholeness*."

(d) As it was impiety that caused our "dioikismos" and bisection, so in piety towards the god Eros lies the hope of meeting with our proper halves and regaining our pristine wholeness.

*Epilogue* : Let us, then, laud Eros as the giver both of present blessings and of bright hopes of *healing* and restoration in the future.



IX. *The third Interlude*: 193 D—194 E.

Some conversation ensues between Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Socrates, and Agathon. Upon Socrates attempting to entangle Agathon in an argument, Phaedrus intervenes and bids Agathon proceed without further delay to offer his meed of praise to the god.

X. *The Discourse of Agathon*: 194 E—197 E.

*Prologue*: The method of previous speakers needs amendment. The correct method, which I shall adopt, is to laud first the character of Eros, and secondly his gifts to men.

(A) The *attributes* of Eros are (1) supreme felicity, (due to) (2) supreme beauty and (3) goodness.

(2) Eros is most *beautiful*, since he is (a) the youngest of gods (all tales to the contrary being false), witness his aversion to old-age; (b) most tender, witness his choosing soft souls for his abode; (c) supple, witness his power to steal unnoticed in and out of souls; (d) symmetrical, because comely as all allow; (e) fair-of-skin, for he feeds on flowers amid sweet scents.

(3) Eros is supremely *good*, since he is (a) most just, having no lot in violence or injustice; (b) most temperate, for he is the master of pleasure since no pleasure is greater than love; (c) most courageous, as holding sway over Ares, the most courageous of the gods; (d) most wise, being expert (α) in both musical and creative poesy, and (β) in the practical arts, as instructor of Zeus, Apollo and Athene in their respective crafts (he, too, inspired the gods with love of beauty and de-throned Necessity).

(B) The *blessings* conferred by Eros are, like his attributes, beauty and goodness. He produces peace and pleasantness in all spheres of life: he is the object of universal admiration, the author of all delights, best guide and captain for gods and men alike, whose praises it behoves all to chant in unison.

*Epilogue*: Such is my tribute of eulogy, not wholly serious nor wholly playful.

XI. *The fourth Interlude*: 198 A—199 C.

Agathon "brought down the house" with his peroration; and Socrates remarked to Eryximachus that its eloquence left him in despair—petrified by the Gorgon of Agathon's brilliant Gorgianisms. "Now,"

he said, "I must retract my rash tongue-pledge to join in a eulogy of Eros, since I perceive that I was quite astray in my ideas about the encomiastic art: for I supposed that truth came first, ornamental compliment second, whereas the contrary is evidently the fact. Such an encomium is quite beyond my poor powers; but if you care for an unvarnished speech about Eros, that I am ready to make." Phaedrus and the rest bidding him proceed in his own fashion, Socrates began by the following conversation with Agathon.

XII. *Socrates' preliminary Discussion with Agathon:*

199 c—201 d.

(1) "Your exordium on Method was admirable, Agathon. But tell me further, is Eros a relative notion, like 'father' or 'brother'?" "Certainly it is."

(2) "Next, you agree that if Eros desires its object it must lack it; and if a man wishes for some good he already possesses, what he really desires is what he lacks, *viz.* the future possession of that good." "True."

(3) "Again, if Eros is (as you said) love for beauty, Eros must lack beauty, and therefore goodness too, and be neither beautiful nor good." "I cannot gainsay you."

XIII. *The Discourse of Socrates (Diotima):* 201 d—212 c.

*Prologue:* I will now repeat the discourse on Eros which I once heard from my instructress in Erotics, Diotima the prophetess—assuming the conclusions formulated just now, and treating first of the character and secondly of the effects of Eros, according to Agathon's own method.

A. [*The nature of Eros, 201 e—204 c.*]

(1) Diotima showed me that Eros, although (as we have seen) neither beautiful nor good, is not therefore ugly and bad but rather *a mean* between these contraries.

(2) She argued also that Eros is not a god, since godhead involves the possession of just those goods which Eros desires and lacks. But neither is he a mortal, but stands midway between the two, being *a great daemon*; and the function of the daemonian is to mediate between gods and men.

(3) As to origin, Eros is son of Poros and Penia, and partakes of the nature of both parents—the fertile vigour of the one, the wastrel neediness of the other. As he is a mean between the mortal and the immortal, so he is a mean between the wise and the unwise, *i.e.* a wisdom-lover (*philosopher*). The notion that Eros is a beautiful god is due to a confusion between subjective Eros and the object loved.

B. [*The effects, or utility, of Eros, 204 D—212 A.*]

(1) [The object or end of Eros.]

What does Eros as “love of the beautiful” precisely imply? In the case of the good, its acquisition is a means to happiness as end. But Eros is not used in this generic sense of “desire for happiness,” so much as in a narrower specific sense. And if we say that Eros is “the desire for the good,” we must expand this definition into “*the desire for the everlasting possession of the good.*”

(2) [The method or mode of action of Eros.]

Eros works by means of generation, both physical and psychical, in the beautiful.

(a) Generation, being an immortal thing, requires harmony with the divine, *i.e.* beauty; without which the process is hindered. And generation is sought because it is, for mortals, the nearest approach to immortality. It is in the desire for immortality that we must find the explanation of all the sexual passion and love of offspring which we see in the animal world, since it is only by the way of leaving a successor to take its place that the mortal creature, in this world of flux, can secure a kind of perpetuity.

(b) But the soul has its offspring as well as the body. Laws, inventions and noble deeds, which spring from love of fame, have for their motive the same passion for immortality. The lover seeks a beautiful soul in order to generate therein offspring which shall live for ever; and the bonds of such soul-marriages are stronger than any carnal ties.

(c) After this elementary prelude, we reach the highest stage of the Mysteries of Love. The right method in Erotic procedure is to pass in upward course from love of bodily beauty to love of soul beauty, thence to the beauty of the sciences, until finally one science is reached which corresponds to the Absolute, Ideal Beauty, in which all finite things of beauty partake. To gain the vision of this is the goal of Love’s endeavour, and to live in its presence were life indeed. There, if anywhere, with truth for the issue of his soul, might the lover hope to attain to immortality.

*Epilogue*: Believing that for the gaining of this boon Eros is man's best helper, I myself praise Eros and practise Erotics above all things and I urge others to do likewise. Such is my "encomium," Phædrus, if you choose to call it so.

XIV. *The fifth Interlude*: 212 c—215 a.

Applause followed. Then suddenly, when Aristophanes was on the point of making an observation, a loud knocking was heard at the door. Presently Alcibiades, leaning on a flute-girl, appeared. "I am come to crown Agathon," he cried, "if you will admit a drunken reveller." Being heartily welcomed, he took the seat next Agathon, where Socrates had made room for him. And as soon as he perceived Socrates, he began playfully to abuse him. Then, taking some of the ribbands with which he had bedecked Agathon, he crowned "the marvellous head of Socrates, the invincible in words."

Next Alcibiades insisted on all the company drinking along with him. And, when Eryximachus protested against bare drinking without song or speech and explained to him what the previous order of procedure had been, Alcibiades replied, "In the presence of Socrates I dare not eulogize anyone else, so that if I am to deliver an encomium like the rest, Socrates must be my theme."

XV. *Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates*: 215 a—222 c.

*Prologue*: My eulogy will take the form of parables—aiming not at mockery but at truth. Socrates resembles (a) Silenus-statuettes which serve as caskets for sacred images; (b) the Satyr Marsyas.

I. In *form* he resembles both (a) the Sileni, and (b) the Satyr.

II. (*In character*) he resembles (b) *the Satyr*, being (1) a mocker, (2) a flute-player. As to (2) he excels Marsyas, since his words alone, without an instrument, fascinate all, old and young. Me he charms far more than even Pericles could, filling me with shame and self-contempt, and driving me to my wit's end.

III. He resembles (a) *the Sileni* in the contrast between his exterior and interior. (a) *Externally* he adopts an erotic attitude towards beautiful youths: (β) but *internally* he despises beauty and wealth, as I know from experience. For I tried to bribe him with my beauty, but all my many attempts came to nothing. Private conversations, gymnastics together, a supper-party *à deux*, even a night on the same couch—all was of no use. Against my battery of charms he was

armed (by his *temperance*) in "complete steel"; and I charge him now before you with the crime of ἕβρις. His *hardihood* was shown in the Potidaea campaign, where none could stand the cold like him. His *valour* was displayed in the battle where he saved my life, and in the retreat from Delium. Especially amazing is his unique *originality*, which makes it impossible to find anyone else like him—except Satyrs and Sileni.

IV. His *speeches* too, I forgot to say, are like the Silenus-statuettes, in outward seeming ridiculous, but in inner content supremely rational and full of images of virtue and wisdom.

*Epilogue*: Such is my eulogy, half praise, half blame. Let my experience, and that of many another, be a warning to you, Agathon: court Socrates less as an "erastes" than as an "anterastes"!

#### XVI. *Concluding Scene*: 222 c—end.

The company laughed at the erotic candour of Alcibiades. Then ensued some banter between Socrates and Alcibiades as rival "erastae" of Agathon, which was interrupted by the entrance of a band of revellers who filled the room with uproar. Some of the guests left, and Aristodemus himself fell asleep. On awaking, about dawn, he found only three of the party still present and awake—Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates: Socrates was trying to convince the others that the scientific tragedy-writer must be capable also of writing comedy. Presently Aristophanes, and then Agathon, dozed off; whereupon Socrates, still "shadowed" by Aristodemus, departed.

### § ii. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DIALOGUE.

#### (A) *The Method of Narration and the Preface.*

The Platonic dialogues, viewed from the point of view of literary form, may be divided into two chief classes. To the first class belong those in which the story of the discussion is told *directly* by one of the protagonists; to the second class belong those in which the story is told *indirectly* or at second-hand,—a mode of narration which involves the further characteristic that dialogues of this class are necessarily prefaced (and concluded) by some explanatory paragraphs. This second class, moreover, falls into two subdivisions, according as the narrator is or is not represented as being himself present at the

discussion. It is to the latter of these subdivisions, in which the narrator is *not* an eye-witness but reports the matter only at second-hand, that the *Symposium* (together with the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*) belongs.

It is noteworthy also that, with the exception of the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*, ours is the only dialogue in which the narrating witness is not Socrates himself. The reason for this is obvious: eulogy of Socrates being one of the main purposes of the dialogue, it would be unfitting to put the story into his mouth, and make him the trumpeter of his own praises. Instead of doing so, Plato selects as the sources of the narrative persons of such a character as to produce the effect of verisimilitude. The way in which Aristodemus, the primary source, and Apollodorus, the secondary source, are described is evidently intended to produce the impression that in them we have reliable witnesses. Apollodorus<sup>1</sup>, "the fanatic," is put before us not only as a worshipper of Socrates, imbued with a passionate interest in philosophical discourses such as are here to be related, but also as an intimate disciple who had "compared with" Socrates for the space of nearly three years past and during that time had made it his peculiar task to study the every act and word of the Master (172 ε). Moreover, the story of the special occasion in question he had diligently conned (οὐκ ἀμελέτητος, 172 λ, 173 c).

Aristodemus<sup>2</sup>, the primary source and actual narrator, is spoken of by Apollodorus as "an old disciple" and one of the most intimate with the Master in earlier years, and in his own narrative he represents himself as following Socrates with dog-like fidelity, and showing the closest familiarity with his ways and habits—a man so single-hearted, so engrossed in matters of fact, as to be constitutionally incapable of tampering with the truth. As the "minute biographer," Aristodemus is the prototype of all later Boswells.

Further, the impression of veracity made by the character of the

<sup>1</sup> Apollodorus appears also in *Phaedo* 59 λ, β as one of those present with Socrates "on the day when he drank the poison in the prison"; as characteristically exhibiting most marked symptoms of grief [this statement would support the epithet μαλακός as well as μανικός in *Symp.* 173 δ]; and as a native of Athens (τῶν ἐπιχωρίων). In *Apol.* 34 λ he is one of those present at the trial of Socrates; and (in 38 β) one of those who offered to go bail to the extent of 30 minae. Pfeiderer takes Apollodorus to represent Plato himself, by a piece of ironical "Selbstobjektivierung," a notion which had already occurred to me.

<sup>2</sup> For Aristodemus, see also *Xen. Mem.* i. 4. 2 where Socrates converses περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον, καταμαθὼν αὐτὸν ὅτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα.



narrators is enhanced by the express statement that in regard to some points at least (*ἐνία* 173 B) the account of Aristodemus was confirmed by Socrates. The points in question are probably (as Hug observes) those which specially concern the picture drawn of Socrates himself. At any rate, it is in regard to these that we have the detailed testimony of Alcibiades, emphasized by repeated asseverations (214 E, 215 A, etc.), and endorsed by the silence of Socrates.

In addition to the evidence it contains for the dates of the narration and of the banquet<sup>1</sup>, and the vivid picture in miniature which it presents of a certain group of Socratics in whom an ardent admiration for the Master was blended with a limited capacity for understanding the deeper side of his practice and doctrine—as if to go barefoot and to rail at filthy lucre were the sum and substance of Socraticism,—there are two further points in the Preface which deserve attention.

Apollodorus, although asked only for the *λόγοι* spoken at the banquet (172 B, 173 E), proceeds to give a full account of the accompanying incidents as well (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς...διηγήσασθαι* 174 A). This may be taken to indicate that for estimating the effect of the dialogue as a whole we are meant to pay regard not only to the series of encomia but also to the framework of incident and conversation in which they are set.

Glaucon, in asking Apollodorus for the desired information concerning the "erotic discourses," states (172 B) that he has already heard an account of them from "another man" (*ἄλλος τις*), which account was unsatisfactory (*οὐδὲν σαφές*), and that the authority quoted by this unnamed informant was "Phoenix, son of Philippos." To this Apollodorus adds the fact (173 B) that this Phoenix was indebted to the same source as himself, namely Aristodemus. What precisely these statements signify it is not easy to determine, since the identity of Phoenix, as well as that of the anonymous informant (*ἄλλος τις*), is unknown to us. But it seems reasonable to infer that there was already in existence, when Plato wrote, at least one other account of a banquet at which Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon figured, and that it is Plato's intention to discredit it. That such is the intention is shown not only by the phrase *οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφές λέγειν*, but also by the statement that the evidence of *ἄλλος τις* was one degree further off from the primary source (Aristodemus) than is that of Apollodorus. Further, the assumption of some such controversial

<sup>1</sup> With regard to this evidence, see *Introd.* § viii.

intention throws light on the emphasis laid on the veracity of the narrative—to which attention has been drawn above—and gives it a more definite motive. It is as if the author means us to read into his preface something to this effect: “Socrates has been misrepresented: it is my task to clear his reputation by putting the facts in their true light.”

If this, then, be a right reading of the hints thus given, what is the distorted account which Plato thus discredits, and who its author? Unfortunately this must remain a matter of conjecture. The most obvious suggestion to make is that the author in question is Xenophon, and the account alluded to his *Symposium*. But Xenophon's *Symposium* is most probably a later work than Plato's; and it is a further objection that the persons represented by Xenophon as present at the banquet are not—with the exception of Socrates—the persons mentioned by Glaucon.

We are obliged, therefore, to look further afield for the author whose identity is thus shrouded. The best suggestion I can offer is that Polycrates the rhetor is the writer intended. In favour of this we may adduce the fact that Polycrates is ὁ κατήγορος whose calumnies Xenophon aims at refuting in his *Memorabilia*<sup>1</sup>. It is by no means improbable *à priori* that Polycrates in his attacks on Socrates described, amongst other incidents, a banqueting-scene in which Socrates and Alcibiades were pictured in an odious light. And if we take the *Banquet* of Xenophon to be a genuine work, the very fact that Xenophon thought it necessary to supplement his *Memorabilia* by such a work might be construed as showing that the author of the slanders he is at such pains to refute had already libelled Socrates in connexion with a similar scene. But unless, by some happy chance, further light

<sup>1</sup> See Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* pp. 662 ff.; Gomperz, *G. T.* II. pp. 63, 118. Gomperz (II. 343) supposes the *Gorgias* to be a counterblast to Polycrates' indictment of Socrates, and Alcibiades' eulogy in *Sympos.* to have the same motive: “Plato had a definite motive for placing such praise in the mouth of Alcibiades—we refer to the pamphlet of Polycrates....This writer had spoken of Socrates as the teacher of Alcibiades—in what tone and with what intention can easily be guessed....Plato himself had touched on the subject (of the *liaison* between the two men), harmlessly enough, in his youthful works, as, for example, in the introduction to the ‘Protagoras.’...But after the appearance of Polycrates' libel, he may well have thought it advisable to speak a word of enlightenment on the subject; which is exactly what he does, with a plainness that could not be surpassed, in the present encomium” (*op. cit.* 394–5). Gomperz, however, does not bring this hypothesis into connexion with the passage in the Preface of *Symp.* discussed above. There may be an allusion to the same matter in *Protag.* 347 c (cp. *Xen. Symp.* VII. 1).



should be shed upon the history of Polycrates' literary activity, it is hardly possible to get beyond the region of conjectural speculation, or to hope for a definitive solution of this obscure literary problem.

(B) *The Prologue of Aristodemus.*

In the Prologue, with which Aristodemus's narrative opens, special attention may be drawn to the following points:—

(a) It is significant that the first person to appear on the scene is Socrates. We are led at once to admire his good humour and ready wit as shown in the playful tone of his conversation (1) with Aristodemus (174 A, B), in which he makes jesting quotations from Homer and indulges in a pun on the name of Agathon (cp. the pun he makes on Gorgias, 198 c); and (2) with Agathon (175 c—E). These amiable traits in the character of Socrates are further illustrated in other parts of the dialogue.

(b) Socrates on the way becomes lost in thought and fails to put in an appearance till the banquet is already far advanced (174 D, 175 c). Aristodemus explains to Agathon (175 B) that this is no exceptional occurrence (*ἔθος τι τοῦτ' ἔχει*). That this incident is intended to be specially emphasized as typical of Socrates' habits becomes clear when we notice how Alcibiades in his speech (220 c) describes a similar incident as taking place in one of the campaigns in which he served. The corroboration thus effected is one of many examples of the literary care and ingenuity with which Plato in this dialogue interweaves incident with speech. Another example occurs a little further on (176 c) where Eryximachus, discussing the question "to drink or not to drink," describes Socrates as *ικανὸς ἀμφοτέρω*: this statement, too, we find amplified and confirmed by Alcibiades (220 A). Both these matters illustrate that entire subordination of flesh to spirit in which Socrates was unique.

(c) Agathon (175 c ff.) expresses a desire to share in the "witty invention" which Socrates had discovered on his way: Socrates with his usual mock-modesty disclaims for himself the possession of *σοφία*, except of a poor kind, but congratulates Agathon on the fine and abundant *σοφία* he has just been displaying so conspicuously: and the conversational banter concludes with Agathon's remark—"Presently, with the Wine-god as umpire, you and I will fight out our wisdom-match." Here, at this early stage, we have struck for us one of the key-notes of the dialogue. For one main motive of the dialogue as a whole is to exhibit the *σοφία* of Socrates, his intellectual as well as

moral supremacy. And we find, in the sequel, that this is done largely by pitting him against Agathon, over the wine-bowl. In this we have the reason for the juxtaposition of the two speeches, matched, as it were, one against the other. His speech is, in itself, one sufficient proof of the superiority of Socrates over his rival. But there are also other proofs: there is the masterly criticism and confutation to which Socrates subjects the belauded poet; there is the express statement, confirmed by expressive action, of Alcibiades, in which is asserted the superiority of Socrates not merely to Agathon but to all others who make claim to σοφία (213 E, 215 c ff.); and finally the Wine-god himself bestows on Socrates the palm when, in the concluding scene, we see him alone pursuing discussion with unflagging zeal and with a clearness of head undimmed by long and deep potations while his rival drowns and succumbs to sleep. Thus the διαδικασία περὶ τῆς σοφίας runs through the book, and always, from beginning to end, νικᾷ ὁ Σωκράτης.

To this we may add one minor point. Agathon, in this preliminary play of wit, applies to Socrates the epithet ὑβριστής, "a mocker." And this, too, is a trait upon which Alcibiades, in the sequel, lays much stress. ὑβρις is one of the most striking characteristics of the Satyr-Socrates (216 E, 219 c).

(d) Another example of the literary interweaving—or the method of "responsions," as we might term it,—which is so marked a feature of the dialogue, is to be found in the statement of Socrates concerning the character of his own knowledge. His speciality in the way of science is, he announces, "erotics," and this is his only speciality (177 D). Accordingly, when we find Socrates in the sequel delivering a discourse on this subject we are evidently intended by Plato to feel that his views are to be taken seriously as those of one who professed to be an expert in this subject if in nothing else. And this intention is emphasized when we come to the later passage (the "responion") in 198 D where Socrates again refers to his conviction that concerning "erotics" he knew the truth (εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). It is hardly necessary to add that "erotics," construed in the Socratic sense, constitutes by no means an insignificant department of knowledge (φαύλη τις σοφία 175 E), as Socrates modestly implies, inasmuch as it is practically coextensive with a theory of education and involves an insight into the origin, nature and destiny of the human soul.

(e) In 177 B we have an interesting parallel between Plato's language and that of Isocrates. In *Hel.* 210 B (τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦς

βομβυλίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βουλευθέντων ἐπαινεῖν κ.τ.λ.) Isocrates scoffs at the eulogists of "bees and salt and such-like trumpery," and his language is echoed in the allusion (put in the mouth of Eryximachus quoting Phaedrus) to a βιβλίον ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἄλας ἐπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν (177 B). This eulogist of salt is commonly supposed to be Polycrates, since encomia on similar paltry subjects—mice, χύτραι, ψῆφοι—are ascribed to him<sup>1</sup>. Dümmler, however<sup>2</sup>, takes the reference to be to Antisthenes (*Protreptikos*), on the strength of the statement in Pollux vi. 16. 98: βομβύλιος δὲ τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωμα καὶ βομβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόσει, ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν προτρεπτικῷ. And for ἄλας as eulogized in the same work he quotes also *Rep.* 372 B ff. (ὄψον ἐξουσιᾷ ἄλας). It may be added that a further allusion to the βομβύλιος, as στενὸν ἔκπωμα, may be discovered in the mention of ἔκπωμα μέγα in *Sympos.* 213 E. Since Antisthenes seems to have devoted a good deal of attention to the subject of μέθη<sup>3</sup>, one is inclined to suppose that his views are alluded to in *Sympos.* (176, 213-14); and another allusion to him may be found in the mention of the χρηστοὶ σοφισταί who eulogized Heracles (177 B), since Heracles was, notoriously, the patron-saint of the Cynics<sup>4</sup>. However much they might differ on other points, Plato and Isocrates were agreed in so far as both found the Cynic leader an objectionable person.

(f) A significant indication is given us at the conclusion of the Prologue that the account of the speeches which follows is not an exhaustive account, but only a *selection*. And it is a selection that has been sifted twice. For Apollodorus states (178 A) that neither did Aristodemus remember *all* the views put forward by *every* speaker, nor did he (Apollodorus) remember all that Aristodemus had related. This statement is further confirmed by the later statement (180 c) that Aristodemus passed over the discourses of several speakers who followed next after Phaedrus. We are to infer, therefore, that there was a good deal of speechifying at the banquet which was not ἀξιωματιμῶν. But why Plato is at pains to emphasize this point is

<sup>1</sup> So Hug (*Sympos. ad loc.*) following Sauppe and Blass: also Jebb, *Att. Or.* ii. 99. I may note here an inconsistency as to the date of Polycrates' "Accusation" in Jebb, *Att. Or.* i. 150-51 compared with *ib.* xlv: in the latter place it is set in 393 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> In this Dümmler (*Akad.* p. 66) follows Winckelmann (*Antisth. fr.* p. 21). Polycrates, however, may be alluded to as well as Antisthenes, as the terms of the reference are wide (ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνά); moreover, a close relation may have existed between these two writers.

<sup>3</sup> See Dümmler, *Antisthenica*, pp. 17 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See Gomperz, *G. T.* ii. p. 151; Dümmler, *Akad.* p. 66.

not wholly clear. It may, of course, be merely a literary device meant to enhance the verisimilitude of the account, since the speeches actually related might be thought insufficient to occupy the length of time supposed to elapse between the end of the δέϊπνον and the hour of Alcibiades' arrival—which would probably not be early. It is possible, however, that we should look for a deeper reason. If so, may not the intention be to brush aside and discredit other speeches stated by another author<sup>1</sup> (ἄλλος τις, 172 B) to have been delivered on this occasion?

(C) *The Interludes.*

The *first Interlude*, worthy of the name, occurs between the second and third encomia (185 c—E), and it is noticeable, first, for the reference to the "isology" of the rhetorical sophists; secondly, for the device by which the natural order of speakers is changed (Eryximachus taking the place of Aristophanes); and thirdly, for the alleged cause which renders such a change necessary, namely the hiccough (λύγξ) of Aristophanes. As regards the significance of this last matter considerable diversity of opinion exists among the commentators. Of the ancients, Olympiodorus (*vit. Plat.* 3) supposed that Plato here ἐκωμώδησε Ἀριστοφάνη when he εἰσάγει αὐτὸν μεταξὺ λυγγὶ περιπεσόντα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον πληρῶσαι τὸν ὕμνον: and similarly Athenaeus (187 c) writes τὸν μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λυγγὸς ὀχλούμενον...κωμῶδειν ἤθελε καὶ διασύρειν: and Aristides (*or.* 46, II. p. 287), ἀλλ' οἶμαι λύζειν αὐτὸν ἴδει, ἵνα εἰς ἀπληστίαν σκωφθῆ. Of the moderns, some have followed the ancients in supposing that the incident is meant to satirize Aristophanes and his intemperate habits (so Stallbaum, Rückert, Steinhart); while some (Stephens, Sydenham, Wolf, Schwegler) take the object of the ridicule to be not so much the habits of the poet as his speech with its "indelicate ingredients." On the other hand, Schleiermacher held the view that Eryximachus with his "physiological and medical notion of love" is here being satirized; while Ast—whose view is shared in the main by Hommel, van Prinsterer and Rettig—argued that the real object of the ridicule is Pausanias, by whose speech Aristophanes implies that he has been "fed up" to the point of loathing. This view Rettig thinks is supported by the phrase Πανσανίου πανσαμένου, which he takes to indicate Apollodorus' ridicule,—by the allusion made by Aristophanes to Pausanias' speech in 189 c,—and by his mention of Pausanias again in 193 B; and he construes the hint of another

<sup>1</sup> See above, § ii. A, *ad fin.*

possible cause (ἡ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου, 185 c) as "affording the key to the hidden meaning of the word πλησμονή." This view, however, is open to the objections (urged by Rückert against Ast) that, first, it makes Aristophanes guilty of excessive rudeness in feigning a hiccough to show his disgust ("aliud est in convivio iocari, aliud in scena," e.g. *Nub.* 906 ff., *Ach.* 585 ff., the places cited by Rettig); and that, further, there is no plain sign that the hiccough was feigned, but on the contrary the whole incident is stated by Aristodemus as matter-of-fact. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the most obvious view—that of the ancients—is nearest to the truth. The incident shows up Aristophanes in a ludicrous light, and at the same time it gives further occasion to Eryximachus to air his medical lore; so that we can read in it the intention of satirizing gently both these personages. But to construe it as aimed at Pausanias is far-fetched and improbable: he is already disposed of in the satirical reference to sophistical "isology"; and to discover a fresh allusion to him in the "other cause" of the hiccough is to discover a mare's nest, for—as the Scholiast *ad loc.* informs us—other physical causes of this symptom were as a matter of fact recognized by the medical profession, and it is only polite on the part of Aristodemus to leave the matter open.

The *second Interlude* (189 A—C) and the *third* (193 D—194 E) call for no special remark.

The *fourth Interlude* (198 A—199 C), which follows on the speech of Agathon, is linked to the third both by a remark which Socrates addresses to Eryximachus, and also, at the close, by his appeal to Phaedrus (cp. 199 B with 194 D). Here, in even a greater degree than in the previous Interludes, Socrates is the central figure of interest, and this position he continues to hold throughout the rest of the dialogue. This Interlude, indeed, may be regarded as one of the cardinal points of the structure, in which the First Act, as we may term it, passes on into the Second; and in the Second Act we reach at length the theoretical climax, in the doctrine of Socrates-Diotima. To this climax the present Interlude, wherein is laid before us Socrates' confession of rhetorical faith, serves as prologue.

The *fifth Interlude* (212 C—215 A) is by far the longest and, as regards the action of the piece, the most important. For it introduces a new actor, and he a protagonist, in the person of Alcibiades. The contrast is striking between the prophetess in her soaring flights to the heavenly places of the spirit and the tipsy reveller with his lewd train who takes her place in claiming the attention of the audience. The



comic relief which, in the earlier scenes, had been supplied by Aristophanes, as *γελωτοποιός*, is now supplied by Alcibiades. We should notice also how a link with the Second Act is furnished here, at the commencement of the Third Act, by the mention of an attempt by Aristophanes to reply to an observation made by Socrates in the course of his speech. But apart from this, the rest of the speakers and banqueters are left out of account except only Agathon, Socrates and Eryximachus. The action of the last of these here is parallel to his action at the commencement of the First Act where he had taken the lead in fixing the rules for the conduct of the symposium. As regards Agathon and Socrates, the most important incident in this Interlude is the decision concerning their contest in *σοφία* which is pronounced by Alcibiades, when, acting the not inappropriate part of Dionysus, he awards the crown to Socrates,—an incident to the significance of which we have already (§ ii. B, C) drawn attention.

Of the *Epilogue* or concluding scene (222 c—end) it is unnecessary to say much. The persons that figure most largely in it are the three central characters, Alcibiades, Agathon and Socrates; while towards the close the rest of the characters receive, as it were, a farewell notice. When the curtain finally falls, it falls significantly on the solitary figure of Socrates, the incarnation of the Eros-daemon, behind whom in his shadow stands the form of his erastes, the “shadow”-biographer Aristodemus.

### § iii. THE FIRST FIVE SPEECHES.

1. *Phaedrus*, son of Pythocles, belonged to the Attic deme Myrrhinus. Lysias describes him as “impoverished” in circumstances, but respectable. In the *Protagoras* he is represented as a disciple of Hippias; while in the *Phaedrus*—named after him—his chief characteristic is his ardent interest in erotic oratory (*λόγοι ἐρωτικοί*), a specimen of which, by Lysias, he has learnt almost completely by heart. It is, then, in accordance with this character that we find Phaedrus, in the *Symposium*, made responsible for the theme of the series of speeches (*viz.* *ἔπαινος Ἐρωτος*, 177 D), and entitled *πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου*. We may gather also from certain indications contained both in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Symposium* that Phaedrus was neither physically strong nor mentally vigorous<sup>1</sup>. The ostensibly prominent

<sup>1</sup> See *Phaedr.* 227 A, *Symp.* 176 c, 223 B, and, generally, his cultivation of medical friends. Also the probable word-play in the deme-name *Μυρρινούσιος*, *Symp.* 176 D, *Phaedr.* 244 A.

position assigned to such a man in the *Symposium* is more natural if we assume that it is due to the desire to make him a link between this dialogue and the *Phaedrus*<sup>1</sup>.

Phaedrus's *speech*, although not without merit in point of simplicity of style and arrangement, is poor in substance. The moral standpoint is in no respect raised above the level of the average citizen; the speaker pays little regard to consistency, and the method of argument, with its want of logical coherence, savours much of the sophists. As examples of this self-contradiction we may point to the statement that Achilles, as younger than Patroclus, must be *παιδικά* not *ἔραστής*, whereas Alcestis, though younger than Admetus, is treated as the *ἑρώσα*, not the *ἑρωμένη*; we may point also to the other inconsequence, that the self-sacrifice of Achilles, the *παιδικά*, is cited in support of the contention that *οἱ ἑρώντες μόνοι* are capable of such self-sacrifice. The arbitrary handling of the Orpheus myth is another striking illustration of the sophistic manner.

What is, however, most characteristic of the speech of Phaedrus is its richness of mythological allusion. Lacking, it would seem, in native force of intellect, Phaedrus relies upon authority and tradition. He quotes Hesiod and Homer, Acusilaos and Parmenides: he builds his argument, such as it is, on the sayings of "them of old time," and on the legendary histories of the son of Oeagrus and the daughter of Pelias; and when he can confute Aeschylus on a point of mythology his joy is great. As a lover of religious tradition, we may credit Phaedrus with a capacity for genuine religious feeling; certainly, in his rôle as high-priest of Eros, on the present occasion, he shows a strict regard for ritual propriety when he rebukes Socrates for interrupting the service of speech-offerings to the god (194 D)<sup>2</sup>.

In point of *literary style* we may notice the following features:—

(a) *Rhetorical ornamentation*: chiasmus (178 D), paronomasia (179 c), special compound verbs (*ἀγασθέντες* 179 c, *ὑπεραγασθέντες* 180 A; *ἀποθανεῖν* 179 E, *ὑπεραποθανεῖν*, *ἐπαποθανεῖν* 180 A);

<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. Crain, p. 7: *Vera causa, cur Plato sermonis in Symposio Phaedrum parentem praedicaverit, haec mihi videtur esse: rediens ad eas cogitationes quas in Phaedro dialogo instituerat, eundem quoque auctorem colloquii reduxit.*

<sup>2</sup> Hug sums up the position of Phaedrus thus (p. xlvi): "Phädrus stellt den gewöhnlichen athenischen Bürger dar, den eine rastlose Neugierde zu den rhetorischen und philosophischen Kreisen hindrängt, der da und dort etwas aufschnappt und sich aneignet, jedoch ohne tieferes Verständnis, aber mit desto grösserem Selbstbewusstsein." Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 528): "The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself...is half-sophist, half-enthusiast."

(b) *Monotony of expression* (οὔτε...οὔτε 178 C (4), 178 D (2); οὔτως...ὡς 178 D (2), οὔτω...ὥστε 179 A, C, τοσοῦτον...ὥστε 179 C; καὶ μὴν...γε 179 A, B; οὔτω καὶ 179 D, τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα 179 D, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ 180 A);

(c) *Anacolutha*: 177 A (οὐ δεινὸν κτλ.), 179 A (καὶ μὴν...οὔτω κακός).

2. Of *Pausanias*, of the deme Κεραμῆς, little is known beyond what we are told in this dialogue<sup>1</sup> and in Xenophon's *Symposium*, where also he appears as notorious for his love for the tragedian Agathon. Xenophon represents Pausanias as a vigorous champion of παιδεραστία<sup>2</sup>, and Plato here assigns to him a similar rôle, although he paints the fashion of the man in less crude colours.

The *speech* of Pausanias is a composition of considerable ability. Although, like Phaedrus, he starts by grounding his conception of the dual Eros on mythological tradition, yet when this conception is once stated the distinction is maintained and its consequences followed out with no little power of exposition. The manner in which the laws regarding παιδεραστία in the various states are distinguished, and in special the treatment of the complex Athenian νόμος, display the cleverness of a first-rate pleader. The general impression, in fact, given us by the speech is that it forms an exceedingly smart piece of special pleading in favour of the proposition καλὸν ἐρασταῖς χαρίζεσθαι. The nakedness of this proposition is cloked by the device of distinguishing between a noble and a base Eros, and by the addition of the saving clause ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα<sup>3</sup>. None the less, it would seem that the speaker's main interest is in the χαρίζεσθαι, rather than in the accruing ἀρετή, and that he is fundamentally a sensualist, however refined and specious may be the form in which he gives expression to his sensualism.

Pausanias is a lawyer-like person in his style of argumentation; and, appropriately enough, much of his speech is concerned with νόμοι.

<sup>1</sup> He is also mentioned in *Protag.* 315 D.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 32 ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀκρασία συγκυλινδουμένων.

<sup>3</sup> We must, of course, bear in mind that, as Jowett puts it (*Plato*, vol. I. p. 529), "the value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy, (though) at variance with modern and Christian notions, is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment." Nor does the Platonic Socrates, in the sequel, fail to take account of them. For some judicious observations on the general question of the Gk. attitude to paederastia, see Jowett, *op. cit.* pp. 534 ff.; Gomperz, *Gk. Thinkers* (E. Tr.) II. pp. 380 ff.; for Eros in Gk. religion, see Miss J. E. Harrison, *Prolegom.* pp. 630 ff.; for Plato's and Xenophon's theories of Love, see I. Bruns, *Vorträge* etc., pp. 118 ff.; P. Crain, pp. 23 ff.



The term is noteworthy, since it inevitably suggests that antithesis νόμος)( φύσις which was so widely debated among the sophists and thinkers of the close of the fifth century. Is the moral standard fixed by nature (φύσει) or merely by convention (νόμῳ)? This was one form of the question; and closely connected with this was the other form: Is knowledge absolute or relative? Pausanias poses as a conventionalist, and a relativist, a champion of law as against nature (πᾶσα πρᾶξις αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά); and this is of itself sufficient to show that, in Plato's eyes, he is a specimen of the results of sophistic teaching.

Nor is it only in his adoption of this principle of moral indifference, as we might call it, and in his capacity τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, that Pausanias stands before us as a downright sophist; his argumentation also is chargeable with the sophistical vices of inconsistency and self-contradiction<sup>1</sup>. For example, with what right, we may ask, does Pausanias condemn the νόμοι of other states than Athens regarding παιδεραστία, while laying down τὸ νόμιμον as the standard of morality? For such a distinction necessarily involves reference to another, superior, standard; whereas, by his own hypothesis, no such standard exists. Again, the section on the καλὴ ἀπάτη (181 E f.) stands out in curious contradiction with the section immediately preceding, in which fidelity and sincerity (τὸ βέβαιον) are put forward as the necessary conditions of a love that is fair (καλός) and irreproachable (οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος).

In *literary style* the speech of Pausanias displays, in a much higher degree than that of Phaedrus, the tricks and ornaments proper to the sophistical schools of rhetoric. Thus we find:—

*Paronomasia*: ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ 182 E; δουλείας δουλεύειν 183 A; πρᾶττειν τὴν πρᾶξιν 181 A, cp. 183 B.

*Alliteration*: ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἷας οὐδ' ἂν δοῦλος οὐδεὶς (λ, δ, ο, ου).

*Rhythmic correspondence* of clauses and periods (εὐρυθμία, ἰσόκωλα): This is an important feature of Greek rhetoric<sup>2</sup>, the invention of which is ascribed to Thrasymachus; and it is especially characteristic of the style of Isocrates<sup>3</sup>. The following examples (as formulated by Hug)

<sup>1</sup> So Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 529) writes: "(The speech of Pausanias) is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic."

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Ar. *Rhet.* III. 9, 1409<sup>a</sup> 25 λέξις κατεστραμμένη καὶ ὁμοία ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις.

<sup>3</sup> A good example occurs in *Helena* 17:

τοῦ μὲν ἐπίπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε  
τῆς δὲ περίβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησε.

will serve to indicate the extent to which Pausanias makes use of these artifices:—

- |      |   |  |
|------|---|--|
| I.   | { | 1. πᾶσα γὰρ πράξις ὧδ' ἔχει.   |
|      |   | 2. αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς,  |
|      |   | 3. οὔτε καλὴ οὔτ' αἰσχρά.  |
| II.  | { | 4. οἶον δ' νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιούμεν,   |
|      |   | 5. ἢ πίνειν ἢ ἄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι,   |
|      |   | 6. οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν,   |
| III. | { | 7. ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει,  |
|      |   | 8. ὡς ἂν πραχθῆ,   |
|      |   | 9. τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη.   |
| IV.  | { | 10. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται,                        |
|      |   | 11. μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν,   |
|      |   | 12. οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρως οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶ καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος<br>ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, |
|      |   | 13. ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν. [180 E <i>ad fin.</i> —181 A.]                |

Here we have four *περίοδοι* of which the first three are *τρίκωλοι*, the fourth *τετράκωλος*: in the three *τρίκωλοι*, the *κῶλα* of each are approximately equal; while in the *τετράκωλος*, long and short *κῶλα* alternate.

Other instances of strophic correspondence are 184 D—E, 185 A ff. (see Hug *ad loc.*).

3. *Eryximachus*, son of Akumenus, is like his father a physician and a member of the Asclepiad guild (186 E); he is also a special friend of Phaedrus (177 A). Alcibiades alludes to Akumenus as “the most temperate sire” of Eryximachus, and he is mentioned also by Xenophon as an authority on diet. The same “temperance” (*σωφροσύνη*) is a marked characteristic of Eryximachus in our dialogue: he is the champion of moderation in drinking (176 B ff., 214 B), and when, near the close, the revellers enter and the fun waxes fast and furious, Eryximachus, together with his comrade Phaedrus, is the first to make his escape (223 B). Another characteristic of the man is his *pedantic* manner. He is incapable of laying aside his professional solemnity even for a moment, and he seizes every possible occasion to air his medicinal lore, now with a lecture on *μέθη* (176 D), presently with another on *λύγξ* (185 D, E).

Scientific pedantry is, similarly, the characteristic of Eryximachus's *speech*. He starts with a conception of Eros as a cosmic principle, from

the standpoint of natural philosophy<sup>1</sup>. This conception he applies and develops with equal rigour in the spheres of medicine, music, astronomy and religion, so that definitions of a precisely parallel kind for each of these departments are evolved. The dogmatic manner appears also in his treatment of the dictum of Heraclitus (187 A), which corresponds to the treatment of Aeschylus by his friend Phaedrus. He resembles Phaedrus also in his fondness for displaying erudition: he knows his Empedocles and his Hippocrates<sup>2</sup>, as well as the experts in musical theory.

The theory of the duality of Eros Eryximachus takes over from Pausanias, but he naturally finds a difficulty in applying this concept to other spheres, such as that of music, and in attempting to elude the difficulty he falls into the sophistical vices of ambiguity and inconsistency. *E.g.* in 187 D the reference of *δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι* is obscure; and, in the same context, the substitutions of *ἡ Οὐρανία Μοῦσα* for *Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία* and of *Πολυμνία* for *Ἀφροδίτη Πάνδημος* are arbitrary<sup>3</sup>.

As regards *literary style* there is little to notice in the speech, beyond its plainness and lack of ornament. The monotony of expression (seen, *e.g.*, in the recurrence of such formulae as *ἔστι δὲ* 187 B, *ἔστι γὰρ* 187 C, *ἔστι δὲ* 187 D) marks it as the product of a pedantic, would-be scientific mind, in which literary taste is but slightly developed and the ruling interest is the schematization of physical doctrines.

4. *Aristophanes*. The greatest of Greek comic poets, the author of the *Clouds*, was a pronounced anti-Socratic. None the less, Plato

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Eurip. *fr.* 839 *τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὄρας ὄση θεός; | ἦν οὐδ' ἂν εἰποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἂν | ὄση πέφυκε κάφ' ὄσον διέρχεται. | ...ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαί', ...ἐρᾶ δ' ὄ σέμνος οὐρανός κτλ.*

<sup>2</sup> Pfeleiderer (*Sokr. u. Plato*, pp. 551 ff.) broaches the theory that Eryx's speech is intended as a parody of (Pseudo-) Hippocr. *περὶ διαίτης*, and that the real author of that work was Eryx. himself. There are, certainly, a number of similarities, but hardly sufficient to prove the case. Obviously, it is a parody of the style of some one or more medical writers, but more than that cannot safely be said: some Hippocratean parallels in matters of detail will be found in the notes. See also my remarks on the next speech (Aristophanes). Teuffel drew attention to the etymological significance of the name (*ἐρυξι-μαχος*); this, however, cannot be an invention of Plato's, although it may partly account for the introduction of the *λύξ* incident.

<sup>3</sup> The doctrine of Love as a harmony of opposites, which plays so large a part in Eryx's discourse, may be illustrated from Spenser ("Hymn to Love"):

"Ayre hated earth and water hated fyre,  
Till Love relented their rebellious yre.  
He then them tooke, and, tempering goodly well  
Their contrary dislikes with loved meanes,  
Did place them all in order," etc.

paints him here in no dark colours, but does justice to his mastery of language, his fertility of imagination, his surprising wit, his hearty joviality. In contrast to the puritanism of the pragmatist doctor, Aristophanes appears as a man of strength to mingle strong drink, who jokes about his "baptism" by liquor (176 B), and turns the scientific axioms of the "man of art" to ridicule (189 A). His rôle is, in fact, throughout that of a γελωτοποιός (189 A), and he supplies the comic business of the piece with admirable gusto<sup>1</sup>. Yet the part he plays is by no means that of a vulgar buffoon: he is poet as well as jester,—a poet of the first magnitude, as is clearly indicated by the speech which Plato here puts in his mouth.

That *speech* is a masterpiece of grotesque fantasy worthy of Rabelais himself. The picture drawn of the globular four-legged men is intensely comic, and the serious manner in which the king of gods and men ponders the problem of their punishment shows a very pretty wit. Their sexual troubles, too, are expounded with characteristic frankness. And it is with the development of the sex-problem that we arrive at the heart of this comedy in miniature,—the definition of Eros as "the craving for wholeness" (τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιθυμία 192 E).

✧ This thought, which is the final outcome of the speech, is not without depth and beauty<sup>2</sup>. It suggests that in Love there is something deeper and more ultimate than merely a passion for sensual gratification; it implies that sexual intercourse is something less than an end in itself. But Aristophanes, while suggesting these more profound reflexions, can provide no solid ground for their support; he bases them on the most portentous of comic absurdities. Here, as so often elsewhere in the genuine creations of the poet, we find it difficult to determine where παιδιά ends and σπουδή begins<sup>3</sup>. How far, we ask ourselves, are the suggestions of an idealistic attitude towards the problems of life seriously meant? Does the cloak of cynicism and buffoonery hide a sincere moralist? Or is it not rather the case that the mockery is the man, and the rest but a momentary

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Plut. *Q. Conv.* vii. 7. 710 c Πλάτων δὲ τὸν τ' Ἀριστοφάνους λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὡς κωμῶδιαν ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Zeller (n. on 192 c ff. ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, κτλ.) "Diese Stelle, in welcher der ernsthafte Grundgedanke unserer Stelle am Deutlichsten zu Tage kommt, gehört wohl zu dem Tiefsten, was von alten Schriftstellern über die Liebe gesagt ist."

<sup>3</sup> See Jevons, *Hist. of Gk. Lit.* pp. 258 ff. for some judicious criticisms of the view that "behind the grinning mask of comedy is the serious face of a great political teacher."

disguise? Certainly, the view maintained by Rettig that the chief purpose of Aristophanes is to impugn παιδερασσία, and to preach up legitimate matrimony as the only true form of love and the sole road to happiness, is a view that is wholly untenable. And while we may acknowledge with Horn (*Platonstud.* p. 261) that the speech of Aristophanes marks a great advance upon the previous λόγοι, in so far as it recognizes the difficulty of the problem presented by the phenomena of Eros and looks below the surface for a solution,—yet how far we are intended to ascribe this sagacity on the part of the speaker to superior reasoning power rather than to a lucky inspiration (θεία μοίρα) is by no means clear.

In connexion with this question as to the design of the speech there is one point which seems to have been generally overlooked by the expositors,—the topical character, as we might term it, of its main substance. This appears, obviously enough, in the jesting reference (193 B) to the love-affairs of Pausanias and Agathon; and obvious enough too are the allusions to Eryximachus and his much-vaunted “art” in the mention made, both at the beginning (189 D) and at the end (193 D), of the healing power of Love, the good “physician.” But in addition to these topical allusions which *sautent aux yeux*, we are justified, I think, in regarding the great bulk of the discourse as being neither more nor less than a caricature of the physiological opinions held and taught by the medical profession of the day. The Hippocratean tract *περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* is sufficient evidence that there raged in medical circles a controversy concerning the unity or multiplicity of man’s nature: the author of the tract was himself an anti-unity man and assailed with equal vigour the views of all opponents, whether the unity they stood for was αἷμα or χολή or φλέγμα—ἐν γάρ τι εἶναί φασιν, ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτέων βούλεται ὀνόμασας, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἑὸν μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ιδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν. To this controversy Aristophanes, we may suppose, alludes when he speaks of man’s ἀρχαία φύσις, which was a unity until by the machinations of Zeus it became a duality. But with this theory of primeval unity of nature the poet combines a theory of sex-characteristics. And, here again, even more definitely, we can discover traces of allusion to current physiological doctrines. Aristophanes derives the different varieties of sex-characters from the bisection of the three primitive ὄλα, viz. φίλανδροι women and φιλογύναικες men from the ἀνδρόγυνον, φιλογύναικες women (ἑταιρίστριαι) from the original θῆλυ, and φίλανδροι men from the original ἄρρεν. Thus we see that Aristophanes analyses



existing sex-characters, classifies them under two heads for each sex, and explains them by reference to a three-fold original. If we turn now to Hippocrates *περὶ διαίτης* (cc. 28 f.) we find there also a theory of "the evolution of sex." Premising that the female principle is akin to water and the male to fire, the writer proceeds thus: "If the bodies secreted by both parents are male (*ἄρσενα*)...they become men (*ἄνδρες*) brilliant in soul and strong in body, unless damaged by after regimen (*i.e.* by lack of *ξηρῶν καὶ θερμῶν σίτων*, etc.). If, however, the body secreted by the male parent is male and that by the female female, and the male element proves the stronger...then men are produced, less brilliant (*λαμπροί*), indeed, than the preceding class, yet justly deserving of the name of 'manly' (*ἀνδρείοι*). And again, if the male parent secretes a female body and the female a male body, and the latter proves the stronger, the male element deteriorates and the men so produced are 'effeminate' (*ἀνδρόγυνοι*). Similarly with the generation of women. When both parents alike secrete female elements, the most feminine and comely women (*θηλυκώτατα καὶ εὐφύεστατα*) are produced. If the woman secretes a female, the man a male body, and the former proves the stronger, the women so produced are bolder (*θρασύτεραι*) but modest (*κόσμιαι*). While if, lastly, the female element prevails, when the female element comes from the male parent and the male element from the female, then the women so produced are more audacious (*τολμηρότεραι*) than the last class and are termed 'masculine' (*ἀνδρείαι*)."

Here we find the sex-characters arranged under three heads for each sex, and explained by reference to four originals, two from each parent. Obviously, this theory is more complicated than the one which Aristophanes puts forward, but in its main lines it is very similar. According to both the best class of men is derived from a dual male element, and the best class of women from a dual female element (although the poet is less complimentary than the physician in his description of this class). The similarity between the two is less close in regard to the intermediate classes; for while Aristophanes derives from his *ἀνδρόγυνον* but one inferior class of men and one of women, Hippocrates derives from various combinations of his mixed (*θηλυ + ἄρσεν*) secretions two inferior classes of both sexes. Yet here, too, under the difference lies a consentience in principle, since both theorists derive all their inferior sex-characters from a mixed type.

We may imagine, then, that Aristophanes, having before his mind some such physiological theory as this, proceeded to adapt it to his purpose somehow as follows. Suppose we take the male element latent,

as the Hippocrateans tell us, in each sex, combine them, and magnify them into a concrete personality, the result will be a Double-man. A similar imaginative treatment of the female elements will yield us a Double-wife. While, if—discarding the perplexing minutiae of the physiological combinations assumed by the doctors—we take a female element from one parent and blend it with a male element from the other, and magnify it according to our receipt, we shall thereby arrive at the Man-wife as our third primeval personality. Such a treatment of a serious scientific theory would have all the effect of a caricature; and it is natural to suppose that in choosing to treat the matter in this way Aristophanes intended to satirize the theories of generation and of sex-evolution which were argued so solemnly and so elaborately by the confrères of Eryximachus.

If in this regard the topical character of the speech be granted, one can discern an added point in the short preliminary conversation between Aristophanes and Eryximachus by which it is prefaced. The latter gives a warning (189 A—B) that he will be on the watch for any ludicrous statement that may be made; to which the former replies: "I am not afraid lest I should say what is ludicrous (*γελοῖα*) but rather what is absurd (*καταγέλαστα*)." In view of what follows, we may construe this to mean that Aristophanes regards as *καταγέλαστα* theories such as those of Eryximachus and his fellow-Asclepiads. Moreover, this view of the relation in which Aristophanes' speech stands to the treatises of the medical doctrinaires—of whom Eryximachus is a type—helps to throw light on the relative position of the speeches, and on the incident by which that position is secured and emphasized. For unless we can discover some leading line of connexion between the two which necessitates the priority of the medico's exposition, the motive for the alteration in the order of the speeches must remain obscure.

It may be added that the allusions in 189 E (see notes *ad loc.*) to the evolutionary theories of Empedocles confirm the supposition that Aristophanes is directly aiming the shafts of his wit at current medical doctrines; the more so as Empedocles shares with Hippocrates the view that the male element is hot, the female cold, and that the offspring is produced by a combination of elements derived from both parents. Other references to Empedocles may be discerned in the mention of Hephaestus (192 D) who, as personified Fire, is one of Empedocles' "four roots," and in the mention of Zeus (190 C), another of the "roots"; and the fact that these two deities play opposite

parts, the one as bisector, the other as unifier, is in accordance with Empedoclean doctrine. Also the statement that the moon "partakes of both sun and earth" (190 B) is, in part at least, Empedoclean.

In point of *style and diction*, the speech of Aristophanes stands out as an admirable piece of simple Attic prose, free at once from the awkwardness and monotony which render the speeches of Phaedrus and Eryximachus tedious and from the over-elaboration and artificial ornamentation which mar the discourses of Pausanias and Agathon. In spite of occasional poetic colouring—as, e.g., in the finely-painted scene between Hephaestus and the lovers (192 c ff.)—the speech as a whole remains on the level of pure, easy-flowing, rhythmical prose, in which lucidity is combined with variety and vivacity of expression.

5. *Agathon*, the tragic poet, if born in 448 B.C., would be a little over thirty at the date of the Symposium (416). He was the παιδικά of Pausanias (193 B), and a man of remarkable beauty as well as of reputed effeminacy<sup>1</sup>. He appears in the dialogue as not only a person of wealth, position and popularity, but a man of refinement, education and social tact. The banquet itself is given by him to a select company of his friends in honour of his recent victory in the tragic contest, and throughout the dialogue he is, formally at least, the central figure—both as host and as victor, and, what is more, as the embodiment of external κάλλος alike in his person (εἶδος) and in his speech (λόγοι). His graceful politeness to his guests never varies, even when Socrates sharply criticises his oration, or when Alcibiades transfers the wreath from his head to that of Socrates (213 E); he himself shares in the admiration for Socrates, welcomes him most warmly and displays the

<sup>1</sup> Ar. *Theam.* 191-2 σὺ δ' εὐπρόσωπος, λευκός, ἐξυρημένος, *shaved (a head)*  
 γυναικόφωνος, ἀπαλός, εὐπρεπῆς ἰδεῖν.  
*ib.* 200 ff. καὶ μὴν σὺ γ', ὧ κατάπυγον, εὐρύπρωκτος εἶ  
 οὐ τοῖς λόγοισιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν, κτλ

And Mneselechos' comments on Agathon's speech and womanish appearance in 180 ff.

ὡς ἡδὺ τὸ μέλος, ὧ πότνια Γενετυλλίδες,  
 καὶ θηλυδριῶδες καὶ κατεγλωττισμένον, κτλ.

In estimating the value of Aristophanes' abuse of his contemporary—in the case of Agathon as in the case of Euripides—we must make due allowance for Ar.'s comic style. As Jevons well observes (*Hist. of Gk. Lit.* p. 274): "In polemics, as in other things, the standard of decency is a shifting one. Terms which one age would hesitate to apply to the most abandoned villain are in another century of such frequent use as practically to be meaningless....The charges of immorality which Ar. brings against Eur. and his plays are simply Ar.'s way of saying that on various points he totally disagrees with Eur." Probably the same holds good of his treatment of Agathon.



utmost jubilation when Socrates promises to eulogize him (223 A). Finally, his consideration is shown in the social *καρτερία* with which he sticks to his post, drinking and talking, till all his guests, except Socrates, have either left or succumbed to drowsiness (223 D).

In his *speech* Agathon claims that he will improve on the *method* of his predecessors. In his attention to method he is probably taking a leaf out of the book of Gorgias, his rhetorical master and model. Besides the initial distinction between the nature and effects of Eros, another mark of formal method is his practice of recapitulation: at the close of each section of his discourse he summarises the results<sup>1</sup>. In his portrait of the nature of Eros—his youth, beauty, suppleness of form and delicacy of complexion—Agathon does little more than formulate the conventional traits of the god as depicted in poetry and art. His attempts to deduce these attributes are mere *παιδιά* (197 E), pieces of sophistical word-play. Somewhat deeper goes his explanation of the working of Eros upon the soul, as well as the body; but the thought that Eros aims at the beautiful (197 B) is his most fruitful deliverance and the only one which Socrates, later on, takes up and develops<sup>2</sup>.

We may observe, further, how Agathon, like Phaedrus, indulges in mythological references, and how—like most of his predecessors (cp. 180 D, 185 E)—he makes a point of criticising and correcting the views of others (194 E, 195 B). Cp. Isocr. *Busir.* 222 B, 230 A.

In *style and diction* the speech of Agathon gives abundant evidence of the influence of the school of Gorgias, especially in the preface (194 E—195 A) and in the 2nd part (197 C—E). Thus we find repeated instances of:—

<sup>1</sup> See 195 E, 196 C, D, 197 C; and cp. Gorg. *Hel.* (e.g.) 15 *καὶ ὅτι μὲν...οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ' ἠτύχησεν, εἰρηται· τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ διέξειμι.* Cp. Blass, *att. Bered.* p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Jowett is somewhat flattering when he writes (*Plato* I. p. 531): "The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain (*sc.* than Aristophanes'), and receives the real if half-ironical approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities....The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus (239 A, B) in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs.... The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights'." One suspects that "the approval of Socrates" is more ironical than real. Agathon's speech belongs to the class condemned by Alcidas, *de Soph.* 12 *οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεργασμένοι καὶ μᾶλλον ποιήμασιν ἢ λόγοις εὐκότες:* cp. *ib.* 14 *ἀνάγκη...τὰ μὲν ὑποκρίσει καὶ βαψωδία παραπλήσια δοκεῖν εἶναι.*

*Short parallel Kola*<sup>1</sup> with homoeoteleuton: e.g. 194 E ε|γὼ δὲ δὴ| βούλομαι | πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν | ὡς χρὴ με εἰπεῖν | ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν: 197 D ἀλλοτριότητος μὲν κενοῖ, οἰκειότητος δὲ πληροῖ.

*Homoeoteleuton and assonance*: e.g. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος (194 E); τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντός...περὶ παντός...οἶος <ὧν> οἶων αἴτιος ὧν (195 A); πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων (195 A).

These rhetorical artifices are especially pronounced in the concluding section, as is indicated by the sarcastic comment of Socrates (198 B τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, κτλ.); in fact, the whole of this section is, as Hug puts it, a "förmliche Monodie." Another feature of A.'s style is his fondness for quotation, especially from the poets (196 c, e, 196 A, 197 B), and his tendency to break into verse himself—*ἐπέρχεται δέ μοί τι καὶ ἔμμετρον εἰπεῖν* (197 c). He has no clear idea of the limits of a prose style, as distinguished from verse; and the verses he produces are marked by the same Gorgianic features of assonance and alliteration. In fine, we can hardly describe the general impression made on us by the style of Agathon better than by adapting the Pauline phrase—"Though he speak with the tongues of men and of angels, he is become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal<sup>2</sup>."

#### § iv. SOCRATES AND DIOTIMA.

To *Socrates* it falls to deliver the last of the encomia on Eros. This is no mere accident, but artistically contrived in order to indicate the relative importance of his encomium as the climax of the series. In form and content, as well as in extent, it holds the highest place, although to its speaker is assigned the *ἑσχάτη κλίνη*.

##### (A) *The substance and form of Socrates' λόγοι.*

(a) The encomium proper is preceded by a *preliminary dialectical discussion with Agathon*, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconceptions of the nature of Eros. The notion of Eros, it is shown, is equivalent to that of Desire (*ἔρως = τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν*)

<sup>1</sup> Distinguish this from the more Isocratean style of the speech of Pausanias with its more developed *ἴσα* and *εὐρυθμία* of periods. Cp. Aristoph. *frag.* 300 καὶ κατ' Ἀγᾶθων' ἀντίθετον ἐξυρημένον, "shaved Agathon's shorn antithesis."

<sup>2</sup> Horn summarises thus (*Platonstud.* p. 264): "Die ganze Rede mit ihrem anspruchsvollen Eingang, ihrem nichtigen Inhalt, ihren wol klingenden Phrasen und Sophismen und insbesondere mit dem grossen Schlussfeuerwerke von Antithesen und Assonanzen ist demnach nichts anderes als ein mit grosser Geschicklichkeit entworfenes Musterstück der...gorgianisch-sophistischen Rhetorik." See also the rhythmic analysis (of 195 p ff.) worked out by Blass, *Rhythmen*, pp. 76 ff.

—a quality, not a person. And the object of this Desire is the beautiful (τὸ καλόν), as had been asserted by Agathon (201 A—B). That Socrates refuses to embark on an eulogistic description of Eros without this preliminary analysis of the meaning of the name serves, at the start, to differentiate his treatment of the theme from that of all the preceding speakers: it is, in fact, an object-lesson in method, an assertion of the Platonic principle that dialectic must form the basis of rhetoric, and that argument founded on untested assumptions is valueless.

(b) *The speech proper* begins with a mythological derivation of Eros, in which his conflicting attributes as a δαίμων—a being midway between gods and men—are accounted for by his parentage. Eros is at once poor, with the poverty of Desire which lacks its object, and rich, with the vigour with which Desire strives after its object. And in all its features the Eros of Socrates and Diotima stands in marked contrast to the Eros of conventional poetry and art, the divine Eros of Agathon.

Eros is defined as Desire and as Daemon; and, in the next place, its potency<sup>1</sup> is shown to lie in the striving after the everlasting possession of happiness. But Eros implies also propagation in the sphere of beauty. It is the impulse towards immortality—the impulse displayed alike by animals and by men, the ground of parental love towards both physical and mental (φιλοτιμία) offspring.

But when we arrive at this point, the question suggests itself as to how, more precisely, these different determinations of Eros are related to one another. What is the link between Eros defined as “the desire for the abiding possession of the good” and Eros defined as “the desire for procreation in the beautiful”? The former conception involves a desire for abiding existence, in other words for immortality, inasmuch as the existence of the possessor is a necessary condition of possession; while the latter also involves a similar desire, inasmuch as procreation is the one means by which racial immortality can be secured. Thus the link between the two conceptions of Eros is to be found in the implicit notion common to both that Eros is the striving after immortality or self-perpetuation. But there is another point to be borne in mind in order to grasp clearly the connexion of the argument. The beautiful includes the good (τάγαθὰ καλά 201 c); so that the desire for the good is already, implicitly, a desire for the beautiful (and *vice versa*).

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* its generic notion (εἶναι, τὸ κεφάλαιον 205 D) as distinguished from the specific limitation (καλεῖσθαι 205 c, 206 B) to sex-love. See W. Gilbert in *Philologus* LXXIII. 1, pp. 52 ff.

Thus the main results of the argument so far are these: Eros is the striving after the lasting possession of the Good, and thereby after immortality; but immortality can be secured only through procreation (τόκος), and the act of procreation requires as its condition the presence of Beauty. We are, therefore, led on to an examination of the nature of Beauty, and it is shown that beauty is manifested in a variety of forms, physical, moral and mental—beauty of body, of soul, of arts and sciences, culminating in the arch-science and the Idea of absolute Beauty. Accordingly the Erastes must proceed in upward course<sup>1</sup> from grade to grade of these various forms of beauty till he finally reaches the summit, the Idea. On the level of each grade, moreover, he is moved by the erotic impulse not merely to apprehend the καλόν presented and to appreciate it, but also to reproduce it in another: there are two moments in each such experience, that of “conception” (κίησις) or inward apprehension, and that of “delivery” (τόκος) or outward reproduction.

The emphasis here laid on the notion of reproduction and delivery (τίκτειν, γεννᾶν), as applied to the intellectual sphere, deserves special notice. The work of the intelligence, according to the Socratic method, is not carried on in solitary silence but requires the presence of a second mind, an interlocutor, an answerer of questions. For the correct method of testing hypotheses and searching out truth is the conversational method, “dialectic,” in which mind cooperates with mind. The practical illustration of this is to be seen in Socrates himself, the pursuer of beautiful youths who delights in converse with them and, warmed by the stimulus of their beauty, λόγους τοιούτους τίκτει οἷτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους (210 c).

(c) As the conception of Eros as a striving after the Ideal pursued not in isolation but in spiritual fellowship (κοινωνία) constitutes the core of the Socratic exposition, so *the form of* that exposition is so contrived as to give appropriate expression to this central conception. It commences with a piece of dialectic—the conversation between Socrates and Agathon. Agathon is the embodiment of that κάλλος which here stimulates the ἐραστής in his search for truth: it is in Agathon’s soul (ἐν καλῷ) that Socrates deposits the fruits of his pregnant mind. In much, too, of the exposition of Diotima the semblance, at least, of intellectual κοινωνία is retained, illustrating the speaker’s principle of philosophic co-operation. Thus the speech as a whole may be regarded

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to observe how Emerson makes use of this Platonic “anabasis” when he writes:—“There is a climbing scale of culture...up to the ineffable mysteries of the intellect.”

simply as a Platonic dialogue in miniature, which differs from the average dialogue mainly in the fact that the chief speaker and guiding spirit is not Socrates but another, and that other a woman. If asked for a reason why Socrates here is not the questioner but the answerer, a sufficient motive may be found in the desire to represent him as a man of social tact. Socrates begins by exposing the ignorance of Agathon: next he makes the amend honourable by explaining that he had formerly shared that ignorance, until instructed by Diotima<sup>1</sup>.

(B) *Diotima and her philosophy.*

(1) *Diotima.* Diotima is a fictitious personage. Plato, no doubt purposely, avoids putting his exposition of Eros into the mouth of any historical person: to do so would be to imply that the theory conveyed is not original but derived. It is only for purposes of literary art that Diotima here supplants the Platonic Socrates: she is presented, by a fiction, as his instructor, whereas in fact he merely gives utterance to his own thoughts. These thoughts, however, and this theory are, by means of this fiction, represented as partaking of the nature of divine revelation; since in Diotima of Mantinea we find a combination of two significant names. The description *γυνή Μαντινική* inevitably implies the "mantic" art, which deals with the converse between men and gods of which τὸ δαιμόνιον, and therefore the Eros-daemon, is the mediating agent (202 E); while the name *Διοτίμα*, "She that has honour from Zeus," suggests the possession of highest wisdom and authority. This is made clear by the rôle assigned to Zeus and his servants in the *Phaedrus*: ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς...πρῶτος πορεύεται, κτλ. (246 E); οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ...πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται, κτλ. (252 E ff.). The characteristics of Zeus, namely guiding power (*ἡγεμονία*) and wisdom (*σοφία*), attach also to his ὀπαδοί: consistently with this Diotima is *σοφή* (201 D), and "hegemonic" as pointing out the ὀρθὴ ὁδός to her pupil, and guiding him along it in a masterful manner (210 A ff., 211 B ff.)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* 1. p. 527): "As at a banquet good manners would not allow him (Socr.) to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. *Menex.* 236 fol.)."

<sup>2</sup> Gomperz's suggestion (*G. T.* II. p. 396) that "the chief object of this etherealized affection" which Plato had in mind when "in the teaching (of Diotima) he



In the person of Diotima, "the wise woman," Plato offers us—in Mr Stewart's phrase—"a study in the prophetic temperament"<sup>1</sup>; she represents, that is to say, the mystical element in Platonism, and her discourse is a blend of allegory, philosophy, and myth. As a whole it is philosophical: the allegory we find in the imaginative account of the parentage and nature of Eros, as son of Poros and Penia; the mythical element appears in the concluding portion, in so far as it "sets forth in impassioned imaginative language the Transcendental Idea of the Soul".<sup>2</sup> And as in the allegory the setting is derived from current religious tradition, so in the myth the language is suggested by the enthusiastic cult of the Orphics. It may be well to examine somewhat more closely the doctrine of the prophetess on these various sides.

(2) *Diotima's allegory.* The first point to notice is the artistic motive for introducing an allegory. It is intended to balance at once the traditional derivations of the God Eros in the earlier speeches, and the grotesque myth of Aristophanes. Socrates can match his rivals in imagination and inventive fancy. It also serves the purpose of putting into a concrete picture those characteristic features of the love-impulse which are subsequently developed in an abstract form. And, thirdly, the concrete picture of Eros thus presented allows us to study more clearly the features in which Socrates, as described by Alcibiades, resembles Eros and embodies the ideal of the philosophic character.

In the allegory the qualities which characterise Eros are fancifully deduced from an origin which is related in the authoritative manner of an ancient theogony. The parents of Eros are Poros and Penia. Poros is clearly intended to be regarded as a God (203 Β οἱ θεοί, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ...Πόρος): he attends the celestial banquet and drinks nectar like the rest. The nature of Penia is less clearly stated: she cannot be a divine being according to the description of the divine nature as εὐδαίμων and possessing τὰγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ given in the context preceding (202 c ff.); and the list of the qualities which she hands down to her son Eros shows that she is in all respects the very antithesis of Poros. We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as δαίμων, combined with the definition of τὸ δαιμόνιον as μεταξύ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ (202 Ε), we are justified

gave utterance to his own deepest feeling and most intimate experience" was Dion of Syracuse would supply, if admitted, a further significance to the name *Diotima*.

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, p. 428.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Stewart, *loc. cit.*

in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in regarding ἡ Πενία as a personification of ἡ θνητὴ φύσις<sup>1</sup>. It is interesting here to notice that Penia had already been personified by Aristophanes in his *Plutus*, and personified as one member of an antithesis<sup>2</sup>.

In the description of Poros, the father of Eros, it is significant that he is stated to be the son of Μῆτις. The idea of Plenty (Πόρος) had already been personified by Alcman, whether or not the Scholiast *ad loc.* is correct in identifying that Poros with the Hesiodic Chaos. And the idea of Wisdom (Μῆτις) also had played a part, as a personified being, in the speculations of the theologians. For it seems, at least, probable that the Orphic theologians had already in Plato's time evolved the equation Phanes = Ericapæus = Metis<sup>3</sup>, and that here as elsewhere in the language of Diotima there lie allusions to the doctrines of that school of mystics.

Of the incidental details of the allegory, such as "the garden of Zeus" where the intercourse between Penia and Poros took place and the intoxication of Poros which led up to that intercourse, the Neoplatonic commentators, as is their wont, have much to say. But we may more discreetly follow Zeller and Stallbaum in regarding such details as merely put in for purposes of literary effect, to fill up and round off the story. Poros could never have fallen a victim to the charms of Penia, since she had none; nor could Penia ever have hoped to win over Poros by persuasion or force, he being endowed with the strength and wisdom of a god. Obviously, therefore, the god must be tricked and his senses blinded—as in the case of the sleeping Samson or of the intoxicated Noah—that the woman might work her will upon him. Nor need we look for any mystical significance in ὁ τοῦ Διὸς κῆπος. The celestial banquet would naturally be held in the halls of the King of the gods; that a king's palace should have a park or garden attached is not extraordinary; nor is it more strange that one

<sup>1</sup> So Plotinus is not far astray when he equates *penia* with *θλη*, matter, potency (*Enn.* III. p. 299 F).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Plato's Πόρος) (Πενία with Ar.'s Πλοῦτος) (Πενία: also the description of *πρωχέλα* as intermediate between *πλοῦτος* and *penia* in *Plut.* 552 with the description of Eros as intermediate between *πόρος* and *penia* in *Symp.* 203 E (ὅστε ἀπορεῖ "Ἔρως ὅστε πλουτεῖ). Cp. also *Plut.* 80 ff. (Πλοῦτος... ἀχμῶν βαδίζει) with *Symp.* 203 C ("Ἔρως ἀχμηρός). The date of the *Plutus* is probably 388 B.C.

Such pairs of opposites were common in earlier speculation. Cp. Spenser, "Hymn in Honour of Love":—

"When thy great mother Venus first thee bare,  
Begot of Plentie and of Penurie."

<sup>3</sup> Plato's mention of a *single* parent of Poros is in accordance with the Orphic notion of Phanes-Metis as bisexed.

of the banqueters, when overcome with the potent wine of the gods, should seek retirement in a secluded corner of the garden to sleep off the effects of his revels.

More important than these details is the statement that the celestial banquet was held in celebration of the birth of Aphrodite, so that the begetting of Eros synchronized with the birthday of that goddess. The narrative itself explains the reason of this synchronism: it is intended to account for the fact that Eros is the "attendant and minister" of Aphrodite. Plotinus identifies Aphrodite with "the soul," or more definitely with "the soul of Zeus" (Zeus himself being  $\delta$  νοῦς), but it seems clear from Plato's language that she is rather the personification of beauty (*Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης* 203 c).

As regards the list of opposite qualities which Eros derives from his parents, given in 203 c—e, there are two points which should be especially observed. In the first place, all these qualities, as so derived, are to be regarded not as merely accidental but inborn (*φύσει*) and forming part of the essential nature of Eros. And secondly, each of these characteristics of Eros, both on the side of his wealth and on the side of his poverty, has its counterpart—as will be shown presently<sup>1</sup>—in the characteristics of Socrates, the historical embodiment of Eros.

Lastly, we should notice the emphasis laid on the fluctuating character of Eros, whose existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to vacuity, from birth to death. By this is symbolised the experience of the *φιλόκαλος* and the *φιλόσοφος*, who by a law of their nature are incapable of remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and are moved by a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of gratification. This law of love, by which *τὸ ποριζόμενον αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ*, is parallel to the law of mortal existence by which *τὰ μὲν (αἰεὶ) γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται* (207 D ff.)—a law which controls not merely the physical life but also the mental life (*ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπιστημίας, etc.*)<sup>2</sup>. Accordingly, the Eros-daemon is neither mortal nor immortal in nature (*πέφυκεν* 203 e), neither wise nor foolish, but a combination of these opposites—*σοφὸς-ἀμαθής* and *θνητὸς-ἀθάνατος*—and it is in virtue of this combination that the most characteristic title of Eros is *φιλόσοφος* (which implies also *φιλ-αθανασία*).

(3) *Diotima's Philosophy.* The philosophic interest of the

<sup>1</sup> See § vi. 3.

<sup>2</sup> For an expansion in English of this thought see Spenser's "Two Cantos of Mutabilitie" (*F. Q.* vii.).



remainder of Diotima's discourse (from 204 A to its end) lies mainly in the relations it affirms to exist between Eros and certain leading concepts, *viz.* the Good, Beauty and Immortality.

(a) *The Problem of Immortality.* Enough has been said already as to determination of these various concepts as expounded in the earlier part of the discourse (up to 209 E). But the concluding section, in which "*the final mysteries*" (τὰ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά) are set forth, calls for further investigation. We have already learnt that Eros is "the desire for procreation in the sphere of the beautiful with a view to achieving immortality"; and we have found also that, so far, all the efforts of Eros to achieve this end have been crowned with very imperfect success. Neither by way of the body, nor by way of the mind, can "the mortal nature" succeed, through procreation, in attaining anything better than a posthumous permanence and an immortality by proxy. We have to enquire, therefore, whether any better result can be reached when Eros pursues the ὀρθὴ ὁδὸς under the guidance of the inspired παιδαγωγός. The process that goes on during this educational progress is similar in the main to what has been already described. *Beauty* is discovered under various forms, and the vision of beauty leads to *procreation*; and procreation is followed by a search for fresh beauty. But there are two new points to observe in the description of the process. First, the systematic method and regularity of procedure, by which it advances from the more material to the less material objects in graduated ascent. And secondly, the part played throughout this progress by the activity of the *intellect* (νοῦς), which discerns the one in the many and performs acts of identification (210 B) and generalisation (210 C). Thus, the whole process is, in a word, a system of intellectual training in the art of dialectic, in so far as it concerns τὸ καλόν. And the end to which it leads is the vision of and converse with Ideal Beauty, followed by the procreation of veritable virtue. It is to be observed that this is expressly stated to be not only the final stage in the progress of Eros but the most perfect state attainable on earth by man (τὸ τέλος 211 B, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπων 211 D, τεκόντι...ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι 212 A). But the question remains, does the attainment of this state convey also personal immortality? It must be granted that this question is answered by Plato, as Horn points out, somewhat ambiguously, "To the man who beholds the Beautiful and thereby is delivered of true ἀρετή it is given to become θεοφιλῆς and to become ἀθάνατος—to him εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων": but in this last *if*-clause there still lies

a possible ground for doubt<sup>1</sup>. We cannot gain full assurance on the point from this sentence taken by itself; we must supplement it either by other indications derived from other parts of Diotima's argument, or by statements made by Plato outside the *Symposium*. Now it may be taken as certain—from passages in the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*—that personal immortality was a doctrine held and taught by Plato. It is natural, therefore, to expect that this doctrine will be also taught in the *Symposium*; or, at least, that the teaching of the *Symposium* will not contravene this doctrine. And this is, I believe, the case, in spite of a certain oracular obscurity which veils the clearness of the teaching. When we recal the statement that the generic Eros, as inherent in the individual, aims at the "everlasting possession" of the good as its τέλος, and when we are told that the ἐρωτικός-φιλόσοφος at the end of his progress arrives at the "possession" (κτηῖμα) of that specific form of Good which is Beauty, and finds in it his τέλος, and when emphasis is laid on the everlastingness (ἀεὶ ὄν) of that possession, then it is reasonable to suppose that the ἀθανασία of the ἐρωτικός who has reached this goal and achieved this possession is implied. It is to be noticed, further, that the phrase here used is no longer μετέχει τοῦ ἀθανάτου nor ἀθανατώτερός ἐστι but ἀθάνατος ἐγένετο. Nor does the language of the clause εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ necessarily convey any real doubt: "he, if any man" may be simply an equivalent for "he above all," "he most certainly<sup>2</sup>." The point of this saving clause may rather be this. The complete philosopher achieves his vision of eternal Beauty by means of νοῦς (or αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ), as the proper organ ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν (212 A): it is in virtue of the possession of that immortal object that he himself is immortalised: and accordingly immortality accrues to him not *qua* ἄνθρωπος so much as *qua* νοητικός or λογικός. In other words, while in so far as he is an ἄνθρωπος, a ζῶον, a ὄλον compounded of two diverse

<sup>1</sup> See F. Horn, *Platonstud.* pp. 276 ff. Horn also criticises the phrase ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι: "die Unsterblichkeit im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes...kann nicht erworben werden. Der Mensch kann nur unsterblich *sein* oder es *nicht sein*, er kann aber nicht unsterblich *werden*." But what Plato means by ἀθάν. γενέσθαι is to regain the life of the soul in its divine purity—the result of right education, as a κάθαρσις or μελέτη θανάτου. See J. Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 383 ff.

It seems quite certain that Plato—whether or not in earnest with his various attempts to prove it—did believe in personal immortality, and would assent to the dictum of Sir Thos. Browne, "There is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun."

<sup>2</sup> See my note *ad loc.* It is to be noticed that similar expressions are used in a similar context in *Phaedr.* 253 A (ἐφαπτόμενοι (θεοῦ)...καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν): *Tim.* 90 B, C. Cp. θεῖος ὢν 209 B, θεῖον καλόν 211 E, θεοφιλεῖ 212 A. That the Idea (τάγαθόν) is οἰκείον to the Soul seems implied by 205 E.

elements body and soul, the philosopher is not entirely ἀθάνατος but still subject to the sway of sad mortality, yet in so far as he is a philosopher, a purely rational soul, grasping eternal objects, he is immortal. If we choose to press the meaning of the clauses in question, such would seem to be their most probable significance<sup>1</sup>.

Another criticism of this passage suggested by Horn is this. If it be true that the philosopher, or ἐρωτικός, does at this final stage attain to immortality, this does not involve the truth of the doctrine of immortality in general, but rather implies that men as such are not immortal and that immortality is the exceptional endowment of a few. Here again we must recal the distinction between ἄνθρωπος and pure ψυχή and νοῦς. The soul as immortal is concerned with the objects of immortal life<sup>2</sup>. In so far as it has drunk of the waters of Lethe and forgotten those objects, in so far as it is engrossed in the world of sense, it has practically lost its hold on immortality, and no longer possesses any guarantee of its own permanence. Although it may remain, in a latent way, in age-long identity, it cannot be self-consciously immortal when divorced from a perception of the eternally self-identical objects. If we may assume that Plato looked at the question from this point of view it becomes intelligible that he might refuse to predicate immortality of a soul that seems so entirely "of the earth, earthy" that the noëtic element in it remains wholly in abeyance.

All that has been said, however, does not alter the fact that individual and personal immortality, in our ordinary sense, is nowhere directly proved nor even expressly stated in a clear and definite way in the *Symposium*. All that is clearly shown is the fact of posthumous survival and influence. That Plato regarded this athanasia of personal δύναμις as an athanasia of personal οὐσία, and identified "Fortwirken" with "Fortleben," has been suggested by Horn, as an explanation of the "ganz neue Begriff der Unsterblichkeit" which, as he contends, is propounded in this dialogue. But it is certainly a rash proceeding to

<sup>1</sup> For this notion of immortality by "communion" or "participation" in the divine life as Platonic, see the passages cited in the last note, also *Theaet.* 176 A. Cp. also the Orphic idea of the mystic as ἐνθεος, "God-possessed." This idea of supersession of personality by divinity ("not I but Christ that dwelleth in me") is a regular feature of all mystic religion.

<sup>2</sup> In other words, ἀθανασία may be used not simply of quantity but of quality of existence. This is probably the case in 212 A: "immortality" is rather "eternal life" than "everlastingness," as connoting "heavenliness" or the kind of life that is proper to divinities. So, as the "spark divine" in man is the νοῦς, ἀθανασία is practically equivalent to pure νόησις. On the other hand, in the earlier parts of the discourse the word denotes only duration (ἀθάνατον εἶναι = δεῖ εἶναι).

go thus to the *Sophist*—an evidently late dialogue—for an elucidation of the problem. A sufficient elucidation, as has been suggested, lies much nearer to hand, in the doctrine of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. It is merely perverse to attempt to isolate the doctrine of the *Symposium* from that of its natural fellows, or to assume that the teaching of Diotima is intended to be a complete exposition of the subject of immortality. “Plato,” we do well to remember, “is not bound to say all he knows in every dialogue”; and if, in the *Symposium*, he treats the subject from the point of view of the facts and possibilities of our earthly life, this must not be taken to imply that he has forgotten or surrendered the other point of view in which the soul is naturally immortal and possesses pre-existence as well as after-existence.

(b) *The Problem of Beauty*. A further point of interest in the latter section of this discourse is the different value attached to τὸ καλόν in the highest grade of love’s progress as compared with the lower grades. In the latter it appeared as merely a means to τὸκος and thereby to ἀθανασία; whereas in the former it seems to constitute in itself the final end. Horn, who notices this apparent reversal of the relations between these two concepts, explains it as due to the fact that in the highest grade Eros is supplanted by Dialectic, or “the philosophic impulse,” which alone gives cognition of the Idea. But if this be so, how are we to account for the use of the term τεκόντι in the concluding sentence, where the attainment of ἀθανασία is described as having for its pre-condition not merely τὸ ὄρᾶν but τὸ τεκεῖν? This is precisely parallel to the language elsewhere used of the action of Eros in the lower grades, and precludes the supposition that Eros ceases to be operant on the highest grade. The truth is rather that, in this final stage, the Eros that is operant is the Eros of pure νοῦς—enthusiastic and prolific intellection, “the passion of the reason.” And the fact that τὸ καλόν in this stage is no longer subordinated to ἀθανασία as means to end of desire is to be explained by the fact that this ultimate κάλλος being Ideal is ἀθάνατον in itself, so that he who gains it thereby gains ἀθανασία.

That there are difficulties and obscurities of detail in this exposition of the concepts we have been considering may be freely admitted. But the line of doctrine, in its general trend, is clear enough, and quite in harmony with the main features of Platonic doctrine as expounded in other dialogues of the same (middle) period. Nor must the interpreter of the dialogue lose sight of the fact that he is dealing here not with the precise phrases of a professor of formal logic but with the

inspired utterances of a prophetess, not with the dialectic of a *Parmenides* but with the hierophantic dogmata of the *Symposium*.

(c) *Eros as Philosophy*. The fact that Socrates himself is evidently presented in the dialogue as at once the exemplar of Philosophy and the living embodiment of Eros might be sufficient to indicate that the most essential result of the Socratic discussion of Eros is to show its ultimate identity with "the philosophic impulse." Since, however, this identification has been sometimes denied, it may be well to indicate more particularly how far this leading idea as to the nature of Eros influences the whole trend of the discussion. We notice, to begin with, the stress laid on the midway condition of Eros, as son of Poros and Penia, between wisdom and ignorance, in virtue of which he is essentially a philosopher (*φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητῆς... φιλοσοφεί* 203 D ff.). We notice next how the children of the soul (*λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῆς*) are pronounced superior in beauty to the children of the body (209 c), and *σοφία*, we know, is one form of *ἀρετή*. Then, in the concluding section (210 A ff.) we find it expressly stated that *κάλλος* attaches to *ἐπιστήμαι* (210 c), and that *φιλοσοφία* itself is the sphere in which the production of *καλοὶ λόγοι* is occasioned by the sight of *τὸ πολὺ πέλαιος τοῦ καλοῦ*. Thus it is clearly implied throughout the discussion that *σοφία*, as the highest division of *ἀρετή* (being the specific *ἀρετή* of *νοῦς*), is the highest and most essential form of *τὸ ἀγαθόν* for man; whence it follows that, if Eros be defined as "the craving for the good," this implies in the first place the "craving for *σοφία*," which is but another way of stating "the philosophic impulse," or in a word *φιλοσοφία*.

It must not be supposed, however, that in virtue of this identification the love-impulse (Eros) is narrowed and devitalised. For *φιλοσοφία* is not merely a matter of book-study, it is also a method of life and a system of education. In reaching the ultimate goal, which is the union of the finite with the infinite in the comprehension of the Idea, the man who is driven by the spirit of Eros passes through all the possible grades of experience in which Beauty plays a part; and from social and intellectual intercourse and study of every kind he enriches his soul. He does not begin and end with what is abstract and spiritual—with pure intellection; nor does he begin and end with the lust after sensual beauty: like the Eros-daemon who is his genius, the true Erastes is *οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε θεός*, and his life is an anabasis from the concrete and the particular beauties of sense to the larger and more spiritual beauties of the mind.

Thus in its actual manifestation in life the Eros-impulse is far-



reaching. And, as already noticed, it is essentially propagative. The philosopher is not only a student, he is also, by the necessity of his nature, a teacher. This is a point of much importance in the eyes of Plato, the Head of the Academy: philosophy must be cultivated in a *school* of philosophy.

The significance of Eros, as thus conceived, has been finely expressed by Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 532): "(Diotima) has taught him (Socr.) that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32); as the mediaeval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei'; as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature 'moving about in worlds not realised,' which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the Symposium of Plato<sup>1</sup>."

(d) *Eros as Religion.* We thus see how to "the prophetic temperament" passion becomes blended with reason, and cognition with emotion. We have seen also how this passion of the intellect is regarded as essentially expansive and propagative. We have next to notice more particularly the point already suggested in the words quoted from Jowett—how, namely, this blend of passion and reason is accompanied by the further quality of religious emotion and awe. We are already prepared for finding our theme pass definitely into the atmosphere of religion not only by the fact that the instructress is herself a religious person bearing a significant name, but also by the semi-divine origin and by the mediatorial rôle ascribed to Eros. When we come, then, to "the greater mysteries" we find the passion of the

<sup>1</sup> See also J. Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 396 f.



intellect passing into a still higher feeling of the kind described by the Psalmist as "thirst for God." This change of atmosphere results from the new vision of the goal of Eros, no longer identified with any earthly object but with the celestial and divine Idea (*αὐτοκαλόν*). Thus the pursuit of beauty becomes in the truest sense a religious exercise, the efforts spent on beauty become genuine devotions, and the honours paid to beauty veritable oblations. By thus carrying up with her to the highest region of spiritual emotion both erotic passion and intellectual aspiration, Diotima justifies her character as a prophetess of the most high Zeus; while at the same time we find, in this theological passage of the Socratic *λόγοι*, the doctrine necessary at once to balance and to correct the passages in the previous *λόγοι* which had magnified Eros as an object of religious worship, a great and beneficent deity.

This side of Diotima's philosophising, which brings into full light what we may call as we please either the erotic aspect of religion or the religious aspect of Eros, might be illustrated abundantly both from the writers of romantic love-poetry and from the religious mystics. To a few such illustrations from obvious English sources I here confine myself. Sir Thos. Browne is platonizing when he writes (*Rel. Med.*) "All that is truly amiable is of God, or as it were a divided piece of him that retains a reflex or shadow of himself." Very similar is the thought expressed by Emerson in the words, "Into every beautiful object there enters something immeasurable and divine"; and again, "all high beauty has a moral element in it." Emerson, too, supplies us with a description that might fitly be applied to the Socratic *λόγοι* of the *Symposium*, and indeed to Plato generally in his prophetic moods, when he defines "what is best in literature" to be "the affirming, prophesying, spermatic words of man-making poets." To Sir Thos. Browne we may turn again, if we desire an illustration of that mental phase, so vividly portrayed by Diotima, in which enjoyment of the things eternal is mingled with contempt of things temporal. "If any have been so happy"—so runs the twice-repeated sentence—"as truly to understand Christian annihilation, ecstasies, exolution, liquefaction, transformation, the kiss of the spouse, gustation of God, and ingression into the divine shadow, they have already had an handsome anticipation of heaven; the glory of the world is surely over, and the earth in ashes with them" (*Hydriotaphia, ad fin.*). A similar phase of feeling is eloquently voiced by Spenser more than once in his "Hymns." Read, for instance, the concluding stanzas of the "Hymne

of Heavenly Love" which tell of the fruits of devotion to the "loving Lord" :—

- "Then shalt thou feele thy spirit so possest,  
And ravisht with devouring great desire  
Of his deare self...  
That in no earthly thing thou shalt delight,  
But in his sweet and amiable sight.
- "Thenceforth all worlds desire will in thee dye,  
And all earthes glorie, on which men do gaze,  
Seeme durt and drosse in thy pure-sighted eye,  
Compar'd to that celestiall beauties blaze,...
- "Then shall thy ravisht soule inspired bee  
With heavenly thoughts farre above humane skil,  
And thy bright radiant eyes shall plainly see  
Th' Idee of his pure glorie present still  
Before thy face, that all thy spirits shall fill  
With sweete enagement of celestiall love,  
Kindled through sight of those faire things above."

From Plato, too, Spenser borrows the idea of the soul's "anabasis" through lower grades of beauty to "the most faire, whereto they all do strive," which he celebrates in his "Hymne of Heavenly Beautie." A few lines of quotation must here suffice :

- "Beginning then below, with th' easie vew  
Of this base world, subject to fleshly eye,  
From thence to mount aloft, by order dew,  
To contemplation of th' immortall sky....
- "Thence gathering plumes of perfect speculation,  
To impe the wings of thy high flying mynd,  
Mount up aloft through heavenly contemplation,  
From this darke world, whose damps the soule do blynd,  
And, like the native brood of Eagles kynd,  
On that bright Sunne of Glorie fixe thine eyes,  
Clear'd from grosse mists of fraile infirmities."

These few "modern instances" may be sufficient to indicate in brief how the doctrines of Plato, and of the *Symposium* in special, have permeated the mind of Europe.

The doctrine of love in its highest grades is delivered, as we have seen, by the prophetess in language savouring of "the mysteries," language appropriate to express a mystical revelation.

On the mind of a sympathetic reader, sensitive to literary *nuances*, Plato produces something of the effect of the mystic *φέγγος* by his τὸ πολὺν πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ and his ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν κτλ. Such phrases stir and transport one as "in the Spirit on the Lord's day" to heavenly places "which eye hath not seen nor ear heard";

they awake in us emotions similar to those which the first reading of Homer evoked in Keats :

“Then felt I like some watcher of the skies  
When a new planet swims into his ken;  
Or like stout Cortes when with eagle eyes  
He stared at the Pacific...Silent, upon a peak in Darien.”

#### § v. ALCIBIADES AND HIS SPEECH.

*Alcibiades* was about 34 years old at this time (416 B.C.), and at the height of his reputation<sup>1</sup>. The most brilliant party-leader in Athens, he was a man of great intellectual ability and of remarkable personal beauty, of which he was not a little vain. It was, ostensibly at least, because of his beauty that Socrates posed as his “erastes”; while Alcibiades, on his side, attempted to inflame the supposed passion of Socrates and displayed jealousy whenever his “erastes” showed a tendency to woo the favour of rival beauties such as Agathon. Other indications of Alcibiades’ character and position which are given in the dialogue show him to us as a man of wealth, an important and popular figure in the smart society of his day, full of ambition for social and political distinction, and not a little influenced, even against his better judgment, by the force of public opinion and the *on dit* of his set. With extraordinary *naïveté* and frankness he exposes his own moral infirmity, and proves how applicable to his case is the confession of the Latin poet, “video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.” He is guiltless, as he says, of pudency, nor would ever have known the meaning of the word “shame” (*αἰσχύνη*) had it not been for Socrates.

Yet, totally lacking in virtue though he be, the Alcibiades of the *Symposium* is a delightful, even an attractive and lovable person. Although actually a very son of Belial, we feel that potentially he is little short of a hero and a saint. And that because he possesses the capacity for both understanding and loving Socrates; and to love Socrates is to love the Ideal. Nominally it is Socrates who is the lover of Alcibiades, but as the story develops we see that the converse is more near the truth: Alcibiades is possessed with a consuming passion, an intense and persistent infatuation for Socrates. And in

<sup>1</sup> “The character of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices which meets us in history, is drawn to the life” (Jowett, *Plato* i. p. 526).

the virtue of this "eros" we find something that more than outweighs his many vices: it acts as the charity that "covers a multitude of sins."

The *speech* of Alcibiades, in spite of its resemblance in tone to a satyric drama composed under the influence of the Wine-god, fulfils a serious purpose—the purpose of vindicating the memory of Socrates from slanderous aspersions and setting in the right light his relations with Alcibiades<sup>1</sup>. And as a means to this end, the general theme of the dialogue, Eros, is cleverly taken up and employed, as will be shown in a later section<sup>2</sup>.

In regard to *style and diction* the following points may be noticed. In the *disposition and arrangement* there is a certain amount of confusion and incoherence. Alcibiades starts with a double parable, but fails—as he confesses—to work out his comparisons with full precision and with logical exactitude. This failure is only in keeping with his rôle as a devotee of Dionysus.

*Frequency of similes*: 216 A ὡς περ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων: 217 A τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος...πάθος: 218 B κεκοινωνήκατε...βακχείας.

*Elliptical expressions*: 215 A, C; 216 B, D, E; 220 C, D; 221 D; 222 B.

*Anacolutha*: 217 E; 218 A.

## § vi. THE ORDER AND CONNEXION OF THE SPEECHES.

Disregarding the introductory and concluding scenes and looking at the rest of the dialogue as a whole, we see that it falls most naturally into three main divisions, *three Acts* as we might call them. In the First Act are comprised all the first five discourses; the Second, and central, Act contains the whole of the deliverances of Socrates; the Third Act consists of Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates<sup>3</sup>. We have to consider, accordingly, how each of these Acts is related to the others; and further, in regard to the first, we have to investigate the relative significance of each of its five sub-divisions or scenes.

### 1. *The first five speeches and their relative significance.*

Plato's own opinion of the earlier speeches appears clearly enough in the criticism which he puts in the mouth of Socrates (198 D ff.).

<sup>1</sup> See *Introd.* § ii. (A) *ad fin.*; and Gomperz, *G. T.* II. pp. 394 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See *Introd.* § vi. 3, where some details of the way in which Alcib. echoes the language of the earlier speakers will be found.

<sup>3</sup> Rettig and von Sybel make the First Act conclude with Arist.'s speech, and the Second Act begin with Agathon's: but that this is a perverse arrangement is well shown by F. Horn, *Platonst.* p. 254 (cp. Zeller, *Symp.*).

Although that criticism is aimed primarily at the discourse of Agathon, it obviously applies, in the main, to the whole series of which his discourse formed the climax. Instead of endeavouring to ascertain and state the truth about the object of their encomia—such is the gist of Socrates' criticism—the previous speakers had heaped up their praises regardless of their applicability to that object (198 E *ad in it.*). What they considered was not facts but appearances (*ὅπως ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει*); consequently they described both the nature of Eros and the effects of his activity in such terms as to make him *appear*—in the eyes of the unsophisticated—supremely good and beautiful, drawing upon every possible source (198 E—199 A).

It thus seems clear that Plato intends us to regard all the first five speeches as on the same level, in so far as all alike possess the common defect of aiming at appearance only (*δόξα*), not at reality (*ἀλήθεια*), in virtue of which no one of them can claim to rank as a scientific contribution (*ἐπιστήμη*) to the discussion.

*The relative order of the first five speeches.* The question as to the principle upon which the order and arrangement of these speeches depends is an interesting one and has given rise to some controversy.

(a) It has been suggested (*e.g.* by Rötcher) that the speeches are arranged in the order of ascending importance, beginning with that of Phaedrus, which is generally admitted to be the slightest and most superficial, and proceeding gradually upwards till the culminating point is reached in the speech of Agathon<sup>1</sup>. This view, however, is untenable in the face of the obvious fact that Agathon's speech is in no real sense the best or most important of the series; rather, from the point of view of Socrates, it is the worst. The fact that each speaker commences his oration by a critique of his predecessor might seem, at first sight, to lend some colour to the view that each was actually making some improvement, some advance; but this preliminary critique is plainly nothing more than a rhetorical trick of method<sup>2</sup>.

(b) Steinhart<sup>3</sup> would arrange the speeches in pairs, distinguishing each pair from the others according to the special spheres of the activity of Eros with which they deal. Phaedrus and Pausanias deal with the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Susemihl, *Genet. Entwickl. d. plat. Phil.* p. 407: "So bildet denn der Vortrag des Sokrates den eigentlichen theoretischen Mittelpunkt des Werkes, die übrigen aber mit dem Alkibiades eine aufsteigende Stufenreihe."

<sup>2</sup> Observe also how, in 193 E, Eryx. characterizes the first four speeches as *πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπά*, "motley and heterogeneous."

<sup>3</sup> Similarly Deinhardt, *Über Inhalt von Pl. Symp.*

ethical sphere; Eryximachus and Aristophanes with the physical; Agathon and Socrates with the higher spiritual sphere.

This scheme, however, is no less artificial, although it contains some elements of truth; and a sufficient ground for rejecting it lies in the fact that the speech of Socrates cannot be classed along with the other five<sup>1</sup>.

(c) Hug's view is that the speeches are arranged from the aesthetic, rather than the logical, point of view, in groups of two each. The second speech in each of the groups is, he holds, richer in content than the first; and the groups themselves are arranged with a view to contrast and variety. But here again, little seems gained by the device of pair-grouping; and the development within the groups is obscure. Hug, however, is no doubt correct in recognizing that the arrangement of the speeches is governed mainly, if not entirely, by artistic considerations, and with a view to literary effect; and that an artistic effect depends largely upon the presence of variety and of contrast is beyond dispute.

(d) Any satisfactory explanation of the order in which the speeches are arranged must be based upon the internal indications supplied by the dialogue itself.

The first inference to be drawn from such indications is this: the speech of Socrates must be left to stand by itself, and cannot be grouped with any one of the first five speeches<sup>2</sup>. This is made quite evident by the tone of the whole interlude (198 A—199 c) which divides Agathon's discourse from that of Socrates, and in special by the definite expression *οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον...ἀλλὰ τά*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 527): "The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs....But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato; they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather than to assist us in understanding him." This is sensibly observed; still, Jowett is inclined to dismiss the matter too lightly. I may add that, while from the artistic point of view it is absurd to class together the speeches of Arist. and Eryx., there is a certain connexion of thought between the two, in their common relation to physiological theories, and so far we may allow that Steinhart points in the right direction (see § iii. 4, above).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 256): "The successive speeches...contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious, performances....All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them." This is well said.



γε ἀληθῆ...ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν κατ' ἑμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέροους λόγους (199 A—B): these last words should finally settle the matter.

We are thus left with five speeches, not six; and this of itself might be enough to show that a division into pair-groups is not feasible. And when we further examine the internal indications, the arbitrary character of any such grouping becomes yet more obvious. For although the first two speeches possess a good deal in common, and were, apparently, confounded together by Xenophon, the method of grouping them in one pair tends to obscure the great difference between them in point of substance, style, and general ability of statement, and to obscure also the fact that a number of other discourses intervened between these two (*μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι* 180 c). The express mention of this last fact is a land-mark not to be ignored.

Moreover, while this distinction is marked between the first speech and the second, there are internal indications which point to a special connexion between the third and the second. Eryximachus starts from the same assumption (the duality of Eros) as Pausanias; and, moreover, he expressly states that his speech is intended to supplement that of Pausanias (186 A *ad init.*). Furthermore, we find Aristophanes classing together these two (189 c).

As regards the fourth discourse (Aristophanes'), we are forbidden by similar internal indications to class it along with any of the preceding discourses. Although much of its point lies in its allusiveness to Eryximachus' theories, Aristophanes himself expressly emphasizes the difference between his speech and the others (189 c, 193 d); and indeed it is evident to the most cursory inspection. Nor is it possible, without reducing the group-system to the level of an unmeaning artifice, to pair the speech of Aristophanes with that of Agathon, which follows next in order. The only ground for such a grouping would be the purely fortuitous and external fact that both the speakers are professional poets: in style and substance the two speeches lie leagues apart, while not even an incidental connexion of any kind is hinted at in the text.

The reason for the position of the fifth discourse (Agathon's) is not hard to discover. Once the general plan of the dialogue, as consisting of three Acts, with the discourse of Socrates for the central Act, was fixed in the author's mind, it was inevitable, on artistic grounds, that Agathon's oration should be set in the closest juxtaposition with that of Socrates,—in other words, at the close of the first Act. This disposition is already pointed to in the introductory incident, where Agathon promises to engage in a match "concerning wisdom" with

Socrates (175 E); and we have another indication of it at the very opening of the dialogue, where Glaucon in speaking of the banqueters mentions these three names only—Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades (172 A). If then, for the purpose of the dialogue as a whole, Agathon is the most important of the first five speakers, it is essential that his discourse should form the climax of the series, and stand side by side with that of Socrates his rival, to point the contrast.

This gives us one fixed point. Another fixed point is the first speech: once Phaedrus has been designated *πατήρ τοῦ λόγου*, the primary inventor of the theme<sup>1</sup>, the task of initiating the series can scarcely fall to other hands than his. Why the three intermediate discourses are placed in their present order is not so clear. Considerations of variety and contrast count for something, and it may be noticed that the principle of alternating longer and shorter speeches is observed<sup>2</sup>. Similarity in method of treatment counts for something too; and from this point of view we can see that the order Phaedrus—Pausanias—Eryximachus is more natural than the order Phaedrus—Eryximachus—Pausanias; since the middle speech of Pausanias has some points in common with both the others, whereas the speech of Eryximachus has practically nothing in common with that of Phaedrus. Granting, then, that on grounds at once of continuity and of variety of extent these three speeches may most artistically be set in their present order, and granting, further, that the proper place for Agathon's speech is the last of the series, the only vacant place left for the speech of Aristophanes is the fourth. Although it is a speech *sui generis*, possessing nothing in common with that of Agathon, yet the mere fact of the juxtaposition of the two famous poets is aesthetically pleasing; while a delightful variation is secured by the interposition of a splendid grotesque which, alike in style and in substance, affords so signal a contrast both to the following and to the preceding speeches<sup>3</sup>. More-

<sup>1</sup> That he is so designated may be due, as Crain thinks, to the desire to connect this dialogue with the *Phaedrus*.

<sup>2</sup> The comparative lengths of the speeches, counted by pages of the Oxford text, are roughly these: Phaedrus 3 pp.; Paus. 6½; Eryx. 3¾; Arist. 6; Agathon 4; Socr. (a) 3, (b) 14½; Alc. 9½. Thus, in round numbers, the total of the first five speeches comes to 23 pp., which very nearly balances the 24 pp. occupied by Socr. (b) and Alcib.

<sup>3</sup> Jowett explains (*Plato* i. p. 530) that the transposition of the speeches of Arist. and Eryx. is made "partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes 'the cause of wit in others,' and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident." No doubt these considerations count for something, but, as I have already tried to show, there is another and a deeper reason for the transposition (see § iii. 4).

over, as is elsewhere shown, Aristophanes handles his theme with special reference to the medical theorists of whom Eryximachus is a type.

The first five speakers are all actual historical personages, not mere lay figures. None the less, we must recognize the probability that Plato is not literally true, in all details, to historical facts but, choosing his characters with a view to scenic effect, adapts their personalities to suit the requirements of his literary purpose. That is to say, we probably ought to regard these persons less as individuals than as types, and their speeches less as characteristic utterances of the individual speakers than as the expressions of well-marked tendencies in current opinion. The view proposed by Sydenham, approved by Schleiermacher, and developed by Rückert<sup>1</sup>, that under the disguise of the personages named other and more important persons were aimed at by Plato probably goes too far. It is true that some of the traits of Gorgias are reproduced in Agathon, and some of those of Isocrates in Pausanias; but where is the *alter ego* of Aristophanes to be found? Nor, in fact, was Plato at any time much concerned to attack individuals as such: the objects of his satire were rather the false tendencies and the tricks of style which belonged to certain sets and schools of rhetors and writers. And here in the *Symposium* his purpose seems to be to exhibit the general results of sophistic teaching in various contemporary circles at Athens; which purpose would be obscured were we to identify any of the characters of the dialogue with non-Attic personages.

The five intellectual types of which Plato here presents us with studied portraits are distinct, yet all the five are merely species of one and the same genus, inasmuch as all represent various phases of ungrounded opinion (*δόξα*), and inasmuch as all alike, in contrast to the philosopher Socrates, are men of *unphilosophic* mind<sup>2</sup>.

## 2. *The relation of the speech of Socrates to the first five speeches.*

The speech of Socrates, as we have seen, stands in contrast not only to the speech of Agathon but also to the whole series of which

<sup>1</sup> Rückert makes the following identifications: Phaedrus = Tisias; Pausanias = Protagoras or Xenophon; Eryximachus = Hippias; Aristophanes = Prodicus; Agathon = Gorgias. Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 529) says of Pausanias: "his speech might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is specially referring to them." Sydenham supposed that Phaedrus stands for Lysias.

<sup>2</sup> So Resl, *Verhältnis*, etc., p. 31: "Alle diese fünf Reden eine breite Basis, fast auf demselben Niveau stehend, bilden sollen für die später folgenden Reden des Sokrates und Alkibiades."

Agathon's speech forms the climax and conclusion; since all of them alike are tainted with the same vice of sophistry. We have now to examine this contrast in detail.

(a) *Socrates v. Phaedrus.* Phaedrus had declared Eros to be μέγας θεός καὶ θαυμαστός (178 A): Socrates, on the contrary, argues that Eros is no θεός but a δαίμων (202 c ff.). Phaedrus had relied for his proofs on ancient tradition (τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου κτλ., 178 B; ὁμολογείται, 178 c): Socrates bases his argument on dialectic, and on the conclusions of pure reason (Diotima being Reason personified). Phaedrus had ascribed the noble acts of Alcestis and Achilles to the working of sensual Eros (179 B ff.): Socrates ascribes the same acts to a more deeply seated desire—that for everlasting fame (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου κτλ., 208 D)<sup>1</sup>:

(b) *Socrates v. Pausanias.* Pausanias had distinguished two kinds of Eros—Uranios and Pandemos (180 D—E): Socrates, on the other hand, treats Eros as a unity which comprises in its single nature opposite qualities (202 B, 203 c ff.); further, he shows that an apparent duality in the nature of Eros is to be explained as due to a confusion between Eros as genus (= Desire) and Eros in the specific sense of sex-passion (205 B ff.).

Pausanias had argued that sensual Eros, of the higher kind, is a thing of value in social and political life as a source of ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία (182 B—C, 184 D—E, 185 B)<sup>2</sup>: Socrates shows that the production of ἀρετή in the sphere of politics and law is due to an Eros which aims at begetting offspring of the soul for the purpose of securing an immortality of fame (209 A ff., 209 D)<sup>3</sup>. And Socrates shows further that for the true Eros τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλόν (210 c) is not the τέλος. Lastly, the connexion between Eros (in the form of παιδεραστία) with φιλοσοφία which had been merely hinted at by Pausanias in 182 c, and superficially treated in 182 D—E, is explained at length by Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> This is the point noticed by Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 531): "From Phaedrus he (Socr.) takes the thought that love is stronger than death."

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 531): "From Pausanias (Socr. takes the thought) that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity."

<sup>3</sup> Gomperz (*G. T.* II. p. 396), à propos of his view that Plato is thinking of his παιδικά Dion in *Symp.*, writes: "they were busy with projects of political and social regeneration, which the philosopher hoped he might one day realise by the aid of the prince. On this view there is point and pertinence in that otherwise irrelevant mention of legislative achievement among the fruits of the love-bond." The suggestion is interesting, but the relevance does not depend upon its being true: Plato, in any cause, taught politics.

(c) *Socrates v. Eryximachus.* Eryximachus, following Pausanias, had adopted the assumption of the duality of Eros: this Socrates denies (202 B).

Eryximachus had extended the sphere of influence of Eros so as to include the whole of nature (the objects of medicine, music, astronomy, religion): Socrates shows that the Eros-instinct affects animals as well as men (207 A)—as equally included under the head of *θηγά* (207 D),—and he ascribes to the Eros-daemon the mediation between gods and men and the control of the whole sphere of religion; but he confines his treatment in the main to the narrower subject of Eros proper as concerned with humanity<sup>1</sup>.

(d) *Socrates v. Aristophanes.* Aristophanes had defined Eros as “the desire and pursuit of wholeness” (*τοῦ ὅλου τῆ ἐπιθυμία καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα* 192 E: cp. 192 B *ὅταν...ἐντύχη τῷ αὐτοῦ ἡμίσει*): Socrates corrects this by showing that wholeness, or one's other half, is only sought when it is good (*οὔτε ἡμίσειος εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου ἐὰν μὴ... ἀγαθὸν ὄν* 205 E<sup>2</sup>). Both, however, agree in maintaining the negative position that Eros is not simply the desire for *ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων συνουσία* (192 C).

(e) *Socrates v. Agathon.* The strictly dialectical part of Socrates' speech (199 C—201 C), which takes the form of a cross-questioning of Agathon, consists, in the main, of a hostile critique and refutation of his speech. But in some few particulars Socrates indicates his agreement with statements made by Agathon. We may, therefore, summarize thus:—

(1) *Points of Agreement:* Socrates approves (199 C) of the rule of method laid down by Agathon (195 A) and of the distinction it implies (201 D *ad fin.*). Agathon stated the object of Eros to be the beautiful (197 B): Socrates adopts and develops this statement (201 A). Agathon ascribed *ἀνδρεία* to Eros (196 C—D): so does Socrates (203 D<sup>3</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> It is hardly correct to say with Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 531) that “from Eryximachus Socrates takes the thought that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature”: this statement requires limitation.

<sup>2</sup> It may be observed, however, that while the Platonic Socrates is here simply in contradiction to Arist., the idea of a “fall” from a primeval state of perfection which underlies the myth of Arist. is very similar to the view put forth by Plato in the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere that the earthly life of the soul involves a “fall” from its pristine state of purity in a super-terrestrial sphere. And in both Eros is the impulse towards restoration: to achieve communion with the Idea is to regain *τὸ οὐκείων, τὸ ὅλον, ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις* (193 D).

<sup>3</sup> Another “glimpse of truth” which appears in A.'s speech is thus indicated by



(2) *Points of Difference*: Agathon's Eros is κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος (197 c): Socrates makes out Eros to be οὔτε καλὸς οὔτε ἀγαθός (201 ε). In particular Socrates denies that Eros is σοφός (203 ε f.), or ἀπαλός (203 c), as Agathon (196 ε f., 195 c, d) had affirmed. Agathon had assumed Eros to be θεός (194 ε, *et passim*): this Socrates corrects (202 β ff., ε).

Agathon, like the rest, in his lavish laudations had confused Eros with the object of love (τὸ ἐρώμενον, τὸ ἐραστόν); whereas Socrates points out that Eros is to be identified rather with the subject (τὸ ἐρῶν, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, 204 c).

### 3. *The relation of Alcibiades' speech to the rest.*

(a) The speech of Alcibiades is related to that of Socrates "as Praxis to Theory<sup>1</sup>." Its main purpose is to present to us a vivid portrait of *Socrates* as the perfect exemplar of Eros (ὁ τελείως ἐρωτικός); and thus to compel us to acknowledge that in the living Socrates we have before us both a complete φιλόσοφος—even as Eros is φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (203 d),—and a δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ—even as Eros is a δαίμων. In addition to this main purpose, the speech serves the secondary purpose of vindicating the master against the charge of indulging in impure relations with his disciples (see § ii. A *ad fin.*).

But the language of Alcibiades echoes not only that of Socrates, in part, but also, in part, that of the earlier encomiasts of Eros. And this is due to the fact that Socrates—the Eros of Alcibiades—plays a double rôle; he is both ὁ ἐρώμενος and ὁ ἐρῶν. This ambiguity of the Socratic nature is already implied in the comparisons with satyrs and Sileni made by Alcibiades, which point to a character that is ἐραστός, however ἐνδεής in outward appearance. We may therefore tabulate the more detailed points of inter-relation as follows:—

(a) *The Eros of the ἐραστής (as exhibiting ἐνδεια), Socrates' encomium.*

*Socrates as ἐραστής (his outward appearance of ἐνδεια) in Alcibiades' encomium.*

203 d ἐπίβουλος ἐστὶ τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς...ἀεί τινας πλέκων μηχανάς.

213 c διεμηχανήσω ὅπως παρὰ τῷ κάλλιστῳ...κατακείσῃ.

203 c φύσει ἐραστής ὧν περὶ τὸ καλόν.

216 d Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν.

Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 526): "When Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, v. 9)": see *Symp.* 190 c *ad init.* But, so far as I see, no reference is made to this point by Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> Hug, p. lxvii.



- 203 D ἀνυπόδητος καὶ δοίκος, χαμαιπετής  
 δει ὦν καὶ ἀστρωτος...ὕπαιθριος κοιμώ-  
 μενος.
- 203 D φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητής.
- 203 D δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σο-  
 φιστής...πόριμος...ὄταν εὐπορήσῃ.
- 209 B εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς.
- 220 B ἀνυπόδητος...ἐπορεύετο.
- 220 D εἰστέκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο (with the  
 context).
- 220 C ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἔστηκε (cp.  
 174 D ff.).
- 215 C ff. κηλεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (κατέχει,  
 ἐκπλήττει), κτλ. 223 A εὐπόρως καὶ  
 πιθανὸν λόγων ἦυρεν.

It will be noticed that in this list the passages which find respersions in the language of Alcibiades are all drawn from the discourse of Socrates. This is due to the fact that it is his discourse alone, of the earlier encomia, which treats Ἔρως on the side of its ἔνδεια. The previous speakers had, as we have seen, regarded Ἔρως as altogether lovely, i.e. as τὸ ἐρώμενον. Accordingly, it is to the next list of parallels that we must look for the passages where Alcibiades echoes their sentiments.

(β) Ἔρως-ἐρώμενος as κάλλιστος καὶ  
 ἀριστος in the earlier encomia.

Socrates as the embodiment of Ἔρως-  
 ἐρώμενος in Alcibiades' encomium.

(1) *Courage.*

178 E (Phaedrus) στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν  
 ...μαχόμενοι γ' ἂν νικῶεν, κτλ.

220 E οὐτι...φυγῆ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον,  
 κτλ.

197 D (Agathon) ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ...  
 παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτῆρ ἀριστος.

220 E συνδιέσωσε...αὐτὸν ἐμέ.

221 B μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμνηεῖται.

203 D (Socrates) ἀνδρείους ὦν καὶ Ἰτης καὶ  
 σύντονος.

219 E τοῖς πόνοις...ἐμοῦ περιῆν, κτλ.

220 E ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τάριστεία.

(2) *Temperance.*

196 C (Agathon) ὁ Ἔρως διαφερόντως ἂν  
 σωφρονοῖ.

216 D πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει...σωφροσύνης;

(3) *Complete virtue.*

196 D περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφρο-  
 σύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας τοῦ θεοῦ εἰρηται,  
 περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται.

219 D ἀγάμενον...σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν  
 ...εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.

(4) *Admirableness.*

180 B (Phaedrus) οἱ θεοὶ...μᾶλλον θαυμά-  
 ζουσιν καὶ ἀγαπᾶται...ὄταν ὁ ἐρώμενος  
 (e.g. Achilles) τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾶ, κτλ.

219 D ἀγάμενον τὴν τούτου φύσιν, κτλ.

221 C Socr., as οὐδενὶ ὁμοῖος, is superior  
 to Achilles.

197 D (Agathon) θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγαστὸς  
 θεοῖς.

220 E ἀξίον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη.

210 E (Socrates) κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν  
 τὴν φύσιν καλόν.

216 E τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα...εἶδον...πάγκαλα  
 καὶ θαυμαστά.

(5) *Inspiration of a sense of honour.*

178 D (Phaedrus) (ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖ) τὴν  
 ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνῃν.

216 B ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι.

(6) *Indifference to personal beauty.*

210 B (Socrates) ἐνός δέ (τὸ κάλλος) καταφρόνησαντα, κτλ. (cp. 210 D, 211 E).

219 C ἐμοῦ...κατεφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας.

(7) *Fruitfulness.*

210 C (Socrates) τίκτειν λόγους...οἷτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους (cp. 210 D).

222 A (τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ εὐρήσει) θειοτάτους καὶ πλείστα ἀγάλματα ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ...τείνοντας...ἐπὶ πᾶν ὄσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κάγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι (cp. 218 D ὡς ὅτι βέλτιστον γενέσθαι).

212 A τίκτειν οὐκ εἰδωλα ἀρετῆς...ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ.

209 B εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ οἶον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν (cp. 185 B πολλὴν ἐπεμέλειαν...πρὸς ἀρετῆν).

210 D καλοῦς λόγους...τίκτη...ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ.

218 A δηχθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

(8) *Range of Influence.*

186 B (Eryximachus) ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει.

222 A (τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ εὐρήσει) ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν, κτλ.

210 D (Socrates) ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος...τοῦ καλοῦ.

The foregoing lists contain, I believe, most if not all of the passages in which Alcibiades, describing Socrates, uses phrases which definitely echo the language or repeat the thought of the earlier encomiasts. When one considers the number of these "responsions" and the natural way in which they are introduced, one is struck at once both with the elaborate technique of Plato and, still more, with the higher art which so skilfully conceals that technique. For all its appearance of spontaneity, a careful analysis and comparison prove that the encomium by Alcibiades is a very carefully wrought piece of work in which every phrase has its significance, every turn of expression its bearing on the literary effect of the dialogue as a whole. Moreover, as we are now to see, the list of parallels already given by no means exhausts the "responsions" offered by Alcibiades.

(b) The speech of Alcibiades, although primarily concerned with Socrates, is also, in a secondary degree, concerned with *Alcibiades himself*. And Alcibiades, like Socrates, plays a double part: he is at once the παιδικά of Socrates the ἐραστής, and the ἐραστής of Socrates the ἐρώμενος. In his rôle of ἐραστής Alcibiades exhibits a spirit very similar to that described in the earlier speeches, in which every display of erotic passion is regarded as excusable if not actually commendable. We may call attention to the following echoes:—

- 218 A πάν ἐτόλμα δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν.
- 219 E ἠπόρουν δὴ καταδεδουλωμένος.
- 218 D ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὡς δτι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι. τούτου δὲ οἶμαι μοι συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ. ἐγὼ δὴ τοιοῦτῳ ἀνδρὶ... ἀν μὴ χαριζόμενος αἰσχυνοίμην τοὺς φρονίμους.
- 218 D εἴπερ...τις ἐστ' ἐν ἐμοὶ δύναμις δι' ἧς ἀν σὺ γένοιο ἀμείνων.
- 222 B οὗς οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστῆς παιδικὰ...μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου.
- 217 C ὥσπερ ἐραστῆς παιδικοῖς ἐπιβουλεύων ...D ἀθθὶς δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας.
- 219 B ταῦτα...ἀφελὶς ὥσπερ βέλη.
- 219 B ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεὶς τὸν τουτοῦ, περιβαλὼν τῷ χεῖρε...κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὄλην.
- 215 D ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμέν καὶ κατεχόμεθα.
- 219 D οὐθ'...εἶχον (δπως) ἀποστερηθεῖν τῆς τούτου συνουσίας.
- 221 A παρακελεύομαι τε αὐτοῖν θαρρεῖν, καὶ ἔλεγον δτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτῷ.
- 182 E (Pausanias) θαυμαστά ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ...ποιεῖν οἴαμιερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ, κτλ.
- 184 C (Paus.) εἰάν τις ἐθέλη τινα θεραπεύειν ἠγούμενος δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀμείνων ἔσεσθαι... αὕτη αὖ ἡ ἐθελοδουλεῖα οὐκ αἰσχυρά.
- 184 E τότε δὴ...συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι.
- 185 B πάν πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.
- 184 D ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς...ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι.
- 184 E ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχυρόν.
- 185 B καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη.
- 203 D (Socrates) ἐπίβουλος ἐστὶ (ὁ Ἔρω) τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς.
- 203 D (Socr.) θηρευτῆς δεινός.
- 191 E ff. (Aristoph.) χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς ἀνδράσι... οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους...ἀποβαίνουσιν εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι.
- 192 B (Aristoph.) θαυμαστά ἐκπλήττονται φιλίᾳ...καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες...χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον.
- 179 A (Phaedrus) ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακός, κτλ.

Since in this list echoes are found of the only two earlier encomiasts who were not represented in the former lists (*viz.* Pausanias and Aristophanes), it will be seen that the speech of Alcibiades contains references, more or less frequent, to sentiments and sayings expressed by every one of the previous speakers. It is chiefly in his description of himself that Alcibiades echoes the language of the first five speakers, and in his description of Socrates that he echoes the language of Socrates. The general impression made on the mind of the reader who attends to the significance of the facts might be summed up briefly in the form of a proportion: as Alcibiades is to Socrates in point of practical excellence and truth, so are the first five speeches to the discourse of Socrates-Diotima in point of theoretical truth and excellence. But while this is, broadly speaking, true of the

inner nature (*φύσις*, τὰ ἔνδον) of Socrates as contrasted with that of Alcibiades, we must bear in mind that in his outward appearance (*σχῆμα*) Socrates is "conformed to this world" and, posing as an *erastes* of a similar type to Alcibiades himself, serves to illustrate the theories and sentiments of the earlier speeches.

Lastly, attention may be drawn to one other parallel in Alcibiades' discourse which appears to have passed unnoticed hitherto. It can scarcely be a mere coincidence that Alcibiades' progress in erotics—in other words, "the temptation of saint" Socrates—is marked by a series of stages (*συνουσία*, *συγγυμνασία*, *συνδειπνεῖν*, 217 A ff.) until it reaches its climax in *συγκείσθαι*, and that a similar *ἀνοδος* by gradual stages (210 A ff., 211 C ff.) up to the final communion with Ideal Beauty had been described as the characteristic method of the true *erastes*. It seems reasonable to suppose that the method of *false* love is designedly represented as thus in detail contrasting with, and as it were caricaturing, the method of *true* love: for thereby an added emphasis is laid upon the latter.

#### § vii. THE DIALOGUE AS A WHOLE: ITS SCOPE AND DESIGN.

No small degree of attention has been paid by the expositors of our dialogue to the question regarding its main purport—"de universi operis consilio." It is plausibly argued that there must be some one leading thought, some fundamental idea, which serves to knit together its various parts and to furnish it with that "unity" which should belong to it as an artistic whole. But wherein this leading idea consists has been matter of controversy. Some, like Stallbaum, are content to adopt the simplest and most obvious view that Eros is the central idea, and that the design of the whole is to establish a doctrine of Eros. Others, again, have supposed that Plato was mainly concerned to furnish his readers with another specimen of the right method of handling philosophical problems. But although either of these views, or both combined, might be thought to supply an adequate account of the design and scope of the dialogue if it had ended with the speech of Socrates, they are evidently inadequate when applied to the dialogue as it stands, with the addition of the Alcibiades scenes. In fact, this last part of the dialogue—the Third Act, as we have called it—might be construed as suggesting an entirely different *motif*,—namely, laudation of Socrates in general, or perhaps rather (as Wolf argued) a defence of Socrates against the more specific charge of unchastity.

That this is one purpose of the dialogue is beyond dispute: many indications testify, as has been shown, that Plato intended here to offer an *apologiam pro vita Socratis*. Yet it would be a mistake to argue from this that the main design of the dialogue as a whole lies in this apologetic. Rather it is necessary to combine the leading idea of this last Act with those of the earlier Acts in such a way as to reduce them, as it were, to a common denominator. And when we do this, we find—as I agree with Rückert in believing—that the dominant factor common to all three Acts is nothing else than the personality of Socrates,—Socrates as the ideal both of philosophy and of love, Socrates as at once the type of temperance and the master of magic. Our study of the framework as well as of the speeches has shown us how both the figure of Socrates and his theory dominate the dialogue, and that to throw these into bolder relief constitutes the main value of all the other theories and figures. This point has been rightly emphasized by Rückert (p. 252): “utique ad Socratem animus advertitur; quasi sol in medio positus, quem omnes circummeant, cuius luce omnia collustrantur, vimque accipiunt vitalem, Socrates proponitur, et Socrates quidem philosophus, sapiens, temperans. Quem iuxta multi plane evanescent, ceteri vix obscure comparent, ipse Agatho, splendidissimum licet sidus ex omnibus, ut coram sole luna pallescit.”

It seems clear, therefore, that the explanation of the “Hauptzweck” of our dialogue which was given long ago by Schleiermacher is the right one—“propositum est Platoni in Convivio ut philosophum qualem in vita se exhiberet, viva imagine depingeret”: it is in the portrait of the ideal Socrates that the main object of the dialogue is to be sought.

The theory of Teichmüller and Wilamowitz as to the occasion on which the dialogue was produced has no direct bearing on the question of design. They suppose that it was written specially for recital at a banquet in Plato's Academy; and, further, that it was intended to provide the friends and pupils of Plato with a model of what such a banquet ought to be. But it would be absurd to estimate the design of a work of literary art by the temporary purpose which it subserved; nor can we easily suppose that Plato's main interest lay in either imagining or recording gastronomic successes as such. Equally unproven, though more suggestive, is the idea of Gomperz that this dialogue *περὶ ἔρωτος* was inspired by an affection for Dion.

## § viii. THE DATE.

We must begin by drawing a distinction between (a) the date of the actual Banquet, (b) that of Apollodorus' narrative, and (c) that of the composition of the dialogue by Plato.

(a) That the date of the Banquet is B.C. 416 (*Ol.* 90. 4) is asserted by Athenaeus (v. 217 A): ὁ μὲν γὰρ (*sc.* Ἀγάθων) ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Εὐφρήμου στεφανοῦται Ἀθηναίους. It is true, as Sauppe and others have pointed out, that the description in 175 E (*ἐν μάρτυσι...τρισημυρίοις*, cp. 223 B n.), would suit the Great Dionysia better than the Lenaea; but this discrepancy need not shake our confidence in the date assigned by Athenaeus. The year 416 agrees with the mention of Agathon as νέος (175 B), and of Alcibiades as at the height of his influence (216 B) before the ill-fated Sicilian expedition.

(b) The date of the prefatory scene may be approximately fixed from the following indications: (1) It was a considerable number of years after the actual Banquet (*οὐ νεωστὶ* 172 C, *παίδων ὄντων ἡμῶν ἔτι* 173 A); (2) several years (*πολλὰ ἔτη* 172 C) after Agathon's departure from Athens; (3) within three years of the commencement of Apollodorus' close association with Socrates (172 C); (4) before the death of Socrates (as shown by the pres. tense *συνδιατρίβω* 172 C); (5) before the death of Agathon (as shown by the perf. *ἐπιδεδήμηκεν* 172 C). It seems probable that Agathon left Athens about 408, at the latest, and resided till 399 at the court of Archelaus of Macedon<sup>1</sup>. Hence any date before 399 will satisfy the two last data. And since the two first data demand a date as far removed as possible from the years 416 and 408, we can hardly go far wrong if we date the dramatic setting circ. 400 B.C.

(c) We come now to the more important question of *the date of composition*. The *external* evidence available is but slight. A posterior limit is afforded by two references in Aristotle (*Pol.* II. 4. 1262<sup>b</sup> 12: *de An.* II. 415<sup>a</sup> 26), a possible allusion by Aeschines (*in Timarch.* 345 B.C.), and a probable comic allusion by Alexis in his *Phaedrus* (*ap. Athen.* XIII. 562 A)—a work which probably cannot be dated before 370 at the earliest.

The *internal* evidence is more extensive but somewhat indefinite. It is commonly assumed<sup>2</sup> that in 193 A (*διφκίσθημεν...Λακεδαιμονίων*)

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche's view that *Ar. Ran.* 72 implies the previous death (*i.e. ante* 405) of A. is refuted by Rettig, *Symp.* pp. 59 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See *e.g.* Zeller, *Plato* (E.T.) p. 139 n.; Teichmüller, *Litt. Fehd.* II. 262.



we have a definite reference to the διοικισμός of Mantinea in 385 B.C. But even if this be granted—as I think it must, in spite of the contradiction of Wilamowitz—it by no means follows that the dialogue must be dated 385—4. We find Isocrates (*Panegy.* 126) mentioning the same event five years later. All that it affords us is a prior limit. Little weight can be given to Dümmler's view that the previous death of Gorgias (circ. 380) is implied by the allusion to him in 198 c (Γοργίου κεφαλὴν κτλ.)<sup>1</sup>. Nor can we lay much stress on the conclusions drawn (by Rückert and others) from the absence of reference to the re-establishment of Mantinea in 370, or to the exploits of the Theban "Sacred Band" at Leuctra (371), which (as Hug thinks) might naturally have been alluded to in 178 E.

The evidence of date afforded by "stylometric" observations is not of a convincing character. M. Lutoslawski, it is true, dogmatically asserts that the *Symposium* stands between the *Cratylus* and *Phaedo* in the "First Platonic Group"; but his arguments, when examined, prove to be of the most flimsy character. Beyond affording a confirmation of the general impression that our dialogue stands somewhere in the "middle" period, the labours of the stylometrists give us little assistance. If we choose to date it in 390 they cannot refute us, nor yet if we date it 10 or 15 years later. The question as to whether the *Symposium* preceded the *Phaedrus* or followed it is one of special interest in view of the number of points at which the two writings touch each other. The evidence on the whole seems in favour of the priority of the *Phaedrus*<sup>2</sup>; but, even if this be granted, little light is shed on the date of composition of the *Symp.*, since that of the *Phaedrus* eludes precise determination.

Equally difficult is it to draw any certain conclusions from the relation in which our dialogue stands to the *Symposium* of Xenophon. That there are many points of connexion, many close parallels, between

<sup>1</sup> See Dümmler, *Akademica*, p. 40; and the refutation by Vahlen, *op. Acad.* i. 482 ff.

<sup>2</sup> So I hold with Schleierm., Zeller, I. Bruns, Hahn and others; against Lutosl., Gomperz and Raeder. It is monstrous to assert, as Lutosl. does, "that the date of the *Phaedrus* as written about 379 B.C. is now quite as well confirmed as the date of the *Symp.* about 385 B.C." I agree rather with the view which makes *Phaedr.* P.'s first publication after he opened his Academy, *i.e.* circ. 388—6 (a view recently supported in England by E. S. Thompson, *Meno* xliii ff., and Gifford, *Euthyd.* 20 ff.). The foll. are some of the parallels: *Ph.* 232 E = *Symp.* 181 E, 183 E; 234 A = 183 E; 234 B = 183 C; 250 C = 209 E; 251 D (240 C) = 215 E, 218 A; 251 A = 215 B, 222 A; 252 A = 189 D; 266 A = 180 E; 267 A (273 A) = 200 A; 272 A = 198 D; 276 A = 222 A; 276 E = 209 B; 278 D = 203 E; 279 B = 216 D, 215 B.

the two works is obvious, but which of the two is prior in date is a problem which has called forth prolonged controversy<sup>1</sup>. This is not the place to investigate the problem: I can only state my firm opinion that the Xenophontic *Sympos.* (whether genuine or not) is the later work. But attempts to fix its date are little better than guess-work: Roquette puts it *circ.* 380—76; Schanz, after 371; K. Lincke (*Neue Jahrb.* 1897), after 350.

It will be seen that the available evidence is not sufficient to justify us in dogmatizing about the precise date of composition of our dialogue. The most we can say is that *circ.* 383—5 seems on the whole the most probable period.

### § ix. THE TEXT.

(1) *Ancient authorities.* The chief manuscripts which contain the text of the *Symposium* are:—

B = codex Bodleianus (or Clarkianus or Oxoniensis); Bekker's α.

T = codex Venetus append. class. 4, cod. 1: Bekker's τ ("omnium librorum secundae familiae fons" Schanz).

<sup>1</sup> Among those who claim priority for Xenophon are Böckh, Ast, Delbrück, Rettig, Teichmüller, Hug, Dümmler, Pfeleiderer; on the other side are C. F. Hermann, I. Bruns, Schenkl, Gomperz. Beside the broader resemblances set forth by Hug, the foll. refs. to echoes may be of interest:—

<i>Xen.</i>	<i>Plat.</i>	<i>Xen.</i>	<i>Plat.</i>
i. 1	= 178 A, 197 E	iv. 53	= 219 B
ii. 23	= 213 E, 214 A	v. 1, 7	= 218 E (175 E)
ii. 26 (iv. 24)	= 185 C, 198 C	viii. 1	= 218 B (187 D)
iv. 14	= 183 A, 184 B, 179 A	„ 8	= 219 D
„ 15	= 178 E, 179 B, 182 C	„ 13	= 184 B
„ 16	= 178 E	„ 21	= 214 C
„ 17	= 181 E, 183 E	„ 23	= 183 A (203 B), 172 C
„ 19 (v. 7)	= 215 A (216 D, 221 D)	„ 24	= 217 E, 222 C
„ 23	= 181 D	„ 31	= 179 E
„ 25	= 193 D	„ 38	= 209 E
„ 28	= 217 E	„ 32 (iv. 16)	= 178 E
„ 47—8	= 188 D	„ 34	= 182 B
„ 48	= 188 D	„ 35	= 179 A
„ 50	= 189 A, 197 E		

The last three parallels are specially interesting, since Xen. ascribes to Pausan. some of the sentiments which Pl. gives to Phaedrus. Possibly (as Hug, Teichm. and others suppose) both writers are indebted to an actual *apologia* of the real Pausan., which Pl. is handling more freely, Xen. more exactly (cp. I. Bruns, *Vorträge*, p. 152).

W = codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. phil. Gr. 7 : Stallbaum's Vind. I.

To these we have now to add, as a new authority,

O.-P. = Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (no. 843 in Grenfell and Hunt's collection).

Since this last authority for the text was not forthcoming until after the publication of the latest critical text of the *Symposium*, I add the description of it given by the editors :—

“The part covered is from 200 B [beginning with the word βουλοῖ[το] after which 40 lines are lost, the next words being αὐ ἐνδεῖα at the end of 200 E] to the end, comprised in 31 columns, of which four (xix—xxii) are missing entirely, while two others (i and xviii) are represented by small fragments ; but the remainder is in a very fair state of preservation....The small and well-formed but somewhat heavy writing exemplifies a common type of book hand, and probably dates from about the year 200 A.D....The corrector's ink does not differ markedly in colour from that of the text, and in the case of minor insertions the two hands are at times difficult to distinguish. But as they are certainly not separated by any wide interval of time the question has no great practical importance....The text, as so often with papyri, is of an eclectic character, showing a decided affinity with no single ms. Compared with the three principal witnesses for the *Symposium* it agrees now with B against TW, now with the two latter as against the former, rarely with T against BW<sup>1</sup> or with W against BT<sup>2</sup>. Similarly in a passage cited by Stobaeus some agreements with his readings against the consensus of BTW are counterbalanced by a number of variations from Stobaeus' text<sup>3</sup>. A few coincidences occur with variants peculiar to the inferior mss., the more noticeable being those with Vindob. 21 alone or in combination with Venet. 184<sup>4</sup> and Parisin. 1642 alone or with Vat. 229<sup>5</sup>. Of the readings for which there is no other authority, including several variations in the order of the words, the majority, if unobjectionable, are unconvincing. The more valuable contributions, some of which are plainly superior to anything found in other mss., are : l. 92 [201 D] εἶπ, l. 112 [202 A] the omission of καί (so Stallbaum), l. 239 [204 B] αὐ εἶη, where BTW have a meaningless ἀν, l. 368 [206 C] καλω as conjectured by Badham

<sup>1</sup> See crit. notes on 202 A, 203 A, 205 B, 206 B, 207 D, 211 C.

<sup>2</sup> See crit. notes on 203 B, 211 D, 213 B, 219 E, 220 C (*bis*).

<sup>3</sup> See crit. notes on 202 C—203 A.

<sup>4</sup> See crit. notes on 201 A (*ad fin.*), 218 D, 220 A, 220 B, 223 C.

<sup>5</sup> See crit. notes on 206 B (*ad init.*), 208 A, 223 C.

for τῷ κ., l. 471 [208 B] μετεχει as restored by Stephanus (μετέχειν MSS.), l. 517 [209 A] τεκειν confirming a conjecture of Hug (κνεῖν MSS.), l. 529 [209 B] επιθυμη as conjectured by Stephanus (ἐπιθυμει MSS.), l. 577 [210 A] και συ omitted by MSS., l. 699 [212 A] θεοφιλει (-ῆ BTW), l. 770 [213 B] κατιδε[ν (?) (καθίζειν MSS), l. 898 [218 D] μοι (probably) with Vind. 21 (μου BTW), l. 1142 [222 D] διαβαλει as conjectured by Hirschig (διαβάλη BTW). On the other hand in many cases the papyrus once more proves the antiquity of readings which modern criticism rejects or suspects."

It may be added that the editors of the papyrus in citing W have made use of a new collation of that ms. by Prof. H. Schöne of Basel "which often supplements and sometimes corrects the report of Burnet." And in this edition I have followed the report of W in their apparatus, where available, while relying elsewhere upon that given by Burnet.

(2) *Modern criticism.* Much attention has been paid by Continental critics during the last century to the text of the *Symposium*, and for the most part they have proceeded on the assumption that the text is largely vitiated by interpolations<sup>1</sup>. Even Schanz and Hug, who may be regarded as moderate and cautious critics in comparison with such extremists as Jahn and Badham, have gone to unnecessary lengths in their use of the obelus. Hug, while admitting that we must take into account the freedom and variety of Plato's style and that it is folly to rob a writer of his individuality by pruning away any and every expression which is in strict logic superfluous, and while admitting also that regard must be paid to the characteristic differences of the various speeches in our dialogue, which forbid our taking any one speech as the norm with which others should be squared,—yet maintains that in the speeches, and especially in those of Pausanias and Socrates, he can detect a number of unquestionable glosses. No doubt there are some cases in these speeches in which it is not unreasonable to suspect interpolation, but even Hug and Schanz have, I believe, greatly exaggerated the number of such cases; and I agree with the editor of the Oxford text in regarding the certain instances of corruption or interpolation as extremely few. Consequently, in the text here printed I have diverged but seldom from the ancient tradition, and such changes as I have made have been more often in the

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.* O. Jahn, Hirschig, Badham, Cobet, Naber, Hartmann. On the other hand, sensible protests have been made by Teuffel and Vahlen; and Bettig's text is, if anything, ultra-conservative.

direction of verbal alteration than of omission. I have, however, recorded in the textual notes a selection of the proposed alterations, futile though I consider most of them to be.

### § x. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The main authorities which I have cited or consulted are<sup>1</sup>:—

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Critical essays or notes by Bast (1794), Voegelin, Naber, Teuffel, M. Vermehren (1870), J. J. Hartmann (1898).

ii. *Annotated Editions*: J. F. Fischer (1776), F. A. Wolf (1782), P. A. Reynders (1825), L. I. Rückert (1829), A. Hommel (1834), G. Stallbaum (2nd ed. 1836), G. F. Rettig (2 vols. 1875—6), A. Hug (2nd ed. 1884).

iii. *Treatises on the subject-matter*: M. H. L. Hartmann (*Chronol. Symp. Pl.* 1798), G. Schwanitz (*Observ. in Pl. Conv.* 1842), M. Lindemann (*De Phaedri orat.* 1853, *De Agath. or.* 1871), J. H. Deinhardt (*Ueber den Inhalt u. s. w. von Pl. Symp.* 1865), M. Koch (*Die Rede d. Sokr. u. das Problem der Erotik*, 1886), W. Resl (*Verhältnis der 5 erster in Pl. Symp. Reden u. s. w.* 1886), C. Boetticher (*Eros u. Erkenntnis bei Pl.* 1894), C. Schirlitz (*Beiträge z. Erklärung d. Rede d. Sokr. u. s. w.* 1890), P. Crain (*De ratione quae inter Pl. Phaedr. et Symp. intercedat*, 1906).

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iv. *Translations*: E. Zeller (1857), A. Jung (2nd ed. 1900), B. Jowett, J. A. Stewart (selections, in *The Myths of Plato*, 1905).

<sup>1</sup> *Abbreviations used are*—Bdhm. = Badham; Bt. = Burnet; Jn. = Jahn; J.-U. = Jahn-Usener; Sz. = Schanz; Verm. = Vermehren; Voeg. = Voegelin.





# ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ· ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

St. III.

P.

172

I. Δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὧν πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον πρῶην εἰς ἄστυ οἴκοθεν ἀνιῶν Φαληρόθεν· τῶν οὖν γνωρίμων τις ὀπισθεν κατιδὼν με πόρρωθεν ἐκάλεσε, καὶ παίζων ἅμα τῇ κλήσει, ὦ Φαληρεὺς, ἔφη, οὗτος [Ἀπολλόδωρος], οὐ περιμενεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστάς περιέμεινα. καὶ ὅς, Ἀπολλόδωρε, ἔφη, καὶ

172 A (νῦν) οὐκ Methodius vulg. Φαληρόθεν del. Naber δ: ὁ vulg. Ἀπολλόδωρος secl. Bdhm. J.-U. οὐ (σὺ) Sauppe περιμενεῖς vulg. Sz.: περιμενεῖς B: περιμένεις TW, Bt. (ὦ) Ἀπολλόδωρε Sz. Ἀπολλόδωρε... ἐζήτουν om. Coisl.

172 A Δοκῶ μοι κτλ. The speaker, Apollodorus (see *Introd.* § II. A), is replying to certain unnamed ἐταῖροι who had been questioning him concerning the incidents and speeches which took place at Agathon's banquet. The plural πυνθάνεσθε (and ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς 173 C, D *infra*) indicates that there were several ἐταῖροι present: the traditional heading of the dialogue, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, is due to the fact that all but one are κωφὰ πρόσωπα.

οὐκ ἀμελέτητος. μελέτη and μελετᾶν are regular terms for the "conning over" of a speech or "part": cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B.

καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον. These words explain the preceding statement δοκῶ... οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι, and serve to introduce not only the sentence immediately following but the whole of the succeeding passage down to 173 B where the initial statement is resumed by the words ὥστε...οὐκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχω.

Φαληρόθεν. Phalerum, the old port of Athens, was about 20 stadia (2½ miles) distant from the city on the S.E.

καὶ παίζων...περιμενεῖς; Where does the joke come in?

(1) Ast, Hommel, Stallbaum and Jowett look for it in the word Φαληρεὺς, which they take to be a play on φαλαρός ("bald-headed," so Jowett) or φαλαρίς ("bald-coot") in allusion to the bald crown or the peculiar gait of Apollodorus. But what evidence is there to show that A. either was bald or walked like a coot?

(2) Another suggestion of Hommel's is to write (with the vulgate) ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος and assume an etymological allusion to the opportuneness of the meeting (as "Apollo-given"). This also is far-fetched.

(3) Schütz, followed by Wolf and Hug, finds the παιδιά in the playfully

*is comitely*  
 μὴν καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐξήτουν βουλόμενος διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγά-  
 B θωνος ξυνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν  
 λόγων τίνες ἦσαν. ἄλλος γὰρ τίς μοι διηγείτο ἀκηκοὺς Φοίνικος  
 τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἰδέναί. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς  
 λέγειν. σὺ οὖν μοι διήγησαι· δικαιοτάτος γὰρ εἶ τοὺς τοῦ ἐταίρου  
 C παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὐ; καὶ γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι Παντάπασιν

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ secl. Baiter J.-U. συνδειπνεῖν T: συνδειπνῶ W<sup>ἐν</sup>

official style of the address, in which the person is designated by the name of his deme, this being the regular practice in legal and formal proceedings (cp. *Gorg.* 495 D Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς...Σωκράτης...ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν: *Ar. Nuβ.* 134); but (as Stallb. objected) the order of the words in that case should be rather ὁ οὗτος Ἀ. ὁ Φαληρεύς. Hug also finds παιδιά in the hendecasyllabic rhythm (ὁ Φαλ. οὗτος Ἀπ.), and the poetic combination ὁ οὗτος (*Soph. O. C.* 1627, *Aj.* 89).

(4) Rettig, reading ὁ Φαληρεύς, omits (with Badham) the proper name Ἀπολλόδωρος as an adscript. This seems, on the whole, the best and simplest solution. Glaucon, at a distance behind, feigns ignorance of the identity of "the Phalerian," and shouts after Apollodorus "Ho there! you Phalerian, halt," in a "stop thief!" tone. It is plausible to suppose also that a certain contempt is conveyed in the description Φαληρεύς ("Wapping-ite"): port-towns are often places of unsavoury repute: cp. *Phaedr.* 243 C ἐν ναύταις που τετραμμένον: *Juv. Sat.* VIII. 174 "permixtum nautis et furibus ac fugitivis."

For the summons to halt cp. *Ar. Plut.* 440 οὗτος, τί δρᾶς; ὁ δειλότατον σὺ θηρίον, | οὐ περιμενεῖς; *Thesm.* 689 ποῖ ποῖ σὺ φεύγεις; οὗτος, οὗτος, οὐ μενεῖς; also *Eq.* 240, 1354. These passages support the future περιμενεῖς rather than the present: "futurum est fortius imperantis; praesens modeste cohortantis aut lenius postulantis" (Stallb.). For the future as a lively imperative cp. 175 A, 212 D.

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ. Similarly in Aristoph. *Gerytades* (*frag.* 204 ἐν τοῖσι συνδείπνοις ἐπαινῶν Αἰσχύλον) σύνδειπνον is used for the more precise συμπόσιον: and a lost play of Sophocles bore the title Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος ἢ σύνδειπνον ἢ σύνδειπνοι (see *fragg.* 146 ff., Dindf.).

τίνες ἦσαν. For phrases of this kind, "satis libere subjecta orationi," see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* II. 393.

Φοίνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου. Nothing is known of this man. See *Introd.* § II. A.

δικαιοτάτος γὰρ κτλ. τοῦ ἐταίρου is almost equivalent to ἐταίρου γε ὄντος, giving the reason why Apollodorus is δικαιοτάτος.

παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ. Cp. *Hom. Od.* XVII. 173 καὶ σφιν παρεγίγνετο δαιτί: and the exordium of the *Phaedo* (57 A) αὐτὸς, ὁ Φ., παρεγένου Σωκράτει ...ἢ ἄλλου του ἠκούσας;

Παντάπασιν ἰσχυρὸς σοι κτλ. "It is quite evident that his narration was of

ἔοικέ σοι οὐδὲν διηγείσθαι σαφὲς ὁ διηγούμενος, εἰ νεωστὶ ἤγει τὴν  
 συνουσίαν γεγονέναι ταύτην ἣν ἐρωτᾷς, ὥστε καὶ ἐμὲ παραγε-  
 νέσθαι. Ἐγώ γε δὴ, <ἔφη>. Πόθεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων; οὐκ  
 οἶσθ' ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπιδεδήμηκεν, ἀφ' οὗ  
 δ' ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποίημαι ἐκάστης  
 ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, οὐδέπω τρία ἔτη ἐστίν;  
 πρὸ τοῦ δὲ περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι καὶ οἰόμενος τὶ ποιεῖν ἀθλιώ- 173  
 τερος ἢ ὄτουοῦν, οὐχ ἦττον ἢ σὺ νυνί, οἰόμενος δεῖν πάντα μᾶλλον  
 πράττειν ἢ φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ ὅς, Μὴ σκῶπτ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι  
 πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία αὕτη. καὶ γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι Παίδων ὄντων  
 ἡμῶν ἔτι, ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ  
 ἢ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἄρα

172 C καὶ Athenæus, Sz. ἐγώ γε δὴ, ἔφη Bt.: ἐγώ γε δὴ BTW: ἐγώ  
 γὰρ ἔφη(ν) Athen.: ἔγωγε γὰρ, ἔφη Voeg.: ἔγωγ', ἔφη Bdhm. ὦ Λύκων  
 Athen. ἐνθάδε om. Athen. 173 A ἢ Tb: ἦν pr. B: ἢ Wt νῦν TW  
 ἔτι ὄντων ἡμῶν Athen. πρώτη om. Athen.: τὸ πρῶτον Usener ἢ om.  
 Priscian: ἢ ἢ T: ἢ Sz. τὰπινίκια Cobet

the vaguest kind." διηγείσθαι is here the infin. of διηγέιτο. The emphatic  
 repetition of οὐδὲν σαφές is a ground for suspecting that the reference is to a  
 published account in which the facts were distorted.

172 C Πόθεν...ὦ Γλαύκων; "What makes you think so, Glaucon?" There  
 is an implicit negation in the question put thus: cp. *Gorg.* 471 D, *Menex.* 235 c.  
 This Glaucon is perhaps the same as the father of Charmides (*Charm.* 154 A,  
 etc.), but probably not the same as the Glaucon of the *Republic*, though  
 Böckh and Munk would identify the two.

πολλῶν ἐτῶν κτλ. For the bearing of this passage on the dramatic date of  
 this prologue, see *Introd.* § VIII.

ἐπιμελὲς πεποίημαι...εἰδέναι. The nearest Platonic parallel for this con-  
 struction is *Epr.* vii. 334 A πολλοῖς...ὑμνεῖν ταῦτα ἐπιμελές.

→ 173 A περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι, i.e. with no fixed principle of conduct,—  
 "like a wave of the sea, driven with the wind and tossed." Cp. *Tim.* 43 B  
 ἀτάκτως ὅπῃ τύχοι προίεσθαι: Seneca *de vita beata* i. 2 "quamdiu quidem  
 passim vagamur non ducem secuti...conteretur vita inter errores brevis," etc.

οἰόμενος τὶ ποιεῖν. For τὶ, *magnam quid*, cp. 219 c, *Phaedr.* 242 E, etc.

Παίδων ὄντων ἡμῶν ἔτι. Sc. Apollodorus and Glaucon. Plato, too, born  
 about 427 B.C., was a παῖς at the date of Agathon's victory (416 B.C.).

τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ. "Respicit Plato ad tetralogias" (Reynders).

τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἢ. For this (compendious) construction cp. Thuc. i. 60  
 τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὑστερον...ἢ Ποτίδαια ἀπέστη (with Shilleto's note);  
 Lys. XIX. 22.

τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν. "Made a sacrificial feast in honour of his victory." On  
 this occasion it was the author himself who provided the feast and offered the  
 sacrifice. Sometimes however it was the Choregus (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 886), and

πάλαι, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγείτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης; Οὐ  
 B μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ Φοίνικι· Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις,  
 Κυδαθηναίευσ, σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος αἰεὶ· παρεγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ  
 συνουσίᾳ, Σωκράτους ἐραστής ὦν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε, ὡς  
 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ Σωκράτη γε ἔνια ἤδη ἀνηρόμην  
 ὦν ἐκείνου ἤκουσα, καὶ μοι ὠμολόγει καθάπερ ἐκείνος διηγείτο. Τί  
 οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ διηγῆσω μοι; πάντως δὲ ἡ ὁδὸς ἢ εἰς ἄστν ἐπιτηδεῖα  
 πορευομένοις καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν.

C Οὕτω δὴ ἰόντες ἅμα τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦμεθα, ὥστε,  
 ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, οὐκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχω. εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν  
 διηγῆσασθαι, ταῦτα χρῆ ποιεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν  
 μὲν τινὰς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων

173 A τί TW B ἄλλοσπερ BT ἀνυπόδητός τ' Ast  
 παραγεγόνει BT καὶ om. T διηγῆση W: διηγῆ σὺ vulg. δὲ  
 om. al.: γε J.-U.: γὰρ Susemihl C δεῖ: δοκεῖ Hirschig

sometimes the friends of the successful competitor (e.g. Xen. *Symp.* I. 4). Similarly at Rome it was customary for the *dux gregis* to entertain his troupe after a victory (see Plaut. *Rud.* 1417 ff.).

173 B Ἀριστόδημος. See *Introd.* § II. A.

Κυδαθηναίευσ. Schol. Κυδαθηναίων· δῆμος ἐν ἄστει τῆς Πανδιονίδος φυλῆς. καλεῖται δὲ καὶ Κύδαθον. The poet Aristophanes also belonged to this deme.

ἀνυπόδητος. In this peculiarity A. imitated Socrates, see 174 A, 220 B, Ar. *Nub.* 103 τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις· | ὦν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν, *ibid.* 362. It is a peculiarity which would appeal to disciples with a *penchant* for the simple life, such as those of the Cynic persuasion.

ἐραστής. "An admirer." Cp. the application of *εταῖρος* in 172 B *supra*.

ἐκείνου...ἐκείνος. Both pronouns refer to the same person, Aristodemus. The statement here made is not without significance, see *Introd.* § II. A.

Τί οὖν...οὐ διηγῆσω. "Haec interrogatio alacritatem quandam animi et aviditatem sciendi indicat" (Stallb.). Cp. *Meno* 92 D (with E. S. Thompson's *note*, where a full list of the Platonic exx. is given).

πάντως δὲ κτλ. "For to be sure," confirming the preceding clause with a new argument. A good parallel is *Laws* I. 625 A πάντως δ' ἢ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή.

173 C ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον. See 172 A *ad init.*

εἰ οὖν δεῖ...χρῆ. The comma is better placed before ταῦτα, with Usener and Burnet, than after it, with Hug and earlier editors. A similar turn of expression is Soph. *Trach.* 749 εἰ χρῆ μαθεῖν σε, πάντα δὴ φωνεῖν χρεῶν.

αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι. Here Apollodorus seems to claim to be no mere disciple, but himself an exponent of philosophy. So far as it goes this might indicate that Apollodorus represents the real author, Plato. For A.'s delight in philosophic λόγοι, cp. what is said of Phaedrus in *Phaedr.* 228 B, where Socr. too is called ὁ νοσῶν περὶ λόγων.

ἀκούω, χωρὶς τοῦ οἶεσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτὸς τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἐταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἶεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες. καὶ ἴσως αὐτὸ ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ D ἠγείσθε κακοδαίμονα εἶναι, καὶ οἶομαι ὑμᾶς ἀληθῆ οἶεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲντοι ὑμᾶς οὐκ οἶομαι ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

ΕΤΑΙ. Ἄει ὁμοῖος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· ἀεὶ γὰρ σαυτὸν τε κακηγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλίους ἠγείσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. καὶ

173 C χρηματιστῶν vulg.

D ἠγείσθε Coisl.: ἠγείσθαι BT

ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω. This may be explained as a mixture of two constructions, viz. (1) ὑπερφυῶς ἐστὶν ὡς χαίρω, (2) ὑπερφυῶς χαίρω: it is found also in *Gorg.* 496 c, *Phaedo* 66 a, *Theaet.* 155 c (but in all these places some codd. and edd. omit ὡς).

χρηματιστικῶν. For this word in the masc., "money-makers," cp. *Rep.* 581 c ὁ γε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μαθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἶ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: also *Phaedr.* 248 d. In *Meno* 78 c (ἀγαθὰ... χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι) we have an expression of the sentiments of a χρηματιστικὸς. For Apollodorus' sentiment, cp. Isocr. c. *Soph.* 291 d λέγουσι μὲν ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται χρημάτων, ἀργυρίδιον καὶ χρυσίδιον τὸν πλοῦτον ἀποκαλοῦντες (where the ref. is probably to Antisthenes): cp. also what Alcib. says of Socr., 216 e, 219 e. The gloss-hunting critics, strangely enough (as Vahlen remarks), have left the words ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐταίρους unscathed.

173 D ἀληθῆ οἶεσθαι. οἶεσθαι here is substituted for ἠγείσθαι, and the following οὐκ οἶομαι is in antithesis, not to the οἶομαι preceding, but to ἠγείσθε. Apollodorus, conscious of his inferiority to Socrates, his ideal, is willing to admit that he is not as yet wholly εὐδαίμων.

ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα. Sc. ὅτι κακοδαίμονες ἐστε. For this exposure of the true condition of "the children of this world" who are εὐδαίμονες in their own conceit, and despise others, one may cite *Apoc.* iii. 17 "Thou sayest, I am rich and increased with goods and have need of nothing; and knowest not that thou art wretched and miserable and poor and blind and naked."

Ἄει ὁμοῖος εἶ. "Semper tibi hac in re constas" (Stallb.): "you are quite incorrigible." So below we have ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ. Cp. *Charm.* 170 a ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὁμοῖος εἶναι.

ἀτεχνῶς πάντας. This seems to be the sole instance in Plato of this combination "all without exception"; but cp. *Rep.* 432 a δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται.

ἀθλίους. Here a synonym for κακοδαίμονας, the word used above. Cp. *Meno* 78 a τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας; Οἶμαι ἐγωγε...τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμῆν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

πλὴν Σωκράτους. "Save Socrates only": notice the emphasis on these words, repeated twice. We may discern, perhaps, in this an allusion, by way



ὀπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἔπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ· σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους.

**Ε** ΑΠΟΛ. ὦ φίλτατε, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι καὶ παραπαίω;

ΕΤΑΙ. Οὐκ ἄξιον περὶ τούτων, Ἀπολλόδωρε, νῦν ἐρίζειν· ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης, ἀλλὰ διήγησαι τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι.

ΑΠΟΛ. Ἦσαν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνοι τοιοῦδε τινές—μᾶλλον δ'

173 D <sup>ν</sup>μαλακός TW: μαλακός B, Naber. οὐκ: εὖ Bast μὲν γὰρ: μέν γε Bdhm. Sz.: μέντ' ἄρα Mdv. **Ε** (ὦ) Ἀπολλόδωρε Method. Sz.

of antithesis, to the κατηγορία Σωκράτους of the sophist Polycrates (see *Introd.* § II. A).

τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι. There can be little doubt (*pace* Naber) that μανικός, not μαλακός, is the true reading: it is supported by the words μαίνομαι καὶ παραπαίω in Apollodorus's reply. Stallbaum supposes an ellipse of some such phrase as δοκεῖς δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτόθεν before ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ., and (with Wolf) explains μανικός as referring to the vehemence and excess of Apollodorus both in praise and blame: cp. *Polit.* 307 B, and *Apol.* 21 A where Chaerephon (termed μανικός in *Charm.* 153 B) is described as σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειεν. But the connexion of the sentence ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ. with the preceding clause is better brought out by Hug; he supplies (after οὐκ οἶδα) "so ganz ohne Grund wirds wohl nicht sein," so that the line of thought is—"Though I do not know exactly why you got the nickname 'fanatic'—yet in your speeches at any rate you do something to justify the title." For a similar use of μὲν γὰρ cp. *Polit.* 264 C ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κρήναις τάχ' ἂν ἴσως εἴης ἡσθημένος. For μανικός cp. also *Meno* 91 C where Anytus regards παρά σοφιστὰς εἰσεῖν as a sign of μανία: and *Acts* xxvi. 24 Μαίνη Παῦλε· τὰ πολλὰ σε γράμματα εἰς μανίαν περιτρέπει.

ἀγριαίνεις. "Rage like a wild beast," "snarl and snap." Cp. *Rep.* 493 B (θρέμμα μέγα) ἡμεροῦνται τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει.

173 E ὦ φίλτατε κτλ. Ironic—"Why, my very dear Sir, it is surely quite obvious that in holding this view about myself and others I display madness and eccentricity!"

παραπαίω. A ἅπαξ εἰρημένον in Plato. For the musical metaphor cp. Ophelia's "I see that sovereign and most noble reason, Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh."

Οὐκ ἄξιον...ἐρίζειν. "We mustn't quarrel." ἐρίζειν, though here used jocularly, is properly a strong term, cp. *Prot.* 337 B ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή: *Rep.* 454 A οὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι (see Adam *ad loc.*).

μᾶλλον δ'. Instead of beginning at once with the speech of Phaedrus, Apollodorus proceeds to give an account of the preliminary incidents which led up to the λόγοι. For the significance of this, see *Introd.* § II. A.



ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκείνος διηγείτο καὶ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διηγῆ- 174  
σασθαι.

II. Ἐφη γάρ οἱ Σωκράτῃ ἐντυχεῖν λελουμένον τε καὶ τὰς  
βλαύτας ὑποδεδεμένον, ἃ ἐκείνος ὀλιγάκις ἐποίει· καὶ ἐρέσθαι  
αὐτὸν ὅποι ἴοι οὕτω καλὸς γεγεννημένος. καὶ τὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἐπὶ  
δεῖπνον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος. χθὲς γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις,  
φοβηθεὶς τὸν ὄχλον· ὠμολόγησα δ' εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. ταῦτα  
δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω. ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦ δ' ὅς,  
πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἂν ἰέναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον; καὶ γὰρ, B

174 A ἄ: δ Hertlein (ἐ) ἐρέσθαι Voeg. Sz. τήμερον: τὴν  
σήμερον vulg. B ἐθέλειν ἂν secl. Cobet Jn. ἂν ἰέναι Steph.: ἀνίεναι BT

ἐξ ἀρχῆς...πειράσομαι διηγῆσασθαι. The same formula occurs in *Phaedo*  
59 c, *Euthyd.* 272 d, *Erist.* vii. 324 b.

174 A Ἐφη γάρ. Sc. ὁ Ἀριστοδῆμος. The whole narrative of the dialogue  
from this point on is dependent upon this initial ἔφη and therefore written in  
*or. obliqua*. οἱ (*σιβι*) = Ἀριστοδῆμος.

λελουμένον. For the practice of bathing and anointing before meals see  
Hom. *Od.* vi. 96—7, Xen. *Symp.* i. 7: Ar. *Plut.* 614 εὐωχεῖσθαι...λουσάμενος,  
λιπαρὸς χωρῶν ἐκ βαλανείου. The comic poets were fond of gibing at Socrates  
and philosophers in general as “unwashed,” e.g. Ar. *Av.* 1554 ἄλουτος οὐ  
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης: id. *Nub.* 835 ff.: Aristophan *ap.* Mein. iii. 360 ff.  
Aristotle, however, was a champion of the bath, *Athen.* 178 F ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ  
ἦν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης (*fr.* 165), ἦκειν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον σὺν ἰδρώτι πολλῷ  
καὶ κονιορτῷ.

τὰς βλαύτας. Schol. βλαύτας· ὑποδήματα. οἱ δὲ βλαντία, σανδάλια ἰσχνά.  
For Socrates' habit of going barefoot, see 220 B *infra*, *Phaedr.* 229 A, Xen.  
*Mem.* i. 6. 2, and the note on ἀνυπόδητος, 173 B *supra*.

→ ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην. ταῦτα is better taken (with Hug and Hommel)  
as accus. of “internal object” than (with Stallb.) as accus. of “remoter  
object,” equiv. to διὰ ταῦτα (cp. *Prot.* 310 E). Elsewhere in Plato καλλωπί-  
ζεσθαι means to “plume oneself,” “swagger,” e.g. *Rep.* 605 d. Observe the  
word-play: “I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man”  
(Jowett): cp. the proverb ὁμοῖος ὁμοίῳ (195 B).

παρὰ καλόν. Sc. Ἀγάθωνα—“to Agathon's (house)”; equiv. to εἰς Ἀγά-  
θωνος above. For “the handsome Agathon,” see *Prot.* 315 d—e (τὴν ἰδέαν  
πάνυ καλός), Ar. *Thesm.* 191 ff.

πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 176 B πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν; *Prot.*  
352 B, *Parm.* 131 E. Cobet's excision of ἐθέλειν ἂν is wanton: cp. (with Ast)  
*Phaedo* 62 C τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν.

174 B ἄκλητος. The jester (γελοιοποιός) who frequents feasts as an  
uninvited guest seems to have been a stock character in Epicharmus; and  
in Xen. *Symp.* Philippus is a person of this type. Araros the comic poet  
was, apparently, the first to dub them γαράσιτοι. Cp. also Archil. 78. 3 οὐδὲ

ἔφη, εἶπον ὅτι Οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύης. "Ἐπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ

174 B μεταβάλλοντες B, Athen., Sz.: μεταβαλόντες T, Bt.

μὴν κληθεῖς (ὑφ' ἡμῶν) ἦλθες, οἷα δὴ φίλος; and Plut. *Q. Conv.* VII. 6. 1, p. 707 B τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐπικλήτων ἔθος, οὓς νῦν "σκιάς" καλοῦσιν, οὐ κεκλημένους αὐτούς, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν κεκλημένων ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἀγομένους, ἐζητείτο πόθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰδοκεῖ δ' ἀπὸ Σωκράτους Ἀριστόδημον ἀναπέισαντος οὐ κεκλημένον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος ἵεναι σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ παθόντα "τι γελοῖον" (see 174 C, with note). In Lat. *vocare* is similarly used of "inviting" (*aliquem ad cenam* Ter. *And.* 2. 6. 22), and *invocatus* = ἄκλητος in Plaut. *Capt.* 1. 1. 2 ("invocatus soleo esse in convivio").

διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες. διαφθείρω is sometimes used of "spoiling" or "stultifying" a statement or argument, e.g. *Gorg.* 495 A, *Prot.* 338 D. And μεταβάλλειν of linguistic alteration (transposition, etc.), as in *Cratyl.* 404 c (Φερσεφόνη for Φερρέφαττα).

ὡς ἄρα κτλ. The force of ἄρα is to indicate that the proverb, when amended, "still, after all" holds good. Two forms of the proverb are extant, viz. (1) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασι (see Schol. *ad h. l.*, Athen. IV. 27); and (2) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασι. The latter form is vouched for by the *poeta anon.* quoted by Athen. I. 8 A (Bergk *P. L. G.* p. 704), ἀγαθὸς πρὸς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἰστιασάμενος ἦκον: Bacchyl. *fr.* 33 (22 Blass) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθῶν δαίτας εὐόχθους ἐπέρχονται δίκαιοι φῶτες [cp. Zenob. II. 19 αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν κτέ. οὕτως ὁ Βακχυλίδης ἐχρήσατο τῇ παροιμίᾳ, ὡς Ἡρακλείους ἐπιφοιτήσαντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν Κήκος τοῦ Τραχυνίου καὶ οὕτως εἰπόντος]: Cratinus *fr.* 111 (Mein.) οἶδ' αὐθ' ἡμεῖς, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς | λόγος, αὐτομάτους ἀγαθοὺς ἵεναι | κομψῶν ἐπὶ δαίτα θεατῶν: also a number of post-Platonic passages cited by Hug, such as Plut. *Q. Conv.* VII. 6 *ad fin.* According to the Scholiast (1) is the original form, which was altered (μεταλλάξας) to (2) by Cratinus and Eupolis; and this is the view adopted by Stallbaum, Rettig and others. But Hug's elaborate investigation of the matter proves convincingly, I think, that the Scholiast is wrong and that the form with ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν was the original, of which the form with ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν is a parody by Eupolis (or Cratinus). This view, first suggested by Schleiermacher, is also supported by Bergk (*ad* Bacchyl. *fr.* 33): "Schol. Plat. Symp. 174 B a vero aberrat cum dicit a principio δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας fuisse, quamquam fidem habuerunt cum alii tum Müller *Dor.* II. 481: neque enim par fuit Herculem tam gravi opprobrio hospitem laedere. Eupolis primus, ut videtur, ludibundus δειλῶν substituit. Locum difficilem Platonis, qui falso criminatur Homerum corripuisse proverbium quod ille omnino non respexit, nemodum probabiliter expedit. Alia varietas, quam nostri homines commenti sunt, δειλοὶ δειλῶν, omni auctoritate destituta est." The main difficulty in the way of accepting this view lies in the words διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες. For even if (with most modern editors) we accept Lachmann's brilliant conjecture Ἀγαθων'(ι), the change thus involved is so slight that it could hardly be called a διαφθορά, nor could the alteration involved in the Homeric account be spoken of as a

“Ἀγάθων ἐπὶ δαΐτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί.” Ὀμηρος μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον διαφθεῖραι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑβρίσαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν· ποιήσας γὰρ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν C ἄνδρα τὰ πολεμικά, τὸν δὲ Μενέλεων “μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν,” θυσίαν ποιουμένου καὶ ἐστιῶντος τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἔλθοντα τὸν Μενέλεων ἐπὶ τὴν θοίην, χεῖρω ὄντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ

174 B Ἀγάθων Lachmann: ἀγαθῶν BT διαφερόντως + ἄνδρα + καὶ ἐστιῶντος om. Athen.

double one (διαφθεῖραι καὶ ὑβρίσαι). The former objection, if it stood alone, might be obviated by the device of inserting μή before διαφθείρωμεν: but in view of the passage as a whole this device is inadmissible. We seem forced to conclude that, whatever the original form of the proverb may have been (and as to this Hug's view is probably right), the form which Plato had here in mind was the form (1) given by Eupolis: and if Plato knew this form to be only a parody of the original (2), we must suppose further that the serious way in which he deals with it, as if it really were a “wise saw,” is only a piece of his fun—a playful display of Socratic irony. (Cp. Teuffel, *Rhein. Mus.* xxix. pp. 141—2.)

Ἀγάθων...ἀγαθοί. For the dative cp. *Prot.* 321 c ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεύς. Similar exx. of paronomasia occur in 185 c, 198 c, *Gorg.* 513 B (δῆμος and Demus, son of Pyrilampes), *Rep.* 614 B (ἄλκιμος, Alcinous): cp. Riddell *Digest* § 323. Teuffel (*loc. cit.*) prefers to retain ἀγαθῶν, partly because of the plur. δαΐτας, partly to avoid the elision of the *iota*; but neither of these objections is serious, and as to δαΐτας, the feast in question lasted at least two days, which might in itself suffice to justify the plural. Jowett's transl. implies that he retains ἀγαθῶν and supposes (1) to have been the original form of the proverb “demolished” by Socr. and Homer.

Ὀμηρος μὲν γὰρ. The antithesis—ἡμεῖς δὲ μόνον διαφθείρομεν, or the like—is easily supplied from the context: for μὲν γὰρ, elliptical, cp. 176 c, and 173 D *supra*. The suggestion that Homer wilfully distorted a proverb which in his day was non-existent is, as Hug observes, obviously jocose.

ὑβρίσαι. The word may retain a flavour of its juridical sense—“liable to a criminal prosecution for assault and battery”: and if so, διαφθεῖρα too may hint at the crime of “seduction.” Homer is chargeable not only with seducing but with committing a criminal assault upon the virgin soundness of the proverb.

174 C μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. “A craven spearman.” *Il.* xvii. 587 οἶον δὲ Μενέλαον ὑπετρέσας, ὅς τὸ πάρος περ | μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής. μαλθακός, as a variant for μαλακός, is used by P. also in 195 D, *Phaedr.* 239 c. Both forms, Μενέλεως and Μενέλαος, are found in Attic prose; the latter, e.g., in *Euthyd.* 288 c. In Athenaeus v. 3, 188 B we have a criticism of this treatment of Menelaus.

ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἔλθοντα. See *Il.* ii. 408 αὐτόματος δὲ οἱ ἦλθε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος: cp. Athen. v. 178 A. Thus the ὑβρις with which Homer is charged

ἀμείνωνος. ταῦτ' ἀκούσας εἰπεῖν ἔφη "Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὁμηρον φαῦλος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοίνην ἄκλητος. ὄρα οὖν ἄγων με τί ἀπο-  
**D** λογήσῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁμολογήσω ἄκλητος ἦκειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σοῦ κεκλημένος. "Σύν τε δὺ," ἔφη, "ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ τοῦ" βουλευ-  
 σόμεθα ὃ τι ἐροῦμεν. ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν.

Τοιαῦτ' ἄττα σφᾶς ἔφη διαλεχθέντας ἰέναι. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη  
 ἑαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν πορεύεσθαι ὑπο-  
 λειπόμενον, καὶ περιμένοντος οὗ κελεύειν προϊέναι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.  
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, ἀνεφωγμένην κατα-  
**E** λαμβάνειν τὴν θύραν, καὶ τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν. οἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ εὐθύς παῖδά τινα ἔνδοθεν ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν οὗ κατέκειντο οἱ  
 ἄλλοι, καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἤδη μέλλοντας δειπνεῖν· εὐθύς δ' οὖν

174 **C** ὄρα...τί Bdhm.: ἄρα...τι B: ἄρα...τι T (τί W) ἀγαγὼν Creuzer  
**D** ὁ τοῦ Gottleber (Hom. K 224): ὁδοῦ BTW: om. Hermog. ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν  
 T: ἀλλ' ἐώμεν B πορευόμενον ὑπολείπεσθαι Rohde Sz. δὲ (ἐ) Cobet Sz.:  
 δ' ἐ Baiter J.-U. **E** οἱ Photius, b: οἱ BT: τὸν W (τῶν) ἔνδοθεν  
 Porson Sz. J.-U. Bt.: τῶν ἔνδον Photius, Jn.

consists in making not an ἀγαθός but a μαλθακός (=δειλός) come ἄκλητος ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας.

ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς. σοφός, "accomplished," was "a fashionable epithet of praise in Plato's time, especially applied to poets" (see *Rep.* 331 E, 489 B, with Adam's notes).

ὄρα οὖν κτλ. This correction of the traditional ἄρα...τι is certain. Cp. 189 A ὄρα τί ποιεῖς: *Phaedo* 86 D ὄρα οὖν...τί φήσομεν. For the dangers of violating etiquette on such occasions, see *Ar. Av.* 983 ff. αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν ἄκλητος ἰὼν ἀνθρώπος ἀλαζῶν | λυπῆ θύοντας καὶ σπλαγχνεύειν ἐπιθυμῆ, | δὴ τότε χρῆ τύπτειν αὐτὸν πλευρῶν τὸ μεταξύ.

174 **D** Σύν τε δὺ' κτλ. See *Il.* x. 224 (Diomedes loq.) σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω καὶ τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν | ὅππως κέρδος ἔη. The same verses are quoted more exactly in *Prot.* 348 c: cp. also *Arist. Pol.* III. 1287<sup>b</sup> 13; *Cic. ad fam.* IX. 7. For exx. of how Plato "variis modis multis affert aliena," see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. pp. 476 ff.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι. The infin. in place of the indic. is due to assimilation: cp. *Rep.* 614 B ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι: see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 755.

174 **E** καὶ τι...γελοῖον παθεῖν. It was an awkward situation in smart society. Cp. *Plut. Conv.* 6 p. 628 ἔλαθε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑπολειφθεῖς ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ δὲ παρεῖσηλθεν, ἀτεχνῶς σκιά προβαδίζουσα σώματος ἐξόπισθε τὸ φῶς ἔχοντος.

οἱ (σιβί) goes with ἀπαντήσαντα. Porson's insertion (from Photius) of τῶν before ἔνδοθεν is no improvement: ἔνδοθεν is to be taken with ἀπαντήσαντα, and there is no indication that there were any ἐξωθεν παῖδες.

ὡς ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ὦ, φάναι, Ἀριστόδημε, εἰς καλὸν ἦκεις ὅπως συνδειπνήσης· εἰ δ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἔνεκα ἤλθες, εἰς αὖθις ἀναβαλοῦ, ὡς καὶ χθὲς ζητῶν σε ἵνα καλέσαιμι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ ἰδεῖν. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτη ἡμῖν πῶς οὐκ ἄγεις; καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, μεταστρεφόμενος οὐδαμοῦ ὁρῶ Σωκράτη ἐπόμενον· εἶπον οὖν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ Σωκράτους ἦκοιμι, κληθεῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνου δεῦρ' ἐπὶ δεῖπνον. Καλῶς γ', ἔφη, ποιῶν σύ· ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἔστιν οὗτος; Ὅπισθεν ἐμοῦ 175 ἄρτι εἰσήει· ἀλλὰ θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς ποῦ ἂν εἴη. Οὐ σκέψη, ἔφη, παῖ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ εἰσάξεις Σωκράτη; σὺ δ', ἦ δ' ὄς, Ἀριστόδημε, παρ' Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακλίνου.

III. Καὶ ἔ μὲν ἔφη ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα κατακέοιτο· ἄλλον δέ τινα τῶν παίδων ἦκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἔστηκε καὶ οὐ καλοῦντος οὐκ ἐθέλει εἰσιέναι. Ἄτοπόν γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐκ οὐ καλεῖς αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ἀφήσεις; καὶ ὃς ἔφη εἰπεῖν Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἔατε

174 E ὦ T: ὦ B συνδειπνήσεις Laur. xiv. 85, Bekk. Sz. τ' ἦ T: τε B ἔφην T οὐδαμῆ TW ἦκοιμι Tb: ἦκοι μη B γ' T: om. B 175 A εἰσήειν Cobet ὅπου Hirschig ἔ μὲν Bast: ἐ Steph.: ἐμέ BT ἔφην T ἵνα (που) vulg.: ὅπου Tmg. ἐν τῷ Steph. J.-U.: ἐν του Mdvig. καὶ οὐ BT: κάμου W, Bt.: καὶ σοῦ t καλοῖς Tmg. W: κάλει rec. b αὐτὸν: αὖθις Herwerden ἀφήσης T

εἰς καλὸν ἦκεις. "Soyez le bienvenu!" For the construction see Goodwin, § 317.

χθὲς ζητῶν σε κτλ. Hug regards this as a piece of polite mendacity on the part of Agathon. Are we, then, to construe Alcibiades' statement, χθὲς μὲν οὐχ οἷός τε κτλ. (212 E) as a similar exhibition of "Salonweltlichkeit"?

175 A παρ' Ἐ. κατακλίνου. Usually each κλίνη held two, but in 175 c it is said that Agathon had a couch to himself, while in 213 A we find three on the same couch.

ἀπονίζειν τὸν παῖδα. The article indicates that a special slave was set apart for this duty. For the custom of foot-washing see Plut. *Phoc.* 20; Petron. *Sat.* 31; *Evang. Luc.* vii. 44; *Joann.* xiii. 5. For the hand-washing see *Ar. frag.* 427 φέρε, παῖ, ταχέως κατὰ χεῖρὸς ὕδωρ, | παράπεμπε τὸ χειρόμακτρον.

Σωκράτης οὗτος κτλ. The *ipsissima verba* of the παῖς are here repeated, hence the use of οὗτος and of the def. article with προθύρῳ: in the corrections proposed by Madvig and Herwerden this point is overlooked. For πρόθυρον, "porch," i.e. the space between the house-door (αὐλεία) and the street, see Smith *D. A.* i. 661<sup>b</sup>.

οὐκ οὐ καλεῖς κτλ. καλεῖς is of course future, not pres. as Rückert wrongly supposed. For the constr. see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 299.



**B** αὐτόν. ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἐνίοτε ἀποστάς ὅποι ἂν τύχη ἔστηκεν. ἤξει δὲ αὐτίκα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. μὴ οὖν κινεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἐᾶτε. Ἄλλ' οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη φάναι τὸν Ἀγαθωνα. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες, τοὺς ἄλλους ἐστιᾶτε. πάντως παρατίθετε ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε; ἐπειδὴν τις ὑμῖν μὴ ἐφeskτήκη—δὲ ἐγὼ οὐδεπώποτε ἐποίησα· νῦν οὖν, νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκλήθη-  
**C** σθαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε, ἵνα ὑμᾶς ἐπαινῶμεν.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ

175 B τοῦτο T Priscian: τοιοῦτον W ἐνίοτε...ἔστηκεν del. Voeg. ἔφη T: om. B ἐπειδὴν τις...μὴ BT: ἐπεὶ τις...οὐ μὴ L. Schmidt: ἐπεὶ οὐ δὴ τις...μὴ Hug: ἐπεὶ δὴ τις...οὐ μὴ Sz: ἐπεὶ καὶ τίσις...μὴ (ἐφeskτήκοι) Verm.: εἴ γ' ὁ ταμίας...μὴ Usener: ἐπειδὴν αὐτός...μὴ cj. Bt.: εἶγε ἀνάγκη τις... μὴ coniciebam ἐφeskτήκη T: ἐφeskτήκη W: ἐφeskτήκει B: "latet ἐφέστηκεν" Usener

175 B πάντως παρατίθετε. For the use of πάντως with imper., cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 27 πάντως τοίνυν...δείξόν μοι: *id.* *Oecon.* XII. 11, III. 12. For παρατίθημι of "putting on the table," cp. *Rep.* 372 C τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς κτλ. Reynders adopts the reading πάντας, καὶ παρατίθετε.

ἐπειδὴν...μὴ ἐφeskτήκη. These words are difficult. They should naturally mean (as Stallb. puts it) "si quando nemo vobis est propositus"; and so Stallb. proposes to construe them, taking the clause as dependent on and limiting ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε. This, however, is, as Hug argues, almost certainly wrong. If we retain the text of the mss. we can only explain the phrase by assuming an ellipse—"serve up what dishes you like (as you usually do) whenever no one is in command." So Zeller renders "tragt uns getrost auf, was ihr wollt, wie ihr es gewohnt seid, wenn man euch nicht unter Aufsicht nimmt," etc.; and Rieckher (*Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. p. 307) "Machet es wie ihr es immer macht, wenn man euch nicht beaufsichtigt (und das habe ich ja noch nie gethan), und setzt uns vor was ihr möget." Most of the emendations offered (see *crit. n.*) are based on the assumption that the clause in question qualifies the leading clause (πάντως παρατίθετε): none of them are convincing, and the construction οὐ μὴ...ἐφeskτήκη (the pres.-perf.) assumed by Schanz and Hug lacks support. If compelled to resort to conjecture, the best device might be to read εἴ γε μὴ for ἐπειδὴν, cut out the μὴ after ὑμῖν, and change the mood of the verb to ἐφέστηκεν—following in part the suggestions of Usener. The ordinary text does not admit of Jowett's rendering, "serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves." As regards the force of ὁ...ἐποίησα, L. Schmidt explains the clause to mean "nunquam autem rem ita ut nunc institui," implying that the concession to the slaves was unusual: Teuffel, on the contrary, sees in it a piece of ostentation on the part of Agathon, boasting of his humanity. The former is clearly wrong.



εἰσιέναι. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἃ δὲ οὐκ ἔαν. ἤκειν οὖν αὐτὸν οὐ πολὺν χρόνον, ὡς εἰώθει, διατρίψαντα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα σφᾶς μεσοῦν δειπνοῦντας. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα—τυγχάνειν γὰρ ἔσχατον κατακείμενον μόνον— Δεῦρ', ἔφη φάναι, Σώκρατες, παρ' ἐμὲ κατάκεισο, ἵνα καὶ τοῦ D σοφοῦ ἀπτόμενός σου ἀπολαύσω, ὃ σοι προσέστη ἐν τοῖς προθύ-


175 C εἰ δὲ BW: \*\*\* δὲ T (τὸν δὲ fuisse videtur): αὐτὸν δὲ vulg.: ἰ δὲ cj. Bekk. οὐκ ἔαν B: οὐκᾶν T D ἀπτόμενός σου TW: om. B, J.-U. Sz. προσέστη T: πρόσσεστιν B

175 C **πολλάκις κελεύειν.** This is an ex. of the pres. infin. representing an impf. indic.: "He said, *ἔδειπνούμεν, ὃ δὲ Σ. οὐκ εἰσῆει· ὃ οὖν Ἀ. ἐκέλευεν· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ εἶων*" (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 119, where see parallels). The accus. *εἰ*, of the speaker, is here used in preference to the more regular nomin. (*αὐτός*) in order to balance the accus. *τὸν Ἀγάθωνα*: cp. *Gorg.* 474 B *ἐγὼ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ...ἡγείσθαι*, and below 175 E.

**ὡς εἰώθει.** To be taken closely with *οὐ π. χρ.*: we should rather say "contrary to his usual custom," the sense being "he arrived unusually soon for him." For a striking instance of Socrates' *ἔθος* see 220 c, where *πολὺν χρόνον διέτριψεν*.

**μάλιστα...δειπνοῦντας.** For *μάλιστα* of approximate measurement, cp. *Parm.* 127 B *περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα*: *Tim.* 21 B, *Crato* 43 A. Nowhere else in Plato is *μεσοῦν* joined with a participle, nor does L. and S. supply any parallel.

**ἔσχατον...μόνον.** Agathon occupied the last *κλίνη* on the right: this was the "lowest seat" at the table, and commonly taken, in politeness, by the host. The seat of honour (*προνομή*) was the left-hand place on the *κλίνη* furthest to the left. Thus if four *κλίμαι* are placed in a row, numbered A—D, and each seating two persons, the person who occupies A<sup>1</sup> is termed *πρώτος*, and the occupant of D<sup>2</sup> *ἔσχατος*: as thus



At this "Banquet" Phaedrus as occupying A<sup>1</sup> is described as *πρώτος* in 177 D: see also the discussion between Socrates and Alcibiades in 222 E. Cp. Theophr. *Char.* 21 *ὃ δὲ μικροφιλότιμος τοιοῦτός τις οἷος σπουδάσαι ἐπὶ δείπνον κληθεὶς παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καλέσαντα δειπνήσαι*: Stob. *Flor.* XIII. 36 *Διονύσιος...ἀτιμάζων αὐτὸν... κατέκλινεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ χώρᾳ*.

175 D **τοῦ σοφοῦ...ἀπολαύσω.** *τοῦ σοφοῦ* is neut., being the antecedent of *ὃ*, not in agreement with *σου*: "that I may enjoy the piece of wisdom which occurred to you." The omission of *ἀπτόμενός σου* by B is probably accidental: without the words (as Teuffel observes) Socr.'s remark (*ἐὰν ἀπτ.*) would be less natural.

ροισ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εὗρες αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης. καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη καθίζεσθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐ ἂν ἔχοι, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἢ σοφία ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληρεστέρου εἰς τὸ κενώτερον ρεῖν ἡμῶν, ἐὰν ἀπτώμεθα ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κύλιξιν ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ρέον ἐκ τῆς πληρεστέρας εἰς τὴν **E** κενωτέραν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ σοφία, πολλοῦ τιμῶμαι τὴν παρὰ σοὶ κατάκλισιν· οἶμαι γάρ με παρὰ σοῦ πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς σοφίας πληρωθήσεσθαι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὴ φαύλη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὔσα, ἡ δὲ σὴ λαμπρά τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφανῆς ἐγένετο πρῶην ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίοις. Ἐβριστῆς εἰ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Ἀγάθων. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον διαδικασόμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ

175 D τὸ BT: τὸν corr. Coisl., J.-U. Sz. ἐρίου: ὄργανου Cornarius: ὕλισθηρίου vel ἡθηνίου Fischer ἐκ τῆς...κενωτέραν del. Voeg. Naber  
**E** τιμῶμαι T: τιμῶμεν B: τιμῶ μὲν Stallb. με del. Usener καὶ B: ἢ καὶ TW ἢ γε T: εἴ γε B καὶ: ἀλλὰ vulg.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης. The protasis is suppressed: Stallbaum supplies εἰ μὴ εὗρες αὐτό: while Hug explains the phrase as a conflate of two thoughts, viz. (1) οὐκ ἂν ἀπέστης εἰ μὴ εὗρες, and (2) οὐ προαπέστης πρὶν εὐρεῖν.

εἰς τὸ κενώτερον. Ficinus renders "ut in vacuum hominem ex pleniore ipso contactu profluere," and many edd. adopt τόν in preference to τό (so too Jowett's transl.).

ὥσπερ τὸ...ὕδωρ κτλ. Editors from Rückert down generally accept the explanation of this passage offered by Geel. Two cups, one empty the other full, are placed in contact: a woollen thread, with one end inserted in the full cup, the other hanging into the empty cup, serves by the law of capillarity to convey the fluid from the one to the other.

175 E φαύλη...καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος. "Meagre" in quantity and "questionable" in quality, in antithesis to πολλή in quantity and καλή in quality.

πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα. Hug supposes an astral allusion—"like a quickly-rising star." This, however, is not necessarily conveyed by the term ἐπίδοσις, for which cp. *Theaet.* 146 B ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει, and the intrans. use of ἐπιιδόναι, *Prot.* 318 A, *Theaet.* 150 D, etc.

οὕτω σφόδρα κτλ. Notice the ironical tone—exaggeration coupled with a purple patch of poetic diction: "shone out with such dazzling splendour before the eyes of three myriads of Greek spectators."

Ἐβριστῆς εἰ. "What a scoffer you are!" Observe that ὕβρις is one of the main charges laid against Socr. by Alcibiades also (219 c, etc.); cp. *Introd.* § II. B.

ταῦτα...διαδικασόμεθα. "We will formally plead our claims in regard to these heads." "Technically *diadicasia* denotes the proceedings in a contest for preference between two or more rival parties either as to the possession

περὶ τῆς σοφίας, δικαστῆ χρώμενοι τῷ Διονύσῳ· νῦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ δεῖπνον πρῶτα τρέπου.

IV. Μετὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, κατακλινέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ 176  
δειπνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπονδὰς τε σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι καὶ  
ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν  
πότον· τὸν οὖν Πausανίαν ἔφη λόγου τοιούτου τινὸς κατάρχειν.  
Εἶπεν, ἄνδρες, φάναι, τίνα τρόπον ῥᾶστα πióμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν  
λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πᾶνυ χαλεπῶς ἔχω ὑπὸ τοῦ χθῆς πότου καὶ

175 E περὶ τῆς σοφίας del. Hirschig 176 A (ὡς) καὶ τῶν Rohde  
καὶ τᾶλλα: κατὰ Ast: καὶ...νομιζόμενα post ποιήσασθαι transp. Steinhart  
ἄνδρες: ἄνδρες Sauppe Sz. ῥᾶστα BT: ἡδιστα γρ. t

of property or as to exemption from personal or pecuniary liabilities...The essential difference between *diadicasia* and the ordinary *δίκαι* is, that all claimants are similarly situated with respect to the subject of dispute, and no longer classified as plaintiffs and defendants" (Smith, *D. A.* i. 620<sup>b</sup>). *περὶ τῆς σοφίας*, added loosely as an afterthought, serves to define *ταῦτα*: Teuffel, as against Jahn, rightly defends the words; and they serve to strike one of the keynotes of the dialogue.

*δικαστῆ...τῷ Διονύσῳ*. Dionysus is an appropriate choice since it was under his auspices that Agathon (*πρόην*) had engaged in an *ἀγών* and won a prize for poetic *σοφία*. There may also lie in the words (as Wolf and Rettig suppose) a jocular allusion to the *σοφία* which is *ars bibendi*, wherein also Agathon was *δυνατώτατος* (176 c). Compare also the pastoral pipe-contests of Theocritus, and Theognis 993 ff. *εἰ...ἄθλον... | σοί τ' εἶη καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίης πέρι θηρισάντων, | γνοιῆς χ' ὄσσον ὄνων κρέσσονες ἡμίονοι*. Cp. *Introduct.* § II. B.

176 A *σπονδὰς...νομιζόμενα*. Plato spares us the details of the ritual proper to such occasions. From other sources we may gather that it included (1) a libation of unmixed wine to *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων* (*Ar. Eq.* 105, etc.); (2) the clearing, or removal, of the tables (*Xen. Symp.* II. 1); (3) the fetching, by the *παῖδες*, of a second supply of water for the hands (*Ar. Vesp.* 1217 etc.); (4) the distribution of wreaths among the guests (*Theogn.* 1001, *Ar. Acharn.* 1145); (5) the pouring out of three libations, viz. (a) to Zeus Olympios and the Olympian gods, (b) to the Heroes, and (c) to Zeus Soter (*Schol. ad Phileb.* 66 D; *Aesch. Suppl.* 27, etc.); (6) the singing of a *Te Deum* (*ἄδειν τὸν θεόν, παιανίζειν Xen. Symp.* II. 1, *Alcman fr.* 24 B, etc.): see Hug's exhaustive note. Rückert wrongly makes *τᾶλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα* depend on *ἄσαντας*: supply (as Reynders) *ποιησαμένους*. For *καὶ τᾶλλα*, cp. (with Vahlen) *Euthyd.* 294 c, *Rep.* 400 D: for *τὰ νομιζόμενα, quae moris sunt*, cp. *II. Alc.* 151 B.

*τίνα τρόπον ῥᾶστα*. *Schol.* ῥᾶστα· τὸ ἡδιστα ἐνταῦθα σημαίνει. Cp. *Od.* IV. 565 *τῇ περ* (sc. in Elysium) *ῥήιστη βιοτή*: and the combination *ῥᾶστα καὶ ἡδιστα*, *Xen. Mem.* II. 1. 9. (See also Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 212 ff. *ad Phaedo* 81 c).

*πᾶνυ χαλεπῶς ἔχω*. The notion is "I was roughly handled in my bout with the wine-god yesterday": cp. *Theaet.* 142 B *χαλεπῶς ἔχει ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν*.

δέομαι ἀναψυχῆς τινός, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλούς—παρήστε  
**B** γὰρ χθές· σκοπεῖσθε οὖν, τίνι τρόπῳ ἂν ὡς ῥᾶστα πίνοιμεν. τὸν  
οὖν Ἀριστοφάνη εἰπεῖν, Τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Πausανία, τὸ  
παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευάσασθαι ῥαστώνην τινὰ τῆς πόσεως· καὶ  
γὰρ αὐτός εἰμι τῶν χθές βεβαπτισμένων. ἀκούσαντα οὖν αὐτῶν  
ἔφη Ἐρυξίμαχον τὸν Ἀκουμένου Ἡ καλῶς, φάναι, λέγετε. καὶ  
ἔτι ἐνός δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκούσαι, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν  
Ἀγάθων. Οὐδαμῶς φάναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔρρωμαι. Ἐρμαιον ἂν εἴη  
**C** ἡμῖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὡς εἴκειν, ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Φαίδρῳ καὶ  
τοῖσδε, εἰ ὑμεῖς οἱ δυνατώτατοι πίνειν νῦν ἀπειρήκατε· ἡμεῖς μὲν  
γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀδύνατοι. Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ  
ἀμφοτέρα, ὥστ' ἐξαρκέσει αὐτῷ ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν  
μοι δοκεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πολὺν  
πίνειν οἶνον, ἴσως ἂν ἐγὼ περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι οἶον ἐστι τάληθῆ  
λέγων ἦττον ἂν εἴην ἀηδής. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε οἶμαι κατά-  
**D** δηλον γεγονέναι ἐκ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ  
μέθη ἐστὶ· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐκὼν εἶναι πόρρω ἐθελήσαιμι ἂν πιεῖν

176 A παρήστε BTW: παρήτε in mg. rec. b B παρασκευάσασθαι TW:  
παρασκευάζεσθαι B αὐτῶν T: αὐτὸν B Ἐρυξίμαχον T: τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον B  
ἀκουμένου W: ἀκουμένου BT καὶ: καίτοι Rohde ἐρρῶσθαι secl. Cobet  
πίνειν, Ἀγάθωνος Vahlen C ἐξαιρῶ Heindorf: ἐξαίρω BT ἀηδής T: ἀηδης B

176 B βεβαπτισμένων: "soaked," "drenched." Cp. Lucian *Bacch.* 7 κερη-  
καὶ βεβαπτισμένῳ: and the use of βεβρεγμένος, Eubul. *Incert.* 5; μέθη βαροῦντι  
βρεχθεῖς Eur. *El.* 326; Sen. *Ep.* 83 mersus vino et madens; Hor. *C.* iv. 5. 39  
dicimus...sicci...dicimus uvidi. A similar "baptism" is described in Evenos  
2. 5—6, εἰ δὲ πολὺς πνεύσειεν (sc. ὁ Βάκχος) ἀπέστραπται μὲν ἔρωτας, | βαπτίζει  
δ' ὑπνω γείτονι τοῦ θανάτου: of which we find an echo in Clem. Alex. *Paed.*  
ii. ii. 27<sup>2</sup> (Stählin) ὑπὸ μέθης βαπτίζόμενος εἰς ὑπνον. There may be an  
underlying allusion to Eupolis' play *Βαπταί* (cp. Bergk *P. L. G.* ii. p. 268).

176 C ἐξαιρῶ λόγου: "I leave out of account": cp. *Phaedr.* 242 B, *Rep.*  
394 B, 492 E. For Socrates as invincible "with wine and wassail," see  
Alcibiades' description, 220 A.

περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι. A favourite subject of discussion with moralists,  
e.g. Theognis 473 ff., 500 ff.; *Laws* i. 677 D ff., Xen. *Symp.* ii.; and the treatise  
περὶ μέθης of Antisthenes.

ἦττον...ἀηδής. "Less likely to bore you," sc. than if you were in the mood  
for wine-bibbing. Compare (with Wolf) Hor. *Sat.* ii. ii. 1 ff. quae virtus et  
quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo...discite non inter lances mensasque nitentes.

176 D χαλεπὸν...ἢ μέθη. Similarly in 180 B we have neut. adj. with  
masc. subst. (θειότερον...ἐραστής). For the sentiment cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 1253  
κακὸν τὸ πίνειν· κτλ.: Theogn. 211 οἶνόν τοι πίνειν πουλὺν κακόν: Xen.

οὔτε ἄλλω συμβουλεύσαιμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προτεραίας. Ἄλλα μὲν, ἔφη φάναι ὑπολαβόντα Φαῖδρον τὸν Μυρρινούσιον, ἔγωγέ σοι εἴωθα πείθεσθαι ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄττ' ἂν περὶ ἰατρικῆς λέγῃς· νῦν δ', ἂν εὖ βουλεύωνται, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούσαντας συγχωρεῖν πάντας μὴ διὰ μέθης ποιήσασθαι **E** τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' οὔτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

V. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, τοῦτο μὲν δέδοκται, πίνειν ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, ἐπάναγκες δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον· καὶ

176 D κραιπαλῶντα T: κραιπαλοῦντα B: κραιπαλῶντι Hirschig φαῖδρον T: φαιδρων B μυρρινούσιον T λέγεις T ἂν TW: αὖ B βουλεύονται corr. Coisl. Bast: βούλωνται BTW: βούλονται vulg.: (αὖ) βούλονται ἂν Thiersch: (αὖ) βούλονται Ast: (αὖ) ἂν βούλωνται Kreyenbühl **E** αὐλητρίδα T: αὐλητρίδα B ἢ ἂν: ἡν B: ἔαν T

*Symp.* II. 26 ἦν μὲν ἀθρόον τὸ ποτὸν ἐγγεώμεθα, ταχὺ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ αἱ γῶμαι σφαλοῦνται κτλ. For the pedantic reference to ἡ ἰατρική, cp. 186 A.

κραιπαλῶντα. *Tim. Lex. Plat.* explains by ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης βαρυνόμενον. For the accus., in place of dat. (in appos. to ἄλλω), cp. 188 D ἡμῖν...δυναμένους: *Rep.* 414 A, etc.

νῦν δ'...οἱ λοιποί. With οἱ λοιποί we must supply σοὶ πείσονται, as Stallb. and Winckelmann observed. Rettig alone, of later editors, retains the reading νῦν δ' αὖ εὖ βούλονται, with Wolf's rendering, "nunc bene est, quod item reliquos id velle video"; but, as Hug remarks, that εὖ βούλονται can mean "bene est quod volunt" lacks proof.

176 E οὔτω...πρὸς ἡδονήν. οὔτως is frequently used thus in combination with adverbs (esp. *ράδιως*, *εἰκῆ*, *ἀπλῶς*, and the like; see Blaydes on *Ar. Vesp.* 461) where it has "a diminishing power" (L. and S.), e.g. 180 c *infra*, *Gorg.* 503 D; cp. the force of *sic* in such phrases as "iacentes sic temere" (*Hor. C.* II. xi. 14).

τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. The antithesis to the μὲν-clause lies, not in the clause ἐπάναγκες δὲ μ. εἶναι, but in τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ. Cp. *Arist. Pol.* 1278<sup>b</sup> 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πότερον κτλ.

ἐπάναγκες. Cp. *Theogn.* 472 πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιερὸν ἔφυ· | τῷ πίνειν δ' ἐθέλοντι παρασταδὸν οἰνοχοεῖτω—where a similar relaxation of compulsory rules is advocated.

εἰσηγοῦμαι. "I propose," *suadeo*: cp. *Crito* 48 A; *Xen. Mem.* II. 7. 10.

τὴν...αὐλητρίδα. It was the fashion at *convivia* to provide pipers, dancers, jesters, jugglers *et hoc genus omne* to amuse the guests. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* II. 1, *Rep.* 373 A κλῖναί τε...καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα (with Adam's note); *Ar. Ach.* 1090 ff.; also *Protag.* 347 c, d (see next page).

ταῖς ἔνδον. *Sc.* ἐν τῷ γυναικείῳ.



177 δι' οἶων λόγων, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι. Φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ κελεύειν αὐτὸν εἰσηγεῖσθαι. εἰπεῖν οὖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον ὅτι Ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. Φαῖδρος γὰρ ἐκάστοτε πρὸς με ἀγανακτῶν λέγει Οὐ δεινόν, φησίν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ἄλλοις μὲν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παιῶνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ

177 A καὶ ante βουλ. secl. Hermann Sz.: καὶ βούλεσθαι del. Voeg.

<sup>ω</sup>  
παιανας W: παίονας BT: παιᾶνας bt

δι' οἶων λόγων. For an appreciation of the *συνουσία διὰ λόγων*, cp. Theogn. 493 ff. ὑμεῖς δ' εὖ μυθεῖσθε παρὰ κρητῆρι μένοντες... | ἐς τὸ μέσον φωνεῦντες ὁμῶς ἐνὶ καὶ συνάπασιν· | χοῦτως συμπόσιον γίνεται οὐκ ἄχαρι. Simplic. in *Epict.* 33. 6, p. 266 καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ἢ χωρὶς λόγων τράπεζα φάτνης οὐδὲν διαφέρει which is probably a reminiscence of *Protag.* 347 C, D καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι (sc. οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι), διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀληθρίδας κτλ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 276 D.

177 A Φάναι δὴ κτλ. It is tempting to excise (with Hermann, Teuffel and Hug) the first καὶ and to construe φάναι closely with βούλεσθαι, as balancing κελεύειν εἰσηγεῖσθαι, πάντας being the subject of both the leading infinn., φάναι and κελεύειν: cp. 177 E ξυνέφασάν τε καὶ ἐκέλευον: *Euthyd.* 274 C ὁ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη...καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον...ἐπιδείξασθαι κτλ. If the first καὶ be retained, it seems most natural to take κελεύειν as dependent on φάναι: Stallb., however, puts a comma after βούλεσθαι, as if making κελεύειν parallel to φάναι: and so too, apparently, Zeller.

κατὰ τὴν Μελανίππην. Euripides wrote two plays of this name, M. ἡ σοφὴ and M. δεσμῶτις. The reference here is to the former (*Frag.* 488 Nauck), οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα, κτλ. Melanippe, a daughter of Aeolus, bore two sons to Poseidon; they were suckled by a cow, and brought to their grandfather Aeolus as βουγενῆ τέρατα: when he proposed to burn them, Melanippe appeared and tried to dissuade him, arguing ὅτι οὐδὲν τέρας ἐστίν. According to another account, M. was a daughter of Cheiron, seduced by Aeolus, and finally metamorphosed into a mare. Cp. *Apol.* 20 E οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, κτλ.: Hor. *Sat.* II. ii. 2 nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofellus.

Οὐ δεινόν κτλ. With this passage, cp. Isocr. IX. 5—8, and X. 12 with its scornful reference to encomiasts of "humble-bees, salt-diets, and the like" (see *Introd.* § II. B (e)).

ὕμνους καὶ παιῶνας. Properly speaking ὕμνοι are odes set for the lyre, παιῶνες odes set for the flute and sung esp. in honour of Apollo. "The paeon is a hymn (1) of supplication or propitiation during the pain or danger; (2) a thanksgiving after it is past" (see Smith, *D. A.* II. 307 s.v.).



\*Ἐρωτι, τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσοῦτῳ θεῷ, μηδὲ ἓνα πώποτε τοσού- B  
των γεγονότων ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μηδὲν ἐγκώμιον; εἰ δὲ βούλει  
αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ  
ἄλλων ἐπαινοὺς καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος  
Πρόδικος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ' ἐγωγε ἤδη  
τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἄλλες ἔπαινον  
θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις C  
ἀν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα· τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρα πολλὴν σπουδὴν  
ποιήσασθαι, Ἐρωτα δὲ [μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων] τετολμηκέναι<sup>καὶ</sup> εἰς  
ταυτηνὴ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνήσαι· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται τοσοῦτος  
θεός. ταῦτα δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγειν Φαῖδρος. ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ

177 B μηδὲν: μηδὲ Valckenaer καὶ ante τοῦτο del. Thiersch καὶ  
ἦττον θαυμαστόν Wolf Thiersch καὶ ante θαυμαστόν om. Steph. Bast.  
ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ T: om. B, Sz. ὠφελίαν T: ὠφέλειαν B C (πολλούς)  
πολλὴν Hirschig ἀξίως T: ἀξίῳ B (ὅτι) οὕτως Wyttenbach  
ἡμελῆσθαι τοσοῦτον θεόν Steph. λέγειν: ψέγειν cj. Bdhm.

τηλικούτῳ. "A god so venerable": Phaedrus holds Eros to be the most ancient of deities, see 178 B. The complaint was not entirely well-grounded, since before this date (416 B.C.) hymns to Eros of a eulogistic character had already been published by Sophocles (*Antig.* 781 ff.), and Euripides (*Hippol.* 525 ff.), and possibly others.

177 B εἰ δὲ βούλει. This phrase serves to introduce a fresh point, marking the transition from poets to "sophists"; cp. 209 D, 220 D (εἰ δὲ βούλεισθε), *Lach.* 188 c, etc.: but to add an infin., as here (σκέψασθαι), is unusual.

τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς. "The worthy sophists"; considering that Phaedrus is the speaker, we must suppose that the adj. is seriously meant, not ironical.

καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν. "Writing in prose," *oratione soluta*. Cp. Isocr. II. 7 καὶ τῶν μετὰ μέτρον ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων: *Lysis* 204 D, *Lais* 811 E, 975 D.

ὥσπερ...Πρόδικος. This alludes to Prodicus's celebrated parable "The Choice of Heracles," for which see Xen. *Mem.* II. i. 21 ff. For Prodicus of Ceos, see Zeller *Presocr. Phil.* vol. II. pp. 416 ff., 473 (E. T.); Gomperz *Gr. Thinkers* (E. T.) I. pp. 425 ff.

ἦττον καὶ. For the unusual position of καὶ after the comparative, cp. Xen. *Cyr.* I. vi. 38 ταῦτα γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἑξαπατᾶν δύναται.

ἐνήσαν ἄλλες. Logically, of course, the subject ought to be ἔπαινος, not ἄλλες. The same βιβλίον is alluded to in Isocr. X. 12 τῶν...τοὺς βομβυλιούς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βουλευθέντων ἐπαινεῖν: its authorship is now generally ascribed (as by Sauppe, Blass, Hug) to the rhetor Polycrates: see further *Introd.* § II. B (e).

177 C τὸ οὖν...ὑμνήσαι. The infin. may be explained (with Ast) as an ex. of the infin. "indignantis," cp. Ar. *Nub.* 819 τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὄντα τηλικουτονί.

ἄμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν καὶ χαρίσασθαι, ἄμα δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρέπον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡμῖν τοῖς παρούσι κοσμήσαι τὸν θεόν. εἰ οὖν ξυνδοκεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν, γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν λόγοις ἰκανὴ διατριβή· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, ἄρχειν δὲ Φαῖδρον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος κατάκειται καὶ ἔστιν ἄμα πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. Οὐδεὶς σοι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ποῦ ἐγὼ ἀποφήσαιμι, ὅς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο **Ε** ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὔτε ποῦ Ἀγάθων καὶ Πausανίας, οὐδὲ μὴν Ἀριστοφάνης, ᾧ περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην πᾶσα ἡ δια-

177 C τούτῳ Bdhm. καὶ χαρίσασθαι del. Hartmann D (περὶ)  
Ἐρωτος Hirschig κάλλιστα W ἄρχειν: λέγειν Hirschig δὲ πρῶτον  
Φαῖδρον vulg. E ἀφροδίτη T ἡ om. T

ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν. *Symbolum dare*: cp. *Laws* 915 E, 927 C ὡς ἔρανον εἰσφέροντα ἑαυτῷ—the only other instances of ἔρανος in Plato. For a defence of the text against Hartmann, who excises καὶ χαρίσασθαι, see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 296. This passage is echoed in Aristid. *Or.* t. I. p. 18.

177 D δοκεῖ γάρ μοι. “My sentence is,” an official formula: cf. *Dem.* I. 2, IV. 17. Hence the point of Socrates’ phrase ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται, four lines below.

λόγον...ἔπαινον. Cp. 214 B, *Phaedr.* 260 B συντιθεῖς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου.

ἐπὶ δεξιὰ. “From left to right”: cp. *Rep.* 420 E (with Adam’s note); *Theaet.* 175 E. Critias 2. 7 καὶ προπόσεις ὀρέγειν ἐπιδέξια.

κάλλιστον. Notice that, in Eryximachus’ view, the first requisite is κάλλος, and contrast the view of Socrates in 198 D ff.

πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. I.e. εἰσηγητὴς τοῦ λ., as Plutarch explains (*Plat. Q.* 1000 F): the same phrase recurs in *Phaedr.* 257 B, cp. *Theaet.* 164 E ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ μύθου: *Lys.* 214 A πατέρες τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἡγεμόνες.

τὰ ἐρωτικά. The objects or principles with which ἡ ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (*Phaedr.* 257 A) is concerned; cp. 186 C, 212 B, *Lysis* 204 B. This passage is alluded to by Themist. *Or.* XIII. p. 161, Max. Tyr. *diss.* XXIV. p. 288: for its significance here, see *Introd.* § II. B.

οὔτε ποῦ...καί. καὶ is used rather than οὔτε because Pausanias and Agathon formed “ein Liebespaar” (Hug).

177 E περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην. There are many points of mutual connexion between Eros, Dionysus and Aphrodite. Thus, Dionysus is the patron-god of the theatre, as shown by the phrases οἱ περὶ τὸν Δ. τεχνῖται, “actors” (*Arist. Probl.* xxx. 10), and Διονυσοκόλακες, “stage-lackeys” (*Arist. Rhet.* III. 1205<sup>a</sup> 23); and on the comic stage erotic scenes were frequent. Moreover, Dionysus was sometimes represented (as by Praxilla of Sicyon, c. 450 B.C.) to be a son of Aphrodite; and in Aristoph. *fr. incert.* 490 (Df.) οἶνος is termed Ἀφροδίτης γάλα. For the traditional inter-connexion of “Wein, Weib und Gesang,” we may also compare Solon 26 ἔργα δὲ Κυπρο-

τριβή, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τουτωνὶ ὧν ἐγὼ ὄρω. καίτοι οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου γίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις κατακειμένοις· ἀλλ' ἐὰν οἱ πρόσθεν ἱκανῶς καὶ καλῶς εἴπωσιν, ἐξαρκέσει ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ τύχη ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἔρωτα. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ξυνέφασάν τε καὶ ἐκέλευον ἄπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. πάντων μὲν οὖν ἂ ἕκαστος εἶπεν, οὔτε πάνυ ὁ Ἄριστόδημος ἐμέ- 178 μνητο οὔτ' αὐ ἐγὼ ἂ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε πάντα· ἂ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιωμακρόνεντον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον.

VI. Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἔφη Φαῖδρον ἀρξάμενον ἐνθένδε ποθὲν λέγειν, ὅτι μέγας θεὸς εἶη ὁ Ἔρωσ καὶ θαυμαστός ἐν

177 E καὶ καλῶς del. Naber ἡμῖν: ὑμῖν J.-U. ταῦτα: ταῦτὰ Usener  
 ἄρα: ἄρα Wyttenbach 178 A δ BT: ὅσα mg. t ἀξιωμακρόνεντον  
 (εἶναι) TW: ἀξιωμακρόνεντων b: ἀξιωμακρόνευτα εἶναι vulg.: ἄξια μνημονεύειν  
 cj. Liebhold ἕκαστα Bdhm. τὸν λόγον secl. Bdhm.

γενοῦς νῦν μοι φίλα καὶ Διονύσου | καὶ Μουσέων, ἂ τίθησ' ἀνδράσιν εὐφροσύνας.  
 Echoes of this phrase are to be found in Aristaen. I. ep. 3, p. 11; Plut. amat. 750 A; Lucian Symp. p. 444.

ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις. ὑστατος here is equivalent to ἔσχατος as used in 175 c (where see note), i.e. placed on the extreme right.

ἐξαρκέσει ἡμῖν. "We shall be content," i.e. we shall not be called upon to speak: for the impers. ἐξαρκεί c. dat. cp. 176 c, 192 b, 210 c.

τύχη ἀγαθῇ. "In Gottes Namen" (Wolf); cp. Phileb. 57 E, Tim. 26 E.

πάντες ἄρα. For the position of ἄρα cp. Prot. 319 A ἢ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι: Rep. 358 c πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα κτλ.

178 A ἀξιωμακρόνεντον. We should expect rather the plural. We must suppose that the sentence is slightly confused, the original idea being to put ἂ δὲ μάλιστα ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιωμακρόνευτα (ταῦτα ἐρῶ), which was altered owing to the insertion, as an afterthought, of καὶ ὧν: then, instead of proceeding ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἄξιον τὸ μεμνήσθαι (or μεμνησθαι τοῦ λόγου), the word originally in mind was put down, but in the sing.: but it is tempting to restore either ἀξιωμακρόνευτ' εἶναι (supposing εἶναι to be corrupted from a compendium), or ἄξιον μνημονεύειν. Prot. 343 A (ρήματα βραχέα ἀξιωμακρόνευτα) is the only other instance of the word in Plato: there may be an echo of the present passage in Xen. Symp. I. 1 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα...ἀξιωμακρόνευτα εἶναι. For the significance of the statement here made by Apollod., see *Introd.* § II. B (g).

Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ κτλ. For the discourse of Phaedrus (178 A—180 B) see *Introd.* § I. (analysis), § III. (1).

ὥσπερ λέγω. "As has been stated": the present tense (186 E, 193 A, etc.) is commoner than the past tense (εἶπον 173 C, 182 D, etc.) in this formula. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐνθένδε ποθὲν. "Roughly at this point," *hinc fere*: the combination recurs 199 c, Phaedr. 229 B, Euthyd. 275 E; so ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν Phaedr. 270 A, Rep. 524 C.

ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ  
κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν  
B τίμιον, ἢ δ' ὅς· τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γονῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὐτ' εἰσὶν  
οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ιδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' Ἑσίοδος  
πρῶτον μὲν Χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι,

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ,  
ἢ δ' Ἔρος.

178 A ἄλλοι Stobaeus πρεσβύτατον BW, Stob.: πρεσβυτάτοις T  
τὸν θεὸν W: τῶν θεῶν BT B ἢ δ' ὅς del. Bast: ὄνειδος Creuzer τεκμή-  
ριον δέ· τούτου (Ἔρωτος delete) Naber γοναὶ Stob., vulg. Ἔρωτος:  
Χάους cj. Bdhm. Ἑσίοδος (ὅς) Heindorf γαί'...Ἔρος secl. Herm.

κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. "In respect of his origin."

ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατον. For the doctrine of the antiquity of Eros, cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 1 τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ ἰσὴλικος τοῖς ἀειγενέσι θεοῖς...Ἔρωτος: Ar. *Av.* 700 πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἔρος συνέμμεξεν ἅπαντα. Agathon, in 195 A, expressly contradicts Phaedrus on this point. Bast excised ἢ δ' ὅς on the ground that "in fine periodi Platonicae non magis usurpatur quam inquit Latinorum."

178 B τεκμήριον δέ...γὰρ. Cp. *Critias* 110 E, *Apol.* 40 c: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 17 τεκμήριον δέ· θαλλοφόρους γὰρ...ἐκλέγονται.

γονῆς...οὔτε λέγονται. This is a rash statement on the part of Phaedrus; for Alcaeus (*fr.* 13 Bgk.) makes Eros son of Zephyros and Iris; Simonides (*fr.* 43), son of Ares and Aphrodite; Euripides (*Hippol.* 534), son of Zeus; Sappho (*fr.* 132), of Gê and Uranos; Ibycus (*fr.* 31), of Chaos; see also the statements in 199 D, 203 ff. *infra*. On the other hand ignorance or doubt as to the parentage of Eros is expressed in Theocr. *Id.* XIII. 1, 2 οὐχ ἄμιν τὸν Ἔρωτα μόνοις ἔτεχ'...ᾤφινι τοῦτο θεῶν ποκα τέκνον ἔγεντο; *Anth. Pal.* v. 176. 7—8 πατὴρ δ' οὐκέτ' ἔχω φράζειν τίνος· οὔτε γὰρ Αἰθέρ, | οὐ Χθῶν φησι τεκεῖν τὸν θρασύν, οὐ Πέλαγος. For the usual Greek assumption that the poets are religious teachers, cp. Ar. *Ran.* 1054 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν | ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖς ἡβῶσιν δὲ ποιηταί: and see Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 9 ff.

ιδιώτου. For this distinction between the prose-writer and the poet, cp. *Phaedr.* 258 D; *Laws* 890 A; *Rep.* 366 E. The term *ιδιώτης* may be taken as a survival of the time when the poet alone had his work "published"—at religious festivals, theatrical shows, κῶμοι, etc.

Ἑσίοδος κτλ. The reference is to *Theog.* 116 ff. ἦτοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γίγεται, αὐτὰρ κτλ. Cp. Ar. *Av.* 693 ff. Χάος ἦν καὶ Νύξ κτλ. The order of the text I have adopted, in the passage following, is that proposed by Schanz, except that he reads ὁμολογεῖ (ὅς) φησι, while Burnet, accepting the transposition, prints σύμφησι instead of ὁμολογεῖ φησι. Hug and others eject the clause φησι...Ἔρωτα as a marginal prose paraphrase of the words of Hesiod; since, as it stands in the traditional order, the clause is obviously tautologous: but tautology is in itself no objection, but rather characteristic of Ph.'s style

Ἡσιόδῳ δὲ καὶ Ἀκουσίλεως ὁμολογεῖ [φησὶ μετὰ τὸ Χάος δύο τούτῳ γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ἔρωτα]. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει

πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

οὕτω πολλαχόθεν ὁμολογεῖται ὁ Ἔρωτος ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατος εἶναι. C

178 B Ἡσιόδῳ...ὁμολογεῖ (quae in BT post πάντων extant) transposui, auctorr. Wolf Sz. Bt. ὁμολογεῖ BT: ξύμφησιν Stob.: σύμφησιν Bt. φησὶ...Ἔρωτα secl. Hommel Jn. Hug: φησὶ...πάντων secl. Ast Turr. J.-U. φησὶ om. Stob.: (ὅς) φησὶ Schanz Παρμενίδης...πάντων om. Stob., Heyne Wunder τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει secl. Jn.: τὴν γένεσιν secl. Rettig C πρεσβυτάτους Stob.

(see Teuffel in *Rhein. Mus.* xlix. p. 133); and there is force in Hermann's remark "aegre intelligo quomodo aliquis clarissimis poetae verbis (paraphrasin) addendam existimaverit, multoque verisimilius videtur Hesiodi locum...postmodo adscriptum...irrepsisse." I bracket the clause as a gloss on ὁμολογεῖ. The clause Παρμενίδης...πάντων is rightly defended by Hug, against Voegelin and others, on the grounds that (1) οὕτω πολλαχόθεν in the following sentence is more appropriate after three than after two instances, and (2) Agathon in 195 c, when alluding to Phaedrus's speech, expressly mentions Ἡσιόδου καὶ Παρμενίδης. The authority of Hesiod is similarly cited by Plut. *amat.* 756 E.

**Ἀκουσίλεως.** Acusilaus of Argos, the "logographer," about B.C. 475 (?), wrote in the Ionic dialect several books of Genealogies, largely based on Hesiod (see the frag. in A. Kordt, *De Acusilao*, 1903). But the reputed work of A., extant in the time of Hadrian, was probably a forgery: a collector of myths is not, properly speaking, a "logographer" at all (see Jevons, *Gk. Lit.* p. 299). Cp. Clem. Alex. vi. ii. 26. 7 τὰ δὲ Ἡσιόδου μετήλλαξαν εἰς πεζὸν λόγον καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἐξένεγκαν Εὐμηλός τε καὶ Ἀκουσίλαος οἱ ἱστοριογράφοι. Hug, retaining the order of the mss., would explain the fact that A. is put last as due to his being an *ιδιώτης*, the others *ποιηταί*.

**Παρμενίδης.** See Parmen. *frag.* 132 (Karsten), R. and P. 101 A; Arist. *Met.* i. 4. 984<sup>b</sup> 25; Plut. *amat.* 756 F. It is to be presumed that the famous Eleate relegated this theogony to his "Way of Opinion." Cp. Spenser's lines (*H. to Love*), "Or who alive can perfectly declare The wondrous cradle of thine infancie... For ere this worlds still moving mightie masse Out of great Chaos ugly prison crept... Love... Gan reare his head, by Clotho being waked."

**τὴν Γένεσιν...μητίσατο.** Hermann and Hug follow Stallbaum in supplying *Γένεσις* as the subject of *μητίσατο*: cp. *Phaedo* 94 D οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ. For the personification of *γένεσις*, cp. Hom. *Il.* xiv. 201 Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν (cited by Plato in *Theaet.* 180 D, *Crat.* 402 B). Plutarch (*loc. cit.*) differs by making Ἀφροδίτη the subject of *μητίσατο*. It is, of course, possible that another (suppressed) subject is intended; since we do not know what the context was in the original.



πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἰτιός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὅ τι μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν εὐθύς νέφ' ὅστις ἢ ἔραστῆς χρηστὸς καὶ ἔραστῇ παιδικά. ὃ γὰρ χρὴ ἀνθρώποις ἠγεῖσθαι παντὸς τοῦ βίου τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βιώσεσθαι, τοῦτο οὔτε συγγένεια οἷα τε ἐμποιεῖν οὕτω καλῶς οὔτε τιμαὶ οὔτε πλοῦτος οὐτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὡς ἔρωσ. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην μεγάλα καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἐξεργάζεσθαι. φημὶ τοίνυν ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐρᾷ, εἴ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιῶν κατάδηλος γίγνοιτο ἢ πάσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ δι' ἀναν-

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν : πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Bast (μέγιστός τε καὶ) μεγίστων Bdhm. αἰτιος ἡμῖν Stob. (ἢ) παιδικά Hommel Jn. εὐγένεια Wytttenbach καλῶς (οὔτε κάλλος) vulg.: οὕτως οὔτε κάλλος Reynd. Jacobs

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν κτλ. The partic. gives the impression of a causal connexion—as if beneficence must be in direct proportion to antiquity!

μεγίστων...αἰτιος. Cp. 197 c *infra*; Ar. *Plut.* 469 ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων αἰτίαν.

εὐθύς νέφ' ὅστις. "From his earliest youth": this properly applies only to the παιδικά. With παιδικά supply χρηστά. For a similar estimate of the value of φίλοι, see *Lys.* 211 E, *Xen. Mem.* II. 4. 1 ff.

ἀνθρώποις...βίου. For ἠγεῖσθαι c. dat. of person and gen. of thing, cp. *Hom. Od.* xxiii. 134 ἡμῖν ἠγεῖσθω ὀρχηθμοῖο: *Xen. Cyr.* viii. 7. 1 τοῦ χόρου ἠγήσατο Πέρσαις. It would be easy, however, by inserting διὰ after the termin. -αι, to restore a favourite Platonic phrase διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (cp. 203 D, *Phil.* 39 E).

συγγένεια. "Kindred," implying nobility of kin: for the concrete use cp. *Gorg.* 472 B, *Laws* 730 B, 874 A, etc., and esp. *Rep.* 491 C κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει. Taking συγγένεια here in a similar sense, we can dispense with Wytttenbach's plausible conj., εὐγένεια (for which cp. *Euthyd.* 279 B, Ar. *Rhet.* II. 15, *Soph. Antig.* 38), which Reynders adopts.

178 D αἰσχύνην...φιλοτιμίαν. Cp. *Lys.* xiv. 2, and 42 (*in Alcib.*) ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμείσθαι, "taking glory for shame and shame for glory." Remembering that Phaedrus was a professed admirer of Lysias, we may, perhaps, recognize here a verbal echo. For a discussion of αἰσχύνη (not distinguished from αἰδώς) see *Arist. Eth. Nic.* iv. ix. 1128<sup>b</sup> 10, and *Rhet.* II. vi. 1383<sup>b</sup> 12.

οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην. Notice that in the subsequent treatment of these two heads the order is reversed (to secure rhetorical "Chiasmus").

εἴ τι αἰσχρὸν κτλ. Cp. *Xen. Cyneg.* xii. 20 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τις ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου ἅπας ἑαυτοῦ ἐστι βελτίων καὶ οὔτε λέγει οὔτε ποιεῖ αἰσχρὰ οὐδὲ κακά, ἵνα μὴ ὀφθῇ ὑπ' ἐκείνων. Also 194 c *infra*.

ἢ πάσχων κτλ. Cp. "It hath been said by them of old time, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for 'a tooth." Ordinary Greek ethics approved of retaliation:



δρίαν μὴ ἀμυνόμενος, οὐτ' ἂν ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὀφθέντα οὕτως ἀλγήσαι οὔτε ὑπὸ ἐταίρων οὔτε ὑπ' ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ὡς ὑπὸ παιδικῶν. ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὀρώμεν, ὅτι διαφερόντως τοὺς **E** ἐραστὰς αἰσχύνεται, ὅταν ὀφθῆ ἔν αἰσχυρῶ τινὶ ὦν. εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις γένοιτο ὥστε πόλιν γενέσθαι ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν τε καὶ παιδικῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν [ἦ] ἀπεχόμενοι πάντων τῶν αἰσχυρῶν καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ μαχόμενοί γ' ἂν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῶεν ἂν **179** ὀλίγοι ὄντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους. ἐρῶν γὰρ ἀνὴρ

**178 E** τὸν ἐραστὴν Hirschig ἢ στρατόπεδον secl. J.-U. (ἐξ) ἐραστῶν Hirschig ἑαυτῶν (πόλιν) Hirschig ἢ seclusi, auctorr. Rückert Jn. Bdhm. Sz. Naber: καὶ J.-U. καὶ (ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς) φ. Ast **179 A** γ' ἂν BT: γ' αὐ Verm. J.-U.: δ' γ' ἂν W

cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 7. 7; see Dobbs, *Philos. and Popular Morals*, etc. p. 39. For another incentive to courage, see *Rep.* 467 B.

**178 E** ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο. "In exactly similar fashion," adverbial accus.: so ταῦτὰ ταῦτα *Meno* 90 E.

τοῖς ἐραστῶν. The plural is due to the fact that it was usual for a number of ἐρασταί to pay court to the same παιδικά (cp. *Charm.* 154 A).

εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις κτλ. Here Ph. passes on to his second head,—the benefits derived from Eros in civic and national life (πόλιν, 178 D *supra*). For the phrase cp. *Laos* 640 B εἰ δ' ἦν τις μηχανή κτλ.: *Parm.* 132 D, *Phileb.* 16 A.

στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν. It is noteworthy that Xen. (*Symp.* VIII. 32) puts a similar statement in the mouth of Pausanias—Παυσανίας γε...εἴρηκεν ὡς καὶ στρατεύμα ἀλκιμώτατον ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ παιδικῶν τε καὶ ἐραστῶν (cp. *Introd.* § VIII. *ad fin.*). Cp. also Xen. *Cyrop.* VII. 1. 30 οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσχυροτέρα φάλαγξ ἢ ὅταν ἐκ φίλων συμμάχων ἠθροισμένη ἦ. This principle was exemplified in the famous ἱερὸς λόχος of the Thebans, organized by Gorgidas (or Epaminondas), which fought first at Leuctra, 371 B.C., see *Athen.* XIII. 561 F, 602 A. A Roman analogy is afforded by Scipio's φίλων ἰλη. The parallel in Xenophon is of itself sufficient to refute Jahn's athetesis of ἡ στρατόπεδον.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν κτλ. Hug, retaining ἦ before ἀπεχόμενοι, would supply, with the participles, from the context "welche Gefühle allein durch den Eros in wirksamer Weise erregt werden." This, however, is exceedingly awkward; and his further remark that οὐκ ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν ἂν ἢ ἀπεχόμενοι is equivalent to ἀριστ' ἂν οἰκ. ἀπεχ. does nothing to lessen the difficulty. By ejecting ἦ, as a very natural interpolation after the comparative by a copyist careless of the sense, we obtain the meaning required—"it would be impossible for them to secure a better constitution of their city, since thus they would abstain" etc.

**179 A** μαχόμενοι κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* 471 D ἀριστ' ἂν μάχοντο τῷ ἡκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους...ἄμαχοι ἂν εἶεν: Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 32 ff.

ὑπὸ παιδικῶν ὀφθῆναι ἢ λιπῶν τάξιν ἢ ὕπλα ἀποβαλὼν ἦττον ἂν δὴ που δέξαιτο ἢ ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ πρὸ τούτου τεθνάναι ἂν πολλάκις ἔλοιτο· καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακὸς ὄντινα οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐνθεὸν ποιήσειε πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ὥσθ' ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ ἀρίστῳ B φύσει· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος, “ μένος ἐμπνεῦσαι ” ἐνίοις τῶν ἡρώων τὸν θεόν, τοῦτο ὁ Ἔρωσ τοῖς ἐρώσι παρέχει γιγνόμενον παρ' αὐτοῦ.

VII. Καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρώντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες. τούτου δὲ καὶ ἡ

179 A μὴν B: μὴ T      hiatum ante οὐδεὶς notav. J.-U.      B (πᾶσι)  
παρέχει Orelli      οὐ μόνον ὅτι: οὐ μόνον οἱ Steph. Sz.: οὐχ ὅτι Fischer J.-U.  
αἱ B: om. T      τούτου: δοκεῖ Verm.

λιπῶν τάξιν ἢ ὕπλα ἀποβαλὼν. “The principal military offences at Athens were dealt with by one law. A citizen was liable to indictment, and, if convicted, to disfranchisement for (1) Failure to join the army—ἀσπρατείας: (2) Cowardice in battle—δειλίας: (3) Desertion of his post—λιποταξίου: (4) Desertion from the army—λιποστρατίου. Of these terms, λιποταξίου was that used in the widest sense, and might include any of the others” (Smith, *D. A.* I. 212<sup>b</sup>). Cp. *Rep.* 468 A, *Laws* 943 D ff., and the compounds *ρίψασπις* (*Laws* 944 B, C; *Ar. Vesp.* 19), *ἀσπιδαποβλής* (*Vesp.* 592). The conduct of the ideal *ἐραστής* on such an occasion is shown in 220 E *infra*.

κινδυνεύοντι. For the sing. dat. referring to παιδικοῖς, cp. *Phaedr.* 239 A, and 184 D *infra*. After κινδυνεύοντι we should expect the sentence to conclude with οὐδεὶς τολμῆ ἂν or the like: the fact that a new ending is substituted may be regarded (with Ast) as due to the agitation (real or pretended) of the speaker “vom furor eroticus ergriffen.”

ἐνθεὸν πρὸς ἀρετὴν. For ἐνθεός, “god-inhabited,” “inspired,” cp. *Ion* 533 E ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι: *ibid.* 534 B and below, 180 B. φύσει, denoting “natural” temper, is here opposed to this supervenient grace. For the thought cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*), “(The lover) dreads no danger, nor misfortune feares...Thou cariest him to that which he hath eyde Through seas, through flames, through thousand swords and speares.”

179 B Ὀμηρος. See *Il.* x. 482 τῷ δ' ἐμπνευσε μένος γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη: *ib.* xv. 262, *Od.* ix. 381. Cp. the (Lacedaemonian) term εἰσπνήλας for ἐραστής: also *Xen. Symp.* iv. 15.

ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. Cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 217 C ἧς ἔνεκα πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμιθέων ἀποθνήσκειν ἠθέλησαν.

οὐ μόνον ὅτι. This expression may be defended by *Thuc.* iv. 85. 3 καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἡσσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσσεισιν: *Arist. Pol.* vii. 11. 1331<sup>a</sup> 11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον (with Newman's note): *Xen. Mem.* ii. 9. 8. Jahn's οὐχ ὅτι would give, as Teuffel argues, the

Πελίου θυγάτηρ Ἄλκηστις ἰκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται ὑπὲρ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐβελήσασα μόνη ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀνδρὸς ἀποθανεῖν, ὄντων αὐτῷ πατρός τε καὶ μητρός· οὗς C ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, ὥστε ἀποδείξαι αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ὄντας τῷ νείει καὶ ὀνόματι μόνον προσήκοντας· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν ἐργασασθαι οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς, ὥστε πολλῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένων εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Ἄιδου ἀνεῖναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσαν ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ· οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα D

179 B παρέχουσαι Verm. ὑπὲρ...Ἕλληνας secl. Bdhm.: ὑπὲρ... λόγου secl. Wolf Sz., post Ἕλληνας posuit Bast: ὑπὲρ τοῦδε del. et τοῦ λόγου post τούτου δὲ posuit Steph.: ὑπὲρ τοῦδε del. Wytttenbach Winckelmann O κατεργασαμένων Methodius δὴ τοῦτο TW τὸ γέρας vulg. ἀνείναι Hommel ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνην Earle τῷ ἔργῳ secl. Baiter: τῷ...θεοὶ secl. Bdhm. \*

wrong sense "I do not say men do so, *cela va sans dire*." We may explain οὐ μόνον ὅτι as elliptical for οὐ μόνον (λέγω) ὅτι.

ἄνδρες...αἱ γυναῖκες. The addition of the article serves to signalize the second case as the more striking: cp. *I. Alcib.* 105 B ἐν Ἕλλησιν...ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις: *Phileb.* 45 E, *ib.* 64 C; Vahlen on *Arist. Poet.* iv. 1449<sup>a</sup> 1.

Ἄλκηστις. Besides Euripides, Phrynichus (438 B.C.) and later Antiphanes (354 B.C.) made Alcestis the theme of a tragedy: see also the *Skolion* by Praxilla in Bergk *P. L. G.* III. § 1293.

ὑπὲρ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου. "In support of my argument."

εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Cp. *Protag.* 312 A εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων: *Gorg.* 526 B: *Thuc.* i. 33. 2.

ἐβελήσασα μόνη κτλ. Cp. Eur. *Alc.* 15 ff. πάντας δ' ἐλέγξας...Οὐχ εὖρε πλὴν γυναικὸς ἦτις ἤθελε | θανεῖν πρὸ κείνου.

179 C οὗς ἐκείνη κτλ. See Eur. *Alc.* 683 ff. where the appeal of Admetus is thus answered by his father Pheres: οὐ γὰρ πατρῶον τόνδ' ἐδεξάμην νόμον | παίδων προθνήσκειν πατέρας οὐδ' Ἑλληνικόν.

ἀλλοτρίους. Admetus might have described his ἀλλότριοι προσήκοντες as "a little more than kin and less than kind."

εὐαριθμήτοις. A grandiose synonym for ὀλίγοις.

ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας...ἀγασθέντες. Cp. *Phaedr.* 259 B ὁ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις δίδοναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες. ἄγαμαι can take either the genitive (*Rep.* 426 D, etc.) or the accus. (*Symp.* 219 D, etc.). This passage is alluded to by *Plut. amat.* 762 A λέγοντες ἐξ ἄδου τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς ἄνοδον εἰς φῶς ὑπάρχειν.

οὕτω...τιμῶσιν. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 28 ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἥρωες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φιλίαν περὶ πλείονος...ποιοῦνται.

σπουδὴν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα τιμῶσιν. Ὀρφέα δὲ τὸν Οἰάγρου ἀτελῆ ἀπέπεμψαν ἐξ Ἰδίου, φάσμα δειξάντες τῆς γυναικὸς ἐφ' ἣν ἦκεν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὐ δόντες, ὅτι μαλθακίζεσθαι ἐδόκει, ἅτε ὦν κιθαρωδός, καὶ οὐ τολμᾶν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀποθνήσκειν ὥσπερ Ἄλκηστις, ἀλλὰ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ζῶν εἰσιέναι εἰς Ἰδίου. τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, καὶ ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεὺς τὸν τῆς Θέτιδος υἱὸν ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν, ὅτι πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτείνας Ἐκτορα, μὴ ἀποκτείνας δὲ τοῦτον οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, ἐτόλμησεν

179 D μάλιστα τιμῶσιν secl. Bdhm. φάντασμα TW τολμῶν Naber  
 διαμηχανήσασθαι W, vulg. ζῆν ἰέναι T ἐποίησαν ἔργον γενέσθαι γυναικῶν  
 Naber E καὶ...ἀπέπεμψαν damnat Naber ἀποθάνοιτο T: ἀποθάνοι B  
 ἀποκτείνας δὲ τοῦτον B: ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο T οἴκαδ' T: οἴκαδε δ' B

179 D Ὀρφέα. For the legend of Orpheus and his wife Eurydice, see Paus. ix. 30, Virg. *Georg.* iv. 454 ff., Ovid *Met.* x. 1 ff. Phaedrus modifies the usual story (1) by making Eurydice a φάσμα, and Orpheus consequently ἀτελής (cp. Stesichorus' treatment of the Helen-legend, followed also by Euripides in his *Helena*, and *Phaedr.* 243 B): (2) by making O.'s descent an act of μαλακία rather than of τόλμα (as Hermesianax 2. 7, Ov. *Met.* x. 13 ad Stygia Taenaria est ausus descendere porta): (3) by representing O.'s death to be a penalty for this cowardice rather than for his irreverence to Dionysus (as Aeschylus *Bassarai*, etc.). For Orpheus and Orphism in general, see Miss J. Harrison *Proleg.* pp. 455 ff.

ἅτε ὦν κιθαρωδός. As if the "soft Lydian airs" of the cithara conduced to effeminacy. For the cithara, as distinguished from the λύρα, see *Rep.* 399 D—E (with Adam's note). It is worth noticing that Spenser (*H. to Love*) cites Orpheus as an instance of ἔνθεος τόλμα—"Orpheus daring to provoke the yre Of damned fiends, to get his love retyre."

τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα. Cp. Isocr. vii. 52, Andoc. i. 108, Dem. xxiii. 203; an example of the rhetorical trick of amplitude. Phaedrus, as Hug observes, is blind to the obvious corollary that Eros sometimes fails to implant τόλμα.

179 E οὐχ ὥσπερ. "Whereas, on the contrary": cp. *Gorg.* 522 A, 189 C *infra*.

εἰς μακάρων νήσους. Cp. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 78 ff., *Skolion* ap. Bgk. *P. L. G.* iii. 1290. Achilles, after death, is variously located, by Homer (*Od.* xi. 467 ff.) in Hades, by Ibycus (*fr.* 37) in Elysium, by Arctinus and others in Leuke ("white-island"), for which see Pind. *Nem.* iv. 49, and Rohde *Psyche* ii. 369 ff. For the situation of the μ. νῆσοι, see Strabo i. 3: cp. Adam *R. T. G.* 135 f.

ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο. See Hom. *Il.* xviii. 96 αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ' Ἐκτορα πόντος ἐτοίμος: *ibid.* ix. 410 ff.; *Apol.* 28 C, D.

οἴκαδ'...τελευτήσοι. This clause is echoed, as Wolf observed, by Aeschines i. 145 ἐπανελθὼν οἴκαδε γηραιὸς...ἀποθανεῖται.

ἐλέσθαι βοηθήσας τῷ ἐραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ 180 ὑπεραγασθέντες οἱ θεοὶ διαφερόντως αὐτὸν ἐτίμησαν, ὅτι τὸν ἐραστὴν οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο. Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ φάσκων Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλου ἐρᾶν, ὃς ἦν καλλίων οὐ μόνον Πατρόκλου ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ τῶν ἡρώων ἀπάντων, καὶ ἔτι ἀγένειος, ἔπειτα νεώτερος πολὺ, ὡς φησιν Ὀμηρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μάλιστα μὲν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ θεοὶ τιμῶσι τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα, μᾶλλον B μέντοι θαυμάζουσι καὶ ἄγανται καὶ εὖ ποιούσιν, ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστής τὰ παιδικά. θειότερον γὰρ ἐραστής παιδικῶν· ἔνθεος γάρ ἐστι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα

179 E βοηθήσαι W Πατρόκλῳ del. Naber 180 A Αἰσχύλος...  
 Ὀμηρος del. Valckenaer ἀλλ' ἄρα W: ἀλλὰ ἄρα T: ἀλλὰ B: ἀλλ' ἄμα Bt.  
 καὶ...ἀγένειος post πολὺ transp. Petersen B ἐραστής...ἐστι secl. Bdhm.

**βοηθήσας.** Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* I. 3. 1359<sup>a</sup> 3 οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν. Isocrates (in *Panegy.* 53) lauds the Athenians for a similar nobility of conduct.

**180 A ἐπαποθανεῖν.** This and 208 D are the only classical instances cited of this compound; nor does there seem to be another class. instance of ὑπεραγασθῆναι.

**Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ.** The reference is to Aesch. *Myrmidons* (*fr.* 135, 136 N.). Sophocles, too, wrote an Ἀχιλλέως Ἐρασταί: cp. also Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 31. Achilles, like Asclepius and others, was worshipped in some places (*e.g.* Epirus) as a god, in others (*e.g.* Elis) as a hero.

**ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ.** “Ἄρα h. l. stare potest, valet: *nimirum*” (Wytttenbach): for ἄρα affirmative in a universal statement, cp. 177 E, *Rep.* 595 A. To alter to ἄμα, as Burnet, is unnecessary.

**καλλίων.** For the beauty of Achilles, see *Il.* II. 673. Ov. *Trist.* II. 411 refers to Sophocles' play—“nec nocet auctori mollem qui fecit Achillem”: cp. Lucian *dial. mort.* 18. 1.

**ἀγένειος.** The hero is so represented in art; and the Schol. *ad Il.* I. 131 applies to him the epithet *γυναικοπρόσωπος*. Similarly Apollo, in Callim. *H.* II. 36 f. οὐποτε Φοῖβου | θηλείης' οὐδ' ὄσσον ἐπὶ χνόος ἦλθε παρειαῖς.

**νεώτερος.** See *Il.* XI. 786 γενέη μὲν ὑπέρτερός ἐστιν Ἀχιλλεύς | πρεσβύτερος δὲ σύ (*sc.* Πάτροκλος) ἐσσι: and Schol. *ad Il.* XXIII. 94. For the relative ages of παιδικά and ἐραστής, see 181 B ff. *infra*; Xen. *Anab.* II. 6. 28 αὐτὸς δὲ (*sc.* Meno) παιδικὰ εἶχε Θαρύπαν ἀγένειος ὧν γενεῶντα (mentioned as an enormity); Ov. *Met.* x. 83 ff.

**μάλιστα μὲν...μᾶλλον μέντοι.** This savours of a Hibernicism: cp. *Gorg.* 509 B μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν...καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον.

**180 B θαυμάζουσι.** Cp. *Rep.* 551 A ἐπαινοῦσί τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 44.

**θειότερον...ἐνθεος.** Cp. 179 A, 209 B *ad in.*; Schol. *ad Eur. Hippol.* 144



τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος μᾶλλον ἐτίμησαν, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀποπέμψαντες.

Οὕτω δὴ ἔγωγέ φημι Ἔρωτα θεῶν καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ κυριώτατον εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας κτήσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ζῶσι καὶ τελευτήσασιν.

- C VIII. Φαῖδρον μὲν τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἔφη εἰπεῖν, μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι, ὧν οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευεν· οὐς παρῆς τὸν Πausανίου λόγον διηγείτο. εἰπεῖν δ' αὐτὸν ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, προβεβληθῆσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἀπλῶς οὕτως παρηγγελθῆναι ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἔρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἦν ὁ Ἔρωτος, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε, νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνὸς
- D ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρρηθῆναι ὁποῖον δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν Ἔρωτα φράσαι ὃν δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτα ἐπαινεῖσαι ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ. πάντες γὰρ

180 B τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος del. Schütz Bdhm. καὶ post θεῶν om. T  
καὶ τιμιώτατον om. T (add. in mg. t) κυριώτερον T C εἶναι del.  
Hirschig: εἰπεῖν postea idem cj. D ὁποῖον: ὁπότερον Herm.

ἐνθεοὶ λέγονται οἱ ὑπὸ φάσματός τινος ἀφαιρεθέντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματοποιοῦ κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐκείνῳ ποιῶντες. See Rohde *Psyche* II. 19 ff.

Οὕτω δὴ κτλ. In this epilogue καὶ πρεσβ. καὶ τιμ. summarize the first part of the speech; καὶ κυριώτατον κτλ., the second part. Cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 218 D κάλλους...μετίσχευεν ὁ σεμνότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ θειότατον τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν.

180 C ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι. The construction here has been misunderstood: Hirschig proposed to write εἰπεῖν for εἶναι, while Hug bids us supply λέγοντας. Evidently both suppose that ἄλλοι τινές mean persons, but it seems better to take them to be λόγοι and to construe μετὰ Φαῖδρον as a compendium for μετὰ τὸν Φαῖδρον λόγον. By this means we secure the word required, λόγους, as the antecedent to ὧν: for διαμνημονεύειν would be less naturally used of a person than of a speech (cp. 178 A πάντων...ἐμέμνητο). For the brachylogy, cp. Thuc. I. 71. 2 ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστίν (with Shilleto's n.).

τὸ...ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἔρωτα. This clause is best taken, with Stallb. and Hug, as nomin. in epeexegetic apposition to προβεβληθῆσθαι ὁ λόγος. Equally improbable are Rückert's view that the clause is accus. ("quatenus sic simpliciter" etc.), and Hommel's that it is exclamatory.

ἀπλῶς οὕτως. Cp. 176 E.

νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ. We may assume the ellipse of οὐ καλῶς ἔχει after νῦν δέ: cp. *Theaet.* 143 E, *Apol.* 38 B, etc.

προρρηθῆναι. Hommel renders by "prius praefari," Hug by "edicere." In favour of Hommel's view cp. προυρρήθη 198 E, τούτων προρρηθέντων *Laos* 823 D; *Rep.* 504 A.



ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἐρωτος Ἀφροδίτη. μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὔσης εἰς ἂν ἦν Ἐρως· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ δύο ἐστὸν, δύο ἀνάγκη καὶ Ἐρωτε εἶναι. πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῶ θεά; ἡ μὲν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἦν δὴ καὶ Οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἦν δὴ Πάνδημον καλοῦμεν. ἀναγ- **E** καῖον δὴ καὶ Ἐρωτα τὸν μὲν τῇ ἐτέρα συνεργὸν Πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Οὐράνιον. ἐπαινεῖν μὲν οὖν δεῖ πάντας θεούς, ἂ δ' οὖν ἐκάτερος εἴληχε πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ πρᾶξις ᾧδ' ἔχει· αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς [πραττομένη] οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά. οἶον 181

**180 D** ἄνευ Ἐρωτος Ἀφροδίτης. Ἀφροδίτης δὲ μιᾶς Graser (ῆς) μιᾶς Rückert οὖν om. Stob. Bekk. δὲ δὴ BW: δὲ T, Stob. ἔρωτας Stob. τὰ θεά Stob.: τῶ θεῶ Cobet διώνης T: διόνης B **E** ἐπαινεῖν... θεούς del. Orelli J.-U. δεῖ πάντας θεούς: οὐ δεῖ πάντα· Bast: οὐ δεῖ πάντα γ' ὁμοίως· Vermehren: hiatus ante ἂ notavit Sz. δ' οὖν: οὖν Orelli: δ' Ast (πράττειν) πειρατέον Kreyenbühl ᾧδι Stob. πραττομένη BT, Stob. Gell.: om. Proclus Steph. Sz.: ταπτομένη Bernays: ἐξεταζομένη Liebhold.

**180 D** οὐκ ἴστιν... Ἀφροδίτη. Cp. Hés. *Theog.* 201 τῇ δ' Ἐρος ὠμάρτησε καὶ Ἴμερος ἔσπετο καλὸς | γεινομένη τὰ πρῶτα θεῶν τ' εἰς φύλον ἰούση: *Orph. H.* 55. 1 Οὐρανίη πολύνυμφε, φιλομμειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη... (8) μῆτερ ἐρώτων.

μιᾶς οὔσης. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 9 εἰ μὲν οὖν μία ἐστὶν Ἀφρ. ἡ διτταὶ κτλ.

τῶ θεά. Plato uses both θεός (181 c, *Rep.* 327 A, etc.) and θεά (*Rep.* 388 A, 391 c, etc.) for "goddess," and θεά here serves to preclude confusion with Ἐρως. For the notion of a dual Aphrodite cp. Xen. *l. c.*, Apuleius *apol.* 12, Plotin. *Enn.* III. 5. 293 B. For Aphrodite Urania, with a temple in Athens, see Hdt. I. 105, 131, etc.; Paus. I. 14. 6. See also Cic. *N. D.* III. 23; Pind. *fr.* 87.

Πάνδημον. For the temple in honour of A. Pandemos, see Paus. I. 22. 3. It is doubtful whether the title originally attached to her as the common deity of the deme, or as the patroness of the *εταῖραι*. But whatever its origin, the recognized use of the title at the close of the 5th century was to indicate *Venus meretrix*.

**180 E** καὶ Ἐρωτα κτλ. The notion of a duality, or plurality, in Eros is also hinted at in Eurip. *fr.* 550 ἐνὸς δ' Ἐρωτος ὄντος οὐ μί' ἡδονή· | οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρώσω, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν: *fr. adesp.* 151 δισσὰ πνεύματα πνεῖς Ἐρως. Cp. *Phaedr.* 266 A.

ἐπαινεῖν... θεούς. This is merely a formal saving clause, to avert possible Nemesis, and although it involves the speaker in something like self-contradiction, there is no good reason to suspect corruption in the text (if correction be required, the easiest would be εὐφημεῖν, cp. *Epin.* 992 D εὐφημεῖν πάντας θεούς κτλ.). The laudation of base gods would sound less strange in ancient than in modern ears; and Eryximachus uses very similar language in 188 D (cp. 195 A).

**181 A** αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς κτλ. Gellius XVII. 20 ignores πραττομένη in his rendering ("Omne," inquit, "omnino factum sic sese habet: neque turpe est,

ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιούμεν, ἢ πίνειν ἢ ἄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἂνπραχθῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη· καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίνυται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρως οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶ καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν.

IX. Ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς Πανδήμου Ἀφροδίτης ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδη-  
 B μός ἐστι καὶ ἐξεργάζεται ὅ τι ἂν τύχη· καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν οἱ  
 φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐρώσιν. ἐρώσι δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν  
 οὐχ ἡττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων, ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρώσι τῶν σωμάτων  
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν, ἔπειτα ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων, πρὸς  
 τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μή.  
 ὅθεν δὴ ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττειν, ὁμοίως  
 μὲν ἀγαθόν, ὁμοίως δὲ τούναντίον. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θεοῦ  
 C νεωτέρας τε οὔσης πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ  
 γενέσει καὶ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος. ὁ δὲ τῆς Οὐρανίας πρῶτον μὲν οὐ  
 μετεχούσης θήλεος ἀλλ' ἄρρενος μόνον, [καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ τῶν

181 A αὐτὸ (καθ' αὐτὸ) t τῇ om. Stob. καλὸς B: καλῶς T  
 B ἀνοητοτάτως W ἀπὸ τῆς: ἀπὸ secl. Sz. Hug: τοιαύτης J.-U.  
 C καί...ἔρως secl. Schütz Teuffel Hug Sz. Bdhm. J.-U.

quantum in eo est, neque honestum, uelut est quas nunc facimus ipsi res, bibere cantare disserere. nihil namque horum ipsum ex se honestum est; quali cum fieret modo factum est, tale extitit," etc.): Proclus also (*in Alcib. I.* p. 215) omits it. It must certainly, I think, be ejected, since it only serves to confuse the argument; none of the alternatives proposed are at all probable; while Rettig's attempt to justify its retention by the device of setting a comma before it is merely absurd. For the language cp. *Meno* 88 c πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν: *Phaedr.* 258 c, d. See also *Eryx.* 397 e; *Arist. Pol.* 1333<sup>a</sup> 9, for the moral indifference of πράξεις καθ' αὐτάς.

ὅ τι ἂν τύχη. "At random"; so ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι 181 B *infra*: *Prot.* 353 A οἱ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσι.

181 B ὧν καὶ ἐρώσι. "In the actual objects of their passion": the full statement would be ἐρώσι τῶν σωμάτων ἐκείνων (sc. παίδων ἢ γυναικῶν) ὧν ἐρώσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψ.

τὸ διαπράξασθαι. A polite euphemism for the sexual act: cp. 182 c, *Phaedr.* 256 c; *Lysias I.* 33.

ἔστι γὰρ...ἄρρενος. Observe that the reasons are put in chiasmic order.

181 C καὶ ἔστιν...Ἔρως. This clause is obviously open to suspicion as (1) anticipating the sense of ὅθεν δὴ κτλ., and (2) standing in partial contradiction to the later statement (181 D *ad init.*) οὐ γὰρ ἐρώσι παίδων.

παιδων ἔρωσ·] ἔπειτα πρεσβυτέρας, ὕβρεως ἀμοίρου· ὅθεν δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἔπιπνοι, τὰ φύσει ἔρρωμενέστερον καὶ νοῦν μᾶλλον ἔχον ἀγαπῶντες. καὶ τις ἂν γνοιή καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παιδευαστίᾳ τοὺς εἰλικρινῶς ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ὠρμημένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐρώσι παιδων, ἀλλ' **D** ἐπειδὴν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν, τοῦτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν. παρεσκευασμένοι γάρ, οἶμαι, εἰσὶν οἱ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχόμενοι ἐρᾶν ὡς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ξυνεσόμενοι καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαντες, ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λαβόντες ὡς νέον, καταγελάσαντες οἰχήσεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλον ἀποτρέχοντες. χρῆν δὲ καὶ νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν παιδων, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄδηλον πολλῆ σπουδῇ ἀνηλίσκετο· τὸ γὰρ τῶν παιδων τέλος ἄδηλον οἱ τελευτᾶ **E**

181 **C** παιδων in παιδευαστῶν mutato post ἀγαπῶντες trs. Verm. πρεσβυτέρας (οὔσης καὶ) Christ ἀμοίρου libri: ἄμοιρος Ficinus Bast Bdhm.: ὕβρεως ἀμοίρου addub. Sz. **D** ἀλλ' (ἦ) Steph. Hug οἰχέσθαι Herwerden παίδας Markland **E** τέλος secl. Bdhm.

ὕβρεως ἀμοίρου. For ὕβρις as especially associated with juvenile "lustihead," cp. *Euthyd.* 273 B ὕβριστῆς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι: *Lysias* xxiv. 16 ὑβρίζειν εἰκός... τοὺς ἔτι νέους καὶ νέαις ταῖς διανοίαις χρωμένους: *Soph. fr.* 705 ὕβρις δέ τοι... ἐν νέοις ἀνθεῖ τε καὶ φθίνει πάλιν.

ἔπιπνοι. "Driven by the spirit": the only other exx. of the word in Plato are *Cratyl.* 428 c and *Meno* 99 d φαῖμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (cp. 179 A n., 180 B n.).

181 **D** τοῦτο δὲ. Sc. τὸ νοῦν ἴσχειν. This is in contradiction to the statements of Phaedrus, 178 c (εὐθύς νέω ὄντι), 180 A (ἔτι ἀγένειος ἦν). For γενειάσκειν (*rubescere*), cp. Solon 27. 5—6 τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων | λαχνούται, χροίης ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης. Cp. Spenser *F. Q.* II. xii. 79 "And on his tender lips the downy heare Did now but freshly spring, and silken blossoms beare": *Hor. C.* iv. 10. 2 (*pluma*).

παρασκευασμένοι κτλ. For the change of construction from ὡς with fut. partic. to (fut.) infin., cp. *Charm.* 164 D, *Rep.* 383 A ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε... ὄντας... μήτε... παράγειν. The clause ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ... νέον is best taken closely with the preceding participle, and καταγελάσαντες... ἀποτρέχοντες closely together. For ἐξαπατήσαντες cp. 184 E, 185 A: *Theogn.* 254 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγους μ' ἀπατᾶς. This ἀπάτη and καταγελάω are forms of the ὕβρις mentioned above, 181 c: cp. 219 c, 222 A.

μὴ ἐρᾶν παιδων. παῖς, as here used, is *Theognis'* μικρὸς παῖς, the παιδάριον of 210 B *infra*.

181 **E** ἄδηλον οἱ τελευτᾶ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 232 E τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν κτλ.: *Theogn.* 1075 ff. πρήγματος ἀπρήκτου χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι τελευτῆν | γνῶναι... ὄρφνη γὰρ τέταται: *Alcid. Odyss.* 5 πᾶσά τε ἀπορία ἦν ποῖ ποτε προβήσοιτο ἢ... τελευτή. A similar

κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ψυχῆς τε πέρι καὶ σώματος. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοὶ τὸν νόμον τούτου αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκόντες τίθενται, χρῆν δὲ καὶ τούτους τοὺς πανδήμους ἐραστὰς προσαναγκάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν προσαναγκάζομεν αὐτούς  
 182 καθ' ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ ἐρᾶν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὸ ὄνειδος πεποιηκότες, ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς· λέγουσι δὲ εἰς τούτους ἀποβλέποντες, ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀκαιρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δὴ που κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὁτιοῦν πραττόμενον ψόγον ἂν δικαίως φέροι.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι

181 E κακίας ἢ edd. Stobaei, Hommel  
 τῶν τοιοῦτον W 182 A τινὰ vulg.  
 γε: τε vulg. ὁτιοῦν (πράγμα) mg. t, Bt.

χρῆν W: χρην B: χρῆ T  
 ἀκαιρίαν: ἀκοσμίαν Liebhold

sentiment occurs in the Clown's song in *Twelfth-Night*: "What's to come is still unsure... Youth's a stuff will not endure."

κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς. Possibly these genitives are to be construed (with Rückert) as dependent on the preceding adverb οἱ: cp. Soph. *O. T.* 413 οὐ βλέπεις ἴν' εἰ κακοῦ (*Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 50 B). Hug, however, takes them to be governed by πέρι, comparing for the separation of prepos. from case *Apol.* 19 c, Soph. *Aj.* 793.

τούτους...ἐραστὰς. For οὔτος contemptuous cp. *Apol.* 17 B, *Rep.* 492 D οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταὶ τε καὶ σοφισταὶ ("οὗτοι is the contemptuous *isti*" Adam).

τὸ τοιοῦτον. Sc. μὴ ἐρᾶν παίδων (D *ad fin.*). For the db. accus. with -αναγκάζω, cp. *Rep.* 473 A τοῦτο μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με: *Phaedr.* 242 B. Hommel, perversely, construes τὸ τοιοῦτον as an adverbial accus., "ganz in der Weise wie" etc.

τῶν ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν. For the legal penalties (by a γραφὴ μοιχείας or ὕβρεως or a δίκη βιαιῶν) for rape and adultery, see Lysias I. 26, 30, 49. One of the lesser penalties was that alluded to by Catullus xv. 18 f., Quem...Per-current raphanique mugilesque.

182 A χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς. χαρίζεσθαι, *obsequi*, "to grant favours"—the converse of διαπράξασθαι—is a *vox propria* in this connexion: cp. Schol. ad *Phaedr.* 227 C τὸ χαριστέον ἐστίν...τὸ πρὸς ἀφροδίσιον ἑαυτὸν συνουσίαν ἐπιιδόναί τινί. For the sentiment here disputed, see Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 19 ff.; *Mem.* I. 2. 29; and the paradox in *Phaedr.* 233 E ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι. Aeschines I. 136 agrees with Pausanias.

τὴν ἀκαιρίαν. "Impropriety" or "tactlessness": for exx. of such ἀκαιρία, see 181 D, *Phaedr.* 231 D ff.

ὁ...νόμος. νόμος here includes both "law" proper and "public sentiment" or "custom" ("die Anschauungen des Volkes," Hug) which are distinguished in Dem. *de Cor.* 114: cp. Thuc. VI. 18. 7: but in Thuc. VI. 16. 2 νόμος is "custom."

νοῆσαι ῥάδιος, ἀπλῶς γὰρ ὄρισται· ὁ δ' ἐνθάδε [καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] ποικίλος. ἐν Ἡλιδι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὐ μὴ B σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἀπλῶς νενομοθέτηται καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις εἴποι οὔτε νέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρὸν, ἵνα, οἶμαι, μὴ πράγματ' ἔχῃσι λόγῳ πειρώμενοι πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ἅτε ἀδύνατοι λέγειν· τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσι. τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἦ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἦ

182 A (ὁ) ἐν Hirschig καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι secl. Winckelmann Hug Sz. J.-U.: fort. post γὰρ transpon. (cf. Teuffel) ὁ supra ἐν Λακεδαίμονι add. T B οὐ T: οὐ B τὸ BT: del. t τοῖς δὲ Ἰωνίας Ast: τῇ δὲ Ἰωνία Thiersch πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι cj. Steph. (καὶ) ὅσοι Rückert γε (post τοῦτό): τε Herm. Sz.

182 A καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι. I follow Winckelmann and others (see *crit. n.*) in bracketing these words: possibly they should be transposed to a place in the next clause, either after γὰρ or after Βοιωτοῖς (in suggesting this I find myself anticipated by an anonymous critic, *ap. Teuffel, Rhein. Mus. xxix.* p. 145). That Laconia was a hot-bed of paederasty might be inferred *à priori* from its military-oligarchical constitution, and is betokened by the verb λακωνίζειν used as a synonym for παιδικοῖς χρῆσθαι (*Ar. frag.* 322), and the adj. κυσολάκων for παιδεραστής. It is certainly unlikely that a ποικίλος νόμος would be ascribed to the Laconians, and unlikely too that they would be classed apart from the μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν. Moreover, in 182 D ff. it is ὁ ἐνθάδε (ἡμέτερος) νόμος which is treated as ποικίλος, and no mention is made there of a similar Laconian νόμος. For Laconian mores, Stallb. cites Xen. *Rep. Lac.* II. 13; Plut. *Lac. Inst.* p. 237 B; Aelian *V. H.* III. 10. 12. In Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 35 the Lacedaemonians are lauded—θεὰν γὰρ οὐ τὴν Ἀναΐδειαν ἀλλὰ τὴν Αἰδῶ νομίζουσι (which ought, perhaps, to be construed as implying that they are slighted here).

182 B ἐν Ἡλιδι κτλ. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 34, *Rep. Lac. l.c.*, Athen. XIII. 2. The Cretan ἀρπαγμὸς παιδῶν (*Laws* VIII. 836) points to a similar state of things.

τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας. The genitive is taken by Hug as dependent on πολλαχοῦ, by Stallb. as dependent on ὅσοι, "vel potius ex demonstrativo ante ὅσοι intelligendo." Hug quotes Xen. *Hell.* IV. 4. 16 πολλαχόσε καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐμβalόντες.

ὅσοι...οἰκοῦσι. The grammar is loose—"per synesin additur ὅσοι perinde ac si praecessisset 'apud Ionas autem et multos alios'" (Stallb.). The language is most appropriate to a time after the Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.), when the Greeks of Asia Minor were again reduced to subjection to the Great King (see Bury, *Hist. Gr.* p. 552); cp. *Cratyl.* 409 E οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες: *Laws* 693 A.

τοῦτό γε καὶ κτλ. Strictly we should supply, with τοῦτο, τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, but the notion latent is probably the more general one τὸ ἐρᾶν (παιδῶν). The palaestrae (gymnasia) were recognized as the chief seats of



**C** φιλογυμναστία· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, συμφέρεи τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γὰρ Ἄριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἄρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν. οὕτως οὐ μὲν αἰσχροὺς ἐτέθη χαρί-

182 C γίγνεσθαι Jn. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ex emend. Vindob. 21: τῶ ἀρχομένῳ Rohde: τῶν ἀρχομένων (ταῖς ψυχαῖς) Bdhm. μάλιστα post καὶ trs. Ast ἄλλα: καλὰ J.-U. πάντα: ταῦτα Schleierm. καὶ ὁ: καὶ secl. Bdhm. Sz. οὐ Tb: ου B

φιλοσοφία and παιδευαστία as well as of φιλογυμναστία. Cp. (for παιδευαστία) Ar. *Nub.* 973 ff., 980 αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν προαγωγέων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς: *Law* 636 B: Xen. *Cyrop.* II. 3. 21: Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 33. 70 in Graecorum gymnasiiis...isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. Bene ergo Ennius: flagiti principium est nudare inter cives corpora: Plut. *amat.* 751 F ff. The gymnasia also served, at Athens, as headquarters of political clubs, cp. Athen. XIII. 602.

182 C φρονήματα...ἐγγίγνεσθαι. For φρον. μεγάλα cp. 190 B. For ἐγγίγνεσθαι cp. Xen. *Rep. Lac.* v. 6 ὅστ' ἐκεῖ ἤκιστα μὲν ὕβριν...ἐγγίγνεσθαι: and 184 A *infra*. The genitive τῶν ἀρχομένων, in place of the more natural dative, may be explained, with Stallb., as due to "a confusion of two constructions," the gen. being dependent on φρον. μεγ. and the dat. after the verb omitted. For the thought, cp. (with Jowett) Arist. *Pol.* v. 11. 15.

ὃ δὴ...ἐμποιεῖν. The neut. sing., which is acc. after ἐμποιεῖν, serves to grasp under one general head the preceding plurals. For this common use of φιλεῖ, *solet*, cp. 188 B *infra*, *Phileb.* 37 B. Hug, excising the καὶ after πάντα, construes τὰ ἄλλα πάντα as a second object, parallel to ὃ. But no change is needed: the phrase means "prae ceteris omnibus maxime amor," as Stallb. renders, cp. the usage of ἄλλος τε καί, τά τε ἄλλα καί in 220 A, *Apol.* 36 A, etc.

ὁ γὰρ Ἄριστογείτονος κτλ. For the exploits of these tyrannicides, who slew the Pisistratids in 514 B.C., see Bury *H. G.* p. 205. Aristogeiton was the ἐραστής of Harmodius, and popular sentiment invested the pair, in later days, with a halo of glory as the patron-saints and martyrs of Love and Liberty. Cp. *Skolia* 9 (Bggk. *P. L. G.* III. p. 646) ἐν μύρτου κλαδὶ τὸ ξίφος φορήσω, | ὥσπερ Ἄρμόδιος καὶ Ἄριστογείτων, | ὅτε τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην | ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποίησάτην: Ar. *Ach.* 980, *Lys.* 632. The exploit was also commemorated by Antenor's bronzes and a group by Critias and Nesiotes (reproduced in Bury *H. G.* p. 209).

ἐτέθη. As aor. pass. of τίθεσθαι, this is equiv. to ἐνομίσθη (cp. two ll. below). It is plain that θεμένων must here be taken to include both rulers and subjects. For πλεονεξία, "arrogant greed," as opposed to ἡ τοῦ ἴσου τιμή, see *Rep.* 359 c. For the theory implied in the following passage, that ἔρως and ἀνδρεία go together (as Phaedrus also had contended, 178 D ff.), cp. Bacon, *Essay* x. (*Of Love*): "I know not how, but Martiall men are given to Love: I think it is but as they are given to Wine; for perils commonly aske to be paid in pleasures."



ζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, κακία τῶν θεμένων κείται, τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων πλεονεξία, τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρία· οὐ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς ἐνο- **D** μίσθη, διὰ τὴν τῶν θεμένων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀργίαν. ἐνθάδε δὲ πολὺ τούτων κάλλιον νενομοθέτηται, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐ ῥάδιον κατανοῆσαι.

**X.** Ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ ὅτι λέγεται κάλλιον τὸ φανερώς ἐρᾶν τοῦ λάθρα, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ ἀρίστων, κἂν αἰσχιούς ἄλλων ὦσι, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῆ ἢ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἐρώντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή, οὐχ ὡς τι αἰσχροὺν ποιοῦντι, καὶ ἐλόντι τε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐλόντι αἰσχροὺν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν **E** ἐλεῖν ἐξουσίαν ὁ νόμος δέδωκε τῷ ἐραστῇ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργάζομένῳ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ἃ εἴ τις τολμῶν ποιεῖν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν διώκων καὶ βουλόμενος διαπράξασθαι πλὴν τοῦτο [φιλοσοφίας], τὰ μέ- **183** γιστα καρποῖτ' ἂν ὄνειδη· εἰ γὰρ ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρὰ

**182 D** οὐ δὲ **T**: οὐ δὲ **B** δὲ **B**: om. **TW** κατανοῆσαι ἐνθ. γ' ὅτι **Bdhm.** ἐνεθυμήθην in mg. **W** τε **T**: om. **B** **E** πρὸς τῷ **Ast** ἃ εἰ **TW**: αἰεὶ **B**: γρ. καὶ αἰεὶ **W** **183 A** φιλοσοφίας secl. Schleierm. Bekk. Hug Sz. **Bdhm.** Bt.: φιλίας, τοῦτο delete, Herm.: φίλοις ὀφθεῖς cj. **Bdhm.**: alii alia εἰ **BT**: ἡ **W**

**182 D** Ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ κτλ. The construction is grammatically incomplete: one would expect δόξειεν ἂν, or the like, to govern the dative. It is not till we get to **183 C** (ταύτη μὲν οὖν κτλ.) that we find the sense resumed.

παρὰ πάντων. Jowett's "all the world" is misleading: the treatment is here confined to Athenian νόμος.

**182 E** πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν κτλ. "Quod attinet ad amasii capiendi conatum" (Stallb.).

ἐξουσίαν...ἐπαινεῖσθαι. Here, as often, the main idea is put in the participle. Again Jowett misleads, in rendering ὁ νόμος "the custom of mankind."

θαυμαστὰ ἔργα. "θαυμαστὰ vel θαυμάσια ποιεῖν vel ἐργάζεσθαι est sich wunderbar geberden...quod dicitur de iis qui vel propter dolorem et indignationem vel ob ingentem laetitiam vel etiam prae vehementi aliqua cupiditate insolito more se gerunt" (Stallb.). Cp. **213 D**, *Apol.* **35 A**, *Theaet.* **151 A**.

**183 A** πλὴν τοῦτο [φιλοσοφίας]. φιλοσοφίας is most probably corrupt: if retained, it would be better to construe it as genit. of object ("the reproaches levelled against philosophy") than as genit. of subject or origin (as **Ast**, **Stallb.**, **Kreyenbühl**), for which we should expect rather φιλοσόφων. The simplest and best remedy is, with Schleiermacher, to eject φιλοσοφίας as a gloss on the misreading τούτου. For ὄνειδος, cp. *Rep.* **347 B** τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται. For καρποῦσθαι, in malam partem, cp. *Rep.* **579 c**; *Eur. Hipp.* **1427 κ.** πένθη. In their translations, Jowett follows **Ast**, but Zeller adopts Schl.'s excision.

του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἢ τιν' ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν οἷάπερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἰκετείας τε καὶ ἀντιβολήσεις ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσι ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὄρκους ὀμνύντες, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις, καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἷας οὐδ' ἂν δούλος οὐδεὶς, ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὕτω τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ  
**B** ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν, τῶν μὲν ὀνειδιζόντων κολακείας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας, τῶν δὲ νουθετούντων καὶ αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν· τῷ δ' ἐρῶντι πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντι χάρις ἔπεστι, καὶ δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ὀνειδούς πράττειν, ὡς πάγκαλόν τι πρᾶγμα διαπραττομένου· ὃ δὲ δεινότατον, ὡς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμη παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὄρκων—ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον

183 A ἄρξαι secl. Verm. Hug Sz. ἢ τιν': δὴ τιν' Bdhm. ἄλλην δύναμιν secl. Bdhm. ἐθέλει T καὶ...ὀμνύντες del. Voeg. J.-U.: ὀμνύντες secl. Hertz Hug Sz. καὶ κοιμ...θύραις secl. Wolf Jn.: post ποιούμενοι transp. Rückert ἐθέλοντας vulg.: ἐθέλονται (δ. δουλεύοντες) Ast **B** αὐτῶν: αὐτοῦ Orelli Sz. ταῦτα πάντα T ἔπεστι T: ἐπεται B: ἔπεται J.-U. Sz. διαπραττομένῳ vulg. μόνον Stob. τῶν ὄρκων T: τῶν ὄρκον B: τὸν ὄρκον al., J.-U. ὄρκον (κύριον) scripsi: ὄρκον (ὄρκον) Hertz Hug

κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις. Cp. 203 D; Ov. *A. A.* II. 238 frigidus et nuda saepe iacebis humo: Hor. *C.* III. 10. 2 asperas | porrectum ante fores, etc. For the other love-symptoms cp. also Xen. *Cyrop.* v. 1. 12.

183 B αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. For this construction cp. *Euthyd.* 305 A, *Charm.* 175 D. With the whole of this passage cp. Xen. *Symp.* IV. 15, VIII. 12 ff.: Isocr. *Hel.* 219 B μόνους αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς καλοὺς) ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἡδίων δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχομεν...καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπ' ἄλλη τινὶ δυνάμει γιγνομένους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ κόλακας ἀποκαλοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ τῷ κάλλει λατρεύοντες φιλοκάλους καὶ φιλοπόνους εἶναι νομίζομεν (with which cp. also 184 c *infra*).

τῷ δ' ἐρῶντι...διαπραττομένου. For the gen. absolute after a dative, cp. *Laws* 839 B ἡμῖν τις παραστάς ἀνὴρ...λοιδορήσειεν ἂν ὡς ἀνόητα...τιθέντων: *Phileb.* 44 c is a less certain case. For the sense of the passage, cp. Bacon, *Essay x. (Of Love)*: "It is a strange thing to note the excessive of this passion; and how it braves the nature and value of things; by this, that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but in Love."

ὡς γε λέγουσιν κτλ. These words qualify the following, not the preceding, clause: Pausanias himself censures perjury in 183 E. For ὡς γε, cp. *Rep.* 352 D, 432 B.

ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον κτλ. This proverbial expression is found in two forms,—ἀφροδίσιος ὄρκος οὐ δάκνει (Hesych.) and ἀφρ. ὄρκος οὐκ ἐμποίνιμος (Suid.). The Scholiast quotes Hesiod (*fr.* 5 G.) ἐκ τοῦδ' ὄρκον ἔθηκεν ἀμείνονα (ἀπήμονα G. Hermann) ἀνθρώποισι | νοσφιδίων ἔργων πέρι Κύπριδος. Cp. Soph. *fr.* 694 ὄρκους δὲ μοιχῶν εἰς τέφραν ἐγὼ γράφω: Callim. *Epigr.* 27 (*Anth. Pal.* v. 5. 3) ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν ἀληθεία, τοὺς ἐν ἔρωτι | ὄρκους μὴ δύνειν οὐατ' ἐς

<κύριον> οὐ φασιν εἶναι—οὕτω καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν πεποιήκασιν τῷ ἐρώντι, ὡς ὁ νόμος φησὶν ὁ ἐνθάδε· C ταύτη μὲν οὖν οἰηθείη ἂν τις πάγκαλον νομίζεσθαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ τὸ φίλους γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς. ἐπειδὴν δὲ παιδαγωγούς ἐπιστήσαντες οἱ πατέρες τοῖς ἐρωμένοις μὴ ἐῶσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς, καὶ τῷ παιδαγωγῷ ταῦτα προστεταγμένα ἦ, ἡλικιωταὶ δὲ καὶ ἐταῖροι ὄνειδίζωσιν, ἐάν τι ὀρώσι τοιοῦτο γυγνόμενον, καὶ τοὺς ὄνειδίζοντας αὐτοὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι μὴ διακωλύωσι μηδὲ λοιδορῶσιν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντας, εἰς δὲ ταῦτά τις αὐτὸ βλέψας ἠγήσασαί τ' ἂν πάλιν αἰσχιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι. τὸ δέ, οἶμαι, ὧδ' ἔχει· οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς

183 B εἶναι BT Stob. Cyril.: δάκνειν Teuffel: εἶναι ἐμποίνιμον Osann Jn. Sz. καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι W. Cyril. vulg. C πεποιήκασιν πᾶσαν Cyril. διαλ. τοὺς ἐραστὰς Orelli καὶ...ἦ secl. Jn.: καὶ...προσ τεταγμένα secl. Hug Sz. ἦ TW: οἱ B: ἦ οἱ al. ἐταῖροι Heindorf: ἕτεροι BT D οὐχ ἀπλοῦν: ἀπλοῦν Bast: οὐχ ἀπλῶς Ast

ἀθανάτων: Aristaen. II. 20: Ov. A. A. I. 633 Iuppiter ex alto periuria ridet amantum: Tibull. I. 4. 21 ff. nec iurare time: Veneris periuria venti | irrita... ferunt, etc. As to the text, the parallels quoted lead us to expect a fuller expression. Hertz's ὄρκον (ἄρκον), adopted by Hug, is ingenious but rather weak in sense. I prefer to insert κύριον (abbreviated κῶν) after ὄρκον. For κύριος, "valid," cp. *Lais* 926 D: *Erp.* vi. 323 C, and see L. and S. s.v. II. 2: οὐ κύριος is equiv. to ἄκυρος, *irritus*. To Jahn's insertion (ἐμποίνιμον) Teuffel rightly objects that it smacks but little of the proverbial manner.

καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι. This seems to balance the statement made by Phaedrus, 179 C—D.

183 C τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. From this dative (governed by ἐπιστήσαντες), we must supply an acc. (τοὺς ἐρωμένους) to act as subject to διαλέγεσθαι. For the general sense of the passage, cp. *Phaedr.* 255 A ἐάν...ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἐρώντι πλησιάζειν: *ibid.* 234 B.

καὶ...προσ τεταγμένα ἦ. Hug, after Jahn and others, condemns this clause on the grounds that (1) ἦ is wanting in B; (2) the change of number, from παιδαγωγούς to παιδαγωγῷ, is awkward; (3) the clause contains nothing new. But there is point in the change from plur. to sing. as serving to individualize the parents' action; and the clause does add to the statement in the context the further idea that the paedagogi are appointed not only as a general safeguard, but with special instructions to ward off this particular danger. ταῦτα, the subject of προστ. ἦ, represents (as Stallb. notes) μὴ ἐῶσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς.

183 D τὸ δέ...ἔχει. For this formula, introducing the solution of a problem, cp. 198 D; *Theaet.* 166 A.

οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν. Stallbaum, ejecting οὐχ with Bast, renders ἀπλοῦν by

ἐλέχθη οὔτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρὸν. αἰσχρῶς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πονηρῶ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῶ τε καὶ **Ε** καλῶς. πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος ὁ ἐραστής ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν, ἅτε οὐ μόνιμου ἐρῶν πράγματος. ἅμα γὰρ τῶ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὐπερ ἦρα, “οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος,” πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἥθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστής διὰ βίου μένει, ἅτε μόνιμῳ συντακεῖς. τούτους δὴ βού-

183 D εἶναι del. Steph. Ast (οὐδὲν) οὔτε Bdhm. αἰσχρῶς μὲν : αἰσχρὸν μὲν Steph. καλῶς δὲ Par. 1810 : καλὸν δὲ BT καὶ καλῶς : καὶ χρηστῶς Sauppe Sz. **Ε** ἐρῶν η τῆς ψυχῆς T ἅτε οὐ B : ἅτε οὐδὲ T

“verum simpliciter,” citing *Phaedo* 62 A, *Phaedr.* 244 A, *Protag.* 331 B. Retaining οὐχ, we cannot take the foll. accus. and infin. as the subject (with Wolf), but must supply τὸ χαρίζεσθαι (with Hug) from the context.

αἰσχρῶς μὲν...καλῶς δὲ. With each adverb, sc. χαρίζεσθαι: cp. *Rep.* 339 c τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς...τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς (sc. τιθέναι).

183 **Ε** τῶ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λ. Youth “is like the flower of the field, so soon passeth it away, and it is gone.” Cp. *Mimn.* 2. 7 μίνυνθα δὲ γίγνεται ἤβης καρπός: *Theogn.* 1305 παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος | ὠκύτερον σταδίου: Ségur's refrain “Ah! le Temps fait passer l'Amour”: Spenser (*H. to Beautie*) “For that same goodly hew of white and red, With which the cheeks are sprinckled, shal decay, And those sweete rosy leaves, so fairely spred Upon the lips, shall fade and fall away” etc.: *Rep.* 601 B οὐκοῦν ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὀραίων προσώποις... ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη: *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει, κτλ.: *Tyrt.* 10. 28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἤβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη: *Mimnerm.* 1. 4. So Emerson (*On Beauty*) “The radiance of the human form...is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months, at the perfection of youth, and in most rapidly declines. But we remain lovers of it, only transferring our interest to interior excellence.”

οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος. A reminiscence of *Il.* II. 71. For the thought, cp. 181 D *supra*: *Xen. Symp.* l.c. ἀπολείποντος δὲ τούτου (sc. τοῦ τῆς ὥρας ἄνθους), ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συναπομαραίνεσθαι. Cp. also *Phaedr.* 232 E, 234 A.

συντακεῖς. “Fused into one” by the flame of love. Cp. 192 D, *Eur. fr.* 964 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνὴ | ἦτις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται: *id. Supp.* 1029.

τούτους δὴ. With the text as it stands in the MSS., τούτους refers to the ἐρασταί only, who are divided into two classes, the good (τοῖς μὲν) and the bad (τοὺς δὲ). But in the next clause τοῖς μὲν refers to the ἐρασταί *en bloc*, and τοῖς δὲ to the ἐρώμενοι. This is extremely awkward; and it is a further objection to the clause that the statement it contains is premature, and would fit in better below (184 D—E). I therefore follow Voegelin and Hug in obelizing. For the language, cp. *Theogn.* 1299 ff. ὦ παῖ, μέχρι τίνος με προφεύξεται; ὥς σε διώκων | δίξην...ἀλλ' ἐπίμεινον, ἐμοὶ δὲ δίδου χάριν.

λεται ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος εὖ καὶ καλῶς βασανίζειν [, καὶ τοῖς μὲν 184  
 χαρίσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ διαφεύγειν]. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοῖς μὲν διώκειν  
 παρακελεύεται, τοῖς δὲ φεύγειν, ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ βασανίζων ποτέ-  
 ρων ποτέ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώμενος. οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ  
 ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀλίσκεσθαι ταχὺ αἰσχρὸν νενό-  
 μισται, ἵνα χρόνος ἐγγένηται, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καλῶς βασα-  
 νίζειν, ἔπειτα τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτικῶν δυνάμεων  
 ἀλῶναι αἰσχρὸν, ἐάν τε κακῶς πάσχων πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτερήσῃ, B  
 ἂν τ' εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικὰς μὴ  
 καταφρονήσῃ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνιμον  
 εἶναι, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλίαν. μία  
 δὴ λείπεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμῳ ὁδός, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι  
 ἐραστῇ παιδικά. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἦν  
 δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα ἠντινοῦν δουλείαν παιδικοῖς μὴ κολακείαν εἶναι C

184 A καὶ...διαφεύγειν secl. Bdhm. Sz. διαφυγεῖν Hirschig διὰ...  
 ἐρώμενος del. Schütz Ast καὶ ποτέρων del. Bast: καὶ...ἐρώμενος secl. J.-U.  
 δὴ BT: δὴ καὶ W ὑπὸ...αἰτίας del. Baiter τὸ (ῆ) Hirschig καὶ ὑπὸ:  
 ἢ ὑπὸ Hirschig B αἰσχρὸν del. Hirschig ἀντευεργετούμενος T εἰς  
 χρ....πολιτικὰς secl. Hirschig J.-U. Hug Sz. μόνιμον: νόμιμον Wolf ἔστι:  
 ὡς J.-U.: ὥσπερ Bdhm.: ἔστι...νόμος om. Verm. Sz. Hug ὥσπερ T: ὥσπερ  
 B Stob. Jn.: ὥσπερ γὰρ Verm. Sz.: ὡς γὰρ Hug: del. Bdhm. ἐθέλοντα BT:  
 ἐθέλοντας vel ἐθειλοντάς Stob. Sz.: ἐθειλοντήν Bast: ἐθειλοντι Bdhm.

184 A ἵνα χρόνος κτλ. For the touchstone of time, cp. Simon. *fr.* 175  
 οὐκ ἔστιν μείζων βάσανος χρόνου οὐδενὸς ἔργου | ὃς καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνοις ἀνδρὸς  
 ἔδειξε νόον: Soph. *O. T.* 614 χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος: Eur.  
*Hippol.* 1051 μηνυτήν χρόνον. On the signif. of βάσανος, see Vahlen *Op. Acad.*  
 II. 7 ff.: cp. *Gorg.* 486 D, *Rep.* 413 E; Clem. Al. *Strom.* I. 291 D.

τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων...ἀλῶναι. Cp. 185 A πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάμενος: 216 D  
 μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδὲν...εἴ τις πλούσιος: Ar. *Plut.* 153 ff. καὶ τοὺς γε παῖδας...δρᾶν...  
 τὰργυρίου χάριν. As against the deletion of the second αἰσχρὸν by Hirschig,  
 see the parallels collected by Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 359. For πολιτ. δυνάμεων,  
 cp. Xen. *Mem.* IV. 2. 35; this may be a hit at Alcibiades, cp. 216 B.

184 B εἰς χρήματα...πολιτικὰς. The reasons for which Hug, after Hirschig  
 and others, rejects these words—as (1) superfluous for the sense, and (2)  
 spoiling the responsion of the clauses ἐάν τε καρτερήσῃ and ἂν τε...καταφρο-  
 νήσῃ—are not convincing. This is the only ex. of διάπραξις, *actio*, cited by  
 L. and S.

ἔστι γὰρ κτλ. Hug, objecting to the “ganz unerträgliche Anakoluthie,”  
 follows Vermehren in excising the clause ἔστι...νόμος, as a gloss on the  
 following νενόμισται, and writing ὡς γὰρ for ὥσπερ. This is too rash. For  
 the sense, cp. 183 B and the passage from Isocr. *Hel.* 219 B there quoted.

ἦν...εἶναι. For simple ἦν (ἔστι) with accus. and infin. cp. *Phaedo* 72 D  
 ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι...τάς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι. For ἐθέλων as adj. (“volun-



μηδὲ ἐπονείδιστον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνον δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος· αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν.

XI. Νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν, εἴαν τις ἐθέλη τινὰ θεραπεύειν ἡγούμενος δι' ἐκείνον ἀμείνων ἔσσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἡ ἐθελοδοουλεία οὐκ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ νόμῳ τούτῳ ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταυτό, D τὸν τε περὶ τὴν παιδευαστίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, εἰ μέλλει ξυμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόμον ἔχων ἐκάτερος, ὁ μὲν χαρισαμένοις παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὅτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν δικαίως αὖ ὅτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν <ὑπουργεῖν>,

184 C μία μόνον T: μία μῶν B: μόνη μία Stob.: μία μόνη vulg., Bt.: μία νόμῳ Ficinus: μία παιδικῶν Verm.: μία ἐρωμένῳ Usener: μία νέων Hug: ἡμῖν νόμῳ Kreyenbühl: μία (τῶν ἐρωμένων τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμῳ) Sz: μία τῷ ἐρωμένῳ Steinhart: μῶν δουλεία secl. Bdhm.: μῶν...ἐκούσιος fort. delenda τίς τινα θέλη Stob. ἐκείνον T, Stob.: ἐκείνο B τινὰ del. Hirschig εἶναι: ἐστιν Stob. τὸ νόμῳ τούτῳ apographa: τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ BT D τὴν σοφίαν Hirschig τὸ T: τῷ BW χαρισαμένοις secl. J.-U.: (τοῖς) χαρ. Hirschig: χαρ. (τοῖς) Baiter ἂν T: οὖν B ὑπηρετῶν Bast αὐτὸν Sauppe (ὑπουργῶν) δικαίως Rettig: δικαίως (ὑπουργῶν) Sz. ἂν T: αὖ B ὑπουργῶν (ὑπουργεῖν) Baiter Vahlen: ὑπουργῶν BTW: ὑπουργεῖν vulg., J.-U.: (ὑπουργεῖν) ὑπουργῶν Bt.

tarily") in prose, cp. Xen. *Anab.* VI. 2. 6; Lys. XIX. 6: in poetry the use is common, e.g. Soph. *O. T.* 649.

184 C οὕτω δὴ κτλ. In this clause the method of action permissible to παιδικὰ is presented as parallel to that permissible to ἐρασταί. That there is some corruption in the text is indicated by the divergence of the MSS. in regard to the words after ἄλλη: but of the many emendations suggested (see *crit. n.*) none is convincing. Perhaps the safest plan is to bracket μῶν...ἐκούσιος, as an adscript meant to suggest a subject for λείπεται, and to supply ὁδός as subject from the preceding context.

σοφίαν...μέρος ἀρετῆς. Cp. *Protag.* 329 E, *Rep.* 427 E (with Adam's n.): "the nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. *Mem.* III. 9. 1—5." How many μέρη ἀρετῆς are assumed here by Pausanias is, of course, left indefinite. (See also 196 B n.)

184 D ὅταν γὰρ κτλ. Notice the balance and rhythm of the clauses in this sentence—(a<sup>1</sup>) ὅταν...ἐκάτερος, (b<sup>1</sup>) ὁ μὲν...ὑπηρετῶν, (b<sup>2</sup>) ὁ δὲ...ὑπουργῶν, (c<sup>1</sup>) ὁ μὲν...ξυμβάλλεσθαι, (c<sup>2</sup>) ὁ δὲ...κτᾶσθαι, (a<sup>2</sup>) τότε δὴ...ἐνταῦθα, (a<sup>3</sup>) ξυμπίπτει...οὐδαμοῦ.

ὑπηρετεῖν...ὑπουργεῖν. Both words are used in an erotic sense. So ὑπουργία is used *in re venerea*, Amphis 'Ial. That ὑπουργῶν (ὑπουργεῖν) is the best restoration is shown by Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 499 ff.: cp. 193 c.



καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ξυμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, **E** τότε δὴ τούτων ξυνιόντων εἰς ταυτόν τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ξυμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ ἐξαπατωμένῳ αἰσχύνην φέρει καὶ μὴ. εἰ γάρ τις ἐραστῇ ὡς πλουσίῳ πλούτου ἔνεκα χαρισάμενος ἐξαπα- 185 τηθείη καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα, ἀναφανέντος τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἦττον αἰσχρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τό γε αὐτοῦ ἐπιδειξάει, ὅτι ἔνεκα χρημάτων ὀτιοῦν ἂν ὀτφοῦν ὑπηρετοῖ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλόν. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κᾶν εἴ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισάμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀμείνων ἐσόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθείη,

184 D ξυμβάλλεσθαι T: ξυμβαλέσθαι B **E** εἰς del. Schütz J.-U. κτᾶσθαι: ἴστασθαι Sz.: κτᾶσθαί τι cj. Hug τότε δὲ Wolf τῶν νόμων del. Bast  
185 A ὡς πλουσίῳ secl. Cobet καὶ...χρήματα del. Cobet κᾶν: καὶ  
Hirschig χαρισόμενος cj. Steph. διὰ...ἐραστοῦ secl. Hug τοῦ ἐραστοῦ  
apogr. Coisl. 155

184 **E** εἰς παιδευσιν...κτᾶσθαι. If the text is right we must suppose that κτᾶσθαι is here equiv. to ὥστε κτᾶσθαι, appended to the main verb ξυμβάλλεσθαι which is to be supplied with εἰς παιδευσιν κτλ. (so Vahlen). Of the corrections suggested (see *crit. n.*) Schanz's is the neatest, but spoils the sense-balance with ξυμβάλλεσθαι. The corruption is, perhaps, to be sought elsewhere: the expression τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν is open to suspicion, since σοφίαν as here used after ἄλλην stands as a generic subst. whereas σοφία has just been termed (184 c) μέρος ἀρετῆς: moreover, we should expect that σοφία should itself constitute the κτῆμα of the recipient, just as φρόνησις is itself the contribution of ὁ ξυμβαλλόμενος. On these grounds, I venture to suggest that another fem. subst., such as διδαχὴν, may have fallen out after ἄλλην (ἐκπαιδευσιν for εἰς π. is just possible).

ἐπὶ τούτῳ. "In this case," i.e. in the quest for ἀρετή, in contrast to "the other cases" where lucre or position is coveted (184 A).

εἰ γάρ τις κτλ. Observe the effort after rhythm, with strophe and anti-strophe. For the thought, see 184 A and cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 C τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ κάλλος τοὺς μὲν μισθαρνήσαντας...ἀτιμάζομεν.

185 A καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα. In defence of the text here, against the excisions of Cobet and Hug, see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* II. 366: cp. *Hipp. Min.* 372 E σὺ οὖν χάρισαι καὶ μὴ φθονήσης ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μου: Thuc. II. 13. 1 μὴ τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπη καὶ μὴ δηώση.

διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ. This phrase also is rejected by Hug (followed by Hirzel) on the grounds that (1) "an der correspondierenden Stelle nichts steht," (2) we should expect rather διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐραστοῦ (cp. 182 c). The latter objection falls if, with Rückert, we take ἐραστοῦ as object. gen. ("suam caritatem erga amatorem"). φιλία ἐραστοῦ here is, I take it, equiv. to the compound φιλεραστία (213 D, cp. 192 B).

**B** ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτημένου ἀρετῆν, ὅμως καλὴ ἢ ἀπάτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὗτος τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν δεδηλωκένας, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ πάντων κάλλιστον· οὕτω πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.

Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρωσ καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ιδιώταις, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγ-  
**C** κάζων ποιείσθαι πρὸς ἀρετῆν τὸν τε ἐρώωντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον· οἱ δ' ἕτεροι πάντες τῆς ἐτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου. ταυτά σοι, ἔφη, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, περὶ Ἐρωτος συμβάλλομαι.

Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, διδάσκουσι γὰρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος δεῖν μὲν Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλου λόγγα

185 **B** καὶ οὐ...ἀρετῆν secl. Hug ἢ om. pr. T (πᾶν) πάντως Stob., Bt. ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα T: ἕνεκα ἀρετῆς Stob. **C** ἔρωτα Stob. αὐτοῦ (τε) Ast τοῦ ἐρώμενου Bast Ast συμβάλλομαι T, Method.: συμβάλλομεν B οὕτως om. Hermog.

185 **B** καλὴ ἢ ἀπάτη. Sc. τῷ ἐξαπατωμένῳ.

δοκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὗτος. This corresponds to δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος κτλ. in 185 A.

185 **C** ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα. For the sense *subito* s. *ex tempore*, cp. *Crat.* 399 D, *Critias* 107 E. On extempore, as opposed to premeditated orations, see Alcidasmas *de Soph.* 3 εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ παραντίκα κτλ.

συμβάλλομαι. "This is my contribution," with allusion to the literary *ἔρανος* mentioned in 177 c.

ἴσα λέγειν. This alludes to the ἴσα σχήματα (including sound-echoes etc., as well as "isokolia") of the rhetorical τεχνῖται (see Spengel, *rhet. Gr.* II. pp. 436—7). We may render (after Jowett): "When Paūsānīās had come τὸ ἄ παῦσε—a pretty piece of 'isology' I have been taught by the professors—" etc. The title οἱ σοφοί is variously applied in Plato to the Orphics (*Rep.* 583 B), to poets (*Rep.* 489 B), and, as here, to linguistic craftsmen. For σοφία as applied to etymological "puns," cp. *Crat.* 396 c, D, and the use of σοφίζεσθαι (in connexion with the etymology of οὐρανός) in *Rep.* 509 D (see Adam's n. *ad loc.*). For a rhetorical repetition of the same word (παύω), see *Gorg. Hel.* 2 τὴν μὲν κακῶς ἀκούουσας παῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφομένους...παῦσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας.

λόγγα. The Scholiast has a long note here: τὸ τοῦ λυγμοῦ σύμπτωμα ἐπιγίνεται τῷ στομάχῳ διὰ πλήρωσιν ἢ κένωσιν ἢ ψύξιν, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ διὰ δῆξιν δριμέων ὑγρῶν καὶ φαρμακῶδων ταῖς ποιότησιν...ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ πληρώσεως λυγμός γένηται, ἔμετος τούτοις ἴαμα καὶ τῶν ἄκρων τρίψις καὶ πνεύματος κατοχή. The hiccough of Aristophanes is part of the comic relief in the piece (see *Introd.* § II. c). For πλησμονή, as a cause of disorder, cp. 186 c n., *Hippocr. de diaet.* III. 72 ff.

ἐπιπεπτωκυῖαν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἰπεῖν αὐτόν—  
 ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἱατρὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακεῖσθαι—<sup>Ω</sup> D  
 Ἐρυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἰ ἢ παῦσαί με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ,  
 ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι. καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω  
 ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶ ἐν τῷ σῶ μέρει, σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴν  
 παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν ᾧ δ' ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, εἴ μὲν σοι ἐθέλη  
 ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἢ λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι  
 ἀνακογχυλίασον. εἰ δ' ἄρα πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβὼν τι <sup>E</sup>  
 ταιοῦτον οἶφ κνήσῃς ἂν τὴν ῥίνα, πτάρε· καὶ εἴαν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς  
 ἕπαξ ἢ δῖς, καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις  
 λέγων, φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη· ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσω.

XII. Εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον  
 εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ Πausanίας ὀρμήσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καλῶς οὐχ ἱκανῶς 186  
 ἀπετέλεσε, δεῖν ἐμὲ πειρᾶσθαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ. τὸ μὲν  
 γὰρ διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸν Ἐρωτα δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς διελέσθαι· ὅτι δὲ

185 C λέγειν om. W D ἐν τῇ κάτω: ἐγγυτάτω Steph. τὸν ἱατρὸν T:  
 τῶν ἱατρῶν B (οὐ) πολὺν Sauppe παύσασθαι Stob. E ἀναλαβὼν:  
 λαβὼν Stob. οἶφ: ὄφ Cobet κνήσῃς Wyttenbach: κνήσῃσιν Luzac:  
 κινήσῃς BT, Stob. Athen. πταρῶν Stob. φάναι B: εἰπέω TW  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι del. Sz. οὐχ ἱκανῶς: οὐχὶ καλῶς olim Sz. 186 A δεῖν  
 om. Method. Sz.: δεῖν ἐμὲ del. Hirschig

ἐν τῇ κάτω αὐτοῦ. Sc. κλίνη—referring to what might jocosely be termed  
 the *clinical* position of the worthy doctor. Cp. n. on ἔσχατον κατακείμενον,  
 175 c.

185 D ἐν τῷ σῶ μέρει. Cp. Meno 92 E ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ εἰπέ.

εἴαν μὲν σοι κτλ. We have here a case of "aposiopesis" or suppressed  
 apodosis; cp. Protag. 311 D; Hom. Il. I. 135 ff.: see Goodwin G. M. T. § 482.

ἀνακογχυλίασον. Schol. ἀνακογχυλίασαι· τὸ κλύσαι τὴν φάρυγγα, ὃ λέγομεν  
 ἀναγαργαρίσαι. With Eryximachus's treatment of λύγξ, cp. Hippocr. de diaet.  
 III. 75 ff. γίνεται δὲ καὶ τοιαύδε πλησμονή· ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίην τὸν σίτον ἐρυγ-  
 γάνεται κτλ.

185 E πτάρε. Cp. Hippocr. Aphor. VI. 13 ὑπὸ λυγμοῦ ἐχομένῳ πταρμοὶ  
 ἐπιγενόμενοι λύουσι τὸν λυγμόν: Arist. Probl. 33.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων. A familiar idiom: "the sooner you speak the better"  
 (see Goodwin G. M. T. § 894): more rarely of 1st person, 214 E *infra*.

οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Schanz's οὐχὶ καλῶς is ingenious but needless: for a similar  
 variety in antithesis Vahlen cites Theaet. 187 E κρείττον γὰρ πον μικρόν  
 εὔ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι. For δεῖν redundant cp. Alc. II. 144 D, 146 B,  
 Rep. 535 A, Laws 731 D, E: Schanz in *nov. comm.* p. 83 regards both ἀναγκαῖον  
 εἶναι and δεῖν ἐμὲ as interpolations by copyists who failed to see the force of  
 δοκεῖ=*aptum videtur*; but in his text he excises only δεῖν: against this, see  
 Teuffel, Rh. Mus. XXIX. p. 140.

οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς τε σώμασι τῶν πάντων ζώων καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῆ φυομένοις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσι, καθεωρακένοι μοι δοκῶ ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς B ἡμετέρας τέχνης, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστὸς καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ θεῖα πράγματα. ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. ἡ γὰρ φύσις τῶν σωμάτων τὸν διπλοῦν Ἐρωτα τοῦτον ἔχει. τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογουμένως ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρά. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσῶδει. ἐστὶ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι Πausανίας ἔλεγε τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς καλὸν χαρί-C ζεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῖς δὲ ἀκολάστοις αἰσχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν

186 A πάντων τῶν Hirschig δοκῶ (γνοῦς) Herwerden τῆς ἰατρικῆς  
secl. Hirschig ὡς (καὶ) Ficinus Steph. B κατὰ τὰνθρώπινα Stob.  
κατὰ τὰ θεῖα Stob. καὶ om. Stob. πρεσβεύω μου Bdhm. ἡ γὰρ:  
ἢ τε γὰρ Sauppe: καὶ γὰρ J.-U. ἔχει T: ἔχη B ὁμολογοῦμεν ὡς TW,  
Stob. τε: τι Stob., Thiersch ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ T: ὑγιεινοερος B ἐστὶ  
δὴ: ἔτι δὲ Bdhm. τῶν ἀνθρώπων del. Thiersch

186 A τῆς ἰατρικῆς. Eryx. speaks, as a member of the Asclepiad guild, of "our art": for his glorification of "the art," see also 176 D, 196 A, and Agathon's allusion in 196 D. Cp. *Theaet.* 161 E τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς κτλ., where also Naber excises τῆς μ. (cp. Vahlen *Op. Ac.* II. 273).

ὡς μέγας κτλ. This ὡς-clause serves to repeat in another form the initial ὄτι-clause, thus making two object-clauses to one main clause in the sentence, for which cp. 211 E *infra*, *Apol.* 20 c.

186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν...τείνει. Cp. 222 B ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντες (λόγους): we might render "of universal scope."

πρεσβεύωμεν. For the sense, "venerate," cp. 188 C, and πρεσβύτερον 218 D: *Crito* 46 C τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ: *Rep.* 591 c.

τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον κτλ. "Things dissimilar in themselves crave dissimilar objects": e.g. the appetites of the sound body differ from those of the sick body. Cp. Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* 9 ὁκόσα πλησμονὴ τίκτει νουσήματα, κένωσις ἰῆται, ὁκόσα δὲ ἀπὸ κενώσιος γένηται νουσήματα, πλησμονὴ ἰῆται...τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν γνῶναι, δεῖ τὸν ἰητρὸν ἐναντίον ἴστασθαι τοῖσι καθεστειῶσι καὶ νουσήμασι καὶ εἶδεσι κτλ.

ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ. "The craving felt by the sound body": cp. ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 186 A. In the doctor's parable, τὸ ὑγιεινόν corresponds to the good, τὸ νοσῶδες to the bad ἐραστής.

ἔστι δὴ. This is, as Hug observes, a favourite opening with Eryx.: cp. ἔστι γάρ, 186 C; ἔστι δέ, 186 D, 187 A.

αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐκάστου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν<sup>1</sup> χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ ὄνομα τὸ ἰατρικόν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρόν<sup>2</sup> τε καὶ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν, εἰ μέλλει τις τεχνικὸς εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρική, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν, καὶ ὁ διαγιγνώσκων ἐν τούτοις τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν ἔρωτα, οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ ἰατρικώτατος, καὶ ὁ μεταβάλλειν D ποιῶν, ὥστε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἔρωτος τὸν ἕτερον κτᾶσθαι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔνεστιν ἔρωτος, δεῖ δ' ἐγγενέσθαι, ἐπιστάμενος<sup>3</sup> ἐμποιῆσαι καὶ ἐνόητα ἐξελεῖν, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη δημιουργός. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐχθίστα

186 C αὐτοῖς: αὐ Rohde καὶ δεῖ, καὶ: καὶ δὴ καὶ Naber τὸν ante καλὸν delend. cj. Usener D κτᾶσθαι B: κτήσασθαι T: fort. ἴσασθαι ἔρωτος secl. J.-U. καὶ...ἐξελεῖν secl. Sz. ἐνόητα (οἷς μὴ δεῖ) Herw.

186 C ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρική κτλ. Cp. (with Poschenrieder) Hippocr. *de flat.* I. p. 570 K. πάλιν αὐτὴ πλησμονὴν ἴηται κένωσις· κένωσιν δὲ πλησμονή...τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶν ἰήματα. ἰατρική γὰρ ἐστὶ πρόσθεσις καὶ ἀφαίρεσις, ἀφαίρεσις μὲν τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων, πρόσθεσις δὲ τῶν ἐλλιπόντων· ὁ δὲ κάλλιστα τοῦτο ποιῶν ἄριστος ἰητρός. Also *Phileb.* 32 A, 35 A for "repletion" and "depletion" in connexion with bodily φύσις: and *Tim.* 82 A γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατος τε καὶ ἀέρος...ἡ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια...στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

ὁ διαγιγνώσκων κτλ. In this passage there is a distinction implied between pure and applied ἰατρική, between medicine as a science (ἐπιστήμη) and as an art (τέχνη). διαγιγνώσκω is here used almost in the technical sense of making a medical diagnosis (cp. Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* 9 τὴν διάγνωσιν...ποιέεσθαι): possibly earlier "Asclepiads" than Hippocrates may have earmarked διάγνωσις as a medical term. Cf. the distinction between κατὰ γνώμην and κατὰ χειρουργίην in Hippocr. *de morbis* I. 6.

186 D ὁ μεταβάλλειν ποιῶν κτλ. Cp. Hippocr. *de morbo sacro*, p. 396 L. ὅστις δὲ ἐπίσταται ἐν ἀνθρώποισι τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν καὶ δύναται ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ποιέειν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὑπὸ διαίτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὗτος καὶ ταύτην τὴν νοῦσον ἰῶτο ἂν: *id. de nat. hom.* 9 τὴν θεραπείην χρὴ ποιέεσθαι...τῇ τῶν διαιτημάτων μεταβολῇ κτλ. In later Greek δημιουργός becomes the *vox propria* for a medical "practitioner," as δημοσιεύειν for "to practise": similarly χειροτέχνης, Hippocr. *περὶ παθῶν* I.

ὥστε...κτᾶσθαι. Supply as subject τὰ σώματα.

καὶ ἐνόητα ἐξελεῖν. Schanz would excise these words; but though they present a rather awkward case of brachylogy, they are otherwise unobjectionable. Herwerden's proposal (see *crit. n.*), though supplying the right sense, is needless; while Lehrs is obviously blundering when he construes ἐνόητα as neut. plural, "und wieder auch das Vorhandene fortzubringen." Hommel gives the meaning rightly, "und die einwohnende (Neigung), die nicht einwohnen darf, heraus zu treiben."

δεῖ γὰρ δὴ. "For he must, as a matter of fact"—an appeal to recognized



ὄντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φίλα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων.  
 ἔστι δὲ ἔχθιστα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, ψυχρὸν θερμῷ, πικρὸν γλυκεῖ,  
 Ε ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· τούτοις ἐπιστηθεὶς ἔρωτα ἐμποιῆ-  
 σαι καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός, ὡς φασιν οἶδε  
 οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, συνέστησε τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην.  
 ἢ τε οὖν ἰατρικὴ, ὥσπερ λέγω, πᾶσα διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου κυβερ-  
 187 νᾶται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ γεωργία· μουσικὴ δὲ καὶ

186 D φίλια Hirschig πικρὸν γλυκεῖ del. Thiersch Hug (καὶ) πάντα  
 Wolf Ε τοῦ θεοῦ secl. Bdhm. 187 A καὶ γεωργία del. Sauppe Jn.

axioms of "the Art." Hippocrates based his medical theory on the as-  
 sumption of two pairs of opposite and primary qualities, ψυχρὸν)(θερμὸν, and  
 ξηρὸν)(ὑγρὸν. By the permutations and combinations of these he sought to  
 account for all varieties of physical health and disease: see e.g. Hippocr. *de*  
*morb.* I. 2; *de affect.* I. Cp. *Lys.* 215 E: Theo. Smyrn. *Math.* p. 15 Bull.  
 καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον θεοῦ κατὰ μουσικὴν τε καὶ ἰατρικὴν, τὰ ἐχθρὰ φίλα  
 ποιεῖν: also *Tim.* 82 A for the "hot" and "cold" in health and disease.

πικρὸν γλυκεῖ. Ast's excision of these words (approved by Stallb., Hug,  
 and others) is, at first sight, plausible, inasmuch as these opposites of taste  
 seem hardly on a par with the other two pairs of primary opposites. But in  
*Lysis* 215 E the same three pairs are mentioned, with ὀξύ)(ἀμβλύ as a fourth,  
 as exx. of the law of ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἐναντίων. Moreover, it is obvious that the  
 question of savours is of special importance in medical science: cp. *Theaet.*  
 166 E τῷ...ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι: Hippocr. *περὶ διαίτης* II.  
 56 τὰ γλυκεία...καὶ τὰ πικρὰ...θερμαίνειν πέφυκε, καὶ ὅσα ξηρὰ ἔστι καὶ ὅσα  
 ὑγρά: *id. de nat. hom.* 2, 6: and the connexion between πικρότης and χολή  
 brought out in *Tim.* 83 A ff. Further, as Hommel observed, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 after only two exx. is unusual.

186 E ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀ. Asclepius in Homer is not more than  
 ἱητὴρ ἀμύμων: in Pindar (*Pyth.* III.) and later poets he is the son of Apollo  
 and Coronis. The earliest seats of his worship seem to have been Thessaly  
 and Boeotia, and his cult, as a "chthonic" and "mantic" deity, may have  
 its roots in a primitive ophiolatry (see Rohde, *Psyche* I. 141 ff.). Cp. *Orph.*  
*Fr.* 272 διὸ καὶ οἱ θεολόγοι τὴν μὲν εἰς Ἀσκληπιὸν ἀναφέρουσιν ὑγίειαν τὴν  
 ἰατρικὴν πᾶσαν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κτλ. Also *Orph. H.* 67, addressed to A. as  
 Ἴητὴρ πάντων, Ἀσκληπιέ, δέσποτα παιάν κτλ. The Asclepiadae were a  
 recognized medical guild, with hereditary traditions; their most famous  
 schools were at Cos and Cnidus, for which see the account in Gomperz *G. T.*  
 (E. tr.) vol. I. pp. 275 ff.: cp. *Phaedr.* 270 c (with Thompson's note).

οἶδε οἱ ποιηταί. The "deictic" οἶδε points to the presence of Aristophanes  
 and Agathon.

187 A γυμναστικὴ. The curative value of physical training is said to  
 have been emphasized especially by Iccos of Tarentum and Herodicus of  
 Selymbria, both 5th century experts in dieting. For the latter as an ad-  
 vocate of walking exercise see *Phaedr.* 227 D (with Schol. *ad loc.*); cp. *Rep.*



παντὶ κατάδηλος τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν ὅτι κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχει τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ Ἡράκλειτος βούλεται λέγειν, ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε ῥήμασιν οὐ καλῶς λέγει. τὸ ἐν γάρ φησι “διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἀρμονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας.” ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφορομένων ἔτι εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφορομένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον B

187 A ἔχοντι νοῦν Hirschig ταῦτὰ T: ταῦτα B ἐν: ὄν vel  
 πᾶν Ast τόξου...λύρας: τοῦ ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος Bast Gladisch λύρας:  
 νεύρας Bergk

406 A: for the former, as an example of abstinence, see *Laws* 839 E. That Plato himself recognizes the connexion between *ιατρική* and *γυμναστική* is shown by such passages as *Gorg.* 452 A ff., 464 B ff., *Soph.* 228 E, *Polit.* 295 C.

καὶ γεωργία. The appositeness of *γεωργία* is not so evident as that of *γυμναστική*, but the use of the word here is defended by 186 A (τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῆ φυομένοις) and by other exx. of a similar collocation, such as *Lach.* 198 D, *Laws* 889 D (cp. also *Protag.* 334 A f.). The art which deals with *φυτά* is regarded as analogous to that which deals with *ζῷα*, involving a similar command of the permutations and combinations, the attractions and repulsions (τὰ ἐρωτικά), of the fundamental qualities.

τὸ ἐν γάρ φησι κτλ. The words of Heraclitus (*Fr.* 45) are given in *Hierpol. refut. haer.* IX. 9 thus: οὐ ξυνίασιν ὄκως διαφερόμενον ἐωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη ὄκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης: cp. *Plut. de Is.* 45 παλίντροπος γὰρ ἀρμονίη κόσμου ὄκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον: *Soph.* 242 E. Probably, as Burnet holds, the original word used by H. was *παλίντροπος*, not *παλίντροπος*, and *ἀρμονίη* combines the original sense of “structure” with the musical sense “octave,” the point of the simile being (see Campbell, *Theaet.* p. 244) “as the arrow leaves the string the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato, *Rep.* 4. 439); and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention. The secret of the universe is the same.” That is to say, the world, both as a whole and in its parts, is maintained by the equilibrium resultant from opposite tensions. For more detailed discussion of the theory see Burnet, *Early Gk. Phil.* pp. 158 ff., Zeller, *Pre-Socr.* (E. T.) vol. II. pp. 33 ff. The τόξον H. had in mind is probably, as Bernays suggested, the Scythian bow—the φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος of *Arist. Rhet.* III. 1412<sup>b</sup> 35 (see the woodcut in Smith, *D. A. s.v.* “arcus”).

ἀλλ’ ἴσως κτλ. Eryximachus argues that H.’s dictum is defensible only if we understand the opposites to be not co-existent: the discordant cannot be simultaneously concordant, though it may be capable of becoming so in lapse of time (πρότερον...ὑστερον). For τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ βαρὺ as matter for ἀρμονία cp. Heraclit. *Fr.* 43 (R. and P. § 27) οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα ἄνευ θηλέος καὶ ἀρρενος, ἐναντίων ὄντων: *Soph.* 253 A; *Phileb.* 17 C, 26 A; *Laws* 665 B.

ὁμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πού  
 ἐκ διαφορομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη· ἡ  
 γὰρ ἁρμονία συμφωνία ἐστὶ, συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία τις. ὁμολο-  
 γίαν δὲ ἐκ διαφορομένων, ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται, ἀδύνατον εἶναι. δια-  
 φερόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ἀδυνατοῦν <δυνατὸν> ἁρμόσαι,  
 C ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος ἐκ διευνηγεμένων  
 πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμολογησάντων γέγονε. τὴν δὲ ὁμολογίαν  
 πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρικὴ, ἐνταῦθα ἡ μουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν,  
 ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμποιήσασα· καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ μουσικὴ  
 περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἐν μὲν γε  
 αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ

187 B τέχνης (ἡ ἁρμονία) vulg. δὲ αὐτὸ: δὲ δὴ Sz.: δὴ οὖν Rohde ὁμολογεῖν  
 scripsi: ὁμολογοῦν codd., edd. ἀδυνατοῦν (δυνατὸν) scripsi: ἀδύνατον  
 codd.: δυνατὸν Susem. C ἐκ post βραδέος om. edd. rec. cum Vindob. 21  
 ὁμόνοιαν: ἁρμονίαν Wolf ἀλλήλοις T (τῶν) περὶ Ast

187 B ὁμολογησάντων κτλ. Cp. Theo. Smyrn. *math.* p. 15 καὶ οἱ Πυθα-  
 γορικοί δέ, οἷς πολλαχῇ ἔπεται Πλάτων, τὴν μουσικὴν φασιν ἐνωτίων συναρ-  
 μογὴν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἔνωσιν καὶ τῶν δίχα φρονούντων συμφρόνησιν, οὐ γὰρ  
 ῥυθμῶν μόνον καὶ μέλους συντακτικὴν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς παντὸς συστήματος· τέλος  
 γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐνοῦν τε καὶ συναρμόζειν. For the Pythagorean ἁρμονία see  
 Philolaus, *fr.* 4. 3 (R. and P. § 56) τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια...ἀνάγκα τῆ τοιαύτα ἁρμονία  
 συγκεκλείσθαι κτλ. The same notion of a *cosmic* ἁρμονία or ὁμολογία appears  
 in *Utrq.* *fr.* 139 τὴν Ἀφροδίτην...τάξιν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι τοῖς  
 ἐγκοσμίαις... (ὁ δημιουργὸς) φιλίας ἐστὶν αἴτιος τοῖς δημιουργήμασιν καὶ ὁμολογίας.

συμφωνία. Cp. *Crat.* 405 D περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἁρμονίαν, ἡ δὲ συμφωνία  
 καλεῖται: *Rep.* 430 E, 398 D, E with Adam's notes: "in its musical application  
 συμφωνία is used both of consonance in the octave or double octave and also  
 of other musical intervals": "ἁρμονία 'reconciles' ὀξύ and βαρύ by a proper  
 arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch. In the wider sense, there-  
 fore, any ὁμολογία of ὀξύ and βαρύ is a ἁρμονία, but in practice the word was  
 used specifically of certain scales or modes."

διαφερόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ κτλ. With the ms. text the sequence of thought is dis-  
 jointed and obscure; αὐτὸ seems out of place, and the next clause (ὥσπερ γε  
 καὶ κτλ.) seems to imply that the possibility rather than the impossibility of  
 harmonizing opposites is stated in the present clause (cp. Susemihl, *Philol.*  
*Anz.* VII. 412). Hence, rather than alter αὐτὸ with Schanz, I prefer to read  
 διαφερόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ἀδυνατοῦν (or ἀδύνατον) (δυνατὸν) ἁρμόσαι:  
 this gives a proper antithesis to the clause preceding.

187 C ὁμόνοιαν. It is possible that this word may contain an allusion  
 to Antiphon's work *περὶ ὁμονοίας*, for which see Dümmler, *Akad.* p. 79.

αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας. "In the constitution of harmony *per se*":  
 ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ might have sufficed, but the addition of *συστάσει* serves  
 to emphasize the fact that ἁρμονία is a synthesis—ὁμολογία—of a plurality of

ἔρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν, οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν δέη πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταχρῆσθαι ῥυθμῶ τε D καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ ἢ ποιούντα, ὃ δὴ μελοποιίαν καλοῦσιν, ἢ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσιν τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργοῦ δεῖ. πάλιν γὰρ ἦκει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν κοσμίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὡς ἂν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνοντο οἱ μήπω ὄντες, δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν τὸν τούτων ἔρωτα, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καλός, ὁ οὐράνιος, ὁ τῆς Οὐρανίας μούσης Ἔρως· ὁ δὲ Πολυμνίας ὁ πάνδημος, ὃν δεῖ εὐλαβούμενον προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσῃται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμποιοῖσῃ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ μέγα ἔργον ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὀψοποιικὴν τέχνην ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι, ὥστ' ἄνευ νόσου τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσασθαι. καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ δὴ καὶ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπειοῖς καὶ τοῖς θείοις, καθ' ὅσον παρῖκει, φυλακτέον ἐκάτερον τὸν Ἔρωτα· ἔνεστον γάρ.

187 C οὐδὲ...ἔστιν del. Schütz πω Bdhm. Mdv. g.: πῶς BT D μέτροις BT: ῥυθμοῖς W τούτων BT: τοιούτων W μούσης del. Sauppe E ἔργον ταῖς Tb: ἐργῶντες B παρῖκει W rec. t: παρήκει BT ἐν ἔστον W

elements: cp. *Laws* 812 C τὰς τῶν ἀρμονιῶν συστάσεις: *Epin.* 991 E ἀρμονίας σύστασιν ἄπασαν. For ῥυθμός, see Adam's note on *Rep.* 398 D: "The elements of music are ῥυθμός and ἀρμονία. The former 'reconciles' ταχύ and βραδύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables": also *Laws* 665 A τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἶη, τῇ δὲ αὐτῆς φωνῆς... ἀρμονία, κτλ., *Phileb.* 17 D (with my note).

Eryximachus analyses Music into Theory (αὐτὴ ἢ σύστασις) and Practice (καταχρῆσθαι ῥ.), the latter being further subdivided into μελοποιία and παιδεία.

187 D παιδεία ἐκλήθη. For "education" as "the right use of melody and verse," compare what Plato has to say about the psychological effects of music and its place in education in *Rep.* II., III., *Laws* II., VIII. Of course παιδεία in the ordinary sense includes also gymnastic; cp. *Rep.* II. 376 E, *Laws* 659 D: in dancing to music (ὀρχηστική *Laws* 816 A) we have a combination of both. It is worth noticing that in the Pythagorean *quadrivium* μουσική had a place beside ἀριθμητική, γεωμετρία and σφαιρική or ἀστρονομία: see Adam's *Republic* vol. II. pp. 163 ff.

πάλιν...ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Pausanias was the author of the λόγος, cp. 186 B *supra*.

187 E Πολυμνίας. "The Muse of the sublime hymn" here replaces Aphrodite, being selected out of the Nine probably, as Ast supposes, because the first part of her name is congruous with the character of Aphr. πάνδημος.

προσφέρειν...καρπώσῃται...ἐμποιοῖσῃ. Supply as subject the indef. τις.

καθ' ὅσον παρῖκει. "So far as possible." Cp. *Rep.* 374 E, *Laws* 734 B.

188 XIII. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὥρων τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις μεστή ἐστὶν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ κοσμίου <sup>οὐρανίου</sup> τυχῆ ἔρωτος ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὰ τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ, καὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβη σώφρονα, ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς ὑβρεως Ἔρωτος ἐγκρατέστερος περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας

B γένηται, διέφθειρέν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδίκησεν. οἳ τε γὰρ λοιμοὶ φιλοῦσι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλ' ἀνόμοια πολλὰ νοσήματα καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ πάχναι καὶ χάλασαι καὶ ἐρυσίβαι ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας περὶ ἄλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται ἐρωτικῶν, ὧν ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἄστρον τε

188 A κοσμίου Bt, Stob.: κόσμου T ἐγὼ ἔλεγον BT: λέγω Stob.: ἔλεγον Wolf τὰ ξηρὰ Stob. (καὶ) περὶ Stob. B διέφθειρεν T: διέφθειρε Stob.: διαφθείρει B ἀνόμοια BT: ἀνόμοια καὶ Stob.: ὅμοια Schütz Bdhm.: ἄνομοια Orelli: αὐτὸ ὅμοια Hermann: δὴ ὅμοια Sauppe: ἄπ' ὅμοια Ast Jn.: ἄνομα Sommer: ἀλλόκοτα Rohde: παντοῖα Winckelmann: ἀνήνυτα Stallb. γίγνεται del. Sauppe: γίνονται Canter: fort. γίγνεται. ἐρωτικῶν οὖν ἐπιστήμη κτλ. ὧν...καλεῖται del. Schütz τε: γε Christ

188 A ἡ τῶν ὥρων...σύστασις. For the influence of the seasons on health see Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* 7 ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς μετέχει μὲν πᾶς πάντων καὶ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ τῶν ξηρῶν καὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν κτλ.: cp. *Phileb.* 26 B.

ἃ νῦν δὴ...ἔλεγον. See above, 186 D.

οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν κτλ. For these aorists, following presents, see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 155.

188 B ἀνόμοια...νοσήματα. "Divers diseases": the adj. is similarly used in Arist. *Poet.* 24. 1459<sup>b</sup> 30 ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις, "relieving the story with varying episodes" (Butcher): cp. *id. H. An.* iv. 1. 523<sup>b</sup> 12: Hippocr. *de flat.* 3 δοκίει μὲν οὖν τὰ νοσήματα οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοισιν εἰκέναι διὰ τὴν ἀλλοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα τῶν τόπων.

πάχναι...καὶ ἐρυσίβαι. Timaeus defines thus: ἐρυσίβη μιλτώδης δρόσος· πάχνη δὲ δρόσος χιονώδης. Roman religion had a goddess *Rubigo*. Ruhnken (*ad Tim.* p. 122) cites *Orph. de lap.* 15, v. 91 καὶ αἰθερίην ἐρυσίβην, | ἦτε κατουρανόθεν πταμένη ποτὶ καρπὸν ἐρυθρῆ, | ἀμφὶ περὶ σταχύεσσι περισμύχουσα κάθηται.

τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται κτλ. There are two difficulties in this passage: (1) the singular verb after the plural subjects is harsh; to explain it we must assume a mental unification of the subjects, of which similar but easier instances occur in *Rep.* 363 A, 618 D, *Laws* 925 E. We might evade this difficulty by removing the colon at *φυτοῖς*, marking καὶ γὰρ...ἐρυσίβαι as parenthetical, and thus construing ἄλλα...νοσήματα as the direct subject of γίγνεται. (2) We should naturally expect *τοιούτων* to have the same reference

φορὰς καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν ὥρας ἀστρονομία καλεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ αἱ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἷς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία—οὐ περὶ ἄλλο <sup>σοφιστικῶς</sup> C τί ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ Ἐρωτος φυλακὴν τε καὶ ἴασιν. πᾶσα γὰρ [ἢ] ἀσέβεια φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις τῷ κοσμῷ Ἐρωτι χαρίζηται μηδὲ τιμᾷ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ [περὶ] τὸν ἕτερον, καὶ περὶ γονέας καὶ ζῶντας καὶ <sup>ἐν</sup> τετελευτηκότας καὶ περὶ θεοῦς· ἃ δὴ προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς Ἐρωτας καὶ ἰατρούειν, καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἢ μαντικὴ φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργὸς τῷ ἐπίστασθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτικά, ὅσα D τείνει πρὸς θέμιν καὶ εὐσέβειαν.

188 B φορὰς W, Stob.: φορας B: φορᾶς T καὶ...ὥρας del. Bast.  
 ὥρας: ὄρους Creuzer αἱ T, Stob.: om. B πᾶσαι B Stob.: ἅπασαι T  
 (ἢ) μαντικὴ Fischer ἐπιστατεῖ (τέχνη) Stob. ταῦτα...κοινωνία del. Schütz  
 C ἀσεβεία Stob.: ἡ ἀσεβεία BT μὴ τις: μήτε ἐν Stob. (μὲν) ἐν Pflugk  
 τὸν Stob.: περὶ τὸν BT: περιτῶς τὸν Koch: θεραπεύῃ Winckelm.: περιττότερον  
 τὸν Pflugk: fort. πη τὸν (περὶ) ἃ Verm. προτέτακται Stob. ἔρωτας  
 BT: ἐρῶντας Stob., Bt.: ἐρωτῶντας cj. Verm.: τοὺς ἔρωτας secl. Herm. Hug Sz.  
 D εὐσέβειαν Stob.: ἀσεβείαν BT

here as τῶν τοιούτων has above (*viz.* to the combinations of elements in which the bad Eros predominates), whereas it seemingly stands in agreement with ἐρωτικῶν: this being so, what does ἐρωτικῶν precisely mean? For it cannot well retain, in this connexion, its proper meaning as genitive of τὰ ἐρωτικά "the laws of affinity" (186 c, 187 c). Ought we, then, to put a stop after γίγνεται and begin a new sentence with ἐρωτικῶν οὖν ἐπιστήμη κτλ.?

ἀστρονομία. The term as here used includes what we should rather call "meteorology": cp. *Rep.* 527 D τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν;...τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν...ναυτιλία προσήκει. For "astronomy" as a regular part of the school curriculum see n. on παιδεία 187 D, and cp. *Theaet.* 145 c, D; *Protag.* 318 E.

ἢ περὶ θεοῦς...κοινωνία. Simpler would have been ἢ θεῶν...κοινωνία, but, as Hug remarks, "Eryximachus liebt das unbestimmte περὶ c. accus."

188 C ἀσέβεια. "Undutifulness," *impietas*. Reverence to parents and country was a matter of religious obligation; cp. *Xen. Mem.* II. 2. 13 εἰ μὴ δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπείῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι (ἢ πόλιν) κτλ.; *ib.* IV. 4. 20; *Rep.* 615 c.

[περὶ] τὸν ἕτερον. Perhaps an original πη was mistaken for a compendium of περὶ: for the combination ἀλλὰ πη, cp. *Theaet.* 191 B ἀλλὰ πη δυνατόν.

ἃ δὴ...ἰατρούειν. The infinitives may be taken as epexegetic of ἃ (so Stallb., Zeller), or ἃ may be construed separately as accus. of respect ("qua in caussa" Ast; "in welcher Beziehung" Hommel). There is no need to eject or emend τοὺς Ἐρωτας: the phrase used 4 ll. above, περὶ Ἐρωτος φυλακὴν τε καὶ ἴασιν, supports Ἐρωτας here.



Οὕτω πολλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει  
 & ξυλλήβδην μὲν ὁ πᾶς Ἔρωσ, ὁ δὲ <sup>ἡ-πρωτῆ</sup>περὶ τὰ γαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης  
 καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς,  
 οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν  
 παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι  
 E καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Ἔρωτα  
 ἐπαινῶν πολλὰ παραλείπω, οὐ μέντοι ἐκῶν γε. ἀλλ' εἴ τι ἐξέ-  
 λιπον, σὸν ἔργον, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, ἀναπληρῶσαι· ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως  
 ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐγκωμιάζειν τὸν θεόν, ἐγκωμιάζε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς  
 λυγγὸς πέπαυσαι.

189 Ἐκδεξάμενον οὖν ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ'  
 ἐπαύσατο, οὐ μέντοι πρὶν γε τὸν πταρμὸν προσενεχθῆναι αὐτῇ,  
 ὥστε με θαυμάζειν εἰ τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων  
 ψόφων καὶ γαργαλισμῶν, οἶον καὶ ὁ πταρμός ἐστι· πάνυ γὰρ  
 εὐθύς ἐπαύσατο, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ τὸν πταρμὸν προσήνεγκα. καὶ τὸν

188 D καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν...θεοῖς secl. Hug δυναμένοις Stob. φίλοις  
 Stob. E καὶ del. Rückert ἡμῶν θεοῖς secl. J.-U. 189 A ὥστ'  
 ἐμέ Bekk.

188 D Οὕτω πολλήν. The German translators mostly take οὕτω as  
 qualifying the adjj., "so vielfach und gross" (Zeller, Schleierm.), but Hommel  
 is probably right in taking οὕτω by itself ("hoc modo," "itaque") comparing  
 οὕτω πολλαχόθεν 178 c. Cp. Hippocr. *de flat.* 3 οὗτος (sc. ὁ ἀῆρ) δὲ μέγιστος ἐν  
 τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν· ἄξιον δὲ αὐτοῦ θεήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν.

καὶ...παρὰ θεοῖς. Hug condemns these words, as implying a slur on the  
 righteousness of the gods. But the phrase is merely a stock formula, like  
 our "heaven and earth," not intended to bear rigid analysis; cp. 186 B, 187 E  
 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπέοις καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις...θεοῖς. For the accus. δυναμένους after ἡμῖν cp. 176 D. The  
 καὶ after εἶναι is rendered "auch" by Hug, as if ὁμιλεῖν governed ἀλλήλοις and  
 φίλους εἶναι the other datives, but Zeller's rendering, which makes both the  
 infinitives govern both sets of datives, seems more natural.

188 E καὶ ἐγὼ, i.e. "I as well as Pausanias": see 185 E *ad fin.*

ἐπειδὴ καὶ. καὶ implies a suppressed reason—"since (it is your turn) and  
 you are cured of your cough."

189 A τὸν πταρμὸν. This was one of the remedies prescribed by Eryx.  
 in 185 E, hence the def. article. προσφέρειν is a *vox propria* for medical  
 "applications," cp. 187 E, *Phaedr.* 268 A; Hippocr. *de flat.* 1 οἶος τ' ἂν  
 προσφέρειν τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ σώματι: *id. de affect.* 1 ὅσα δὲ τοὺς χειροτέχνas  
 εἰκὸς ἐπίστασθαι καὶ προσφέρειν καὶ διαχειρίζειν κτλ.

τὸ κόσμιον. This is in ridicule of the theory of medicine stated in 186 c ff  
 and of the use of the term κόσμιος in 187 D, 188 c.



Ἐρυξίμαχον, ὦγαθέ, φάναι, [Ἀριστόφανες,] ὄρα τί ποιεῖς. γελωτοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ φύλακά με τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐάν τι γελοῖον εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ **B** λέγειν. καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν Εὐ λέγεις, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, καὶ μοι ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἀλλὰ μὴ με φύλαττε, ὡς ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, οὐ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἴπω,—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν κέρδος εἴη καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον,—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα. Βαλὼν γε, φάναι, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, οἶει ἐκφεύξεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὕτω λέγε ὡς δώσω λόγον· ἴσως μέντοι, ἂν δόξῃ μοι, ἀφήσω σε. **C**

XIV. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἄλλη γέ πη ἐν νῶ ἔχω λέγειν, ἢ ἢ σύ τε καὶ Πausanίας εἰπέτην. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ἠσθῆσθαι, ἐπεὶ αισθανόμενοί γε μέγιστ' ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατα-

189 **A** ὦγαθέ φάναι T: ὦγαθέ φάναι ὦγαθέ B Ἀριστόφανες del. Sauppe Hug **B** ὦ om. vulg. μὴ γε Bdhm. ῥηθήσεσθαι T: ἠττηθήσεσθαι (sed ἦτ extra versum) B: ἤδη ῥηθήσεσθαι Rettig: fort. ἔτι ῥ. **C** εἶπετον Blass ἄνθρωποι Bekk.: ἄνθρωποι BT: οἱ ἄνθρωποι W, vulg.

[Ἀριστόφανες]. I follow Sauppe and Hug in regarding the proper name as a gloss on ὦγαθέ: as a rule, ὦγαθέ stands alone.

189 **B** οὐ τι...εἴπω. In γελοῖα Arist. applies the term used by Eryx. in a different sense, distinguishing between γελοῖα, *ridicula*, and καταγέλαστα, *deridenda*; whereas Eryx. had meant by γελοῖον what A. calls καταγέλαστον, cp. 199 D, 221 E.

τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης. This may allude (as Rettig thinks) to Eryximachus's Οὐρανία μουσα and Πολυμνία, and to his phrase ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ τέχνῃ (187 D, E).

Βαλὼν γε κτλ. "So you think you are going to get off scot-free!" Suidas s.v. βαλὼν explains by πρὸς τοὺς κακὸν τι δράσαντας καὶ οἰομένους ἐκφεύγειν. Cp. *Rep.* 344 D οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι: *Phaedo* 91 c; *Plut. de s. n. v.* 548 B ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ βαλὼν, εἶπεν, ἀπηλλάγη, καλῶς εἶχε περιορᾶν τὸ βέλος ἐγκείμενον.

189 **C** Καὶ μὴν κτλ. This clause has reference to what Eryx. had said, not in 189 B, but in 188 E (εἴ πως ἄλλως ἐν νῶ ἔχεις κτλ.)—"Yea verily, it is my intention to act as you suggested."

παντάπασι...οὐκ. "To have completely failed to discern." For δύναμις ()( φύσις) as a rhetorical category, cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 218 D ῥάδιον δὲ γνῶναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ κτλ.

ἐπεὶ αισθ. γε κτλ. For ἐπεὶ...γε cp. *Rep.* 352 c. The following infinitives (with ἄν) are governed by δοκοῦσιν, repeated in thought from the main clause. For the sense, cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 221 A ὡς...δυναμένην, ἀναθήμασι καὶ θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλαις προσόδοις ἰάσκεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν αὐτὴν χρή.

σκευάσαι καὶ βωμούς, καὶ θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν μεγίστας, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτόν, δέον πάντων μάλιστα **D** γίγνεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος, ἐπίκουρός τε ὦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰατρὸς τούτων, ὧν ἰαθέντων μέγιστη εὐδαιμονία ἂν τῷ ἀνθρωπέϊφ γένοιε εἶη. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ἔσεσθε. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῆς. ἢ γὰρ πάλαι ἡμῶν φύσις οὐχ αὐτὴ ἦν ἢπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλοια. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τρία ἦν τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ **E** ὥσπερ νῦν δύο, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον προσῆν κοινὸν ὄν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οὗ νῦν ὄνομα λοιπόν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἠφάνισται· ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ ἐν τότε μὲν ἦν καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων

189 **C** καὶ βωμούς del. Blass ποιῆσθαι Hirschig **D** εὐδαιμονία ἂν BTW: ἂν εὐδαιμονία vulg. εἰσηγήσασθαι post αὐτοῦ trs. Blass ἔσεσθαι T δεῖ δὲ Blass παλαιὰ Blass αὐτὴ B: αὕτη T, Stob.: ἢ αὐτὴ Euseb., Blass ἀλλὰ ἄλλη Euseb. πρῶτα W τὰ τῶν BT: τῶν W, Euseb. Stob. **E** δύο om. Stob. ἀλλὰ καὶ: ἀλλὰ Stob. Eusebii codd. aliquot on om. Stob. Euseb. ἐν B: om. T, Euseb. Stob., Sz.

οὐχ ὥσπερ. "Whereas": cp. 179 E.

189 **D** ἰατρὸς. This term recalls the doctor's speech, esp. 186 B ff., 188 c ff.; cp. *Phaedr.* 252 A.

ἐγὼ οὖν παράσομαι. "Parodie des Pausanias (180 D) und Eryximachos (186 A)" (Rettig).

εἰσηγήσασθαι. The force of this word is lost if we render it "narrate," "relate" with L. and S.: it means "to initiate into": cp. 176 E, Xen. *Mem.* II. 7. 10. For the next clause cp. *Menex.* 240 D ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι.

φύσιν...παθήματα. This is the order of A.'s exposition—περὶ φύσεως 189 D—190 C, περὶ παθημάτων 190 C—193 A. For various views of physiologists as to the φύσις ἀνθρώπου, see Hippocrates' tract with this title, where the theory that man ἐν τι εἶναι (αἷμα, χολή, φλέγμα, etc.) is combated. Aristotle's exposition is intended, no doubt, as a caricature of the medicos of his age (see *Introd.* § iii. 4).

189 **E** ἀνδρόγυνον κτλ. Suidas ἀνδρόγυνος· ὁ τὰ ἀνδρὸς ποιῶν καὶ τὰ γυναικῶν πάσχων. Rückert wrongly renders εἶδος by "genus": it means "forma" (as Stallb.). εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα are taken by Rückert and Hug as nomin., by Stallb. as accus. of respect, the construction being ἐν γὰρ (*sc.* τῶν γενῶν) ἦν τότε ἀνδρόγυνον: the latter way seems the better. Rettig proposes to insert τό before ἐν, which would give the same sense. If εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα are construed as accus., it is better to take them closely with ἀνδρόγυνον

κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐν ὄνειδει ὄνομα κείμενον. ἔπειτα ὄλον ἦν ἐκάστου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ εἶδος στρογγύλον, νῶτον καὶ πλευρὰς κύκλω ἔχον, χεῖρας δὲ τέτταρας εἶχε, καὶ σκέλη τὰ ἴσα ταῖς χερσί, καὶ πρόσωπα δὲ ἐπ' αὐχένι κυκλοτερεῖ, ὅμοια πάντη· κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς 190 προσώποις ἐναντίοις κειμένοις μίαν, καὶ ὄτα τέτταρα, καὶ αἰδοῖα δύο, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων ἄν τις εἰκάσειεν. ἐπορεύετο δὲ καὶ ὀρθὸν ὡσπερ νῦν, ὅποτέρωσε βουληθείη· καὶ ὅποτε ταχὺ ὀρμήσειε θεῖν, ὡσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες καὶ εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περι-

189 E (τοῦ) θήλεος Euseb., Blass ἐν ὄνειδει T: ἐν ὄν εἶδει B νῶτόν τε καὶ Stob., Blass τὰ σκέλη ἴσα Hirschig: σκέλη (δὲ) Blass 190 A κειμένοις om. Stob. ὡς: ὅσα Stob. ὅποτέρως Stob. θεῖν B, Stob.: ἐλθεῖν T καὶ BT, Stob.: om. al. ὀρθὸν τὰ: ὀρθὰ ὄντα Stob.: ὀρθὰ Blass

than with ἐξ ἀμφοτ. κτλ. (as Stallb.). For ἀνδρόγυνος, see also Hippocr. *de diaet.* 28.

For the description cp. Emped. 257 ff. (St.) πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι | ...μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν | τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῆ, στεῖροις ἡσκημένα γυίοις: Lucr. v. 837 ff. portenta...androgynum, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum: Ov. *Met.* iv. 378 nec femina dici | nec puer ut possint; neutrumque et utrumque videntur: Livy xxvii. 11. 4. Theophrastus (*Char.* 16) mentions Hermaphroditus-statues; and the Orphic conception of Eros-Phanes may also be compared.

νῦν δὲ κτλ. "But now the name exists solely as a term of reproach": cp. the use in Latin of *semivir*, Virg. *A.* iv. 215 ille Paris cum semiviro comitatu: Livy xxxiii. 28. 7.

ὄλον ἦν κτλ. Cp. Emped. 265 (St.) οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον. ὄλον is predicate and not merely (as Ast, Schleierm.) a qualifying adj. with τὸ εἶδος. Certainly, as Rettig notes, Zeller's "ganz rund" is impossible. Rabelais (I. 8) has a reference to this passage—"ung corps humain ayant deux testes, l'une virée vers l'autre, quatre bras, quatre pieds, et deux culs; tel que dict Platon, in *Symposio*, avoir esté l'humaine nature à son commencement mysticq"—in his description of Gargantua's equipment.

190 A κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' κτλ. "Quis non Iani meminert?" (Hommel). The notion of a similar double-fronted, androgynous being is found in the Talmud, and Euseb. *pr. Evang.* xii. 12 quotes our passage as a plagiarism from Moses.

οἱ κυβιστῶντες. Schol. κυβιστήρ ὁ ὀρχηστής, καὶ κυβιστῶν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι. Cp. *Il.* xvi. 750, and the evolutions of the "tumbler" Hippoclidēs described in *Hdt.* vi. 129: also Xen. *Symp.* ii. 11, vii. 3. The καί before εἰς ὀρθόν reads awkwardly; if retained, we must render it "actually" (*adeo*, Wolf), but possibly ἴσα or ἴσα καὶ may have been the original. Rettig quotes Cic. *de Fin.* v. 35 si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante sed retro fugere, plane se ipse et hominem exuens ex homine naturam odisse (videtur).

φερόμενοι κυβιστώσι κύκλω, ὁκτὼ τότε οὔσι τοῖς μέλεσιν ἀπερει-  
 δόμενοι ταχὺ ἐφέροντο κύκλω. ἦν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα τρία τὰ γένη καὶ  
**B** τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἦν τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔκγονον, τὸ δὲ  
 θῆλυ τῆς γῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον τῆς σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ  
 σελήνη ἀμφοτέρων μετέχει· περιφερῆ δὲ δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἡ  
 πορεία αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὅμοια εἶναι. ἦν οὖν τὴν ἰσχὺν  
 δεινὰ καὶ τὴν ῥώμην, καὶ τὰ φρονήματα μεγάλα εἶχον, ἐπεχεί-  
 ρησαν δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ὁ λέγει "Ὀμηρος περὶ Ἐφιάλτου τε καὶ  
 Ἔντου, περὶ ἐκείνων λέγεται, τὸ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ἐπιχει-  
**C** ρεῖν ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐπιθησομένων τοῖς θεοῖς.

XV. Ὁ οὖν Ζεὺς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἐβουλεύοντο ὅ τι χρῆ  
 αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι, καὶ ἠπόρουν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον

190 A κυβιστώσι κύκλω del. Sauppe Bdhm Sz. τότε ὁκτὼ T, Stob.  
 ἀπερειδόμενοι T: ἀπερ εἰδομεναι B: ἐπερειδόμενοι ej. Steph. B ἀμφότερον T  
 ὅτι...μετέχει del. Jn. μετείχεν Stob., Blass (καὶ) περιφερῆ Blass δὴ om.  
 Stob. αὐτῶν del. Blass τε καὶ BT: καὶ W C ὡς...θεοῖς post Ἔντου  
 transp. Steinhart ὁ γοῦν Stobaei A

190 B ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν κτλ. Aristophanes too can pose as an erudite  
 physicist. His astronomical lore may come partly from Parmenides, partly  
 from the Pythagoreans. Cp. Arist. *de gen. an.* I. 2 ἄρρεν γὰρ λέγομεν ζῶον  
 τὸ εἰς ἄλλο γεννῶν, θῆλυ δὲ τὸ εἰς αὐτό· διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ τὴν τῆς γῆς φύσιν ὡς  
 θῆλυ καὶ μητέρα νομίζουσιν, οὐρανὸν δὲ καὶ ἡλιον...ὡς γεννῶντας καὶ πατέρας  
 προσαγορεύουσιν. For the moon as bisexed, cp. *Orph. Hymn.* IX. 4 (θῆλὺς τε  
 καὶ ἄρσην); Macrobius III. 8 Philochorus affirmat Venerem esse lunam et ei  
 sacrificium facere viros cum veste muliebri, mulieres cum virili, quod eadem  
 et mas aestimetur et femina. Procl. *in Tim.* p. 326 C (οὕτω δὴ καὶ σεληνιακὴν  
 ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς κατιέναι φύσιν, καθὰ τὴν Μουσαίου φασί, καὶ ἀπολλωνιακὴν  
 (ἡλιακὴν Jahn) εἰς γυναικός, καθάπερ ἱστοροῦσι τὴν Σίβυλλαν) shows that  
 opinion on the matter was not uniform: see also Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* II.  
 368 c, 371 f ff.

ὅτι...μετέχει. Vögelin and others rightly defend this clause against athe-  
 tizers like Jahn: it adds to the impression of "komische Gelehrsamkeit."

περιφερῆ. "Globular" rather than "circular" ("kreisformig," Ast,  
 Schleierm.). For πορεία, *incessus*, cp. *Tim.* 45 A, *Polit.* 266 B.

τὰ φρονήματα μεγάλα εἶχον. They were "high minded" and had "proud  
 looks"; they did not "refrain their soul and keep it low": "μεγάλα φρονήματα  
 dicuntur habere qui contra dominos conspirant, cp. 182 c" (Hommel).

ὁ λέγει Ὀμηρος. See *Od.* XI. 305 ff., *Il.* v. 385 ff. We may compare also  
*Ps.* II. 2, "The kings of the earth set themselves...against the Lord"; and  
 the Babel tradition (*Gen.* XI. 4 ff.; cp. *Orig. c. Cels.* IV. p. 515 A ff.).

190 C οὔτε γὰρ...εἶχον. This obviously implies, as Hug remarks, moral  
 rather than physical impossibility—the inexpedience of killing the goose that  
 lays the golden egg. Supply ἠφάνισαν with *κεραυνώσαντες*.

καὶ ὡσπερ τοὺς γίγαντας κεραυνώσαντες τὸ γένος ἀφανίσαιεν—αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίζετο—οὐθ' ὅπως ἐφ' ἄσελγαίειν. μόγις δὴ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐννοήσας λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἂν εἶεν τε ἄνθρωποι καὶ παύσαιεντο τῆς ἀκολασίας ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ D αὐτούς, ἔφη, διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι ἔσονται, ἅμα δὲ χρησιμώτεροι ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν γεγονέναι· καὶ βαδιοῦνται ὀρθοὶ ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκελοῖν. ἐὰν δ' ἔτι δοκῶσιν ἀσελγαίειν καὶ μὴ 'θέλωσιν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, πάλιν αὖ, ἔφη, τεμῶ δίχα, ὡστ' ἐφ' ἑνὸς πορεύονται σκέλους ἀσκωλίζοντες. ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἔτεμνε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα τέμ-

190 C γὰρ (ἂν) Ast (τὰ) ἱερὰ Stob., J.-U. μόλις δὲ Stob. εἶεν τε: ἰώνται Stob. ἄνθρωποι Voeg.: ἄνθρωποι BT ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι secl. Kreyenbühl Sz. D δ' ἔτι Stob., vulg.: δέ τι BT 'θέλωσιν Baiter Bt.: θέλωσιν B, Stob.: ἐθέλωσιν T ἀσχαλίζοντες Stob. ὄα Timaeus Pollux: ὡὰ BT, Suidas: ὡὰ Stob. Photius: ὄτα Euseb.

**ἠφανίζετο.** For the impf. without ἂν, cp. (with Stallb.) *Rep.* 450 D, *Euthyd.* 304 D; *Ar. Nub.* 1212.

**μόγις...ἐννοήσας.** Notice the comic touch: the omniscient Zeus has to cudgel his brains over the business!

**ὡς ἂν εἶεν.** For this construction after a present, cp. *Xen. Cyrop.* I. 2. 5 (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 349, cp. § 351).

**ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι.** Although these words are superfluous, a little legal verbosity may be excused in a comedian's Zeus.

190 D **χρησιμώτεροι.** "More lucrative." Zeus, with a sharp eye to "the loaves and fishes," contrives to kill two birds with one stone. The propagation of piety by making fissures in men is an idea that tickles, and the discovery of the benefits—from the Olympian point of view—which result from schisms of this sort is νόημα γελοιότατον. This passage is alluded to by Musonius *ap.* Stob. *Flor.* LXVII. 20; Julian, *Ep.* LX. p. 448 c.

**ἐὰν δ' ἔτι κτλ.** The ingenious Deity has still "a rod in pickle": the process of bisection may be repeated *ad lib.* until the wicked are left literally with not a leg to stand on.

**ἀσκωλίζοντες.** Schol. ἀσκωλιάζειν κυρίως μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀσκούς ἄλλεσθαι ἀηλιμμένους, ἐφ' οὓς ἐπήδων γελοίου ἔνεκα· τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπεφυκόσι τοῖς σκέλεσιν ἀλλομένων. ἤδη δὲ τιθέσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄλλεσθαι τὸ νεῦρον (τὸν ἕτερον cj. Bekk.) τῶν ποδῶν ἀνέχοντα, ἢ ὡς νῦν ἐπὶ σκέλους ἑνὸς βαίνοντα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ χωλαίειν. Hesych. ἀσκωλίζοντες· ἐφ' ἑνὸς ποδὸς ἐφαλλόμενοι. Cp. Schol. ad *Ar. Plut.* 1130: *Virg. Georg.* II. 383 inter pocula laeti | mollibus in pratis unctos saluere per utres. See also Smith *D. A. s.v.* "ascoliasmus."

**ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα κτλ.** For ὄα (see *crit. n.*) cp. Pollux VI. 79 ἦν δὲ τρωγάλια κάρυα μυρτίδες μέσπιλα, ἃ καὶ ὄα καλεῖται: Tim. (Phot., Suid.) ὄα· ἀκροδρύων



**Ε**νοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν [, ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ ταῖς θριξίν]· ὄντινα δὲ τέμοι, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐκέλευε τό τε πρόσωπον μεταστρέφειν καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνχένος ἥμισυ πρὸς τὴν τομήν, ἵνα θεώμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ τμησιν κοσμιώτερος εἶη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰλλα ἰᾶσθαι ἐκέλευεν. ὁ δὲ τό τε πρόσωπον μετέστρεφε, καὶ συνέλκων πανταχόθεν τὸ δέρμα ἐπὶ τὴν γαστέρα νῦν καλουμένην, ὥσπερ τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια, ἐν στόμα ποιῶν ἀπέδει κατὰ μέσσην τὴν γαστέρα, ὃ δὴ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καλοῦσι. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ῥυτίδας

**190 D** τέμνοντες καὶ secl. Kreyenbühl Bt.: καὶ secl. Bdhm. Hug Sz.  
**Ε** ταριχεύσειν Photius Suidas ἢ...θριξίν secl. Sydenham Sz. Bt. οἱ T,  
 Stob.: om. B θριξί (διαιροῦντες) Toup καὶ...ἥμισυ del. Sauppe  
 καὶ τὸ: κατὰ τὸ Verm. αὐτοῦ T: αὐτοῦ B, Stob. τμησιν: πρότμησιν  
 Naber βαλλάντια T: βάλλοντα B ἀπέδεισε Stob. τὸν del. Hommel  
 τὰς om. Stob.

εἶδος μήλοισ μικροῖς ἐμφερές. It is the "sorb-apple" or "service-berry," Lat. *sorbum*; for the mode of preserving these cp. Varro *de re rust.* I. 59 (putant manere) sorba quidam dissecta et in sole macerata, ut pira, et sorba per se ubicumque sint posita, in arido facile manere: and for ταριχεύειν in this sense of "drying," cp. Phot. (Suid.) ταριχεύειν...σημαίνειν δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηραίνειν.

The clause ἢ ὥσπερ...ταῖς θριξίν is condemned by most edd. It is an objection to the phrase that, as Rettig notes, we ought naturally to supply with it not only the appropriate τέμνοντες but also the inappropriate μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν: this objection however is not insuperable, and if necessary τέμνοντες might be transposed. It is argued on the other hand by Hommel and Vögelin that a second simile is really required, the sorb-slicing describing only the mode of operation, whereas the egg-slicing adds the idea of ease and facility. That *ῥα θριξί διαίρειν* was a proverbial saying is shown by Plut. *amat.* 24, p. 770 B οἶσθα τοὺς παιδικοὺς ἔρωτας (εἰς) ἀβεβαιότητα πολλὰ λέγουσι καὶ σκώπτουσι λέγοντες ὥσπερ ῥον αὐτῶν τριχί διαίρεισθαι τὴν φιλίαν. Rückert supposes "ovorum per crines dissectionem ludi genus fuisse; fortasse ex ovorum dissectione per crines facta convivae futura praedicere solebant": Zeller writes "vielleicht ein Gesellschafts- oder Liebesspiel, das darin bestanden haben könnte, dass zwei Tischgenossen sich in die zwei Hälften eines hartgesottenen Eies theilten, nachdem es mit einem dem Einen von ihnen ausgezogenen Haare zerschnitten war, also ein griechisches Vielliebchen." It is, perhaps, possible that it had some connexion with (Orphic) magic and divination by *φοσκοπία*. For the process of bisection, cp. *Phaedr.* 265 E.

**190 E** τὴν αὐτοῦ τμησιν. Here τμησις denotes, of course, the result rather than the process: Naber's *πρότμησιν*, *umbilicum*, is ingenious but needless.

τὰλλα ἰᾶσθαι. Apollo, as ἀκείσιος and ἰητήρ, very properly plays the part of surgeon's assistant.

τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια. "Round pouches with strings to draw": see Smith *D. A.* I. 565.



τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τὰ στήθη διήρθρου, ἔχων τι τοιοῦτον 191  
 ὄργανον οἶον οἱ σκυτοτόμοι περὶ τὸν καλάποδα λεαίνοντες τὰς  
 τῶν σκυτῶν ῥυτίδας· ὀλίγας δὲ κατέλιπε, τὰς περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν  
 γαστέρα καὶ τὸν ὀμφαλόν, μνημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ πάθους.  
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡ φύσις δίχα ἐτμήθη, ποθοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ ἡμισυ τὸ  
 αὐτοῦ ξυνηῖ, καὶ περιβάλλοντες τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συμπλεκόμενοι  
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφύναι, ἀπέθνησκον ὑπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ τῆς  
 ἄλλης ἀργίας διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐθέλειν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ποιεῖν. καὶ B  
 ὁπότε τι ἀποθάνοι τῶν ἡμίσεων, τὸ δὲ λειφθείη, τὸ λειφθὲν ἄλλο  
 ἐζήτει καὶ συνεπλέκετο, εἴτε γυναικὸς τῆς ὅλης ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει,  
 ὃ δὴ νῦν γυναῖκα καλοῦμεν, εἴτε ἀνδρός· καὶ οὕτως ἀπόλλυντο.  
 ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλλην μηχανὴν πορίζεται, καὶ μετατίθησιν  
 αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν· τέως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτὸς εἶχον,  
 καὶ ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ' εἰς γῆν, ὥσπερ οἱ C

191 A ὄργανον del. Creuzer καλάποδα T, Pollux Stob.: καλόποδα B  
 ἐπειδὴ: ἐπεὶ Stob. ἡ φύσις (αὐτῶν) vel (ἡμῶν) Ast ἐπόθουν Verm. J.-U.  
 ἕκαστοι τῷ ἡμίσει Verm. τὸ libri: τε Stob. Priscian: τῷ Verm. J.-U.  
 αὐτοῦ om. Priscian ξυνηῖ T, Stob. Priscian: ξυνεῖναι B, Verm. J.-U.: del.  
 Rettig ἀμπλεκόμενοι Stob. λιμοῦ B: τοῦ λιμοῦ T, Stob.: τῆς λιμοῦ W,  
 vulg. B τὸ δὲ T: τὸδε B ξυνεπέπλεκτο Stob. ἡμισείας Stob.  
 ἀπόλλυντο T: ἀπόλλυντο B: ἀπόλλυτο Stob.

191 A διήρθρου. "Shaped out," "moulded"; cp. *Phaedr.* 253 D. Cp. Aelian, *H. A.* II. 19, v. 39, VI. 3.

τὸν καλάποδα. "The (cobbler's) last": Lat. *forma* (Hor. *Sat.* II. 3. 106), or *tentipellium*. Suidas (*s.v.* κᾶλα) κᾶλον γὰρ τὸ ξύλον· ἐξ οὗ καὶ καλόπους, ὁ ξύλινος ποῦς.

μνημεῖον...πάθους. The residue of the wrinkles was intended to serve as a memorial "of man's first disobedience...and all our woe." This repeats the idea already expressed in 190 E *supra* (ἵνα θεώμενος κτλ.).

ἡ φύσις. Creuzer renders this by "nos homines," disapproving of Ficinus' "natura" and Schleierm.'s "forma": but φύσις is no mere periphrasis but connotes *original* nature or form.

ποθοῦν ἕκαστον κτλ. To attempt to restore the Bodleian reading ξυνεῖναι, as several of the later critics do, involves too much alteration; thus Hug writes τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνεῖναι, Usener ἐπόθουν...τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνεῖναι. Notice the "constructio ad sensum," ποθοῦν...περιβάλλοντες...ἀπέθνησκον. There is an echo of this passage in Philo *de op. mund.* 53 p. 36 M.

τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας. "General inactivity," implying that the λιμός itself was due to ἀργία. Cp. *Rep.* 554 A, c (with Adam *ad loc.*).

191 B εἴτε ἀνδρός. Abbreviated for εἴτε ἀνδρός τοῦ ὅλου ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει. Notice that the third possibility (εἴτ' ἀνδρογύνου) is omitted.

191 C ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες. This is not merely a piece of natural history;

τέττιγες· μετέθηκέ τε οὖν οὕτω <ταῦτ'> αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν καὶ διὰ τούτων τὴν γένεσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐποίησε, διὰ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἐν τῷ θήλει, τῶνδε ἕνεκα, ἵνα ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἅμα μὲν εἰ ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ ἐντύχοι, γεννῶεν καὶ γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος, ἅμα δ' εἰ καὶ ἄρρην ἄρρην, πλησμονὴ γοῦν γίγνοιτο τῆς συνουσίας καὶ διαπαύοιντο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέποιντο καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου ἐπιμελοῦντο. ἔστι D δὴ οὖν ἐκ τόσου ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως συναγωγεὺς καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἐν ἐκ δυοῖν καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην.

191 C τε: δὲ Ast οὕτω αὐτῶν: ὁμοῦ πάντων cj. Usener (ταῦτ') αὐτῶν scripsi: αὐτῶν B: αὐτῶν T: αὖ Schanz: αὐτὰ vulg.: del. Rückert αὐτῶν... πρόσθεν del. Jn. Hug ἔμπροσθεν Stob. fort. (τὰ αἰδοῖα) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Stob. γέννησιν Verm. Sz. ἐν: νέαν Stob. διὰ...θήλει del. Jn. Sz. (σῶν) (vel ἔτι) γίγνοιτο Rückert: γένοιτο Stob.: σώζοιτο Susemihl τὸ γένος BT, Stob.: γένος J.-U.: τόκος Verm.: ὁ γόνος Hommel ἄρρην apogr. Coisl. 155 Stob. D συναγωγός Stob. ἕνα Stobaei A

it contains also an allusion to the cicada as the symbol of Athenian autochthony: cp. *Polit.* 271 A τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἦν ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, τὸ δὲ δὴ γηγενὲς εἶναι ποτε γένος λεχθέν κτλ.: *Thuc.* I. 6, *Ar. Eq.* 1331. For the mode of propagation of cicadae, cp. *Ael. H. A.* II. 22 ταῖς ἀφύαις ὁ πηλὸς γένεσις ἔστι· δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ οὐ τίκτουσιν οὐδὲ ἐπιγίνονται κτλ.: the female lays her eggs in the sand, where the young are hatched out by the sun's heat. Cp. also *Plut. amat.* 767 c.

οὕτω...πρόσθεν. Hommel explains οὕτω by *hac ratione, qua dixi*; Rückert by *uti nunc posita sunt*, which seems preferable. αὐτῶν (*sc. τὰ αἰδοῖα*) by itself reads rather awkwardly; but, as Vögelin points out, a glossator would certainly have added the missing words. It is, perhaps, just possible that τὰ αἰδοῖα fell out before καὶ διὰ, owing to similarity of letters; but the insertion of ταῦτ' is a simpler change.

γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος, *i.e.* τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, cp. 190 D τὸ γένος...ἀνθρωποι. There is no reason to tamper with the text: the present tense secures the notion of continuance without need of supplements such as Rückert's σῶν or ἔτι. (A neater change would be τείνοιτο.)

ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα. In contrast to their former ἀργία (191 B). Cp. Hesiod's title ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι. βίος is here practically equiv. to ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή (*Laos* 842 c); and the phrase means "husbandry and other means of subsistence."

ἔστι δὴ οὖν. Here at last we come to the point of the whole tale—the function and value of Eros.

ἐκ τόσου. "From such early times," *tam longo ex tempore*: the only other ex. in Plato is *Laos* 642 B, but the phrase is common in *Hdt.*, *e.g.* v. 88, vi. 84.

191 D συναγωγεὺς. "A unifier," in the sense of "restorer." This subst. is unique in Plato, and rare elsewhere; cp. the use of *συναγωγός*, *Prot.* 322 c, *Tim.* 31 c.

XVI. "Ἐκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον, ἅτε τετμημένος ὡσπερ αἱ ψῆτται, ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο. ζητεῖ δὴ αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ξύμβολον. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ τμῆμά εἰσιν, ὃ δὴ τότε ἀνδρόγυνον ἐκαλεῖτο, φιλογύναικές τ' εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μοιχῶν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γεγόνασι, καὶ ὅσαι αὖ **E** γυναῖκες φίλανδροί τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι [ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γίγνονται]. ὅσαι δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν γυναικὸς τμῆμά εἰσιν, οὐ πάνυ αὐταὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν νοῦν προσέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας τετραμμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ αἱ ἑταιρίστριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ

191 D οὖν: γοῦν cj. Usener ἕκαστος TW: ἕκαστον B, Stob. τμήματος Stob. **E** φιλομοιχεύτριαι Stob. ἐκ...γίγνονται del. Bdhm. Sz. γυναικῶν W καὶ αἱ...γίγνονται del. Voeg. αἱ om. Stob.

ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον. "But the indenture of a man" (Jowett): σύμβολον here is the *tessera hospitalis*; the host presents his departing guest with one half of a broken die (*ἀστράγαλος*), retaining the other half himself (see Smith *D. A. s.v.* "hospitium"). Cp. the use of the word by Empedocles, in his theory of reproduction stated in *Arist. de gen. an.* I. 18. 772<sup>b</sup> 10 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς...φησὶ ἐν τῷ ἄρρени καὶ ἐν τῷ θήλει οἶον σύμβολον εἶναι, ὅλον δ' ἀπ' οὐδετέρου ἀπιέναι—"ad quod decretum philosophi respexit fortasse Aristophanes" (Stallb.).

αἱ ψῆτται. Lat. *rhombi*, a kind of flat-fish (perhaps plaice or turbot): Schol. ἰχθύδιόν τι τῶν πλατειῶν ἢ ψῆττα, ἐκ δύο δερμάτων συγκείσθαι τὴν ἰδέαν δοκοῦν, ὃ τινες σανδάλιον καλοῦσιν κτλ.: "genus piscium, quod oculos et nares in altera tantum parte capitis habet" (Stallb.). Cp. *Ar. Lys.* 115 (where the Schol. curiously defines ψ. as ὄρνειον τετμημένον κατὰ τὸ μέσον, ὡς οἱ σφήκες), *Athen.* VIII. p. 329.

φιλογύναικές. Cp. *Cic. Tusc.* IV. 11. 25 *similiterque ceteri morbi...ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam, quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, etc.* The sing. is *φιλογύνης* (see L. and S.).

191 E φίλανδροί. The word here has the bad sense noted in *Hermog. de id.* III. p. 324 W. τὴν γὰρ ἀκολασίαν βούλεται νῦν δήπου σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ μοιχεύεσθαι. Somewhat different is the force in *Soph. fr.* 1006 N. (*Hermog. Rhet.* III. p. 324) καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς δὲ φίλανδρόν που τὴν Ἀταλάντην εἶπε διὰ τὸ ἀσπάξεσθαι σὺν ἀνδράσιν εἶναι: and *Eur. Androm.* 229; while in *Ep. Titius* II. 4 *φιλανδρία* is a virtue.

ἐκ τούτου...γίγνονται. I follow Badham and Hug in rejecting these words as an adscript derived from the context (a view already suggested by Hommel). Badham writes, "si altero praedicato opus esse credidisset Plato, quod aegre adducar ut credam, aliquanto pulcrius orationem variasset quam γεγόνασι in γίγνονται mutando." The three-fold repetition sounds clumsy.

γυναικὸς τμήμα, i.e. a section of the γυνή ὅλη ("Doppelweib") of 191 B. Similarly below ἄρρениος τμήμα refers to the ἀνὴρ ὅλος ("Doppelmann"). With the theory of sex-characters here expounded, cp. *Hippocr. de diaet.* I. 28 ff.

αἱ ἑταιρίστριαι. *Timaeus* ἑταιρίστριαι· αἱ καλούμεναι τριβάδες. Cp. *Clem. Alex. Paed.* III. 21, p. 264 P. γυναῖκες ἀνδρίζονται παρὰ φύσιν γαμούμεναι τε καὶ γαμοῦσαι γυναῖκες: and *Ep. Rom.* I. 26.

γένους γίνονται. ὅσοι δὲ ἄρρενος τμημά εἰσι, τὰ ἄρρενα διώκουσι, καὶ τέως μὲν ἂν παῖδες ὦσιν, ἅτε τεμάχια ὄντα τοῦ ἄρρενος,  
 192 φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι τῶν παίδων καὶ μειρακίων, ἅτε ἀνδρειότατοι ὄντες φύσει. φασὶ δὲ δὴ τινες αὐτοὺς ἀναισχύντους εἶναι, ψευδόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀρρενωπίας, τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς ἀσπαζόμενοι. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τελεωθέντες μόνοι ἀποβαίνουσιν εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἄνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἐπειδὴν  
 B δὲ ἀνδρωθῶσι, παιδεραστοῦσι καὶ πρὸς γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας οὐ προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν φύσει, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀναγκάζονται·

191 E (ἄρρενες) ἄρρενος Bast τέως: ἕως Ast Sz. τεμάχια om. Stob.  
 192 A οὗτοι (οἱ) Hommel Sz. τῶν μειρακίων Stob. δὲ δὴ: δὴ Stob.  
 οὔτε γὰρ Stob. αὐτοῖς vulg. B φύσει...ἀναγκάζονται del. Hug ἀλλὰ... ἀναγκάζονται del. Jn. Sz.

τέως ἂν. "I. q. ἕως ἂν, *quamdiu*" (Ast). As this use is unique in Plato, Ast proposed to write ἕως ἂν. In 191 B τέως has its usual force, *adhuc*.

τεμάχια. "Slices": this recalls the comparison with ψῆτται, τέμαχος being used esp. of fish.

συγκατακείμενοι. An example of this is Alcibiades: see his own account in 217 D ff.

192 A ἀνδρειότατοι. An allusion, as Hommel remarks, to the ambiguity of the word ἀνδρείος. Cp. Hippocr. *de diaet.* I. 28 ἦν μὲν οὖν ἐς ἄρσενα τὰ σώματα ἀποκριθέντα ἀμφοτέρων τύχη...γίνονται οὗτοι ἄνδρες λαμπροὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἰσχυροί.

φασὶ...τινες. Cp. what Pausanias says in 182 A (ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν κτλ.).

ἀρρενωπίας. Etym. M. s.v. ἀρρενωπός· ὁ ἄρρενος πρόσωπον ἔχων, κατὰ συνεκδοχὴν. ἤγουν ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ δυνάμενος πρὸς ἐχθρὸν ἀνταχθῆναι. The subst. is ἄπ. λεγ., but the adj. occurs in *Laws* 802 E τὸ δὴ μεγαλοπρεπὲς οὖν καὶ τὸ τὴν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον ἀρρενωπὸν φατέον εἶναι. Rettig regards all these apparently encomiastic terms as ironical.

τελεωθέντες. "When grown up," cp. *Rep.* 377 B, 466 E.

ἄνδρες is predicative: "Such as these, and they alone, turn out *men* (i.e. manly, capable) in public affairs": Ficinus wrongly renders "cum adoleverint, soli ad civilem administrationem conversi, viri praestantes evadunt"; and Schleierm. also goes wrong. For the connexion between the paederastic temper and politics, cp. 182 c, Ar. *Nub.* 1093, *Eq.* 333 ff., etc.

ἀνδρωθῶσι. This verb is not found elsewhere in Plato: cp. Hdt. I. 123, Eur. *H. F.* 42.

192 B φύσει...ἀναγκάζονται. Hug, on quite insufficient grounds, expunges these words. It is true that there was, so far as is known, no law at Athens to enforce matrimony, though there was such a law at Sparta, according to Stob. (*Serm.* 65 p. 410) and Pollux (VIII. 40), by which citizens were liable to a

ἀλλ' ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτοῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων καταζῆν ἀγάμοις. πάντως μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος παιδεραστής τε καὶ φιλεραστής γίγνεται, ἀεὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἀσπαζόμενος. ὅταν μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐντύχη τῷ αὐτοῦ ἡμίσει καὶ ὁ παιδεραστής καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς, τότε καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλία τε καὶ οἰκειότητι καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες, ὡς C ἔπος εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον. καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες μετ' ἀλλήλων διὰ βίου οὗτοί εἰσιν, οἳ οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι βούλονται σφίσι παρ' ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων συνουσία, ὡς ἄρα τούτου ἔνεκα ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ χαίρει ξυνῶν οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς· ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἐκατέρου ἢ ψυχὴ δῆλη ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ δύναται D

192 B ἀγάμοις οὔσι· Stob. μὲν οὖν (post ὅταν): μέντοι Sauppe: μὲν Sz καὶ om. Stob. θαυμαστότατ' Bdhm. C ἐκπλήττονται T: ἐκπλήττοντα B (ἐπὶ) σμικρὸν Stob. οὐδενὶ Stob., Bt.: οὐδὲν BTW: οὐδὲ recc., J.-U. ἐτέρῳ: ἐκατέρῳ Stob. χαίρει T: χαίρειν B D ἢ ψυχὴ ἐκατέρου Stob.

γραφὴ ἀγαμίου (or ὄψιγαμίου). But, as Hommel notes, νόμος covers not only law but custom; and it appears that "certain disabilities attached, at Athens, to the state of celibacy; those who entered public life, as ῥήτορες or στρατηγοί, were required παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (Deinarch. c. Demosth. p. 99 § 72)": see Smith *D. A.* I. 43 a. And it is to be noticed that it is precisely public men who are spoken of in the text. The antithesis φύσει ( νόμῳ derives from the Sophists (Hippias v. Protagoras), see my *Philebus* p. xxviii n., Adam *R. T. G.* pp. 279 ff., Gomperz *G. T.* I. pp. 401 ff.

φιλεραστής. This applies to the ἐρώμενος; cp. the use of φιλεραστία in 213 D. Those who are παιδερασταί in manhood were φιλερασταί in boyhood (φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας 191 E), so that the words here are put in chiasmic order, as Stallb. observes. Hommel absurdly suggests that π. τε καὶ φιλεραστής may denote "virum qui neque alios vituperet amatores puerorum, et ipse pueros amet." The point is also missed by Rückert's "amicorum amator," and Wolf's "sodalium amator."

αὐτῷ...ἡμίσει. This refers to 191 D, ζητεῖ δὴ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ζύμβολον.

ἄλλος πᾶς. This is a short way of referring comprehensively to the segments of the other δλα, viz. the androgynous and the "Doppelweib" (191 D, E).

θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται κτλ. Cp. 211 D.

192 C ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. This qualifies the negatives in the clause, like *paene dixerim*: "Barely consenting to be sundered for even a moment."

καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες κτλ. "It is these who continue in fellowship their life long, although they could not so much as say what gain they expect from one another." Schleierm. misses the force of οὗτοι by making it direct antecedent to οἱ ("diese sind es welche" etc.). For the thought of this passage, cp. 181 D, 183 E, *Phaedr.* 254 A ff., 255 E ff.

τούτου ἔνεκα, i.e. τῆς τῶν ἀφρ. συνουσίας ἔνεκα.



εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντεύεται ὃ βούλεται καὶ αἰνίττεται. καὶ εἰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατακειμένοις ἐπιστὰς ὁ Ἥφαιστος, ἔχων τὰ ὄργανα, ἔροιτο· Τί ἔσθ' ὃ βούλεσθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν παρ' ἀλλήλων γενέσθαι; καὶ εἰ ἀποροῦντας αὐτοὺς πάλιν ἔροιτο· Ἄρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων; εἰ γὰρ τούτου **E** ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐθέλω ὑμᾶς συντήξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε δύο ὄντας ἓνα γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τ' ἂν ζητε, ὡς ἓνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἓνα εἶναι κοινῇ τεθνεῶτε· ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε· ταῦτα ἀκούσας ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐξαρνηθείη οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἂν φανείη βουλόμενος, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ' ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα ἐπεθύμει, συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεῖς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἰς γενέσθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις ἡμῶν ἦν αὕτη καὶ ἡμεν ὅλοι· τοῦ **193** ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα. καὶ πρὸ τοῦ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἐν ἡμεν, νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν διφκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ,

**192 D** θέλω B **E** συμφυσῆσαι BTW: συμφῦσαι b t, vulg. ζῆτε ὡς T: ζητήσεως B ἄλλο ὅτι TW τοῦτο δ: τοῦ οὐ Bdhm. τούτου γὰρ Ficinus Bast: τούτου ἄρ' Wolf **193 A** διφκίσθημεν: διεσχίσθημεν Cornarius ὑπὸ: ἀπὸ Hommel

**192 D** καὶ εἰ...ἔροιτο. The apodosis to this duplicated protasis is to be found in ἴσμεν ὅτι κτλ. (192 E). For Hephaestus and his tools, see *Od.* VIII. 266 ff., esp. 274 ἐν δ' ἔθετ' ἀκμοθέτῳ μέγαν ἄκμονα, κόπτε τε δεσμούς | ἀρρήκτους ἀλύτους ὄφρ' ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένοιεν. He would also have his bellows (φῦσαι), tongs (πύραγμα), and hammer (σφῦρα, ραιστήρ): see *Il.* XVIII. 372 ff., 474 ff.

**192 E** συντήξαι. Cp. 183 E, *Tim.* 43 A πυκνοῖς γόμοις ξυντήκοντες: *Eur. fr.* 964 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνή, | ἢ τις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε, σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται. For τήκειν of the effects of love, cp. *Theocr. id.* I. 66; *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 3.

συμφυσῆσαι. Stallb., Hommel and Jowett retain the vulgate, συμφῦσαι, but the other lection gives a better sense—"to weld together," *conflare*: cp. *Il.* XVIII. 470. There is a ref. to this passage in *Arist. Pol.* II. 4. 1262<sup>b</sup> 11 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφῦναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἓνα (Newman here reads συμφυῆναι), but the word συμφῦναι is probably due to a reminiscence of 191 A. For the sense, cp. *Orph. Fr.* 139 παρήγαγεν...τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἐνοποιὸν ὄντα τῶν ὄλων.

τοῦ ὅλου...ὄνομα. This *definition* sums up the description of Eros given in 191 D *ad init.*

**193 A** διφκίσθημεν κτλ. This is apparently a reference—in spite of the audacious anachronism (cp. *Introd.* § VIII.), to the διοικισμός of Mantinea in



καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. φόβος οὖν ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμιοι ὤμεν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὐθις διασχισθησόμεθα, καὶ περίμεν ἔχοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις καταγραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι, διαπεπρισμένοι κατὰ τὰς ῥίνας, γεγονότες ὥσπερ λίσπαι. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντ' ἄνδρα χρὴ ἅπαντα παρακελεύεσθαι εὐσεβεῖν περὶ θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ Β τύχωμεν, ὡς ὁ Ἔρως ἡμῖν ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός. φῖ μηδεὶς ἐναντία πραττέτω—πράττει δ' ἐναντία, ὅστις θεοῖς ἀπεχθάνεται— φίλοι γὰρ γενόμενοι καὶ διαλλαγέστες τῷ θεῷ ἐξευρήσομέν τε καὶ ἐντευξόμεθα τοῖς παιδικοῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις αὐτῶν, ὃ τῶν νῦν ὀλίγοι ποιοῦσι. καὶ μὴ μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος, κωμωδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὡς Πausanίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω· ἴσως μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τούτων τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ εἰσὶν ἀμφοτέροι τὴν φύσιν ἄρρενες· λέγω C

193 A διασχισθησόμεθα T: διασχισθησώμεθα B καταγραφῆ Schneider: κατὰ γραφὴν Ruhnken Sz. διαπεπρισμένοι T: διαπεπρησμένοι B: δίχα πεπρισμένοι Ruhnken ἅπαντι Hirschig Sz. B ὡς BT: ὡν recc. vulg., Herm. J.-U.: fort. ὄσων ἡμιτόμοις αὐτῶν Bast μοι B: μου T γὰρ καὶ: γὰρ Wolf C ἄρρενος Bast: ἄρρενος ἐνός Orelli

385 B.C., for which see Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 1 ff. ἐκ δὲ τούτου καθηρέθη μὲν τὸ τεῖχος, διφικίσθη δὲ ἡ Μαντινεῖα τετραχῆ καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾧκουν (i.e. κατὰ κώμας): Isocr. *Pan.* 67 A: Arist. *Pol.* II. 2, § 3.

καταγραφὴν. Many editors divide the word κατὰ γραφὴν. Probably whichever reading we adopt the meaning is the same, "in profile," the figures being bas-reliefs (*crusta*). Cp. Plin. xxxv. 34 hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est obliquas imagines.

ὥσπερ λίσπαι. These are διαπεπρισμένοι ἀστράγαλοι (Schol. *ad loc.*, Suidas), like the σύμβολον of 191 D: cp. Ar. *Ran.* 826, Schol. *ad Eur. Med.* 610.

193 B ὡς ὁ Ἔρως. The Bodleian's ὡς, though doubtful, is possible. Perhaps the variants arose from an original ὄσων or ἐν φῖ.

πράττει...ἀπεχθάνεται. This may contain an allusion, as Usener suggests, to some familiar verse such as, e.g., πράττει δ' ἐναντί' δε θεοῖς ἀπήχθετο.

μὴ μοι ὑπολάβῃ. This is one of three cases in Plato of "μὴ with the (independent) subjunctive implying apprehension coupled with the desire to avert the object of fear,"—the other cases being *Euthyd.* 272 c, *Laws* 861 E (see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 264).

κωμωδῶν τὸν λόγον. "Ridiculing my discourse," cp. 189 B: so ἐπικωμωδῶν, *Apol.* 31 D. As Hug observes, A. is really κωμωδῶν himself when, in comic contrast to the picture drawn of Agathon in *Thesm.* 31 ff., he here suggests that he is τὴν φύσιν ἄρρην.

193 C ἀμφοτέροι...ἄρρενες. "H. e. ἄρρενος ἐνός" Stallb. As Wolf (like Stallb.) says, ἄρρενες τὴν φύσιν means "mares origine, τμήματα seu τεμάχια τοῦ ἄρρενος," and implies further, as Rettig notes, "mares natura, geborene Päderasten."

δὲ οὖν ἔγωγε καθ' ἀπάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ὅτι οὕτως  
 ἂν ἡμῶν τὸ γένος εὐδαιμον γένοιτο, εἰ ἐκτελέσαιμεν τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ  
 τῶν παιδικῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος τύχοι εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀπελθὼν  
 φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄριστον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν νῦν παρόντων τὸ  
 τούτου ἐγγυτάτω ἄριστον εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ παιδικῶν τυχεῖν  
 κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ πεφυκότων· οὐ δὴ τὸν αἴτιον θεὸν ὑμνοῦντες  
 D δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν Ἐρωτα, ὃς ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι ἡμᾶς πλείστα  
 ὀνίνησιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἄγων, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας  
 παρέχεται, ἡμῶν παρεχομένων πρὸς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν, καταστήσας  
 ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαι-  
 μονας ποιῆσαι.

Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐστὶ περὶ Ἐρωτος,  
 ἀλλοῖος ἢ ὁ σός. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐδεήθην σου, μὴ κωμωδήσης αὐτόν,  
 E ἵνα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀκούσωμεν τί ἕκαστος ἐρεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ τί  
 ἐκάτερος· Ἀγάθων γὰρ καὶ Σωκράτης λοιποί.

193 C ἀπελθὼν: ἐπανελθὼν Mehler Naber      τοῦτο δ' T: τοῦτον δ' B  
 D Ἐρωτα del. Voeg.      τε T: om. B      ἡμῶν...εὐσέβειαν del. Voeg.  
 ποιήσιν Hirschig      E λοιποί (μόνοι) Naber

ἀπελθὼν. "Returning," "being restored to": so, perhaps, ἀπῆμεν πρὸς τὸ  
 ἄστυ *Rep.* 327 B; cp. πάλιν ἀπιέναι *Phaedr.* 227 E, etc. Hence Mehler's  
 ἐπανελθὼν is superfluous.

ὑμνοῦντες...ὑμνοῖμεν. Cp. 184 D ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν κτλ.:  
 and Agathon's echo of the word (ἐφ'ὑμνοῦντα) in 197 E.

193 D εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον. Cp. *Charm.* 163 D ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ  
 καλοῖς: *Rep.* 586 E. Possibly there is an intentional echo in the word of  
 διακίσθημεν, as used in 193 A.

ἐλπίδας μ. παρέχεται. Cp. 179 B μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται: *Xen. Symp.* IV. 25.  
 For the aor. infin. (without ἄν) after a verb of "hoping," cp. *Phaedo* 67 B  
 (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 136). Notice the rhetorical care with which this  
 peroration echoes (ἰασάμενος...εὐδαιμόνας) the exordium (ἰατρὸς...εὐδαιμονία,  
 189 D); also, in εὐσέβειαν we have an echo of εὐσεβεῖν, 193 A *ad fin.*: and the  
 emphasis on ἰασάμενος (with Ἐρυξίμαχε in the next line) should not be  
 missed.

ἄλλοιος ἢ ὁ σός. This serves to emphasize, by repetition, the statement  
 made by A. in 189 C (ἄλλη γέ πη...λέγειν κτλ.).

ὥσπερ οὖν ἐδεήθην σου. See 189 B, 193 B.

193 E τί ἐκάτερος. A. corrects himself with a precision worthy of  
 Prodicus, the comparative form being more proper than the superlative  
 (ἕκαστος) in speaking of two only. Observe that Aristodemus (the narrator)  
 should have spoken next after Eryx., but is here ignored: to have represented  
 him as a chief speaker "wäre auch nicht richt passend gewesen" (Zeller).

XVII. Ἄλλὰ πείσομαί σοι, ἔφη φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον· καὶ γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος ἠδέως ἐρρήθη. καὶ εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὔσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά, πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἰρήσθαι· νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη εἰπεῖν Καλῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠγώνισαι, 194 ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε· εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὐ νῦν ἐγὼ εἶμι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὐ ἔσομαι, ἐπειδὴν καὶ Ἀγάθων εἶπη εὖ, καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖο καὶ ἐν

193 E ξυνήδη Cobet: ξυνήδην libri ἀπορήσωσι T: ἀπορήσω B  
194 A ου νῦν B ἴσως ου B: οὐ ἴσως Sz.: οὐ Jn. εὖ, καὶ μάλ' distincti  
auctore Vahlen: εὖ καὶ μάλ' BT, Bt.: εὖ μάλ' Hirschig Sz.: καὶ μάλ' Verm.

καὶ γὰρ...ἐρρήθη. "Indeed I was quite pleased with your discourse": hence, Eryximachus could "let off" Aristophanes (cp. 189 c ἴσως...ἀφήσω σε). Whatever the esoteric meaning of A.'s discourse may have been, Eryx. apparently regards it simply as a piece of pleasantries—"er hat sich also offenbar nicht verstanden, sondern hat sich blos an die lustige Aussenseite derselben gehalten" (Rettig).

εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη κτλ. For this construction with ξύνουδα, cp. *Prot.* 348 B ἵνα τοῦτοφ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν (with Adam's note); *Phaedo* 92 D, *Apol.* 34 B.

πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην. For the imperf. here (in an unfulfilled condition) as a primary tense, cp. *Theaet.* 143 E (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 172).

194 A Καλῶς...ἠγώνισαι. This implies that the various encomiasts are engaged in a rhetorical contest (ἀγών): "your display in the competition was a fine one."

εἰ δὲ γένοιο κτλ. Cp. Ter. *Andr.* II. 1. 9 tu si hic sis, aliter censeas. For μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως (rashly altered by critics) cp. *Rep.* 589 D, Ar. *Vesp.* 1486, and see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 494 f.

ἐπειδὴν κτλ. Notice the elaborate courtesy, not devoid of irony, with which S. treats Agathon, who evidently is a man with a taste for flattery. Since the combination εὖ καὶ μάλ' is open to suspicion, the regular forms being either εὖ μάλ' (*Gorg.* 496 c, etc.) or καὶ μάλ' (*Phaedr.* 265 A, etc.), I adopt the punctuation suggested by Vahlen. Other critics have proposed to eject either the καὶ or the εὖ: it would be equally easy to alter εὖ to σύ, or transpose to καὶ εὖ. The text, punctuated after εἶπη, has been construed (1) as "plenius dictum pro εὖ μάλ'" (Stallb.), the καὶ connecting μάλ' with εὖ (Hommel), or (2) as εὖ μάλ' with καὶ, corresponding to the following καὶ, interjected (so Ast); but neither of these explanations is tenable. In favour of construing εὖ with εἶπη may be cited εὖ ἐρουῦντος three ll. below and εὖ ἐρεῖ 198 A: for the order, cp. *Rep.* 613 B ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ: *Laus* 805 B, 913 B (see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 494 ff.): add Thuc. I. 71. 7 πρὸς τάδε βουλευέσθε εὖ, καὶ κτλ.

ἐν παντὶ εἴης. "You would be at your wits' end," in *summa consilii inopia* (Ast). Cp. *Euthyd.* 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας: *Rep.* 579 B; Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 29. Cp. the use of παντοῖος εἶναι (γίγνεσθαι).

παντὶ εἴης ὥσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν. Φαρμάττειν βούλει με, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ἵνα θορυβηθῶ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι τὸ θέατρον προσδοκίαν μεγάλην ἔχειν ὡς εὖ ἐροῦντος ἐμοῦ. Ἐπιλήσμων μεντὰν εἶην, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, εἰ ἰδὼν τὴν σὴν  
 B ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀναβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα μετὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ βλέψαντος ἐναντία τοσοῦτῳ θεάτρῳ, μέλλοντος ἐπιδείξασθαι σαυτοῦ λόγους, καὶ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν ἐκπλαγέντος, νῦν οἰηθείην σε θορυβηθήσεσθαι ἕνεκα ἡμῶν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸν Ἀγάθωνα φάναι, οὐ δὴ πού

194 B ἀκρίβαντα B ἐπεδείξασθαι T θορυβήσεσθαι TW σὺ δὴ πού cj. Steph.

Φαρμάττειν β. με. "To cast a spell upon me." Extravagant praise was liable to cause nemesis and the evil eye: cp. *Phaedo* 95 B μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι (with Stallb. *ad loc.*): *Virg. Ecl.* VII. 27, and the Latin terms *fascinum*, *malis lingua*. For φαρμάττειν, cp. *Meno* 80 A γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις. Both here and in *Meno l. c.* the phrase may be reminiscent of *Gorg. Hel.* 15 οἱ δὲ τῶν λόγων πειθοῖ τινα κακῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν.

τὸ θέατρον. "The house,"—rather absurdly applied to the small gathering of banqueters, but A. is still full of his recent triumph in the θέατρον proper and readily takes up the idea that he is again engaged in a literary ἀγών (cp. ἡγωνίσαι, 194 A n.).

Ἐπιλήσμων. Cp. *Ar. Nub.* 129 γέρον ὦν ἀπιλήσμων καὶ βραδύς. As Hommel notes, the word is "senum decrepitorum constans epitheton." Socrates applies it to himself also in *Prot.* 334 c, d.

τὴν σὴν...ἀναβαίνοντος. For the construction, cp. *Ar. Ach.* 93 (ἐκκόψειε...) τὸν γε σὸν (ὀφθαλμὸν) τοῦ πρέσβεως. See *Madv. Gr. Syntax* § 67.

194 B ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα. It seems to have been usual for the poet, as well as the players and choreutae, to appear before the audience, wearing crowns but not in costume, at the προαγών of the great Dionysia held in the Odeum of Pericles on the 8th of Elaphebolion: see *Aesch.* III. 67 (Schol.), *Ar. Vesp.* 1109 (Schol.). The ὀκρίβας was apparently a platform (βῆμα, cp. *Ion* 535 ε) in the Odeum, and not, as formerly supposed, the λογεῖον or stage in the theatre itself (cp. *Smith D. A.* II. 813 b, 818 b): Schol. ὀκρίβαντα· τὸ λογεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ οἱ τραγωδοὶ ἡγωνίζοντο. τινὲς δὲ κελλίβαντα τρισκελῆ φασίν, ἐφ' οὗ ἴστανται οἱ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ τὰ ἐκ μετεώρου λέγουσιν. Another meaning of ὀκρίβας is a painter's "easel."

μέλλοντος ἐπιδείξασθαι. The force of μέλλοντος is seen when we remember that the ἀνάβασις of the poets took place at the προαγών, before the actual performance of the play. For ἐπιδείκνυσθαι of theatrical displays, cp. *Ar. Ran.* 771 ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθ' Εὐριπίδης, ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς λωποδύταις κτλ. With Agathon's self-assurance cp. *Isocr. Paneg.* 43 c μικρὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμαντοῦ θρασυάμενος...ποιήσομαι τοὺς λόγους.

με οὕτω θεάτρου μεστὸν ἡγεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι νοῦν ἔχοντι ὀλίγοι ἔμφρονες πολλῶν ἀφρόνων φοβερώτεροι; Οὐ μεντὰν καλῶς C ποιοίην, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Ἀγάθων, περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ ἄγροικον δοξάζων· ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι εἴ τισιν ἐντύχοις οὗς ἡγοῖο σοφούς, μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν φροντίζοις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὔτοι ἡμεῖς ὤμεν—ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖ παρήμεν καὶ ἡμεν τῶν πολλῶν—εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις ἐντύχοις σοφοῖς, τάχ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτούς, εἴ τι ἴσως οἶοιο αἰσχροὺς ὄν ποιεῖν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο, εἴ τι οἶοιο αἰσχροὺς D ποιεῖν; καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον ἔφη ὑπολαβόντα εἰπεῖν Ὡ φίλε Ἀγάθων, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνη Σωκράτει, οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει αὐτῷ ὄπηοῦν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὀτιοῦν γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχη ὅτφ διαλέγηται, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἠδέως μὲν ἀκούω Σωκράτους διαλεγομένου, ἀναγκαῖον δέ μοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἐρωτι καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι

194 C φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη vulg. ἄλλοις: ἀλλ' Bdhm. ἴσως secl. Sz. Bt.: πως cj. Usener: fort. transp. post τάχ' ἂν ὄν secl. Wolf: ἂν cj. Bt. D οἶοιο B. γίνεται MdvG.

οὕτω θεάτρου μεστὸν. This means "theatri applausu inflatum esse" (Stallb.); rather than "stage-struck," cp. Themist. 26. 311 B; Synes. *de prouid.* 105 B θεάτρου καὶ ἀγορᾶς ἀπληστος.

194 C πολλῶν ἀφρόνων. As Wolf observes, "ein feines Compliment für das Parterre in Athen." But such a lofty contempt for the bourgeois of the pit and gallery is quite in keeping with A.'s position as the artistic aristocrat. If Aristophanes flatters his public on their σοφία (as in *Ran.* 1109 ff.), it is obvious that he does so with his tongue in his cheek. Cp. *Laws* 659 A, οὔτε γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρου δεῖ τόν γε ἀληθῆ κριτὴν κρίνειν μανθάνοντα.

περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ. "Nota vim pronominum...: de te, viro tanto tamque insigni, ego, homo vilis" (Hommel). For ἄγροικος, cp. 218 B, *Laws* 880 A *Theaet.* 174 D ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαιδευτον...γίνεσθαι.

μὴ οὐχ...ὤμεν. For Platonic exx. of μὴ or μὴ οὐ in "cautions assertions or negations," see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 265.

ἄλλοις...σοφοῖς. Not "other wise men" but "others who are wise" (*sc.* unlike us).

ἴσως. This word is probably genuine. Possibly, however, it should be transferred to a place before, or after, τάχ' ἂν (for the combination ἴσως τάχ' ἂν, cp. *Tim.* 38 E, *Laws* 676 C, etc.; Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 14). The ὄν after αἰσχροὺς is sufficiently confirmed by *Rep.* 425 C, *Phaedo* 77 A (see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* I. 496 f. on the whole passage).

194 D οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει...γίνεσθαι. For Socrates as φιλόλογος, see *Apol.* 38 A, *Phaedo* 61 E; and for his "cramp-fish" style of dialectic, *Laches* 187.

ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ. For Socrates as φιλόκαλος, cp. 213 C, 216 D: it is a mark of the ἐρωτικός.



παρ' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ὑμῶν τὸν λόγον· ἀποδοὺς οὖν ἐκάτερος τῷ θεῷ  
**E** οὕτως ἤδη διαλεγέσθω. Ἄλλὰ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Φαίδρε, φάναι τὸν  
 Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν· Σωκράτει γὰρ καὶ αὐθις  
 ἔσται πολλάκις διαλέγεσθαι.

XVIII. Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με  
 εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι πάντες οἱ πρόσθεν εἰρηκότες  
 οὐ τὸν θεὸν ἐγκωμιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαιμονίζειν τῶν  
 ἀγαθῶν ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος· ὁποῖος δέ τις αὐτὸς ὧν ταῦτα  
 195 ἔδωρήσατο, οὐδεὶς εἴρηκεν. εἷς δὲ τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντὸς ἐπαίνου  
 περὶ παντός, λόγῳ διελθεῖν οἷος ὧν <οἷων> αἴτιος ὧν τυγχάνει  
 περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ. οὕτω δὴ τὸν Ἐρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δίκαιον  
 ἐπαινεῖσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷος ἔστιν, ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις.

Φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἐρωτα, εἰ θέμις  
 καὶ ἀνεμέσητον εἰπεῖν, εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν, κάλλιστον

194 **E** ὡς BTW: ᾗ vulg. ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτ' ἐπαινεῖν Hirschig 195 **A** ὀρθὸς  
 om. T παντὸς om. Bdhm. οἷος ὧν (οἷων) scripsi: οἷος οἷων Sz. Bt.:  
 οἷς οἷων ex emend. T: οἷος ὧν BT: οἷος ὧν vulg., J.-U.: οἷος ὄσων Baiter: οἷος  
 ὧν (ὄσων) Voeg.: οἷος Bdhm. αἴτιος: αὐτὸς Bdhm.

ἀποδοὺς οὖν. Cp. *Polit.* 267 A καλῶς καὶ καθαπερὲι χρέως ἀπέδωκάς μοι τὸν  
 λόγον: *Rep.* 612 B, C; 220 D *infra*.

194 **E** πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. Stallbaum, though reading ὡς, punctuates  
 like Hommel (who keeps the vulgate ᾗ) after the first as well as after the  
 second εἰπεῖν, as if the meaning were "to speak in the way in which I ought  
 to speak," which is nonsense. The first εἰπεῖν (=δηλοῦν) is different in force  
 from the other two (=λόγον ποιεῖσθαι), the sense being "first to state the  
 proper method I am to adopt in my oration, and secondly to deliver it."  
 Agathon has imbibed a "worship of machinery"—the machinery of method—  
 from the fashionable schools of rhetoric.

δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι. Agathon, like the rest (cp. 180 D, 185 E), adopts the  
 favourite rhetorical device of criticizing the manner or thought of previous  
 speakers: cp. Isocr. *Busir.* 222 B, 230 A; *Hel.* 210 B φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον...  
 τυγχάνει δ' ἀπολογία εἰρηκῶς κτλ.: *Panegy.* 41 B ff., 44 C.

195 **A** οἷος ὧν (οἷων). This doubling of relatives is a favourite trick of poets  
 and rhetors; cp. Soph. *Aj.* 923 οἷος ὧν οἷως ἔχεις ("mighty and mightily  
 fallen"), *ib.* 557, *Trach.* 995, 1045; Eur. *Alc.* 144; Gorg. *Palam.* 22 οἷος ὧν  
 οἷφ λαιδορεῖ: *id.* *Hel.* 11 ὅσοι δὲ ὄσους περὶ ὄσων καὶ ἔπεισαν καὶ πείσουσι.

εἰ θέμις καὶ ἀνεμέσητον. For excess in laudation as liable to provoke  
 νέμεσις, see n. on *φαρμάττειν*, 194 A. For the thought (here and at the end of  
 A.'s speech) cp. Spenser, *H. to Love*, "Then would I sing of thine immortall  
 praise...And thy triumphant name then would I raise Bove all the gods, thee  
 onely honoring, My guide, my God, my victor, and my king."



ὄντα καὶ ἄριστον. ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὧν τοιόσδε. πρῶτον μὲν νεώτατος θεῶν, ὃ Φαῖδρε. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸς B παρέχεται, φεύγων φυγῇ τὸ γήρας, ταχὺ ὃν δῆλον ὅτι· θάπτον γοῦν τοῦ δέοντος ἡμῖν προσέρχεται. ὁ δὲ πέφυκεν Ἔρωσ μισεῖν καὶ οὐδ' ἐντὸς πολλοῦ πλησιάζειν. μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς “ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει.” ἐγὼ δὲ Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρωσ Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ

195 B τῶν λόγων Stob. (ἐν) φυγῇ Stob. ταχὺ...προσέρχεται del. Heusde ὃν B: οὖν T ἔρωτος B οὐδ' ἐντὸς Stob.: οὐ δόντος B: οὐδ' ὄντος T πλησιάζειν T, Stob.: πλησιάζει B ἔστι (νέος) Sauppe J.-U. Sz.: ἔπεται Winckelmann δεῖ πελάζειν Stob. ἄλλα πολλὰ Hirschig

195 B ὃ Φαῖδρε. Phaedrus is specially addressed because it is his thesis (ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατος ὁ Ἔρωσ 178 A, C) which is here challenged.

μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον. This serves to echo, and reply to, Phaedrus's τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου 178 B (cp. 192 A). For the attributes youth and beauty, cp. Callim. H. II. 36 καὶ μὲν ἀεὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀεὶ νέος (of Phoebus).

φεύγων φυγῇ. A poetical mode of giving emphasis. “φυγῇ φεύγειν nunquam sic legitur ut simplex φεύγειν de victis militibus, sed per translationem, fugientium modo, h. e. omni contentione aliquid defugere atque abhorrere” (Lobeck *Parall.* II. p. 524). Prose exx. are *Erip.* 974 B, *Erist.* viii. 354 C; Lucian *adv. indoct.* 16.

ταχὺ ὃν...προσέρχεται. Bast, “motus ἀτοπία sententiae,” condemned these words; but the presence of sophisticated word-play is no reason for suspicion in A.'s speech. A. argues that Age, in spite of its “lean shrunk shanks,” is nimble, only too nimble indeed in its pursuit of men: therefore, *à fortiori*, the god who can elude its swift pursuit must be still more nimble. For the agility of Eros, cp. *Orph.* H. 58. 1, 2 (κικλήσκω) Ἔρωτα...εὐδρομον ὀρμηῇ.

ἐντὸς πολλοῦ. Cp. Thuc. II. 77 ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι. For the sense (abhorrence of age), cp. Anacr. 14. 5 ἢ δὲ (νῆνις)...τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην, | λευκὴ γάρ, καταμύμφεται κτλ.

ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν. Hug adopts Sauppe's addition (νέος), but this spoils the ring of the clause and it is best to leave it to be mentally supplied: for the ellipse, cp. 213 C γελοῖος ἔστι τε καὶ βούλεται. For μετὰ...σύνεστι, cp. *Laws* 639 C; Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 352 A παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα.

ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ. The original of this is Hom. *Od.* XVII. 218 ὡς ἀεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. Cp. 186 B *supra*, *Lysis* 214 A, *Rep.* 329 A; Aristaen. *Ep.* I. 10: and for a Latin equivalent, Cic. *de Senect.* 3. 7 pares cum paribus, veteri proverbio, facillime congregantur: so Anglicè, “birds of a feather flock together.” Similar in sense is ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει (Arist. *Rhet.* I. 11. 25).

Φαίδρῳ. The reference is to 178 B. Spenser (*H. to Love*) combines these opposite views,—“And yet a chyld, renewing still thy yeares, And yet the eldest of the heavenly Peares.”

Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός. A proverbial expression to denote the

C φημί νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ αἰεὶ νέον, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεοῦς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκείνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔκτομαί οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βιαία, εἰ Ἔρωσ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐξ οὗ Ἔρωσ τῶν θεῶν βασιλεύει. νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ τῷ  
D νέῳ ἀπαλός· ποιητοῦ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οἶος ἦν Ὀμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείξαι θεοῦ ἀπαλότητα. Ὀμηρος γὰρ Ἄτην θεὸν τέ φησιν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαλήν—τοὺς γοῦν πόδας αὐτῆς ἀπαλοὺς εἶναι—λέγων

195 C νεώτατόν τε Stob. πράγματα T, Stob.: γράμματα B παρ-  
μενίδης T: παρμενίδης B: Ἐπιμενίδης Ast εἰ ἐκείνοι om. Stob. λέγουσιν  
Stob. ἐγένοντο Stob. D οἶός περ ἦν ὁ Ὀμηρος Stob. τοὺς...εἶναι  
secl. Jn. Sz.: τοὺς...βαίνει secl. Orelli. (φησιν) εἶναι Stob.

“ne plus ultra” of antiquity: cp. Moeris p. 200 Ἰαπετός· ἀντὶ τοῦ γέρον. καὶ Τίθωνος καὶ Κρόνος· ἐπὶ τῶν γερόντων: Lucian *dial. deor.* 2. 1; Ar. *Nub.* 398, *Plut.* 581. Cronus and Iapetus were both Titans, sons of Uranus and Gê (Hes. *Th.* 507), and imprisoned together in Tartarus (*Il.* VIII. 479). Iapetus was father of Prometheus, and grandfather of Deucalion, the Greek “Adam”: hence “older than Iapetus” might be rendered “ante-preadamite.”

195 C ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Π. λέγουσιν. These were the authorities adduced by Phaedrus (178 B). Hesiod relates such παλαιὰ πράγματα in *Theog.* 176 ff., 746 ff.; but no such accounts by Parmenides are extant. Accordingly, it has been supposed (e.g. by Schleierm.) that A. is mistaken, and Ast proposed to read Ἐπιμενίδης: but cp. Macrob. *somn. Scip.* I. 2 Parmenides quoque et Heraclitus de diis fabulati sunt. If P. did relate such matters in the poem of which portions remain, clearly (as Stallb. observed) it could only have been in Pt. II. (“The Way of Opinion”). Cp. Ritter and Pr. § 101 D, “Generati sunt deinceps (i.e. post Amorem) ceteri dei, de quibus more antiquiorum poetarum παλαιὰ πράγματα narravit, v. Plat. *Symp.* 195 c, Cic. *D. Nat.* I. 11”; Zeller, *Presocr.* p. 596 (E. Tr.); Krische *Forsch.* p. 111 f. For Ἀνάγκη in the cosmogonists, cp. Parmen. 84 K., κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη | πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἔεργει: *id.* 138 ὧς μιν ἄγουσ' ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη: Emped. 369 ἐστὶν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα κτλ.

εἰ...ἔλεγον. Rettig and Stallb. rightly explain the imperf. as due to the reference to Phaedrus's mention of H. and P. (178 B).

ἔκτομαί οὐδὲ δεσμοί. Cp. *Euthyphro* 5 E ff., *Rep.* 377 E where such tales of divine immortality are criticized.

195 D ἀπαλός. Cp. Theogn. 1341 αἰαῖ, παιδὸς ἐρῶ ἀπαλόχροος: Archil. 100 θάλλεις ἀπαλὸν χροά: *Phaedr.* 245 A λαβοῦσα ἀπαλήν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχῆν.

Ὀμηρος γάρ. See *Il.* XIV. 92—3. Schol. πῖλναται· προσπελάζει, προσεγγίζει.

τοὺς γοῦν...εἶναι. As Hug observes, the occurrence of καὶ ποσὶ καὶ πάντη below is sufficient to establish the soundness of these words.

τῆς μένθ' ἀπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὔδεος  
 πίνονται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἢ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει.  
 καλῶ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι τεκμηρίῳ τὴν ἀπαλότητα ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι οὐκ  
 ἐπὶ σκληροῦ βαίνει, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μαλθακοῦ. τῷ αὐτῷ δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς  
 χρῆσώμεθα τεκμηρίῳ περὶ Ἐρωτα ὅτι ἀπαλός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ γῆς **E**  
 βαίνει οὐδ' ἐπὶ κρανίων, ἃ ἐστὶν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς  
 μαλακωτάτοις τῶν ὄντων καὶ βαίνει καὶ οἰκεῖ. ἐν γὰρ ἤθεσι καὶ  
 ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἴκησιν ἴδρυται, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὴ ἐξῆς  
 ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἀλλ' ἦτινι ἀν σκληρὸν ἦθος ἐχούσῃ ἐντύχη,  
 ἀπέρχεται, ἢ δ' ἀν μαλακόν, οἰκίζεται. ἀπτόμενον οὖν ἀεὶ καὶ ποσὶ  
 καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μαλακωτάτων, ἀπαλώτατον  
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι. νεώτατος μὲν δὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαλώτατος, πρὸς δὲ **196**  
 τούτοις ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος. οὐ γὰρ ἀν οἴός τ' ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσασθαι

**195 D** τῆς BT, Stob.: τῆ Aristarchus, Homeri (T 92) codd. οὔδεος BT,  
 Stob.: οὔδει W, vulg., Hom. codd. πίνονται ex πίνονται T: πίνονται B:  
 πιναται Stob. μοι δοκεῖ Stob. τῷ αὐτῷ TW, Stob.: τὸ αὐτὸ B **E** χρῆ-  
 σόμεθα Stob., vulg. καὶ (ante βαίνει) om. Stob. ἐξῆς T: ἐξ ἧς B ἐνοι-  
 κίζεται Naber ἐν μαλακοῖς τ. μ. Naber ἀπαλώτατον om. Stob.

**195 E** ἤθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς. "In the tempers and souls": here ἦθος seems  
 to be co-ordinate with ψυχῆ, but below (ἦθος ἐχούσῃ, sc. ψυχῆ) subordinate,  
 i.e. A. uses the word loosely with more attention to sound than sense: cp.  
*Lys.* 222 A κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος: 183 E  
*supra*, 207 E *infra*. Notice also the material way in which ἦθη and ψυχαὶ are  
 here conceived: cp. Moschus I. 17 ἐπὶ σπλάχνοις δὲ κάθηται: and the figure in  
 such a phrase as "the iron entered into his soul."

καὶ ποσὶ καὶ πάντῃ. "With feet and with form entire," "nicht wie Ate  
 blos mit Füßen" (Wolf): πάντῃ, like αἰεῖ, is A.'s own extension of the Homeric  
 statement.

ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μ. The genitive is governed by ἀπτόμενον, and ἐν  
 μαλακωτάτοις is parallel to ἐν τοῖς (πρεσβύτατον) 178 A: "the most soft of  
 softest things."

**196 A** νεώτατος...ἀπαλώτατος. Cp. *Rep.* 377 A νέφ καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὄφωον.

ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος. ὑγρός, here opposed to σκληρός, is often used "de rebus  
 lubricis, lentis, flexibilibus, mollibus" (Stallb.): cp. *Theaet.* 162 B τῷ δὲ δὴ  
 νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι (opp. to σκληρῷ ὄντι) προσπαλαίειν: Pind. *Pyth.*  
 I. 17 (11) ὁ δὲ (αἰετὸς) κνώσσων ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ: Callistr. *descript.* 3 (of a  
 bronze of Eros) ὑγρὸς μὲν ἦν ἀμοιρῶν μαλακότητος. Another sense of ὑγρός, in  
 erotic terminology, is "melting," "languishing," e.g. Anth. Plan. 306 ἐπ'  
 ὄμμασιν ὑγρὰ δεδορκώς: Anacr. xxviii. 21: and in *hymn. Hom.* xviii. 33 ὑγρός  
 is an epithet of πόθος. "Supple of form" is the best rendering here. Arist.  
*G. A.* I. 7. 3 applies ὑγρότης (τοῦ σώματος) to serpents.—περιπτύσσασθαι is  
 ἀπ. λεγ. in Plato, and mainly used in poetry.

οὐδὲ διὰ πάσης ψυχῆς καὶ εἰσιῶν τὸ πρῶτον λαυθάνειν καὶ ἐξιῶν, εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. συμμέτρου δὲ καὶ ὑγρᾶς ιδέας μέγα τεκμήριον ἢ εὐσχημοσύνη, ὃ δὴ διαφερόντως ἐκ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως Ἔρωσ ἔχει· ἀσχημοσύνη γὰρ καὶ Ἔρωτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀεὶ πόλεμος. χροᾶς δὲ κάλλος ἢ κατ' ἄνθη δίαίτα τοῦ θεοῦ σημαίνει· ἀνανθεὶ γὰρ καὶ  
**B** ἀπηνθηκότι καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὄτφουν οὐκ ἐνίξει Ἔρωσ, οὐ δ' ἂν εὐανθῆς τε καὶ εὐώδης τόπος ἦ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἴζει καὶ μένει.

**196 A** καὶ (ante εἰσιῶν) om. W καὶ ὑγρᾶς secl. Jn. Sz.: καὶ τρυφερᾶς Verm.: καὶ ἀβρᾶς Sehrwald ιδέας: οὐσίας Stob. ἢ κατ': ἦ καὶ τὰ Stob. δίαίτα: δὴ τὰ Stob. **B** εὐώδης τε καὶ εὐανθῆς Stob. ἐνταῦθα (δέ) Stob., Bt.

**συμμέτρου...ιδέας.** "Acute vidit Astius σύμμετρον referendum esse ad περιπτύσσεσθαι. Amor enim, quia potest πάντα περιπτύσσεσθαι, recte σύμμετρος vocatur. Itaque ne hic quidem audiendus est Orellius qui σύμμετρος legendum putabat" (Stallb., so too Rückert and Hommel). Rettig takes σύμμετρος to be merely a synonym for ὑγρός, supposing that the proof of the statement ὑγρός τὸ εἶδος, which was first stated negatively, is here being stated positively—"nun hängt συμμετρία mit der εὐσχημοσύνη zusammen und ebenso ὑγρότης mit συμμετρία. Vgl. Legg. vi. 773 A, Phileb. 66 B." On the other hand Hug, supposing that συμμετρία is introduced as a new attribute distinct from ὑγρότης, follows Jahn in ejecting the words καὶ ὑγρᾶς. Rettig's view, adopted also by Teuffel, seems the most reasonable: A., with sophistical looseness, smuggles in the extra term σύμμετρος beside ὑγρός in order to secure the applicability of εὐσχημοσύνη. By συμμετρία, properly used, is meant the perfect proportion of the parts in relation to one another which results in a harmonious whole: see my *Phileb.* p. 176. For εὐσχημοσύνη, cp. *Rep.* 400 c ff.

**ἐκ πάντων.** Cp. *Theaet.* 171 B ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα...ἀμφισβητήσεται, "on all hands, then,...we find it disputed" (so Campbell *ad loc.*, who observes that "this use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others"). Ficinus seems to connect ἐκ π. with διαφ., which is possible but less probable.

**χροᾶς δὲ κάλλος κτλ.** Possibly we have here a reminiscence of some passage in poetry: χροᾶς...ἄνθη admits, as Hug observes, of being scanned as a "catalectic pentapody" (like Eur. *Phoen.* 294). In the repeated mention in these lines of ἄνθος and its compounds, we may discern an allusion to Agathon's tragedy Ἄνθεός. Cp. Plato 32 (*P. L. G.* II. 311) αὐτὸς δ' (sc. ὁ Ἔρωσ) ἐν καλύκεσσιν ῥόδων πεπεδημένος ὑπνω | εὐδεν μειδιῶν: Alcman 38 μάργος δ' Ἔρωσ οἶα παῖς παῖσδει...ἄκρ' ἐπ' ἄνθη καβαίνων...τῷ κυπαιρίσκῳ: Simon. fr. 47 ὀμλεῖ δ' ἄνθεσιν, (ὡτε) μέλισσα ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομένα: Eros, like Titania, loves "a bank where the wild thyme blows" (εὐώδης τόπος), and might echo the song "where the bee sucks, there suck I," etc. For the negative thought ἀνανθεῖ...οὐκ ἐνίξει, cp. Philo *de meretr. merc.* II. 264 ἐξώροις γενομένας ("when past the flower of their age," sc. ταῖς ἐταίραις) οὐδεὶς ἔτι πρόσεισιν, ἀπομωρανθείσης ὡσπερ τινῶν ἀνθῶν τῆς ἀκμῆς. For εὐώδης τόπος, cp. *Phaedr.* 230 B. The description of Eros lying soft in Soph. *Antig.* 781 ff. is somewhat similar,

XIX. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ταύθ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται, περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς Ἐρωτος μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον ὅτι Ἐρωτος οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται οὐθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ οὐτε θεόν, οὐθ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου οὐτε ἄνθρωπον. οὐτε γὰρ αὐτὸς βία πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει· βία γὰρ Ἐρωτος οὐχ ἄπτεται· οὐτε ποιῶν ποιεῖ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐκὼν Ἐρωτι πᾶν ὑπηρετεῖ, ἃ δ' ἂν ἐκὼν ἐκόντι C ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν "οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι" δίκαια εἶναι. πρὸς

196 B ἔτι: ὅτι Stob. οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ om. Stob. οὐτε θεῶν Stob. ἀνθρώπων. οὐδὲ Stob. C πάνθ' Stob. ἂν BT, Stob.: ἄν τις vulg. τῶν πόλεων Stob. (τῶν om. Stobaei A).

(Ἐρωτος) ὅς ἐν μαλακαῖς παρεῖαις | νεανίδος ἐννυχεύεις: cp. Hor. C. iv. 13. 6 ff. (Amor) virentis...pulcris excubat in genis. Also the echo of our passage in Aristaen. Ep. II. 1.

196 B Περὶ μὲν οὖν...περὶ δὲ κτλ. Cp. Isocr. Pan. 47 C περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου...ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους κτλ.: Phaedr. 246 A.

περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς. In drawing out this part of his theme Agathon follows the customary four-fold division of ἀρετή into δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία. Adam (on Rep. 427 E) writes "There is no evidence to shew that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato." Yet it certainly seems probable that these four were commonly recognized as leading ἀρεταί at an earlier date (see the rest of the evidence cited by Adam), and a peculiarly Platonic tenet would hardly be put into the mouth of Agathon. Cp. Protag. 329 c ff.; and for a similar use made of this classification in encomiastic oratory, see Isocr. Hel. 31 ff., Nicocl. 31 ff., 36 ff. (cp. n. on 184 c).

οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται. The maxims "love your enemies, do good to them which despitefully treat you" formed no part of current Greek ethics: cp. Meno 71 E αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή,...τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: Crito 49 B: Xen. Mem. II. 3. 14; and other passages cited by Adam on Rep. 331 E. See also Dobbs, Philos. etc. pp. 39, 127, 243. Notice the chiasmus ἀδικεῖ...ἀδικεῖται...ὑπὸ θεοῦ...θεόν.

βία πάσχει. These words form one notion and are put as a substitute for ἀδικεῖται, just as ποιεῖ (sc. βία) below is a substitute for ἀδικεῖ. Cp. Polit. 280 D τὰς βίας πράξεις. There may be a ref. here to the ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαι of Gorgias Hel. 19.

πᾶς γὰρ κτλ. With but slight modification this would form an iambic trimeter. Cp. Gorgias ap. Phileb. 58 A ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας, of which our passage may be a reminiscence.

196 C & δ' ἂν κτλ. The argument is that where mutual consent obtains, since βία is absent, there can be no ἀδικία. For a different view of δικαιοσύνη see Arist. Eth. N. v. 9. 1136<sup>b</sup> 32 ff. ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κτλ.: Crito 52 E: Xen. Symp. VIII. 20.

οἱ πόλεως...νόμοι. Apparently a quotation from Alcidas, a rhetor of the



δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Ἐρωτος δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν κρείττω εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἦττους, κρατοῦντ' ἂν ὑπὸ Ἐρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ, κρατῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὁ Ἐρως διαφερόντως ἂν σωφρονοῖ. καὶ μὴν εἰς γε ἀνδρείαν Ἐρωτι “οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται.” οὐ γὰρ ἔχει Ἐρωτα Ἄρης, ἀλλ' Ἐρως Ἄρη, Ἄφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος· κρείττων δὲ ὁ ἔχων τοῦ ἐχομένου· τοῦ δ' ἀνδρειοτάτου τῶν ἄλλων κρατῶν πάντων ἂν ἀνδρειότατος εἴη. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας τοῦ θεοῦ εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται· ὅσον οὖν δυνατόν, πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ἴν' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην

196 C πλείστον Cobet κρατεῖ Stob., Naber: κρατοίη Bdhm. σωφρονοίη Stob. ἀνδρίαν BT D ἄρην Stob. Ἄφροδίτης del. Naber ἂν om. B ἴν' αὐτὸ T: αὐτὸ B: ἴν' οὖν Stob.

school of Gorgias: see Arist. *Rhet.* III. 1406<sup>a</sup> 18 ff. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μειζόσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον...οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους (see Cope *ad loc.*). Two extant works are ascribed to Alcidamas, viz. an *Odysseus* and a *de Sophistis*: the latter is probably genuine and “seems to justify Aristotle’s strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets” (Cope *loc. cit.*). See further Vahlen, *Alkidamas* etc. pp. 508 ff.; Blass, *Att. Bereds.* II. 328.

εἶναι γὰρ...σωφροσύνη. This definition of “temperance” is common to both scientific and popular morals. Cp. *Rep.* 389 D σωφροσύνης...αὐτοὺς (εἶναι) ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν (“temperance, soberness and chastity”): *ib.* 430 E, *Phaedo* 68 c: Antiphon *fr.* 6 σωφροσύνην δ' ἀνδρὸς...ὅστις τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονὰς ἐμφράσσειν κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἡδυνήθη αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. See Dobbs *op. cit.* pp. 149 ff.; Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* pp. 227 ff.

Ἐρωτος δὲ κτλ. The argument is vitiated both by the ambiguity in the use of Eros (as affection and as person) and by the ambiguity in κρατεῖ ἡδονῶν, which in the minor premiss is equivalent to ἐστὶν ἡ κρατίστη ἡδονή. For similar fallacies, see *Euthyd.* 276 D ff.; Arist. *soph. el.* 165<sup>b</sup> 32 ff. For ἔρως as a master-passion, cp. *Rep.* 572 E ff. Agathon here again echoes Gorgias (*Hel.* 6 πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι κτλ.).

οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται. This comes from Soph. (*Thyestes*) *fr.* 235 N. πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται. Cp. Anacreontea 27 A, 13 ἔλαβεν βέλεμον (sc. Ἐρωτος) Ἄρης.

196 D ὡς λόγος. See Hom. *Od.* VIII. 266 ff., already alluded to in 192 D.

πάντων ἀν...εἴη. Another illegitimate conclusion. By means of a tacit substitution of the notion ἀνδρεία for κράτος, it is assumed that ὁ κρατῶν τοῦ ἀνδρείου must be ἀνδρειότερος.



τιμήσω ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος τὴν αὐτοῦ, ποιητῆς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως **E** ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι· πᾶς γοῦν ποιητῆς γίγνεται, “κᾶν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρὶν,” οὐδ’ ἂν Ἐρως ἀψῆται. ὧ δὲ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρήσασθαι, ὅτι ποιητῆς ὁ Ἐρως ἀγαθὸς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν· ἂ γὰρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὐτ’ ἂν ἐτέρῳ δοίῃ οὐτ’ ἂν ἄλλον διδάξειε. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζῶων ποίησιν **197** πάντων τίς ἐναντιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν, ἢ γίγνεταιί τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα; ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν τεχνῶν δημιουργίαν οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι οὐ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς ἀπέβη, οὐδ’ ἂν Ἐρως μὴ ἐφάψῃται, σκοτεινός; τοξικὴν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνεῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας καὶ

**196 E** κᾶν T: καὶ B χρήσασθαι Stob., Blass: χρῆσθαι BT, cet. τὴν... μουσικὴν del. Sauppe Jn. ἔχη T. **197 A** μὲν δὲ BT: μὴν δὲ W: μὴν Stob. ποίησιν del. Blass πάντως Stob. τε om. Stob. τὰ ζῶα πάντα Blass οὐκ del. Blass

**196 E** ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος. See 186 B.

πᾶς γοῦν κτλ. An allusion to Eurip. (*Stheneboea*) fr. 663 N. ποιητὴν δ’ ἄρα | Ἐρως διδάσκει, κᾶν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρὶν. This last phrase had a vogue: cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 1074; Menander *Com.* 4, p. 146; Plut. *amat.* 17. 762 B, *Symp.* I. 622 c; Longin. *de subl.* 39. 2 (quoted with other passages by Nauck). For the ditties of a love-sick swain, cp. *Lysis* 204 D. See also Aristid. t. I. *Or.* IV. p. 30.

πᾶσαν...μουσικὴν. With A.’s bisection of ποίησις cp. the analysis of the notion by Socrates, 205 B *infra*.

**197 A** καὶ μὲν δὴ...γε. *Porro etiam, quin etiam.* (See Madv. *Gr. Synt.* § 236.)

Ἐρωτος...σοφίαν. σοφίαν is here predicate (against Rückert) and stands for σοφίας ἔργον. For Eros as “poetic” in this sense, cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*), “But if thou be indeede, as men thee call, The worlds great Parent.”

τὴν...δημιουργίαν. This branch of ποίησις is really a distinct kind from the other two, as not involving invention or creation. For “demiurgic arts,” see *Phileb.* 55 D ff., and for ἰατρικὴ as an example *Phileb.* 56 A; cp. 186 C, D *supra*. Cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 B (where H. is eulogized as the cause τεχνῶν καὶ φιλοσοφιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὠφελειῶν).

φανός. *Illustris*: Hesych. φανόν· φωτεινὸν καὶ λαμπρόν: cp. *Phaedr.* 256 D. For gods as διδάσκαλοι and ἡγεμόνες (197 E), cp. Isocr. *Busir.* 229 B—C τοὺς θεοὺς...ἡγοῦμαι...αὐτοὺς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φῦναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ διδασκάλους γεγενῆσθαι.

Ἀπόλλων ἀνεῦρεν. For Apollo as the inventor of τοξικὴ, see Hom. *Il.* II. 827; of μαντικὴ, *Il.* I. 72; of ἰατρικὴ, 190 E ff. *supra*. See also *h. Hom. Apoll.* 131 ff.; and for μαντικὴ in connexion with the cult of A., Rohde *Psyche* II. pp. 56 ff.

**B** ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής, καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἡφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἰστουργίας καὶ Ζεὺς “κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.” ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατεσκευάσθη τῶν θεῶν τὰ πράγματα Ἔρωτος ἐγγενομένου, δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους· αἴσχει γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι Ἔρωτος· πρὸ τοῦ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ θεοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὡς λέγεται, διὰ τὴν τῆς Ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ἔφυ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γέγονε καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

**C** Οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἔρωτος πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὢν κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αἴτιος εἶναι.

197 B καὶ οὗτος del. Blass (τε) χαλκείας Blass καὶ Ζεὺς...ἀνθρώπων om. Stobaei ed. princ. κυβερνᾶν BTW, Stob.: κυβερνήσεως Vindob. 21, vulg.: κυβερνᾶν τὰ cj. Voeg. ἐγγενομένου Stob. αἴσχους Ast ἔπι Blass Bt. (ἔπι vel ἔτι B): ἔπεισιν T, Stob.: ἐνι corr. b, Porson J.-U.: ἐνεσιν in mg. rec. b: ἔστιν D, Ast πρῶτου δέ Stob. C πρῶτον Stob.

197 B ἔρωτος...Ἔρωτος. Here, as elsewhere in these λόγοι, there is a play on the double sense of the word as (1) a mental affection (i.q. ἐπιθυμία), and (2) a personal agent.

καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς. Supply (as Stallb. and Hug) Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴεν μαθηταί. Less probable is the explanation of Ast and Rückert who, regarding ὥστε...μαθητής as parenthetical, supply ἀνεῦρον with Μοῦσαι (and the other nominatives) and take μουσικῆς (and the other genitives) as dependent on ἐπιθυμίας...ἡγεμονεύσαντος mentally repeated. For the double genitive of person and thing, cp. *Rep.* 599 c τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο.

χαλκείας...ἰστουργίας. For Hephaestus, cp. 192 D n.; and for Athene as patroness of weavers *Il.* xiv. 178, v. 735; Hes. *Op. D.* 63.

Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν. The sudden change of construction from genitive to bare infin., together with the unusual genit. after κυβερνᾶν, are best explained by assuming (with Usener) that we have here another of Agathon's poetical tags. For Zeus as world-pilot, see *Il.* II. 205, ix. 98: cp. *Parmen. fr.* 128 M. δαίμων, ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾶ: and below, 197 E *ad initt.*, κυβερνήτης is applied to Eros (cp. 186 E).

κατεσκευάσθη κτλ. This sentence is quoted later on (201 A) by Socrates. τὰ πράγματα echoes the παλαιὰ πράγματα of 195 c. κάλλους is object. gen. after Ἔρωτος.

αἴσχει γὰρ κτλ. This repeats the assertion of 196 A—B. Rettig reads αἴσχει...ἔστιν, arguing that ἔστιν, not ἐνι, is required by the ref. in 201 A: but αἴσχει ἔστιν as an equiv. for αἴσχους ἔστιν would be a strange use. The restoration ἔπι is as certain as such things can be.

ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον. See 195 c. Notice that here as there A. refuses to make himself responsible for the ascription of violence to the gods, as shown by the saving clause ὡς λέγεται.

197 C ἄλλων τοιούτων. Sc. οἷα κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή: cp. *Rep.* 372 D.

ἐπέρχεται δέ μοί τι καὶ ἔμμετρον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν  
εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην  
νηνεμίαν, ἀνέμων κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

οὗτος δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀλλοτριότητος μὲν κενοῖ, οἰκειότητος δὲ πληροῖ, τὰς D  
τοιιάσδε ξυνόδους μετ' ἀλλήλων πάσας τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι, ἐν ἑορταῖς,

197 C ἔμμετρος Hermog. Method. ἀνέμων BT: τ' ἀνέμων Stob. vulg.:  
δ' ἀνέμοις Hermog. κοίτην BT: κοίτην τ' Stob.: κοίτη Hermog. cod. Monac.:  
κοίτη θ' Dindorf Jn.: κοίτη δ' Herm. τ' ἐνὶ κήδει Stob. Hermog.: τε νικηδαι  
B: τε νηκηδῆ T: τε νικηδαι W (in mg. γρ. καὶ νηκηδεῖ): τ' ἐνὶ γήθει Bast:  
νηκηδῆ Dindf. Herm. Jn.: λαθικηδῆ Winckelmann: τ' ἐνὶ κήτει Hommel Christ  
(ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κοίτη ἀκηδῆ Bdhm.) D οὗτος γὰρ Stob. ἀλλοτριώτατος Stob.

ἐπέρχεται δέ μοί κτλ. Here Agathon breaks out into verse of his own, whereas hitherto he had contented himself with quoting from others (196 c, ε). Observe the alliterative effect, dear to the school of Gorgias, of the play with ρ and ν, γ and λ, in the former, and of ν and μ in the latter of the two verses.

νηνεμίαν...κήδει. Both the punctuation and reading of this verse are doubtful. Rückert, Stallb., and the Zurich edd. print commas after γαλήνην and ἀνέμων, Hug and Burnet only after ἀνέμων, Hommel after γαλήνην and κοίτην. It would appear, however, from the Homeric passage (*Od.* v. 391 = xii. 168, ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο ἠδὲ γαλήνη | ἔπλετο νηνεμίη), of which this is obviously an echo, that no stop should be placed after γαλήνην, but rather after νηνεμίαν or ἀνέμων: while the compound word ἀνεμοκοῖται, applied to a sect (γένος) in Corinth who claimed to be able τοὺς ἀνέμους κοιμίζειν (see Hesych. and Suid. s.v.; also Welcker *Kl. Schr.* 3. 63; Rohde *Psyche* II. p. 88; and 202 ε n.), makes it probable that ἀνέμων κοίτην are meant to go closely together. Further, although as Zeller argues it is appropriate enough in general to describe Love as "is qui non aequoris solum sed etiam humani pectoris turbas sedat" (cp. *Il.* xxiv. 128 ff., Catull. 68. 1—8), still the reversion to human κῆδος after mentioning waves and winds is a little curious, and it is tempting to adopt Hommel's conjecture ἐνὶ κήτει which, if κῆτος can bear the sense of "sea-depths" (see L. and S. s.vv. κῆτος, μεγακῆτης) would furnish a more satisfactory disposition of ideas—"peace on land and on sea, repose in heaven above and in the depths below." Or, if we assumed that an original

ἐνὶ νείκῃ (=νείκει) was corrupted by haplography to ἐνὶ κῆ<sup>νε</sup>, a fair sense would be obtained. If the ordinary text be kept, we may notice (with Vögelin) how the force of the prepos. in ἐν ἀνθρ....ἐνὶ κήδει varies "in the style of the Sophists." In *Theaet.* 153 c we have a similar combination, νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας, the only other Platonic ex. of νηνεμία being *Phaedo* 77 E. γαληνός as an adj. occurs in *Ax.* 370 D.

197 D ἀλλοτριότητος κτλ. For Eros as the peace-maker, cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 221 B εὐρήσομεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας δι' αὐτὴν ὁμονοήσαντας καὶ κοινὴν στρατείαν... ποιησαμένους.

τὰς τοιάσδε ξυνόδους. "Haec deicticōs dicta sunt: quale est hoc convivium nostrum" (Stallb.).

ἐν χοροῖς, ἐν θυσίαις γυγνόμενος ἡγεμών· πραότητα μὲν πορίζων, ἀγριότητα δ' ἐξορίζων· φιλόδωρος εὐμενείας, ἄδωρος δυσμενείας· ἴλεως ἀγανός· θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγαστὸς θεοῖς· ζηλωτὸς ἀμοίροις, κτητὸς εὐμοίροις· τρυφῆς, ἀβρότητος, χλιδῆς, χαρίτων, ἡμέρου, πόθου πατήρ· ἐπιμελῆς ἀγαθῶν, ἀμελῆς κακῶν· ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν φόβῳ,

197 D θυσίαις BT: θυσίαισι W: εὐθυμίαις Stob., Jn.: fort. θιάσοις ἀγανός Usener Bt.: ἀγαθός BT: ἀγαθοῖς Stob., Jn. Sz.: ἴλεως ἀγαθοῖς secl. Rettig: ἡμερτὸς ἀγαθοῖς Schulthess τρυφῆς secl. J.-U. Sz. χλιδῆς T: χληδῆς B: χληδῆς W ἡμέρου B πόθου om. Stob., secl. Voeg. Sz. ἀμελῆς B

ἐν θυσίαις. For θ. Stob. has εὐθυμίαις, which looks like a gloss on some word other than θυσίαις. I am inclined to suspect that θιάσοις should be restored: the word would fit in well between χοροῖς and ἡγεμών, "in festive bands." The corruption might be due to the loss of the termination, after which θιάς was mistaken for θυσιάς. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 1 πάντες ἐσμὲν τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου θιασῶται.

ἀγανός. The ἀγαθός of the mss. cannot stand, and Stobaeus's ἀγαθοῖς (adopted by most edd. since Wolf) is open to objection both as spoiling the symmetry and because of the occurrence of ἀγαθῶν just below. We want a more exquisite word, and Usener's ἀγανός is more appropriate in sense than such possible alternatives as ἀγανός or ἀγλαός. For Agathon's antitheses, cp. Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. 614 D; Athen. v. 11.

τρυφῆς...χλιδῆς. Moeris: χλιδῆ Ἀττικοί, τρυφή Ἑλληνες. Hence Hug omits τρυφῆς as a gloss on χλιδῆς, and (to preserve symmetry) omits πόθου also.

ἐν πόνῳ κτλ. These words have given rise to much discussion and many emendations (see *crit. n.*). Two main lines of interpretation are possible: either (1) we may suppose that maritime allusions are to be sought in these words to match those in κυβερνήτης κτλ.; or (2) we may suppose the latter set of words to be used in a merely metaphorical sense. Badham adopts line (1); so too Schütz regards the whole figure as borrowed "e re nautica. Nautis enim saepe timor naufragii, desiderium terrae, labor in difficultate navigandi, aerumna nauseantibus...accidere solet"; and he takes the following four substt. (κυβερν. κτλ.) as referring in order to these four conditions. And, adopting this line, I myself formerly proposed to read (for ἐν πόθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ) ἐν πόρῳ, ἐν ῥόθῳ. The 2nd line of explanation is adopted (a) by those who attempt to defend the vulgate, and (b) by some who have recourse to emendation. Thus (a) Stallb. commends Ast's view that λόγος can stand here because Agathon's speech is full of "merus verborum lusus"; while Hommel takes the words ἐν πόνῳ etc. as "e re amatoria deprompta," expressing the affections of the lover while seeking the society of his beloved, and connects (in the reverse order) λόγῳ with κυβερν., πόθῳ with ἐπιβ., φόβῳ with παραστ., and πόνῳ with σωτήρ. On the other hand, (b) Rettig—while altering the second pair to ἐν μόθῳ, ἐν λόχῳ—also disregards the maritime metaphor and

ἐν πότῳ, ἐν λόγῳ κυβερνήτης, ἐπιβάτης, παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτήρ **E**  
 ἄριστος, ξυμπάντων τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων κόσμος, ἡγεμὼν κάλ-  
 λιστος καὶ ἄριστος, ᾧ χρὴ ἔπεσθαι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐφυμνούντα

197 D ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ ἐν πότῳ ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ ἐν  
 πόθῳ ἐν λόγῳ codd.: ἐν φόβῳ ἐν πόθῳ ἐν πόνῳ ἐν μόγῳ Schütz: ἐν πόνῳ ἐν  
 φόβῳ ἐν μόθῳ ἐν μόγῳ Jn.: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν μόθῳ ἐν λόγῳ Rettig: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν  
 πόθῳ ἐν νόσῳ Winckelmann: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν πόθῳ ἐν σάλῳ Usener: ἐν πλῶ ἐν  
 πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ Bdhm. **E** ἐπιβάτης del. Bdhm.: ἐπιδώτης Usener τε καὶ  
 del. Bdhm.

understands the passage "überhaupt von Kriegsgefahren und dem in solchen geleisteten Beistand," comparing the allusions to such matters by Phaedrus (179 A) and Alcibiades (220 D ff.). Here Rettig is, I believe, partly on the right track; since the clue to the sense (and reading) here is to be looked for in Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates. We find πόνῳ echoed there (219 E τοῖς πόνοις...περιῆν), and φόβῳ also (220 E φυγῆ ἀνεχώρει, 221 A ἐν φόβῳ) and ἐν λόγῳ may be defended by the allusions to Socrates' λόγοι (215 C ff., 221 D ff.). Thus the only doubtful phrase is ἐν πόθῳ, which has no parallel in Alcib.'s speech, and is also objectionable here because of the proximity of πόθου. In place of it I propose ἐν πότῳ (cp. *Phileb.* 48 A), of which we find an echo (in sense if not in sound) in 220 A ἐν τ' αὐ ταῖς εὐωχίαις...καὶ πίνειν... πάντας ἐκράτει. For maritime terms in connexion with λόγος, cp. *Lach.* 194 C ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον: *Parm.* 137 A διανεῦσαι...τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων: *Phaedr.* 264 A; *Phileb.* 29 B. So both λόγος and πότος in Dionys. Chalc. 4. 1 ff. ὕμνουσ οἰνοχοεῖν...τόνδε...εἰρεσίη γλώσσης ἀποπέμψομεν...τοῦδ' ἐπὶ συμποσίου· δεξιότης τε λόγου | Φαίακος Μουσῶν ἐρέτας ἐπὶ σέλματα πέμπει: *id.* 5. 1 ff. καὶ τινες οἶνον ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρεσίη Διονύσου, | συμποσίου ναῦται καὶ κυλίκων ἐρέται | (μάρνανται) περὶ τοῦδε. Cp. also Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 5. 9 quaerebam utrum panderem vela orationis statim, an eam...dialecti-corum remis propellerem. For παραστάτης, of Eros, cp. ὁ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμων in later Stoic literature (Rohde *Psyche* II. 316): Epict. *diss.* I. 14. 12; Menander (*ap. Mein. Com.* IV. 238) ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου. For Socrates as σωτήρ, see 220 D ff.: the term is regularly applied to a ἥρωσ, e.g. Soph. *O. C.* 460 (Oedipus); Thuc. V. 11. 2 (Brasidas); Eur. *Heracl.* 1032 (Eurystheus): Pind. *fr.* 132 has the same combination, σωτήρ ἄριστος: cp. Spenser, "(Love) the most kind preserver Of living wights." ἐν πόνῳ might be a reminiscence of Pind. *Nem.* X. 78 παῦροι...ἐν πόνῳ πιστοί: or used, Homericly, of "the toil of war" (= ἐν μαχαίς, cp. 220 D). For κυβερνήτης used metonymously, cp. 197 B (*n.* on κυβερνᾶν); so Emerson, "Beauty is the pilot of the young soul." ἐπιβάτης, in the present context, must mean "a marine," *classarius miles*, and hence, by metonymy, "a comrade" in general.—The general sense of the passage is this: "in the contests both of war and peace the best guide and warden, comrade and rescuer is Eros." Cp. also Procl. *in I Alc.* p. 40.

197 E ξυμπάντων...κόσμος. Cp. Gorg. *Hel.* 1 κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος.

ἡγεμὼν...ἐφυμνούντα. The image is that of Eros as *coryphaeus* leading a



καλῶς, φῶδης μετέχοντα ἦν ἄδει θέλγων πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων νόημα.

Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγος, ὦ Φαίδρε, τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω, τὰ μὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς μετρίας, καθ' ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναμαι, μετέχων.

198 XX. Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀγάθωνος πάντας ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ἀναθορυβῆσαι τοὺς παρόντας, ὡς πρεπόντως τοῦ νεανίσκου εἰρηκότος καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη εἰπεῖν βλέψαντα εἰς τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Ἄρά σοι δοκῶ, φάναι, ὦ παῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ, ἀδεὲς πάλαι δέος δεδιέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μαντικῶς ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ἀγάθων θαυμαστῶς ἐροῖ, ἐγὼ δ' ἀπορήσοιμι; Τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, μαντικῶς μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι, ὅτι Ἀγάθων εὖ ἐρεῖ· τὸ δὲ σὲ ἀπορήσειν, οὐκ οἶμαι.

197 Ε καλῶς BT: καλῆς Stob.: καλῶς καλῆς vulg.: καλῶς τῆς Ast: καλῶς καὶ τῆς Orelli Teuffel: καὶ Mdv. Sz. δὲ (καὶ) Method. 198 Α πρεπόντως b t: πρέποντος BTW ἄρα B ἐροῖη Cobet Jn. δοκεῖς μοι T

procession of singers, and singing ("a song of my beloved") himself (φῶδης ἦν ἄδει). Notice how Agathon repeats the phrase θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων (cp. 197 B). For ἡγεμών, cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*) "Thou art his god, thou art his mighty guide." καλῆς is omitted in Ficinus' transl.

νόημα. Here used, poetically, as equivalent to νοῦς: cp. Pind. *Pyth.* vi. 29; Theogn. 435; Emped. 329 St., αἶμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω. "Let it be presented as a votive-offering (ἀνάθημα) to the God (sc. Eros)."

παιδιᾶς...σπουδῆς. Possibly an echo of Gorg. *Hel. ad fin.* Ἐλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον. For the antithesis, cp. 216 Ε; *Laws* 647 D; *Phileb.* 30 Ε; *Ag. Ran.* 389.

μετρίας. "H.e. κοσμίας" (Stallb.), with, perhaps, a latent play on the other sense of μέτρον, in allusion to the rhythmical style of A.'s oration; cp. 187 D, 205 C, *Phaedr.* 267 Α ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν.

198 Α ἀναθορυβῆσαι. Cp. *Protag.* 334 C εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι: *Euthyd.* 276 B; *Cic. Sen.* 18. 64 a cuncto consensu plausus multiplex datus.

πρεπόντως...τῷ θεῷ. Cp. *Laws* 699 D εἰρηκας σαυτῷ τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι πρεπόντως.

ὦ παῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ. Observe the mock-solemnity of this mode of address: cp. 172 Α, 214 Β. Socrates addresses Eryx. with allusion to his language in 193 Ε (εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη κτλ.).

ἀδεὲς...δέος δεδιέναι. Schol. ἀδεὲς δέος· ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μὴ ἄξια φόβου δεδιότων. ὁμοιον τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ψοφοδεὲς ἀνθρώπος (*Phaedr.* 257 D). Observe how Socr. here, in caricature of Agathon's style (e.g. 197 D), combines in one phrase the *figura etymologica* and the figure *oxymoron*: cp. *Eur. I. T.* 216 νύμφαν δύσσυμφον: *ib.* 566 χάριν ἄχαριν: *id. Hel.* 690 γάμον ἄγαμον.

ἂ νῦν δὲ ἔλεγον. The reference is to 194 Α.



Καὶ πῶς, ὦ μακάριε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, οὐ μέλλω ἀπορεῖν B καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλος ὅστισούν, μέλλον λέξειν μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα; καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ὀλίγου ἀποδρὰς φρόνην, εἴ πη εἶχον. καὶ γὰρ με C Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμνησκει, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου

198 B καὶ παντοδαπὸν οὕτω TW μὲν om. Vind. 21, vulg. Sz.: (μὲν, θαυμαστά δέ· Bdhm.) ἀκούων om. W

198 B οὐ μέλλω κτλ. Notice the change of tense in ἀπορεῖν...λέξειν: Plato uses pres., fut., and aor. infinitives after μέλλω, of which the last is the rarest construction. For the sense, cp. *Soph.* 231 B.

παντοδαπὸν λόγον. There is irony in the epithet. Socr. implies that he regards it as a motley λόγος, "a thing of shreds and patches." Cp. 193 E, and 198 E (πάντα λόγον κινούντες κτλ.).

οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά. The antithesis must be mentally supplied: "the earlier parts were not equally marvellous (although they were marvellous)." Stallb. explains differently, "τὰ μὲν ἄλλα accipi potest absolute pro et quod cetera quidem attinet; quo facto non inepte pergitur sic: οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά, particula μὲν denuo iterata." But the former explanation (adopted by Rettig and Hug, after Zeller) is the simpler and better.

τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς κτλ. τὸ is accus. of respect, going closely with ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, not with τοῦ κάλλους (as Rückert): "quod autem exitum orationis tuae attinet" (Stallb., and so Hommel). τοῦ κάλλους is governed by ἐξεπλάγη, as gen. of causative object (cp. *Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 61 b). ἀκούων, "as he heard."

τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων. Cp. 199 B ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων. Properly, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are distinguished as, in logic, the subject and predicate and, in grammar, the noun and verb respectively. But commonly ὄνομα is used of any single word, and ῥῆμα of a clause, or proposition (e.g. *Protag.* 341 E); cp. *Apol.* 17 B; *Cratyl.* 399 A, 431 B. Both here and below, as Athenaeus observes (v. 187 c), Πλάτων χλευάζει τε τὰ ἰσόκωλα τὰ Ἀγάθωνος καὶ τὰ ἀντίθετα. Cp. the criticism of the Sophistic style in *Alcid. de Soph.* 12 οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεργασμένοι καὶ μᾶλλον ποιήμασιν ἢ λόγοις εἰκότες καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον καὶ πλείων ἀληθείας ἀποβεβληκότες: *Isocr. c. Soph.* 294 D τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὄλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν.

οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων. Cp. 221 D *infra*; *Rep.* 378 D τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστίου λογοποιεῖν.

ὀλίγου. I.e. ὀλίγου δεῖν. Cp. *Theaet.* 180 D; *Euthyd.* 279 D.

198 C Γοργίου...ἀνεμίμνησκει. For Agathon as a "Gorgiast," see *Introd.* § III. 5. Cp. *Philostr. de vit. Soph.* I. καὶ Ἀγάθων...πολλαχοῦ τῶν ἱαμβείων γοργιάζει: *Xen. Symp.* II. 26, IV. 24.

τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου. See *Od.* XI. 632 ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ἦρει | μή μοι γοργεῖην

ἐπεπόνθη· ἐφοβούμην μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἐνενόησα τότε ἄρα καταγέλαστος ὢν, ἠνίκα ὑμῖν ὠμολόγουν ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκωμιάσασθαι  
**D** τὸν Ἔρωτα καὶ ἔφην εἶναι δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ πράγματος, ὡς ἔδει ἐγκωμιάζειν ὅτιοῦν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ἀβελτερίας ὄμην δεῖν τάληθῆ λέγειν περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν, ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγόμενους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι· καὶ πάνυ δὴ μέγα ἐφρόνουν ὡς

198 C ἐν τῷ λόγῳ secl. J.-U.: πελώρου Bdhm. τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ del. Hartmann  
**D** ἀβελτηρίας T τοῦ (post ἐκάστου) del. Hommel τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν Bast

κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου | ἐξ Ἄιδεω πέμψειεν ἀγανὴ Περσεφόνηα. Miss Harrison (*Proleg.* p. 191) renders γοργεῖν by "grizzly," with the note "Homer does not commit himself to a definite Gorgon": his Gorgoneion is "an underworld bogey, an ἀποτρόπαιον." That "the Gorgon was regarded as a sort of incarnate evil eye" (*ibid.* p. 196) appears from Athen. v. 64. 221 κτείνει τὸν ὑπ' αὐτῆς θεωρηθέντα, οὐ τῷ πνεύματι ἀλλὰ τῇ γιγνομένη ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων φύσεως φορᾶ καὶ νεκρὸν ποιεῖ. Rohde (*Psyche* II. 407) points out that "Hekate selbst wird angerufen als Γοργὼ καὶ Μορμὼ καὶ Μήνη καὶ πολύμορφε: *hymn* bei Hippol. *ref. haer.* 4. 35 p. 73 Mill"; and that Γοργὼ appears to be a shorter form for Γοργύρα (Ἀχέροντος γυνή, Apollod.). For the pun on *Gorgias-Gorgon*, cp. that on ἀγαθῶν (174 B n.). As against Dümmler's inference that Gorgias' previous death is here implied, see Vahlen *op. Acad.* I. 482 ff.

ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Cp. 201 A, *Gorg.* 457 D, *Theaet.* 169 B. To eject these words with Hug, or to substitute πελώρου with Badham, would (as Voegelin and Rettig contend) destroy the antithesis ἐν τῷ λ. )( ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λ., and spoil the "Gorgianische Wortspiel." Further, the phrase serves as a parallel to the Homeric ἐξ Ἄιδεω. Observe, as a feature of the parody, the different sense in which Socr. uses δεινός: also, how the sentence as a whole forms a playful retort to Agathon's remark in 194 A (φαρμάττειν βούλει με κτλ.). For the adverbial use of τελευτῶν, cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B, C; *Gorg.* 457 D. (See also Vahlen, *l.c.* for a discussion and defence of the text.)

τότε...ἠνίκα. The τότε goes with ὢν which is imperf. partic.: the ref. is to 177 D.

198 D ἐγὼ μὲν κτλ. The μὲν here is answered by the δέ in τὸ δέ ἄρα below. For ἀβελτερία, cp. *Theaet.* 174 c, *Phil.* 48 c (see my note *ad loc.*).

τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν. "That this (viz. the statement of the facts) should be the ground-work": there is no need to insert, with Bast, πρῶτον or μέγιστον after τοῦτο. For this sense of ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Menex.* 237 B. For the thought, cp. Emerson "Veracity first of all and forever. *Rien de beau que le vrai.*"

ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων. Rettig's comment on this is "mit Beziehung auf das collective in τοῦτο gedachte τάληθῆ." This is misleading, since τοῦτο means

εὖ ἐρώων, ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν [τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὀτιοῦν]. τὸ δὲ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὀτιοῦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς μέγιστα **E** ἀνατιθέναι τῷ πράγματι καὶ ὡς κάλλιστα, εἴαν τε ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντα εἴαν τε μὴ· εἰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πρᾶγμα. προυρρήθη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει, οὐχ ὅπως ἐγκωμιάσεται. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, πάντα λόγον κινουῦντες

198 D τοῦ...ὀτιοῦν secl. Bdhm. Sz. τούτοις ἦν Bast **E** δόξει Steph.: δόξη BT

τὸ τᾶληθῆ λέγειν, a singular notion, and αὐτὰ ταῦτα here represents simply τᾶληθῆ. In the Socratic theory of rhetoric here stated we have the following order of treatment proposed: (1) τὸ τᾶληθῆ λέγειν, (2) ἡ τῶν καλλίστων ἐκλογή, (3) ἡ εὐπρεπῆς θέσις. But it is implied that the 2nd and 3rd of these—artistic selection and arrangement—are valueless, except in so far as they are based on the 1st requisite: in other words, matter is more important than form. Cp. Procl. in Tim. p. 27 αἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας εὐφημίαι πασῶν προέχουσεν, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ Σωκράτης παραδίδωσιν.

ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. I follow Badham and Hug in bracketing the next words (τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὀτιοῦν) as an erroneous gloss on ἀλήθειαν, with which we must supply περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος, as required by δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά above and the passage there alluded to (175 D). Cp. Phaedr. 259 E ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὃν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μέλλῃ. Rettig defends the traditional text, asking "ist denn ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὀτιοῦν hier nicht identisch mit ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ Ἔρωτος?" To this the answer is "no!": for if the tradition be kept we must take τὴν ἀλήθειαν as equivalent to τὴν ἀληθῆ (or rather ὀρθὴν) μέθοδον, which is a very unlikely equation, especially so soon after τᾶληθῆ in another sense: Stallb.'s rendering may serve to indicate the difficulty involved,—“utpote veram tenens laudationis cujuslibet naturam et rationem”: Jowett's "thinking I knew the nature of true praise" shirks the difficulty.

τὸ δὲ ἄρα. For τὸ δέ, "but in reality," cp. Meno 97 c (with Thompson's note), Apol. 23 A (with Stallb.'s note).

198 E οὐ τοῦτο, i.e. οὐ τὸ τᾶληθῆ λέγειν.

τὸ...ἀνατιθέναι. Perhaps an allusion to the term used by Agathon, ἀνακείσθω 197 E. For Socrates' criticism, cp. Phaedr. 272 A, Menex. 234 C οἱ οὕτω καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἐκάστου λέγοντες, κάλλιστα πως τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς: Isocr. Busir. 222 B δεῖ τοὺς μὲν εὐλογεῖν τινὰς βουλομένοις πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν προσόντ' ἀποφαίνειν (which sentiment is, perhaps, referred to here).

προυρρήθη. Cp. 180 D. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει. The emphasis is on δόξει, implying the regular Platonic antithesis δόξα (ἀλήθεια). Cp. Simon. 76 τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται (cited in Rep. 365 c).

πάντα λόγον κινουῦντες. "Raking up every tale." Cp. Phileb. 15 E; Theaet. 163 A; Rep. 450 A.

ἀνατίθετε τῷ Ἐρωτι, καὶ φατε αὐτὸν τοιοῦτόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοσού-  
 199 των αἰτιον, ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται ὡς κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος, δῆλον ὅτι  
 τοῖς μὴ γιννώσκουσιν—οὐ γὰρ δὴ που τοῖς γε εἰδόσι—, καὶ καλῶς γ'  
 ἔχει καὶ σεμνῶς ὁ ἔπαινος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη ἄρα τὸν τρόπον  
 τοῦ ἐπαίνου, οὐ δ' εἰδὼς ὑμῖν ὠμολόγησα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ μέρει  
 ἐπαινέσεσθαι. “ἡ γλῶσσα” οὖν ὑπέσχετο, “ἡ δὲ φρήν” οὐ·  
 χαιρέτω δὴ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τούτον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἂν δυναίμην. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τά γε ἀληθῆ, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω  
 Β εἰπεῖν κατ' ἑμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέρους λόγους, ἵνα μὴ γέλωτα  
 ὄφλω. ὄρα οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ τι καὶ τοιούτου λόγου δέη, περὶ  
 Ἐρωτος τὰληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων  
 τοιαύτη ὅποια δᾶν τις τύχῃ ἐπελθοῦσα.

198 Ε τοιοῦτων τε εἶναι Steph. 199 Α δῆπου Cobet Bt.: ἂν που T:  
 που B, Sz. ἤδη ἄρα T: ἤδη B οὐ δ' Sauppe: οὐδ BT γλῶσσα W:  
 γλῶττα BT ἐγκωμιάσω Wolf Jn. Β δέει Bekk. Sz. περὶ...λεγόμενα  
 del. Hirschig ὀνομάσει W Vind. suppl. 7 δᾶν J.-U. Sz. Bt.: δὴ ἂν  
 Stallb.: δ' ἂν B: δ' ἄν T: ἄν apogr. Vat. 1030

199 Α ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται. φαίνηται here, as δόξει above, is emphatic. A com-  
 parison with 195 Α shows that Socr. is alluding especially to Agathon's oration.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ που κτλ. Cp. *Gorg.* 459 Α οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ  
 πιθανώτερος ἔσται: and for οὐ γὰρ που... 200 Β, *Euthyphr.* 13 Α.

καὶ καλῶς γ' κτλ. Earlier editors generally print a full stop after εἰδόσι.  
 Socr. here sarcastically endorses the approval with which Agathon's ἔπαινος  
 had been received (ὡς πρεπόντως εἰρηκότος κτλ., 198 Α).

ἡ γλῶσσα οὖν κτλ. Euripides' line (ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος  
*Hippol.* 612) soon became a familiar quotation: see *Ar. Thesm.* 275, *Ran.* 101,  
 1471; *Theaet.* 154 D; *Cic. de offic.* III. 29. 108 iuravi lingua, mentem iniuratum  
 gero.

χαιρέτω δὴ. “I say good-bye to it”: cp. *Laws* 636 D τὸ...τοῦ μύθου χαιρέτω:  
*id.* 886 D. Rettig suggests that here the formula may be intended as another  
 echo of Euripides: cp. *Med.* 1044 οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην· χαιρέτω βουλευματα | τὰ  
 πρόσθεν: *Hippol.* 113.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κτλ. “I withdraw my offer to eulogize.” ἐγκωμιάζω must here  
 be a “present for future” (see *Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 110. 3), since Socr. has not  
 yet begun the eulogy.

199 Β κατ' ἑμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς κτλ. “In my own fashion, not entering into  
 competition with your orations.” For κατὰ c. acc. in this sense, cp. *Apol.* 17 Β  
 οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ (“not after their pattern”): *Gorg.* 505 D.

γέλωτα ὄφλω. This resumes the notion in καταγέλαστος ᾧν, 198 c.

ὦ Φαῖδρε. Socrates, like Agathon (197 Ε), politely appeals to Ph. as the  
 πατήρ λόγου: cp. 194 D.

εἴ τι κτλ. For εἴ τι, *numquid*, cp. *Rep.* 526 Ε σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ εἴ τι πρὸς  
 ἐκείνο τείνει κτλ.

ὀνόμασι δὲ κτλ. See 198 Β n. Of ὅποια δὴ Ast cites no instance; the

Τὸν οὖν Φαῖδρον ἔφη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κελεύειν λέγειν, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἶοιτο δεῖν εἰπεῖν, ταύτη. Ἐπι τοίνυν, φάναι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πάρες μοι Ἀγάθωνα σμίκρ' ἄττα ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα ἀνομολογησάμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἤδη λέγω. Ἀλλὰ παρήμι, φάναι τὸν Φαῖδρον, C ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη ἔφη ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἄρξασθαι.

XXI. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δέοι αὐτὸν ἐπιδειξάμενος ὅποιός τις ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν πάνυ ἄγαμαι. ἴθι οὖν μοι περὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰλλα καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διήλθες οἶός ἐστι, καὶ τότε εἰπέ· D πότερόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος οἶος εἶναί τινος ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως, ἢ οὐδενός; ἐρωτῶ δ' οὐκ εἰ μητρός τινος ἢ πατρός ἐστι—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ

199 C ἀλλ' ἐρώτα Agathon tribuit B, Naber D οἶός τ' TW ἔρως ἔρως B: ἔρως T

force of δὴ is to heighten the notion of indefiniteness which lies in *ὅποια* (so Hug).

ἐπι τοίνυν κτλ. ἐπι goes with ἐρέσθαι. Socrates appeals thus to Ph. because Ph. had previously (194 D, E) debarred him from catechizing A.

ἀνομολογησάμενος κτλ. Cf. 200 E, *Gorg.* 489 A. For οὕτως ἤδη, cp. 194 D. For ἐνθένδε ποθὲν, 178 A.

199 C καθηγήσασθαι. The ref. is to A.'s exordium, 195 A.

ἴθι οὖν. *agedum*; cp. *Gorg.* 452 D, *Rep.* 376 D.

199 D τινος...ἢ οὐδενός. These are objective genitives to be construed with the second ἔρως: "Is Love love for some object or for none?" For the use of the indef. in such phrases, cp. *Phileb.* 35 B ὁ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμῶ.

οὐκ εἰ μητρός τινος κτλ. These words have been variously interpreted: (1) Lehrs and Prantl construe the genitives as subjective ("love felt by a mother"); (2) Ast as objective ("love for a mother"); (3) Rückert, followed by Hommel and Hug, takes them to be genn. of origin; so too Zeller renders "ich meine damit aber nicht, ob er eine Mutter oder einen Vater hat." Of these, (1) seems the least probable in point of sense, and with subjective genitives τινος would be superfluous. It is a serious objection (as Hug admits) to (3) that it compels us to regard the "absurdity" (*γελοῖον*) of the question as lying in its form rather than its substance. That the "absurdity" lies in the substance of the statement is shown, e.g., by *Lys.* 221 A ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; (cp. *Phaedr.* 274 C). But if so, recourse must be had to textual alteration: we must strike out either the second ἔρως, with Sommer, or the whole block of words εἰ Ἔρως... πατρός, as Hug (followed by Jowett) suggests. This, however, is a hazardous alternative. On the whole, then, the explanation (2) put forward by Ast seems the most probable. Construing, "I do not ask whether Eros has for its object a father or a mother, since to ask whether Eros is *eros* for a parent



ἐρώτημα, εἰ Ἐρως ἐστὶν ἔρως μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς—ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων, ἄρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστὶ πατήρ τινος ἢ οὐ; εἶπες ἂν δὴ πού μοι, εἰ ἐβούλου καλῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν υἱὸς γε ἢ θυγατρὸς ὁ πατήρ πατήρ· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ὡσαύτως; Ὁμολογεῖσθαι καὶ **E** τοῦτο. Ἐτι τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀποκρίναι ὀλίγη πλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθῃς δὲ βούλομαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην, τί δέ; ἀδελφός, αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἔστι τινὸς ἀδελφός ἢ οὐ; Φάναι εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς; Ὁμολογεῖν. Πειρῶ δὴ, φάναι, καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν. ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; Πάνυ μὲν **200** οὐν ἔστιν. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, φύλαξον παρὰ σαυτῷ μεμνημένος ὅτου· τοσόνδε δὲ εἶπέ, πότερον ὁ Ἐρως ἐκείνου

**199 D** εἰ Ἐρως...πατρὸς secl. Hug εἰ ὁ Hirschig ἔρως del. Sommer ὁμολογεῖσθαι BTW : ὁμολογήσαι vulg.: ὁμολογεῖν Stallb. Sz. **E** ἀδελφός Cobet Sz.: ἀδελφός libri, Bt. ἀδελφός del. Bdhm. **200 A** μεμνημένος del. Bdhm. ὅπου Mdvg.

were an absurd question," the point will be taken to lie in the fact that *ἔρως*, as properly denoting *sexual* passion, cannot naturally have for its object a parent. The same interpretation might be kept if we struck out—as perhaps we ought—the words *μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς*, and construed "the question would be absurd if (*or* granting that) Eros is (really) *ἔρως* (*i.e.* sex-love)."

*αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων.* Rettig approves Stallbaum's explanation, "*h. e. πατέρα, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν ut mox loquitur. Vult autem cogitari de patris notione, qualem mente informatum habemus.*" But the use of the neuter in apposition to the masc. is sufficient to indicate that "cogitari de patris notione"; and it is most natural to regard *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* as implying a reference to the previous use of "this very word, *πατήρ*."

*εἶπες ἂν.* "You would at once reply." (See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 414, Thompson on *Meno* 72 B.)

*ἡ μήτηρ ὡσαύτως.* *Sc. ἐστὶν υἱὸς γε ἢ θυγατρὸς μήτηρ.*

**199 E** *Εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην.* For apodosis we may supply *τί ἂν φαίης*; or the like: cp. 204 D, *Prot.* 311 E.

*αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἔστιν.* "Notionally," "in its abstract significance."

**200 A** *Τοῦτο μὲν...ὅτου.* Rettig, Rückert and Lehrs put a comma before *μεμνημένος*, rendering "hoc igitur apud animum serva (*sc. alicujus esse*) atque cujus sit, memento." Hommel and Hug, on the other hand, follow Ast and Schleierm. in removing the comma, explaining *ὅτου* (*sc. ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως ἐστὶν*) as epexegetic of *τοῦτο*, and construing *φύλαξον μεμνημένος* closely together: thus Schleierm. renders "Dieses nun, habe Socrates gesagt, halte noch bei dir fast in Gedanken, wovon sie (er) Liebe ist." On this latter view—which is certainly preferable—we must suppose Socrates to be alluding to the definition of the object of love (*viz. κάλλος*) previously given by Agathon (in 197 B), while debarring him from restating it at this point in the discussion.



οὐ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμῆ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, φάναι. Πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐ ἐπιθυμῆ τε καὶ ἐρᾶ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμῆ τε καὶ ἐρᾶ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων; Οὐκ ἔχων, ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε, φάναι. Σκόπει δὴ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμῆν οὐ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμῆν, εἰ μὴ ἐνδεές ἦ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὡς Ἀγάθων, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· σοὶ δὲ πῶς; **B** Κάμοί, φάναι, δοκεῖ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἄρ' οὖν βούλοιστ' ἂν τις μέγας ὦν μέγας εἶναι, ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ὦν ἰσχυρός; Ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων. Οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεής ἂν εἴη τούτων ὁ γε ὦν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὦν βούλοιστο ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ταχύς ὦν ταχύς, καὶ ὑγιής ὦν ὑγιής— ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων ἄπερ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπιθυ- **C** μῆν, ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, τούτου ἕνεκα λέγω· τούτοις γάρ, ὡς Ἀγάθων, εἰ ἐννοεῖς, ἔχειν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνάγκη ἂ ἔχουσιν, εἰ μὴ τε βούλωνται εἰ μὴ μή, καὶ τούτου γε δὴ

**200 B** ὁμολογημένων **W**: ὁμολογουμένων *vulg.* εἰ δ' ἄρα *Stallb.* γὰρ καὶ **BT**: γὰρ **W** ταυτὶ **T** **U** ἕκαστον *vulg.*

ἐπιθυμῆ αὐτοῦ. For αὐτοῦ resuming ἐκείνου, cp. 195 A, *Soph. O. T.* 248. Observe that the entire argument here is based on the identification of ἔρως with ἐπιθυμία (see 205 D): cp. the use of ἐρᾶν in *Theogn.* 256 πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾶ, τὸ τυχεῖν. Cp., for the question here discussed, *Lys.* 221 D f.

ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος. Cp. *Phaedr.* 267 A, 269 D; see Blass, *Att. Bereds.* I. 78.

ἐπιθυμῆν οὐ ἐνδεές ἐστιν. Cp. *Lysis* 221 D τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐ ἂν ἐνδεές ἦ, τούτου ἐπιθυμῆ: *Eryx.* 405 E αἱ δ' ἐπιθυμῆαι πᾶσαι οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἐνδειαί τινων: *Gorg.* 496 D. A similar theory is implied in *Phileb.* 35 A ὁ κενούμενος... ἐπιθυμῆ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾶ πληροῦσθαι (which also illustrates the use of ἐρᾶν and ἐπιθυμῆν as synonyms). Cp. also *Isocr. Hel.* 219 A (quoted below, on 200 c).

**200 B** θαυμαστῶς...ὡς. For ὡς thus separated from its adverb, cp. *Phaedo* 95 A, 99 D, *Theaet.* 157 D. Thus Bast's suspicions as to the soundness of the text were unfounded.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ κτλ. In this sentence we have an ex. of anacoluthon: after the protasis the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis (ἴσως...λέγω), then the protasis is resumed in an altered form (ἀλλ' ὅταν τις κτλ.), which leads up finally to the apodosis in the form εἴποισμεν ἂν αὐτῷ κτλ. The main purpose of the whole paragraph is to guard against a possible misunderstanding as to the nature of βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία which might arise from carelessness in analyzing the sense of popular phraseology.

ταῦτα οἰηθείη. ταῦτα and πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα are accusatives of "remoter object" with οἰηθείη, "with regard to these and all similar cases."

που τίς ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; ἀλλ' ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνων βούλομαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ πλουτῶν βούλομαι καὶ πλουτεῖν, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἃ ἔχω, εἴπομεν ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, **D** πλούτον κεκτημένος καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτηῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ γε νῦν παρόντι, εἴτε βούλει εἴτε μὴ, ἔχεις· σκόπει οὖν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν παρόντων, εἰ ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ τόδε, ὅτι βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον παρεῖναι. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἄν; Συμφάναι ἔφη τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη, Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν, ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σφζόμενα καὶ <ἀεὶ> **E** παρόντα; Πάνυ γε, φάναι. Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἐτοίμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει

**200 C** καὶ πλουτεῖν B: πλουτεῖν T **D** ἔχεις T: ἔχῃς B ὁμολογοῖς b: ὁμολογοῖ Steph. οὐκοῦν δὴ pr. T τὸ...παρόντα secl. Bdhm. Sz. τὸ T: τὰ B: τὸ τοῦ cj. Usener ταῦτα: τοιαῦτα Liebhold σφζόμενα secl. Liebhold καὶ TW, Bt.: μοι B: τὰ νῦν Vindob. 21: τὰ μὴ Sauppe: μὴ Rettig: οἱ Voeg.: ἦτοι cj. Usener: ἀεὶ Schirlitz: καὶ ἀεὶ scripsi μοι παρόντα secl. Herm. J.-U. Hug **E** ὁ ἄλλος T

**200 C** βούλομαι...καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ. The point here emphasized is that βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία, when their sense is investigated, are found to apply only to the future (εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον), not to the present (ἐν τῷ παρόντι). For investigation shows that "I wish for what I have" is really an abbreviated phrase for "I wish to continue having in the future what I now at present have" (βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα παρεῖναι). For the force of βούλησις, cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 A τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων, ὧν ἂν ἐν χρεῖα γενώμεθα, τυχεῖν μόνον βουλόμεθα... τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἔρωσ ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται, τοσοῦτ' αὖ μείζω τοῦ βούλεσθαι ῥώμην ἔχων, ὄσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κρείττον ἐστὶν (with which cp. also 205 D *infra*).

**200 D** ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἄν; For the interrogative ἄλλο τι, ἄλλο τι ἦ, see *Meno* 82 c (with Thompson's note); *Prot.* 353 c (with Adam's note).

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν κτλ. The main construction is rightly explained by Stallb.: "τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρ. κτλ. relativo pronomini per epexegesis adduntur, nec assentior Rückerto interpunctionem post αὐτῷ ἐστὶν inferenti": τὸ is in the nominative, where we should rather expect τοῦ in apposition to ἐκείνου, owing to assimilation to ὃ. For the reading of the last words in the sentence, see *crit. n.* Rettig reads μὴ παρόντα "in hypothetisch-causalem Sinne." More attractive is Usener's excision of the words μοι παρόντα, adopted by Hug. The objection to καὶ, printed by Burnet, is that it fails to supply an explanation of B's μοι: hence I prefer to read καὶ ἀεὶ, supposing that an abbreviated καὶ blending with ἀεὶ might account for both variants.

**200 E** Καὶ οὗτος κτλ. οὗτος represents the typical τις and ἄνθρωπος of 200 c; and ἄλλος πᾶς serves to generalise, cp. 192 B.

καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὐ ἐνδεὴς ἐστὶ, τοιαύτ' ἅττα ἐστὶν ὧν ἡ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν; Πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν. Ἴθι δὴ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἐνδεια παρῆ αὐτῷ; Ναί, φάναι. Ἐπὶ δὴ τούτοις ἀναμνήσθητι τίνων ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ 201 λόγῳ εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἐγὼ σε ἀναμνήσω. οἶμαι γάρ σε οὕτωςί πως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖς κατεσκευάσθη τὰ πράγματα δι' ἔρωτα καλῶν· αἰσχυρῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἶη ἔρως. οὐχ οὕτωςί πως ἔλεγες; Εἶπον γάρ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς γ' ἔλεγες, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἂν εἶη ἔρως, αἰσχυροὺς δ' οὐ; Ὡμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν ὠμολόγηται, οὐ ἐνδεὴς ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτου ἐρᾶν; Ναί, B εἰπεῖν. Ἐνδεὴς ἄρ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἔρως κάλλος. Ἀνάγκη, φάναι. Τί δέ; τὸ ἐνδεὴς κάλλους καὶ μηδαμῆ κεκτημένον κάλλος ἄρα λέγεις σὺ καλὸν εἶναι; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἐτι οὖν ὁμολογεῖς ἔρωτα καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει; καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν Κινδυνεύω, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν τότε εἶπον. Καὶ μὴν καλῶς

200 E τε καὶ BT: καὶ W ἀνομολογησώμεθα W ἂν ἐνδεια κτλ. (usque ad 213 E ὅτι) exstat in Oxyr. Pap. 843 παρην O.-P. 201 A δι' ἔρωτος O.-P.: δι' ἔρωτα O.-P. corr. ἔρως BT O.-P.: ὁ ἔρως W γ' ἔλεγες scripsi: γε λέγεις libri, edd.: γε λέγε[ι]ς O.-P. ἄλλο τι ἢ O.-P. corr., Ven. 184 Vind 21 B ἔχει W: ἔχῃ BT του[τ]ου O.-P. corr.: του O.-P. ὦ Σωκράτες κινδυνεύω O.-P.

· ἐνδεια παρῆ. This sounds like a jocular contradiction in terms: in Eros there is a plentiful lack.

201 A ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. See 197 B: cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 A τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἔρως ἡμῶν ἐγγίγνεται.

ἐπιεικῶς γ' ἔλεγες. For ἐπιεικῶς, *probe, recte*, cp. *Rep.* 431 E, *Laws* 635 A. I have ventured to read ἔλεγες for the traditional λέγεις. In the present context λέγεις seems objectionable because of its ambiguity, since "You say well" would more naturally be taken to refer to A.'s reply (εἶπον γάρ) than to his previous statement. This objection is not touched by Rettig's defence of the tense: "auch das Präsens ist ganz an seinem Platze. Da Agathon bestätigt, dass er sich so geäußert habe, wie Sokrates angebe, so gilt seine obige Äusserung auch jetzt."

201 B οὐ...καὶ μὴ ἔχει. "Sic dictum est ut ὃ apud ἔχει repetendum est" (Stallb.).

τὸ ἐνδεὴς κάλλους. With reference to this Proclus (*in Tim.* p. 128) comments: ἐνδεὴς κάλλους ἐν συμποσίῳ προσεῖπε τὸ μὴ πρῶτως καλὸν ἀλλὰ μετέχον κάλλους: cp. *ib.* p. 110. For the tautologous form of expression, cp. 185 A n.; Eur. *Ion* 680 αὐτὴ δ' ἄπαις ἢ καὶ λελειμμένη τέκνων: *id.* *Heracl.* 530, etc. (see Vahlen *op. Acad.* II. 366).

Κινδυνεύω...εἶπον. εἰδέναι is past, not present, in sense.

Καὶ μὴν...εἶπες. Not "recte dixisti" (Ficinus), but "praeclare dixisti"

C γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων. ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν ἔτι εἶπέ· τὰγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Ἔμουγε. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ Ἔρωσ τῶν καλῶν ἐνδεής ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλά, κἂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδεής εἴη. Ἐγώ, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐχέτω ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Οὐ μὲν οὖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, φάναι, ὦ φιλούμενε Ἀγάθων, δύνασαι ἀντιλέγειν, ἐπεὶ Σωκράτει γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν.

D XXII. Καὶ σὲ μὲν γε ἤδη ἐάσω· τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἐρωτος, ἕν ποτ' ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταυτὰ τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ

201 C εἶπας O.-P. Vat. 227 φιλούμενε: φιλε O.-P. (οὐ) δύνασαι  
 Sauppe D μαντινικῆς BT O.-P.: μαντικῆς W vulg. Διοτίμας O.-P.  
 ἦν: εἶναι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> θυσαμένη Steph. δεκέτη Bdhm. Sz. [ε]ποιησατο<sup>της</sup>  
 νοσου O.-P.

(Wolf). What Socr. alludes to is not A.'s foregoing reply, but his oration (cp. 198 B, 199 c); and the point of his remark is to suggest that formal beauty of diction does not necessarily involve the more essential beauty of ἀλήθεια.

201 C τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλά. For the coincidence of these two concepts, cp. *Prot.* 360 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 297 B, C, *Phileb.* 64 E ff. It might be near the truth to say that τὸ καλόν is neither less nor more than τὸ ἀγαθόν in its external aspect, "goodness" as apprehended by the aesthetic faculty, or goodness *qua* attractive and soul-stirring. See also Plotin. *de pulcr.* p. 46; Procl. *in I Alc.* p. 329.

Ἐγώ...σοι...σὺ. The personal pronouns are, by position and repetition, emphatic. Agathon means to imply that he yields not so much to the force of argument as to the wordplay of Socrates' invincible dialectic: cp. 216 B *infra*: Xen. *Symp.* v. 8.

201 D Καὶ σὲ...ἐάσω. "You I will now release": this is said with reference to the phrase used in 199 B ἔτι...πάρες μοι Ἀγάθωνα κτλ.

Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας. Probably both these names are meant to be etymologically significant: the resemblance of the adj. to μαντικὴ is patent (in fact some mss. give μαντικῆς, and Ficin. *fatidica muliere*), while as illustrating the omen of Διοτίμα one might cite Soph. *fr.* 226 N. σοφὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὃν ἂν τιμᾷ θεός. See further *Introd.* § IV. c. Hug quotes an imitative passage from Dio. Chrys. I. p. 59 R. μῦθον...ὃν ἐγὼ ποτε ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Ἡλείας ἣ Ἀρκαδίας ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλέους διηγουμένης. See also Max. Tyr. *diss.* xxiv. 4, p. 588; Clem. Al. *Strom.* vi. p. 631 B.

πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ κτλ. For the Great Plague at Athens in 430 B.C. see Thuc. II. 47, Bury *H. G.* p. 407. That the plague had been rife elsewhere for some time previously is implied by Thuc. *l. c.* For similar instances of the averting or postponing of impending evils by divine or prophetic agency, see Hdt. I. 91 τρία γὰρ ἔτεα ἐπανεβάλετο (sc. ὁ Λοξίης) τὴν Σαρδίῶν ἄλωσιν:

ἔρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν,—ὄν οὖν ἐκείνη ἔλεγε λόγον, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διελθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἐμοὶ καὶ Ἀγάθωνι, αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἔμαντουῦ, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι. δεῖ δὴ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὥσπερ σὺ διηγῆσω, διελθεῖν αὐτὸν πρῶτον, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρωσ καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα τὰ **E** ἔργα αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ῥᾶστον εἶναι οὕτω διελθεῖν, ὡς ποτέ με ἡ ξένη ἀνακρίνουσα διήκει. σχεδὸν γὰρ τι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔλεγον οἷάπερ νῦν πρὸς ἐμὲ Ἀγάθων, ὡς εἶη ὁ Ἔρωσ μέγας θεός, εἶη δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ἤλεγχε δὴ με τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις οἷσπερ ἐγὼ τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἶη κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον οὔτε ἀγαθός. καὶ ἐγώ, Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφην, ὦ Διοτίμα; αἰσχροὺς ἄρα

**201 D** λογον ἐκεῖνη ἐλεγεν O.-P. ἐπ' Coisl. corr. Paris 1642 O.-P., Bast: ἀπ' BTW δεῖ δὴ TW O.-P.: δεῖλη B διηγῆσω BT O.-P.: δὴ ἡγήσω Sz. Bt.: καθηγήσω Hirschig: ὑφηγήσω Sauppe: διήρησαι Usener: ἡγήσω olim Herm. **E** ποῖός: οἰοῖς O.-P. ποτ' ἐμὲ vulg. γάρ: δὲ O.-P. εφην λεγεις O.-P. αἰσχρο[ν] O.-P.

Athen. XIII. 602 B: Euseb. *praep. evang.* v. 35, p. 233 B, C: cp. Virg. *Aen.* VII. 313 ff., VIII. 398 ff. (where "decem annos" is the interval named). A specially interesting parallel, as mentioning the same 10 years' interval, is *Laus* 642 D ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θεῖος...ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν δέκα ἔτεσι πρότερον παρ' ὑμᾶς...θυσίας τε ἐθύσατο τινας...καὶ δὴ καὶ φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον εἶπεν ὅτι δέκα μὲν ἐτῶν οὐχ ἤξουσιν κτλ.

αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἔμαντουῦ. Rückert alone retains the lection ἀπ' ἔμαντουῦ. Cp. *I Alc.* 114 B εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε: *Soph.* 217 C.

ὥσπερ σὺ διηγῆσω. I think the traditional text, supported also by the Papyrus, may stand, taking διηγῆσω to imply—with veiled contempt—a lengthy or meticulous disquisition. Schanz's δὴ ἡγήσω is open to a double objection, (1) the repeated δὴ is displeasing, and (2) ἡγήσω is a feeble word to apply to Agathon's dogmatic exposition (in 195 A) of the rules of method. Sauppe's ὑφηγήσω is appropriate enough (cp. *Gorg.* 455 D, *Crat.* 392 D), but does not explain the corruption.

**201 E** διελθεῖν αὐτὸν κτλ. Here Socrates cites almost verbatim the language used by Agathon in 195 A λόγῳ διελθεῖν...δόσεις. Observe however the significant addition by Socr. of the words τίς ἐστὶν: he requires a statement of the essential notion (τίς ἐστὶ) as well as of the attributes (ποῖός τις).

εἶη δὲ τῶν καλῶν. The genitive is not masc. nor one of origin (=ἐκ τῶν καλῶν) as Wolf thought, but as Stallb. rightly notes "καλῶν pendet ex Ἔρωσ, quod etiam hic positum est ut p. 196 D": cp. 201 A, 204 D, for similar gen. of the object.

αἰσχροὺς ἄρα κτλ. Socrates represents himself (ironically) as unversed in the rules of logic, and habitually confusing contradictory with contrary notions (οὐ-καλός with αἰσχροός): for the distinction, cp. *Soph.* 257 B, 257 D ff.; *Euthyd.* 283 B, 285 A ff., *Cratyl.* 429 B ff.



ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐστὶ καὶ κακός; καὶ ἦ, Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἔφη· ἦ οἶει, ὅ τι  
 202 ἂν μὴ καλὸν ἦ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρὸν; Μάλιστα γε. Ἡ  
 καὶ ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἦ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ  
 σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; Τί τοῦτο; Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν [καὶ] ἄνευ τοῦ  
 ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν·  
 ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ  
 τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνου πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἔστι δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον  
 ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 B λέγεις. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ μὴ καλὸν ἐστὶν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι,  
 μηδὲ ὃ μὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς  
 ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδέν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν  
 αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τι μεταξύ, ἔφη, τούτοιον.  
 Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖται γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι.  
 Τῶν μὴ εἰδότες, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἦ καὶ τῶν εἰδότες; Ξυμ-  
 πάντων μὲν οὖν. καὶ ἦ γελάσασα, Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

201 E ἔφη· ἦ: εφην O.-P.<sup>1</sup> 202 A ἂν (post καί): (δ) ἂν Ast Mdv. Sz.:  
 ὅ τι ἂν Steph. Hirschig: ὅτι ἂν, delete καί, Reynders: ἂν οἴοιο Hommel τὸ  
 ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν T O.-P.: τὸ τὰ ὀρθὰ δ. W: τὸ ὀρθοδοξάζειν B καὶ om. O.-P.,  
 del. Stallb. Bdhm. Sz. τοιοῦτο O.-P.: τοιοῦτόν τι Hirschig ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα del.  
 Bdhm. B τούτοιον εφη O.-P. γε BT O.-P.: μοι W

202 A Ἡ καὶ ἂν μὴ κτλ. "H. e. ἂν τι μὴ σοφόν. Nam τι e superiore ὅ τι  
 facile intelligas" (Stallb.).

Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν κτλ. This distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is much  
 insisted on by Plato; see esp. *Rep.* 477 ff.; *Meno* 99 A: cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 209 A.  
 For τὸ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι as the distinctive mark of ἐπιστήμη, cp. *Meno* 98 A;  
 but this definition is criticised unfavourably in *Theaet.* 201 c ff. (see Zeller,  
*Plato*, pp. 171 ff.). I bracket καὶ before ἄνευ: if retained, we must render  
 with Rückert (and Hug) "auch ohne Rechenschaft geben zu können." For  
 this "intensive" use of καί, see Thompson on *Meno* 71 B. Rettig defends the  
 Bodleian ὀρθοδοξάζειν thus "ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν ginge auf Einzelnes und Thatsäch-  
 liches, nicht auf den Begriff als solchen und die geistige Eigenschaft": but  
 this distinction is imaginary, and there is no other evidence, in Plato or  
 elsewhere, for the existence of this compound, Aristotle's word (*E. N.* VII.  
 8. 4) being ὀρθοδοξέω. Possibly we should write καὶ (ὄντα) δ., cp. *Rep.* 413 A.

μεταξὺ φρονήσεως κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* 477 A μεταξύ τι...ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης:  
 ib. 478 D.

202 B Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε. "I. q. μὴ ἀναγκαῖον νόμιζε, v. Heindorf ad  
 Euthyd. (sic) p. 432 c" (Stallb.). For this use to denote logical compulsion, cp.  
 also *Cratyl.* 432 E μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα...ἀλλ' ἔα κτλ.: *Parmen.*  
 133 c.

Τῶν μὴ εἰδότες. Sc. παρὰ: cp. *Crat.* 408 D, *Soph.* 243 D, etc. A similar  
 distinction had been drawn twice by Socr. himself, see 194 B ff., 199 A.



ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἳ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ C  
θεὸν εἶναι; Τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰς μὲν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δ' ἐγώ.  
κἀγὼ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφη, λέγεις; καὶ ἦ, Ῥαδίως, ἔφη. λέγε  
γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντα θεοὺς φῆς εὐδαιμόνας εἶναι καὶ καλοὺς; ἦ  
τολμήσαις ἄν τινα μὴ φάναι καλὸν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνα θεῶν εἶναι;  
Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Εὐδαιμόνας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ  
καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους; Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλὰ μὴν Ἐρωτά γε ὁμο-  
λόγηκας δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν D  
τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν. Ὁμολόγηκα γάρ. Πῶς δ' ἂν οὖν θεὸς  
εἴη ὃ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος; Οὐδαμῶς, ὥς γ' ἔοικεν.  
Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ Ἐρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις;

XXIII. Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ὁ Ἐρως; θνητός; Ἡκιστά γε.

202 C ἔφη om. O.-P. καὶ καλοὺς secl. Bdhm. Sz. καλὸν τε καὶ secl.  
Bdhm. Sz. θεῶν BT O.-P.: θεὸν pr. W τοὺς τἀγαθὰ BT Stob. O.-P.:  
τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς W τὰ καλὰ B O.-P., J.-U.: καλὰ TW Stob., Sz. Bt. D τῶν  
καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Stob. πῶς δ' ἂν scripsi: πῶς ἂν B Stob. O.-P., J.-U.:  
πῶς δ' ἂν TW, Bt. τῶν TW Stob. O.-P.: γ' ὧν B ὥστ' ἔοικεν Stob.  
τί οὖν; ἔφη. εἴη ἂν ὁ Ἐρως θνητός; cj. Steph. ὁ ἔρως εἴη Stob. ἔφη B  
Stob., J.-U. Sz. Bt.: ἔφη TW O.-P., Jn.

202 C κἀγὼ εἶπον...ἔφη. We might avoid this tautology (for which cp.  
177 A) by reading κἀγὼ, εἶπον πῶς κτλ., construing εἶπον as 1st aor. imper.,  
as in *Meno* 71 D. Cp. *Rep.* 338 D ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις.

Ῥαδίως. Sc. τοῦτο λέγω. For the use of *ράδιως* with *λέγω* and the like,  
often with a bad meaning, of ill-timed lightness, cp. *Meno* 94 E (with  
Thompson's note), *Rep.* 377 B, 378 A. Here, however, the meaning is probably  
*ράδιόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγω* (so Rettig), or as Stallb. "sic ut res facilem habet expli-  
cationem": cp. *Rep.* 475 E ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *ράδιως*  
*πρὸς γε ἄλλον*· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι κτλ. It would also be possible to suppose that  
Diotima is, playfully, adapting her reply to the form rather than the sense of  
Socr.'s question: "In what way do you speak thus?" "I speak it lightly"  
(without compunction): i.e. the *λέγω* to be supplied with *ράδιως* may mean  
"I say, utter the word," whereas the *λέγεις* of Socr. meant "do you mean."

εὐδαιμόνας εἶναι κτλ. Badham's excision of both *καὶ καλοὺς* and *καλὸν*  
*τε καὶ* is plausible: if the words are sound, we must assume the stress in each  
clause to be laid on the terms here in question, *εὐδαιμόνας...εὐδαιμόνα*.

Εὐδαιμόνας δὲ δὴ κτλ. Cp. the phrases used by Agathon in 195 A.

202 D Ὁμολόγηκα γάρ. Socr. represents himself as having already con-  
ceded to Diotima exactly as much as Agathon had conceded to him (cp.  
201 E *σχεδὸν γάρ τι κτλ.*): for A.'s concession of the point here in question,  
see 200 A, E.

ἄμοιρος. This word had already been employed by Agathon, 197 D (cp.  
181 c); it is a poetical word rarely used by Plato elsewhere, except in *Laws*  
(693 E, etc.).

Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; Ὡσπερ τὰ πρότερα ἔφην, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. Τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα; Δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ **Ε** γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξὺ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; Ἐρμηνεύον καὶ διαπορθμεῖον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς [τῶν θυσιῶν], ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὄν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυνδεδέσθαι.

202 **Ε** τε καὶ BT O.-P.: καὶ W Stob. τίνα δ' ἦν Stob. διαπορθμεῖον O.-P. θεοῖς τε τὰ Stob. τῶν θυσιῶν om. Pollux, secl. Sz. (τὸ) ἐν μέσῳ δέον Vermehren ἐμ μέσῳ O.-P.: ἐμμέσῳ Lobeck δὲ ὄν: δὴ ὄν Peipers: ὀδεῖον cj. anon. ὄν (τὰ) Bergk (τὰ ὄλα) συμπληροῖ Reynders: (ἀμφοτέρους) σ. Bdhm. τὸ πᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸ Orelli αὐτὸ om. Stob.

Ὡσπερ τὰ πρότερα. Viz. the exx. of a mean between extremes given in 202 A, B.

**Δαίμων μέγας.** The epithet serves to point the correction of Socrates' definition, μέγας θεός (202 B). Cp. Olympiod. in *Alcib. I.* p. 22 "δαίμονα" δὲ ὡς μέσον αὐτὸν προσαγορεύει· μέσος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐρωμένου καὶ ἐραστοῦ· "μέγαν" δέ, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὲρ αἰσθησιν καὶ νοερῶς ἐνεργεῖ. Procl. in *Alcib. I.* p. 64 Cr., p. 66. For τὸ δαιμόνιον as μεταξὺ, cp. Eur. *Troad.* 55—6: *Med.* 1391: *Hel.* 1137 ὃ τι θεὸς ἢ μὴ θεὸς ἢ τὸ μέσον κτλ. (see Rohde, *Psyche* II. 249 n. 1).

202 **Ε** Ἐρμηνεύον κτλ. For the term ἐρμηνεύειν to describe the mediating office of δαίμονες, cp. *Epin.* 985 B ἐρμηνεύεσθαι (δαίμονας) πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τοὺς...θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάντα. Hommel bids us take ἐρμηνεύον with ἀνθρ. τὰ παρὰ θεῶν (as "eiusdem atque Ἐρμῆς radicis") and διαπορθμεῖον with θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων (the office of the πορθμεύς, Charon, being "animas e terra ad sedes deorum transvehere"). This is probably right; but in any case it is a mistake to regard the two words as synonymous, as do L. and S. (*s. v.* διαπορθμεύω, "to translate from one tongue into another, to interpret").

**ἀμοιβὰς [τῶν θυσιῶν].** ἀμοιβή as a "return-present" (in transactions between gods and men) is used in Hom. *Od.* I. 318 σοὶ δ' ἄξιον ἔσται ἀμοιβῆς (sc. τὸ δῶρον): *ib.* III. 58 ἄλλοισι δίδου χαρίεσσαν ἀμοιβῆν...ἀγακλειτῆς ἐκατόμβης: cp. Eur. *Or.* 467 οἷς...ἀπέδωκ' ἀμοιβὰς οὐ καλὰς. Pollux (VI. 187) when quoting our passage ignores τῶν θυσιῶν. Cp. also Procl. in *Alcib. I.* p. 46, 63: Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 26, p. 361 B ὃ τε Πλάτων ἐρμηνευτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀνομάζει γένος καὶ διακονικὸν ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, εὐχὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ καὶ δεήσεις...ἀναπέμποντας, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ μαντεῖα δεῦρο καὶ δόσεις ἀγαθῶν φέροντας: Apuleius *de deo Socr.* 6 hos Graeci nomine δαίμονας nuncupant, inter homines caelicolasque vectores hinc precum inde donorum, qui ultro citro portant hinc petitiones inde suppetias, ceu quidam utrisque interpretes et salutigeri. per hos eosdem, ut Plato in symposio autumat, cuncta denuntiata et magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagiorum species reguntur: see also Plut. *de or. def.* 415 A; Philo Jud. *de somn.* p. 586 D (δαίμονες) τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπικελεύσεις τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων χρείας τῷ πατρὶ διαγγέλλουσι.

ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὄν. This calls for no alteration (such as is suggested by

διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν  
 τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπφδάς καὶ τὴν 203  
 μαγγανείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται,  
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς  
 ἀνθρώπους < καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς ἀνθρώποις >, καὶ ἐγρηγοροῦσι καὶ

202 E ἱερῶν Stob. 203 A τὰς τελετὰς B Stob. O.-P., J.-U.: τελετὰς  
 TW, Bt. καὶ τὰς ἐπφδάς...γοητείαν secl. Hug καὶ τὴν...γοητείαν secl. Voeg.  
 μαγγανείαν Geel J.-U. Sz.: μαντείαν BT Stob. O.-P.: μαγείαν Bdhm. Bt.  
 ἀνθρώπους (καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς ἀνθρώποις) Wolf Usener Sz.: ἀ. (καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς  
 θεοὺς) Heusde: ἀνθρώποις Stobaei P ἐγληγοροσ[σ]ι O.-P.

Vermehren): with συμπληροῖ sc. ἀμφοτέρους. The μέσον serves as the δεσμός  
 by which the extremes (here θνητοὶ and ἀθάνατοι) are united into an organic  
 whole (ὅλον). Cp. Procl. in Alc. I. pp. 69, 72, 77.

203 A τὰς τελετὰς. "Ritual": cp. Rep. 365 A λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικη-  
 μάτων...ἄς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν: Phaedr. 244 E (with Thompson's note): Laws  
 738 C θυσίας τελεταῖς συμμίκτους. That καθαρμοὶ (and τελεταί) included περιθειώ-  
 σεις, λουτρά, περιρράνσεις appears from Cratyl. 405 A. Rohde (Psyche II. 70 n. 3)  
 points out that "diese μάντεις entsprechen in allem Wesentlichen den Zaubern  
 und Medicinmännern der Naturvölker. Wahrsager, Arzt, Zauberer, sind hier  
 noch eine Person." E.g. Apis in Aesch. Suppl. 260 ff.; cp. Eur. Heracl. 401,  
 Phoen. 1255 ff., and the part played by Empedocles. In Hippocr. de morb.  
 sacr. p. 591 the μάντεις and καθαρταί are witch-doctors, claiming control of  
 the elements, as rain-makers, etc. (καθαρμοὺς προσφέροντες καὶ ἐπαιδάς...  
 περικαθαίρων καὶ μαγέων...τε καὶ θύων σελήνην τε καθαιρήσει καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανιεῖ  
 καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ εὐδίην ποιήσει κτλ.): cp. 197 C n.

τὴν μαγγανείαν πᾶσαν. Geel's correction μαγγανείαν is perhaps slightly  
 preferable, on the ground of Platonic usage, to Badham's μαγείαν. Cp.  
 Laws 908 D ἐξ ὧν μάντεις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν  
 μαγγανείαν κεινημένοι: id. 933 A ἄλλη δὲ (φαρμακεία) ἢ μαγγανείαις τέ τισι καὶ  
 ἐπφδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι λεγομέναις πείθει κτλ. (cp. 933 C): Gorg. 484 A τὰ  
 ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπφδάς: also [Dem.] xxv. 79 λαβῶν τὰ  
 φάρμακα καὶ τὰς ἐπφδάς...μαγγανεύει καὶ φενακίζει. Hug objects to γοητείαν,  
 as elsewhere used by Plato in a bad sense. There is, however, no need to  
 suppose that any of these terms are intended here to convey more than a  
 neutral sense; and to represent ἡ Μαντιτικὴ as a disbeliever in any of the  
 arts of divination or wizardry would be less artistic than pedantic. Moreover,  
 the language used here is supported by the echo it finds in the description of  
 Eros below (203 D ad fin.) as δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής. Rep.  
 364 B, C shows Plato's own low opinion of current μαντικὴ, but Socrates was  
 probably more credulous, see Xen. Mem. I. 1. 9, 4. 15.

θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους κτλ. Since the participles can neither be construed  
 with θεοῖς, because of the sense, nor with ἀνθρώπους, because of the case, it is  
 necessary to supply some such supplement as that adopted in the text.  
 Rettig accepts Stallbaum's explanation of the traditional text: "Quum enim

καθεύδουσι· καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ὧν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ περὶ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάνανσος. οὗτοι δὲ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοὶ τε καὶ παντοδαποὶ εἰσιν, εἷς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Ἔρως.

Πατρὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίνας ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός; Μακρότερον μὲν, Β ἔφη, διηγῆσασθαι· ὅμως δέ σοι ἐρῶ. ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, εἰστιῶντο οἱ θεοί, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μῆτιδος υἱὸς Πόρος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἶον δὲ εὐωχίας οὔσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὁ οὖν Πόρος μεθυσθεὶς

203 A σοφὸς: σ<sup>σ</sup>οφος O.-P.: σφοδρὸς Stob. ὧν om. Stob. περὶ χειρουργίας Stob. O.-P.: χειρουργίας BTW, J.-U. Bt. β<sup>β</sup>ανανσους O.-P. πολλοὶ τε Stob. O.-P.: πολλοὶ BTW τούτων· O.-P. ἐστὶ om. Stob. τίνας ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός BW: καὶ μητρός τίνας ἐστὶ T<sup>1</sup> O.-P. (ἐστίν) Β εἰστιῶντο W b t, Hermog., Sz.: ἰστιῶντο O.-P.: ἡστιῶντο T, Bt.: ἡστιῶντο B οἳ τε ἄλλοι θεοὶ καὶ Hermog. προσαιτήσουσα T O.-P.: προσαιτῆς οὔσα B: προσαίτις οὔσα Euseb. Origen

dicatur ὁμιλεῖν τινι et διαλέγεσθαι τινι, etiam ὁμιλία καὶ διάλεκτος τινι recte dici potuit. Et quum antea...perspicuitatis caussa usus esset praepositione πρὸς addito casu accusativo, nunc ad legitimam constructionem revertens, neglecta grammatica diligentia, dativum post accusativum recte inferri potuit." But at this rate one might justify anything in the way of distorted grammar! Hug marks a lacuna after ἀνθρώπους. For the ref. to divine communications in sleep ("the visions of the head upon the bed"), cp. Pind. *fr.* 131. 3 ff.; *Rep.* 571 D ff. (with Adam's notes); Rohde, *Psyche* I. 6 ff.

δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ. Compare the etymological definition (δαίμων = δαήμων) in *Cratyl.* 398 c. For Socrates as an example of the δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ, see 219 B.

περὶ τέχνας...βάνανσος. Cp. *Theaet.* 176 c, *Laws* 644 A; Arist. *Rhet.* I. 9. 1367<sup>a</sup> 31 (ἐλευθέρου σημεῖον) τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάνανσον τέχνην. The question as to why manual labour is held in contempt is asked in *Rep.* 590 c, and answered in *Rep.* 495 D (see Adam's notes ad loc.).

οἱ δαίμονες. Other Platonic passages mentioning these intermediary beings are *Rep.* 392 A, 427 B, 617 D (with Adam's note), *Laws* 713 D, 717 B. For later developments see esp. Plutarch (*de defect. orac.*, *de Is. et Os.*, *de daem. Socr.*, etc.). Cp. Rohde, *Psyche* I. 153.

Πατρὸς δέ...τίνας κτλ. These are genitives of origin. Here we have it tacitly assumed that Phaedrus's statement (178 B), that Eros is unbegotten, is untrue.

203 B Πόρος. We find in Alcman *fr.* 16 (with the Schol. ὅτι τὸν Πόρον εἶρηκε τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου μεμυθευμένῳ Χάει) a precedent for this personification of Πόρος. Πενία is personified by Aristophanes in the *Plutus*, *passim*. For Μῆτις, see Hes. *Theog.* 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρώτην ἄλοχον θέτο Μῆτιν, | πλείστα θεῶν τε ἰδυίαν ἰδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων: (μῆτις is, in Epic, the especial attribute of Zeus, as μῆτιέτα): Μῆτις was also an Orphic *alias* of

τοῦ νέκταρος—οἶνος γὰρ οὔπω ἦν—εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κήπον εἰσελθὼν  
 βεβαρημένος ἠΐδεν. ἢ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς  
 ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου, κατακλίνεται τε παρ'  
 αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν Ἔρωτα. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκό- C  
 λουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως, γεννηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνης  
 γενεθλίοις, καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστῆς ὦν περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀφρο-  
 δίτης καλῆς οὔσης. ἅτε οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας υἱὸς ὦν ὁ Ἔρως ἐν  
 τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ καθέστηκε. πρῶτον μὲν πένης ἀεὶ ἐστί, καὶ πολλοῦ

203 B ἐξελθων O.-P. ἠΐδεν BTW: εὔδεν O.-P., al. παιδοποιήσασθαι  
 Naber J.-U. C δὴ καὶ BT O.-P.: δὴ W καὶ θεράπων: καὶ om. Orig.  
 ἐκείνων Orig. ἐραστῆς del. Bdhm. καλὸν καὶ BT O.-P.: καὶ om. W:  
 fort. καλόν, ὡς καὶ τῆς...οὔσης del. Bdhm. πένης TW O.-P.: πενίης B

Eros. For *nectar* as the primeval substitute for wine, cp. Hom. *Il.* v. 341, etc., also *Phaedr.* 247 E τοὺς ἵππους...νέκταρ ἐπότισε. The celestial δειπνον was, it appears, followed by a συμπόσιον. Spenser, *H. to Love*, speaks of the god as "Begot of Plentie and of Penury." See further *Introd.* § IV. c 2.

εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κήπον. Cp. Soph. *fr.* (*Ion*) 297 N. ἐν Διὸς κήποις ἀρούσθαι μόνον εὐδαιμόνας ὄλβους. It is interesting to notice that Origen (*Contra Cels.* iv. 39) identifies the "garden of Zeus" with Paradise, Poros with Adam, Penia with the Serpent. With the intoxication and its results we might compare the O. T. stories of Noah and his sons and of Lot and his daughters. For the neo-Platonic interpretation of the myth, see Plotinus *Enn.* III. 5. 2, 292 F ff., 298 F: cp. also *Introd.* § IV. c 2. A similar Orphic legend is mentioned by Porphyry *de antr. nymph.* 16 (*Orphica* p. 180) παρὰ δὲ τῷ Ὀρφεῖ ὁ Κρόνος μέλιτι ὑπὸ Διὸς ἐνεδρεύεται· πλησθεὶς γὰρ μέλιτος μεθύει καὶ σκοτοῦται ὡς ὑπὸ οἴνου καὶ ὑπνοῖ, ὡς παρὰ Πλάτωνι ὁ Πόρος τοῦ νέκταρος πλησθεὶς, οὔπω γὰρ οἶνος ἦν. Another classical example is the trick played by Lady Macbeth on Duncan's "spongy officers" ("his two chamberlains Will I with wine and wassail so convince" etc.).

βεβαρημένος. A later form for the Epic βεβαρηώς (*Od.* III. 139): cp. Theocr. xvii. 61 βεβαρημένα ὠδίνεσσιν.

παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ κτλ. So Andoc. iv. 22 υἱὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς πεποίηται: and παῖδας ποιείσθαι in *Crito* 45 D, *Laws* 674 B, 783 D, as equiv. to the cpd. παιδοποιείσθαι (*Rep.* 449 D, *Laws* 784 A, B, E). These parallels are sufficient to defend the text (see *crit. n.*), without resorting to Rettig's absurd notion that παιδίον π. is "verecundior" than the cpd.

203 C τῆς Ἀφροδίτης...θεράπων. Cp. *Orph. fr.* 139 τὴν γὰρ Ἀφροδίτην παρήγαγεν ὁ δημιουργὸς...καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ὀπαδὸν αὐτῆς: Sappho *fr.* 74 (λέγει ἢ Ἀφροδίτη) σύ τε καλὸς (κάμος Bgk.) θεράπων Ἔρος: Hes. *Theog.* 201 τῇ δ' (sc. Ἀφροδίτη) Ἔρος ὠμάρτησε καὶ Ἴμερος ἔσπετο καλὸς | γεινομένη ταπρῶτα κτλ.: Max. Tyr. *diss.* xxiv. p. 297.

ἐραστῆς ὦν περὶ τὸ καλόν. Cp. 204 B, 206 E. For the thought, cp. Sir T. Browne (*Rel. Med.*) "I am naturally amorous of all that is beautiful."

πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. Here follows a list of the properties which attach to Eros in virtue of his descent from Penia. Observe that the order is chiasmic—here Penia-Poros, above Poros-Penia.



δεῖ ἀπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἶον οἱ πολλοὶ οἶονται, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς  
 D καὶ αὐχμηρὸς καὶ ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἄοικος, χαμαιπετῆς ἀεὶ ὦν καὶ  
 ἄστρωτος, ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιμώμενος, τὴν τῆς  
 μητρὸς φύσιν ἔχων, ἀεὶ ἐνδεία ξύνοικος. κατὰ δὲ αὐτὸν πατέρα  
 ἐπίβουλός ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀνδρείος ὦν καὶ ἴτης  
 καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτῆς δεινός, ἀεὶ τινὰς πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ

203 D καὶ οἶκος Themistius ὑπαίθριος BW O.-P., Orig.: ὑπαι-  
 θρίους T (ἔστι μὲν οὖν) τὴν cj. Sommer τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς libri: ἀγαθοῖς O.-P.  
 δεινός om. apogr. Paris. 1810, del. Kreyenbühl ἀεὶ προσπλέκων Orig.  
 μηχανάς: <sup>μηχ</sup>[α]νας βαs O.-P. (i.e. ἀμοιβας O.-P.<sup>1</sup>)

οἶον οἱ πολλοὶ οἶονται. This popular opinion had been esp. voiced by Agathon, 195 c ff.; and he had used the term σκληρός in 195 E, 196 A. The properties of Eros are, as observed by Max. Tyr. *diss.* xxiv. 4. p. 461, ἀτεχνῶς οἶα εἰς αὐτὸν Σωκράτην ἔσκωπτον ἐν Διονυσίοις οἱ κωμῳδοί: cp. Themist. *or.* 13. p. 161 D ff.

203 D αὐχμηρὸς. This is evidently intended as the contrary of Agathon's epithet ὑγρός, 196 A. Cp. Ar. *Plut.* 80 ff. (Πλούτος) ἀθλίως διακείμενος...αὐχμῶν βαδίζεις; and the echoes in *Plut. de fort.* p. 98 D, in *amat.* 759 A.

ἀνυπόδητος...ἄστρωτος. These, too, are characteristics of the Socratic (and Cynic) way of life. For ἀνυπόδητος, see 173 B, 220 B; for χαμαιπετῆς καὶ ἄστρωτος the account given by Alcibiades in 220 B, C. Compare also the description of the Σελλοί ("fakirs") in *Pl.* xvi. 234 ff. Σελλοί, ἀνιπτόποδες, χαμαιεῦναι κτλ. (see Welcker *Kl. Schr.* 3. 90 f.; Rohde, *Psyche* I. 122).

ἐπὶ θύραις κτλ. For the θυραυλῖαι of ἐρασταί, see 183 A, *Anthol.* v. 5; and for this phrase as applicable to Socrates, 175 A, 220 C, Ar. *Nub.* 169 ff. So too Penia was described in 203 B as (οὔσα) περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὑπαίθριος and σύνοικος are words of a poetical flavour: cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 24 ὁ ἀεὶ σύνοικος ἐμοὶ ἔρωσ.

ἴτης. "Energetic" ("go-ahead"): Schol. ἴτης· ἴστωρ, ἐπιστήμων, ὡς ἐνταῦθα. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰταμοῦ καὶ θρασέος. The Scholiast's ὡς ἐνταῦθα is clearly wrong, and that Plato connected the word with ἰέναι is shown by *Protag.* 349 E πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη, ἐφ' ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι. Cp. *Prot.* 359 C: Callinus I. 9—10 ἀλλὰ τις ἰθὺς ἴτω | ἔγχος ἀνασχόμενος κτλ. Here, however, the special sense of intellectual progress (μέθοδος, ἀνοδος) may be implied, cp. 210 A (μετῆ, ἰόντα, ἰέναι), and my note on ἀνδρείαν 212 B (also 205 D).

θηρευτῆς δεινός. "A mighty hunter," a very Nimrod. For the notion of the chase in erotics, cp. the use of ελεῖν and διώκειν in 182 E, etc., and of θήρα in *Soph.* 222 D τῆ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρα (cp. θηρῶμαι in Isocr. *Hel.* 219 D): for the same notion applied to philosophical enquiry, cp. *Phaedo* 66 C τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν: *Gorg.* 500 D, *Theaet.* 198 A ff. So Emerson (*On Beauty*), "The sharpest-sighted hunter in the world is Love, for finding what he seeks and only that."

πλέκων μηχανάς. "Weaving plots," "intriguing": cp. Eur. *Androm.* 66 ποίας μηχανάς πλέκουσιν αὐ; *Orph. H.* 55. 3 (Ἀφροδίτη) δολοπλόκε: Aelian *H. A.* III. 30 σοφώτατος ὁ κόκκυξ, καὶ πλέκειν εὐπόρους ἐξ ἀπόρων μηχανάς δεινόςτατος.

φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητῆς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστῆς· καὶ οὔτε ὡς ἀθάνατος πέφυκεν οὔτε ὡς θνητός, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας **E** θάλλει καὶ ζῆ, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀποθνήσκει, πάλιν δὲ ἀναβιώσκει διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποριζόμενον αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ· ὥστε οὔτε ἀπορεῖ Ἐρωσ ποτὲ οὔτε πλουτεῖ, σοφίας τε αὐ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν. ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, 204 οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦσι

**203 D** πόριμος T O.-P. corr.: πορισμος B: φρονιμος O.-P.<sup>1</sup> φιλοσοφῶν T: φιλοσόφων B γόης καί: καὶ om. O.-P. **E** αὐτῆς om. O.-P. καὶ ζῆ B O.-P.: τε καὶ ζῆ TW, Orig. ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ secl. Jn. Hug: ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ Hommel πάλιν: παλιν παλιν O.-P. corr., Orig. αναβιοσκε[ι]ται O.-P. ποτ' Ἐρωσ vulg. Hirschig τε αὐ T, Bt.: τε B, Herm.: δ' αὐ Orig.: αὐ O.-P.: δὲ Sommer Sz.

**πόριμος.** As son of Πόρος. Agathon, too, had described Eros as (πράγματα) πορίζων, 197 D.

**δεινὸς γόης** κτλ. For γόης, see 203 A n.; and for Socrates as wizard or charmer, 215 C ff., *Meno* 80 A ff., *Xen. Mem.* III. 11. 17—18. For σοφιστῆς, cp. 177 B, 208 C; *Rep.* 596 D; *Xen. Cyrop.* VI. 1. 41 νῦν τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἐρωτος: Maxim. Tyr. XXIV. 9 (=Sappho fr. 125) τὸν Ἐρωτα Σωκράτης σοφιστὴν λέγει, Σαπφῶ μυθοπλόκον. The esoteric meaning of these epithets is thus explained by Hermias in *Plat. Phaedr.* p. 97: (εἶπε τὸν Ἐρωτα) φιλόσοφον μὲν ὡς τὸ λογικὸν ἡμῶν διεγείροντα ἐπὶ τὰ καλά· γόητα δὲ ὡς τὸν θυμὸν καταστέλλοντα· φαρμακία (δὲ) ὡς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κηλοῦντα· σοφιστὴν δὲ ὡς τὴν φύσιν ἀπατῶντα καὶ δειλεάζοντα—this however must be taken “with a grain of salt.” Cp. also Procl. in *Cratyl.* p. 94, 158 ὅτι οἶδεν ὁ Πλάτων τὸ ὄνομα τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπὶ σεμνῶ τάττειν πράγματι· τὸν γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμενον ἐπιστρέφειν οὕτως καλεῖ, οἷον τὸν Δία (*Μίν.* 319 C), τὸν Ἄϊδην (*Crat.* 403 E), τὸν Ἐρωτα.

**203 E** θάλλει. Cp. *Cratyl.* 414 A αὐτό γε τὸ θάλλειν τὴν αὔξην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων. For the alternation of life and death in Eros, compare the case of Polydeuces in *Pind. Nem.* x. 87 ff.

**ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ.** These words are condemned, on no sufficient grounds, by Hug and others as “sehr prosaische und abschwächend.”

**αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ.** “Die geistigen Güter werden uns zu Theil nur insofern wir sie erwerben” (Rettig). The cpd. ὑπεκρεῖν is ἀπ. λεγ. in Plato, but cp. *Euthyd.* 291 B αἰ δ' (ἐπιστήμαι) αἰεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον.

**οὔτε ἀπορεῖ...οὔτε πλουτεῖ.** ἀπορία is a quality of the mother of Eros (διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπορίαν 203 B), as πλοῦτος of the father. On the other hand πενία is described as a mean between πλοῦτος and πτωχεία in *Ar. Plut.* 552.

**204 A** ἔστι γάρ. Sc. σοφός: cp. *Simon.* 5. 10 θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας (sc. ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι). For the midway position of the φιλόσοφος, cp. *Phaedr.* 278 D, *Lysis* 218 A; *Plotin. Enn.* VI. 7. 35 ff.

σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν ἀγαθὸν· μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν· οὐκ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆι ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι.

Τίνες οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, οἱ φιλοσοφούντες, εἰ μήτε  
 B οἱ σοφοὶ μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί,  
 ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν αὐ καὶ ὁ Ἔρωσ. ἔστι γὰρ δὴ  
 τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρωσ δ' ἐστὶν ἔρωσ περὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥστε  
 ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ  
 εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις·  
 πατὴρ μὲν γὰρ σοφοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐπόρου, μητὴρ δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ  
 ἀπόρου. ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις τοῦ δαίμονος, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, αὕτη·  
 C ὃν δὲ σὺ φήθης Ἔρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες. φήθης δέ,  
 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τεκμαιρομένη ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τὸ ἐρώμενον Ἔρωτα  
 εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἐρώων. διὰ ταῦτά σοι, οἶμαι, πάγκαλος ἐφαίνετο ὁ Ἔρωσ.  
 καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐραστὸν τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλὸν καὶ ἀβρὸν καὶ τέλειον  
 καὶ μακαριστόν· τὸ δὲ γε ἐρώων ἄλλην ἰδέαν τοιαύτην ἔχον, οἷαν  
 ἐγὼ διήλθον.

204 A σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: σοφοὶς γ. O.-P. αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ Vindob. 21,  
 Sydenham χαλεπὸν del. Hommel Bdhm.: χαλεπή O.-P. ἀμαθίας cj. Ast  
 αὐτῷ W b: αὐτῷ T: αυτω O.-P.: αὐτὸ B ἰκανόν del. Hirschig B δῆλον  
 δὴ TW O.-P., vulg. Sz. Bt.: δηλονότι B: δῆλον Herm. J.-U.: δῆλόν ἐστι Rettig  
 δῆλον τοῦτό γ', ἡ δ' ἡ, καὶ Bdhm. αὐ Ven. 184 Vind. 21, vulg. Bt.: ἂν εἴη  
 O.-P.: ἂν BTW: δὴ Usener Sz.: del. Rückert: fort. εἰς μετοξυ O.-P.  
 C ωθης O.-P. τεκμαιρομένη B<sup>1</sup> λέγεις: ελεγεσ O.-P. εἶναι Ἔρωτα O.-P.  
 οιομαι O.-P. τὸ τῷ: τῷ Bdhm. αβρον O.-P. corr.: αγαθον O.-P.<sup>1</sup>  
 τελειον O.-P.

αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό κτλ. "Precisely herein is ignorance a grievous thing, (viz.) that" etc. If, with Stallb., we take αὐτὸ τοῦτο as adverbial accus. of respect, with τὸ μὴ...ἰκανόν as an exegetical supplement, no emendation is required. For the neuter χαλεπὸν in appos. to ἀμαθία, cp. 176 D, *Phileb.* 12 c.

204 B Δῆλον δὴ...καὶ παιδί. Cp. *Euthyd.* 279 D τοῦτο δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοίη: *ib.* 301 B, *Lys.* 205 c (Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 72). Observe how sharply Diotima snubs Socrates, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί (208 c). For my cj. ὧν εἰς, cp. 203 A.

φιλόσοφον εἶναι. Cp. *Procl. in Tim.* 52 δύο τούτους θεοὺς ὁ Πλάτων φιλοσόφους ἐκάλεσε, τὸν τε Ἔρωτα καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν (*Tim.* 24 D),...ἦν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς "καὶ Μῆτις πρῶτος γενέτωρ καὶ Ἔρωσ πολυτερπῆς" (*Orph. Theog. fr.* 8. 11), καὶ ὡς μὲν Μῆτις τίκτει τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ὡς δὲ Ἔρωσ ἀπογεννᾷ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν σειράν.

204 C ἀβρὸν. Agathon (here alluded to) had used the subst. ἀβρότης (197 D), besides the epithets ἀπαλός and ὑγρός (195 c ff.).

μακαριστόν. The only other Platonic exx. are *Rep.* 465 D, *Phaedr.* 256 c. Cp. the use of μακαρίζω in 216 E *infra*.

XXIV. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ξένη· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἔρωσ τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειράσομαί σε διδάξαι. ἔστι μὲν **D** γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτος καὶ οὕτω γεγρονῶς ὁ Ἔρωσ, ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν, ὡς σὺ φῆς. εἰ δέ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρωσ, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Διοτίμα; ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον ἐρῶ· ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. Ἄλλ' ἔτι ποθεῖ, ἔφη, ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε· τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰ καλά; Οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μεταβαλὼν **E** ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρώμενος πυνθάνοιτο· φέρε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα· ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί

204 C (δὲ) ὢν cj. Steph. δὴ (τὰ) μετὰ Bdhm. **D** καὶ οὕτω superscr. O.-P. σὺ φῆς: σύμφης Jn. τε B O.-P.: om. TW ἐρῶ Aldin., edd.: ἐρῶ b: ἐρᾷ BTW: ερα O.-P.: fort. ὄρα (cf. E *infra*) ἔτι ποθεῖ TW O.-P., Bt.: ἐπιποθεῖ B, Sz.: ἔτι ἐπιποθεῖ Rückert τοιάνδε O.-P. **E** πυνθάνοιτο secl. Usener ὄρα scripsi: ἐρᾷ BTW O.-P.: ἐρῶ Aldin. vulg. Bt.: ἔροιτο Herm. J.-U.: om. Ven. 184, Bast Sz.: εἴ γ' ἐρᾷ Rohde τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί distinxit Winckelmann: τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί; olim Voeg. αὐτῷ BT

τίνα χρείαν κτλ. Here begins the second section of Socrates-Diotima's exposition. For χρεία, "utility,"—equiv. here to the δόσεις of 195 A, the ἔργα of 199 c—cp. *Gorg.* 480 A, etc.

Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' κτλ. "Ebenso 180 D, 186 A, 189 D, 194 E. Also wohl parodisch und spöttisch" (Rettig).

204 D ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν. This is object. genitive: cp. 201 E, 206 E. As Rettig notes, Diotima herself affects περὶ τὸ καλόν in preference to τοῦ καλοῦ (after ἔρωσ, etc.); and this may be used as an argument against Jahn-Usener's σύμφης.

εἰ δέ τις κτλ. For the omission of the apodosis, cp. 199 E εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην κτλ.

σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. The preceding query had been ambiguously worded, since τῶν καλῶν might be taken either as a partitive gen. dependent on τί, or as an object. gen. with Ἔρωσ (τί being adverbial accus.): that the latter was the construction intended is now shown by the revised statement of the query—ὁ ἐρῶν...τί ἐρᾷ; I am inclined to suspect that we should read ὄρα (see 204 E n.) for ἐρῶ (ἐρᾷ MSS.).

ἔτι ποθεῖ. If we read ἐπιποθεῖ we must ascribe to the proposition its full force, "craves further"; the other exx. of the cpd. in Plato are *Prot.* 329 D τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ: *Laus* 855 E. The former of these supports Rückert's ἔτι ἐπιποθεῖ.

Οὐ πάνυ...ἔτι. For οὐ πάνυ, cp. *Meno* 71 c (with Thompson's note).

204 E μεταβαλὼν. Here the participle "adverbii partes agit," cp. *Gorg.* 480 E, *Phileb.* 51 A. For the ellipse, cp. 204 D, 199 E.

φέρε, ὦ Σ., ὄρα. Most editors bracket the mss.' ἐρᾷ: Stallb., after

ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰγαθά; Τοῦτ' εὐπορώτερον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ,  
 205 ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαιμόνων ἔσται. Κτήσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν  
 οἱ εὐδαιμόνες εὐδαιμόνες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα τί δὲ  
 βούλεται εὐδαιμόνων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν  
 ἢ ἀπόκρισις. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, εἶπον ἐγώ. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν βούλησιν  
 καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον πότερα κοινὸν οἶει εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώ-  
 πων, καὶ πάντα τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι αἰεὶ, ἢ πῶς  
 λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων. Τί δὴ οὖν,  
 B ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάντας ἐρᾶν φαμέν, εἴπερ γε πάντες τῶν  
 αὐτῶν ἐρώσι καὶ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ τινάς φαμεν ἐρᾶν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Θαυμάζω,  
 ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτός. Ἀλλὰ μὴ θαύμαζ', ἔφη· ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα  
 τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιτιθέντες ὄνομα,  
 ἔρωτα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν. Ὡσπερ τί; ἢν  
 δ' ἐγώ. Ὡσπερ τόδε. οἶσθ' ὅτι ποιήσις ἐστὶ τι πολὺ· ἢ γὰρ τοι ἐκ

205 A ἀγάθων B δὲ τὴν B O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: δὴ τὴν TW, Bt. εἶναι  
 οἶει W B αὐτῶν: ἀγαθῶν cj. Naber γὰρ ἄρα T O.-P., Bt.: γὰρ BW, J.-U.  
 ἐρώωντος T (ἔν) τι εἶδος Hirschig τοι Vind. 21, vulg. Sz. Bt.: τι BTW:  
 τω O.-P., δ' O.-P. mg.

Winckelmann, retains it with the punctuation ἐρᾶ ὁ ἐρών τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί  
 ἐρᾶ;—a mode of expression which is “vehementius quam ut aptum videri  
 possit huic loco” (Rettig). Rückert defends the Aldine reading ἐρῶ as a  
 permissible superfluity “in familiari sermone.” I suspect that here, as above,  
 we should read ὄρα: cp. ὄρα τί ποιεῖς 189 A; *Rep.* 596 C; *Crat.* 385 D φέρε...εἰπέ.

205 A ἵνα τί. *Sc. γένηται*: for this colloquial use see Goodwin *G. M. T.*  
 § 331.

τέλος...ἔχειν. Because it is recognized that εὐδαιμονία constitutes in itself  
 the ethical τέλος or “summum bonum”: cp. *Clit.* 410 E ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς  
 τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαιμόνα γενέσθαι: *Arist. E. N.* I. 7. 1097<sup>a</sup> 33 ἀπλῶς δὴ  
 τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ...τοιούτων δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ. Cp.  
 also 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰών κτλ.

πάντας...αἰεὶ. Here αἰεὶ goes with βούλεσθαι, not with αὐτοῖς εἶναι (as in  
 206 A *infra*).

Τί δὴ οὖν κτλ. Diotima here points out an apparent contradiction between  
 the previous conclusion (κοινὸν πάντων) and common opinion, due to the  
 ambiguity of the term ἔρωσ (ἐρᾶν) which is used both in a generic and in a  
 specific sense.

205 B Ὡσπερ τί; “For example—?”

ποιήσις. The selection of this term as an ex. of varying connotation is  
 partly, no doubt, due to the fact that it was one of the matters specially  
 emphasized by Agathon, 197 A. For πολὺ, *multiplex*, cp. *Polit.* 282 A.

ἢ γὰρ τοι κτλ. For the definition, cp. *Soph.* 219 B, 265 B ποιητικὴν...πᾶσαν  
 ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἢ τις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον  
 γίγνεσθαι: also *Phileb.* 26 D; *Xen. Mem.* II. 2. 3; *Procl. inst. theol.* p. 74.



τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἰόντι ὄτρωϋν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποιήσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ C τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἡ δ' ἦ, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ καλοῦνται ποιηταὶ ἀλλ' ἄλλα ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἐν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὄλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποιήσεις γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ποιήσεως ποιηταί. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφην. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα· τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία D

205 C ἡ δ' ἦ Bekker: η δ η O.-P.: ἡδη BTW οὐ om. W ἔχουσιν TW O.-P., Sz.: ἔξουσιν B, Bt.: ἴσχουσιν Sauppe μόριον BT O.-P.: μόνον pr. W γὰρ τοῦτο: γ. ταυτα O.-P. εφη[v] λεγεις O.-P. D πᾶσα...εὐδαιμονεῖν del. Bdhm.

205 C αἱ...ἐργασίαι. Cp. *Gorg.* 450 C τῶν μὲν (τεχνῶν) ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστι. The word denotes manufacturing processes: cp. n. on *περὶ τέχνας* κτλ., 203 A. For ὑπὸ c. *dat.*, a construction rare in Attic prose, cp. *Phileb.* 58 A: *Hipp. Maj.* 295 D τά τε ὑπὸ τῆ μουσικῆ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις (ὄργανα): *Rep.* 511 A. Cp. Aristotle's use of ὑπὸ c. *acc.* to denote the subordination of arts, *E. N.* I. 1. 1094<sup>a</sup> 10 ff. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν κτλ.

ἐν μόριον. Equivalent to ἐν εἶδος (205 B): for this logical use of the term cp. *Gorg.* 464 B, *Laus* 696 B. For ἀφορίζω, cp. *Soph.* 257 C, 268 D τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις...μόριον.

τὸ περὶ...τὰ μέτρα. Cp. 187 D, 196 E.

205 D τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν κτλ. Opinions are divided as to the construction of τὸ κεφάλαιον: it may be construed (1) as nominative and subject, "the generic concept (*sc. τοῦ ἔρωτος*) is—"; so Hommel, Vermehren, Hug, Prantl, comparing *Gorg.* 463 A καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ (*sc. τῆς ῥητορικῆς*) τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν: or (2) as adverbial *acc.* (of respect), "in its generic aspect," cp. *Phileb.* 48 C ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον: *Euthyphr.* 8 E. The latter is certainly the more natural mode of construing here, since no genitive (*αὐτοῦ*) is added. But other difficulties remain: what is the subject of ἐστι, if τὸ κεφάλαιον is adverbial? Should we (*a*) construe with Ficinus (followed by Stallb.<sup>2</sup>, Lehrs, Zeller, Jowett and others) "nam summam quidem omnium bonorum felicitatisque appetitio maximus et insidiator amor est cuique"? Or (*b*) should we rather, with Stallb.<sup>1</sup> and Prantl, supply ὁ ἔρωσ as the subject of ἐστι and construe πᾶσα ἡ...εὐδαιμονεῖν as the predicate? To my mind the latter is the more natural method. Next arises the question, how are we to deal with the last part of the sentence, ὁ μέγιστός...παντί? If with most edd. (except Rückert, Stallb.<sup>2</sup> and Rettig) we regard *δολερός* as corrupt, the best plan is to excise the whole clause with Hug (and Stallb.<sup>1</sup>), since none of the corrections of *δολερός* hitherto proposed (see *crī. n.*) are at all convincing. The chief objection to *δολερός* is, not so much the meaning of the word itself (which may be defended by 203 D), as rather (to quote Stallb.<sup>2</sup>) "conjunctio superlativi μέγιστος cum δολερός positivo." But even this objection

καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὁ “ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ” ἔρως παντί· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄλλη τρεπόμενοι πολλαχῆ ἐπ’ αὐτόν, ἢ κατὰ χρηματισμὸν ἢ κατὰ φιλογυμναστίαν ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οὐτ’ ἐρᾶν καλοῦνται οὐτ’ ἐρασταί, οἱ δὲ κατὰ ἓν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τε καὶ ἐσπουδακότες τὸ τοῦ ὄλου ὄνομα ἰσχουσιν, ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγειν. Καὶ λέγεται μὲν γέ τις, ἔφη, **Ε** λόγος, ὡς οἱ ἂν τὸ ἡμισυ ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν· ὁ δ’ ἐμὸς λόγος οὐθ’ ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὐθ’ ὄλου, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που, ὧ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν· ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμενεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ

**205 D** ὁ...δολερὸς secl. Usener: ὁ...παντί secl. Stallb. (1827) Hug μέγιστός: ὀρμητικός Creuzer δολερὸς: δολερώτατος Stallb. (1852): δεινόςτατος Ast: κοινὸς Hommel: ὀλόκληρος Pflugk Mdv. : ὄλος Bdhm.: ἀθρόος Verm.: πρῶτος cj. Sz.: τολμηρὸς Creuzer: σφοδρότατος Sydenham: σφοδρὸς Cobet: μόνος Schirlitz: κερδαλέος Naber πάντη Pflugk αὐτόν: αὐτό Voeg. Sz.: ἀγαθὸν Orelli χρηματισμῷ O.-P.<sup>1</sup> εσχον O.-P. ἔρωτά...ἐρασταί secl. Sz. ἔρως τε Hertlein ἐρασταί: fort. ἐραστὰς κινδυνευουσι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **Ε** τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἡμισυ Sz.: τὸ ἡμισυ τὸ ἑαυτῶν Sauppe Jn.: ἑαυτῶν secl. Usener ἐπεὶ T O.-P.: ἐπὶ B

is not, I think, insuperable; for if we construe παντί closely with δολερὸς as “all-ensnaring,” we get a superlative idea which balances μέγιστος, while in sense it is supported by 203 B, D and Sappho’s δολοπλόκε Ἀφροδίτα. If, adopting this explanation, we retain the traditional text, it seems best to regard the clause ὁ μέγιστός...παντί as an appositional quotation and to construe, with Prantl, “nämlich jene grösste und für jeden verfängliche Liebe.” Hommel is singular in taking τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν (sc. ἡ ἐπιθυμία), as well as τὸ κεφάλαιον, as subject (“und das Streben nach dem höchsten Gute, d. i. nach Glückseligkeit, ist die grösste Liebe”).

**ἔρωτα...ἐρασταί.** This sequence is irregular. Usually with ὄνομα ἔχειν the name is in the nominative, in apposition with the subject, e.g. Laws 956 c διαίτηται ὄνομα...ἔχοντες (so here ἐρασταί): but the accus. is also possible (in appos. with ὄνομα), as in Plut. Arist. 2. But the combination of the two constructions is certainly awkward, and the words may well be, as Schanz supposes, a gloss.

**Καὶ λέγεται κτλ.** An allusion to Aristophanes’ speech, esp. 192 B, E ff.: cp. 212 c. For οὐθ’ ὄλου, below, cp. 192 E.

**205 E** ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε κτλ. Cp. Xen. Mem. I. 2. 54 ἔλεγε δ’ ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὃ τι ἂν ἀχρεῖον ἢ καὶ ἀνωφελές αὐτός τε ἀφαιρῆι καὶ ἄλλῳ παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τέ γε αὐτῶν ὄνυχας τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι κτλ.: Ev. Matth. 5. 30 καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιὰ σου σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτήν κτλ.

τὰ ἑαυτῶν πονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτῶν, οἶμαι, ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκείον καλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρώσιν ἄνθρωποι 206 ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἢ δ' ἦ, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ λέγειν, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐρώσιν; Ναί, ἔφην. Τί δέ; οὐ προσθετέον, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῖς ἐρώσιν; Προσθετέον. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ εἶναι; Καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον. Ἔστιν ἄρα ξυλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρωσ τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις.

XXV. "Οτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ἢ δ' ἦ, τῶν τίνα B τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τίνι πράξει ἢ σπουδῇ καὶ ἢ σύντασις ἔρωσ ἂν καλοῖτο; τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄν τὸ ἔργον; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐ

205 E καλεῖ W: καλῆ BT 206 A ἄνθρωποι Bekk. Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωποι BT: ἄνθρωποι O.-P.: οἱ ἄνθρωποι W: del. Baiter ἢ τὰγαθόν Hirschig ἢ σοὶ...ἀγαθοῦ om. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἢ δ' ἦ Bekker: η[δ]η O.-P. corr.: ἦδη BT ὅτι ἄνθρωποι Sauppe Jn. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ BW O.-P. corr.: τὰγαθοῦ T, Bt. προσθεταίον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> (bis) οὖν BT O.-P.: om. W τοῦ τὸ T O.-P.: τοῦτο B αὐτῷ TW O.-P.: αὐτὸ B B δὴ: δε O.-P. Paris 1642 τούτου Bast Sz. Bt.: τοῦτο libri, O.-P. αἰεὶ om. Vat., Bekk. Sz.: ἄγε Usener ἢ δ' ἦ Bekk.: ἦδη BT: η δ η O.-P. τῶν T b O.-P.: τὸν B αὐτὸν T σύντασις B O.-P.: σύστασις TW

εἰ μὴ εἴ. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 476<sup>4</sup>.

τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκείον. Cp. *Rep.* 586 E εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον (with Adam's note): *Charm.* 163 C, D ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεία τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς: *Arist. E. N.* x. 7.

206 A ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. For the assumption that τὰγαθόν is the final end of desire, cp. *Phileb.* 20 B ff., *Gorg.* 467 D ff., etc. The statement here is referred to by Proclus in *Alcib. I.* p. 129.

ἀπλοῦν. Equivalent to ἄνευ προσθέσεως ἀληθές: cp. 183 D; *Phaedr.* 244 A εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι κτλ. ("true without qualification," Thompson); *Prot.* 331 c.

206 B ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν αἰεὶ. Most edd. follow Bekker in ejecting αἰεὶ: Rettig, however, rightly keeps it with the note "αἰεὶ=die gegebene Definition gilt überall und für alle Fälle"; cp. 205 A, B.

αὐτὸ. Sc. τὸ τὰγαθὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι αἰεὶ.

ἢ σύντασις. Cp. 203 D (Ἔρωσ ἐστὶ) σύντονος: *Phileb.* 46 D σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ (with my note): *Euthyd.* 288 D. For the limitation of the notion of Eros here (ἂν καλοῖτο), cp. that in 205 A ff. (καλοῦνται, C, D).

τυγχάνει ὄν. Not "what does it happen to be," but "what in reality is it": see Verrall on *Eur. Med.* 608: cp. *Phaedo* 65 D—E.

Οὐ μαντῶν κτλ. For the suppressed protasis (sc. εἰ τοῦτο εἶχον εἰπεῖν), cp. 175 D.

μεντᾶν σέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ αὐτὰ ταῦτα μαθησόμενος. Ἄλλ' ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν. Μαντείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖται ὅ τί ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ μανθάνω.  
 C Ἄλλ' ἐγώ, ἦ δ' ἦ, σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. κυοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχροῦ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ [τῷ] καλῷ. [ἦ γὰρ

206 B ἔφην, ἐγὼ *distinxit Ast* καὶ οὐ μανθάνω *del. Naber* C ἦ δ' ἦ *Bekk.: ἦδη BT: δη O.-P. ἄνθρωποι Sauppe Jn. καὶ κατὰ τὸ TW O.-P., Bt.: κατὰ τὸ B τὴν om. T ἐν τῇ Bdhm. J.-U. Sz.: ἐν τινι libri, Bt.: ἐν Naber τίκτειν δὲ...ἐστίν del. Rettig καλῷ Bdhm.: καλῷ O.-P.: τῷ καλῷ libri ἦ γὰρ...ἐστίν del. Ast Sz. Bt.*

ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ. *φοιτᾶν* is the regular word for "attending" lectures or a school, see *Prot.* 326 C *eis didaskálon...φοιτᾶν: Rep.* 328 D *δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα: Phaedo* 59 B.

τόκος ἐν καλῷ. The act of procreation appears to be called almost indifferently (1) *τόκος*, as *hence*, (2) *γέννησις* (206 C, E, 209 D), (3) *γέννησις καὶ τόκος* (206 E), (4) in passive aspect *γένεσις* (206 D, 207 D). Similarly with the verbs: we find *τίκτειν* (206 C, 210 C, etc.), *γεννᾶν* (206 D, 207 A, etc.), *τίκτειν καὶ γεννᾶν* (206 D, 209 B, C).

Μαντείας...μανθάνω. Notice the play on the stem-sound. Rettig, citing *Eur. Hippol.* 237 (*τάδε μαντείας ἄξια πολλῆς*), writes "Witzspiel mit Anklang an Eur. und Anspielung auf Diotima's Heimath und Beruf": the latter allusion is likely enough, but the "Anklang an Eur." is very problematical; had it been specially intended we should have had *ἄξια* or *πολλῆς* echoed as well.

206 C κυοῦσι. *κῆσις*, "pregnancy," is properly the condition intermediate between conception (*σύλληψις*) and delivery (*τόκος*). Cp. *Achill. Tat.* I 10 *καὶ νεανίσκος ἔρωτος πρωτοκύμων οὐ δεῖται διδασκαλίας πρὸς τὸν τοκετόν*. For the language and thought of this whole passage, cp. *Theaet.* 150 ff., *Phaedr.* 251 A ff., *Tim.* 91 A: also *Max. Tyr. diss.* XVI 4, p. 179 *κυοῦσι δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν ψυχαὶ φύσει, ὠδίνουσι δὲ ἔθει, τίκτουσι δὲ λόγῳ κτλ.*: *Clem. Al. Strom.* v. 552 B: *Themist. or.* XXXII. p. 355 D.

ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γ. I adopt *Badham's* correction *τη* for *τινι* since the change involved is very slight and *ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ* is unexampled in Plato: cp. *Gorg.* 484 C *ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: Rep.* 461 B; *Phaedr.* 209 B *infra*; 255 A; *Meno* 89 B. Plato also uses *ἐν ἡλικίᾳ*, e.g. *Rep.* 461 B: *Charm.* 154 A: *Laws* 924 E.

τίκτειν δὲ...καλῷ. There is much to be said for *Rettig's* view that this sentence (as well as the next) is a gloss. As he argues, the words "gehören also ihrem Inhalte nach nicht an die Stelle, an welcher sie stehen, sondern sie müssten nach dem Satze *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κτλ.* folgen. An dieser Stelle collidiren sie aber mit den gleichbedeutenden Worten τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ...ἀρμόστων,

ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία τόκος ἐστίν.] ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῳῷ ἀθάνατον ἔνεστιν, ἢ κύησις καὶ ἢ γέννησις. τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ἀναρμόστον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν παντὶ τῷ θεῖῳ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀρμόττον. D Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἢ Καλλονὴ ἐστὶ τῇ γενέσει. διὰ ταῦτα

206 C δέ: γὰρ Rohde ἔνεστιν B O.-P.: ἐστὶν TW τὰ B O.-P.: ταῦτα TW D θεῖῳ TW: θεῷ B O.-P. τῇ γενέσει διὰ ταῦτα· ὅταν κτλ. distinxit Schirlitz

für deren Glosse ich sie ansehe. Worauf sollten auch die Worte ἔστι δὲ... πρᾶγμα gehen, wenn ihnen die Worte τίκτειν δὲ...καλῶ unmittelbar vorangingen?" It is just possible, however, to retain the clause as a kind of parenthetic addendum to the preceding sentence, which forestalls, somewhat confusingly, the sentences τὰ δ'...ἀρμόττον. The omission of the article before καλῶ, confirmed by the Papyrus, is certainly an improvement. For the thought, cp. Plotin. *Enn.* III. v. p. 157 B.

[ἢ γὰρ...τόκος ἐστίν.] Most edd. (except Hommel and Stallb.) agree in excising this clause as a meaningless intrusion. Hommel and Stallb. explain the words as intended to introduce the first part of the exposition of τόκος, viz. τόκος κατὰ σῶμα: and Stallb. renders "nam (γὰρ=nemlich) viri et mulieris coitus, est ille nihil aliud nisi τόκος." Susemihl's comment is "die Zeugung werde als die wahrhafte Aufhebung der Geschlechtsdifferenz bezeichnet." But, as Rettig shows, none of these attempts to justify the clause are satisfactory. Perhaps it is a gloss on ἡλικία.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κτλ. Cp. *Laus* 773 E, 721 C γαμῖν δὲ...διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος φύσει τινὶ μετείληφεν ἀθανασίας· οὐ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαν ἴσχειν πᾶς πᾶσαν κτλ.: Cicero *Tusc.* I. 35 quid procreatio liberorum, quid propagatio nominis...significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare?: Clem. Al. *Strom.* II. p. 421 C ἐπισκευάσας τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν (sc. διὰ τοῦ γάμου), καὶ οἰονεὶ διαμονὴν τινὰ παισὶ παιδῶν μεταλαμπαδευομένην.

ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ. For the connexion of Eros with ἀρμονία, see 187 A ff.; for harmony of the body, cp. *Rep.* 591 D; and of the soul, *Rep.* 430 E ff., *Phaedo* 85 E ff.

206 D Μοῖρα...Εἰλείθυια. Cp. Pind. *Ol.* VI. 41 τῆ μὲν ὁ Χρυσόκομας πρᾶμῆτιν τ' Ἐλείθυιαν παρέστασέν τε Μοίρας: *id.* *Nem.* VII. 1 Ἐλείθυια πάρεδρε Μοιρᾶν βαθυφρόνων. Μοῖρα ("the Dispenser") is a birth-goddess also in Hom. *Il.* XXIV. 209 τῷ δ' ὡς ποθι Μοῖρα κραταίη | γιγνομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνφ. For Eileithyia, see also *Il.* XII. 270, Hes. *Theog.* 922; and it is noteworthy that Olen made out Eros to be the son of Eileithyia (see Paus. IX. 27). Libanius (*or.* v. t. I. p. 231 R.) identifies Eil. with Artemis.

ἢ Καλλονή. Usener was no doubt right in taking καλλονή here as a proper name, in spite of Rettig's objection that "deren Existenz nachzuweisen ihm aber nicht gelungen ist"; for such a personification, in this context, requires no precedent. "Beauty acts the part of our Lady of Travail at the birth." Possibly we ought to insert ἐπι after ἐστι(ν) or read ἔπι in place of ἐστι.



ὅταν μὲν καλῶ προσπελάζῃ τὸ κυοῦν, ἱλεῶν τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραϊνόμενον διαχεῖται καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ· ὅταν δὲ αἰσχροῦ, σκυθρωπὸν τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειρᾶται καὶ ἀποτρέπεται καὶ ἀνείλλεται καὶ οὐ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ἴσχον τὸ κύημα χαλεπῶς φέρει. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἢ πτοίησις γέγυνε

206 D. σκυθρωπὸν τε (γίγνεται) cj. Usener συσπειρᾶται TW: ξυ[ν]σπειραται O.-P.: συνσπείρεται B καὶ ἀποτρέπεται secl. Usener Sz. ἀνίλλεται O.-P.: ἀνείλλεται B: ἀνείλλεται W: ἀνείλλεται T σπαργῶντι W πτοίησις TW O.-P., Abresch: ποίησις B: πτόησις Bekk. Sz.: πόνησις Sydenham

**προσπελάζῃ.** For this poetical word, cp. Hom. *Od.* ix. 285, and (of sexual converse) Soph. *O. T.* 1101 Πανὸς προσπελασθεῖσα.

**ἱλεῶν.** Cp. 197 D.

**διαχεῖται.** This word may signify both physical and emotional effects: for the former cp. *Laios* 775 c τῶν σωμάτων διακεχυμένων ὑπὸ μέθης: for the latter, Suidas (Hesych.) διαχεῖται· χαίρει, διαχέεται, and the Psalmist's "I am poured out like water."

**συσπειρᾶται** κτλ. Schol. συσπειρᾶται· συστρέφεται. Suid. κυρίως δὲ ἀνίλλεσθαι τὸ ἀπαξιῶν. They are realistic terms to express aversion, derived perhaps from the action of a snail in drawing in its horns and rolling itself into a ball. Cp. Plotin. *Enn.* I. vi. 2. 51 ἡ ψυχὴ...πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνίλλεται καὶ ἀρνείται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριουμένη. Usener and Hug may be right in bracketing καὶ ἀποτρέπεται, on which Hug comments "Zwischen dem der Gleichnissprache angehörenden συσπειρᾶται und ἀνίλλεται ist das matte, prosaische ἀποτρέπεται unpassend"; but the extra word helps to add emphasis, if nothing more, and Plotinus too uses three verbs. In ἀνείλλεται Rettig sees an "Anspielung auf ἀνειλείθια" (cp. Eur. *Ion* 453). Cp. Plut. *de s. n. v.* p. 562 A.

**σπαργῶντι.** For σπαργᾶν, *lacte turgere*, cp. *Rep.* 460 c: in *Phaedr.* 256 A (σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ) σπαργῶν = *Venere tumens*. The Scholiast here has σπαργῶντι· ὀρμῶντι, ὀργῶντι, ταραττομένῳ, ἢ ἀνθοῦντι. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μαστῶν πεπληρωμένων γάλακτος. Here the realism of the language and the juxtaposition of κυοῦντι compels us to construe "great with child" (as L. and S.) or "with swelling bosom"—not merely "bursting with desire" or excitement. Cp. σφριγῶ as used in Ar. *Lysistr.* 80.

**ἢ πτοίησις.** "Sic feliciter emendavit Abresch"—his conj. turning out to have some ms. support. The subst. occurs also in *Prot.* 310 D γινώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν: *Crat.* 404 A τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ μανίαν: and the verb (ἐπτοῆσθαι) in *Rep.* 439 D, *Phaedo* 68 c, 108 A. Cp. Mimnermus 5. 2 πτοιῶμαι δ' ἐσορῶν ἔνθος ὀμηλικίης. It seems a *vox propria* for the condition of the lover "sighing like a furnace": cp. Plotin. *de pulcr.* p. 26 (with Creuzer's note).

περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδίνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ἔστι **E** γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρωσ, ὡς σὺ οἶει. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Εἶπεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἢ γέννησις. ἀθανασίας δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπι- 207  
θυμεῖν μετὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ ἔρωσ ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι.

**XXVI.** Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκέ με, ὅποτε περὶ τῶν

**206 E** ἀπολύειν TW O.-P.: ἀπολαύειν B: ἀποπαύειν cj. Naber ἔχοντα: ἐρῶντα Voeg. τίνος μὴν Steph. πάνυ...ἔφη del. Bdhm. τί...γεννήσεως vulgo Socrati tribuunt, Diotimae Herm. (Voeg.) reddidit δὴ BT O.-P.: δεῖ W γεννήσεως: γενεσεως O.-P. ἀειγενές: αει γενεσις O.-P. **207 A** ἀγαθὸν scripsi: ἀγαθοῦ BT O.-P.: τὰγαθὸν W Vind. Suppl. 7, vulg. Bast (ὁ) ἔρωσ Bekk. Sz.

**206 E** ὠδίνος ἀπολύειν. This is the office of Καλλονὴ as Εἰλείθυια: cp. *Theaet.* 151 A ταύτην...τὴν ὠδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη (sc. ἡ μαιευτικὴ) δύναται: *Rep.* 490 B ὃ πλησιάζας καὶ μίγεις τῷ ὄντως ὄντι, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν...καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος: *Max. Tyr. diss.* xvi. 4, p. 179 λόγος μαιεύεται ψυχὴν κυοῦσαν καὶ ὠδίνων μεστήν.

τὸν ἔχοντα. "Sc. ταύτην τὴν ὠδίνα" (Wolf): but Hommel and Stallb. supply αὐτό, i.e. τὸ καλόν. Cp. *Phaedr.* 252 A τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ἰατρὸν εὔρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων,—which settles the question.

τί...γεννήσεως; τί, answered by ὅτι, means "why" or "wherein" rather than "what" (as in 204 D), and the genitive, like those preceding, is objective. Supply ἐστίν ὁ ἔρωσ.

ἀειγενές. This is practically a re-assertion of the statement in 206 c (θεῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα κτλ.). Cp. *Laws* 773 E ὡς χρὴ τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλείποντα κτλ.

**207 A** εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν κτλ. Against Bekker, Dindorf, Ast, Stallb.<sup>1</sup> who adopted τοῦ τὰγαθὸν Rückert wrote: "etiam vulg. proba est. Construe: εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔρωσ ἐστίν, quibus ἐξηγητικῶς addita sunt verba ἑαυτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ. In quibus supplendum est subj. ὁ ἔρωσ." To this Stallb.<sup>2</sup> and Rettig assent, comparing *Pind. Ol.* III. 33 τῶν νιν γλυκὺς ἕμερος ἔσχεν...φυτεῦσαι: *Thuc.* v. 15. 1 ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι (where Poppo cites for the exegetic infin. *Crito* 52 c, *Xen. Cyr.* v. 231). None the less, the mss.' text seems—if not "sine ullo sensu" as Wolf put it—at least very awkward Greek. The obvious allusion to the former definition, ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶ τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ (206 A *ad fin.*), supports Bekker's reading here as the right one: but if we read τοῦ τὰγαθόν here consistency requires that we also read μετὰ τὰγαθοῦ in the preceding line, an easy change but supported by no authority. Hence I content myself with the minimum of alteration, viz. ἀγαθὸν for ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐρωτικῶν λόγους ποιοῖτο, καὶ ποτε ἤρετο Τί οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἴτιον εἶναι τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία, ἐπειδὴν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, καὶ  
**B** τὰ πεζὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ, νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τὸ ξυμμιγῆναι ἀλλήλοις, ἔπειτα περὶ τὴν τροφήν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἔτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ διαμάχεσθαι τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις καὶ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν, καὶ αὐτὰ τῷ λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα ὡστ' ἐκείνα ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιῶντα; τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, ἔφη, οἷοιτ' ἂν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν· τὰ δὲ θηρία τίς αἰτία οὕτως ἐρωτικῶς  
**C** διατίθεσθαι; ἔχεις λέγειν; καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην· ἢ δ' εἶπε, Διανοεῖ οὖν δεινός ποτε γενήσεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτικά, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἐννοῆς; Ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά τοι, ὦ Διοτίμα, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἶπον, παρὰ σέ ἤκω, γνοὺς ὅτι διδασκάλων δέομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε

207 A αἰσθάνη Bt. ἐπιθυμωσι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> B ἐστιν del. Bdhm. τούτων καὶ BT O.-P.: τούτων W αὐτὰ: αὐτω O.-P. τῷ del. Bdhm. παρατεινομενω O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἐρωτικῶς del. Naber C αὐτὸν ἔλεγον b, vulg. Sz. Bt.: ἀνελεγον B: ἂν ἔλεγον TW: ἐλεγον O.-P.

ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται. "In welchem gewaltsamen Zustande sich die Thiere befinden" (Schlei.). The phrase is echoed by Alcibiades in 215 E, cp. 207 B, 208 C. For διάθεσις see *Phileb.* 11 D, with my note.

207 B νοσοῦντα...περὶ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν: *Soph. fr.* 162 (Dindf.) νόσημ' ἔρωτος τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν (but Nauck *fr.* 153 reads the verse otherwise).

καὶ διαμάχεσθαι κτλ. This is a correction of Phaedrus's statement (179 B ff.): cp. 220 D ff. For the fact, cp. Aelian *H. A.* I. 18, II. 40: *Λαῶς* 814 B μὴδ' ὡσπερ ὄρνιθας περὶ τέκνων μαχομένας...ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν κτλ.

καὶ αὐτὰ κτλ. "Schleiermacher: um sie nur zu ernähren. Recte. Fallitur enim Hommel, ὥστε sic usurpari negans ideoque voculam ejectam cupiens. Conf. De Rep. VIII. p. 549 C al." (Stallb.). As Stallb. explains, αὐτὰ κτλ. depend on αἰσθάνει, the construction being changed, and αὐτὰ = *sponte*. For παρατείνεσθαι, "racked," cp. *Lys.* 204 C: *Ar. fr.* 421.

τίς αἰτία κτλ. For αἰτία with the (anarthrous) infin., cp. *Phaedo* 97 A αἰτία...γενέσθαι. For the foregoing description of the phenomena connected with reproduction in the animal-world, cp. (with Rettig) *Od.* XVI. 216 ff.; *Λαῶς* 814 B; *Arist. Hist. An.* VIII. 1; *Cic. de fin.* III. 19. 62.

207 C Διανοεῖ. "Do you fancy—?": cp. *Λαῶς* 755 B μηκέτι...τὴν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν ὡς ἄρξων διανοηθήτω. Notice the tone of indignant scorn in which Diotima speaks, cp. 204 B.

δεινός τὰ ἐρωτικά. Cp. 193 E, 198 D.

ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἶπον. See 206 B.

καὶ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά. Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τὸν ἔρωτα, οὐ πολλάκις ὠμολογήκαμεν, μὴ θαύμαζε. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ D λόγον ἢ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐν ἑκαστον τῶν ζώων ζῆν

207 D (κατὰ) τὸν αὐτὸν Hirschig αἰεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος B: αἰεὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος T O.-P., Jn. Bt.: τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι Sz.: τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ J.-U. τῇ γενέσει libri, O.-P.: τῇ γεννήσει Wolf Bdhm. J.-U.: secl. Verm. Sz. Bt. ὅτι: ὅταν Usener καταλείπει Usener ἐν...ζώων del. Ast

οὐ πολλάκις ὦμ. οὐ means ἀθανασίας: πολλάκις refers not only to 206 E f. but also to other conversations such as are implied in 207 A (ἐδίδασκέ με ὅποτε κτλ.).

207 D ἐνταῦθα. "Here," i.e. in the case of τὰ θηρία, as distinguished from that of humans.

τὸν αὐτὸν...λόγον. Adv. accus.; cp. 178 E.

κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. This implies (cp. 208 A *ad fin.*, B) that only partial immortality, at the best, can attach to ἡ θνητὴ φύσις.

ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος. I retain the reading of B rejected by recent edd. (see *crit. n.*): ἀεὶ goes with the preceding words, cp. *Rep.* 618 C τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι: and 206 A, B *supra*. If, with Burnet, we adopt the reading of T, we must suppose εἶναι to be doing double duty, "both to exist (εἶναι) always and to be (εἶναι) immortal." For the desire of this mortal "to put on immortality," cp. *Eur. fr.* 808 ὦ φιλόζωοι βροτοὶ... οὕτως ἔρω βρότοισιν ἔγκειται βίου: Browne *Hydriot.* c. 5 "Restless inquietude for the diuturnity of our memories unto present considerations seems a vanity almost out of date, and superannuated piece of folly."

δύναται κτλ. This introduces the explanation of the saving phrase κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ταύτῃ is adverbial (equiv. to ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ in 208 B *ad init.*), and τῇ γενέσει, if genuine, is an exegetic supplement. Possibly we should excise τῇ γενέσει, with Vermehren; or else alter to τῇ γεννήσει. But the use of τῇ γενέσει above (206 D) in the sense of "the process of generation," combined with the emphasis, by repetition of its moods and tenses, laid on γίγνεσθαι in the sequel (207 D—208 A), may make us hesitate to adopt any change; cp. also the passage quoted in the next note.

ἀεὶ καταλείπει κτλ. Cp. *Laus* 721 C γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων...τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἀεὶ γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετεληφέναι: *ib.* 773 E (cited above). On this "conceit" of "a fruitful issue wherein, as in the truest chronicle, they seem to outlive themselves," Sir T. Browne (*Rel. Med.* § 41) observes "This counterfeit subsisting in our progenies seems to me a mere fallacy" etc.

ἐπεὶ καὶ κτλ. We should expect this first clause to be followed by something like οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ νέον ἀεὶ γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι or οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, but, affected by the parenthetic clause οἶον...γένηται, the

καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, οἶον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμοῦς ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ **Ε** ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα καὶ αἷμα καὶ ξύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἦθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λύπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι **208** καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταυτὸν πάσχει. ὁ γὰρ καλεῖται μελε-

**207 D** τὰ αὐτὰ: ταυτα O.-P.: ταῦτ' Bdhm. ἀλλὰ νέος: ἀλλοῖος Steph.: ἀλλὰ νέος τὰ μὲν Sommer: fort. (τὰ μὲν) ἄμα νέος (τὰ μὲν προσλαμβάνων) τὰ δὲ Wolf: τὰ δὲ (παλαιὰ) Bast **Ε** τρόποι T O.-P.: τόποι B ἔθη Fischer ἔτι B O.-P.: ἐστιν TW

sentence follows a different course. Cp. the cases of anacoluthon in 177 B, 182 D.

νέος...τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς. For the omission of τὰ μὲν, cp. *Theaet.* 181 D, *Protag.* 330 A, *Rep.* 451 D. I think it not unlikely that for ἀλλὰ we should read ἄμα: the processes of growth and decay are synchronous. For the substance of this passage cp. Heraclitus *fr.* 41 δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης: (Heraclitus *ap.*) Plut. *de EI Delph.* c. 18 ὁ χθὲς (ἄνθρωπος) εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθνηκεν, ὁ δὲ σήμερον εἰς τὸν αὔριον ἀποθνήσκει. μένει δ' οὐδεὶς, οὐδ' ἔστιν εἷς, ἀλλὰ γιγνόμεθα πολλοὶ περὶ ἐν φάντασμα: Max. Tyr. *diss.* XLI. 4 μεταβολὴν ὁρᾶς σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλαγὴν, ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον κτλ.: Plut. *cons. ad Apoll.* 10: *Cratyl.* 439 D ff.: see also Rohde *Psyche* II. 148.

The influence of "the flowing philosophers" is noticeable also in Epicharm. *fr.* 40. 12 ff. (Lorenz)—

ὦδε νῦν ὄρη  
καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὔξειθ', ὁ δὲ γὰ μὲν φθίνει.  
ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.  
ὁ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κωῦποκ' ἐν τωῦτῳ μένει,  
ἄτερον εἶη κα τόδ' ἤδη τοῦ παρεξιστακότος.  
καὶ τὺ δὴ κάγω χθὲς ἄλλοι καὶ νῦν ἄλλοι τελέθομες,  
καῦθις ἄλλοι κωῦποχ' ὡῦτοὶ καττὸν αὐτὸν αὐ λόγον.

Cp. Spenser *F. Q.* VII. 7. 19 And men themselves do change continually, | From youth to eld from wealth to poverty...Ne doe their bodies only flit and fly, | But eeke their minds (which they immortall call) | Still change and vary thoughts, as new occasions fall."

**208 A** αἱ ἐπιστήμαι. The word is used here in the popular sense—"notitiae rerum in sensus cadentium" (Rückert); cp. *Rep.* 476 D ff.

μελετᾶν. See note on ἀμελέτητος 172 A *supra*.



τᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης [μνήμην] σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σφύζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπίον καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον B ἐγκαταλείπειν οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ σῶμα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄλλη. μὴ οὖν θαύμαζε εἰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾷ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἢ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ ἐπεται.

208 A μνήμην secl. Baiter Sz. Bt.: μνημη O.-P.: μνήμη Sauppe Jn. θνητὸν T O.-P.: ὄνητὸν B οὐ τῷ T O.-P.: οὕτω B τὸ αὐτὸν B O.-P.: ταῦτὸν Bdhm. J.-U. B τῷ τὸ: τῷ Liebhold: τῷ τὸ αἰεὶ Usener καὶ παλαιούμενον om. Stob., J.-U. ἐγκαταλείπειν: ἐγκαταλιπειν O.-P.: καταλείπειν Stob.: αἰεὶ καταλείπειν Hirschig Jn. ταύτῃ...ἄλλη om. Stob. μετέχει Steph., O.-P.: μετέχειν libri, Voeg. ἀδύνατον Creuzer Sz. Bt.: δυνατόν, ἀδύνατον Voeg.: ἀθάνατον libri, O.-P. ἄπαν Stob.

λήθη γὰρ κτλ. Cp. *Phaedo* 75 D οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν...ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; *Phileb.* 33 E ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος: *Meno* 81 c; *Laws* 732 c. For the πηγὴ Δήθης (Μνημοσύνης) in Hades, see *Pind. fr.* 130; Rohde, *Psyche* II. 209<sup>3</sup>, 390<sup>1</sup>.

[μνήμην]. This word is either interpolated or corrupted (*pace* Rettig who attempts to defend it by citing *Phileb.* 34 B): ἀπιούσης must refer to the same subst. as ἐξιούσης above, viz. τῆς ἐπιστήμης, while καινὴν must qualify the same subst. as ἀπιούσης. For later reff. to this doctrine, see *Philo Jud. de nom. mut.* p. 1060; *Nemes. de nat. hom.* 13, p. 166.

208 B ἀλλὰ τῷ...οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. This view is reproduced by Aristotle, *de an.* II. 4. 415<sup>a</sup> 26 ff. φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν...τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό...ἵνα τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν...ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ συνεχείᾳ...κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ...καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἶον αὐτό, ἀριθμῶ μὲν οὐχ ἔν, εἶδει δ' ἔν: cp. *id. Pol.* I. 1252<sup>a</sup> 26 ff.; *de gen. an.* II. 735<sup>a</sup> 17 ff.

ταύτῃ τῇ μ. Cp. ταύτῃ, 207 D *ad init.*

ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄλλη. Stallb.<sup>2</sup>, retaining the traditional ἀθάνατον, comments: "haec addita videntur et oppositionis gratia et propter verba extrema καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα: quae ne falso intelligerentur, sane cavendum fuit"—which, as Hommel points out, is unsatisfactory. Against ἀδύνατον Rückert absurdly objects that Plato would have written ἄλλη δὲ ἀδύνατον.

παντὶ...ἔπεται. Since ἐπεσθαι is more naturally used of attendance on a divinity (cp. 197 E, *Phaedr.* 248 A etc.) perhaps ἔπεστω ought to be read (cp. 183 B *crit. n.*). ἡ σπουδὴ serves to recall 206 B.

XXVII. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασά τε καὶ εἶπον  
 Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα, ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῶς οὕτως  
 C ἔχει; καὶ ἦ, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί, Εὐ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες·  
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι,  
 θαυμάζοις ἂν τῆς ἀλογίας [περὶ] ἃ ἐγὼ εἶρηκα εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς, ἐνθυ-  
 μηθεῖς ὡς δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι τοῦ ὀνομαστοῖ γενέσθαι “καὶ  
 κλέος ἐς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι,” καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου  
 D παίδων, καὶ χρήματ' ἀναλίσκειν καὶ πόνους πονεῖν οὐστινασοῦν

208 C ἔφη BT O.-P.: om. W ἐπεὶ B O.-P., Sz.: ἐπεὶ γε TW, Bt.  
 ἐθέλοισ Steph. περὶ BT: πέρι Vind. 21, Bast Herm.: περι O.-P.: secl. Ast  
 Sz. ἐς B, Sz. Bt.: εἰς TW O.-P. ἀθάνατον del. Wolf πάντες W  
 μᾶλλον om. T

Εἶεν. “Really!”: “In irrisione verti potest so?” (Ast). This is a somewhat rare use; cp. *Rep.* 350 E ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραῦσιν ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσας, “εἶεν” ἐρῶ: *ib.* 424 E; *Euthyd.* 290 C. For the doubled “verbum dicendi” (εἶπον...ἦν), cp. 177 A, 202 C.

208 C ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί. We might render “in true professorial style.” The reference may be partly (as Wolf and Hommel suggest) to the fact that the sophistic, as contrasted with the Socratic, method was that of didactic monologue (δύλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου *Prot.* 329 A)—the lecture rather than the conversation. Thus in the sequel (208 C—212 A) Diotima develops her own doctrine without the aid of further question-and-answer. Stallb., however, explains the phrase as intended to ridicule the pretended omniscience of the sophists; Rettig sees in it an indication that what follows is meant, in part, as a parody of the earlier speeches; and by Ast and Schleierm. it is taken to refer only to the dogmatic tone of εὐ ἴσθι. For τέλει σοφιστής, cp. *Crat.* 403 E (applied to Hades); σοφιστής applied to Eros, 203 D; οἱ χρηστοὶ σοφισταί, 177 B; οἱ σοφοί, 185 C. It is possible also that in τέλει there may be a hint at the mystery-element in D.’s speech (cp. 210 A and πρὸς τέλος 210 E).

εἰ ἐθέλεις κτλ. For φιλοτιμία, cp. 178 D. The thought here recalls Milton’s “Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise” etc.

θαυμάζοις ἂν κτλ. Stallb., defending περὶ, says “ad ἐννοεῖς facillime e superioribus intelligitur αὐτά.” But we may justly complain here, as Badham does at *Phileb.* 49 A, of “the dunce who inserted περὶ.”

καὶ κλέος...καταθέσθαι. “Ex poeta aliquo petita esse ipse verborum numerus declarat” (Stallb.): but it is just as probable that Diotima herself is the authoress—rivalling Agathon. Cp. Tyrtaeus 12. 31—2 οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ' ὄνομ' αὐτοῦ | ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆς περ εἰὼν γίγνεται ἀθάνατος: Theogn. 245—6 οὐδέ τὸτ' οὐδέ θανῶν ἀπολείς κλέος, ἀλλὰ μελήσεις | ἄφθιτον ἀνθρώποις αἰὲν ἔχων ὄνομα: Simon. 99. 1 ἄσβεστον κλέος...θίντες. For the thought, see also Cic. *Tusc.* I. p. 303; *Cat. Mai.* 22. 3.

καὶ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. ἐπεὶ οἶει σύ, ἔφη, Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἢ προαποθανεῖν τὸν ὑμέτερον Κόδρον ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν παίδων, μὴ οἰομένους “ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς περί” ἐαυτῶν ἔσσεσθαι, ἦν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, ἀλλ’, οἶμαι, ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιούσιν, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀμεί-

208 D ἄν...προαποθανεῖν om. W βαλειας O.-P. περί Ast Sz. Bt.: περι BT

208 D ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. An obvious allusion to 180 A ff.: Diotima corrects Phaedrus by showing the motive for self-sacrifice to be not so much personal ἔρως as ἔρως for immortal fame. The use of the cognate accus. (κινδύνους, πόνους) is another poetical feature in this passage—reminiscent of Agathon’s style.

Κόδρον. Schol.: πολέμου τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ὄντος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἔχρησεν ὁ θεὸς τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν αἰρήσειν τὰς Ἀθήνας, εἰ Κόδρον τὸν βασιλέα μὴ φονεύσουσιν. γγούς δὲ τοῦτο ὁ Κόδρος, στείλας ἑαυτὸν εὐτελεῖ σκεύη ὡς ξυλιστήν καὶ δρέπανον λαβών, ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων προῆει. δύο δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπαντησάντων πολεμίων τὸν μὲν ἕνα πατάξας κατέβαλεν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀγνοηθεὶς ὅστις ἦν, πληγείς ἀπέθανε. This “popular story” is late: “according to the older tradition Codrus fell in battle” (see Bury *Hist. Gr.* p. 169): the traditional date of the event is about 1068 B.C. Notice the rare προαποθανεῖν (once each in Hdt., Antiphon, Xen.), and the “sophistic” jingle in προ-, ἐπ-, ἀποθανεῖν. For later allusions to Codrus, see Cic. *Tusc.* I. 48; Hor. *C.* III. 19. 2.

ἀθάνατον μνήμην κτλ. Cp. Simon. 123 μνήμα δ’ ἀποφθιμένοισι πατὴρ Μεγάριστος ἔθηκεν | ἀθάνατον θνητοῖς παισὶ χαριζόμενος: *id.* 4. 8 (Λεωνίδας) ἀρετᾶς λελοιπῶς | κόσμον ἀέναον κλέος τε: *id.* 96. Observe how near ἀθάνατον ...ἔσσεσθαι goes to forming a complete hexameter.

ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου. Cp. Soph. *Philoct.* 1419 ὄσους πονήσας καὶ διεξελθῶν πόνους | ἀθάνατον ἀρετὴν ἔσχον: Pind. *Ol.* VII. 163 ἄνδρα τε πύξ ἀρετᾶν εὐρόντα: *id.* *Nem.* X. 2 φλέγεται δ’ ἀρεταῖς μυρίαῖς ἔργων θρασέων ἔνεκεν (“countless monuments” J. B. Bury, see *Append. A* in his ed.): *id.* *Isthm.* IV. 17 (with Bury, *App.* F): Thuc. I. 33. 2: *Rep.* 618 B ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς: Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 1. 29: *Anth. Pal.* VII. 252. These passages show that ἀρετὴ can denote not only “excellence” but its result, reward or token, “renown,” “distinction,” whether or not embodied in a concrete “monument.” For the thought cp. Spenser *F. Q.* III. iii. 1 “Most sacred fyre, that burnest mightily In living brests...which men call Love...Whence spring all noble deedes and never dying fame.”

εὐκλεοῦς. Cp. Simon. 95 εὐκλέας αἶα κέκευθε, Λεωνίδα, οἱ μετὰ σείῳ | τῆδ’ ἔθανον: *Menex.* 247 D. With the thought of this passage, cp. Sir T. Browne *Hydriot.* c. 5 “There is no antidote against the opium of time...But the iniquity of oblivion blindly scattereth her poppy, and deals with the memory of men without distinction to merit of perpetuity....In vain do individuals

**Ε** νους ὄσι, τοσοῖτφ μᾶλλον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρώσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες, ἔφη, κατὰ τὰ σώματα ὄντες πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον τρέπονται καὶ ταύτη ἐρωτικοί εἰσι, διὰ παιδογονίας ἀθανασίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οἴονται, αὐτοῖς “ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον  
209 πάντα ποριζόμενοι”· οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν—εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, οἱ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κυοῦσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν· τί οὖν προσήκει; φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· ὧν δὴ εἰσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες γεννή-

208 **Ε** κατὰ τὰ O.-P., Paris 1812, vulg. Sz.: κατὰ BTW, Bt. οἴον τε Vind. 21  
209 **Α** ἢ (αἰ) ἐν Naber κυησεται O.-P.<sup>1</sup>: κυησαιτε O.-P. corr.: κνεῖσθαι Bdhm. τεκεῖν Hug Sz., O.-P.: κνεῖν libri: τίκτειν Jn.: γεννᾶν cj. Teuffel

hope for immortality, or any patent from oblivion, in preservations below the moone.” Also Soph. *Philoct.* 1422 ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῶνδ’ εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον.

208 **Ε** οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες. Here first the two kinds of pregnancy, bodily and mental,—mentioned together in 206 B, c—are definitely separated.

πρὸς τὰς γ. μ. τρέπονται. Cp. 181 c, 191 E.

ἀθανασίαν κτλ. Hug points out that by a few slight alterations this can be turned into an elegiac couplet:—

ἀθάνατον μνήμην κευδαιμονίαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς  
εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον πάντα ποριζόμενοι.

Hommel had already printed εἰς...χρόνον as a half-verse.

209 **Α** οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν. Sc. ἐγκύμονες ὄντες. In this anacoluthic period Rettig sees a parody of Phaedrus’s style with its “langathmigen, anakoluthischen und regellosen Perioden.”

καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν. Hug’s conjecture, τεκεῖν for κνεῖν, is fortunate in finding confirmation in the Papyrus. If κνεῖν be read, what is the point of the distinction of tenses? Schleierm. renders by “erzeugen und erzeugen zu wollen”; Schulthess, “zeugen und empfangen”; Rettig explains that “κνεῖν geht auf den dauernden, κυῆσαι auf den vollendeten Process”; Stallb. “et concepisse (quae est actio semel...perfecta) et conceptum tenere.” But there is certainly not much point here in making any such fine-spun distinction, unless it be to imply that Diotima is playing the part of a σοφιστής!

φρόνησιν...ἀρετὴν. “Moral wisdom and virtue in general”: the phrase is an echo of that in 184 D. For φρόνησις, cp. *Rep.* 427 E (with Adam’s note); *Meno* 88 B (with Thompson’s note).

οἱ ποιηταὶ. That the poets were ethical teachers and the stage a pulpit—just as Homer was the Greek Bible—was an axiom in the Hellenic world. See the appeal to the authority of poets in the *Protagoras* (and Adam’s note on 338 E); *Ar. Ran.* 1009 (Eurip. loquitur) βελτίους τε ποιούμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: *Lysis* 214 A οὗτοι γὰρ (sc. οἱ ποιηταὶ) ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες. The fact that most kinds of poetry were produced in connexion with, and under the sanction of, religion, had no doubt something to do with this estimate of it. See further Adam *R. T. G.* pp. 9 ff.

τορες καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὐρετικοὶ εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ  
 μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἢ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων  
 τε καὶ οἰκίσεων διακοσμήσεις, ἧ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ  
 δικαιοσύνη· τούτων αὐ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν **B**  
 θεῖος ὦν καὶ ἠκούσης τῆς ἡλικίας τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾶν ἤδη ἐπι-  
 θυμῆ, ζητεῖ δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος περιῶν τὸ καλὸν ἐν ᾧ ἂν γεννή-  
 σειεν· ἐν τῷ γὰρ αἰσχυρῷ οὐδέποτε γεννήσει. τὰ τε οὖν σώματα τὰ  
 καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχυρὰ ἀσπάζεται ἅτε κυῶν, καὶ ἂν ἐντύχη  
 ψυχῇ καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, πάνυ δὴ ἀσπάζεται τὸ ξυναμ-

**209 A** τὰς libri, O.-P.: τὰ Sommer Bt. διακοσμήσεις Vind. 21, vulg.  
 Bast Heindorf J.-U. Sz.: διακόσμησις libri, O.-P., Sommer Bt. **B** αὐ B  
 O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: δ' αὐ TW, Bt. ψυχὴν, (τὴν φύσιν) Heusde θεῖος libri,  
 O.-P., Sz.: ἦθεος Parmentier Bt.: θεῖος ὦν del. Jn. ἐπιθυμῆ Steph. J.-U.  
 Sz.: ἐπιθυμη O.-P.: ἐπιθυμεί libri, Bt. δὴ BT O.-P.: δὲ W περιῶν T  
 O.-P.: περὶ ὧν B ἐν ᾧ δὴ γεννήσῃ Bdhm. ἢ τὰ αἰσχυρὰ del. Bdhm.  
 ἄτε: ὁ γε Usener

δημιουργῶν...εὐρετικοί. An allusion to 197 A δημιουργίαν...ἀνεῦρεν.

μεγίστη...τῆς φρονήσεως. Cp. *Crat.* 391 B ὀρθοτάτη τῆς σκέψεως: *Rep.* 416 B;  
*Thuc.* I. 2 τῆς γῆς ἢ ἀρίστη: see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 50 a, R. 3.

σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη. Cp. *Phaedo* 82 A οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολι-  
 τικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηθευκότες, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ  
 ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γενοῦναι ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ: *Meno* 73 A. For  
 these virtues in the *Republic*, see Adam on 432 A, 434 c. Here they combine  
 to form a description of "ordinary civil virtue."

**209 B** τούτων αὐ κτλ. Here the main statement is resumed. With  
 Stephens (followed by Ast, Rückert and Hug) I read ἐπιθυμῆ, whereas  
 Burnet prints ἐπιθυμεί. ζητεῖ δὴ κτλ., with commas after ψυχὴν and ἡλικίας.  
 Stallb. takes καί as intensive rather than connective, and renders θεῖος ὦν  
 "quippe divinus." Burnet adopts Parmentier's ἦθεος, but there seems little  
 point in emphasizing the celibacy of the youth. If alteration be required,  
 the best would be ἐνθεος, for which cp. 179 A, 180 B. But in *Meno* 99 c ff.  
 θεῖος, in much the same sense as ἐνθεος, is applied to the very classes here  
 mentioned—ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοφδοὺς καὶ  
 μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς...φαίμεν ἂν θεῖους τε  
 εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν κτλ. (see Thompson *ad loc.*): hence the word may well  
 be sound here also. For τῆς ἡλικίας (and θεῖος) cp. 206 c.

ζητεῖ...περιῶν. Cp. *Prot.* 348 D περιῶν ζητεῖ ὅφ' ἐπιδείξῃται: *Rep.* 620 c:  
*Apol.* 23 B. περιέμεναι occurs also in 193 A, 219 E.

ἐν τῷ γὰρ αἰσχυρῷ. A repetition of 206 c: cp. *Rep.* 402 D, *Phaedr.* 253 A ff.

καὶ ἂν...εὐφυεῖ. Notice the iambic rhythm. For the sense of γενναῖος,  
 "well-bred" (of a dog, *Rep.* 375 A), cp. (Eurip. *ap.*) *Gorg.* 485 E. For εὐφυής  
 also cp. (Eurip. *ap.*) *Gorg.* 484 c ff.; *Rep.* 409 E. Cp. for the sense Plotin. *de*  
*pulcr.* 309 (Cr.); *Rep.* 620 B; Cic. *Lael.* 14; and esp. *Phaedr.* 276 E.

τὸ ξυναμφότερον. Cp. *I. Alc.* 130 A ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ ξυναμφότερον.



φότερον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ  
 C ἀρετῆς καὶ [περὶ] οἷον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἃ ἐπιτη-  
 δεύειν, καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παιδεύειν. ἀπτόμενος γάρ, οἶμαι, τοῦ καλοῦ  
 καὶ ὀμιλῶν αὐτῷ, ἃ πάλαι ἐκύει τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ, καὶ παρῶν καὶ  
 ἀπῶν μεμνημένος, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου,  
 ὥστε πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν [τῆς τῶν παίδων] πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι ἰσχουσι καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιότεραν, ἅτε καλλιόνων καὶ  
 ἀθανατωτέρων παίδων κεκοινωνηκότες. καὶ πᾶς ἂν δέξαιτο ἑαυτῷ  
 D τοιοῦτους παῖδας μᾶλλον γεγενῆσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίλους, καὶ εἰς  
 "Ὀμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ <εἰς> 'Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς  
 τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλῶν οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν, ἃ ἐκείνοις

209 C περὶ secl. Steph. Mdv. Sz. Bt.: περὶ τοῦ Coisl.: περὶ οἷον Sommer  
 ἀπῶν καὶ παρῶν T καὶ (ante τὸ) om. Vind. 21, Bast τῆς...παίδων  
 seclusi τῶν παίδων: ἄλλων παίδων Hug<sup>1</sup>: θνητῶν παίδων Schirlitz: τῶν  
 πολλῶν Rohde: τῶν παιδογόνων Bast: fort. τῶν (γῆνων) παίδων καλλίων  
 ὦν B παίδων secl. Creuzer J.-U. D εἰς Ἡσίοδον O.-P.: 'Ἡσίοδον libri,  
 edd. ζητῶν ὅσα Proclus: ζηλοῖη οἷα Ast καταλελοίπασιν Method. Bdhm.

εὐπορεῖ λόγων. Cp. 223 A; *Tim.* 26 D ἵνα εὐποροῖεν λόγων μετ' ἐμοῦ.

209 C καὶ [περὶ] οἷον κτλ. περὶ is retained by Hommel and Stallb. who renders "quale sit in quo tractando versari debeat is qui boni viri nomen et dignitatem obtinere velit," taking οἷον as neut., and by Rettig who regards the "redundance and tautology" of the words as due to the "sophistical character" of the passage.

τοῦ καλοῦ. This is masc., not neuter, as the context shows.

καὶ παρῶν καὶ ἀπῶν. A rhetorical formula; cp. *Soph. Antig.* 1109 οἱ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπόντες: *id. El.* 305: *Crat.* 420 A, *Laws* 635 A. As Hommel observes, μεμνημένος (*sc. αὐτοῦ*) can in strictness apply only to ἀπῶν.

τὸ γεννηθὲν κτλ. Cp. 207 B, *Phaedr.* 276 E.

τῆς τῶν παίδων. Hugprints τῶν x x x παίδων with the note (after Vermehren) "es scheint ein Epitheton wie φύσει ο. ähnl. ausgefallen zu sein." Stallb. explains ἡ κοινωνία τῶν παίδων to mean "conjunctio ex liberorum procreatione oriunda." The simplest remedy is to bracket the words τῆς τῶν παίδων (see *crit. n.*).

ἀθανατωτέρων. For this Hibernian comparison cp. *Phaedo* 99 c.

209 D ζηλῶν οἷα κτλ. *I.e.* ζηλῶν αὐτοὺς ὅτι τοιαῦτα κτλ., "With envy for the noble offspring they leave." For οἷος = ὅτι τοιοῦτος, cp. *Xen. Cyr.* VII. 3. 13 (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 198 R. 3). Rückert punctuates after 'Ἡσίοδον, Hommel after ἀπόβλεψας, and it is evident from Rettig's note,—"Homer kann man nur bewundern, mit andern Dichtern ist es eher möglich zu wetteifern,"—that he too mistakes the construction: we must supply αὐτοὺς (as Stallb.) with ζηλῶν and construe all the accusatives as depending on εἰς: cp. *I. Alc.* 120 A, 122 B, c. This passage is quoted by Proclus *ad Pl. Rep.* p. 393.

ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἔφη, οἷους Λυκούργος παῖδας κατελίπετο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι σωτήρας τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. τίμιος δὲ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ Σόλων διὰ τὴν τῶν νόμων γέννησιν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἑλλησι καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις, **E** πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετὴν· ὧν καὶ ἱερὰ πολλὰ ἤδη γέγονε διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους παῖδας, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους οὐδενός πω.

XXVIII. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὃ Σώκρατες, κἄν

209 D κατελίπετο b O.-P, J.-U. Sz. Bt.: κατέλιπεν...τὸ B: κατελείπετο T: κατέλιπε τοῖς vulg.: κατέλιπεν αὐτοῦ Rettig ὑμῖν TW vulg.: ἡμῖν B O.-P. (probab.) (ο) Σολων O.-P. **E** ἐν Ἑλλησι: Ἑλλησι O.-P. ἐν βαρβάροις: βαρβάροις Clement πολλὰ...ἔργα secl. Hartmann καλὰ: ἀλλα O.-P. (καὶ) γεννήσαντες O.-P. (οὐδέν) οὐδενός πω Hirschig

ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην. Cp. 208 D (note).

αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. Rettig says "sc. ἀθάνατα"; but the words imply κλέος as well as ἀθανασία.

εἰ δὲ βούλει. See on 177 D. This is a brachylogy for εἰ δὲ βούλει, ζηλῶν Λυκούργον οἷους παῖδας κτλ.

παῖδας κατελίπετο. For the middle, cp. *Laws* 721 c, *Rep.* 594 c.

σωτήρας τῆς Δ. "Dadurch, dass sie den revolutionären Bewegungen ein Ende machten" (Rettig). Agathon had already applied σωτήρ to Eros (197 E). For Plato's philo-Laconism, see Zeller's *Plato* (E. T.) p. 484. For the mythical lawgiver "Lycurgus" (vulgarly dated at 885 B.C.), see Bury *H. Gr.* p. 135. The statement that his laws were the salvation "practically" of Hellas may be taken to refer to the part played by the Spartans during the Persian invasions, cp. Pind. *Pyth.* i. 77 ff. See also the parallel passage in Xen. *Symp.* viii. 38—9.

τίμιος δὲ κτλ. For this emphatic position of the adj., cp. *Laws* 730 D τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν.

209 E ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ. An echo of 182 B: cp. *Prot.* 326 D. This passage is alluded to by Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 130. 38 ἔν τε τῷ συμποσίῳ ἐπαινῶν Πλάτων τοὺς βαρβάρους κτλ.

πολλὰ...ἔργα. Another rhetorical "tag," as is shown by the parallel in *Menex.* 239 A πολλὰ...καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφώνησαντο εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους: cp. Phaedrus's expressions in 179 B, c.

παντοίαν ἀρετὴν. Cp. *Critias* 112 E κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοίαν ἀρετὴν: Eur. *Med.* 845 (ἔρωτας) παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνέργους.

ἱερὰ πολλὰ. For the shrine of Lycurgus, see Hdt. i. 66, Plut. *Lyc.* 31. The language echoes Aristophanes' μέγιστ' ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατασκευάσαι (189 c); and it is cited by Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 300 P.

Ταῦτα...κἄν σὺ μνηθείης. Here Diotima passes on to the final section of her discourse on erotics (see 210 D n.). Hug and P. Crain (following C. F. Hermann and Schwegler) suppose that κἄν σὺ μ. indicates that what follows is something beyond the ken of the *historical* Socrates, whose view

210 <sup>initiate</sup> σὺ μνηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἔνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, εἴαν τις ὀρθῶς μετήη, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἶός τ' ἂν εἴης. ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ <καὶ σὺ> ἔπεσθαι,

210 A ἂν post οἶδ' transp. Naber εφην O.-P. καὶ σὺ ἐπεσθαι O.-P.: ἔπεσθαι libri, edd.

they regard as correctly represented in Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 97 ff. But although we may admit (with Thompson, *Meno* p. 158) that "we often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held," we are not hereby justified in assuming such criticism on every possible occasion. And, in the case before us, another and more probable explanation of the words lies to hand. Socrates throughout—with his usual irony—depicts himself as a mere tiro in the hands of the Mantinean mistress; but he is still, in spite of his mock-modesty, the ideal philosopher of Alcibiades' encomium. As it was a part of his irony that he had already (201 E) put himself on the level of Agathon and the rest of the unphilosophic, so the contemptuous κἂν σὺ here serves to keep up the same ironical fiction,—i.e. it applies neither to the ideal nor to the real (historical) Socrates, but to the hypothetical Socrates—the disguise assumed by the ideal Socrates when he played the part of pupil (cp. Rettig's note, and F. Horn *Platonstud.* p. 248). The attitude of Socr. may be illustrated by the words of S. Paul (1 *Cor.* iv. 6) ταῦτα δέ, ἀδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ Ἀπολλῶ δι' ὑμᾶς, ἵνα ἐν ὑμῖν μάθητε κτλ. For μνηθείης, see next note.

210 A τὰ δὲ...ἐποπτικά. Cp. *Phaedr.* 250 C εὐδαιμόνα φάσματα μνούμενοι τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες: *ib.* 249 C τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος. On the former passage Thompson comments, "μνούμενοι and ἐποπτεύοντες are not to be distinguished here, except in so far as the latter word defines the sense of the former. Properly speaking μύησις is the generic term for the entire process, including the ἐποπτεία, or state of the epopt or adept, who after due previous lustrations and the like is admitted into the adytum to behold the αὐτοπτικά ἀγάλματα (*Iambl. Myst.* II. 10. 53)": "the distinction between the two words (μύησις and ἐποπτεία), as if they implied, the one an earlier, the other a more advanced stage of imitation, was a later refinement." According to Theo Smyrnaeus (*Math.* p. 18) there were five grades of initiation, viz. καθαρμός, ἢ τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις, ἐποπτεία, ἀνάδελξις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπίθεσις, ἢ θεοφιλῆς καὶ θεοῖς συνδιαίτος εὐδαιμονία. For the language and rites used in the mysteries, see also Plut. *de Is.* c. 78; *id.* *Demetr.* 26; Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. p. 689; Rohde *Psyche* II. 284; and the designs from a cinerary urn reproduced in Harrison, *Proleg.* p. 547.

ὧν ἔνεκα. "The final cause": cp. 210 E, *Charm.* 165 A.

ταῦτα. Repeating ταῦτα...τὰ ἐρωτικά: see the recapitulation in 211 C.

οἶός τ' ἂν εἴης. Sc. μνηθῆναι: this, as Thompson observes, shows that μύησις includes ἐποπτεία. Notice the emphasis laid, here at the start and throughout, on educational method, τὸ ὀρθῶς μετιέναι.

προθυμίας...ἀπολείψω. Cp. *Rep.* 533 A τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολείποι.

πειρῶ δὲ (καὶ σὺ) ἔπεσθαι. I have added καὶ σὺ from the Papyrus; it serves

ἀν οἴός τε ἦς. δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄρχεσθαι μὲν νέον ὄντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἠγῆται ὁ ἠγούμενος, ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλοῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι, ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὄτφουιν σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι, B καὶ εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν, πολλή ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἔν τε καὶ ταῦτόν ἠγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐννοήσαντα καταστήναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν

210 A ἄν: εαν O.-P. αὐτὸν TW O.-P.: αὐτῶν B, Sz. Bt.: αὐ του Verm. σώματος secl. (Rückert) Voeg. J.-U. Hug ἔπειτα δὲ libri, O.-P.: ἔπειτα καὶ Themist.: ἔπειτα Usener αὐτὸν: fort. αὐ B κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ BT O.-P.: κ. τῷ ἐπὶ W σώματι τῷ TW O.-P.: σ. τὸ B ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ B O.-P.: ἐτέρῳ T εἰ (δὴ) δεῖ cj. Jn. τοῦτο δ' BW O.-P.: τούτῳ δ' T

to lay an appropriate stress on the personal effort required on the part of the disciple, the incapacity of whose "natural man" is so persistently emphasized.

δεῖ γάρ κτλ. The sentence runs on without a full stop till we reach the close of 210 D: Rettig sees in this straggling style a parody of the style of Pausanias. The passage following was a favourite with the neo-Platonists; see the reff. in Alcinous *isag.* 5; Plut. *quaest. Plat.* 3. 2. 1002 E; Themist. *or.* 13, p. 168 c; Plotin. *Enn.* I. 6. 1, p. 50; Procl. *in Alcib. I.* p. 330.

ὁ ἠγούμενος. The educational "conductor" is represented as a *μυσταγωγός*. So we have ἀγαγεῖν 210 C, παιδαγωγηθῆ 210 E, ἄγεσθαι 211 C.

ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος. If we retain σώματος—and emphasis requires its retention,—it is difficult to justify the Bodleian αὐτῶν: and αὐτὸν, which has the support of the Papyrus, although rather otiose, is preferable to such substitutes as Hommel's αὐ τῶν (σωμάτων) or Vermehren's αὐ του, since αὐ is hardly in place here. Voegelin's objection to αὐτὸν, endorsed by Rettig, that it should involve the repetition of δεῖ, does not strike one as fatal; and I follow Rückert and Stallb. in adopting it.

210 B τὸ ἐπὶ...σώματι. Cp. 186 A.

τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν. This has been interpreted in three ways: (1) "das in der Idee Schöne" (Schleierm.), "das Schöne der Gesammtgattung" (Schulthess); so too Zeller and F. Horn; (2) "quod in specie (opp. to 'summo genere') pulchrum est" (Stallb., after Wytttenbach), so too Hommel; (3) "das in der Gestalt Schöne" (Ruge), "pulcritudo quae in forma est atque sensibus percipitur" (Rückert). The last of these is undoubtedly right, and has the support also of Vermehren, Rettig and Hug; for εἶδος of physical "form" or "outward appearance," cp. 196 A, 215 B.

μὴ οὐχ...ἠγεῖσθαι. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 817.

ἐννοήσαντα καταστήναι. Sc. αὐτὸν δεῖ, resuming the oblique construction.

τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο. "Idem est quod τοῦτο τὸ σφόδρα ἐρᾶν vel τὸν σφοδρὸν τοῦτον ἔρωτα" (Stallb.). We have had a description of this σφοδρότης already, in 183 A ff.

ἡγησάμενον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ὦν τὴν  
 C ψυχὴν τις κἂν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιοῦτους [καὶ ζητεῖν] οὔτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὐθραύσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυγγενές ἐστιν, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν σμικρὸν τι ἡγήσῃται εἶναι· μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὐθραύστημῶν κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη  
 D τὸ καλὸν μηκέτι τῷ παρ' ἐνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου

210 C κἂν Herm. Bdhm. Bt.: καὶ ἐὰν BT O.-P.: καὶ ἂν W: καὶ Ast Sz. καὶ ζητεῖν secl. Ast (fort. transp. post αὐτῷ): καὶ secl. Bdhm. Mdv. Sz. Bt. εἴ τινας W ἀναγκασθεῖς Ast ἵνα...εἶναι secl. Hug: ἵνα del. Ast ἵνα ἴδῃ T: ἵνα εἶδῃ O.-P.: ἵν' αἰδη B: fort. ἵνα διίδη αὐθραύσασθαι (τὸ τῶν) Hirschig  
 D τῷ Schleierm. Sz. Bt.: τὸ libri, O.-P. οἰκέτης: ὁ οἰκέτης Hommel παιδαρίου del. Ast

ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν κτλ. The uncontracted form καὶ ἐὰν is very rare in Plato, see Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 95. For ἄνθος, cp. 183 E.

210 C [καὶ ζητεῖν]. Ast rightly condemned these words as "ineptum glossema." To excise καὶ only (as Badham) is unsatisfactory, since as Hug justly observes τίκτειν ζητεῖν λόγους "ist unerträglich matt." Stallb. attempts to justify the words thus: "Diotima hoc dicit, talem amatorem non modo ipsum parere quasi et ex se procreare, sed etiam aliunde quaerere et investigare eiusmodi sermones, qui iuvenes reddant meliores"; so too Rettig. But this is futile.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. "In Morals" (Stewart): cp. *Laws* 793 D ὅσα νόμους ἢ ἔθη τις ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλεῖ: *Rep.* 444 E: *Gorg.* 474 E.

ἵνα τὸ...εἶναι. This clause is subordinate to, rather than coordinate with, the preceding ἵνα clause (like the ἕως ἂν clause in D *infra*),—a juxtaposition which sounds awkward. Hence it is tempting either to excise this clause with Hug, or with Ast to read ἀναγκασθεῖς for ἀναγκασθῇ, and delete the second ἵνα. Against Hug's method it may be urged that the words are wanted to correspond to ἐνός...σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον in 210 B above, and to emphasize the "littleness" of corporeal beauty even when taken in the mass. For this belittling of things of the earth, cp. *Theaet.* 173 E ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησάμενη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα...φέρεται κτλ. Observe how πᾶν...ξυγγενές here balances (πᾶν) κάλλος...ἀδελφόν in 210 B.

ἀγαγεῖν. The construction is still dependent upon δεῖ, but the subject to be supplied (*viz.* τὸν ἡγούμενον) is changed.

210 D μηκέτι τῷ παρ' ἐνί κτλ. τῷ, *sc.* καλῷ, is governed by δουλεύων, and the phrase contains a clear reference to the language of Pausanias in 183 A ff. ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, "like a lackey," is of course contemptuous, as in *Theaet.* 172 D κινδυνεύουσιν...ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. For ἀγαπῶν, "contented with," cp. *Menex.* 240 c. If we retain the mss.' τὸ παρ' ἐνί the construction is



κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δουλεύων φαῦλος ἢ καὶ μικρολόγος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτη καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεῖς καὶ αὐξηθεῖς κατίδη τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε. πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἶόν τε **E** μάλιστα.

**210 D** κάλλος del. Bdhm. ἢ ἀνθρώπου del. Schirlitz: fort. ἄνου ἑνός: τινος O.-P.<sup>1</sup> δουλεύων del. Bast τίκτη Coisl. corr.: τίκτει BT καὶ διανοήματα del. Bdhm.: ante τίκτη transp. Hommel ἄφθονα Ast ρωθεῖς W

awkward, as Stallb.<sup>2</sup> admits—"quod olim accusativum defendendum suscepimus, videtur nunc interpretatio loci quam proposuimus, quamvis Rückerto et Hommelio probata, nimis contorta nec satis simplex esse." I am inclined to suspect the phrase ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινός. Schirlitz proposed to excise ἢ ἀνθρώπου: I suggest παιδαρίον κάλλος [ἢ] ἄνου τινός, "of some witless urchin," and suppose a reference to what Pausanias said in 181 B ἐρῶσι...ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων: 181 D οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἤδη ἄρχονται νοῦν ἴσχειν (cp. next n.).

φαῦλος...μικρολόγος. Cp. 181 B, where those who follow Aphrodite Pandemos (loving women and boys) are described as οἱ φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος. πέλαγος of itself connotes vastness; cp. *Rep.* 453 D εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον (ἂν τις ἐμπέσῃ): *Prot.* 338 A φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων. The phrase is alluded to in Clem. Al. *protrept.* 69 A; Plut. *quaest. Plat.* 1001 E; Themist. *or.* XIII. p. 177 c.

θεωρῶν. This should be taken closely (supplying αὐτό) with what precedes, not with πολλοὺς...λόγους (as Ast's Dict. *s.v.* implies). The parable suggests that the spectator, having reached the hill-top, turns himself about and gazes, wonder-struck, at the mighty ocean of beauty which lies spread before him, till the spectacle quickens his soul and moves it to deliver itself of many a deep-lying thought.

καλοὺς...μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. Cp. *Menex.* 247 B: *ib.* 234 C: *Rep.* 503 C νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μ. τὰς διανοίας: *ib.* 486 A, 496 A γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας. Cp. for the sense Plotin. *de pulcr.* 8 c (Cr.).

ἀφθόνῳ. ἄφθονος is used alike of fruits (*Polit.* 272 A) and of soils (*Soph.* 222 A), thus meaning both "abundant" and "bountiful"—"unstinted" and "unstinting."

ῥωσθεῖς. Cp. *Phaedr.* 238 c; 176 B *supra*.

ἐπιστήμην μίαν. This unitary science—ἐπιστήμη in the strict Platonic sense, called also (211 c) μάθημα—is dialectic; cp. *Phaedr.* 247 B τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶν ὅν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν. See parallels in Plotin. *de pulcr.* 2 A (Cr.); Procl. *in I. Alc.* p. 246.

**210 E** πειρῶ δέ μοι κτλ. Here again, as at 210 A (πειρῶ δέ ἐπισθαι κτλ.), a climax in the exposition is marked.

XXIX. Ὅς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά παιδαγωγηθῆ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκείνο, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἔνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν  
 211 πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν, πρῶτον μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δὲ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μὲν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν

211 A τοδε δε O.-P.

ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. "In correct and orderly succession"; see 211 B *ad fin.* τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς...λέναι κτλ., and 210 A where the right order of procedure (πρῶτον...ἔπειτα, etc.) is specially emphasized.

πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν. "πρὸς τέλος λέναι dicebantur ii, qui superatis gradibus tandem ad spectanda arcana admittebantur" (Hommel). Cp. the use of τέλεα in 210 A, τέλεον 204 C, τέλος 205 A.

ἐξαίφνης. "On a sudden": this suggests the final stage in the mystery-rites, when out of darkness there blazed forth suddenly the mystical φέγγος, and ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ the φάσματα (*Phaedr.* 250 C) or ἱερὰ μυστικά—consisting probably of images of Demeter, Iacchus and Persephone, and other sacred emblems—were displayed to the awe-struck worshipper (μακαρία ὄψις τε καὶ θέα). Cp. Plotin. *Enn.* 43. 17 ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ κτλ.; Plato *Epr.* vii. 341 C ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον (*sc.* the highest μάθημα). See further Rohde, *Psyche* II. 284.

κατόψεται. Cp. 210 D *supra*, and *Phaedr.* 247 D (καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ.), which suggest that καθορᾷ was a *vox propria* for viewing ritual displays.

θαυμαστὸν...καλόν. Similarly *Phaedr.* 250 B κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν. For θαυμαστὸν cp. 219 B: it often connotes the supernatural, *e.g.* *Rep.* 398 A προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερόν καὶ θ. καὶ ἡδύν.

οὗ δὴ ἔνεκεν κτλ. "The goal to which all our efforts have been directed": cp. 210 A; *Phaedr.* 248 B οὗ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ κτλ. See the parallel in Plotin. *de pulcr.* 42 C, D (Cr.).

211 A πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα...οὐδ' αὖ κτλ. The Ideal object is distinguished by three leading characteristics, viz. (1) eternity and immutability; (2) absoluteness, or freedom from relativity; (3) self-existence. Compare the accounts of Ideal being given in *Phaedo* 78 C ff., *Phaedr.* 247 C ff., *Cratyl.* 386 D, 439 C ff., *Rep.* 476 A, 479 A ff., *Soph.* 249 B ff., *Phileb.* 15 B, 58 A, *Tim.* 51 D ff. The description has, necessarily, to be conveyed by means of negative propositions, *i.e.* by way of contrast with phenomenal objects. See also the parallels in Plotin. *Enn.* v. viii. 546 C, vi. vii. 727 C.

τῇ μὲν...τῇ δε. "In part...in part": so *Theaet.* 158 E, *Polit.* 274 E, *Laws* 635 D.

πρὸς μὲν τὸ...τὸ. This denotes varying "relation," as in the Aristotelian τὸ πρὸς τι.

[ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὄν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν]. οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὄν ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινί, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ B αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν

211 A ὡς...αἰσχρόν secl. Voeg. J.-U. Hug Sz. Bt. ὄν om. W αὖ BT O.-P.: αὐτὸ W αὐτῷ BT O.-P.: αὐτὸ W οὐδὲν ὧν libri, edd.: ουδε εν O.-P. B μετ αυτου O.-P.: del. Naber τρόπον τινὰ B O.-P.: τῶν τρόπον TW

ὡς τισὶ...αἰσχρόν. Rettig defends this clause, quoting Wolf's note, "τισί (geht) auf alle vier (vorher genannten) Ideen, Theile, Zeit, Verhältniss, Ort." Teuffel argues that "ausser Platon selbst hätte nicht leicht Jemand einen Anlass gehabt einen Beisatz zu machen." None the less, I believe we have here another "ineptum glossema."

φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ. Sc. τῷ θεωμένῳ. φαντάζεσθαι often connotes illusive semblance; cp. *Phaedo* 110 D, *Rep.* 572 B.

οὐδέ τις λόγος. It is difficult to be sure of the sense in which λόγος is used here. (1) It is most natural to refer it, and ἐπιστήμη following, to the λόγοι and ἐπιστήμαι of 210 c, and to render by "discourse," "argument" (with Gomperz, Stewart and Zeller). This rendering has in its favour the fact that this is the usual sense of λόγος (λόγοι) throughout this dialogue. (2) Or λόγος may mean "concept"; so Rettig, who comments: "Die Ideen sind nicht blosse Begriffe, sie sind vielmehr Existenzen, χωρισταί, wie Aristoteles sich ausdrückt, und Bedingungen des Seins und Werdens der Dinge der Sinnenwelt." Cp. *Phaedr.* 245 E, *Laws* 895 E, *Phaedo* 78 c, in which places (to quote Thompson) "λόγος is equivalent to ὄρος or ὀρισμός, of which οὐσία is the objective counterpart." This more technical sense is, perhaps, less probable in the present context; but, after all, the difference between the two renderings is not of vital importance. The essence of the statement, in either case, is that the Idea is not dependent upon either corporeal or mental realization, i.e. that it is not subjective, as a quality or product of body or mind, but an objective, self-conditioned entity. A third possible sense of λόγος is "ratio," or mathematical relation. Perhaps "formula" would best render the word here.

οὐδέ που ὄν. που is probably used in a local sense: cp. Arist. *Phys.* III. 4. 203<sup>a</sup> 7 Πλάτων δὲ ἔξω μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι σῶμα, οὐδὲ τὰς ιδέας, διὰ τὸ μηδέ που εἶναι αὐτάς. But though the Ideas are extra-spatial, it is Platonic (as Aristotle implies, *de An.* III. 4. 429<sup>a</sup> 27) to say τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν.

211 B μονοειδὲς. Cp. *Phaedo* 78 D μ. ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό: ἰβ. 80 B μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ: *Theaet.* 205 D: *Tim.* 59 B: *Rep.* 612 A εἴτε πολυειδὲς εἴτε μονοειδὲς (ἢ ἀληθὲς φύσις). Stewart renders "of one Form," but the full force may be rather "specifically unique," implying that it is the sole member of its class.

μετέχοντα. For the doctrine of "participation," see esp. *Phaedo* 100 c ff., *Parmen.* 130 B ff.

τοιοῦτον, οἷον. Equiv. to τοιοῦτον ὥστε (see Madv. *Gr. S.* § 166 c).

ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκείνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδευαστεῖν ἐπανιών ἐκείνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἄπτοιοτο τοῦ τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ C τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ αἰεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ

211 B ἐκείνο B O.-P.: ἐκείνω TW μήτε τι BTW: μήτε Vind. 31 Paris 1642 O.-P. ὅταν δὴ B O.-P.: ὅταν δὲ δὴ TW C ἐπαναβαθμοῖς W: ἐπ' ἀναβαθμοῖς B: ἐπαναβασμοῖς T O.-P. σωμάτων (ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν) ἐπὶ Sydenham ἀπὸ τῶν (καλῶν) ἐπιτ. vulg. μαθήματα, καὶ libri O.-P., Bdhm. Usener Hug: μαθ., ὡς Sz. Bt.: μαθ., ἔστ' ἂν vulg.: μ., ἕως ἂν Stallb.: μ. ἕως Herm.: μ., ἵνα Sauppe: μ., ἵνα καὶ Winckelmann τὸ μάθημα τελευτήση del. Bdhm. τελευτῆσαι Usener Hug: τελευτήση libri, Sz. Bt.: ante τελευτήση lacunam statuit Voeg.

ἐκείνο. Sc. (αὐτὸ) τὸ καλόν. So frequently "ἐκείνο et ἐκείνα *das Ueber-sinnliche* significat, τάδε vero vel ταῦτα *das Sinnliche*" (Ast): cp. *Phaedr.* 250 A, *Phaedo* 74 B, etc.

μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. As to the ἀπάθεια of the Idea, see *Soph.* 248 A ff., 251 c ff., and my article on "The Later Platonism" in *Journal of Philol.* xliii. pp. 189 ff.

ἐπανιών. Cp. *Rep.* 521 C τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι: *ib.* 532 B, C.

τοῦ τέλους. This combines the senses "goal" and "sacred symbol": cf. 210 A; *Soph. fr.* 753 N. ὡς τρεῖς ὄλβιοι | κείνοι βροτῶν, οἱ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη | μόλωσ' εἰς Ἄιδου.

τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ κτλ. Here commences a recapitulation of "the Ascent of Love" as described in 210 A—211 B; cp. *Rep.* vi., vii. for both language and thought.

211 C ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι. This refers to the παιδαγωγός or μυσταγωγός of 210 E, not (as Wolf thought) to the operation of a δαίμων.

ἐπαναβαθμοῖς. For the notion of a ladder of ascent cp. *Rep.* 510 B ff., 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ...οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμας ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἴων...οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβῆναι κτλ. Cp. Tennyson's "the great world's altar-stairs"; the dream-ladder at Bethel; and the Titanic heaven-scaling of 190 B. Possibly a contrast is intended between the futile attempt of the Earth-born εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ποιεῖν, and the successful efforts of the Heaven-born lover ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐπανιέναι. For later parallels, see Plotin. *de pulcr.* 60 B (Cr.); Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. p. 611 D.

καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κτλ. The reading and construction of this passage.

ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, <ἵνα> καὶ γνῶ αὐτὸ  
 τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη D  
 ἢ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπων, θεωμένῳ  
 αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. ὃ ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα  
 καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι εἶναι, οὐδὲ νῦν  
 ὀρώων ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἔτοιμος εἶ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὀρώωντες  
 τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ξυνόντες αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς, εἴ πως οἷόν τ' ἦν, μήτε ἐσθίειν  
 μήτε πίνειν, ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον καὶ ξυνεῖναι. τί δῆτα, ἔφη,  
 οἴομεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, E  
 ἄμικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων

211 C (ἵνα) καὶ scripsi: καὶ libri: ἵνα Usener: κἂν Bdhm.: καὶ γνῶ...καλόν  
 secl. Hug αὐτὸ: αὐτῷ O.-P. D μαντική vulg., Themistius ποτε ἴδῃς  
 O.-P.: ποτ' εἴδῃς B: ποτ' εἴδῃς T: ποτ' ἴδῃς apographa, Sz. χρυσίον: χρυσοῦ  
 O.-P. αἰεὶ post μόνον καὶ transp. Ast θεᾶσθαι μόνον TW: θεάσασθαι  
 μόνον B: μόνον θεάσασθαι O.-P. E ἄμικτον post θνητῆς, ἀλλ' transp.  
 Liebhold ἀλλὰ del. Ast Liebhold ἀναπλεῶ O.-P.

are uncertain. I follow Usener in changing τελευτήσῃ to the infinitive and in  
 inserting ἵνα after μάθημα (retaining, however, καὶ before γνῶ which he need-  
 lessly deletes). The objection to Schanz's ὡς (for καὶ) ἀπὸ τῶν μ. is that ὡς,  
 in the final use, occurs but once elsewhere in Plato, according to Weber's  
 statistics (see Goodwin, *G. M. T.* p. 398), being very rare in all good prose-  
 writers except Xenophon. Another possible expedient would be to read  
 γνῶναι in place of γνῶ. ἔστ' ἄν is a non-Platonic form.

τελευτήσῃ...τελευτῶν. The repetition serves to emphasize the finality of  
 the Idea.

αὐτὸ...δ ἔστι. For this formula to express ideality, cp. *Phaedo* 74 B,  
 75 B οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι: *Theaet.* 146 E.

211 D ἐνταῦθα...εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι. "There above all places"; so *Phaedo*  
 67 B ἐκεῖ...εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι: cp. 212 A εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ...ἐκείνῳ. For ἐνταῦθα  
*c. gen.* cp. *Theaet.* 177 C, *Rep.* 328 E. For βίος βιωτός, cp. *Apol.* 38 A, *Eur.*  
*Alc.* 802.

οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον κτλ. Similar is *Proverbs* viii. 11 "Wisdom is better than  
 rubies; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it."  
 That Socr. held this view is shown in 216 D, E. For κατὰ *c. acc.*, of comparison,  
 cp. *Gorg.* 512 B, *Rep.* 466 B.

ξυνόντες...μήτε πίνειν. Cp. 191 A ff.; also Sappho 2, Archil. 103, *Soph. fr.*  
 161 N. (ὀμμάτειος πόθος): *Rel. Med.* "There are wonders in true affection—  
 when I am from him I am dead till I be with him," etc.

τί δῆτα...οἴομεθα. Sc. γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, or the like.

211 E εἰλικρινές κτλ. Cp. *Philob.* 52 D τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές: *Phaedo*  
 66 A, *Rep.* 478 E.

μὲ ἀνάπλεων. *Tim.* ἀνάπλεως· ἀναπεπλησμένος· χρῆται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμο-  
 λυσμένου: cp. *Phaedo* 83 D and the use of the verb in *Phaedo* 67 A μηδὲ



καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναίτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; ἄρ' οἶει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον γίγνεσθαι  
 212 ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ  
 ξυνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῆ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ  
 γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἰδῶλα ἀρε-  
 τῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδῶλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς  
 ἐφαπτομένῳ· τέκοντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει

211 E θνητῆς del. Bdhm. ἀλλ'...κατιδεῖν del. Bdhm. ἔφη om. T  
 212 A ᾧ δεῖ Ast: ὁ δεῖ B: ὠδὶ b: ὁ δεῖ T: δὴ Schleierm.: ἀεὶ Rohde Sz.  
 ἐφαπτομένῳ del. Voeg.

ἀναμιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου (sc. τοῦ σώματος) φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Also *Rep.* 516 E, *Theaet.* 196 E. This passage is cited by Plotin. *Enn.* I. vi. 7, p. 56.

χρωμάτων. For the Idea as ἀχρώματος οὐσία, see *Phaedr.* 247 C.

φλυαρίας θνητῆς. "Lumber of mortality": cp. *Phaedo* 66 C ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδῶλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς (sc. τὸ σῶμα); *Gorg.* 490 C; *Rep.* 581 D.

φαῦλον βίον. For the sense, cp. *Soph. fr.* 753 N., *Eur. fr.* 965 D. ὄλβιος ὅστις ...ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως | κόσμον ἀγήρω κτλ.

212 A ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ. "With the proper organ," sc. τῷ νῷ: cp. *Phaedr.* 247 C ἢ γὰρ...ἀναφῆς οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατῆ νῷ κτλ.: *Phaedo* 65 E; *Rep.* 490 B αὐτοῦ δ' ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου: *ib.* 532 A πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆ νοήσει λάβῃ. For the organ of intellectual vision (τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος...οἷον εἰ ὄμμα), see *Rep.* 518 C: cp. *S. Matth.* vi. 22 ff. So Browne *Hydriot.* "Let intellectual tubes give thee a glance of things which visive organs reach not": cp. Plotin. *de pulcr.* 60 B (Cr.).

οὐκ εἰδῶλα...ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ. Rettig writes, "εἰδῶλον ist hier nicht *Trugbild*, sondern *Abbild*. εἰδῶλα ἀρετῆς sind...Tugenden zweiten Grades. Vgl. *Pol.* VII. 516 A, 534 C, X. 596 A, 598 B...Commentar zu unserer Stelle ist *Symp.* 206 D." On the other hand, cp. *Theaet.* 150 A εἰδῶλα τίκτειν, with 150 C πότερον εἰδῶλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. Evidently here the point of εἰδῶλα lies in the inferiority rather than the similarity of the objects when compared with ὄντως ὄντα. But it is scarcely probable that an allusion is intended, as Zeller suggests, to the myth of Ixion "der seine frevelnden Wünsche zu Here erhob, aber statt ihrer ein Wolkenbild umarmte und mit ihm die Centauren erzeugte."

ἐφαπτομένῳ. Of mental action, cp. *Rep.* 490 B (quoted above). Voegelin proposed to omit the second ἐφαπτομένῳ, but Plato never omits the participle with ἅτε. For parallels, see *Phaedo* 67 B, *Rep.* 534 C; Plotin. *de pulcr.* 46 E (Cr.).

θρεψαμένῳ. Cp. 209 C.

θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;

Ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἔφη μὲν Διοτίμα, πέπεισμαι B δ' ἐγὼ· πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρώμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ κτήματος τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἔρωτος οὐκ ἂν τις ῥαδίως λάβοι. διὸ δὴ ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα τὸν Ἔρωτα τιμᾶν καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ, <καὶ> τὰ ἐρωτικά καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύομαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ἐγκωμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν τοῦ Ἔρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἶός τ'

212 A θεοφιλεῖ rec. t O.-P., vulg.: θεοφιλῆ BTW B ὁ om. O.-P. ἐγὼ χρῆναι φημι Method. (καὶ) τὰ ἐρωτικά καὶ Sz.: καὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά Usener: τὰ δ' ἐρωτικά καὶ Bdhm. ἀσκῶν Vahlen τον ερωτα post ἐγκωμιάζω add. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἀνδρείαν secl. Hug: τε καὶ χρείαν Bdhm.

θεοφιλεῖ. Cp. *Rep.* 612 E, *Phil.* 39 E.

εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ. Cp. *Phaedo* 58 E, 66 A; and 211 D *supra* (*ad initt.*).

ἀθανάτῳ. Cp. *Soph. fr.* 864 N. οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς | θεία ξύνεστιν ἡμέρα τεθραμμένος. A passage such as this might have evoked the remark in *Isocr. c. Soph.* 291 E μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχνούνται τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν.

212 B πέπεισμαι κτλ. "Beachte man das Spiel mit πέπεισμαι, πεπεισμένος, πειρώμαι, πείθειν" (Rettig). Cp. 189 D ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι κτλ.

κτήματος. *I.e.* αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ. Cp. *Phil.* 19 C τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον: *ib.* 66 A.

συνεργόν. Cp. 180 E; and 218 D τούτου δὲ οἶμαί μου συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ.

διὸ δὴ...τιμᾶν. This echoes both *Phaedrus's* οὕτω δὴ ἔγωγέ φημι Ἔρωτα θεῶν...τιμώτατον (180 B) and *Agathon's* ὃ χρὴ ἔπεισθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα (197 E). Probably τιμᾶν here implies practical veneration; cp. the Homeric use of τιμή (*P* 251, λ 304, ω 30, etc.), and *Hes. Theog.* 142.

τὰ ἐρωτικά...ἀσκῶ. For Socrates' devotion to "erotics," see 177 D οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά, 198 D *ad initt.* Probably ἀσκῶ (like τιμῶ) has a religious connotation here, "I am a devotee of"; cp. *Hesych. ἀσκεία· θρήσκεια, εὐσέβεια*: *Pind. Nem.* ix. 9 (with J. B. Bury's note). In spite of Rettig's objection that Usener's conj. (see *crit. n.*) "bewirkt eine Tautologie mit dem Folgenden καὶ νῦν...Ἔρωτος," it seems to me—as to Hug—an improvement, and (as modified by Schanz) I adopt it: a certain amount of tautology is inevitable, unless we resort to excision. For καὶ (intensive) διαφερόντως cp. *Phaedo* 59 A, *Rep.* 528 D. Vahlen, reading ἀσκῶν, construes καὶ αὐτὸς τ. and καὶ τ. ᾄ. παρακ. as parallel: but in this case I should expect αὐτός (τε). Most edd. (Bekk., Bt., etc.) put commas after τιμᾶν and ἀσκῶ.

τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν. For the δύναμις of Eros cp. 188 D (Eryx.) πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει...ὁ πᾶς Ἔρωτος: and for his ἀνδρεία, 179 A (*Phaedr.*), 196 C ff. (*Agathon*) εἰς γε ἀνδρείαν κτλ., 203 D (*Socr.*) ἀνδρείος ὢν (cp. 219 D ff.). The intention here may be (as I find suggested also by Schirlitz) that the long

**C** εἰμί. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἐρωτα νόμισον εἰρήσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε.

**XXX.** Εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Σωκράτους τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὅτι ἐμνήσθη αὐτοῦ λέγων ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὐλειον θύραν κρουομένην πολλὴν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κωμαστῶν, καὶ αὐλητρίδος **D** φωνὴν ἀκούειν. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, Παιῖδες, φάναι, οὐ σκέψεσθε; καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἦ, καλεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, λέγετε ὅτι οὐ

**212 C** επιχειρεῖν λεγειν τι O.-P. αὐλειον rec. t O.-P., vulg.: αὐλιον BT κροτουμένην T (καὶ) ὡς Bdhm.: ὡς (ὑπὸ) Naber: καὶ Ast **D** κεψεσθε O.-P. ἐὰν: αν O.-P.

course of παιδαγωγία described above requires ἀνδρεία in the learner who is to attain πρὸς τὸ τέλος: cp. *Meno* 81 D ἐὰν τις ἀνδρείος ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμη ζητῶν. Neither Badham's *χρεῖαν* (cp. 204 c) nor Hug's athetesis of ἀνδρείαν is probable.

**212 C** εἰ μὲν βούλει...εἰ δέ. Cp. *Euthyd.* 285 c (with Gifford's n.); Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 478.

ὅ τι...χαίρεις ὀνομάζων. Cp. *Prot.* 358 A; *Phaedr.* 273 c; *Eur. fr.* 967 D. σοὶ... Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης | ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις.

τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν. Observe that Socr. is not so enthusiastically applauded as Agathon (πάντας ἀναθορυβῆσαι, 198 A): Socrates appealed rather τῷ ἔχοντι ὧτα ἀκούειν.

λέγων...περὶ τοῦ λόγου. See 205 D ff. καὶ λέγεται...λόγος κτλ.

τὴν αὐλειον θύραν. For this "street-door," which generally opened inwards and gave admittance to a narrow passage (*θυρωρείον*), see Smith *D. A.* I. 661 b.

κρουομένην. As the Porter in *Macbeth* would say, "there was old knocking at the door." For κρούειν cp. *Prot.* 310 A, 314 D; but the usual Attic word is κόπτειν (Μοερίσ κόπτει τὴν θύραν ἔξωθεν... Ἀττικῶς, κροτεῖ δὲ Ἑλληνικῶς: Schol. ad *Ar. Nuβ.* 132 ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν κρουόντων κόπτειν λέγουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔσωθεν ψοφεῖν), or πατάσσειν *Ar. Ran.* 38. Cp. Smith *D. A.* I. 990 b.

ὡς κωμαστῶν. "Ut comissatorum, h. e. quasi comissatores eum (sc. strepitum) excitarent" (Stallb.). Stallb. rightly removed the comma placed after παρασχεῖν in Bekker's text. κωμασταί, "flown with insolence and wine," would naturally be in a noisy mood. For Alcib. as a reveller, see *Plut. Alcib.* 193 D.

αὐλητρίδος φωνήν. Not "tibicinae vocem," as Wolf, but rather "sonum tibiae, quam illa inflavit," as Stallb. For φωνή thus (poetically) applied to instrumental music, cp. *Rep.* 397 A πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς: similarly *Xen. Symp.* VI. 3 ὅταν ὁ αὐλὸς φθέγγηται. For the αὐλητρίς as a regular accessory of κῶμοι, cp. 176 E, *Theaet.* 173 D: similar are the ἐταῖραι of *Rep.* 373 A, 573 D: cp. Catullus's "cenam non sine candida puella."

**212 D** καλεῖτε. "Invite him in"; cp. 174 D, E, 175 B.

πίνομεν ἀλλὰ ἀναπαυόμεθα ἤδη. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον Ἀλκιβιάδου τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούειν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ σφόδρα μεθύοντος καὶ μέγα βοῶντος, ἐρωτῶντος ὅπου Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἄγειν παρ' Ἀγάθωνα. ἄγειν οὖν αὐτὸν παρὰ σφᾶς τὴν τε αὐλητρίδα ὑπολαβοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ἀκολούθων, καὶ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένον αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τινα στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων, E καὶ ταινίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλὰς, καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ἄνδρες, χαίρετε· μεθύοντα ἄνδρα πάνυ σφόδρα δέξεσθε συμπότην,

212 D ἀλλα πανομεθα O.-P. σφόδρα μ. καὶ del. Hartmann (καὶ) ἐρωτῶντος vulg. Hirschig: del. Hommel Hartmann κελεύοντος (ἐ) Hirschig Sz. E ταινίας T O.-P.: τενίας B (et mox) ἄνδρες Sz.: ὦ ἄνδρες Usener δέξεσθε B O.-P. corr.: δέξασθε T: δεξεσθαι O.-P.<sup>1</sup>

ἀναπαυόμεθα ἤδη. "We are retiring already," rather than "the drinking is over" (Jowett): cp. *Prot.* 310 c ἐπειδὴ...δεδειπνηκότες ἡμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι κτλ. The statement here would be a social fiction (see 174 D n.).

σφόδρα μεθύοντος κτλ. Hommel and Hartman may be right in regarding ἐρωτῶντος as a gloss: for βοᾶν followed directly by a question the former quotes Asclep. *Epigr.* XIX. 5 τῇ δὲ τοσοῦτ' ἐβόησα βεβρεγμένος· ἄχρι τίνος, Ζεῦ;

ἄγειν οὖν. Evidently the subject of this infin. is not Agathon's παῖδες, as implied in Schleierm.'s transl., but Alcib.'s own attendants.

ὑπολαβοῦσαν. For ὑπολαβεῖν in this physical sense, "casurum sustentare," cp. *Rep.* 453 D (the only other ex. in Plato), and Hdt. I. 24 of the dolphin "supporting" by "getting under" Arion (L. and S.'s "take by the hand" is probably wrong).

ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας. "Intellige fores ipsius domus, in qua convivae erant, sive τὴν μέταυλον θύραν" (Stallb.).

212 E αὐτὸν...ἴων. "More Graecorum abundat αὐτὸν propter oppositionem taeniarum quas gestabat in capite" (Wolf). Violets were specially in fashion at Athens, as implied in the epithet *ἰοστέφανοι* (*Pind. fr.* 46). Other favourite materials for wreaths were myrtle and roses: cp. *Stesich.* 29 πολλὰ δὲ μύρσινα φύλλα | καὶ ῥοδίνους στεφάνους ἴων τε κορωνίδας οὔλας.

ταινίας. Cp. *Thuc.* IV. 121 δημοσία μὲν χρυσῶ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν...ἰδία δὲ ἐταινίου κτλ.: *Pind. Pyth.* IV. 240; *Hor. Carm.* IV. 11. 2. See Holden on *Plut. Timol.* p. 266: "ταινία, taenia, lemniscus, a sort of fillet or riband, given as a reward of honour, either by itself, or more commonly as a decoration to be fastened upon other prizes, such as crowns, wreaths, which were considered more honourable when accompanied with a *lemniscus* than when they were simply given by themselves. Originally it was made of linden-bark or of wool, but afterwards of gold and silver tinsel (*Plin. N. H.* 21. 4)."

μεθύοντα...πάνυ σφόδρα. The peculiar order—"a drunken fellow right royally (drunk)"—seems intended to indicate that the speaker is, or feigns to be, considerably mixed.

ἢ ἀπίωμεν ἀναδήσαντες μόνον Ἀγάθωνα, ἐφ' ὧπερ ἤλθομεν; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, φάναι, χθές μὲν οὐχ οἴος τ' ἐγενόμην ἀφικέσθαι, νῦν δὲ ἤκω ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ ἔχων τὰς ταινίας, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς κεφαλῆς τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλῆν †ἐὰν εἴπω† οὕτως ἀναδήσω. ἄρα καταγελάσεσθέ μου ὡς μεθύοντος; ἐγὼ δέ, κἂν  
 213 ὑμεῖς γελάτε, ὅμως εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἀλλὰ μοι λέγετε αὐτόθεν, ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εἰσὶω ἢ μή; συμπίεσθε ἢ οὐ;

Πάντας οὖν ἀναθορυβῆσαι καὶ κελεύειν εἰσιέναι καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν. καὶ τὸν ἰέναι ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περιαιρούμενον ἅμα τὰς ταινίας ὡς ἀναδήσοντα, ἐπίπροσθε τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχοντα οὐ κατιδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ καθίξεσθαι παρὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα ἐν μέσῳ Σωκράτους τε καὶ

212 E ὧπερ B: ὅπερ TW O.-P. ἤλθομεν TW O.-P.: ἤχθομεν B εχθες O.-P. οἴος τ' T O.-P.: οἶς τ' B ἐπὶ...ταινίας del. Naber ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτως BT: κεφαλῆν add. W: post ἀναδήσω transp. cj. Steph., post ἄρα Ast: secl. Wolf J.-U. Bt.: ἀνειπὼν (vel ἐὰν ἀνείπω) οὕτως Winckelmann: ὧν εἶδον οὐτ. Usener: ἐὰν εἰσὶω οὐτ. Bergk: ἐὰν ἔτι οἴος τ' ὧ, οὐτ. temptabam καταγελάσασθαι W 213 A κελεύειν T: κελεύει B

χθές. I.e. at the main celebration of Agathon's victory, cp. 174 A.

ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτως. Since Wolf most edd. agree in obelizing these words as a (misplaced) gloss on the following clause. Hommel's conj. is ingenious, though far-fetched—ἐὰν εἴπον (addressed to his attendants) "dixi iam saepius, mitti me velle liberum a vestris manibus." I have proposed ἐὰν ἔτι οἴος τ' ὧ, οὕτως ἀναδήσω, "if I am still capable of doing so," in jesting allusion to his own incapable condition: or perhaps the original had νεανίσκου. The scenic effectiveness of οὕτως, used δεικτικῶς, I should be loth to use. Jowett's "as I may be allowed to call him" cannot be got out of the Greek.

213 A αὐτόθεν. *Statim, illico* (Stallb.); cp. Thuc. vi. 21. 2.

ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς. "On the terms stated" (cp. *Laws* 850 A), i.e. as a συμπότης. This is made clear by the following clause, συμπίεσθε ἢ οὐ; which repeats the condition already stated in 212 E (μεθύοντα...δέξεσθε συμπότην): Rückert, as Stallb. observes, is wrong in saying "at nullam (conditionem) dixit adhuc." That Alcibiades meant his "conditions" to be taken seriously is shown by the sequel, 213 E ff.

ἀναθορυβῆσαι. Cp. 198 A. For καλεῖν, see 212 D *ad init.*

ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Including, we may suppose, the αὐληγρίς, see 212 D.

ἐπίπροσθε...Σωκράτη. "Und da er sie sich vor die Augen hielt, bemerkte er Sokrates nicht" (Zeller). Ficinus, followed by Wolf and Schleierm., wrongly renders "Socratem, licet e conspectu adstantem, non vidit"; so too Hommel writes "ante oculos habuit et vidit Socratem, sed eum non agnovit." For ἐπίπροσθεν ἔχειν, cp. *Critias* 108 c.

παρὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. I.e. on the ἐσχάτη κλίνη: for the disposition of the company see 175 c.



ἐκείνου· παραχωρήσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκείνον κατείδεν. B παρακαθεζόμενον δὲ αὐτὸν ἀσπάζεσθαι τε τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καὶ ἀναδεῖν. εἰπεῖν οὖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα Ὑπολύετε, παῖδες, Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται. Πάνυ γε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῖν ὄδε τρίτος συμπότης; καὶ ἅμα μεταστρεφόμενον αὐτὸν ὄραν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἰδόντα δὲ ἀναπηδήσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν Ὡ *μνημ* Ἡράκλεις, τουτὶ τί ἦν; Σωκράτης οὗτος; ἐλλοχῶν αὐ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκεισο, ὥσπερ εἰώθεις ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι ὅπου ἐγὼ ὦμην C ἦκιστα σε ἔσεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τί ἦκεις; καὶ τί αὐ ἐνταῦθα κατεκλίνης, καὶ οὐ παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει οὐδὲ εἴ τις ἄλλος γελοῖος ἔστι

213 B κατείδεν scripsi: κατιδε[ν] O.-P.: καθίζειν libri: ὡς...καθίζειν secl. Bdhm. Sz. Bt. ὄδε τρίτος W O.-P., Sz. Bt.: φδε τρίτος B, J.-U.: τρίτος ὄδε T ὄραν T O.-P.: ὄρα B τουτὶ τί ἦν TW O.-P.: τουτ' εἰπεῖν B Wmg. Σωκράτης del. Naber ἐνλοχῶν B C εἰώθεις vulg. καὶ οὐ Herm. Sz. Bt.: ὡς οὐ B: πῶς οὐ Hug οὐδὲ B: οὔτε T

213 B παραχωρήσαι. "Locum dedisse": cp. *Prot.* 336 B.

ὡς ἐκείνον κατείδεν. The adoption of this reading from the Papyrus obviates the necessity of bracketing the words (see *crit. n.*). Adam on *Rep.* 365 D writes "ὡς for ὥστε...is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon... but almost unexampled in Plato," citing as instances *Prot.* 330 E, *Phaedo* 108 E, *II. Alc.* 141 B, and our passage: Goodwin, however (*G. M. T.* § 609), recognizes only one instance of ὡς=ὥστε c. *in fin.* in Plato (viz. *Rep. l.c.*). Certainly this is no fit context for the introduction of a "curious archaism."

Ὑπολύετε. "Calceos solvite": see Smith *D. A.* i. 393 b. The opposite process is ὑποδεῖν (174 A).

ἐκ τρίτων. Cp. *Gorg.* 500 A, *Tim.* 54 A; *Eur. Or.* 1178.

τουτὶ τί ἦν; "Mirandi formula, qua utuntur, quibus aliquid subito et praeter expectationem accidit" (Stallb.). The idiom is common in Aristophanes, e.g. *Vesp.* 183, 1509, *Ran.* 39, etc. The words Σ. οὗτος are, as Rettig observes, "nicht Ausruf, sondern an sich selbst gerichtete Frage des Alcibiades."

ἐλλοχῶν. Cp. *Prot.* 309 A ἀπὸ κνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄραν; *I. Alc.* 104 c. See also the description of Eros in 203 D (ἐπίβουλος κτλ.).

213 C ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι. Cp. 210 E; *Theaet.* 162 C εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει κτλ.

καὶ οὐ παρὰ κτλ. I adopt Hermann's καὶ for the ὡς of the mss. Stallb. explains ὡς by "quippe, nam, ut mox in verbis ὡς ἐμοὶ...γέγονεν": Hommel, putting a question-mark after βούλεται, renders "warum setzest du dich grade dahin, als zum Beispiel nicht neben A." etc.: but, if ὡς be kept, it would be best to mark a question after κατεκλίνης.

γελοῖος...βούλεται. With βούλεται, supply γελοῖος εἶναι. For Aristoph. as γελοῖος, cp. 189 B. The sense is, as Rettig puts it, "Was hast du γελοῖος und

τε καὶ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ διεμηχανήσω ὅπως παρὰ τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν ἔνδον κατακείσῃ; καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἀγάθων, φάναι, ὅρα εἴ μοι ἐπαμύνεις· ὡς ἐμοὶ ὁ τούτου ἔρωσ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα γέγονεν. ἀπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου, ἀφ' οὗ τούτου  
 D ἠράσθη, οὐκέτι ἔξεστί μοι οὔτε προσβλέψαι οὔτε διαλεχθῆναι  
*jealous* καλῶ οὐδ' ἐνί, ἢ οὐτοσί ζηλοτυπῶν με καὶ φθονῶν θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ λαιδορεῖται τε καὶ τῷ χεῖρε μόγις ἀπέχεται. ὅρα οὖν μή τι καὶ νῦν ἐργάσῃται, ἀλλὰ διάλλαξον ἡμᾶς, ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ βιάζεσθαι, ἐπάμυνε, ὡς ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πάνυ ὀρρωδῶ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔστι, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ διαλλαγῇ. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν εἰσαυθίς σε τιμωρή-

213 C βούλεται (εἶναι) Bdhm. διεμηχανήσω: τι εμηχανήσω O.-P. (ὦ) Ἀγάθων vulg. Jn. ἐπαμύνεις libri, Bt.: ἐπαμυνεῖς Steph. J.-U. Sz. οὐ T: οὐ B D οὐτοσί xxx T: οὐτοσί πως Coisl. θαυμαστὰ B O.-P.: θαυμάσια TW ἐπάμυνε T: ἐπάμυναι B

ύβριστής bei dem liebenswürdigen Tragiker zu thun, du gehörst zu dem Spottvogel Aristophanes": "birds of a feather should flock together." Rückert suggests that the antithesis γελοῖος) κάλλιστος may imply a reflection on "Aristophanis forma."

διεμηχανήσω. For erotic scheming, cp. 203 D ff.

ἐπαμύνεις. "In animated language the present often refers to the future, to express *likelihood, intention, or danger*" (Goodwin, *G. M. T.* § 32).

213 D προσβλέψαι. This may have been the *vox propria* for a lover's glance, cp. Ar. *Plut.* 1014 (quoted below).

ἢ οὐτοσί. This (elliptical) use of ἢ, *alioquin*, "but that," is "regular with δέι, προσήκει, and the like, in the preceding clause" (Adam on *Prot.* 323 A).

ζηλοτυπῶν. This is a *σπ. εἰρ.* in Plato: cp. Ar. *Plut.* 1014 ff. ὅτι προσέβλεψέν μέ τις, | ἐτυπτόμην διὰ τοῦθ' ὄλην τὴν ἡμέραν. | οὕτω σφόδρα ζηλότυπος ὁ νεανίσκος ἦν.

θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται. Cp. *Laws* 686 c θ. ἐργασάμενον; *Theaet.* 151 A θ. δρῶντες; 182 E *supra* θ. ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ: similarly 218 A ποιούσι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὅτιοῦν.

τῷ χεῖρε. This and 214 D *infra* are the only exx. in Plato of ἀπέχεσθαι in the sense *continere (manum)*: elsewhere it occurs mainly in poetry (*Od.* xxii. 316, etc.).

μανίαν. Cp. *Laws* 839 A λύττης... ἐρωτικῆς καὶ μανίας: Soph. *fr.* 162 νόσημ' ἔρωτος τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν: and 173 D *supra*.

φιλεραστίαν. "Amor quo quis amatorem amplectitur" (Ast); equivalent to ἀντέρως (*Phaedr.* 255 D): cp. 192 B.

ὀρρωδῶ. *Horresco*, a strong word for "quaking with fear."

διαλλαγῇ. Alcib. catches up Socrates' word διάλλαξον and negatives it with a "What hast thou to do with peace?" "But," he proceeds, "I'll have

σομαι· νῦν δέ μοι, Ἀγάθων, φάναι, μετάδος τῶν ταινιωῶν, ἵνα ἀναδήσω καὶ τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν, καὶ μὴ ἔμοι μέμφηται ὅτι σὲ μὲν ἀνέδησα, αὐτὸν δὲ νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους, οὐ μόνον πρῶην ὥσπερ σύ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ, ἔπειτα οὐκ ἀνέδησα. καὶ ἅμ' αὐτὸν λαβόντα τῶν ταινιωῶν ἀναδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι.

XXXI. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεκλίνη, εἰπεῖν· Εἶεν δὴ, ἄνδρες· δοκεῖτε γὰρ μοι νῆφειν· οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν οὖν ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ ποτέον· ὁμολόγηται γὰρ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν. ἄρχοντα οὖν αἰροῦμαι τῆς πόσεως, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς ἱκανῶς πῖητε, ἐμαυτόν. ἀλλὰ φερέτω, Ἀγάθων, εἴ τι ἔστιν ἔκπωμα μέγα. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ φέρε, παῖ, φάναι,

*be sober*

213 D (ὦ) Ἀγάθων Sauppe Jn. Sz.: ὦ ἄθων J.-U. E ἀναδήσω καὶ TW O.-P., Sz. Bt.: ἀναδησώμεθα B: ἀναδησώμεν καὶ Herm. J.-U. τὴν τούτου secl. Jn. ἄνδρες: ὄνδρες Sz. J.-U. οὖν ὑμῖν T, Winckelmann Bt.: ὑμῖν B, J.-U. Sz. φερέτω, Ἀγάθων Bt.: φερέτω Ἀγ. libri: φέρετ', ὦ Ἀγ. Cobet J.-U.: φερέτω, ὦ Ἀγ. Naber: Ἀγάθων secl. Sz. ἔκπωμα T: ἔκπομα B

that out with you by-and-bye!" (see 214 c *ad fin.* ff.). Then, with a sudden change of tone from bullying and banter to affectionate earnestness, he begins νῦν δέ μοι κτλ.

213 E τὴν τούτου...κεφαλὴν. "Incipit Alc. dicere τὴν τούτου κεφαλὴν, quod priusquam elocutus est, sentit nimis languidum esse; inde revertitur quasi ac denuo progreditur, positus verbis ταυτηνὶ τὴν θ. κ." (Rückert). Perhaps as Alc. says these words (notice the deictic ταυτηνὶ) he playfully strokes the head of Socr. τούτου is expanded by Jowett into "of this universal despot."

νικῶντα. The present symposium was part of Agathon's *epinikian* celebration (see 174 A), and his victory also was gained by λόγοι (cp. 194 B).

ἔπειτα. *Tamen*, "yet after all," i.e. in spite of the fact of his perpetual victoriousness. Cp. *Prot.* 319 D, 343 D.

κατακλίνεσθαι. Ever since he first discovered Socrates, Alcibiades had been standing (see 213 B *ad fin.* ἀναπηδῆσαι).

Εἶεν δὴ. "Come now": "die Worte enthalten hier eine Aufforderung" (Rettig). Cp. 204 c, *Phaedo* 95 A. The question to drink or not to drink is now resumed from 213 A *ad init.*

οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν. "This can't be allowed": cp. *Rep.* 379 A and 219 c *infra*. ὁμολόγηται κτλ. See 212 E f.

ἄρχοντα...τῆς πόσεως. "As symposiarch": cp. the Latin *arbiter* (*magister*) *bibendi* Hor. *C.* I. 4. 17, II. 7. 25. For the qualifications proper in such "archons," see *Laws* 640 c ff.; and for other details, Smith *D. A.* II. 740 b ff. The emphatic position of ἐμαυτόν is to be noticed.

φερέτω, Ἀγάθων. *Sc. ó παῖς*: I adopt Burnet's improved punctuation, which renders further change needless.

214 τὸν ψυκτῆρα ἐκείνον, ἰδόντα αὐτὸν πλέον ἢ ὀκτῶ κοτύλας χωροῦντα. τοῦτον ἐμπλησάμενον πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκπιεῖν, ἔπειτα τῷ Σωκράτει κελεύειν ἐγγεῖν καὶ ἅμα εἰπεῖν· Πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν· ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κελεύη τις, τοσοῦτον ἐκπιῶν οὐδέν μᾶλλον μὴ ποτε μεθυσθῆ. τὸν μὲν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐγγέαντος τοῦ παιδὸς πίνειν· τὸν δ' Ἐρυξίμαχον Πῶς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ποιούμεν; οὕτως οὔτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλικι B οὔτε τι ἄδομεν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ διψῶντες πιόμεθα; τὸν οὖν

214 A πλέον: πλείν J.-U. τοῦτον (οὖν) Athenaeus κελεύη B: κελεύση T ποιῶμεν apogr. Laur. ix. 85, Hirschig Naber (ποιῶμεν—λέγωμεν—ἄδωμεν Sommer) B οὔτε τι ἄδομεν T, Bt.: οὔτ' ἐπάδομεν B, J.-U. Sz.

214 A τὸν ψυκτῆρα. "Yonder wine-cooler." Suid. ψυκτῆρα· κάδδον ἢ ποτήριον μέγα, ἀπὸ τοῦ θᾶπτον ψύχεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν κρᾶσιν: Poll. vi. 99 ὁ δὲ ψυκτῆρ πολυθρύλητος, ὃν καὶ δίνον ἐκάλουν, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ὁ ἄκρατος· οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ ἀκρατοφόρον αὐτὸν καλοῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἔχει πυθμένα ἀλλ' ἀστραγαλίσκους. Other names for it were πρόχυμα (Moeris, Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 617) and κάλαθος (Hesych. s.v.): for details see Smith *D. A. s.v.* Psycter; cp. Xen. *Mem.* ii. i. 30 ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίης, ... τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς: Xen. *Symp.* ii. 23 ff.

ὀκτῶ κοτύλας. The κοτύλη or ἡμίνα (=6 κύαθοι) was .48 of a pint, so that 8 κοτύλαι are nearly equal to 2 quarts. For a ψυκτῆρ this seems to have been a small size, since Athenaeus (v. 199) mentions ψυκτῆρες holding 18 to 54 gallons. Alcib. was not alone in his taste for an ἔκπωμα μέγα: cp. Anacr. 32 τρικύαθον κελίβην ἔχουσα: Alcaeus 41. 2 καδ' δ' ἄειρε κυλίχνας μεγάλας: Xen. *Symp.* l.c. ὁ παῖς ἐγγεάτω μοι τὴν μεγάλην φιάλην: Gouffé (*Le Verre*) "Nous devons aux petites gens Laisser les petits verres."

ἐμπλησάμενον. "Ast: implevisse. Immo implendum curasse" (Rückert).

ἐγγεῖν. Cp. Soph. *fr.* 149 D φορεῖτε, μασσέτω τις, ἐγγεῖτω βαθὴν κρητῆρα: Alcaeus 31. 4 ἔγχεε κίρνας ἓνα καὶ δύο κτλ.: Theogn. 487 σὺ δ' ἔγχεε τοῦτο μάταιον | κωτίλλεις αἰεὶ· τοῦνεκά τοι μεθύεις. Notice that Alcib. adopts the order ἐπὶ δεξιά, see 175 E.

τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν. "My trick avails nothing." For σόφισμα, "a witty invention," cp. *Lach.* 183 D, *Rep.* 496 A; Aesch. *P. V.* 470. Alcib., with his σόφισμα, recalls Eros the σοφιστής (203 D).

οὐδέν...μεθυσθῆ. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 295. For Socrates' invincible head for wine, see also 176 c, 220 B, 223 c.

Πῶς οὖν...ποιούμεν. The present indic. differs from the subjunctive, "quod dicitur de eo quod revera iam fit, neque adhuc suscipiendum est" (Stallb.): contrast ἀλλὰ τί ποιῶμεν (deliberative) just below. For the indignant οὕτω cp. Hom. *Il.* ii. 158 οὕτω δὴ οἰκόνδε...φεύξονται.

214 B οὔτε τι ἄδομεν. This lection is preferable to B's οὔτ' ἐπάδομεν which is accepted by most later editors. Eryx. would not propose to "chant spells," the only sense in which the compound word is used by Plato. For the idea of trolling a catch over one's cups, cp. Gouffé (*Couplets*) "On boit

Ἄλκιβιάδην εἰπεῖν ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, βέλτιστε βελτίστου πατρὸς καὶ σωφρονεστάτου, χαῖρε. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον· ἀλλὰ τί ποιῶμεν; Ὁ τι δᾶν σὺ κελεύης. δεῖ γάρ σοι πείθεσθαι·

ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιός ἄλλων·

ἐπίταττε οὖν ὃ τι βούλει. Ἄκουσον δὴ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον. ἡμῖν πρὶν σὲ εἰσελθεῖν ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει λόγον περὶ Ἐρωτος εἰπεῖν ὡς δύναίτο κάλλιστον, καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι. **C** οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν· σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ εἴρηκας καὶ ἐκπέπωκας, δίκαιος εἰ εἰπεῖν, εἰπὼν δ' ἐπιτάξαι Σωκράτει ὃ τι ἂν βούλη, καὶ τοῦτον τῷ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ καὶ οὕτω τοὺς ἄλλους. Ἄλλά, φάναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν Ἄλκιβιάδην, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, μεθύοντα δὲ ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν μὴ οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦ.

214 B Ἐρυξίμαχε del. Naber δᾶν Bt.: δ' ἂν T: ἂν B, J.-U. πιθέσθαι Bdhm. ἰητρὸς T, Sz. Bt.: ἰατρὸς B **C** ὡς (ἂν) Sauppe (τούς) νηφόντων vel νήφοντας cj. Steph. λόγους (λόγον) Bast

chez eux, on boit beaucoup Et de bourgogne et de champagne; Mais rien ne vaut un petit coup Qu'un petit couplet accompagne."

For λόγοι ἐπικυλίκειοι, cp. Athen. 2 A; Lucian *Timon*, c. 55.

ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε κτλ. Alcibiades—as if to show how ready he is ἄδειν τι—replies with an iambic trimeter—"A noble sire's most noble, sober son!" The superlatives are not without irony, cp. 177 B, Xen. *Mem.* III. 13. 2.

χαῖρε. "All hail!" Alcibiades pretends not to have noticed the doctor before.

ἰητρὸς γὰρ...ἄλλων. From *Il.* XI. 514: "Surely one learned leech is a match for an army of laymen." Pope's rendering—"the wise physician skilled our wounds to heal"—hardly deserves the name, although Jowett paid it the compliment of borrowing it.

ἐπίταττε. "Prescribe": the techn. term for a medical prescription, cp. *Rep.* 347 A κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων: *Polit.* 294 D, *Laws* 722 E.

ἔδοξε κτλ. See 177 D.

214 C ὡς δύναίτο κάλλιστον. Cp. Thuc. VII. 21 ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας πληροῦσιν (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 96): there is no need to insert ἂν, as Sauppe suggested.

καὶ ἐκπέπωκας. "But have finished your draught."

μεθύοντα...παραβάλλειν. "μεθύοντα negligentius dictum est pro λόγον ἀνδρὸς μεθύοντος" (Wolf). For the brachylogy cp. 180 c μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον κτλ. (see note *ad loc.*); 217 D ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ. With παραβάλλειν we must supply as subject τῶνα (with Rettig) rather than σε, i.e. Ἐρυξίμαχον (with Wolf). Of conjectures Bast's is the most plausible. Cp. Theogn. 627 αἰσχρὸν τοι μεθύοντα παρ' ἀνδράσι νηφόσι μείναι.

For a stricture on ἔπαινοι μεθύοντος, see *Phaedr.* 240 E.



**D** καὶ ἅμα, ὦ μακάριε, πείθει τί σε Σωκράτης ὧν ἄρτι εἶπεν; ἢ οἶσθα ὅτι τούναντίον ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ ὃ ἔλεγεν; οὗτος γάρ, ἐάν τινα ἐγὼ ἐπαινέσω τούτου παρόντος ἢ θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον ἢ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἀφέξεται μου τὸ χεῖρε. Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, μηδὲν λέγε πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἕνα ἄλλον ἐπαινέσαιμι σοῦ παρόντος. Ἄλλ' οὕτω ποίει, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, εἰ βούλει· Σωκράτη ἐπαίνεσον.

**E** Πῶς λέγεις; εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· δοκεῖ χρῆναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε; ἐπιθῶμαι τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τιμωρήσωμαι ὑμῶν ἐναντίον; Οὗτος, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις; ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερά με ἐπαινέσεις; ἢ τί ποιήσεις; Τάληθῆ ἔρῳ. ἀλλ' ὄρα εἰ παρίης. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, φάναι, τά γε ἀληθῆ παρίημι καὶ κελεύω λέγειν. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ μέντοι οὕτωςι ποίησον. ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλη, καὶ εἰπέ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι·

214 D ἢ οἶσθ' J.-U. E τιμωρήσομαι W ἐπαινέσει Bekk. Sz.:  
ἐπαινέσεις BTW: ἐπαινέσαι Bt. παριεῖς Schanz

214 D ὦ μακάριε. "Gutmüthig-ironisch" (Rettig): cp. 219 A.

πείθει...εἶπεν; "H. e. πείθει σέ τι τούτων ἃ Σ. ἄρτι εἶπεν;...h. e. noli quidquam eorum credere quae modo dixit S." (Stallb.). A. is alluding to 213 C—D (ἀπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου κτλ.).

οὐκ ἀφέξεται κτλ. "Satis lepide iisdem fere verbis hic utitur Alcib. quae Socr. l. l. exhibuit" (Hommel); A. is turning the tables on S.

Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. This form of oath is rare in Plato, see Schanz *nov. comm. Plat.* p. 23. The main reason why A. chooses Poseidon to swear by is, no doubt, because P. was the special deity of the ancient aristocracy of Athens (see R. A. Neile's ed. of *Ar. Knights*, p. 83); but A. may also be punning on πόσις, as if Ποσειδῶν meant "drink-giver," and invoking a "deus madidus" as appropriate to his own "madid" condition. Cp. *Euthyd.* 301 E, 303 A.

214 E τιμωρήσομαι. This echoes the τιμωρήσομαι of 213 D.

Οὗτος. "Ho, there!" Cp. 172 A.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα. "To make fun of me": cp. *Phileb.* 40 C (ἡδοναὶ) μεμνημένα τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα ("caricatures"): so ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα *Polít.* 293 E, 297 C.

ἐπαινέσει. Plato always uses the middle form of the future, with the doubtful exception of *Laws* 719 E (where Burnet, after Bekker, corrects ἐπαινέσοι to ἐπαινέσαι), see Veitch *Gk. Verbs s.v.*

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι. Sc. τάληθῆ λέγων: *iam iam dicam*. Cp. 185 E, *Phaedo* 100 C, *Euthyd.* 272 D (in all which places the participle is expressed).

καὶ...ποίησον. Hommel rashly proposes to read ποιήσων for ποιήσον and remove the stop after the word. For καὶ μέντοι, see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 254.

ἐπιλαβοῦ. "Pull me up," "call me to order." Cp. *Gorg.* 469 C, 506 B ἐπιλαμβάνου ἐάν τι σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.

ἐκῶν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι. ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμιμνησκόμενος 215  
ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάσης· οὐ γάρ τι ῥάδιον τὴν σὴν  
ἀτοπίαν ὧδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

XXXII. Σωκράτης δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω,  
δι' εἰκόνων. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιώτερα, ἔσται  
δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἔνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιό-  
τατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἔρμογλυφείοις

215 A τι: τοι vulg. Hirschig ἔρμογλυφίοις T

215 A ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν. "In a wrong order," or "in promiscuous fashion":  
cp. *Il.* II. 75, *Aesch. Ag.* 92, etc. Alcib. forestalls criticism by this apology for  
the "mixed" style of his reminiscences, on the ground of what he calls his  
"present condition" (ὧδ' ἔχοντι = μεθύοντι, *crapula laboranti*).

οὐ γάρ τι ῥάδιον. For οὗτι, *hapdquaquam*, cp. 189 B.

ἀτοπίαν. Cp. *Gorg.* 494 D; 221 C *infra*. That Socrates is an "out-of-the-  
way" character, a walking conundrum, is, in fact, the main theme of Alc.'s  
speech: it is a mistake to limit this ἀτοπία to the contradiction between his  
outer and inner man, as Susemihl does.

οὕτως...δι' εἰκόνων. For οὕτως with an exegetic phrase, cp. 193 C, *Laws*  
633 D, *Rep.* 551 C οὕτω...ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. For εἰκόνες, "similes," see *Ar. Rhet.*  
III. 4, where they are described as a kind of μεταφοραὶ ("A simile is a metaphor  
*writ large*, with the details filled in," Cope *ad loc.*). εἰκασίαι ("conundrums")  
were also "a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings" (Thompson  
on *Meno* 80 C), see for exx. *Ar. Vesp.* 1308 ff., *Av.* 804 ff.: cp. *Rep.* 487 E, *Phaedo*  
87 B; *Xen. Symp.* VI. 8 ff.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιώτερα. Sc. οὕτως ποιήσειν, or the like: cp. 214 E.

τοῖς σιληνοῖς κτλ. These were statuettes representing a Silenus playing a  
flute or pipe; the interiors were hollow and served as caskets to hold little  
figures of gods wrought in gold or other precious materials. But the precise  
fashion of their construction and how they opened (*διχάδε διοιχθέντες*) is by no  
means clear. (1) Hug thinks they were made with a double door (*δικλίδες*):  
similarly Stallb. and Hommel ("in contrariis Silenorum lateribus duobus duo  
foramina erant, quae epistomio quodam claudi poterant"). (2) Schulthess  
supposes that one section telescoped into the other ("Schiebt man sie aus-  
einander, so erblickt man inwendig Götterbilder"). (3) Panofka, with  
Schleiermacher, supposes that the top came off like a lid. (4) Lastly,  
Rettig "denkt an ein Auseinandernehmen in zwei Hälften" though exactly  
how this differs from (3) he does not clearly explain. But—as Rettig himself  
observes—"mag es verschiedene Arten solcher Gehäuse gegeben haben," and  
in the absence of further evidence it would be rash to decide which of the  
possible patterns is here intended: the language (*διχάδε διοιχθέντες*) rather  
favours the idea that the figures split into two, either horizontally or  
vertically—possibly, also, with a hinge. Cp. *Synes. Ep.* 153, p. 292 B ὥσπερ  
ἐποιοῦν Ἀθήνησιν οἱ δημιουργοὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ Χάριτας καὶ τοιαῦτα κάλλη θεῶν  
ἀγάλμασι σιληνῶν καὶ σατύρων ἀπίσχοντες: *Maximus comm. in Dion. Areop.*  
*de div. nom.* c. ix. t. II. p. 201 f. (ed. Cord.) ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἶά τινας ἀνδριάντας

**B** καθημένοι, οὓς τινὰς ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἱ διχάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἔνδοθεν ἀγίλαματα ἔχοντες θεῶν. καὶ φημί αὐτὸν εἰκέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τό γε εἶδος ὁμοίος εἶ τούτοις, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐδ' <ἄν> αὐτὸς δὴ πού ἀμφισβητήσῃς· ὡς δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα εἰκας, μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ὑβριστῆς εἶ· ἢ οὐ; ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογήσῃς, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐλητῆς; πολὺ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου.

**C** ὁ μὲν γε δι' ὀργάνων ἐκλήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ ὅς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῆ· ἂ γὰρ Ὀλυμπος ἡὔλει,

215 B διχάδε: δίχα Steph. Ast οὐδ' (ἄν) αὐτὸς Stallb. δήπου BT, vulg.: ἄν δήπου Sauppe: ἄν πού Baiter Sz. Bt.: om. Stallb. ἀμφισβητήσεις vulg.

ἐποίουν μήτε χεῖρας μήτε πόδας ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐρμᾶς ἐκάλουν· ἐποίουν δὲ αὐτοὺς διακένους, θύρας ἔχοντας, καθάπερ τοιχοπυργίσκους· ἔσωθεν οὖν αὐτῶν ἐτίθεισαν ἀγάλματα ὧν ἔσεβον θεῶν κτλ. (cp. Etym. Magn. s.v. ἀρμάριον): Xen. *Symp.* iv. 19; Julian *Or.* vi. p. 187 A.

τοῖς ἐρμογλυφείοις. "The statuaries' shops," apparently a ἄπαξ εἶρ.: cp. Luc. *Somn.* 2. 7.

215 B ἀγάλματα...θεῶν. Cp. 222 A, *Phaedr.* 251 A.

φημί αὐτὸν κτλ. This second comparison arises out of the first, since the Satyr is himself akin to the Sileni: on the connexion between the two (as both originally horse-demons) see Harrison, *Proleg.* p. 388. Schol.: Μαρσύας δὲ αὐλητῆς, Ὀλύμπου υἱός, ὅς...ἤρισεν Ἀπόλλωνι περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ ἠττήθη, καὶ ποιῆν δέδωκε τὸ δέρμα δαρείας, κτλ.

τό γε εἶδος. For the Satyr-like ugliness of Socr., cp. Schol. *ad Ar. Nub.* 223 ἐλέγετο δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ὄψιν Σειλήνῳ παρεμφαίνειν· σιμός τε γὰρ καὶ φαλακρὸς ἦν: *Theaet.* 143 E προσέειπε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων: *ib.* 209 B, *Meno* 80 A f.; Xen. *Symp.* iv. 19, v. 7.—δήπου (ἄν) ἀμφισβ. (cp. *Meno* 72 c) is another possible order of words.

ὑβριστῆς εἶ. "You are a mocker" or "a bully" (Jowett): so too Agathon had said, in 175 E. For the present Alcib. forbears to enlarge on this Satyr-like quality, but he resumes the subject in 216 c ff., see esp. 219 c, 222 A. Observe also that Alcib. is here turning the tables on Socr., who had brought practically the same charge against A. in 213 c, D. Schleierm.'s rendering, "Bist du übermüthig, oder nicht?", is based on a wrong punctuation.

οὐκ αὐλητῆς. *I.e.* (as Schol. B puts it) ἐν ἡθει. ἐκείνου, *sc.* Μαρσύου.

215 C Ὀλυμπος. For Ὀλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ as τὰ παιδικὰ of Marsyas, cp. *Minos* 318 B; Paus. x. 30; also *Laws* 677 D, 790 D ff.; Arist. *Pol.* v. 5. 1340<sup>a</sup> 8 ff.; Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 307 c.

For κατέχεσθαι of "possession" (by supernal or infernal powers), cp. *Meno* 99 D, *Phaedr.* 244 E; *Ion* 533 E ff. (Rohde *Psyche* II. pp. 11, 18 ff., 48<sup>1</sup>, 88). The orgiastic flute-music (having a cathartic effect parallel to that of tragedy) provided, as Aristotle explains, a kind of homoeopathic remedy for the fit of ἐνθουσιασμός.

Μαρσύου λέγω που, τοῦ διδάξαντος· τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἐάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς αὐλῇ ἐάν τε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, μόνῃ κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. σὺ δ' ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λόγοις ταῦτόν τοῦτο ποιεῖς. ἡμεῖς γοῦν ὅταν μὲν τοῦ ἄλλου ἀκού- **D** ωμεν λέγοντος καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος ἄλλους λόγους, οὐδὲν μέλει ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενί· ἐπειδὴν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος, κἂν πάνυ φαῦλος ἢ ὁ λέγων, ἐάν τε γυνή ἀκούῃ ἐάν τε ἀνὴρ ἐάν τε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα. ἐγὼ γοῦν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλον κομιδῇ δόξειν μεθύειν, εἶπον ὁμόσας ἂν ὑμῖν, οἷα δὴ πέπονθα αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου λόγων καὶ πάσχω ἔτι καὶ νυνί. ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολὺ μοι **E** μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα

215 **O** που, τοῦ scripsi: τούτου BT, Bt.: τοῦ τοῦτον Voeg.: τοῦ Bdhm. Sz.: τοῦτον Sommer: αὐτοῦ Liebhold μόνους olim Orelli: μανία Winckelmann δηλοῖ τοὺς: δ. θνητοὺς Hommel: κηλεῖ τοὺς Orelli **D** τις ἀκούῃ del. Hirschig ἔγωγ' οὖν T κομιδῇ B ἐπομόσας cj. Naber **E** νῦν T

**M.** λέγω που, τοῦ δ. I venture on this slight innovation: otherwise it were best, with Badham, to cut down the τούτου to τοῦ.

δηλοῖ...δεομένους. Cp. the imitative passage in *Minos* 318 B καὶ μόνῃ κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρεῖα ὄντας. θεῶν δεόμενοι is virtually equiv. to κορυβαντιῶντες (215 E); cp. Rohde *Psyche* II. 48<sup>1</sup>. “μόνα = vorzugsweise. Vgl. Symp. 222 A” (Rettig).

ψιλοῖς λόγοις. I.e. “in prose,” devoid of metrical form as well as of musical accompaniment (ἄνευ ὀργάνων). Cp. *Laus* 669 D λόγους ψ. εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες: *Menex.* 239 c.

215 **D** ὅταν μὲν κτλ. Observe the antitheses σοῦ (του ἄλλου—τῶν σῶν λόγων) (ἄλλους λόγους—πάνυ φαῦλος...λέγων) (πανὺ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος.

ἢ...ἄλλου λέγοντος. A case in point is the *Symposium* itself, where Socrates' λόγοι are reported at second-hand.

ἐάν τε γυνή κτλ. “No sex or age is impervious to the impression”—in antithesis to the preceding universal negative οὐδενί. For ἔκπληξις as a love-symptom, cp. *Charm.* 154 c.

κομιδῇ...μεθύειν. Schol. κομιδῇ· ἰσοδυναμεῖ...τῷ σφόδρα καὶ τελείως. Cp. 212 E.

εἶπον ὁμόσας ἂν. “I would have stated on my oath,” i.e. I would not merely have described the facts, as I am about to do, but would have called Heaven to witness by a ὄρκος (cp. 183 A). Hommel supposes that Alcib. “rem silentio praeterire apud se constituit”; but this is confuted by the context. For a ref. to this passage, see Procl. in *I. Alc.* p. 89.

215 **E** τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων. Τιμ. κορυβαντιῶν· παρεμβαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῶς κινεῖσθαι: Schol. ad Ar. *Vesp.* 9 κορυβαντιῶν· τὸ κορύβασι κατέχεσθαι. Cp. *Crito* 54 D ταῦτα...ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν

έκχειται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου· ὀρώ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμ-  
 πόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας. Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων  
 ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὖ μὲν ἠγοῦμην λέγειν, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον,  
 οὐδ' ἔτεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς  
 διακειμένου· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τουτουὶ τοῦ Μαρσίου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω  
 216 διετέθη, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. καὶ  
 ταῦτα, Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐρεῖς ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν ξύνοιδ'  
 ἔμαυτῷ ὅτι εἰ ἐθέλοιμι παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα, οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι  
 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάσχοιμι. ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι  
 πολλοῦ ἐνδεῆς ὦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ἔμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ, τὰ δ' Ἀθηναίων

215 Ε ὑπὸ...τούτου secl. Voeg. Hug τῶν τούτου TW: τούτου B: τούτου  
 secl. J.-U. ταῦτα (ταῦτα) π. Naber 216 Α Σώκρατες B, J.-U.: ὡς Σ. T,  
 Jn. Bt. (cf. 217 B) ταῦτα: ταῦτα BT ἔτι T: τι B

δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν: *Ion* 533 Ε, 536 c. Among the symptoms of κορυβαντισμὸς  
 were the hearing of faery flute-notes, visions, hypnotic dreams, dance-motions  
 etc. (see Rohde *Psyche* II. 47 ff.): cp. also *Plut. adv. Colot.* 1123 D.

ἦ τε καρδία πηδᾷ. Cp. *Ion* 535 c, *Phaedr.* 251 c; *Sappho* 2. 5 τό μοι μάν |  
 καρδιαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόασεν: *Ar. Nuῦ.* 1393 οἶμαι γε τῶν νεωτέρων τὰς καρδίας |  
 πηδᾶν ὅτι λέξει.

ὑπὸ τῶν λ. τ. τούτου. Rettig seems right in arguing that a Glossator would  
 be unlikely to write thus; and repetitions of this kind are characteristic of  
 Alc.'s speech (cp. 221 D).

Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων. For the oratorical powers of Pericles, cp. *Phaedr.*  
 269 Ε, *Meno* 94 Α, *Menex.* 235 Ε; *Thuc.* II. 65; *Ar. Ach.* 530 ff.; *Cic. Brut.* XI.  
 44, *de or.* III. 34; and esp. Eupolis *Δῆμοι* (fr. 6. 34) κράτιστος οὗτος (sc. Περικλῆς)  
 ἐγένετ' ἀνθρώπων λέγειν | ...πειθῶ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν | οὕτως ἐκήλει,  
 καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. Comparing this  
 with our passage,—taken in conjunction with 213 D (νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας  
 ἀνθρώπους), 215 B (ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους), 218 Α (πληγεῖς τε καὶ δηχθεῖς ὑπὸ  
 τῶν...λόγων), 221 C (οἷος αὖ Περικλῆς κτλ.),—it seems probable that Plato has  
 this passage of Eupolis in mind, and represents Alcib. as confuting Eupolis—  
 as a return for the raillery he had suffered at the hands of E. in his *Βαπταί*:  
 cp. the story told in *Cic. Att.* VI. 1 that Alcib. got Eupolis drowned.

μου ἡ ψυχῆ. For this position of the genitive of the pronoun, which gives  
 it nearly the force of an ethic dat., cp. *Rep.* 518 c, *Phaedo* 117 B (cp. *Vahlen*  
*op. Acad.* I. 440 ff.).

ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς δ. Cp. *Xen. Mem.* IV. 2. 39: 210 D ὡσπερ οἰκέτης...  
 δουλεύων.

216 Α μὴ βιωτὸν. This echoes, by way of contrast, 211 D ἐνταῦθα...  
 βιωτόν.

ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. Cp. ὡδ' ἔχοντι, 215 Α.

οὐκ...ἀληθῆ. Notice these repeated protestations of veracity: cp. 214 Ε,  
 215 B (and see *Introd.* § II. Α).

οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι. Contrast with this the *καρτερία* of Socr., 219 D, 220 Α.



πρίττω. βία οὖν ὡσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὄτα οἴχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω. πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τούτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο ἐν Β ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὄντιν οὖν· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι. ξύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαντῷ ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένῳ, ὡς οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἂ οὗτος κελεύει, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀπέλλθω, ἠττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω, καὶ ὅταν ἴδω, αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὁμολογημένα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἠδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δ' αὖ τούτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι C πολὺ μείζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

216 A βία: βύων Abresch J.-U. ἐπισχόμενος secl. J.-U. C ἂν  
μείζον Sauppe χρήσωμαι corr. Ven. 185, Bekk.: χρήσομαι BT

βία...φεύγων. "Invitus mihique ipsi vim inferens aufugio" (Rückert). Hommel wrongly takes βία with ἐπισχόμενος. βύων, the conjecture of Abresch, based on Hesych. (βύων τὰ ὄτα· ἐπιφράττων) makes the order awkward and produces tautology. ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὄτα is the opposite of the foregoing παρέχειν τὰ ὄτα: cp. Plut. *Pomp.* 55; Hor. *Ep.* II. 2. 105 obturem patulas impune legentibus aures; *Acts* vii. 57 *συνέσχον τὰ ὄτα αὐτῶν*: *Ps.* lviii. 4, 5 (A.V.) "they are like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ear; which will not hearken to the voice of charmers, charming never so wisely." For the Σειρήνες, cp. Hom. *Od.* XII. 39 ff., and see Harrison *Proleg.* pp. 197 ff.

αὐτοῦ...παρὰ τούτῳ. αὐτοῦ is not really "redundant" (as Ast)—"sitting still here beside him," i.e. "müssig und entfernt von Staatsgeschäften" etc. (Rettig); cp. Ar. *Ran.* 1490 ff.; *Apol.* 31 c ff.

καταγηράσω. Perhaps a *double entendre*—A. implying that S.'s moralizings ("rumores senum severiorum") would soon make an old man of him.

216 B ὃ οὐκ...ἐνεῖναι. This is a specimen of the naive candour which characterizes Alcib. throughout. For Alcib.'s self-assurance, cp. Xen. *Mem.* I. 2. 47.

ἠττημένῳ...πολλῶν. "Me honori, quo me ornet populi multitudo, succumbere" (Stallb.). Cp. *Rep.* 359 A: Xen. *Cyrop.* III. 3. 2 ἦδεσθαι τῇ ὑπὸ πάντων τιμῇ: Thuc. I. 130. 1. For the thought, cp. *Rep.* 491 c ff.

δραπετεύω. "I take to my heels," like a runaway slave (*δραπέτης*, *Meno* 97 E).

τὰ ὁμολογημένα. I.e. the conclusions as to his own ἔνδεια forced upon him by S.; cp. 216 A ἀναγκάζει...ὁμολογεῖν.

216 C πολὺ μείζον. So μέγα κήδεταί *Il.* II. 26.

οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι. Since Alcib. is here generalizing, the (dubitative) subj. seems preferable to the more definite fut., as Hommel argues against Stallb.

Alcib. is in the position of a "Dipsychus," "halting between two opinions"

XXXIII. Καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου· ἄλλα δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσατε ὡς ὁμοίός τ' ἐστὶν οἷς ἐγὼ ἤκασα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὡς θαυμασίαν ἔχει. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν τοῦτον γινώσκει· **D** ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ δηλώσω, ἐπεὶ περ ἠρξάμην. ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα

216 C ἤκασα Fischer: εἴκασα libri **D** καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν secl. Jn. Bdhm. Sz. αὐ B: om. TW ἀγνοεῖ πάντη (καὶ...οἶδεν deletis) Bast οἶδεν. ὡς distinxit Bt. ὡς: πῶς Ast: ἡ Usener

or rather two instincts. Cp. Soph. fr. 162. 8 οὕτω γε τοὺς ἐρώντας αὐτὸς ἴμερος | δρᾶν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν πολλάκις προίεται: Anacr. fr. 89 ἐρῶ τε δηῦτε κοῦκ ἐρῶ | καὶ μαίνομαι κοῦ μαίνομαι.

οἷς ἐγὼ ἤκασα αὐτὸν. Sc. τοῖς σιληνοῖς. ἤκασα recalls the δι' εἰκόνων of 215 A. οὐδεὶς...γινώσκει. Plato may mean by this, as Hug suggests, that the majority of the admirers and followers of Socr. possessed a very dim insight into the sources of his real greatness—ἀλλ' ἐγὼ (Plato, behind the mask of Alcib.) δηλώσω.

216 D ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται κτλ. For Socrates as (professing to be) subject to intense erotic emotion, see the vivid description in *Charm.* 155 c ff. ἐγὼ ἦδη ἠπόρουν, καί μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο...καὶ ἐφλέγόμεν καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἔμαντοῦ ἦν κτλ.

καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν. Most of the later critics (including Voeg., Teuffel, Hug) agree in ejecting this clause. Rettig, who defends it, writes: "die Worte gehen auf den vermeintlichen Stumpsinn des S., wie er so häufig mit roher Sinnlichkeit verbunden ist...Die Worte ἐρωτευόμενος...διατελεῖ den obigen καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν gegensätzlich gegenüberstanden...Da nicht blos die *Silene* ἐρωτικῶς διάκεινται κτλ., so würde ohne unsere Worte die folgende Frage ὡς τὸ σχῆμα...οὐ σιληνώδες; kaum motivirt sein." But (as generally interpreted) the clause seems hardly pertinent to the main argument, which is the contrast between the outward appearance of eroticism and the inner σωφροσύνη of Socr.: the clause ἐρωτευόμενος κτλ. does nothing to strengthen the case for the reference to γνῶσις here; while there is no reason to suppose that professions of ignorance were specially characteristic of Sileni (in spite of the story of Midas and Silenus in Plut. *ad Ap. de consol.* 115 c (Σειλ.) οὐδὲν ἔθελεν εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ σιωπᾶν ἀρρήτως). If retained as it stands the clause is best taken closely with the previous words, as expressing an erotic symptom. [Possibly, however, for πάντα we should read πάντας and for οὐδὲν, οὐδέν', taking the words as masc. (sc. τοὺς καλοῦς).] This implies of course that οἶδεν bears the sense "agnoscit" (and ἀγνοεῖ the opposite), for which cp. Eur. *H. F.* 1105 ff. ἔκ τοι πέπληγμαι...τίς...δύσγνωιαν ὅστις τὴν ἐμὴν ἰάσεται; σαφῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθότων: *id. El.* 767 ἔκ τοι δείματος δυσγνωσίαν | εἶχον προσώπου· νῦν δὲ γινώσκω σε δὴ. (Cp. for this sense, Vahlen *op. Ac.* II. 63 f.)

ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ. "Which is the rôle he affects." For this use of σχῆμα

αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο οὐ σιληνώδες; σφόδρα γε. τοῦτο γὰρ οὗτος  
 ἔξωθεν περιβέβληται, ὡσπερ ὁ γεγλυμμένος σιληνός· ἐνδοθεν δὲ  
 ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει ὧ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης;  
 ἴστε ὅτι οὐτ' εἴ τις καλός ἐστι μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖ  
 τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς οἰηθείη, οὐτ' εἴ τις πλούσιος, οὐτ' εἴ  
 ἄλλην τινὰ τιμὴν ἔχων τῶν ὑπὸ πλήθους μακαριζομένων· ἡγέεται  
 δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι—

216 D αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο disting. vulg. Schleierm. Sz. τοῦτο· οὐ distinxit  
 Bernhardy ἐγλυμμένος J.-U. (εὖ) ἴστε cj. Bdhm. E ἡμᾶς: τιμᾶς  
 Heusde

of an acted part, cp. *I. Alc.* 135 D, *Rep.* 576 A: similarly σχηματίζω, simulō, *Phaedr.* 255 A οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρώντος, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος. This is preferable to rendering by "forma et habitus," as Stallb. The punctuation of the passage has been disputed: "vulgo enim legebatur καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σιληνώδες σφόδρα γε, quod Stephanus ita corrigebat ut pro οὐ σιληνώδες scriberet ὃν σειλ." (Stallb.): Stallb., Rückert, Badham, Schanz and Hug follow Bekk. and Schleierm. in putting a comma after οἶδεν and a full stop after αὐτοῦ (so too Hommel, but proposing οὐδέ for οὐδέν): Rettig follows Bernhardy in putting the full stop after τοῦτο, with a comma at οἶδεν: Burnet puts a full stop at οἶδεν, and no further stop before σιληνώδες; Ast proposed πῶς for ὡς. Bast, reading πάντη for πάντα and ejecting καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, construed ὡς...σφόδρα γέ as dependent on ἀγνοεῖ: and Stephens's οὐδέ involves a similar construction.

περιβέβληται. "Has donned" as it were a "cloak" of dissimulation: cp. *Xen. Oec.* II. 5 εἰς δὲ τὸ σὸν σχῆμα ὃ σὺ περιβέβλησαι: *Ps.* cix. 18 "he clothed himself with cursing like as with his garment."

ἐνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς. Cp. 215 B: *Soph. Antig.* 709. The word ἐνδοθεν recalls Socrates' prayer in *Phaedr.* 279 B δ...θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδότην.

ἴστε ὅτι κτλ. For the general sense, cp. *Charm.* 154 B.

216 E ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς. Cp. 214 D.

πλούσιος...τιμὴν ἔχων. Stallb. renders "aut praeterea honore aliquo ornatus," distinguishing τιμή from κάλλος and πλοῦτος; whereas Rückert states that "τιμή dicta est h. l. de re, quae honorem habet efficitque τιμία, ita ut κάλλος et πλοῦτος etiam τιμαί esse possint." Rettig supports Stallb., but probably the other two ἀγαθά are also classed in A.'s mind as τίμια. Cp. 178 c, 216 B: *Pind. fr. inc.* 25.

τῶν...μακαριζομένων. Sc. τιμῶν.

καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι. "h. e. atque nos, qui talia magni faciamus nullo in numero habendos censet" (Stallb.). This,—or Rückert's "nos ipsos qui pulcri, qui divites sumus,"—seems to bring out rightly the point of the personal reference; in spite of Rettig, who writes "völlig fremd ist der Platonischen Stelle der Zusatz, welchen Stallb. hier macht." For this use of οὐδέν (= οὐδενὸς ἀξίους) cp. 219 A, 220 A. The attitude here ascribed to Socr. is very like that ascribed to his admirer Apollodorus in 173 c, D.

λέγω ὑμῖν,—εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ. σπουδάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνοιχθέντος οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἐώρακε τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ' 217 εἶδον, καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν οὕτω θεῖα καὶ χρυσᾶ εἶναι καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ θαύμαστα, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἔμβραχυ ὃ τι κελεύει Σωκράτης. ἠγούμενος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐσπουδακέναι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὥρᾳ ἔρμαιον ἠγούσάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν, ὡς ὑπάρχον μοι χαρισαμένῳ Σωκράτει πάντ' ἀκούσαι ὅσα περ οὗτος ἤδει· ἐφρόνου γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ ὥρᾳ θαυμάσιον ὄσον. ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεῖς, πρὸ τοῦ

216 Ε λέγω ὑμῖν BT: λέγων μὲν οὐ Herm.: ἠγούμενος Bdhm.: ἵνα λέγω ὑμῖν Sz.: ἀλλ' ἐρῶ ὑμῖν Usener: del. Voeg.: fort. transp. post ἀλλὰ infra τε καὶ Usener 217 Α καὶ μοι T, J.-U. Bt.: καὶ ἐμοὶ B: κάμοι Hirschig Sz. ἔμβραχυ Cobet Sz. Bt.: ἐν βραχεῖ BT ὃ τι (ἀν) Sauppe Jn. οὗτος: αὐτὸς Bdhm. δὴ B: ἤδη TW: ἔτι cj. Wolf

λέγω ὑμῖν. There is no objection, at least in A.'s speech, to this kind of parenthetic interjection (cp. οἴσθε, D *supra*); cp. *Apol.* 30 A, *Thuc.* VI. 37. 2, *Eur. Med.* 226. Similarly in *Gorg.* 464 c, 526 c "asseverandi causa orator ad ea quae maxime attendi vult addit illa φημί, λέγω" (see Vahlen *op. Acad.* I. 479). I am, however, inclined to suspect that the words are misplaced, and originally stood after ἀλλά, three lines lower down; if so, we should read ἀλλά—λέγω ὑμῖν—ἐγὼ κτλ., or perhaps ἀλλὰ ἂ λέγω ὑμῖν ἐγὼ: this would serve to echo the ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δηλώσω of D *ad init.* Cp. also 222 B ἂ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω.

εἰρωνευόμενος. Schol. εἰρων.: ὑποκρινόμενος, χλευάζων. Cp. 218 D; *Rep.* 337 A αὕτη ἐκείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους.

τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα. See 215 A n.: ἄγαλμα, as ἐφ' ᾧ τις ἀγάλλεται, can fitly be applied to spiritual as well as material treasures: cp. the use of *ιερόν* in *Eur. Hel.* 1002. This passage is cited in *Procl. in Alc. I.* p. 89; *Clem. Alex. Strom.* VII. 5, p. 846 P.: cp. *Cic. de Legg.* I. 22 "ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dedicatum putabit."

217 Α χρυσᾶ. "Nur ein poetischer mit καλός synonymer Ausdruck" (Rettig); no doubt the material ἀγάλματα referred to were of gold or gilt, cp. *Critias* 116 D χρυσᾶ...ἀγάλματα ἐνέστησαν. For the metaph. use, cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 301 A, *Phaedr.* 235 E φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς: *Gorg.* 486 D χρυσοῦν ἔχων...τὴν ψυχὴν: and Shakspeare's "Golden lads and lasses."

ἔμβραχυ. "In short," used to qualify a universal statement expressed by a relative such as ὅστις: cp. *Gorg.* 457 A (with Heindorf *ad loc.*), *Hipp. Min.* 365 D; *Ar. Vesp.* 1120.

ἐσπουδακέναι ἐπὶ κτλ. Observe how this contrasts with the παίζειν of 216 Ε: A., we are to infer, had not as yet (at the date of the incident following) learnt the "irony" of Socr. With the attitude of Alcib. here cp. what Pausanias says in 184 B ff.

ὥρᾳ. ὥρα as *flos aetatis* is nearly equiv. to *ἄνθος* (183 Ε, 210 c): cp. 219 c, *Phaedr.* 234 A, *I. Alc.* 131 Ε τὰ...σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δ' ἄρχει ἀνθεῖν.

ἐφρόνου κτλ. For Alc.'s vanity, cp. *I. Alc.* 104 A.

οὐκ εἰωθὼς ἄνευ ἀκολούθου μόνος μετ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεσθαι, τότε ἀποπέμπων τὸν ἀκόλουθον μόνος συνεγιγνόμεν· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς B πάντα τάληθῆ εἰπεῖν· ἀλλὰ προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εἰ ψεύδομαι, Σώκρατες, ἐξέλεγχε· συνεγιγνόμεν γάρ, ὡ ἄνδρες, μόνος μόνω, καὶ ὦμην αὐτίκα διαλέξεσθαι αὐτόν μοι ἄπερ ἂν ἐραστής παιδικοῖς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ διαλεχθεῖη, καὶ ἔχαιρον. τούτων δ' οὐ μάλα ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει διαλεχθεῖς ἂν μοι καὶ συνημερεύσας ὄχετο ἀπιῶν. μετὰ ταῦτα ξυγγυμνάζεσθαι προῦκαλούμην αὐτόν καὶ συνεγυμναζόμεν, ὡς τι ἐνταῦθα περανῶν. συνεγυμνάζετο οὖν μοι C καὶ προσεπάλαιε πολλάκις οὐδενὸς παρόντος· καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; οὐδέν γάρ μοι πλέον ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδαμῆ ταύτη ἤνυτον, ἔδοξέ μοι ἐπιθετέον εἶναι τῷ ἀνδρὶ κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν καὶ οὐκ ἀνετέον, ἐπειδὴ περ ἐνεκεχειρήκη, ἀλλὰ ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. προκαλοῦμαι δὴ αὐτόν πρὸς τὸ συνδειπνεῖν, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ

217 A μόνος secl. Hirschig J.-U. Hug B (ὡ) Σώκρατες Sz. δ' οὐ: δη O.-P. ἂν BT: αὐ Wolf: δη Sauppe Sz.: ἄττα Ast: ἄλλα Rettig: del. Hommel Hirschig: fort. αἰεὶ καὶ συνεγυμναζόμεν secl. Sauppe Sz. Hug C ἐνταῦθά (γε) Naber ἀνετέον: ανεταιον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρ. Wytttenbach

217 B τάληθῆ...ψεύδομαι. Cp. 216 A, 214 E for similar protestations. Observe the effectiveness of this pause in the narration, and of the challenge to contradiction, as marking an approaching climax: cp. *Phaedo* 85 D.

ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. "Tête-à-tête": cp. *Rep.* 604 A, *Phaedr.* 236 C ἐσμὲν...μόνω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ.

ἄν...ὄχετο. If ἄν is right we must take it to denote repeated action, "solebat identidem discedere" (Stallb.): cp. *Apol.* 22 B (Madv. *Gr. S.* § 117 b, R. 3; L. and S. s.v. ἄν c).

συνημερεύσας. The only other ex. in Plato is *Phaedr.* 240 C παιδικοῖς...ἐραστής...εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἀηδέστατον.

ξυγγυμνάζεσθαι. For this practice, cp. 182 c, *Menex.* 236 D, *Rep.* 452 A ff.; and Xen. *Symp.* II. 16 ff., where Socr. treats of public and private gymnastics.

217 C οὐδέν...πλέον ἦν. "Nihil enim proficiebam" (Stallb.): cp. 222 D.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτλ. Rettig supposes an allusion to Eur. *Hipp.* 390 ff. ἐπειδὴ τοισὶδ' οὐκ ἐξήνυτον Κύπριν | κρατῆσαι, κατθανεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι. For other reff. to Eurip., see 177 A, 189 c, 196 E.

ἰστέον...πρᾶγμα. Reynders is alone in approving of Wytttenbach's "restoration," ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα: for, as Rückert argues, this must imply either that A. had as yet made no "conamen alliciendi S.," which is untrue, or that he had not as yet begun his narration, which is equally untrue. The sense of the text is "I must get to the bottom of the matter without more ado," i.e. discover the real ground of Socrates' indifference. Cp. *Apol.* 20 C τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα;

προκαλοῦμαι δὴ κτλ. Here comes the third and most desperate expedient,



**D** ἐραστῆς παιδικοῖς ἐπιβουλεύων. καί μοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταχὺ ὑπήκουσεν, ὅμως δ' οὖν χρόνῳ ἐπέισθη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφίκετο τὸ πρῶτον, δειπνήσας ἀπιέναι ἐβούλετο. καὶ τότε μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος ἀφήκα αὐτόν· αὐθις δὲ ἐπιβουλεύσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐδεδειπνήκαμεν, διελεγόμεναι αἰὲ πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐβούλετο ἀπιέναι, σκηπτόμενος ὅτι ὀψὲ εἶη, προσηνάγκασα αὐτὸν μένειν. ἀνεπαύετο οὖν ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ, ἐν ἧπερ ἐδείπνει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι  
**E** ἄλλος καθηῦθεν ἢ ἡμεῖς. μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς ὄντινόν λέγειν· τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἂν μου ἠκούσατε λέγοντος, εἰ μὴ πρῶτον μὲν, τὸ λεγόμενον, οἶνος—ἄνευ

217 **D** ἐδεδειπνήκαμεν Bt.: 'δεδειπνήκειμεν Usener: δεδειπνήκαμεν Bekk. anecd.: ἐδεδειπνήκει BT O.-P. αἰὲ add. Bekk. anecd.: om. BT O.-P. ἐπειδὴ (γε) O.-P. αὐτόν: αὐτοῦ Sauppe μένειν: μονον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **E** οὖν δὴ B O.-P. Tmg.: οὖν TW καὶ (ἐξείη) πρὸς cj. Liebhold

in which Alcib. reverses their respective rôles and acts towards Socr. no longer as παιδικά but as ἐραστῆς (cp. 213 c, 222 b, and see *Introd.* § VI. 3). For three as a climactic number cp. *Phil.* 66 d, *Euthyd.* 277 c, *Rep.* 472 a. For ἐπιβουλεύων, cp. 203 b, 203 d.

217 **D** αἰὲ...νυκτῶν. "Usque ad multam noctem" (Stallb.). For this force of αἰὲ, cp. αἰὲ διὰ τοῦ βίου *Phaedo* 75 b, etc.; so with πόρρω, *Gorg.* 486 a τοὺς πόρρω αἰὲ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας. For the plural νύκτες, "night-watches," cp. 223 c, *Prot.* 310 c πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν: *Phil.* 50 d.

ἐν τῇ...κλίνῃ. ἐμοῦ is short for τῆς ἐμῆς (or ἐμοῦ) κλίνης: cp. the similar brachylogy in 214 c: *Hom. Od.* vi. 308.

οἰκήματι. "Room": cp. *Prot.* 315 d, *Phaedo* 116 a.

217 **E** μέχρι...δεῦρο. So *Laws* 814 d τῆς...δυνάμεως τὸ μέχρι δεῦρο ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

καὶ πρὸς ὄντινόν λέγειν. This reminds one of Diotima's language in 209 e ff. (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ.).

τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ. Photius explains thus: οἶνος ἄνευ παίδων δύο παροιμίαι· ἡ μὲν οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια, ἡ δὲ οἶνος καὶ παῖδες ἀληθείς. For the first of these, cp. *Alcaeus fr.* 57 b, *Theocr. Id.* xxix. 1. We might render "In wine and wean is candour seen." Cp. *Schol. ad h. l.*; *Athen.* ii. 37 e *Φιλόχορος* δὲ φησιν ὅτι οἱ πίνοντες οὐ μόνον ἑαυτοὺς ἐμφανίζουσιν οἷτινές εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀνακαλύπτουσι, παρρησίαν ἄγοντες. ὅθεν "οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια" λέγεται: *Alcaeus fr.* 53 οἶνος γὰρ ἀνθρώποις δίοπτρον: *Hor. Sat.* i. 4. 89 *condita cum verax aperit praecordia Liber*. Similar sayings about the effects of wine are *Ar. Plut.* 1048 μεθύων ὀξύτερον βλέπει: *Theogn.* 479 ff. οἶνος...κουφὸν ἔθηκε νόον. The explanations of H. Müller ("Trunkene sagten die Wahrheit, mochten Diener zugegen sein oder nicht") and of Hommel ("si proverbio illo vinum, quod neque praesentiam neque absentiam servorum curat (alluding to the ἀκόλουθος of 217 a), non esset veridicum") are clearly wrong. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* viii. 24.

τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων—ἦν ἀληθής, ἔπειτα ἀφανίσει Σωκράτους ἔργον ὑπερήφανον εἰς ἔπαινον ἐλθόντα ἄδικόν μοι φαίνεται. ἔτι δὲ τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πάθος καμὲ ἔχει. φασὶ γάρ πού τινα τοῦτο παθόντα οὐκ ἐθέλειν λέγειν οἶον ἦν πλὴν τοῖς δεδηγμένοις, ὡς μόνοις γνωσομένοις τε καὶ συγγνωσομένοις, εἰ πᾶν 218 ἐτόλμα δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀδύνης. ἐγὼ οὖν δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν ἂν τις δηχθείη—τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν [γὰρ] ἢ ὅ τι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνομάσαι πληγείς τε καὶ

νῆμε

218 A τε καὶ ὑπὸ W ἀλγεινοτάτου Steph. δηχθείη T O.-P.: δειχθῆ B ἢ ψυχὴν γὰρ B: γὰρ ἢ ψ. TW O.-P.: ἢ ψ. non legit Schol. B, secl. Usener Sz. Bt.: ἢ ψ. γὰρ secl. Christ: γὰρ secl. clusi: fort. ἢ ψ. τᾶρα

ἀφανίσει. "To keep dark": notice the play ἀφανίσει...φαίνεται, which Lehrs represents by "eine helle That des S. ins Dunkle zu setzen." φαίνεται after the impf. ἦν is one of Alc.'s anacolutha.

ὑπερήφανον. The adj. here, though *prima facie* eulogistic, evidently contains (as Rückert notes) "grata quaedam ambiguitas," as alluding to the ὕβρις of Socr., cp. the use of ὑπερηφάνια to denote "superbia cum contemtionem coniuncta" (Ast) in 219 c. For the good sense of the word, cp. *Phaedo* 96 A, *Gorg.* 511 D.

τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος κτλ. For this proverbial case, cp. Aristides *or.* 15, I. p. 234 ὡσπερ τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐχίδνης φασὶ πληγέντα μὴ ἐθέλειν ἐτέρω λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅστις πεπειράται: *id. or.* 49, II. p. 395: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 28 ὡσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος...ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὡσπερ κνησμά τι ἐδόκουν ἔχειν: *id. Mem.* I. 3. 12 ff. ἐνίσει γὰρ τι τὰ φαλάγγια κατὰ τὸ δῆγμα...ὥστε μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν. This last passage refers to the "bite of love," for which cp. Soph. *fr.* 721 ἔρωτος δῆγμα: Socrates (Bergk *P. L. G.* II. p. 288) πόθῳ δηχθείς. Rückert is no doubt right in holding that there is allusion here "ad certam fabellam, nobis licet ignotam." Cp. also Aesch. *Cho.* 996.

218 A πᾶν...λέγειν. "Alii de remediis totoque curationis genere (haec) verba intelligunt, alii de motibus, gestibus furibundis, dictisque quae doloris magnitudo elicuerit, sanis hominibus nil nisi risum moturis" (Rückert). The former of these views is adopted by Stallb. and Rettig (who takes the phrase to refer to the superstitious use of charms, amulets, etc.), the latter by Hommel. The phrase recalls 182 E θαυμαστά ἔργα...τολμῶη ποιεῖν: 208 D πάντα ποιούσιν: cp. *Rep.* 576 A. It seems best here to interpret it broadly of the results of the δῆγμα, whether or not directly aiming at a cure: *i.e.* as covering both the senses indicated above.

τὸ ἀλγεινότατον. "In my most sensitive part."

τὴν καρδίαν. Schol. B, ὅτι τὴν καρδίαν (καρδίαν τὴν Herm.) ψυχὴν καλεῖ. This implies—as Usener inferred—that the words ἢ ψυχὴν were absent from the Scholiast's text: none the less, in view of the context, I think it rash to expunge the words, and content myself with obelizing γὰρ. For ἢ ὅτι κτλ., cp. 212 c.

δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, οἳ ἔχονται ἐχίδνης ἀγριώ-  
 τερον, νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφυοῦς ὅταν λάβωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσι δρᾶν τε  
 καὶ λέγειν ὅτιοῦν—καὶ ὄρων αὐ Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξι-  
 Β μάχους, Πausανίας, Ἀριστοδήμους τε καὶ Ἀριστοφάνους· Σωκράτη  
 δὲ αὐτὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι; πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνή-  
 κατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας· διὸ πάντες ἀκούσεσθε·  
 συγγνώσεσθε γὰρ τοῖς τε τότε πραχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις·  
 οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶ βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας  
 παμμεγάλας τοῖς ὡσὶν ἐπίθεσθε.

XXXIV. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, ὃ τε λύχνος ἀπεσβήκει  
 C καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἔξω ἦσαν, ἔδοξέ μοι χρῆναι μηδὲν ποικίλλειν πρὸς  
 αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρως εἰπεῖν ἅ μοι ἐδόκει· καὶ εἶπον κινήσας

218 A μὴ B O.-P.: καὶ μὴ T, Bt. B δεῖ καὶ vulg. τοῖς τε B (?):  
 τοῖς T (?) εἴ τις T O.-P.: εἴ τι B παμμεγάλας Naber J.-U.: πάνυ μεγάλας  
 libri, Sz. Bt. C (καὶ) κινήσας O.-P.

ὑπὸ τῶν...λόγων. Cp. 210 D λόγους...ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνω. For πληγεῖς, cp.  
*Euthyd.* 303 A ὡσπερ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄφωνος ἐκείμην: *Erist.* vii. 347 D.  
 νέου ψυχῆς. Rost, removing the comma before νέου, connected ν. ψυχῆς  
 with ἔχονται, wrongly: for ἔχεσθαι without a genitive, cp. *Gorg.* 494 E.

Observe the word-play ἔχ-ονται ἐχ-ίδνης.

μὴ ἀφυοῦς. Cp. 209 B ψυχῆ...εὐφυεῖ.

Φαίδρους κτλ. For a similar (generalizing) use of the plural of proper  
 names, cp. *Menex.* 245 D, *Ar. Ran.* 1040 ff., *Av.* 558 f.

218 B συγγνώσεσθε. This echoes the συγγνωσομένοις of 218 A *supra*.

οἱ δὲ οἰκέται. This echoes Diotima's ὡσπερ οἰκέτης, 210 D *ad init.*: cp. *Ar.*  
*Ach.* 242, *Ran.* 41 for the nomin. of address.

βέβηλός. Cp. Schol. *Aristid.* III. p. 471 ἔστι δὲ κήρυγμα μυστικὸν τὸ "θύρας...  
 βέβηλοι," ὡς που καὶ Ὀρφεὺς δηλοῖ "φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστὶ· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε  
 βέβηλοι": *Tim.* βέβηλοι· ἀμύητοι. Alcib.'s language, like Diotima's, is sugges-  
 tive of mystery-lore: cp. *Theaet.* 155 E; *Eur. Bacch.* 70 ff., 472; Horace's "odi  
 profanum volgus et arceo."

πύλας...τοῖς ὡσὶν. Cp. *Theogn.* 421 πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπων γλώσση θύραι οὐκ  
 ἐπίκεινται | ἄρμόδιαι.

ὃ τε λύχνος ἀπεσβήκει. Cp. *Ar. Plut.* 668 ὡς δὲ τοὺς λύχνους ἀποσβέσας...  
 ἐγκαθεύδειν: *Juv.* IX. 104, *Hor. C.* III. 6. 28.

218 C ποικίλλειν. "Artificiose, h. e. obscure vel ambigue loqui" (Ast):  
 "to beat about the bush." Cp. the use of ποικίλος in 182 B: *Laos* 863 E τὸ  
 τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον...σαφῶς ἂν διορισαίμην οὐδὲν ποικίλλων: *Soph. Trach.*  
 421, 1121.

ἐλευθέρως εἰπεῖν. Cp. *Pind. Nem.* IX. 49 θαρσαλέα δὲ παρὰ κρατῆρι φωνὰ  
 γίνεται. Notice the word-play ἔδοξε...ἐδόκει. For κινήσας, cp. *Rep.* 329 D  
 βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον κτλ.

αὐτόν, Σώκρατες, καθεύδεις; Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οἴσθα οὖν ἄ μοι δέδοκται; Τί μάλιστα; ἔφη. Σὺ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμοῦ ἐραστής ἄξιος γεγονέναι μόνος, καὶ μοι φαίνη ὀκνεῖν μνησθῆναι πρὸς με. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτως ἔχω· πάνυ ἀνόητον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι σοὶ μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐμῆς δέοιο ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον D τοῦ ὡς ὁ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι, τούτου δὲ οἶμαί μοι συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ. ἐγὼ δὴ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν μὴ χαριζόμενος αἰσχυνοίμην τοὺς φρονίμους, ἢ χαριζόμενος τοὺς τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἄφρονας. καὶ οὗτος ἀκούσας μάλα εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ εἰωθότως ἔλεξεν ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, κινδυνεύεις τῷ ὄντι οὐ φαῦλος εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ

218 C ἔχω B O.-P.: ἔχων TW χαρισασθαι O.-P. εἴ τι B O.-P.: ἔτι TW D ὡς ὁ τι TW O.-P.: ὅσῳ τι B μοι Vind. 21 O.-P. (prob.), vulg.: μου BTW (παρ) ἑαυτοῦ Stallb.: (πρὸς) ἑαυτοῦ Herwerden ἑαυτῷ εἰωθότως vulg. φίλε om. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> κινδυνεύει...φαῦλ' εἶναι Bdhm.

ἐμοῦ...ἄξιος. Whether ἐμοῦ goes closely with ἐραστής or with ἄξιος is open to doubt: Jowett renders "the only one who is worthy of me," whereas Rettig writes "ἄξιος absolut=würdig, beachtenswert."

ὀκνεῖν κτλ. "To be shy of mentioning (your love) to me": cp. *I. Alc.* 103 A οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος...τοσοῦτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον.

τῆς οὐσίας...τῶν φίλων. Cp. 183 A ἢ χρήματα...ὑπὸ φίλων. For ἢ τῶν φίλων = ἢ τῆς τῶν φίλων, cp. the brachylogy in 217 D (ἐμοῦ).

218 D πρεσβύτερον. Poll. II. 12 καὶ πρεσβεύειν τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ τὸ "οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον" ἀντὶ τοῦ "οὐδέν τιμώτερον": 186 B, 188 C *surra*.

συλλήπτορα. For the ἐραστής as an aid to ἀρετή, see 185 A; cp. Socrates' description of Eros as συνεργός, 212 B. μοι was taken by Stallb. with συλλήπτορα, by Rückert with εἶναι, but it is better to say with Hommel that, as an ethic dat., "ad totum verborum complexum refertur."

κυριώτερον. "More competent": cp. *Theaet.* 161 D.

τοὺς φρονίμους...ἄφρονας. Compare the similar aristocratic sentiment of Agathon, 194 B. It is worth noticing that whereas Pausanias had spoken of those who disapprove of χαρίζεσθαι as τινείς, here they are termed οἱ πολλοί. Cp. Xen. *Mem.* I. 6. 13. Similarly Browne, *Rel. Med.* "This noble affection falls not on vulgar and common constitutions."

σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ. "Very characteristically": cp. "suum illud est" Cic. *Tusc.* I. 42. 99.

οὐ φαῦλος. "Kein Dummkopf" (Hug); cp. 174 C, 175 E. Socr. means that if Alcib. proposes to make such a profitable bargain, bartering his own cheap κάλλος for the rare κάλλος of Socr., he evidently is a "cute" man of

**Ε** τυγχάνει ὄντα ἃ λέγεις περὶ ἐμοῦ, καὶ τις ἔστ' ἐν ἐμοὶ δύναμις, δι' ἧς ἂν σὺ γένοιο ἀμείνων· ἀμήχανόν τοι κάλλος ὀρώης ἂν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ εὐμορφίας πάμπολυ διαφέρων. εἰ δὴ καθορῶν αὐτὸ κοινώσασθαι τέ μοι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ ἀλλάξασθαι κάλλος ἀντὶ κάλλους, οὐκ ὀλίγῳ μου πλεονεκτεῖν διανοῆ, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ δόξης

**219** ἀλήθειαν καλῶν κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῷ ὄντι "χρύσεια χαλκείων" διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄμεινον σκόπει, μὴ σε λανθάνω οὐδὲν ὦν. ἢ τοι τῆς διανοίας ὄψις ἄρχεται ὅξυ βλέπειν ὅταν ἢ τῶν ὀμμάτων τῆς ἀκμῆς λήγειν ἐπιχειρῇ· σὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι πόρρω. κἀγὼ ἀκούσας, Τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἔφην, ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦν οὐδὲν ἄλλως εἴρηται ἢ ὡς διανοοῦμαι· σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς οὕτω βουλευοῦ ὅ τι σοὶ τε ἄριστον καὶ ἐμοὶ ἡγεῖ. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, τοῦτό γε εὖ λέγεις·

**Β** ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιόντι χρόνῳ βουλευόμενοι πράξομεν ὃ ἂν φαίνεται νῶν περὶ τε τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄριστον.

**218 Ε** τοι BTW O.-P.: τι al., Bekk.: τε vulg.      τέ μοι BT O.-P.: μοι W  
**219 Α** καλῶν del. Bdhm.      νοεῖς secl. Voeg., J.-U.      ἢ τοι W, Steph.: ἦτοι  
 BT      ὄψις ἄρχεται om. Stob.      ἐμοῦ TW O.-P.: ἐμοί B      [σοι τε] σι O.-P.

business. Cp. Diog. L. III. 63 ὁ γοῦν φαῦλος λέγεται παρ' αὐτῷ (sc. Platoni) καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ, ὡς καὶ παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ ἐν Δικυμνίῳ κτλ. (see Eurip. fr. 476 N. φαῦλον, ἀκομψον, τὰ μέγιστ' ἀγαθόν κτλ.).

**218 Ε** ἀμήχανόν κτλ. Supply from the context, with Stallb., "nam hoc ita si sit." Rückert, after Schleierm., wrongly connects this clause with the preceding, "qua fiat, ut tu melior evadas, atque exinde immensam in me pulcritudinem cernas"; while Hommel makes it depend upon εἴπερ. Cp. *Rep.* 509 B, 608 D; *Charm.* 155 D.

**εὐμορφίας.** For the notion of a beauty-competition here suggested, cp. Xen. *Symp.* v. 1. Cp. also the σοφία-match of 175 E.

**ἀντὶ δόξης ἀλήθειαν κ.** "Real for sham beauties": ἀλήθειαν καλῶν = ἀλήθινα καλά. Cp. *Phil.* 36 c ff.; and for the antithesis, cp. 198 E, 212 A *surra*.

**219 Α** χρύσεια χαλκείων. A "familiar quotation" from *Il.* VI. 235—6 (Γλαῦκος) ὃς πρὸς Τυδείδην Διομήδεα τεύχε' ἄμειβεν | χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων. Later reff. to the proverb are frequent, e.g. Plut. *adv. Stoic.* 1063 E; Clem. Alex. *Cohort. ad Gent.* 71 c. Cp. *Winter's Tale* I. 2 "take eggs for money." In χρύσεια there is an obvious allusion to the ἀγάλματα χρυσᾶ of 216 E.

**ἢ τοι...ὄψις.** For this idea of the inverse development of vision, cp. *Laws* 715 D, *II. Alc.* 150 D. Rettig thinks that in this passage there may lie a ref. to *Phaedr.* 253 D ff., and an indication that the views there put forward are crude and the book itself "eine jugendliche Schrift."

**219 Β** ἐν γὰρ τῷ κτλ. Thus Socr. practically defers the consideration of the matter to "the Greek Kalends." Rettig calls attention to the catalectic hexameter in ἐν γὰρ...βουλευόμενοι, which gives a touch of jocular liveliness.



Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τε καὶ εἰπὼν, καὶ ἀφείς ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρώσθαι αὐτὸν ὦμην· καὶ ἀναστάς γε, οὐδὲ ἐπιτρέψας τούτῳ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀμφιέσας τὸ ἱμάτιον τὸ ἐμαντοῦ τούτου— καὶ γὰρ ἦν χειμῶν—ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεῖς τὸν τουτουί, περιβαλὼν τὴν χεῖρε τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, C κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὄλην. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα αὐτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι. ποιήσαντος δὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ οὗτος τοσοῦτον περιεγένετό τε καὶ κατεφρόνησε καὶ κατεγέλασε τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ ὕβρισε καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο <ὄ> γε ὦμην τί εἶναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—

219 B βέλει TW O.-P. τούτῳ T, Thiersch: τοῦτο B: τοῦτον W τουτουί TW O.-P. (prob.), Bt.: τούτου B, J.-U. Sz. O αὐ B: om. TW καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο (ὄ) γε scripsi: [καὶ] περι ἐκεῖνο γε O.-P.: καίπερ ἐκεῖνό γε TW: καίπερ κείνό γε B: καὶ 'κείνό γε Sz.: καίτοι 'κείνό γε Bt.: καίπερ...εἶναι secl. Hug

ἀφείς ὥσπερ βέλη. Sc. τοὺς λόγους. For this image applied to "winged words," cp. the use of βαλῶν 189 B; *Phileb.* 23 B βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμ-προσθεν λόγων: *Theaet.* 180 A; *Pind. Ol.* I. 112.

τετρώσθαι. "I thought I had winged him." Cp. *Theogn.* 1287 ἀλλὰ σ' ἐγὼ τρώσω φεύγοντά περ: and the description of Eros as θηρευτῆς δεινός, 203 D.

τρίβωνα. Cp. *Prot.* 335 D; *Ar. Ach.* 184, etc. The vogue of the "philosopher's cloak" (*pallium*) seems to date from Socrates: cp. *Plut. de disc. ad.* 56 c. For the incident, see also *Lysias in Alcib.* xiv. 25 (*Teichmüller Litt. F.* II. 267 ff.); *Theocr. Id.* xviii. 19; cp. *Theogn.* 1063 ff. ἐν δ' ἤβη πάρα μὲν ξὺν ὀμήλικι καλὸν εὔδειν | ἱμερτῶν ἔργων ἐξ ἔρον ἰέμενον. Notice the stylistic effect produced both by the row of successive participles, mostly asyndetic ("der Sturm lauf ist vergeblich" Rettig); and by the repetition of the pronoun (τούτῳ, -τον, -τουί, -τῳ, οὗτος). "Forsan haec illustrat *Soph. Trach.* 944. Respexit Alciphron I. 38" (*Wytttenb.*).

219 C δαιμονίῳ. Cp. 202 D.

καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα κτλ. *Alcib.*'s fourth appeal to Socr. for confirmation, cp. 217 B.

τοσοῦτον. "Dictum est *δεικτικῶς* et per quandam exclamationem ut significet: *mirum quantum me vicit*" (*Stallb.*): Rückert and Hommel, on the other hand, suppose that "sequi debebat ὥστε" so as to give the sense "ut non aliter ab eo surrexerim," etc. (*Rückert*), or ὥστε καὶ καταφρονῆσαι κτλ. (*Hommel*). Rückert's view, which explains the change of construction as due to the intervening parenthesis, seems the most probable.

περιεγένετό κτλ. *Alcib.* is fond of piling up synonyms by way of emphasis; cp. 207 A, 219 D, 221 E.

ὑβρισε. ὕβρις is a *vox propria* in erotic literature for the "spretae iniuria formae"; cp. *Anthol. Pal.* v. 213 οὐκ οἶσω τὰν ἀπάλαιστρον ὕβριω.

*Anacreon fr.* 129 ὑβριστὰι καὶ ἀτάσθαλοι ('*Ἀνακρέων ἀπειλεῖ τοῖς Ἔρωσιν... ἐπειδὴ περ ἑώρα τὸν ἔφηβον ὀλίγον αὐτοῦ φροντίζοντα...εἰ μὴ αὐτῷ τιτρώσκειεν*

δικασταὶ γὰρ ἔστε τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερήφανίας. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς, οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδαρθηκῶς ἀνέστην μετὰ D Σωκράτους, ἢ εἰ μετὰ πατρὸς καθηῦδον ἢ ἀδελφοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

XXXV. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἶσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγούμενον μὲν ἠτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντετυχηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἷῳ ἐγὼ οὐκ

219 D ἢ εἰ B O.-P.: ἢ TW

αὐτίκα τὸν ἔφησον κτλ.). Cp. Spenser's, "Thou hast enfrosen her disdainfull brest," and "Whilst thou tyrant Love doest laugh and scorne At their complaints, making their paine thy play, Whylest they lie languishing like thrals forlorne" (cp. καταδεδουλωμένος 219 E *infra*).

καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο (ο) γε κτλ. So I have ventured to write on the strength of the evidence of the Papyrus.

Rettig keeps the Bodleian κείνο, as tolerable "in hac Alcibiadis oratione singularia amantis," and refers to Poppo *ad* Thuc. VIII. 86, Lob. *ad* Phryn. p. 7, and other authorities: but to bolster up the double anomaly "vain is the strength of man": if κείνο be retained we must assume prodelision (κείνο).

τι εἶναι. "Magni quid esse" (Rückert): cp. *Gorg.* 472 A: it is the opposite of οὐδὲν εἶναι, 216 E, 219 A.

δικασταὶ. Alcib. appeals to the audience to try the case, the notion of a lawsuit (γραφὴ ὑβρεως) having been suggested by the word ὑβρισεν. We have already had, in this speech, terms suggestive of legal proceedings, viz. 214 D τιμωρήσωμαι ὑμῶν ἐναντίον: 215 B μάρτυρας παρέξομαι: and δικαστής itself was already used by Agathon in 175 E.

μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς. Such an invocation of the whole pantheon is unusual, but cp. *Tim.* 27 c.

οὐδὲν περιττότερον. *Haud aliter*, cp. Isocr. III. 43.

καταδεδαρθηκῶς. Cp. 223 c, *Apol.* 40 D. For the incident cp. Petron. 128 non tam intactus Alcibiades in praeceptoris sui lecto iacuit: Lucian *vit. auct.* 15; Corn. Nep. *Alcib.* c. ii.

219 D τίνα...διάνοιαν. A's feelings were a blend of chagrin and veneration: cp. the perplexity described in 216 c; Theogn. 1091 ff. ἀργαλέως μοι θυμὸς ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος· | οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι, κτλ.

ἠτιμάσθαι. Cp. Theogn. 1313 ἐμὴν δὲ μεθήκας ἀτίμητον φιλότητα.

ἀγάμενον. This is an echo, both of Phaedrus's language in 179 c, 180 A, and of ἀγαστός applied to Eros (197 D). Observe the assonance ἡγούμενον... ἀγάμενον. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 8.

τὴν τούτου φύσιν κτλ. Hommel renders "des Mannes ganzem Wesen besonders seiner Besonnenheit und Charakterfestigkeit" etc.; Rettig explains φύσις as "die geistige Naturanlage des S., seine theoretische und spekulative Begabung, ingenium, σοφία (vgl. Theaet. 144 A)." The former seems the more natural interpretation; φύσις may be intended also as an echo of Aristophanes' use of the word (189 D etc.).

ἀν ᾧμην ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν; ὥστε οὐθ' ὅπως οὖν ὀργιζοίμην εἶχον καὶ ἀποστερηθείην τῆς τούτου συνουσίας, οὐθ' ὅπῃ προσαγαγοίμην αὐτὸν ἠπόρου. εὐ γὰρ ἤδη ὅτι **E** χρήμασί γε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄτρωτος ἦν πανταχῇ ἢ σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας, ᾧ τε ᾧμην αὐτὸν μόνῳ ἀλώσεσθαι, διεπεφεύγει με. ἠπόρου δῆ, καταδεδουλωμένος τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου περιῆα. ταῦτά τε γὰρ μοι ἅπαντα προυγεγόνει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἡμῖν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν ἐγένετο κοινῇ καὶ συνεσιτούμεν ἐκεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· ὅπῳτ' ἀναγκασθείμεν ἀποληφθέντες που,

**219 D** ωομην O.-P. corr. καρτερίαν: εγκρατειαν O.-P. οὐθ': ουδ O.-P. corr. εἰ και O.-P. συνηθειας O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **E** ὅποι vulg. ἤδη B: ἤδειν W O.-P. γε TW O.-P., Jn.: τε B, J.-U. Sz. Bt. δῆ BT O.-P.: τε W ταῦτά τ' ἄρα Bdhm. κοινῇ vulg. J.-U. Naber: κοινή BT O.-P., Sz. Bt. οὖν libri, Bt.: οὖν (ἐν) Winckelmann J.-U. Sz. ὅπῳτ' W, Herm.: ὅπῳταν BT O.-P.: ὅπῳταν γοῦν vulg.: ὅπῳτε δ' Sauppe Jn.: ὅπῳτ' αὐ Rohde: οἶον ὅπῳτ' cj. Usener ἀποληφθέντες Cornarius, Sz. Bt.: ἀπολειφθέντες libri, O.-P.: ἀπολειφθέντες σίτου, οἶα Heusde

φρόνησιν...καρτερίαν. "φρόνησις verbunden mit καρτερία ist doch nichts Anderes als die Auflösung des Begriffs der σωφροσύνη in seine beiden Bestandtheile. Vgl. Pol. iv. 430 E, Phädr. 237 E, Krat. 411 E" (Rettig).

οὐθ'...εἶχον. Of moral impossibility, as in 190 c, *Phaedr.* 241 A.

**219 E** ἄτρωτος. "Invulnerable on all sides": cp. τετρώσθαι 219 B. For the incorruptibility of Socr., shown by his sending back Alcib.'s presents, see Stob. *Flor.* xvii. 17, Ael. v. h. ix. 29.

σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας. For the impregnable seven-fold shield of Ajax, see Pind. *Isthm.* v. 45; Soph. *Aj.* 576; Welcker *Kl. Schr.* II. p. 267.

ᾧ τε ᾧμην. Sc. τῇ ᾧρα (cp. 219 c): the antecedent, κατὰ τοῦτο (διαπεφ.), has to be supplied.

καταδεδουλωμένος. Cp. *Euthyd.* 303 c. Above, 215 E, we had ἀνδραποδῶδες διακείμενος.

περιῆα. "I wandered about," suggestive of aimless despair: cp. *Prot.* 348 D, *Rep.* 620 c: so περιτρέχων 173 A.

στρατεία...κοινῇ. Potidaea revolted from Athens in 435 B.C. and after 5 years of war was reduced in 430 (see Bury's *Hist. Gr.* pp. 392—3): Socr.'s part in the campaign is alluded to also in *Apol.* 28 E, *Charm.* 153 A, c: cp. *Plut. adv. Colot.* p. 1117 E.

συνεσιτούμεν. "We were mess-mates" (σύσσιτοι). This implies personal friendship rather than proximity of origin; for Socr. and Alcib. belonged to different φυλαί and to different τάξεις.

τοῖς πόνοις. Cp. 197 E ("Ἐρως) ἐν πόνῳ...ἄριστος.

ἀποληφθέντες. "Cut off," "a commeatu intercepti et prohibiti" (Stallb.): cp. *Hdt.* II. 115. 2; *Thuc.* VI. 22; *Gorg.* 522 A.

220 οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν. ἔν τ' αὖ ταῖς εὐωχίαις μόνος ἀπολαύειν οἷός τ' ἦν τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ πίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλων, ὅποτε ἀναγκασθεῖη, πάντα ἐκράτει, καὶ ὁ πάντων θαυμαστότατον, Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐώρακεν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσσεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὰς τοῦ χειμῶνος καρτερήσεις—δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες—θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ποτε ὄντος B πάγου οἷου δεινοτάτου, καὶ πάντων ἢ οὐκ ἐξιόντων ἔνδοθεν ἢ εἴ τις ἐξίοι ἡμφισμένων τε θαυμαστὰ δὴ ὅσα καὶ ὑποδεδεμένων καὶ ἐνειλιγμένων τοὺς πόδας εἰς πῖλους καὶ ἀρνακίδας, οὗτος δ' ἐν

220 A πρὸς τὸ: πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ Sauppe: πρὸς αὐτὸν τῷ Bdhm. ἐν δ' αὖ Wolf ἀπολλυεῖν O.-P.<sup>1</sup> οἷός τ' ἦν del. Bdhm. τε τᾶλλα Bdhm. πίνων Usener πάντα: πάντων Hirschig ὁ πάντων TW O.-P.: ὅποτε B θαυμασιωτάτον O.-P. Vind. 21 ἐώρακεν TW O.-P.: ἐωράκει B χειμῶνες del. Naber B πάγου B O.-P.: τοῦ πάγου TW ἢ οὐκ B O.-P.: οὐκ TW δὴ TW O.-P.: ἢ B οὗτος δ' BTW: οὗτος O.-P. Vind. 21

220 A οἷα δὴ κτλ. Sc. φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, or the like; cp. *Rep.* 467 B οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ (sc. γίνεσθαι); *Euthyd.* 272 A.

οὐδὲν ἦσαν...πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 195 D οἷός ἦν...πρὸς κτλ., and 216 E οὐδὲν εἶναι.

εὐωχίαις. Cp. *Laws* 666 B ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα: 203 B *supra*.

τὰ τ' ἄλλα κτλ. The construction is loose; we may either explain it (with Stallb.) as a brachylogy for τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι...ἐκράτει, or say (with Wolf) that ἐκράτει is carelessly put for κρατῶν. Hug construes πίνειν closely with ἀναγκασθεῖη, marking οὐκ ἐθέλων as a parenthesis; but it is simpler to regard πίνειν as a kind of accus. of respect ("at drinking") with ἐκράτει. For the ἀνάγκη of the "symposiarch's" ruling cp. 176 A, 223 B.

ἐώρακεν. The plpf. ἐωράκει (in spite of Rettig, etc.) is inconsistent with πώποτε. For Socr.'s invincibility in carousals, see 176 C, 214 A, 223 C; and cp. *Theogn.* 491 ἀνίκητος δέ τοι οὗτος | ὅς πολλὰς πίνων μὴ τι μάταιον ἐρεῖ.

αὐτίκα...ἔσσεσθαι. I.e. we shall have proof, before the night is over, of Socr.'s καρτερία in this regard.

δεινοί...χειμῶνες. Cp. *Thuc.* II. 70 ὁρῶντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ: *Aesch. Pers.* 495 ff.

θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο. An echo of 182 E and 213 D.

220 B οἷου δεινοτάτου. I.e. τοιούτου οἷος δεινότατός ἐστιν: cp. *Apol.* 23 A (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 96. 1).

πῖλους. Schol. πῖλος· ἱμάτιον ἐξ ἐρίου πλήσεως γινόμενον, εἰς ὑετῶν καὶ χειμῶνων ἄμυναν. Cp. *Laws* 942 D; *Hes. Op.* 541 ff. "Had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces" (Jowett).

ἀρνακίδας. Schol. ἀρνακίδες δὲ ἀρνῶν κώδια: *Suid.* ἀρνακίς· τὸ τοῦ ἀρνὸς κώδιον, τὸ μετὰ τῶν ἐρίων δέρμα. Cp. *Themist. or.* IV. 50 B.

τούτοις ἐξήκει ἔχων ἰμάτιον μὲν τοιοῦτον οἶόνπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθει φορεῖν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥᾶον ἐπορεύετο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι. οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονούντα σφῶν.

XXXVI. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα·

C

οἶον δ' αὖ τὸδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖ ποτὲ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι. ξυννόησας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἔωθέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ προухώρει αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἀνίει ἀλλὰ εἰστήκει ζητῶν. καὶ ἤδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἠσθάνοντο, καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλω ἔλεγον ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἔστηκε. τελευτῶντες δὲ τινες τῶν Ἰώνων,

220 B οἶόνπερ B O.-P.: οἶον TW C αὖ τὸδ' W O.-P., Cornarius: αὐτὸ BT ἔρρεξε B στρατιᾶς O.-P., Cobet Sz. Bt.: στρατείας libri, J.-U. εἰστήκει vulg. O.-P.: ἐστήκει libri προухώρει B ἀνίει: ανειη O.-P. ἄνθρωποι Mehler Cobet Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωποι libri ἔλεγον Mehler Cobet Sz.: ἔλεγεν libri, O.-P., Bt. ἐξ: ως εξ O.-P. καὶ ante τελευτῶντες add. W Ἰώνων libri, O.-P.: νέων Mehler Hug Sz.: ἰδόντων Schmidt: Παιόνων Rettig

ἰμάτιον...φορεῖν. Cp. 220 A n.; Xen. *Mem.* I. 2. 1, 6. 2 καὶ ἰμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς. For ἀνυπόδητος, see also 174 A, 203 D.

ὑπέβλεπον. "Looked askance (suspiciously) at him," i.e. "quippe quem ipsos despicere opinarentur" (Stallb.). Cp. *Eryx.* 395 A ὑποβλέψας...ὥσπερ τι ἀδικούμενος: *Crito* 53 B ὑποβλέφονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων.

220 C Καὶ ταῦτα...ταῦτα. For this formula of transition, dismissing the subject, cp. *Laws* 676 A.

οἶον δ' αὖ...ἀνὴρ. From Hom. *Od.* iv. 242, with the slight alteration οἶον δ' αὖ for ἀλλ' οἶον: there it is spoken by Helen in describing Odysseus.

ξυννόησας. Rettig holds that the following section is an illustration of the "spekulative Begabung" (*φύσις* 219 D) of Socr.; but it describes, primarily, another phase of his *καρτερία*. For S.'s habit of thought-immersion, cp. 174 E ff., Gell. *N. A.* II. 1; similarly, in Indian gymnosophists, Plin. *H. N.* VII. 2. 22. The similar incident in 174 E ff. is there construed by Agathon as a symptom of *σοφία* (see 175 C—D).

Ἰώνων. Rückert comments "Iones illo tempore sub Atheniensium ditione erant, unaque militabant"; but most recent editors suspect corruption after Mehler (*ad Xen. Symp.* p. 75) "Neque fuere eorum in ordinibus, neque Platonis haec sunt verba." To Mehler's restoration, τῶν νεῶν, Rettig objects that "den Athenern gleichviel ob jung oder alt diese Weise des Sokrates kaum auffallend war; da man ihn genugsam kannte"; while in favour of his own conj. Παιόνων, he cites Thuc. I. 59, 61, etc. But I agree with Usener (*Rhein. Mus.* LIII. p. 372) that Ἰώνων may well be genuine.



**D** ἐπειδὴ ἐσπέρα ἦν, δειπνήσαντες—καὶ γὰρ θέρος τότε γ' ἦν—χαμύνια ἐξευεγκάμενοι ἅμα μὲν ἐν τῷ ψύχει καθηύδον, ἅμα δὲ ἐφύλαττον αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἐστήξοι. ὁ δὲ εἰστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχευ· ἔπειτα ὄχετ' ἀπιῶν προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν, ἐξ ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰριστεῖα ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοί, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τὰριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς, καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι οὔτε μέμψῃ

220 **D** προσευξόμενος b ἐν ταῖς : καὶ ἐν ταῖς O.-P. οὐκ ἐθέλων τετρωμένον T **E** Σωκρατην O.-P.

220 **D** χαμύνια. ταπεινὰ κλινίδια (Schol.); τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς στρωννύμενα (Tim.): cp. (Eros) χαμαιπετής, 203 **D**; Hipponax 67 ἐν σταθμίῳ τε καὶ χαμευνίῳ γυμνόν.

προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ. Hesiod (*Op.* 339) prescribes prayer at sunrise and sunset; cp. *Laws* 887 **E**, 966 **D**; *Soph. O. C.* 477; *Ar. Plut.* 771 καὶ προσκυνῶ γε πρῶτα μὲν τὸν ἥλιον. The suggestion here may be that the Sun-god (*Phoebus*, the revealer, "the light of the world") brings mental illumination, and that Socr.'s εὐχή was in part a thanksgiving therefor. As a parallel to Socr., we may refer to "the devotion of Orpheus to Helios" as pointed out in Harrison *Proleg.* p. 462. Moreover, Socr. regarded Apollo as his special patron-god, see *Apol.* 39 **D** ff., *Phaedo* 85 **B**, *Tim.* 40 **A** (Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 325, 434 ff.): and the sun is the symbol of ideal Good, see *Rep.* 530 **A**, *Phileb.* 28 **D**. For the content of a Socratic prayer, see *Phaedr.* 279 **B—C**; *Xen. Mem.* I. 3. 2 ἠύχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ διδόναι. Of prayers to Helios we have exx. in *Soph. Aj.* 845 ff.; *id. fr.* 772 Ἡέλιος οἰκτεῖρεί με | ὄν σοφοὶ λέγουσι γεννητὴν θεῶν | καὶ πατέρα πάντων.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε. *Sc.* ἀκούσαι οἷος ἦν, or the like; cp. 177 **B**. Alcib. here passes on to treat of the ἀνδρεία of Socr.

ἀποδοῦναι. "Tanquam debitum persolvere" (Stallb.).

ἡ μάχη. "Illa pugna (omnibus nota)" (Rückert); *i.e.* the fight (in 432 **B.C.**) which preceded the blockade of Potidaea, cp. 219 **E n.**, *Thuc.* I. 62 ff., II. 2.

ἔσωσεν. With this, and συνδιέσωσεν below, cp. Eros as σωτήρ ἀριστος, 197 **E**.

220 **E** οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν. This passage echoes the language of Phaedrus in 179 **A**: ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ κτλ., and ὄπλα ἀποβαλόν. To rescue a man's arms was to save him from the disgrace attaching to ὄπλων ἀποβολή.

οὔτε μέμψῃ. Here for the fifth time Alcib. challenges Socr. to contradict him (cf. 219 **c**): for μέμφομαι, cp. 213 **E**.

οὔτε ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι τάριστεία, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου 221 φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον· ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγενόμενος ἵππον ἔχων, οὗτος δὲ ὄπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασμένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτος τε ἅμα καὶ Λάχης· καὶ ἐγὼ περιτυγχάνω, καὶ ἰδὼν εὐθύς παρακελεύομαι τε αὐτοῖν θαρρεῖν, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτῶ. ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην Σωκράτη ἢ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ—αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦττον ἐν φόβῳ ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἵππου εἶναι—πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἔμοιγε B ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὡσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, “βρενθυόμενος καὶ τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλων,”

221 A σωκράτην T ἢ B: ἢ TW: η O.-P.: ἦν vulg. B ὡσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε secl. Jn. J.-U. τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ T O.-P.: τῷ φθαλμῷ B: τ' ὀφθαλμῷ W

**ἀξίωμα.** “Social standing”: “erat genere Alcmaeonida...ipse Periclis in tutela erat” (Rückert). Cp. *I. Alc.* 104 B; Thuc. II. 37, v. 43, etc.

**ἢ σαυτόν.** We should expect μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτός, but the accus. is put in order to balance ἐμὲ, “propter oppositionis gravitatem” (Stallb.). For the omission of μᾶλλον after words “denoting a wish or choice,” see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 93 c.

221 A ἀπὸ Δηλίου. For this famous battle in Boeotia (424 B.C.), when the Athenians under Hippocrates were routed by the Thebans under Pagondas, see Thuc. IV. 76 ff., Bury's *Hist. Gr.* pp. 442—3.

**καὶ Λάχης.** Cp. *Lach.* 181 B. Athenaeus (v. 329 ff.) perversely contends that Socr. took part in no battle.

**περιτυγχάνω.** Cp. Hermann on Ar. *Nub.* 196, “ἐπιτυγχάνειν dicitur qui quaerit, περιτυγχ. qui non quaerens in aliquid incidit.”

**κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην.** “I got a finer view of”: cp. *Rep.* 467 E ἐφ' ἵππων... κάλλιστά τε θεάσονται...καὶ ἀσφαλίστατα κτλ.

**ἐν φόβῳ.** Cp. 197 D.

**ἔμφρων.** “Cool,” “collected”; cp. *Ion* 535 B πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ, ἢ ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίγνεις; *Laiws* 791 B ἀντὶ μανικῶν...ἔξεις ἔμφρονας ἔχειν.

221 B τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο. An accus. absol., like τὸ λεγόμενον: “ut tuo illo utar” (Stallb.). Cp. *Soph.* 233 B, *Euthyd.* 284 c (with Schanz, *nov. comm.* pp. 76 f.). The ref. is to Ar. *Nub.* 362 ὅτι βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις. The *Clouds* was not produced until the year after the battle of Delium, viz. 423 B.C.

**βρενθυόμενος.** “Stalking like a pelican” (Jowett): Schol. ad *Nub.* 362 βρενθύει· ἀποσεμνύνεις σεαυτὸν ἐν τῷ σχήματι καὶ ταυρηδὸν ὄρας· κομπάζεις καὶ ὑπεροπτικῶς βαδίσεις: cp. Schol. ad *Pax* 25, ad *Lysist.* 887. “Nimirum ductum est verbum a βρένθος, quod significat avem aquaticam, frequenter ad paludes commorantem altisque pedibus incedentem” (Stallb.).

**τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλων.** “H. e. torvo vultu oculos in obliquum vertens”

ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δῆλος ὦν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν, ὅτι εἴ τις ἄψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπήει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος· σχεδὸν γάρ τι τῶν οὕτω διακειμένων ἐν τῷ C πολέμῳ οὐδὲ ἄπτονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκουσι.

Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις καὶ ἄλλα ἔχοι Σωκράτη ἐπαινέσαι καὶ θαυμάσια· ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τάχ' ἂν τις καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοιαῦτα εἴποι, τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅμοιον εἶναι, μήτε τῶν παλαιῶν μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων, τοῦτο ἄξιον παντὸς θαύματος. οἶος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ

221 B περισκοπῶν Ast Bekk. Sz. φίλους BTW: φίλους al., O.-P., Steph. ἀψαιτο O.-P. ἀμύνηται B διὸ...διώκουσιν secl. Hartmann διὸ δὴ καὶ Arist. οὗτος: αὐτος O.-P. ἑταῖρος Arist., Sz. Bt.: ἕτερος libri, O.-P., J.-U. ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ante ἀλλὰ ponit Arist. C μᾶλλον post φεύγοντας addit Arist. θαυμάσαι Hirschig τῶν μὲν: των O.-P. (ut videtur) δέ: δε δη O.-P. εἶναι μήτε TW O.-P.: εἶναί με B

(Stallb.). Rettig objects that this rendering is inconsistent with ἡρέμα φίλους, and explains by "oculis prope admotis intueri, also scharf ansehen," cp. *Phaedo* 103 A, *Rep.* 531 A. Ast gives "oculos in aliquid immotos habere intentos": Reynders, τὸ βλέμμα ἄνω καὶ κάτω κινεῖν: Jowett, "rolling his eyes."

ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν. This verb is ἀπ. εἶρ. in Plato, and perhaps conveys a literary allusion: Rückert explains it to mean "oculis quasi comitari, observare, ut omnes motus lento oculorum motu notare videaris."

δῆλος...πόρρωθεν. "Similiter Apollodorus, qui Socratis incessum imitatus est, τῶν οὖν...πόρρωθεν ἐκάλεσεν κτλ." (Hommel).

ὁ ἑταῖρος. So Jahn, after Aristides t. II. p. 72: the more definite term is preferable, as Rettig argues against Teuffel. For confusion of the two words in the codd., cp. 183 c (*crit. n.*), and see Schanz, *nov. comm.* p. 59.

221 C προτροπάδην. "In headlong rout"—an Epic (*Il.* XVI. 304) word, ἀπ. εἶρ. in Plato. For the sense, cp. Tyrt. 11. 11—13 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τολμῶσι... παυρότεροι θνήσκουσι κτλ.: Seneca, *Ep.* 94 audentes fortuna iuvat (see Bergk, ad Simon. *fr.* 227): *Il.* v. 531 f. αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοοὶ ἢ ἐπέφανται· | φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή: *ib.* xv. 561 ff.

Πολλὰ...καὶ ἄλλα κτλ. Cp. 195 B, 201 D. Hirschig's θαυμάσαι gives us (as Rettig argues) "einen matten Gedanken."

θαύματος. "Of wonder" (the subjective feeling), cp. *Phil.* 36 D, *Laios* 967 A: elsewhere in Plato θαῦμα means "quod mirum est."

οἶος γὰρ κτλ. For Achilles, see *Od.* iv. 267 ff.; and cp. 179 E f.

Βρασίδαν. For this famous Spartan leader, who fell fighting at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., see Thuc. II. 25, 85 ff., v. 6; Bury, *Hist. Gr.* pp. 445 ff.

ἄλλους, καὶ οἶος αὐτὸν Περικλῆς, καὶ Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι· καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ ταῦτ' ἂν τις ἀπεικάζοι· οἶος D δὲ οὐτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὔροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικάζοι τις αὐτόν, ἀνθρώπων μὲν μηδενί, τοῖς δὲ σιληνοῖς καὶ σατύροις, αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους.

**XXXVII.** Καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις παρέλιπον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότατοί εἰσι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τοῖς διοιγομένοις. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανείεν **E** ἂν παγγέλοιοι τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται, σατύρου [ἂν] τινὰ ὑβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ

**221 C** εἰσὶ...ἕτεροι secl. Jn. J.-U. εἰσὶ: οἶοι Bdhm. **D** τοὺς del. Bdhm.: τοὺς (μὲν) Hirschig ταῦτ': ταῦτ' B: τοῦτ' W ἄνθρωπος Sauppe Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωπος BT οὔτε τῶν νῦν...παλαιῶν del. (Hommel) Hirschig Jn. ἄρα εἰ B: ἄρα TW O.-P. λέγω TW O.-P.: λέγων B αὐτόν τε καὶ vulg. **E** ἐθέλοι B: ἐθέλει T τῶν...λόγων TW O.-P.: τὸν...λόγον B παγγέλοιοι scripsi: πᾶν γελοῖοι TW O.-P., vulg. Bt.: γελοῖοι B, J.-U. Sz. τινὰ B O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: ἂν τινὰ TW: δὴ τινὰ Baiter Cobet Bt.: αὐτὸν Rückert

Περικλῆς. See 215 E n., *Gorg.* 515 c ff., 519 A.

Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα. Comparable to Pericles on the ground of eloquence (cp. 215 E, Pericles as ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ). For Nestor, see Hom. *Il.* i. 247 ff.; for Antenor, *Il.* vii. 347 ff.; Hor. *Ep.* i. 2. 9.

**221 D** τὴν ἀτοπίαν. "Originalität" (Wolf): see 215 A n.

ἀνθρώπων μὲν κτλ. See 215 A, B, 216 E.

**221 E** παγγέλοιοι. Cp. 189 B, 215 A; the context shows that -γέλοιοι here is nearly equiv. to καταγέλαστος. Of Socr., as of S. Paul, it was said that "his speech was contemptible."

ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα. See 198 B n.

ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται. Cp. 216 B ἔξωθεν περιβέβληται.

σατύρου [ἂν] τινὰ. Stallb. vainly argues in a long note "ἂν tenendum et per ellipsin verbi (i.e. οὐσαν) explicandum esse."

ὑβριστοῦ. Cp. 215 B, 175 E. In δοράν, the satyr's "hide," there is an allusion, no doubt, to the flaying of Marsyas by Apollo.

ὄνους γὰρ κτλ. "His talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers" (Jowett). Schol. *καυθηλίους· τοὺς βραδεῖς νοῆσαι ἢ ἀφνεῖς. ἀπὸ κάρθωνος, ὅς ἐστιν ὄνος, εἰρημένοι, κτλ.*: cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 170 ff., 177 ff. For ὄνοι in Plato, cp. *Gorg.* 516 A, *Rep.* 563 C; for χαλκεῖς, *Prot.* 319 D, *Crat.* 388 D, 389 E. Cp. *Gorg.* 490 c ff., where Callicles objects ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει κτλ.: Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 37 ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, Ἀλλὰ τῶνδὲ τοῖ σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκίων: *ib.* iv. 4. 5—6: Max. Tyr. *diss.* ix. 1.

κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέφας, καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν.

222 διοιγομένους δὲ ἰδὼν αὐ τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὐρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλείστ' ἀγάματ' ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῶ κἀγαθῶ ἔσεσθαι.

Ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἃ ἐγὼ Σωκράτη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ αὐ ἃ μέμφομαι συμμίξας ὑμῖν εἶπον ἃ με ὕβρισεν. καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ Εὐθύδημον τὸν Διοκλέους καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ πολλούς, οὓς οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστῆς παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντ'

221 E κανθηλίους O.-P. 222 A διοιγομένους B αὐ Bekk. Hug Bt.: ἂν libri, O.-P.: δὴ Sz. ἐγγὺς αὐτῶν γε Hommel εὐρήσειε Usener τῶν λόγων TW O.-P.: τὸν λόγον B: del. Wagner Voeg. τείνοντας TW: τινοντας O.-P.: τείναντας B ἐπὶ TW O.-P.: ἔτι B B πάνυ om. O.-P.

222 A ἰδὼν αὐ τις. "ἂν cum participio cohaeret hoc sensu, ἐάν τις ἴδῃ... si quis forte viderit" (Rückert); Stallb., too, defends ἂν, citing *Rep.* 589 E, *Phaedo* 61 c, *Euthyd.* 287 D; the objection of Rückert and Rettig, that αὐ ought to stand after διοιγομένους rather than after ἰδὼν, is not fatal.

μόνους...τῶν λόγων. For the contrast implied, cp. Homer's οἶος πέπνυται, ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἴσσουσιν (*Meno* 100 A). A similar ascription of life to λόγοι is to be found in *Phaedr.* 276 A.

θειοτάτους κτλ. Cp. 216 D—E. The whole of this account of Socrates' λόγοι is virtually an encomium of his σοφία.

τείνοντας...ἐπὶ πᾶν. Cp. 188 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει: *Rep.* 581 B. For echoes of phrases in the previous speeches here, and throughout Alcib.'s speech, see *Introd.* § vi (3).

ἃ μέμφομαι κτλ. "Verba ita connectenda sunt: καὶ συμμίξας αὐ ἃ μέμφομαι εἶπον ὑμῖν ἃ με ὕβρισε" (Stallb.). Stephens erroneously put a comma, Wolf a full stop, after μέμφομαι. Rückert, agreeing with Stallb., put a comma after συμμίξας, and Hommel added another after αὐ. Jowett's transl.,—"I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me"—seems to imply a different view of the construction. The points alluded to are those mentioned in 217 B ff., 219 c.

222 B Χαρμίδην. For Charmides, Plato's *avunculus*, see *Charm.* 154, 157; *Xen. Mem.* III. 7, *Symp.* III. 9 etc.

Εὐθύδημον. This Euthydemus, son of Diocles (see *Xen. Mem.* IV. 2. 40), is not to be confounded with his namesake the sophist, who appears in the dialogue *Euthyd.*

παιδικὰ...ἀντ' ἐραστοῦ. "The object rather than the subject of love." This may fairly be construed, with Rettig, as an indication that Socr., the



ἐραστοῦ. ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων γνόντα εὐλαβηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὡσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι.

XXXVIII. Εἰπόντος δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γέλωτα C γένεσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐδόκει ἔτι ἐρωτικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ Σωκράτους. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, Νήφειν μοι δοκεῖς, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποθ' οὕτω κομψῶς κύκλω περιβαλλόμενος ἀφανίσαι ἐνεχέρις οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα πάντα εἶρηκας, καὶ ὡς ἐν παρέργῳ δὴ λέγων ἐπὶ τελευτῆς αὐτὸ ἔθηκας, ὡς οὐ πάντα τούτου

222 B ἐξαπατᾶσθε B ἀλλ' υπο O.-P.<sup>1</sup> γνῶντα B C παρησια O.-P. εδοκε τ[ι] O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ομψῶς pr. B οὐ ἔνεκα TW: οὐδ' ἔνεκα B: ουνεκα O.-P. (ν e δ corr.): οὐ δὴ ἔνεκα Usener

embodiment of the ideal κάλλος, is exalted above Eros (cp. 201 A): contrast 180 B θεϊότερον ἐραστῆς παιδικῶν. For the reversal of the rôles of Alc. and Socr., cp. *I. Alc.* 135 D κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγῆσω σε κτλ. Cp. also *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 5; and see *Introd.* § VI. 3.

ἃ δὴ...ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. Hommel and Rettig, after Stallb., take the infin. clause to be expegetic of ἃ: Rückert construes ἐξαπ. as a second accus. depending on λέγω: Hug makes the infin. depend on ἃ λέγω (equiv. to "I give you this warning") as on a "verbum voluntatis." It may be simply an oblique imperative.

κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν. Cp. *Hom. Il.* XVII. 33 ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω: *ib.* XX. 198: *Hes. Op.* 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω: *Hdt. I.* 207 παθήματα μαθήματα: *Aesch. Ag.* 177, *Cho.* 313: *Soph. O. C.* 143: and our English proverb "a burnt child dreads the fire." Schol. ῥεχθὲν...ἔγνω· ἐπὶ τῶν μετὰ τὸ παθεῖν συνιέντων τὸ ἀμάρτημα. ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐτέρα παροιμία· ὁ ἀλιεὺς πληγεὶς νοῦν φύσει· κτλ.

222 C παρρησίᾳ. "Naivetät" (Wolf); see A.'s excuses for it in 217 E.

Νήφειν μοι δοκεῖς. Echoing the phrase previously used by Alcib. (δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι νήφειν 213 E), Socr. jocosely derides his repeated plea of intoxication 212 E, 214 C, etc.), saying in effect: "It's sober you are, not drunk; otherwise you could never have excogitated so deep a scheme."

κομψῶς. Of a "pretty" trick; cp. *Theaet.* 202 D, *Soph.* 236 D.

κύκλω περιβαλλόμενος. See *Ast ad Phaedr.* 272 D "imago desumta est ab amictu, quem rhetores, priusquam perorarent, componere solebant: V. Quintil. XI. 3. 116": *Cic. de or.* III. 39. 138 se circumvestit dictis. For κύκλω cp. *Ar. Rhet.* I. 9. 33 (with Cope's note), III. 14. 10, and Virgil's "per ambages" (*G.* II. 45).

ἐπὶ τελευτῆς. *I.e.* as if it were an after-thought only: cp. 198 B, *Phaedr.* 267 D.

**D** ἔνεκα εἰρηκώς, τοῦ ἐμὲ καὶ Ἀγάθωνα διαβάλλειν, οἰόμενος δεῖν ἐμὲ μὲν σοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ μηδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἄλλου. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἀλλὰ τὸ σατυρικόν σου δράμα τοῦτο καὶ σιληνικὸν κατάδηλον ἐγένετο. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, μηδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ γένηται, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβαλεῖ. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν, Καὶ μὴν, **E** ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ καὶ ὡς κατεκλίνη ἐν μέσῳ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ. οὐδὲν οὖν πλέον αὐτῷ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ παρὰ σὲ ἐλθὼν κατακλινησώμαι. Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, δεῦρο ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ κατα-

222 D διαβαλεῖ Hirschig Cobet Sz. Bt.: διαβαλεῖ O.-P.: διαβάλῃ BTW

222 D ἐμὲ...διαβάλλειν. "To set us at variance": cp. 222 D, *Rep.* 498 c. οἰόμενος δεῖν κτλ. *I.e.* thinking that you must at once monopolise Socr. as your ἐραστής and Agathon as your παιδικά. For δεῖν, cp. 222 E.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες κτλ. For the conversational carelessness of the repeated ἀλλά, cp. 175 B (four times).

τὸ σατυρικόν σου δράμα κτλ. A playful allusion to the εἰκόνες employed by Alcib. in his encomium (see 215 B). For "satyr-drama" see Smith, *D. A. II.* 860 b: "The satyr-drama was so-called because the Chorus consisted of satyrs attendant on Dionysus...it was aptly described as παίξουσα τραγωδία": Jevons, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* p. 186.

μηδὲν πλέον κτλ. An echo of the language of Alcib. in 217 c.

222 E χωρὶς διαλάβῃ. "Dictum hoc eleganter cum amphibolia quadam, ut et de spatio possit cogitari et de animorum disiunctione" (Stallb.): cp. *Phil.* 55 D.

ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ. The original order of the places on this (ἐσχάτη) κλίνη was (1) Agathon, Socrates (see 175 C—D): then Alcibiades on his entrance had seated himself in the middle (213 B *ad init.*), thus making the order (2) Agathon, Alcib., Socr.: now Socrates invites Agathon to shift his position so as to change the order to (3) Alcib., Socr., Agathon: presently, in the sentence following, Alcibiades suggests that, instead of this, Agathon should take the middle place (ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν), which would result in the order (4) Alcib., Agathon, Socrates. But the adoption of this last order is, as Socr. hastens to point out, impossible, inasmuch as it would cause serious dislocation in the series of λόγοι which are bound to proceed in order from left to right (see 214 c), each speaker taking for his theme his next neighbour on the right. If the order (4) were adopted, it would be the duty of the next speaker, Agathon, to eulogize Socrates, a task already performed by Alcib. himself; whereas by adopting the order (3), the next speech would fall to Socr., and he would have for his theme Agathon, an arrangement unobjectionable in itself and well-pleasing to Socr. (πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι, 223 A) as well as to Agathon (ιοῦ ιοῦ κτλ., 223 A).

κλίνου. ὦ Ζεῦ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, οἷα αὐτὸν πάσχω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. οἶεται μοι δεῖν πανταχῆ περιεῖναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τι ἄλλο, ὧ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσφ' ἡμῶν ἔα Ἀγάθωνα κατακεῖσθαι. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἐπήνεσας, δεῖ δ' ἐμὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δεξιῇ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλιθῆ Ἀγάθων—οὐ δὴ που ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινέσεται, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεθῆναι; ἀλλ' ἔασον, ὧ δαιμόνιε, καὶ μὴ φθονήσης τῷ 223 μειρακίῳ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεθῆναι· καὶ γὰρ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι. Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, Ἀλκιβιάδη, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν ἐνθάδε μείναιμι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον μεταναστήσομαι, ἵνα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐπαινεθῶ. Ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, τὰ εἰωθότα· Σωκράτους παρόντος τῶν καλῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλλω. καὶ νῦν ὡς εὐπόρως καὶ πιθανὸν λόγον ἤρην, ὥστε παρ' ἑαυτῷ τουτονὶ κατακεῖσθαι.

222 E περιεῖναι: περιῦναι O.-P. γὰρ ἐμὲ B O.-P.: γάρ με TW αὐτὸν Bekk.: αὐτὸν B O.-P.: αὐτὸν T: αὐτὸν δ' Ast κατακλιθῆ O.-P. οὐ δὴ που: οὕτω δήπου Bdhm.: fort. οὐ δεῖ που ἐπαινέσεται: fort. ἐπαινεῖσαι vel ἐπαινεῖσθαι πρὶν: δεῖν Usener Hug: παρὸν (vel παρῆς...ἄλλον) Bdhm. 223 A μᾶλλον B O.-P.: ..., μᾶλλον T: om. Vind. 21: ἄλλον Mdv. ἐπαινεθῆναι; distinxit Ast ἰοῦ ἰοῦ T παντὸς: παντοσ[α] O.-P. ευπορω O.-P.

οἷα αὐτὸν πάσχω. "How I am fooled" (Jowett). This echoes 215 D οἷα δὴ πέπονθα κτλ.: cp. 184 B κακῶς πάσχων (sc. ὁ ἐρώμενος).

ὑπὸ σοῦ. ὁ ὑπό τινι (or ὑποκάτω τινος) is equiv. to ὁ ἐπὶ δεξιῇ (cp. 175 c n.).

οὐ δὴ που κτλ. If we retain the ms. reading, this clause is best printed as interrogative (so Bt. and Lehrs)—taking the place of a regular apodosis, such as δέήσει αὐτὸν ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινεῖν. Against Badh.,—who wrote "monstri vero simile est, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεθῆναι,"—Rettig attempts to defend the text thus: "Statt der Worte: 'er wird eher wollen von mir gelobt werden, als mich loben,' setze man: es wird nicht verlangt werden können, dass er mich lobe, bevor ich vielmehr ihn gelobt habe"; i.e. οὐ δήπου ἐπαινέσεται is equiv. to οὐ δήπου ἐπαινεῖν ἐθελήσει. This, however, is awkward; and some corruption must, I believe, be assumed: if so, the changes I have proposed seem the most plausible.

223 A Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ. For a distinction between ἰοῦ, as a cry of joy, and ἰού, of pain, see Schol. on Ar. *Nub.* 1170. Here it denotes jubilation, not commiseration as Hommel suggests ("Wehe, wehe, armer Alkibiades" etc.).

Ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα. Cp. 210 E, *Charm.* 166 B (Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 16).

εὐπόρως. This echoes phrases in the description of Eros, son of Πόρος, see 203 D (πόριμος), 203 E (εὐπορήση), 204 B (πατρὸς...εὐπόρου). Similarly πιθανὸν suggests the plausible tongue of the γόης and σοφιστῆς of 203 D.

πιθανὸν λόγον ἤρην. For this "inventiveness of plausible argument" as belonging to the art of the sophistical rhetor, cp. *Gorg.* 457 A ff., *Phaedr.* 269 D.

**B** XXXIX. Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα ὡς κατακείσόμενον παρὰ τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνίστασθαι· ἐξαίφνης δὲ κωμαστὰς ἤκειν παμπόλλους ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, καὶ ἐπιτυχόντας ἀνεφωγμέναις ἐξιόντος τινὸς εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς πορεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς καὶ κατακλίεσθαι, καὶ θορύβου μεστὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πίνειν πάμπολυν οἶνον. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἐρυξίμαχον καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οἴχεσθαι ἀπιόντας, ἔ δὲ **C** ὕπνον λαβεῖν, καὶ καταδαρθεῖν πᾶν πολὺ, ἅτε μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν οὐσῶν, ἐξεγρέσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἤδη ἀλεκτρούων ἀδόντων, ἐξεγρόμενος δὲ ἰδεῖν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους καθεύδοντας καὶ οἴχομένους, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Σωκράτη ἔτι μόνους ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ πίνειν ἐκ φιάλης μεγάλης ἐπὶ δεξιά. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη αὐτοῖς

223 B αναιωγμεναις O.-P.<sup>1</sup> εἰς τὸ: εισω O.-P. (τους) αλλους O.-P.  
 ἔ δὲ BW: ἔαδε T: εαυτον δε O.-P. C καταδάρθειν Rettig πᾶν: ατε  
 O.-P.<sup>1</sup> Σωκρατη και Αριστοφανη O.-P. Ven. 184 Vind. 21 μεγαλης  
 φι[λ]αλης O.-P. Paris 1642 Vat. 229

223 B ἐξαίφνης δὲ κτλ. Cp. the "sudden" tumultuous entrance of Alcibiades (212 C καὶ ἐξαίφνης κτλ.). The incursion here is devised in order to save the situation. For the sake of artistic effect, the series of λόγοι must now stop: the climax having been reached in the encomium of Socr. by Alcib., to add a eulogy of any lesser personage would be bathos.

ἐξιόντος τινὸς κτλ. Hommel comments: "imaginem proponit commissatorum contra nitente eo, qui iam exiturus erat, aditum vi expugnantium." But, as Rettig remarks, there is no hint in the text of *vis* or of *nisus*. The words ἐξιόντος τινὸς are merely put in to explain how it was that they found the doors open. εἰς τὸ ἄντικρυς is connected by Hommel and Stallb.<sup>2</sup> with ἐξιόντος, but by Rückert, Ast and Stallb.<sup>1</sup> with πορεύεσθαι: the former view is preferable.

Ἐρυξίμαχον. Eryx and Phaedrus are represented throughout as "hunting in couples"; and it is characteristic of the former, as an authority on health, and of the latter, as a valetudinarian, that they should be the first to escape from the scene of θόρυβος and παμπόλυς οἶνος: cp. 176 B ff., 214 A ff.

223 C μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν. This indication of date would suit either the *Lenaea* in January or the *Great Dionysia* in March, though rather favouring the former (cp. *Introd.* § VIII a).

ἀλεκτρούων ἀδόντων. Cp. *Theaet.* 164 C ἀλεκτρούονος ἀγεννοῦς δίκη...ἄδειν. The hour of cock-crow was, theoretically, the 3rd watch (12—3 a.m.): cp. *Ev. Mc.* xiii. 35. Jowett's "he was awakened by a crowing of cocks" misses ἤδη, which goes with ἀδόντων.

καὶ οἴχομένους. We should expect ἤ rather than καί: but (as Rückert observes) οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι fall into two subdivisions,—those absent in spirit (καθεύδ.), and those absent in body (οἴχομ.).

ἐγρηγορέναι κτλ. Cp. *Athen.* v. 192 A Σωκράτης...ἐγρήγορε...καὶ πίνει ἐξ ἀργυροῦ φρέατος· καλῶς γάρ τις τὰ μέγαλα ποτήρια οὕτως ὠνόμασε κτλ.

διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Ἄριστόδημος οὐκ ἔφη μεμνηῆσθαι τῶν λόγων—οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγενέσθαι ὑπονυστάζειν τε· τὸ D μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγωδοποιὸν ὄντα <καὶ> κωμωδοποιὸν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους νυστάζειν, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἄριστοφάνη, ἥδη δὲ ἡμέρας γιγνομένης τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, κατακοιμίσαντ' ἐκείνους, ἀναστάντα ἀπιέναι, καὶ <ἐ> ὥσπερ εἰώθει ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἐλθόντα εἰς Λύκειον, ἀπονιψάμενον, ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε τὴν ἄλλην

223 D καὶ κωμωδοποιὸν Vind. 21, vulg. Sz. Bt.: κωμωδοποιὸν BTW O.-P.

πρῶτον B: πρότερον TW O.-P. Ἀριστοφάν[ους]<sup>ῆν</sup> O.-P. γενομένης vulg.  
Hirschig κατακοιμίσαντ' BW O.-P.: κατακοιμήσαντ' T καὶ ἐ Herm. Sz.  
Bt.: καὶ libri, O.-P.: καὶ ἰ Bekker ἄλλην: ὄλην Ficinus

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτλ. This is artistic selection disguised under the cloke of imperfect recollection, cp. 178 A, 180 c.

223 D τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον. "The gist of it was...": cp. 205 D *ad init.*

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς κτλ. Cp. *Ion* 534 B τέχνη ποιῶντες. Here both τέχνη and ἐπίστασθαι are emphatic, with no distinction between them implied. The point of Socrates' argument is that the *scientific* poet must be master of the art of poetry in its universal, generic aspect, and therefore of both its included species, tragedy and comedy. This thought, if developed, might be shown to mean that full knowledge both of λόγοι and of ψυχαί, and of the effects of the one on the other, is requisite to form a master-poet. Which is equivalent to saying that, just as the ideal State requires the philosopher-king, so ideal Art is impossible without the φιλόσοφος-ποιητής. The thesis here maintained by Socrates finds in the supreme instance of Shakspeare both illustration and confirmation: "The Merry Wives" came from the same hand as "Othello" and "Lear."

The statement in Schol. *ad Ar. Ran.* 214 and Philostr. (*vit. soph.* I. 9, p. 439) that Agathon wrote comedies as well as tragedies is probably due to a blunder: see Bentley, *opusc. phil.* p. 613.

οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους. "Erant enim vino languidi. Ad ἐπομένους intelligi potest τοῖς λεγομένοις *Euthyphr.* p. 12 A οὐχ ἔπομαι τοῖς λεγομένοις" (Stallb.).

κατακοιμίσαντα. An allusion, perhaps, to Agathon's κοίτην ὑπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει, 197 c. Cp. *Laws* 790 D κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν παιδίων.

<ἐ>. I.e. Aristodemus, the narrator: for his practice (εἰώθει) of dogging the footsteps of the Master, cp. 173 B, 174 B (ἔπου).

Λύκειον. This was a gymnasium, sacred to Apollo Lyceus, situated in the eastern suburbs of Athens, though the exact site—whether s.e. or n. of the



ἡμέραν διατρίβειν, καὶ οὕτω διατρίψαντα εἰς ἐσπέραν οἴκοι ἀναπαύεσθαι.

223 D καὶ κ[α]ι οὕτω O.-P.

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Cynosarges—is uncertain. The Lyceum is mentioned also in the beginning of the *Lysis* and of the *Euthyphro*; cp. Xen. *Mem.* I. 1. 10, Paus. I. 19. 4. “Ibi Socr. versabatur propterea quod sophistae in eo scholas habebant, quorum inscitiam solebat convincere, et quod plurimos illic adolescentes nanciscebatur, quibus cum sermones instituere posset” (Stallb.).

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