

30 April 1947

Memorandum to: Colonel L. Smirnov

From: Lt. J. A. Curtis, Investigator 9, 1935

Subject: Assistant Chief of Staff in 1936. War Minister
on Dec 9, 1935.

In reference to your memorandum received by this Division
of 28 April, 1947, the following information is submitted:

Nishio, Toshizo held the position of Assistant Chief of
Staff of the Japanese Army General Staff in March 1936.

J. A. Curtis
2d. Lt. Inf.

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2277-
2279

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 67

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Dec 9, 1935

Source: Letter from Nishio to Furuse, Vice War Minister
on Dec 9, 1935.

Stated Kwantung Army's propaganda plan shall be
carried out in parallel with its military activity in
North China proper.

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2967

Man. Sum.

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, October 1935.

Source: Letter to FURUSO, Mikio, Vice-Army Minister.

He sent plans for control of public opinion and press to Manchuria to FURUSO on October 25, 1935, showing intent to aid Japanese policies by this method.

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: KIMURA, Heitaro

Address: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo

Facts to be proven by witness are that while General KIMURA was a member of Supreme War Council, it was in a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts.

The testimony is relevant in that it tends to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions.

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by Kimura Heitaro

Now in Suzama

Facts to be proved by witness are that while Genl Kimura was a member of Supreme War Council, it was in a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts.

The testimony is relevant in that it tends to prove that Kimura took no part in important decisions.

NISHIO, Juzo

Request by: DOHIHARA, Kenji

Address: Sugamo

Served as Supreme War Councillor during period that accused served in a similar capacity. Testimony of witness will be principally concerned with the activities of the accused during the period he served in such capacity.

Testimony believed to be relevant and is specifically concerned with Count 20.

NISHIO, Juzo Genl.
Proposed by Dohkora, Kenji

At present in Sugamo

Served as Supreme War Councillor during period that accused served in a similar capacity. Testimony of Witness will be principally concerned with the activities of the accused during the period he served in such capacity.

Testimony believed to be relevant and is specifically concerned with Count 20

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Address: Sugamo Prison

Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Assistant Chief of Staff). Later CinC of China Expeditionary Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Chief of General Staff of the same army.).

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are:

- (1) That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- (2) That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the new government in Manchuria and that after Generals MINAMI and ITAGAKI arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the cooperative attitude of Manchukuo.
- (3) The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards North China after the Tan-ku armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti-Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian administration.
- (4) That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Charhar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-ku agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in Inner-Mongolia.
- (5) That the incidents which happened around Outer-Mongolia and near the maritime district were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria and Korea.
- (6) That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China and Japan.
- (7) That the government under Wang-Chen-Wei was not a puppet government.

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NISHIO, TOSHIZO

Request by Ito, Senshin.

Now in Sugamo.

Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army
[at which time Ito was Assistant Chief of Staff]
later C. in C. of China Expeditionary Army, [at which time Ito was Chief of Genl Staff of the same Army].

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are:-

- ① That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein, and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- ② That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the New Govt in Manchuria and that after Genls Minami & Ito

Nishio Toshiyo

arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the cooperative attitude of Manchukuo.

③ The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards N. China after the Tan-hu armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian Administration.

④ That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Chahar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-hu agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in inner Mongolia.

⑤ That the incidents which happened around outer Mongolia and near the maritime District were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria & Korea.

⑥ That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China & Japan.

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Nishio, Toshiyo

⑦ That the government under Wang-Chin-wei was not a puppet government

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

Address: Sugamo Prison

This witness was Vice Chief of Staff 1936.

(14)

NISHIO, Toshizo

Request by: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

address: now in custody in Sugamo prison.

This witness was vice-chief of staff 1936.

SUBJECT: NISHIO, Toshizo General

Born in 1881. Until 1936 Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Kwangtung; from 1936-37 Vice Chief of Japanese General Staff; Commander of the Imperial Guard; until 1939 Director of Military Education; since September 1939 has been Commander in Chief of Expeditionary Corps in China. He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; has been raised to the post of Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China through having unity of command in war operations and flanks. May become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchese State.

SOURCE: Italian Consular Official
JICA North Africa, carded BR 21 Feb. 1944 (OSS Card File).

Subject's great friend is General S. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work".

SOURCE: (OSS Card File)

Enclosed is a Interrogation Report on NISHIO, Toshizo, conducted by the Interrogation Section, Special Intelligence Division, CIS

Page 1

Translated by Seiichi OHTA

Social status and ^{permanent} domicile: the military class, of the Tottori Prefecture

Name: Toshiyō NISHIO ~~Nishio~~

Date of birth: ~~born~~ Oct. 31, the 14th year of Meiji / 1881 /

Nov. 22, 1902 Graduated from the Military Academy

" " " Appointed Probationary,
~~Ordered a student~~ Officer.

June 26, 1903 Appointed Infantry
~~Ordered a infantry~~ Sublieutenant.)

(by the Cabinet)

Assigned to the 40th Infantry Regiment.

" " " ~~Appointed to attach to the Infantry 40th Regi-~~

~~ment~~ (by the War Ministry.)
~~by the Department of War~~

Oct. 20, 1903 Conferred the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank.

Promoted to Infantry

Feb. 1, 1905 ~~Ordered a military~~ Lieutenant.

(P. 2)

Mar. 10, 1905 Raised to
~~Conferred~~ the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.

Oct. 27, 1906 Relieved ^{of principal post} the ~~former business~~ and ~~ordered~~ assigned to attach
 the Cadet Section
 the student party of the Military Academy

(P. 2)

Apr. 1, 1906. Decorated with the fifth class Order of the Golden Kite.
 Awarded the War-Medal of the 1904-5 War.
~~still some time give a war medal of the war in 1904 to 1905~~

" " " Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit ^{with} and given
 Single Ray of the
 the Order of the Rising Sun ~~with the Monochromatic Ray~~

Oct. 26, 1907 Appointed Cadet Section Officer of the Military Academy
~~Appointed to attach the student party of the~~
 military academy

Dec. 10, 1907. Ordered to enter the Military Staff College.

Dec. 21, 1907. Relieved ^{of the principal post} the ~~former business~~ and ~~appointed~~ assigned to
~~attach~~ the 40th Infantry Regiment.

Dec. 15, 1909 Promoted to Captain -
~~Appointed a military captain~~

" " " Relieved ^{of the principal post} ~~the former business~~ and appointed
Company Commander of the 40th Infantry Regiment.

Feb. 21, 1910. Raised to,
~~Conferred~~ the Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank

Dec. 9, 1910. Relieved ^{of principal post} ~~the former business~~ and ^{assigned} ~~appointed~~
~~to the~~ ^{Bureau of} ~~the section staff of the Bureau of~~ Military Affairs ~~in the~~
~~Department of~~ War Ministry.

Aug. 13, 1912 Relieved ^{of principal post} ~~the former business~~ and ordered to
be stationed in, ^{prosecute the} ~~go to~~ Germany to study ^{of} ~~the~~ military affairs,
~~by the Department of~~ ^{(by the} War Ministry)

May 31, 1913 Decorated with
~~Conferred~~ the 5th Order of Merit ~~and~~ ^{with} the Order
of the Sacred Treasure.

(P.2)

Aug 23, 1914 Assigned ^{Army} ~~Ordered to attach to the~~ General Staff.

Feb. 15, 1915 Relieved ^{of principal post} the ~~former post~~ and appointed ~~to~~ ^{Staff-Officer} ~~be a member of the~~ ^{Army} General Staff. ~~by the Department~~

~~ment of War~~ (by the War Ministry)

Mar. 3, 1915 Concurrently ^{Instructor of} ~~appointed to be a teacher of the~~ ^{Army} ~~military~~ ^{School.} (by the War Ministry) ~~Medical college as an additional post~~

~~The Department of War~~

1915
March 20 Raised to
~~Decorated with~~ the Junior Grade of the 6th class
Court Rank.

1916 January 21 Relieved of the principal
~~Released from the present~~ and ~~the~~ additional posts.
Appointed Instructor in military science
~~the strategy constructor~~ of The Military
Staff College

1916
March 22 Concurrently appointed Staff-Officer
~~a member of~~ the Army
General Staff Office

1915 November 7 Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit
with the Sacred Treasure. ~~Money~~ ^{grant} ¥ 400
Granted a sum of 400 yen.
Awarded the War-Medal of ^{the} 1914-5 War.

1916 November 15 Appointed ~~infantry~~ ^{Infantry} Major.

- 1915 Nov. 10, ^{Awarded} ~~Conferred with~~ the Coronation Commemoration Medal.
- 1918 June 24, ^{Relieved of} ~~Released from~~ the additional post. (by the War Ministry)
- 1919 March 19, Concurrently appointed ^{Staff-Officer of Army} ~~a member of~~ the General Staff Office
- 1919 April 15, ^{Relieved of the principal and} ~~Released from the present and~~ additional posts and appointed Adjutant of War Ministry and concurrently Secretary to War Minister (by the War ~~War Minister's Secretary~~ Ministry)
- 1920 April 10, ^{Raised to} ~~Decorated with~~ the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank.
- 1920 May 10, Ordered to take an official trip to China. (by the War Ministry)
- 1920 August 10, Appointed Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel. (by the Cabinet)

1920 Nov. 1, Decorated
~~Conferred~~ with the Small Cordon of the Rising

Granted a sum of 2,100 yen,
Sun. ~~Money grant~~ ¥ 2,100 in recognition

of ~~his~~ services in ^{the} 1915-20 ~~years~~ War

1922 April 1, ~~Relieved~~

Relieved of the principal
~~Released from the present~~

and ~~the~~ additional posts

~~assigned~~
And ~~appointed~~ ~~number~~

~~attached~~ to the 10th In-

fantry Regiment. (by the War ~~Ministry~~ ^{Ministry})

1923 April 1, ~~Relieved~~

Relieved of ~~principal~~
~~Released from the present~~

post and appointed

Instructor in military science

~~strategy constructor of~~

of the Military Staff College. ~~War Ministry~~
(by the War Ministry)

1923 August 6, Appointed Infantry Colonel.

Cabinet

1923 ~~Sept. 30~~ Dec 30, Decorated with the 3rd

Order of Merit with the
Sacred Treasure.

1923 November 30, Raised to ~~Decorated with the~~

Junior Grade of the
5th Court Rank

1924 November 28,

Concurrently appointed
~~instructor of the Naval~~
Instructor of the Naval

Staff College (by the Navy ~~Ministry~~)

1925 March 18,

Relieved of
~~Released from the~~ principal present

post and appointed

Commander
Chief of the 40th Infantry

Regiment (by the War

~~War~~ Ministry)

Relieved of
~~Released~~ from the

additional post. (by the Navy

~~Navy~~ Ministry)

Relieved of
~~Released~~ from the principal

~~sent~~ post and appointed

Chief of the 1st Section

Inspector General
of the Department of

Military ~~Education~~ Training

~~War~~ Ministry

(by the War Ministry)

Appointed a Mem-

ber of the ~~Military~~ Army

1925 March 18

1925 March 18,

1926 March 2,

1926 April 9,

1928 October 25,

Council
Technical ~~Conference~~
(by the Cabinet)

~~Cabinet~~

Appointed Staff -

under the Commander
officer ~~of all arms~~ of

the ~~Coronation~~ Military

Review in commemoration of

the Coronation (by the War

Ministry)

1928 Dec. 12

Concurrently appointed

Research member of the ~~studying~~

~~Department~~ ^{of} the ~~Military~~ ^{Army}

Signal ~~Communication~~ School.

~~War~~
~~Ministry~~

(by the War Ministry)

1928) Dec. 28 Raised to ~~conferred~~ the Junior

Grade of the 5th

Court Rank.

1929 Feb. 28

Appointed ^{member} ~~suite~~ of the

first Special Inspector's ~~suit~~.

~~The same~~

(by the War Ministry)

1929) Aug. 1, Appointed

Major General
(by the Cabinet)

~~Cabinet~~

1929) Aug. 1,

Relieved of ~~Discharged~~ member

of the ~~Military Technical~~ Army Technical

Council. (by the Cabinet)

~~the~~
~~same~~

" "

Appointed Commander of

the 39th Infantry Brigade
(by the War Ministry)

~~War~~
~~Ministry~~

1930 Aug. 1,

~~Appointed member of~~
Assigned to the Army,

~~War~~

~~the Ordnance Central Depot.~~

~~Ministry~~

Ordnance Main Depot. (by the War Ministry)

1932 Apr. 11,

Appointed Chief of the

4th ~~Division~~ Department of the Army
(General)

~~the~~
~~same~~

Staff. (by the War Ministry)

1933 Apr. 10,

Appointed ~~the~~ Chief of ~~the~~

staff in command of the Military
~~the Emperor's birth-~~

Review in commemoration of the
Emperor's Birthday. (by the War
Ministry)

~~War~~
Ministry)

1933
Aug. 1. Appointed Lieute-

nant General.

~~Cabinet~~

1933
Sep. 4. (by the Cabinet)
Decorated with
~~Confere~~ the 2nd

Merit with
Order of the Sacred

Treasure.

1933
Sep. 1. Raised to
~~Confere~~ the Junior

Grade of the 4th Court

Rank.

~~1934~~ 1934
Mar. 5. Appointed the 1st

Appointed ~~the~~ Chief of

~~the~~ Staff of the Kwantung Army,

concurrently

and ~~the~~ Chief of the special

Duty Department,

~~service~~ of the Kwantung Army.

1935 Aug. 15,

(Not ~~published~~ ^{recorded} in ^{the} Official Gazette (by the War Ministry)

~~War Ministry~~

Appointed ^{Japanese Commissioner} ~~Imperial member~~ at the ~~of~~ Japan-Manchoukuo ~~Co~~

~~Army~~ ^{Economic} Joint Commission (by the Cabinet)

~~Cabinet~~

1934 Apr. 29,

Decorated with ~~Conferred~~ The First

Order of Merit with

the Grand Cordon of

~~For the Merits of the~~

the Rising Sun, in recognition of merits in the 1931-34 Incident.

~~1931-1934 Incident~~

1936 Mar. 23,

Relieved of ~~Discharged~~ Chief of staff

of ^{the} Kwangtung Army. (Not recorded in the Official Gazette) (by the War Ministry)

~~War Ministry~~

1936 Mar. 23,

Appointed Vice-Chief of

1936
Mar. 28

Army
the General Staff.
(by the War Ministry)
Relieved of Japanese Commissioner
~~Discharged Imperial Army~~

War
Ministry

at the
~~head~~ of Japan-Manchoukeno

Economic
~~Economic~~ Joint Commission. Cabinet

1936
Apr. 8

(by the Cabinet)
Appointed member of

National Investigation Committee,
the Resource Council. Cabinet

1936
May 1

(by the Cabinet)
Appointed Commissioner

the Department of
Imperial Household. Ministry
of Imperial Household

1936
May 12

(by the Department of Imperial Household)
Appointed member of the

Investigation
Educational Reform Council. Cabinet

1936
Dec. 1

Committee (by the Cabinet)
Appointed Acting Chief

the Department
of General Affairs Division

1937 Mar. 1

Army
of the General Staff.

16
~~War~~
Ministry

(by the War Ministry)
Relieved of Acting Chief of the
~~Discharged the above.~~
General Affairs Department of
the Army General Staff.

~~War~~
Ministry

~~Discharged principal post.~~

Relieved of the principal post.

(by the War Ministry)

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Translated by
H. Hattori 17.

March 1, 1937	Appointed to the Commander		
	# of the Imperial Guard		
	Division. (by the Cabinet)		Cabinet
March 25, 1937 1937	Relieved of the	Relieved of the Member	
		National Investigation	
		of the Resources Council Cabinet	
		Committee (by the Cabinet)	
* Apr. 1, 1937		Relieved of the	The Dept of
		Commissioner of the Department of Imperial Household.	the Imperial
		Lowest official	Household
	Raised	(by the Department of Imperial Household.)	
" "	Conferred to the Senior Gr-		
	ade of the 4th Court Rank		
* Aug. ⁽²⁶⁾ 1937	Relieved of the regular principal		
	post. (Not recorded in the		
	position (Official Gazette)	was not gazetted	The War Mini-
	(by the War Ministry)		stry

<p># ²⁶ Aug. 1937</p>	<p>Appointed to the Commander of the Second Army. (Not recorded in the official gazette.) (by the Cabinet)</p>	<p>was not gazetted</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>
<p># ³⁰ Apr. 1938</p>	<p>Relieved of the regular post. ^{principal post.}</p>		
<p>" " "</p>	<p>Appointed to Inspector- General of Military ^{Training;} Education, and concurrently # Supreme War</p>		
<p># ² Nov. 1938</p>	<p>Councillor. (Not recorded in the official gazette.) (by the Cabinet)</p>	<p>was not gazetted</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>
<p># ² Nov. 1938</p>	<p>Awarded with a set of Granted a set of silver cups, in recognition of merits in the conclusion of the Japan-Germany/illigible/ Agreement.</p>	<p>for his services in conclusion of</p>	
<p># ¹ Aug. 1939</p>	<p>Appointed to the General of Army (by the Cabinet)</p>		<p>Cabinet</p>
<p># ¹⁵ Aug. 1939</p>	<p>Raised Conferral to the Junior</p>		

Grade of the Third Court Rank

¹² Sep. 1939

Relieved of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~
principal, additional
~~regular and casual~~

~~post~~ posts ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~The War Ministry~~
(by the War Ministry)

" "

Appointed ^{Supreme} ~~to the~~ Commander
~~in chief~~ of the ^{China} Expeditionary ~~Army~~ ^{Forces}
~~for China~~ (by the Cabinet)

~~Cabinet~~

²³ Sep "

Concurrently appointed ~~to the~~

Commander of the Third Army ~~was not gazetted~~ ~~Cabinet~~
(Not recorded in the Official Gazette) (by the Cabinet)

²⁹ Apr. 1940

Decorated with the First class ~~For his services~~
Order of the Golden Kite, in recognition
of merits in the China Incident. ~~in the China Incident~~

* Mar 1. 1941 Appointed ~~to the~~ Supreme

War Councillor. (by the Cabinet)

~~Cabinet~~

* Sep 1. 1941

Appointed ~~to the~~ Chair

Chief Commissioner

~~of~~ of the Committee

for the Special Grand

Festival of ^{the} Yasurumi

Shrine ~~which was~~

~~to be held~~ in Oct. 1941

April 15, 1943. Raised to the Senior Grade of the Third Court Rank.

* May ³ 1943 Placed on the reserve list

The War Ministry

(by the War Ministry)

* July ²⁵ 1944 Appointed ~~to the~~ Governor

of Tokyo - to

appointed Chief

Concurrently ~~the~~ ~~Chief~~ of

Maritime
the ~~Marine~~ Transportation Bureau.

appointed
Concurrently ~~the~~ Chief of the

Marine Court of Inquiry.

Conferred ~~the~~ 2nd Rank

of the Higher Civil Service

Cabinet

(by the Cabinet)

~~10~~ Mar. 1943 Concurrently appointed to the

Secretary / Gunjikan / ~~and~~ of the
Ministry of Munitions, and

Super-intendant / Gunjikan-

ri-kan / of the Ministry

of Munitions.

Cabinet

Promoted
~~Conferred~~ to the First class of

the Higher Civil Service (by the Cabinet)

June 9, 1945	Relieved of the concurrent part of office, the Secretary and Superintendent of the Ministry of Munitions.	Cabinet
June 10, 1945	(by the Cabinet) Governor Appointed to the Inspector the General of Kantō and Shinetsu Districts and concurrently the Governor of Tokyo-to	Cabinet
Aug. 22, 1945	Discharged from both Relieved of the principal, regular and concurrent office and additional posts at his own request. (by the Cabinet)	Cabinet

NISHIO, Toshizo - Sugamo Prison

Request by OSHIMA, Hiroshi

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese.**
- (b) The witness was Vice Chief of Staff 1936.**
- (c) The witness will testify as to the aims of the Japanese Army in concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact and the attitude of the Japanese military at the time. This witness is in Sugamo Prison and his testimony will be corroborated by UMEZU, a defendant.**

3 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson USN Att: Cmdr. Cole; Mr. Edwards;
Mr. Lons; Mr. Cunningham; Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

ITAGAKI
OSHIMA

WITNESS

NISHIO, Toshio

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 on this witness has been included in the Investigative Files and is now available.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson, USN APT: Comdr. Cole;
Mr. Lopez; Mr. Edwards; Mr. Hyde; Mr. Cunningham

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness - Itagaki

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Itagaki

Oshima

WITNESS

Nishio, Toshizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Record

Man. Sum.

2277-2279

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2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EPM
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2967

Man. Sum.

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, October 1935.

Source: Letter to FURUSO, Mikio, Vice-Army Minister.

He sent plans for control of public opinion and press to Manchuria to FURUSO on October 25, 1935, showing intent to aid Japanese policies by this method.

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2277-
2279

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 67

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Dec 9, 1935

Source: Letter from Nishio to Furuso, Vice War Minister
on Dec 9, 1935.

Stated Kwantung Army's propaganda plan shall be
carried out in parallel with its military activity in
North China proper.

Witness: NISHIO, General Toshizo (Juzo)

I. Defense Application

1. Witness expected to testify -

- a. That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- b. That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the new government in Manchuria and that after Generals MINAMI and ITAGAKI arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the co-operative attitude of Manchukuo.
- c. The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards North China after the Tan-ku armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti-Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian administration.
- d. That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Charhar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-ku agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in Inner-Mongolia.
- e. That the incidents which happened around Outer-Mongolia and near the maritime district were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria and Korea.
- f. That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China and Japan.

- g. That the government under Wang-Chen-Wei was not a puppet government.

2. Background

- a. Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Assistant Chief of Staff).
- b. Later Commander-in-Chief of China Expeditionary Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Chief of General Staff of the same army).

3. Address

- a. Sugamo Prison

- II. Summary of Prosecution's Evidence Relating to Witness

1. None

- III. Other Available Facts

1. 1903, Graduate Military Academy with highest honors, Second Lieutenant, Infantry.
1904-05, Participated Russo-Japanese War with 48th Infantry.
March 1934 to March 1936, Chief of General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
(Page 55, 31 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
1937, Commander of the Second Army in North China.
September 1939, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China.
(Page 51, 17 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
March 1941, Member of Supreme Military Council.
2. Italian Consular file reflects of him:
"He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State."

3. OSS file says of him:

"He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General S. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: 'I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work'."

4. The Chinese Division says of him:

"1928 - Secretary to the Prime Minister, General TANAKA, the author of the alleged Tanaka Memorial."

5. Decorations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr.1934	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian War Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr.1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	"
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang, 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec.1937	Gros KreuzAdler Order	Japanese-German Amity	"
2 Nov. 1938	Granted set of silver cups	Japan-German Agreement	

III. Other Available Facts

1. See Curriculum Vitae

IV. Suggested Subjects for Cross-Examination

1. Decorations

- a. Is it not true that you were one of the military leaders of Japan who was for Japanese-German collaboration and alliance? (Tone of examiner should be such as to induce the witness to answer in the negative.)
 - b. If he answers in the negative, then ask him about the Gros KreuzAdler Order he received on 23 December 1937 for promotion of German-Japanese amity and the set of silver cups he received on 2 November 1938 in recognition of the merits for the conclusion of Japanese-German agreement.
 - c. Also ask about texts and reasons for other awards received in connection with Manchurian and China Incidents.
2. Witness stated on page 58 of his January 31, 1946 interrogation that he did not know the details regarding the Tangku agreement; he also did not know whether the agreement was adhered to. This seems not to bear with what defense expects him to prove in I-1, c and d. (See Appendix 1, his January 31, 1946, interrogation, hereto attached.)
 3. On pages 45-46 of his 29 January 1946 interrogation, witness stated that he heard rumors that groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in the Kwantung Army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions in certain matters. (See Appendix 2, his 29 January 1946 interrogation, hereto attached.)

4. With respect to I-1-a, witness was Chief of the Fourth Department of the Army General Staff. Occupying a small position and presumably in Tokyo, why should he know about the ideal and principles behind the establishment of Manchukuo?
5. On page 36 of his 25 January 1946 interrogation, by Mr. English, witness tried to justify occupation by his troops of more than 300 kilometers of Chinese territory, maintaining the ridiculous position that "when TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect TSINAN it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAINGSU border."

Witness betrayed shrewdness and smartness when he was asked the following question and responded the way he did:

"Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, that they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?"

"A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy."

(See Appendix 3, his 25 January 1946 interrogation, hereto attached.)

APPENDIX 1

NISHIO - 58

31 January, 1946.

- Q. According to the TANGKU agreement Japan was ordered to withdraw troops and so was China. Japan did withdraw and isn't it reasonable to assume that China pursuant to the terms of the truce also withdrew its forces?
- A. While the Chinese troops did withdraw they also continued infiltrating in the guise of police troops. However, I am not well acquainted with matters in China and these are merely suppositions.
- Q. Then General, as I understand it, you do not know the details regarding that truce and as to whether and how it was carried out?
- A. I don't know the details and I don't know whether the agreement was adhered to.
- Q. Let us discuss now General, the situation in Manchuria when you arrived there. What I would like to know is the number of troops that the Japanese had in Manchuria at that time; where they were stationed, and something about the relationship between Japan and the government of Manchukuo regarding military, civil and political matters. That is a large question and I think it might be advisable if you would state chronologically or in narrative form the substance of the question just asked.
- A. About the time I returned from Manchuria there were approximately four divisions, Japanese divisions, stationed there and six brigades approximately. These brigades were used for railway protection and as railway lines increased, brigades were increased and I think there were about six. The four divisions were stationed in the following places - one division at HARBIN, and one division at MUTANCHAING, and one division in the region between MUKDEN and JEHOL. With reference to the six brigades these brigades were scattered and I can only give you the location of the headquarters. These were in the following places, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, MUTANCHAING, KAIRIN MUKDEN, and one west of Mukden, the name of which place I cannot recall at the moment. The divisions I think were composed of about 10,000 men each, and the brigades of about 4,000 men each.

The development of railways and road construction were considered of prime importance, in addition to development of industry, and the maintenance of peace all over Manchukuo would have been facilitated. Also, with a view to possible trouble with the Soviet these were considered necessary as a part of the defenses and great efforts were expended to perfect these. Other objectives were the development of coal fields, of steel production, agricultural developments, forestry and lumber. Great efforts were made to have CHANG HSUEH LIANG give up his anti-Japanese attitude.

APPENDIX 2

NISHIO - 45 - 46

29 January, 1946

- Q. General, you said that you heard rumors in connection with the inner group of young officers who it is alleged planned what took place at Mukden in 1931. Will you tell us please what you recall now in connection with those rumors?
- A. I don't remember because I didn't pay much attention to the rumors.
- Q. General, you might not have paid any attention to these rumors, but what were the rumors in this connection?
- A. The rumors were to the effect that groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in the Kwantung Army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions in certain matters.
- Q. What were those matters?
- A. I don't know just what these matters were as these are merely rumors that I heard, however, I am certain that the Kwantung Army command was not implicated in these matters.
- Q. Then, General, according to the rumors you heard at that time, there must have been a division within the Kwantung Army as to what should be done regarding matters in Manchuria.
- A. There must have been differences of opinion amongst members of the staff but I do not know just what these differences were.
- Q. General, I am not asking you what you know about the differences, but what you call rumor or hearsay told you about those differences?
- A. I don't know just what these differences were that were being rumored about.
- Q. From the rumors you heard, General, would you say that there was a division between the younger officers and older officers in the Kwantung Army?
- A. There may have been differences of opinion but I have never heard of this matter being discussed in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Well, General, I would like you to tell me, based upon the rumors that you heard at that time, what some of these differences were no matter where you heard them?
- A. I have never heard of what these differences were. I really don't know. I merely know that there was a difference of opinion. There must have been as a result of the collusion between elements in Tokyo and elements in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. What elements in Tokyo were in collusion with elements in the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.
- A. I know nothing about this at all.

NISHIO - 46 - 47

29 January, 1946,

Q. From the rumors you have heard about this matter, General, would you say these elements in Tokyo were military men, navy men, or civilians?

A. I believe they were military men according to rumors.

Q. According to rumors would you say these men were young men or old men?

A. I believe they were younger men.

Q. They would hold what rank, General?

A. I believe they were generally people below the rank of Lt. Colonel.

APPENDIX 3

NISHIO - 36

25 January, 1946

- Q. The Japanese were constantly occupying Chinese territory, isn't that true?
- A. All this resulted in repelling Chinese counter attacks.
- Q. Didn't the Japanese forces at any time initiate an attack?
- A. Yes, in certain parts or regions.
- Q. What parts or regions?
- A. It would be difficult to state exactly in what regions the Japanese forces initiated an attack, in view of the wide area covered and to prepare for an eventual attack by Chinese forces attacks would have been initiated by Japanese commanders on the spot in various localities.
- Q. You say "would have been," do you mean attacks were made at those places?
- A. As I said before, it would be difficult to state just where attacks were initiated. When TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN, but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect TSINAN it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAINGSU border.
- Q. General, you stated that the first army and part of the second army traveled south on both sides of the HANGKOW PEKING railroad, isn't that so?
- A. Yes, until the enemy was dispersed.
- Q. At what point?
- A. At JUNTOKU.
- Q. What is the distance between JUNTOKU and PEIPING?
- A. Between 300 and 400 kilometers.
- Q. What strategic places, if any, are located between those two points between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. The junction of the TAIYUAN railway with the Peking Hangkow railway at SHINCHIACHUANG as an important place from the point of view of communications.
- Q. What was the population of SHINCHIACHUANG at that time?
- A. Judging from the size I would say it was a town of some 100,000, but this is a Chinese town and they may have had 150,000.

25 January, 1946.

- A. There is nothing special between the two places.
- Q. From a military point of view are there places within those two points of strategic value?
- A. No.
- Q. What is the population of Juntoku?
- A. I don't know as I've never been there.
- Q. Is it a large or small place from the standpoint of population?
- A. It is a town, but I don't know its size.
- Q. What is the distance between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. Perhaps 150 to 200 kilometers.
- Q. Is Kaifeng a large town or city?
- A. It is a rather big town.
- Q. About how many people would you say?
- A. I am not sure, but perhaps it is 200,000 more or less.
- Q. Are there any important places between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. There is a town called SHINGO between Juntoku and Kaifeng.
- Q. Are there any other towns between those towns?
- A. Towns and villages, but I don't remember their names and population.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces at any time occupy Kaifeng?
- A. Yes, about the end of May or early in June.
- Q. What year?
- A. 1938.
- Q. How far had those armies gone down along the Hangkow railroad during 1937?
- A. I think it was near Juntoku.
- Q. About what time did the Japanese forces arrive there - that is, what date?
- A. About the 25th of October.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces meet the Chinese forces at any point between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. Fighting occurred with HOTE as a center and Chinese troops were repelled and retreated south.
- Q. This was early in October 1937?
- A. Yes.

25 January 1946

Q. To what point?

A. After the Hote battles there were no serious occasions. The Chinese forces retreated over the great wall towards Taiyuan. Some of these Chinese forces retreated south along the Peking-Hankow railway line.

Q. How far?

A. They retreated south of Taiyuan and towards Shingo on the railway line and no big battles were fought below SHINCHUACHUANG.

Q. Did those two Japanese armies continue to advance south?

A. Yes, to Juntoku.

Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, that they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?

A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

NISHIO TOSHIZO



Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. In January 1937, when General Ugaki received an Imperial order to form a cabinet, I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. I state herein the circumstances within the Army at that time.

At that time, the Chief of the General Staff was Prince Kan-in, the War Minister was General Terauchi and the Inspector-General of Military Education was General Sugiyama. General Umezu was the Vice-Minister of War. Among the central authorities of the Army there were strong opinions in opposition to General Ugaki's cabinet-formation. At that time, after the 26 February Incident, the central authorities of the Army intended and endeavored for the enforcement of internal control of the Army. However, much misunderstanding was prevalent about General Ugaki in the form of rumors regarding the so-called "March Incident". Therefore, once the news of General Ugaki's cabinet-formation was known, officers in minor positions, below chiefs of sections and bureaus, opposed his formation of a cabinet, and circumstances looked quite serious.

I conferred with Umezu, the Vice-Minister of War, about this problem, considering the necessity of controlling the whole army. Both I and General Umezu had good will for General Ugaki and were not opposed personally to his forming a cabinet. Nevertheless, if it were to be completed without consideration of the circumstances within the Army, it would be impossible to avoid disorder or lack of control of the Army. Therefore, we concluded, the problem should be handled by the conference of three leading generals of the Army, and no subordinates or younger officers should have any connection with the matter. We strictly prohibited any undercurrents in the Army.

After that the problem was handled by Generals Terauchi and Sugiyama. Though, as no consultation was had by them with their subordinates, I did not know of the fact at first, I was told that the generals visited Ugaki and explained the serious circumstances of the Army, requesting him to reconsider the matter of his cabinet-formation. I was also told that the generals negotiated with some candidates for War Minister, who however did not accept the post, giving as the reason the difficulties of internal control of the Army. Thus, I was told, in such circumstances General Ugaki abandoned the attempt to organize a cabinet. In addition, this disturbance within the Army spread to the ex-soldiers and since the Ex-Soldiers' Association was quite worried about the

state of affairs an explanation was made, I knew, under the name of the Vice-Minister about the particulars of the problem.

2. When I was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-General Umezu was the Commander of the China Garrison. When War Minister Hayashi came to Hsinking for an inspection of Manchuria, at the end of May 1935, the Kwantung Army reported to him the circumstances at that time. Commander Umezu also was called to Hsinking by the Minister to report, and saw him. At that time I also met Commander Umezu; the meeting, however, did not go beyond a mere greeting, and no conference was had with the Kwantung Army with respect to policies, etc. Commander Umezu left Hsinking right after the meeting with the Minister, and returned to his post.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Nishio Toshizō (seal)

On this 30th day of September, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent Nishio Toshizō (seal)

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.


On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (Seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.


Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
7 October 1947

3 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson USN Att: Cmdr. Cole; Mr. Edwards;
Mr. Lopez; Mr. Cunningham; Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

ITAGAKI
OSHIMA

WITNESS

NISHIO, Toshizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 on this witness has been included in the Investigative Files and is now available.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

NISHIO

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

25 April 1947

MEMO TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to the following documents:

1. IPS Document 2403, an affidavit by IMURA, Jo (or Minoru). This document was not introduced in evidence. IMURA is a defense witness assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
2. IPS Document 2421, an affidavit of KOMAI, Tokuzo, regarding control of Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army. This document has not been used in evidence. KOMAI is a defense witness assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
3. IPS Document 2546, an affidavit of ISIHARA, Kanji. This document has not been used in evidence. ISIHARA is a witness for the defense assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
4. IPS Document 2626, containing among other items a report from General TADA, Shun (or Hayao), regarding the reorganization of the Manchurian Army. This file contains also documents implicating General NISHIO, Toshizo. This document has not been used in evidence. Both TADA and NISHIO are defense witnesses assigned to Mr. Lopez.

I suggest consideration of the first named three affidavits for use in cross examination, and further analysis and research into IPS Document 2626 for use in cross examination or rebuttal.

KURT STEINER
1st Lt., Inf.

cc: Mr. Dunnigan
Mr. Lopez
Mr. Wagner

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Robinson, USN ATT: Comdr. Cole;
Mr. Lopez; Mr. Edwards; Mr. Hyde; Mr. Cunningham

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Itagaki

Oshima

WITNESS

Nishio, Toshizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

<u>Record</u>	Man. Sum.
2277-2279	p. 67
2967	

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EPM
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2967

Man. Sum.

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, October 1935.

Source: Letter to FURUSO, Mikio, Vice-Army Minister.

He sent plans for control of public opinion and press to Manchuria to FURUSO on October 25, 1935, showing intent to aid Japanese policies by this method.

Name: Nishio, Toshizo

Record
2277-
2279

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 67

Title: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Dec 9, 1935

Source: Letter from Nishio to Furuso, Vice War Minister
on Dec 9, 1935.

Stated Kwantung Army's propaganda plan shall be
carried out in parallel with its military activity in
North China proper.

Nishio

17 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to the following documents:

1. IPS Document 610, being a confidential record of Manchurian affairs. Included (Item 32) is a report about the Manchurian Incident bearing the seal of NISHIO, Juzo or Toshizo, who will be a witness for the Defense and who has been assigned to Messrs. Ao, Edwards, Lopez, Nye and Robinson.
2. IPS Document 614, a confidential record of Mongolia affairs containing an "Outline for the Establishment of a Government in Mongolia," (Item 131) which was, among other persons, addressed to Major General KAGESA, Sadaaki or Teiho, who will be a witness for the Defense and has been assigned to Messrs. Dunnigan, Lopez, Edwards and Robinson.
3. IPS Document 620, a confidential record of Manchurian affairs containing a report of the counseling section of the Kwantung Army's Military Administration Bureau, (Item 102) stating that the announcement by the command of the Kwantung Army that the plans of this Army are of a defensive nature was designed only for the ears of other nations, especially the League of Nations, advising on administration of Manchukuo and suggesting that leaders of Manchukuo should gradually be retired. Major General TADA, Shun, was head of the section from which this report originated. (See analysis of IPS Document 612.) He is a witness for the Defense and has been assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Edwards and Robinson. The report was addressed to War Ministry. The Defendant ARAKI was War Minister at the time.

None of the above mentioned documents has been introduced in evidence.

I suggest that these documents be re-analyzed and examined without delay for use in cross-examination and possible use in rebuttal.

Copies to: Dr. Ao, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Lopez, Judge Nye, Capt. Robinson, Mr. Dunnigan

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
I. P. S.
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject:

^{AST}
From: F. S. Tavenner, Jr. To: D. N. Sutton

Date: 15 April 1947

I attach memorandum from Lopez, addressed to me and to you,
regarding the witness NISHIO. This witness was assigned to Mr. Carr.
Probably you will want to put one copy in Mr. Carr's file.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: A. S. Comyns-Carr
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT : Witness NISHIO, Toshizo

I hand you herewith data prepared by Mr. Lopez containing suggestions for the examination of the witness NISHIO, Toshizo summoned on behalf of the defendants ITAGAKI, DOHIHARA and OSHIMA.

D. N. SUTTON
Assistant Counsel

Incls.

1. Ltr from Mr. Lopez, 14 Apr 47.
2. Appendix 1.
3. Appendix 2.

CC.

Mr. Tavenner
Mr. Lopez

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

14 April 1947


MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Lopez
SUBJECT : NISHIO, Toshizo (ITAGAKI's witness)

1. On the cross examination of the witness regarding Japanese ideal in Manchuria, the following line is further suggested:

a. On pages 2277-2279 of the Record, excerpts of his letter, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, addressed to the Vice Minister of War, FURUSHO, on 9 December 1945, were read. It was headed "Kwantung's Army Propaganda Plan Which Shall Be Carried Out in Parallel with its Military Activity in North China".

b. Pertinent pages of the Record wherein the excerpts appear are hereto attached as Appendix 1.

c. General NISHIO's letter was IPS Document No. 1242 (Court Exhibit No. 195) which is hereto attached as Appendix 2.


Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor

Attachments:
As described.

Paragraph 8. "Our propaganda for Manchuria will be, that the appearance of the independent government in North China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their longing for the

APPENDIX 1

The prosecution next introduces the prosecution document No. 1242.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Document No. 1242 will receive exhibit No. 195.

MR. HYDER: This is a letter from NISHIO, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, dated December 9, 1935, to FURUSHO, Vice Minister of War, received December 12, 1935.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

(Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No. 195 was received in evidence.)

MR. HYDER: I should like to read excerpts of our offer, if I may.

(Reading): "Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan Which Shall Be Carried Out in Parallel with its Military Activity in North China.

"I. General Principle. We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness, as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into China proper takes place. We shall launch out on a movement to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the central government, by fermenting anti-Kuomintang and anti-communism agitation among them."

"II. The program of propaganda." Paragraph 5. "It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China some time in the future, we do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large."

Paragraph 8. "Our propaganda for Manchuria will be, that the appearance of the independent government in North China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their longing for the fine administration of the Manchurian government, and it will brighten the future of Manchuria."

"III. Execution program."

"1. Propaganda shall be planned and carried out by the Army staff. The special service facilities in China and Inner Mongolia and also the expeditionary forces there shall also perform the duty.

"2. Prior to the advance of our military forces into China Proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly to support from the side, the propaganda of the Japanese government and the Japanese forces stationed in China. After the advance of our forces into China proper, it shall be performed so as to facilitate our military activities.

"3. Propaganda within their sphere of activities shall be carried out in conformity with the above-mentioned plan by the dispatched Force. As a rule, personnel necessary for such propaganda shall be "raised by the dispatched troops. But, if it is impossible for them to raise the necessary personnel, Army staff section will solicit them. Propaganda section will be dispatched directly from the Army, if necessary.

"4. A close connection with the Japanese forces and various Japanese agents in China shall be maintained in the execution of this plan."

APPENDIX 2

Document No. 1242

Page 1.

Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan Which Shall Be Carried Out in Parallel with its Military Activity in North China.

I. General Principle.

We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness, as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into China Proper takes place. We shall launch out on a movement to estrange the inhabitants of North China from the central government, by fermenting anti-Kumingtung and anti-communism agitation among them. As for the Chinese people and army of the rest of China, we shall take a measure to form an anti-war atmosphere.

II. The program of propaganda.

1. The central government has regarded North China as a colony, in a sense, and has long made it the object of exploitation. The inhabitants in North China, therefore, have been cherishing a strong desire to establish a separate government of their own in order to shake themselves from the fetters of the central government. Burning with strong aspiration for independence, the people concerned have expressed their firm resolution to establish an independent country.
2. The enactment of the nationalization of silver has made the central government the object of resentment, and as a result of it, the movement to establish a new independent government in North China is making rapid progress.
3. It is the greatest desire of the Japanese government to form an anti-communist front with the North China independent government, for it may be considered the first ray of hope for the establishment of the lasting peace in the Orient by the harmonious cooperation among Japan, China, and Manchuria. We, therefore, shall assume a definite attitude to support wholeheartedly the establishment and development of the independent government in North China.
4. The Chinese central government has violated the agreement of cessation of hostility in North China and other military agreements; they have been disturbing the peace of Manchuria; instigating a boycott of Japanese goods, and an anti-Japanese sentiment; and has become a great menace to the Japanese interest and residents in North China and the existence of the Manchurian Empire; therefore, we have to make it clear that we shall be obliged to resort to arms if the Chinese government continues such underhanded tactics.

5. It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China some time in the future, we do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large.

6. We shall try to enhance an anti-war sentiment among the people, by propagandizing extensively that the employment of military forces by the Chinese central government or other military Lords will reduce the people to the greatest misery and will lead to the destruction of the country.

7. As for the Chinese forces, we will take a measure to promote antagonism between them and to increase their admiration for the strength of the Japanese military power, thus depriving their fighting spirit.

8. Our propaganda for Manchuria will be, that the appearance of the independent government in North China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their longing for the fine administration of the Manchurian government, and it will brighten the future of Manchuria.

III. Execution program.

1. Propaganda shall be planned and carried out by the Army staff. The special service facilities in China and Inner Mongolia and also the expeditionary forces there shall also perform the duty.

2. Prior to the advance of our military forces into China Proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly to support from the side, the propaganda of the Japanese government and the Japanese forces stationed in China. After the advance of our forces into China proper, it shall be performed so as to facilitate our military activities.

3. Propaganda within their sphere of activities shall be carried out in conformity with the above-mentioned plan by the dispatched Force. As a rule, personnel necessary for such propaganda shall be raised by the dispatched troops. But, if it is impossible for them to raise the necessary personnel, Army staff section will solicit them. Propaganda section will be dispatched directly from the Army, if necessary.

4. A close connection with the Japanese forces and various Japanese agents in China shall be maintained in the execution of this plan.

5. Such propaganda activities as do not fall under this plan shall be carried out in conformity with the Kwantung Army's propaganda plan in peace time.

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: NISHIO, Toshizo (ITAGAKI)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u> X </u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u> X </u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	_____	<u> X </u>
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	_____	<u> X </u>
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u> X </u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Pedro Lopez
Capt. James J. Robinson
William E. Edwards

By

P. Lopez

DATE 3 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: NISHIO, Chuzo (Toshizo) (KIMURA)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u> x </u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u> x </u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u> x </u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u> x </u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	<u> x </u>	_____
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	<u> x </u>	_____
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	_____	_____
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u> x </u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Pedro Lopez
Capt. James J. Robinson
William E. Edwards

By _____

PROGRESS REPORT

April 3, 1947

DOHIMARA's Witness:

Nishio, Toshizo

Completed: Items 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8.

Partially completed: Items 3, 4, 5 and 9.

Judge Judson T. Y. Nyi

Dr. Daniel S. Ao

Lefey

Witness: NISHIO, General Toshizo (Juzo)

I. Defense Application

1. Witness expected to testify -

- a. That the ideal of establishing a new state in Manchuria was to create in that region an entirely new state realizing all the ideals and wishes of Japanese and persons of all nationalities living therein and to establish a defense line against Soviet invasion.
- b. That the Kwantung Army was under strict limitation concerning guidance of the new government in Manchuria and that after Generals MINAMI and ITAGAKI arrived in Manchuria there was improvement of the co-operative attitude of Manchukuo.
- c. The chief aims of the Kwantung Army towards North China after the Tan-ku armistice agreement was to preserve peace in the areas around Manchukuo so that no anti-Japanese disturbances then prevailing in China would affect the Manchurian administration.
- d. That the Kwantung Army did not welcome the invasion of Chinese armies into Charhar District as that would infringe the spirit of the Tan-ku agreement, but that at the same time it did not support the independent movements of Mongolians in Inner-Mongolia.
- e. That the incidents which happened around Outer-Mongolia and near the maritime district were due to aggressive policies of Soviet Russia towards Manchuria and Korea.
- f. That in respect to the military activities in China no aggressive policy or plan was entertained and their purpose was to obtain speedy settlement of disturbances then extant and bring peace and prosperity between China and Japan.

- g. That the government under Wang-Chen-Wei was not a puppet government.

2. Background

- a. Was one time Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Assistant Chief of Staff).
- b. Later Commander-in-Chief of China Expeditionary Army (at which time ITAGAKI was Chief of General Staff of the same army).

3. Address

- a. Sugamo Prison

- II. Summary of Prosecution's Evidence Relating to Witness

1. None

- III. Other Available Facts

1. 1903, Graduate Military Academy with highest honors, Second Lieutenant, Infantry.
1904-05, Participated Russo-Japanese War with 48th Infantry.
March 1934 to March 1936, Chief of General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
(Page 55, 31 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
1937, Commander of the Second Army in North China.
September 1939, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China.
(Page 51, 17 January 1946 interrogation of witness by Mr. English.)
March 1941, Member of Supreme Military Council.
2. Italian Consular file reflects of him:
"He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State."

3. OSS file says of him:

"He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General S. ITAGAKI whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of ITAGAKI, NISHIO once said: 'I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work'."

4. The Chinese Division says of him:

"1928 - Secretary to the Prime Minister, General TANAKA, the author of the alleged Tanaka Memorial."

5. Decorations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	"
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang, 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec. 1937	Gros Kreuz Adler Order	Japanese-German Amity	"
2 Nov. 1938	Granted set of silver cups	Japan-German Agreement	

IV. Suggested Subjects for Cross-Examination

1. Japanese ideal in Manchuria (See I-1-a ante)

- a. Fully covered by Comyns-Carr interrogation of YAMAMOTO Kumaichi (tsn. pp. 17929-17988; 18019-18032)
- b. On pp. 45-46 of his 29 Jan. '46 interrogation by Mr. English, witness stated he heard rumors groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in Kwantung Army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions (See Appendix 1)
- c. He was Chief of Fourth Department, Army General Staff, relatively small position and in Tokyo, Why should he know about ideals behind Manchurian establishment? (Source: CIS file)

2. Tang-ku Truce (See I-1-c and d ante)

- a. Presented as Pros. Exh. 193, dated May 31, 1933 (For summary of provisions, see Appendix 2)
- b. Pros. witness GOETTE testified that after Tang-ku Truce of May 31, 1933 he saw Chinese renegade troops under two Chinese generals enter demilitarized zones from Japanese-controlled areas and disappear into Japanese-held areas (See GOETTE's testimony re Tang-ku, Appendix 3)
- c. On p. 58 of his 31 Jan. 46 interrogation by Mr. English, witness stated he did not know the details regarding Tang-ku agreement, did not know whether agreement was adhered to (See Appendix 4)

3. China operations

- a. On p. 36 of his 25 Jan. '46 interrogation by Mr. English, witness steadfastly defended justification of capturing districts and towns beyond to protect his position in those already captured. Thus, when asked the reason for advancing beyond 300 kilometers of sparsely populated territory, he answered "when TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect TSINAN it

was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAING-SU border."

Indicative of his shrewdness, is the way he answered the following question:

"Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?

"A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy."
(See Appendix 5)

4. Puppetry of Wang-Chen-Wei government (See I-1-g ante)

- a. Pros. Exh. 272, Report from Central China Expeditionary Army to War Ministry, 1939. (Record p. 3,659; p. 3,672)

A new central government will be established with WANG as its head. Japan will ~~be~~ conciliate both the regular and irregular forces and use them to strengthen the power of the new government. It was aimed at to weaken the enemy, CHIANG, the national government of China, and to drive out pro-CHIANG movements of third powers. The theory of racial consciousness was used only for the purpose of estranging the Chinese from CHIANG. Japan must draft the principles and platform of the new central government and make it the basis of propaganda.

- b. Pros. witness GOETTE, stated on pp. 3,858-3,860 of the Record:

Jan 1940, Japanese decided to combine all the puppet regimes then existing into one under WANG. General KAGESA dominated the whole show, during the conference at TSINGTAO as well as in Nanking. WANG himself merely said in vague terms.

- c. Exh. 465, secret agreements and letter from WANG to ABE, the Japanese Enboy (Record, pp. 5,327-31):

Japan secured the right to demand from China military necessities, and communication facilities, for the troops stationed there. Japan had to 'cooperate' with Japan for the production and the use of raw materials. WANG promised Japan the cooperation for Japan's warlike purposes.

- d. IPS Doc. 1519, being Foreign Ministry Files of WANG Chin-wei, now under process, will show that WANG was under complete control of the Japanese.

5. Decorations

- a. Is it not true that you were one of the military leaders of Japan who urged strongly for Japanese-German collaboration and alliance? (Tone of examiner should be such as to induce the witness to answer in the negative).
- b. If he answers in the negative, encourage him to speak on his solicitude for friendship with America and Britain. Then ask him if on 23 Dec. '37 he was not awarded the Gros Kreuz Adler Order for promoting German-Japanese collaboration. Did he not receive on 2 Nov. '38 a set of silver cups in recognition of his services in promoting Japanese-German agreement.
- c. Also ask him about tests and reasons for other awards received in connection with Manchurian and China Incidents (See III-5 ante)

6. Very good friend of ITAGAKI

- a. When he was Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, ITAGAKI was his Assistant Chief of Staff; when

he was later C-in-C of China Expeditionary Army, ITAGAKI was his Chief of Staff (See I-2-a and d)

- b. He used to sooth offended financiers on behalf of ITAGAKI. He once said: "I'll do the fighting; let ITAGAKI do the office work." (See III-3 ante).

APPENDIX 2 /

NISHIO - 45 - 46

29 January, 1946

- Q. General, you said that you heard rumors in connection with the inner group of young officers who it is alleged planned what took place at Mukden in 1931. Will you tell us please what you recall now in connection with those rumors?
- A. I don't remember because I didn't pay much attention to the rumors.
- Q. General, you might not have paid any attention to these rumors, but what were the rumors in this connection?
- A. The rumors were to the effect that groups in Tokyo were in contact with groups in the Kwantung Army urging them to exceed their authority and instructions in certain matters.
- Q. What were those matters?
- A. I don't know just what these matters were as these are merely rumors that I heard, however, I am certain that the Kwantung Army command was not implicated in these matters.
- Q. Then, General, according to the rumors you heard at that time, there must have been a division within the Kwantung Army as to what should be done regarding matters in Manchuria.
- A. There must have been differences of opinion amongst members of the staff but I do not know just what these differences were.
- Q. General, I am not asking you what you know about the differences, but what you call rumor or hearsay told you about those differences?
- A. I don't know just what these differences were that were being rumored about.
- Q. From the rumors you heard, General, would you say that there was a division between the younger officers and older officers in the Kwantung Army?
- A. There may have been differences of opinion but I have never heard of this matter being discussed in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Well, General, I would like you to tell me, based upon the rumors that you heard at that time, what some of these differences were no matter where you heard them?
- A. I have never heard of what these differences were. I really don't know. I merely know that there was a difference of opinion. There must have been as a result of the collusion between elements in Tokyo and elements in the Kwantung Army.
- Q. What elements in Tokyo were in collusion with elements in the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.
- A. I know nothing about this at all.

NISHIO - 46 - 47

29 January, 1946,

Q. From the rumors you have heard about this matter, General, would you say these elements in Tokyo were military men, navy men, or civilians?

A. I believe they were military men according to rumors.

Q. According to rumors would you say these men were young men or old men?

A. I believe they were younger men.

Q. They would hold what rank, General?

A. I believe they were generally people below the rank of Lt. Colonel.

APPENDIX 2

2272
2273

*Exhibit 193, known as the Tangku Truce, dated May 31, 1933 was then offered and * admitted in evidence and is summarized as follows:

Article I provides that the Chinese Army shall immediately withdraw to the areas west and south of the line, and shall henceforth refrain from taking all acts of provocation or disturbance.

Article II -- The Japanese Army, in order to ascertain the actual carrying out of Article I, may use airplanes and other means for observation which shall be accorded due protection by the Chinese.

Article III. The Japanese Army, having ascertained that the provisions have been carried out, shall not cross the aforementioned line and shall withdraw to the Great Wall line.

APPENDIX # 3

Q Was that the fighting that terminated by what was referred to as the TANG-KU TRUCE?

A That is true.

Q That is already covered by a document in this case. After the -- withdraw the question. Do you know the date of that agreement of cessation of hostilities?

A. May 31, 1933.

Q Were the results of it published in Peiping at the time it was effected?

A The general terms and conditions were so published.

Q What did you see after that agreement was signed in the neighborhood of Peiping?

A On two occasions I personally saw armies of so-called Chinese renegade troops enter the zone demilitarized by the Tang-Ku Truce.

Q Did you talk with some of those forces and were you able to learn who was in control of them?

A Those armies were under two Chinese generals, one General Feng-Che-Ju and the other General Liu-Wei-Tang. Those forces entered this demilitarized zone from Japanese controlled areas and, having passed across the demilitarized zone, disappeared again into Japanese held areas. When the Chinese officials in Peiping admitted their confusion as to what it was about I went into the area with a newspaper colleague. When I talked with the officers of these two forces besides giving anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Nationalist China slogans, they would give me no reason for their presence there. I once again saw the troops of Liu-Wei-Tang. That was on the morning of July 8, 1937, within a few miles of the battle of Marco Polo Bridge.

John Goette
R 3745-6

NISHIO - 58

31 January, 1946.

- Q. According to the TANGKU agreement Japan was ordered to withdraw troops and so was China. Japan did withdraw and isn't it reasonable to assume that China pursuant to the terms of the truce also withdrew its forces?
- A. While the Chinese troops did withdraw they also continued infiltrating in the guise of police troops. However, I am not well acquainted with matters in China and these are merely suppositions.
- Q. Then General, as I understand it, you do not know the details regarding that truce and as to whether and how it was carried out?
- A. I don't know the details and I don't know whether the agreement was adhered to.
- Q. Let us discuss now General, the situation in Manchuria when you arrived there. What I would like to know is the number of troops that the Japanese had in Manchuria at that time; where they were stationed, and something about the relationship between Japan and the government of Manchukuo regarding military, civil and political matters. That is a large question and I think it might be advisable if you would state chronologically or in narrative form the substance of the question just asked.
- A. About the time I returned from Manchuria there were approximately four divisions, Japanese divisions, stationed there and six brigades approximately. These brigades were used for railway protection and as railway lines increased, brigades were increased and I think there were about six. The four divisions were stationed in the following places - one division at HARBIN, and one division at MUTANCHANG, and one division in the region between MUKDEN and JEHOL. With reference to the six brigades these brigades were scattered and I can only give you the location of the headquarters. These were in the following places, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, MUTANCHANG, KAIRIN MUKDEN, and one west of Mukden, the name of which place I cannot recall at the moment. The divisions I think were composed of about 10,000 men each, and the brigades of about 4,000 men each.

The development of railways and road construction were considered of prime importance, in addition to development of industry, and the maintenance of peace all over Manchukuo would have been facilitated. Also, with a view to possible trouble with the Soviet these were considered necessary as a part of the defenses and great efforts were expended to perfect these. Other objectives were the development of coal fields, of steel production, agricultural developments, forestry and lumber. Great efforts were made to have CHANG HSUEH LIANG give up his anti-Japanese attitude.

APPENDIX 3 5

NISHIO - 36

25 January, 1946

- Q. The Japanese were constantly occupying Chinese territory, isn't that true?
A. All this resulted in repelling Chinese counter attacks.
- Q. Didn't the Japanese forces at any time initiate an attack?
A. Yes, in certain parts or regions.
- Q. What parts or regions?
A. It would be difficult to state exactly in what regions the Japanese forces initiated an attack, in view of the wide area covered and to prepare for an eventual attack by Chinese forces attacks would have been initiated by Japanese commanders on the spot in various localities.
- Q. You say "would have been," do you mean attacks were made at those places?
A. As I said before, it would be difficult to state just where attacks were initiated. When TOKKEN had been occupied my orders were not to advance south towards TSINAN, but Chinese troops crossing the Yellow River and infiltrating into TOKKEN-TSINAN region necessitated attacking them. They were repulsed and this led to the occupation of TSINAN. To protect TSINAN it was necessary to protect the railway line running south in the direction of the SHANTUNG-KAINGSU border.
- Q. General, you stated that the first army and part of the second army traveled south on both sides of the HANGKOW PEKING railroad, isn't that so?
A. Yes, until the enemy was dispersed.
- Q. At what point?
A. At JUNTOKU.
- Q. What is the distance between JUNTOKU and PEIPING?
A. Between 300 and 400 kilometers.
- Q. What strategic places, if any, are located between those two points between Juntoku and Peiping?
A. The junction of the TAIYUAN railway with the Peking Hangkow railway at SHINCHIACHUANG as an important place from the point of view of communications.
- Q. What was the population of SHINCHIACHUANG at that time?
A. Judging from the size I would say it was a town of some 100,000, but this is a Chinese town and they may have had 150,000.

25 January, 1946.

- A. There is nothing special between the two places.
- Q. From a military point of view are there places within those two points of strategic value?
- A. No.
- Q. What is the population of Juntoku?
- A. I don't know as I've never been there.
- Q. Is it a large or small place from the standpoint of population?
- A. It is a town, but I don't know its size.
- Q. What is the distance between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. Perhaps 150 to 200 kilometers.
- Q. Is Kaifeng a large town or city?
- A. It is a rather big town.
- Q. About how many people would you say?
- A. I am not sure, but perhaps it is 200,000 more or less.
- Q. Are there any important places between Juntoku and Kaifeng?
- A. There is a town called SHINGO between Juntoku and Kaifeng.
- Q. Are there any other towns between those towns?
- A. Towns and villages, but I don't remember their names and population.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces at any time occupy Kaifeng?
- A. Yes, about the end of May or early in June.
- Q. What year?
- A. 1938.
- Q. How far had those armies gone down along the Hangkow railroad during 1937?
- A. I think it was near Juntoku.
- Q. About what time did the Japanese forces arrive there - that is, what date?
- A. About the 25th of October.
- Q. Did the Japanese forces meet the Chinese forces at any point between Juntoku and Peiping?
- A. Fighting occurred with HOTE as a center and Chinese troops were repelled and retreated south.
- Q. This was early in October 1937?
- A. Yes.

25 January 1946

Q. To what point?

A. After the Hote battles there were no serious occasions. The Chinese forces retreated over the great wall towards Taiyuan. Some of these Chinese forces retreated south along the Peking-Hankow railway line.

Q. How far?

A. They retreated south of Taiyuan and towards Shingo on the railway line and no big battles were fought below SHINCHUACHUANG.

Q. Did those two Japanese armies continue to advance south?

A. Yes, to Juntoku.

Q. General, if the Japanese forces were advancing between the places just mentioned and in view of the fact that there are very few towns between some of those places through which the Japanese forces proceeded would you not say that the Japanese forces were on the offensive at the time, that is, that they were taking aggressive action against the Chinese forces?

A. The object of all attacks is to defeat and disperse the enemy and attacking retreating forces is a fundamental principle of military strategy.

Resume by: Commander Cole

Date : 29 April 1947

NISHIO, Toshizo (Chuzo or Juzo)

1. Requested as witness by: KIMURA

2. Subpoena request: states that "The facts to be proved by this witness are that while General KIMURA was a member of the Supreme War Council, it was a position of no importance, and other pertinent facts. The testimony of this witness is relevant in that it tends to prove that KIMURA took no part in important decisions."

3. Summary of Personal History:

31 Oct. 1881 - Born
22 Nov. 1902 - Graduated Military Academy.
Appointed a probationary officer.
1 Aug. 1929 - Promoted to Major General
11 Apr. 1932 - Appointed Head of 4th Dept. at Staff H.Q.
10 Apr. 1933 - Appointed Chief of Staff
5 Mar. 1934 - Appointed Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army and
Head of Special Service in Kwantung Army.
23 Mar. 1936 - Appointed Vice Chief of Army General Staff.
1 Dec. 1936 - Appointed Director of the General Affairs Section of
General Staff Headquarters.
16 Aug. 1937 - Appointed Commander of the 2nd Army.
1 Aug. 1939 - Promoted to General.
12 Sept. 1939 - Appointed General Commander of the Army sent to China.
1 Mar. 1941 - Appointed member of Supreme War Council.
3 May 1943 - Put on reserve list.
25 July 1944 - Appointed Governor of Tokyo.

4. Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Grand Cordon of Order of Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
2 May 1936	Chingyuan-Chang 1st Class (Manchuria)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	Foreign Ministry
23 Dec. 1937	Gros Kreuz Adler Order	Japanese- German Amity	" "

(Decorations, continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class or Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
2 Nov. 1938	- Granted set of silver cups	Japanese-German Agreement	Foreign Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of Golden Kite - 1st Class	China Incident	War Ministry

5. Present Status: - ex-General, Imperial Japanese Army at present in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo.

6. Summary of Interrogations:

The witness was interrogated on ten occasions (IPS Case File No. 51 - serials 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21). A general summary of the first two interrogations is set forth in IPS Case File No. 51, serial 40, as follows:

In 1931 and 1932, a Japanese Division in the home islands comprised ten thousand men and a brigade from three to four thousand; in case of a mobilization, these figures would be just about doubled. In peace time it was generally the custom to send about two-thirds of a division to China, the other one-third remaining in Japan. In Manchuria, before the Incident, there were about six thousand men in a division. The brigades in Manchuria at that time were of a special kind and comprised about five to six thousand men. The division and brigade in Manchuria at the time of the Incident retained its strength but other forces were sent to Manchuria. As the Incident progressed, NISHIO heard rumors of forces being increased by two or three divisions.

Immediately after the Mukden Incident fighting broke in Changchun and it gradually spread to Harbin and Tsitsihar and fighting also broke out at a later date at the Tientsin-Peking railway line and also at Mutanchiang. (pages 6 and 7)

In 1934, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army was General SHIKARA, later being succeeded by General MINAMI. At that time there were no actual operations, the main duties of the army being the quelling of activities of bandits and outlaw troops that were damaging the railroads and government properties, etc. The headquarters was stationed at Hsinking and remained there until the end of the war. (page 11)

The First Section of General Headquarters planned the operations in Manchuria during 1931 and 1932, the defense of the nation being the principal objective of the First Section. (page 40)

However, General NISHIO thinks that the military operations in Manchuria on or about September 18, 1931, were planned by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. There being no large-scale operations in Manchuria at that time, the details of these operations would be planned and drawn up by the Kwantung Army, the First Section of Headquarters in Tokyo being concerned only with the size of the army to be dispatched to Manchukuo and other important matters of that description. General NISHIO does not think that the plans drawn up by the Kwantung Army in connection with the Manchurian Affair had been submitted to the General Headquarters for approval prior to their going into effect, as the Manchurian Incident was unforeseen and would therefore be dealt with on the spot by the Kwantung army. General NISHIO states that he is sure that plans for operations against the Soviet forces had been prepared. (pp. 40, 41, 42)

At the outbreak of the war in Manchuria the Japanese forces involved numbered between twelve and thirteen thousand. (p. 43)

There was one division to the Kwantung Army while it was stationed at Port Arthur in 1931 of about six thousand men. These troops were stationed along the railway zone between Port Arthur and Changchun. (p. 44)

After the outbreak of the Incident, additional forces were sent to reinforce the Kwantung Army. In October, 1931, about one division consisting of perhaps ten thousand men were sent as reinforcements. This division came from Korea. Towards the end of 1931 or early 1932 another division of about ten thousand troops was dispatched from Japan. The Commander of the third division mentioned was Lieutenant General MATSUKI, Naosuke. (pp. 44 and 45)

The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in 1931 was General KANAYA, being succeeded by Prince KANIN.

When Manchukuo was established as a state, an agreement was made whereby the protection, maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo would be undertaken by Japanese and Manchukuoan forces for the defense of the country. (p. 55)

General NISHIO states that in 1934 there were approximately four Japanese divisions stationed in Manchuria and six brigades. The brigades were used for railway protection, and as railway lines increased the brigades were increased to about six. The four divisions were stationed in the following places: Tsitsihar, Harbin, Mutanchaing, and one division between Mukden and Jehol. The six brigades were scattered, but their headquarters were at: Tsitsihar, Harbin, Mutanchaing, Karin, Mukden, and one west of Mukden. The divisions were composed of ten thousand men each and the brigades of four thousand men each.

General NISHIO states that the development of railroads and road construction were considered of prime importance, in addition to the development of industry. He also states that because of possible trouble with the Soviet these were considered necessary as a part of the defenses, and great efforts were expended to protect these. Other objectives were the development of coal fields; of steel production, agricultural developments, forestry, and lumber. (pp. 58 and 59)

Advisors were sent to Manchukuo and were of several different categories: Civilian advisors in connection with administration and other such matters, military advisors to advise on military matters. There may have been a few civilian advisors sent in connection with military matters. (p. 64)

Control and authority exercised in Manchuria was concentrated in the hands of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. (p. 64)

The gendarmerie in the Kwantung territory was under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army Commander, and NISHIO states that the gendarmerie in Korea was independent of the high Army Command there. The head of the gendarmerie was under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. (p. 74)

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The witness was interrogated on three occasions (IPS Case File No. 51 - 12, 14, 15) concerning the Supreme War Council. These interrogations are summarized as follows: -

The Supreme War Council is composed of Marshalls, Ministers of Army and Navy, the Chiefs of Staff of Army and Navy and other Generals and Lieut. Generals who are members of the War Council. The Supreme War Council's function is to assist the Emperor. Members of the War Council are invited to participate in the Supreme War Council. NISHIO was a member of the War Council from March, 1941 until he retired from active service in April, 1943. He was never invited to participate in the Supreme War Council (Serial 12, p. 82).

The Supreme War Council was nominal and honorary and usually composed of members of the Imperial Family (Serial 12, p. 82). The duty of the War Council was to answer questions put by the Emperor on military matters (Serial 13, p. 84). In the early part of December, 1941, a meeting of the War Council was held at the Palace in Tokyo at which the Emperor asked them if the Japanese Army and Navy were ready to fight in the event diplomatic negotiations failed. The Council was unanimously in favor of war with the United States (Serial 12, p. 86). The Council felt that there was no way out for Japan except war since Japan was blockaded economically and was requested to withdraw from Manchuria which would leave her without protection against Russia (Serial 14, p. 102).

NISHIO became a member of the War Council by command of the Emperor upon the recommendation of War Minister TOJO (Serial 15, p. 88).

NISHIO had one conversation with TOJO during the summer of 1941 concerning a tour of inspection he had made of military installations in Japan (Serial 15, p. 91).

NISHIO attended two meetings of the War Council while he was a member, one early in December, 1941 already mentioned, and the other (date unknown) which concerned a new manual of arms for the use of military troops (Serial 15, p. 94).

7. Statements in interrogations by witness concerning the Japanese War Council:

Interrogation of 8 February, 1946 (IPS Case File 51-12)

Q. "General, were you at any time a member of the Supreme War Council?

A. Yes, I was. That is the highest body besides the Marshall's office.

Q. General, I am referring to some excerpts of news items that appeared in the Stars and Stripes, that is a newspaper published by the U.S. Army in Tokyo, and this particular item appeared December 6, 1945, and I would like to ask you some questions about an interview you had with the Associated Press around that time.

A. That is all right.

Q. General, will you please tell us something about the makeup of this Supreme War Council?

A. Membership of the Supreme War Council is composed of Marshalls, Ministers of Army and Navy, and the Chief of Staff, and the equivalent rank known as Chief of Staff of the Navy, and other members who are in ranks of General and Lieut. General, who are members of the War Council...

Q. So General, there is a War Council and a Supreme War Council?

A. What is commonly known as the Supreme War Council could better be called the Marshall's Office or groups whose function it is to assist the Emperor in the making of military decisions. However, our War Council members usually participate in their meetings.

Q. Were you a member of the War Council as well as the Supreme War Council?

A. No, sir. I was merely a member of War Council but never participated in the Marshall's Council.

- Q. Why?
- A. Because the participation in the conference of the Marshall's group is only upon invitation from them.
- Q. What is your full rank, General?
- A. My rank is General of Japanese Army and I was made a member of the War Council.
- Q. When were you made a member of the War Council?
- A. March of 1941. I held that office until April of 1943 when I retired from active service.
- Q. Wouldn't a full General and member of the War Council automatically be a member of the Marshall's council - that is, the Supreme War Council?
- A. No, until full General is given the title of a Marshall, he is not qualified to sit in on that council.
- Q. You only sit on the council by invitation, as I understand it. Is that true?
- A. It could be.
- Q. Did you at any time while you were a member of the War Council receive an invitation to sit in at a meeting of the Supreme War Council?
- A. No, sir. However, I heard that Marshalls held their meeting while I was in office. I don't know hardly anything about what a Marshalls' council does.
- Q. But the War Council is a function apart and distinct from the Supreme War Council, is that true?
- A. Marshalls are automatically members of the War Council. However, the members of War Council are not members of the Marshalls Council and I never was called upon to appear before them. Naturally, the functions of Marshalls Council, and that is, the Supreme Council, and ordinary war council could be differentiated in that respect in membership.
- Q. That answer, General, is not entirely responsive to the question. What I want to know is, what is the authority of the War Council? What work does it do? What functions does it perform?
- A. War Council has no authority. However, it has duties to respond to any questions on military matters which may be asked of them by the Emperor. In other words, War Council as such does not take any initiative.
- Q. Now, General, what is the authority, or if it has no authority, what are the duties or obligations of the Supreme War Council?

- A. In later years the office of Marshall was nominal and honorary and I don't know of any rule or regulation which prescribes the duties or obligations of them. In later years mostly, especially until the time the war with America broke out the body was composed of members of the Imperial family. There might be some regulations governing that body but I don't know of any.
- Q. I still don't know what the functions of the Supreme War Council were and how its functions differed, if it did differ from the function of the War Council.
- A. The fact of the matter is, although there existed such council, Supreme Council, they never functioned at all, it was merely an honorable body existing nominally and I presume the function would be that of responding to the Emperor whenever he chose to ask of them any question.
- Q. But, General, you just told us that that was the function of the War Council?
- A. What you say is very true. I could not tell you just under what circumstances that body is used by the Emperor, but my knowledge is that there was no particular problems which was to be classified as proper questions to be brought before the Marshalls Council and to the War Council.
- Q. Is the War Council as such, provided for by law or by Constitution?
- A. I don't know for sure. You can find provisions given in the constitution for establishment of War Council but I am certain that the Army and Navy regulations provides for that.
- Q. Does the War Council advise the Emperor or did the War Council advise the Emperor on important military matters?
- A. No, sir, but War Council would attempt to answer questions asked by the Emperor.
- Q. Was there anybody in existence whose function it was to advise the Emperor on military matters?
- A. The Minister of War and the Chief of Staff are the proper officials to consult on military problems with the Emperor.
- Q. General, in the newspaper article previously referred to, it is stated that you stated that the sole function of the War Council was to advise the Emperor when asked on military questions. It is also stated that you said that this session was "more for imparting information to the council than asking for its advice." Will you explain what you mean by this statement and that quotation?
- A. I think I understand what you mean. I see there is a little misunderstanding about the statement I have made at the time. For the first part of the statement I am reported to have made, it was never the function of the War Council to give advice to the Emperor. That body is to respond or answer to any question the Emperor may ask us on military matters.

As to the second part of this statement I am reported to have made, what I meant was that at war councils meetings, immediately preceding the war with America the council was consulted with for its opinion strictly from the military standpoint, whether the Army and Navy are ready to wage war if it becomes necessary or not. That means when the issue is as pressed as that War Council did not have as a choice than to say that we will fight if necessary. In other words, what we had been asked to answer really amounted to giving of information to get ready to fight. That was what I had in mind. We were informed to be ready for war.

Q. When was that meeting held, General?

A. The early part of December of that year.

Q. 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. Would a matter such as you have just described, been considered by the Supreme War Council, as well as by the War Council?

A. I am certain that the Marshall's group was not consulted on the matters I have just described, although War Council was consulted with.

Q. General, previously you stated during this interrogation that the Marshall's office gave advice to the Emperor on military matters, is that true?

A. No, it is not true. My understanding is that that body never gave advice to the Emperor on military matters.

Q. General, this meeting that was held early in December 1941, where was it held? Were you present and who else was present?

A. It was held at the Palace in Tokyo and I attended it also.

Q. Who else?

A. Prince KANIN, representing the Army, Prince ASAKA, Prince HIGASHI KUNI, General TOJO, Minister of War SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff General TERAUCHI, General YAMADA, General DOIHARA, Lt. General SHINOTSUKE. My memory is vague as to the presence of Prince HASHIMOTO. Then from the Navy side Admiral NAGANO, Chief of Staff of Navy, SHIMADA, Minister of Navy, Admiral HYAKUTAKE, Admiral OIKAWA, There might have been two other members present but I don't remember them clearly now.

Q. Any others?

A. That is about all.

Q. Was the Emperor there?

A. Yes.

.....

NOTE - It appears that the witness NISHIO was incorrect in his terminology when he distinguished between the Supreme War Council and the War Council. What he called the Supreme War Council is really the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. On page 524 of the Transcript the distinction is stated as follows:

"Then there were the Emperor's Military Boards which consisted, in the first place, of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, which was established in 1898 and consisted of the Princes of the Royal Blood and the highest army and navy officers.

Secondly, the Supreme War Council, which originated in 1887 when the services were being revamped on western lines and was definitely established by Imperial Ordinance No. 294 in 1903."

Interrogation of 11 February, 1946 (IPS Case File 51-15):

- Q. "General, how many meetings of the War Council did you attend while you were a member?
- A. Two only. The one I told you about the other day and another, which was purely a military council and only attended by military councillors.
- Q. When was that meeting held?
- A. I don't remember the date of this meeting. I don't even remember whether it was before or after the war but I remember the object of the meeting.
- Q. Possibly if you tell us what the object of the meeting was you might recall when it was held?
- A. This was in connection with a new manual of arms for the use of railway troops and this was referred to the War Council for approval.
- Q. General, was it before or after the meeting we discussed at the last interrogation, that is the meeting that was held around the first week of December, 1941?
- A. I remember this only vaguely. It seems to me it was before that meeting discussed the last time. It was to discuss the manual of arms for the railway troops.
- Q. Was it the intent at that time to train these railway troops for combat action?
- A. While there had been other manuals before this, they were not complete and this was the result of experiences gained in China and other places and was the first issued.

- Q. How long before this meeting of December, 1941, was this meeting regarding the manual of arms held?
- A. I don't even remember definitely whether it was before or after the meeting referred to. I cannot even place the date approximately. I believe we could find out definitely by referring to others who attended the meeting. "

7. Cross-Examination:

It is suggested that NISHIO be cross-examined as follows:

- (a) In his interrogation quoted above the witness stated that he attended only two meetings of the War Council and never attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council. As pointed out above this was merely an attempt to evade the issue by a confusion in nomenclature. When NISHIO said Supreme War Council he meant the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. In fact, the two meetings he attended were the Supreme War Council. He was a member of the Supreme War Council from March, 1941 until he retired from active service in April, 1943. Since KIMURA did not become a member of the Supreme War Council until 11 March, 1943, their respective terms of office coincided only for a few weeks. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how this witness could have any real knowledge as to whether KIMURA took an active part in the War Council meetings. The witness should be interrogated on this point.

It is to be noted, however, that KIMURA will claim that the Prosecution has introduced no evidence that the Supreme War Council ever held a meeting while he was a member (Motion to Dismiss by defendant KIMURA dated 20 Jan. 1947, p. 2). Prosecution Court Exhibit #2246 (Pros. Doc. #2534-A) states that KIMURA attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council on 30 June, 1941 (Transcript p. 16,178). Defense Counsel for KIMURA will claim that KIMURA, who was Vice Minister of War on that date, attended only as a representative of the Army and not as a member (Motion to Dismiss by defendant KIMURA dated 20 Jan. 1947, p. 3). However, the fact is that KIMURA attended the meeting as part of the inner circle and presumably took part in any decisions.

Case # 51

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo
General (retired)
STATUS : Pending

Memorandum for the Files:

On 4 December 1945 CIS files reflect the following information on personnel indicted as War Criminals and ordered apprehended 3 December 1945:

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes List prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a, of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

JAMES J. GAINE, JR.
Capt., Inf.

4 December 1945

CASE NO. 51

RE: NISHIO, Toshizo

STATUS: Pending.

MEMO FOR THE FILE:

Source: Not stated.

From : NIPPON TIMES #16780, 4 December 1945

INFORMATION:

"NISHIO, Toshizo. This retired General was concurrently Inspector General of Military Training and member of the Supreme Military Council in 1938. In 1939 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. In 1944 he became Governor of Tokyo."

UNDEVELOPED LEAD:

Review Nippon Times "morgue" for possible further information.

JOE B. ALEXANDER
2nd Lt., Inf.

FILE:

REPORT BY: D. L. Waldorf

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo, General (Retired)

DATE: 19 January 1946

STATUS: Pending

Inspector General of Military Training, concurrently Member Supreme Military Council, 1938. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, 1939. Supreme Military Council, 1941. Governor Tokyo Metropolitan Area, 1944. As with any other Commander-in-Chief in China during Japanese aggression he should be held responsible for acts of the Japanese Army in China.

He appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a of Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 November 1945.

PENDING

(Counter Intelligence Justification Files reflected the above indicated information concerning subject.)

CASE NO.: 51-

Report by William A. Hardy
Special Agent, CIC

RE : NISHIO, Toshizo (Juzo)

STATUS: Closed

DATE : 15 January 1946

A review of CIS Files reveals the following additional information concerning the Subject:

1881	Oct.	Born Tottori Prefecture; m. Toshiko, 3rd daughter of Tadatoshi Sakai.
1903		Graduated Military Academy with highest honors; 2nd Lt., Infantry
1904-05		Participated Russo-Japanese War with 40th Infantry
1905		1st Lt., Infantry
1909		Captain, Infantry
1910		Graduated Army Staff College, 2nd in class
1916		Major, Infantry
1920		Lt. Col., Infantry
1920-21		Adjutant, War Ministry
1922		Attached to 10th Infantry Regiment (Okayama)
1923		Colonel, Infantry
1923-24		Instructor in military science, Army Staff College
1925		Commander, 40th Infantry Regiment (Tottori)
1926-28		Chief, 1st Section, Office Inspector General of Military Training.
1929		Major General; Commander, 39th Infantry Brigade
1930		Attached to Central Ordnance Depot; concurrently Chairman, Military Inquiry Committee, War Ministry
1932		Chief, 4th Bureau, Army General Staff
1934		Chief of Staff, Kwantung
1936	Mar.	Vice Chief, Army General Staff
1937	Mar.	Commander, Imperial Guards Division
1937	Aug.	Sent to North China on secret mission
1938	April	Inspector General of Military Training; concurrently Member Supreme Military Council
1939	Aug.	General
1939	Sept.	Commander in Chief, Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China
1941	Mar.	Member Supreme Military Council
1943	May	Retired from Army

Typical staff officer, quiet, modest, and without political affiliations. Formerly spoken of as authority on Japanese war plans with respect to Russia. Reputed to have been drafter of "Compendium of Combat" (Santo Kyo), army handbook. (21,104).

(Source: Report of Ital. Mil. Attache in Tokyo for May 1938, OSS FEI. Attended a conference at the Palace held by the Emperor on 16 January 1945. Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 Jan. 1945.)

Chief of the Kanto Munitions Intendance Bureau.

(Source: FCC, Daily Report, 16 July 1945)

He inspires much faith in Japanese military circles for his military and political ability; may become the future head of the new central government of China, as already a Japanese General has become head of the Manchu State.

(Source: Italian Consular Official)
JICA North Africa, carded ER 21 February 1944.

He hates Communism and also hates Japan's great capitalist families, principally because the latter disputed mastery of Japan with the Army. His great friend is General S. Itagaki whom he has used to soothe offended financiers while he quietly extended the Army's grip on industry. Of Itagaki, Nishio once said: "I'll do the fighting; let Itagaki do the office work."

(Source: OSS FE)

Issued appeal to the inhabitants of the City (Tokyo) to exhibit an "exemplary attitude" and confront "all difficulties, even death."

(Source: FCC Daily Report, 8 August 1944.)

A review of ATIS files revealed the following additional information concerning subject.

July 25, 1944 Appointed Governor of Tokyo with the additional duties of Chief of the Yokohama Court of Admiralty, Superintendent General of the Kanto-Shinetsu Regional Bloc; Chief of the Yokohama Sea Transportation Bureau.