

Def. Doc. 2555

EXHIBIT #

3316

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE  
FAR EAST

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Having first duly sworn en oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in  
my country I hereby depose as follows.

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## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- v -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF ITAGAKI, SeishiroI. DURING THE PERIOD AS STAFF OFFICER OF THE  
KWANTUNG ARMY (1st May, 1929 - 30th July, 1932)

1. I was appointed staff officer of the Kwantung Army (Army Colonel) on 1st May, 1929, the 4th Year of Showa, and held that post until 30 July 1932, the 7th Year of Showa. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at the time of my above appointment was Lieut. Gen. Eitaro Hata. At the time of the Manchurian Incident the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was Lieut. Gen. HONJO, Shigeru and the Chief of Staff was Major-General Miyake, Mitsuji.

My duties were to receive orders from the Chief of Staff and to maintain contact between Staff officers and manage the staff office, and also attend to liaison business of the army.

As for the duties and privileges of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the Chief of Staff and Staff officers, they are ruled in the Regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters (Court Exhibit No. 1415).

2. General situation in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident, as follows:

(a) In China, since 1925, a movement for the recovery of alleged lost national rights had been started and anti-Japanese actions became increasingly active. In Manchuria also there occurred violations of Japan's rights and interests. In June, 1928, the 3rd Year of Showa, CHANG Tsuo-lin was killed by a bomb and CHANG Hsueh-liang succeeded him. In the same year the CHANG Hsueh-liang regime affiliated with the Nanking Government, changed the Manchurian colour, adopted the "blue sky and white sun" ensign & letting influences of the Chinese Nationalist Party penetrate into Manchuria.

The anti-Japanese movement there was organized under the direction of the Kuomintang and government offices and it became very active and intense. The Japanese rights in Manchuria were infringed and the Japanese nationals were squeezed in the belt-like strip along the South Manchurian Railway. The extreme pressure against the Korean immigrants, violence and oppression of the Japanese and obstruction to communication, etc. were intensified and increased in number. In spite of the earnest and sincere cooperative policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara, no prospect for relaxation of the anti-Japanese activities in China was in sight, and the situation was continuously aggravated. Just before the outbreak of the Incident, several hundred questions were pending.

(b) On the other hand, in the military field, CHANG Hsueh-liang, since taking office as the Vice Commander of the Kuomintang Army in the Fall of 1928, planned to strengthen and reorganize the army under his control, and he increased the strength of the standing army to two hundred odd thousand, enlarged the scale of the Mukden Arsenal, equipped the army with such modern arms as tanks and airplanes and strengthened the system of discipline. Thus he endeavoured to raise both the quality and the quantity of his army, and as a result, as compared with the Kwantung Army at that time, not only in its strength but in its equipment, his army was far superior to it.

Since then the anti-Japanese sentiments gradually influencing the Chinese Troops, they assumed a contemptuous attitude toward the Japanese troops, boasting of the superiority of the Chinese Army and the abundance of their experiences of actual fighting through engaging in yearly internal wars, and the anti-Japanese sentiments of the officers and men became very vigorous.

Moreover, the disposition of the Chinese troops was changed so as to encircle our garrison areas along the South Manchurian Railways and the Kwantung troops which had been placed dispersedly, fell into a situation extremely dangerous from the military point of view. That is to say, that while no more than ten odd thousand Kwantung troops, with the inferior equipment and formation, had been stationed dispersedly, still on peace time footing, in the area almost one thousand kilometers<sup>long</sup>, along the South Manchurian Railway, they came to be placed under siege by the large force of two hundred<sup>thousand</sup>/odd Chinese troops, equipped with superior arms, burning with anti-Japanese sentiments, and assuming a most provocative attitude.

23. With the anti-Japanese situation increasingly aggravated and the Chinese troops aflame with anti-Japanese sentiments, a danger of collision between the Japanese and Chinese armies had thus been gradually fermented. The solution of the situation seemed extremely difficult unless either the Japanese or Chinese would concede or compromise, because the situation between Japan and China at that time was the collision between the conflicting demands, the recovery of China's alleged lost rights and the maintenance of our rights and interests. But the Chinese had no intention at all to compromise and the situation was that anti-Japanism by force of arms would be inevitable. If we were to avoid it, there was no solution for us except to abandon all the special rights and interest we had in political, economic and military fields generally. However such a thing as the wholesale abandonment of our rights and interests was not only what our government could not undertake but also what the national public opinion would not permit. Therefore, as for the Kwantung Army, they tried hard to avoid friction with the Chinese, sought all means of appeasement, admonished our officers and men to be patient and cautious, prohibiting any rash acts.

However, on the other hand, they were under the necessity to working out an emergency counter-measure in case of collision between the Japanese and Chinese troops, which might happen by positive military actions on the part of the Chinese. The Kwantung Army, in order to deal with the pressing situation desired to increase its strength, change the disposition of its troops, and replete its equipment, but this desire was not approved by the central authorities of the army. Therefore, the Kwantung Army mapped out a plan with the then existing strength and equipment, without getting assistance from the central authorities since the previous year. They established a plan of operations that in case of collision between the Chinese and the Japanese troops, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces in Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the enemy, would settle the matter within a short period. They decided to make preparations necessary for education, training, communication, transportation and other things, in accordance with the above plan, and to make up for the shortcomings of the fighting power by utilizing the material for military operations, which could be found in Manchuria, to the best possible advantage.

It was a part of that plan that they set two heavy guns in the premises of the Mukden Independent Garrison Barracks in Mukden. These guns were those which became needless as the result of scaling down of the fortifications at Port Arthur, and were appropriated. It was a natural step to make up the shortage of the fighting power, and it was in order not to stimulate the Chinese in the peace time that they concealed the setting up of those guns. Commander-in-Chief Honjo, who had taken the post and arrived in August 1931, actually witnessed repeated occurrences of incidents due to the intensification of anti-

Japanese feeling, especially such serious cases as killing Captain NAKAMURA, Wanpaoshan Incident, and disturbances staged against the troops guarding railways in various places and on their practice maneuvers, read out the mounting tension of the situation. Then he strictly warned the officers and enlisted men against any rash act, but at the same time instructed them to the execution of their duties positively and decidedly once emergency arose.

4. I was accompanying Commander-in-Chief Honjo on his informal inspection trips of the troops under his command, and finished the trips with the inspection of the troops located at Liaoyan on 18 September, 1931 (6th Year of Showa). On the same day Commander-in-Chief Honjo was informed by the Chief of Staff Miyake that Major General Tategawa, the Chief of the First Department of the General Staff Office, was coming to Mukden; and Miyake requested him to send either ISHIWARA or me, staff officers, to Mukden to meet the Major General. Assuming that the matter would probably be in connection with the terms of negotiation on the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, Commander-in-Chief Honjo ordered me to go to Mukden. Accordingly, I went to Mukden from Liaoyan. Toward evening that day, Major General TATEKAWA arrived, and I greeted and dined with him. The Major General, saying that having left Tokyo in a hurry he missed the special train and was unable to take sufficient rest in the crowded coach, and he was worn out. Since he was scheduled to stay there for a few days, he did not incline to mention his business immediately, except a few words to the effect that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. I answered that there was no need of worrying if it was the business, and remarked that I would hear him at leisure the next day, because he seemed tired out. Then we closed the talk, and I took leave to return to my billet.

5. On my way to the billet after taking leave of Major General TATEGAWA, as I was concerned with the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, I went to the Special Service Section of Mukden in order to get further information about it, but as there was no further news I chatted for a while with the staffs. Just as I was going to return to my billet there was a telephone from the garrison troops, calling the Special Service Section and reported the case of blasting up the railway line at Liu Chiaokou. By several following contacts by telephone, I understood that just after 10:00 P.M. Chinese troops blasted the rail line of the South Manchurian Railway at the western side of Peitaying, north of Mukden, and the patrolling scouts of the company of Hushihtai received shots from the enemy lying in ambush. Upon receiving the information the company of Hushihtai hurriedly went to their rescue, collided and engaged in a battle with Chinese troops. Although they had occupied a corner of Peitaying in spite of the enemy's resistance, with the enemy increasing machine guns and infantry guns, the company was hard pressed. From the report of the railway guard it was clear that the incident was not a mere infringement upon rights and interests in the shape of blasting the railway, but a planned challenge of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese Army; and it was judged that the Seventh Brigade of Peitaying was in action against us. Therefore, I keenly felt the risk was so close that if we hesitated a moment the leased territories attached to the South Manchurian Railway and the Japanese troops would be encircled and attacked by the Chinese Army in Mukden.

At that moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIMANOTO and Colonel HIRATA sent the word to the Commander-in-Chief and others through the Special Service Section of Mukden.

SHIMAMOTO, the Second Battalion Commander of the Independent Infantry Garrison, stated that he would immediately go to rescue with all his troops the Hushihtai Company, which was in a desperate battle at a corner of Peitaying, and HIRATA, the 29th Regimental Commander, who had been informed of the situation, declared that he, as the Commander of the Garrison made up his mind to cooperate with SHIMAMOTO's Battalion by attacking the Mukden Wall with all the power under his command.

In the capacity of a Staff officer<sup>who</sup>/happened to be present there, I accepted their determinations and took steps to report to the Commander-in-Chief that the Independence Garrison would fight it out with the enemy at Peitaying and the 29th Regiment against the enemy within Mukden. The reason why I accepted was:

(i) the determination of the above commanders were absolutely necessary, in the line with the plan of operations of the army in case of emergency, not only for the self-defense of the troops in Mukden, but also for the benefit of the activities of the main force of the army;

(ii) I thought it was necessary to give these Commanders assurance in taking actions according to their determinations by my acknowledgment, since I as a staff officer was fully conversant with the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief previously.

When I reported the details of the above steps to the Commander-in-Chief Honjo as the headquarters of the Kwantung Army moved to Mukden on 19 September, he approved the steps as they completely coincided with his intentions.

6. On the night of 18th September we informed the Consulate-General of Mukden by telephone of the outbreak of the incident and of the actions taken by the army, and asking Consul MORISHIMA to come up to the Special Service office we explained the circumstances in detail and asked for his cooperation.



I also talked about the matter with Consul-General HAYASHI several times by telephone. Consul-General HAYASHI said that, as Japan and China had not yet formally entered the war, and as the Chinese, through consultant CHAO, Hsin-po, had announced their adoption of the principle of non-resistance he hoped that the army would arrange the matter so it could be dealt with through diplomatic agents, putting an end to the military actions on the part of Japan at that time. In reply to his assertion, I explained the following in detail and asked his reconsideration. That is to say, the incident this time was different from those of the predecessors, because the regular army of the Chinese had challenged the Japanese army; the fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese was already under way, and it was impossible for the present to separate them.

Anyway, unless the present military actions would be settled it was practically impossible to place the case to the diplomatic negotiations. Though the Chinese were saying that the Chinese were completely abiding by the principle of non-resistance, according to the report from the frontier, they were attacking at Hushihtai, causing dead and injured. I could not imagine that CHAO Hsin-po would be able to arrange a cease-fire agreement on his own responsibility, because he was a mere civil official, having no influence in military affairs. Particularly what had to be considered was that it could not be known whether it might not prove to be the enemy's habitual trick in order that they might rearrange the situation by gaining time, making the actions of the Japanese army delayed and relaxed. I told him we had to be careful, that the condition was of such a grave nature that it permitted no hesitation. I, also, pointed out that the realization of Consul-General HAYASHI's contention was practically impossible in the light of then actual situations.

The battle around Mukden terminated on the 19th September. However, as all the Chinese functionaries who were holding important posts of the city administration had fled, the police, communications, and the banking services all came to a standstill. All the citizens closed their doors and the city became utterly chaotic. The convicts came out of the prison and ran rampant on the streets. Thus the situation became so bad that we could not leave it that way even for a moment, in the interests of public safety. In view of the above circumstances, and also to cope with the earnest desire of the citizens, the army commander Honjo, for the purpose of maintaining public safety, promulgated immediately an emergency municipal administration and appointed Colonel DOHIHARA as the temporary Mayor. The Kwantung Army had no intention of instituting a military administration. They did not admit any other soldier than Colonel DOHIHARA to take part in the administration and apart from a few Japanese advisors, the greater part of the functionaries were Chinese nationals. Thus its purpose was to maintain the public peace as a temporary measure with the arrangement that whenever a qualified Chinese was available the power of administration should immediately be transferred to him.

Colonel DOHIHARA served only one month as temporary Mayor, and on the 20th October Mr. CHAO Hsin-po became Mayor and almost all of the advisors were removed..

8. Commander-in-Chief Honjo had been too cautious to disclose any of his political opinions during the course of the hostilities of the Manchurian Incident.

However, when the independence declaration of each province of Manchuria as well as of some influential persons therein created a general tendency throughout Manchuria that the establishment of a new state was inevitable, he made public, at the end of October 1931 at Kwantung Army Headquarters, the following important statement:

In view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese conflict which had existed before the Manchurian Incident led itself to the present regrettable all out clash between the two countries, we must make certain that an unfortunate incident of this nature should never happen again. In order to do so, we must devise measures with which to settle the incident to the complete satisfaction of both countries. The first step toward materialization of this measure would be to pay high regard to the expressed desire of the whole Manchurian people.

The anti-Japanese movement which had been conducted before the present incident contributed to creating among the Chinese people an anti-Japanese sentiment, which finally developed into a bitter feeling of enmity.

This feeling seems to have been eliminated now, but we must go a step further to completely wipe it out from their mind by enhancing the spirit of racial harmony to such extent that the people of both countries feel no racial discrimination among them.

So long as Japan maintains her special rights and interests in Manchuria, it cannot help causing a sense of inequality and a sense of being oppressed among the Manchurian people, no matter how legally right the Japan's rights and interests, from the viewpoint of international law, may be.

Therefore, Japan should voluntarily give up her rights and interests there, renounce her special right of extraterritoriality and should return Port Arthur and Dairen to Manchuria, if, by doing so, the relations between the two countries can attain such standard as where the interests of both countries become identical and where the sense of racial discrimination no longer exists.

Since the Japanese and the Manchurian people are the elements constituting the state of Manchuria, based on the equal footing without racial discrimination, Japanese should abandon all of their superior complex and the sense of special rights over that area. They must realize that they stand on an equal footing with the Manchurian people in constituting this new state whether as government officials or civilians. I suggest that those who serve the new country as government officials should have such determination as to naturalize themselves to that country.

Maladministration of Chang Hsuehliang was the cause of hatred, not only of the governmental authorities of Japan and Manchuria, but also of all of the thirty million Manchurian populace. Chang Hsuehliang's failure with the Manchurian people lay in his adoption of some party policy. One thing Manchuria should be most careful about in the future is to respect the will of the people by rejecting the return of Chang Hsuehliang and his party.

Restoration of imperial regime in Manchuria would be an act of anachronism, furthermore, it is apt to give birth to an evil cause which will deprive Manchuria forever of her possible opportunity of harmonizing with China in the future. Even if Mr. Henry Pu Yi were to become the head of the new state in compliance with the request of thirty million Manchurian people, there must be a clear distinction between his assumption as head of the state and the restoration of imperial regime.

Independence of the new state is the result of a movement of a race freeing itself from the nation to which it belonged, and so it is not in any way violating any treaty. Those influential Manchurian people of the present should be fully responsible to the people of Manchuria.

It is feared that the independence of a new state may overshadow the path to cooperation between China and Japan, but at the same time, it is possible that the new state, by administering good rule, can work as a tie for China-Japan collaboration in the future, and we must hope that this should be the case with the coming new state.

What everything depends upon is good administration and the welfare of the people. The misgoverning in the past, administered by the former military clique should of course be improved. First of all, the heavy extortion of tax should either be abolished or alleviated. All laws purporting to be anti-Japanese should immediately be abolished.

The Kwantung Army should be indifferent to all political affairs of Manchuria. It should leave all the administrative matters of the new state to the independent and autonomous regime of the Manchurian people, and should solely limit its action, as its guiding principle, to assisting the maintenance of law and order. However, the national defense should be a problem for the joint strength of Japan and the new state, and, for the time being, the Kwantung Army should appoint itself to this task.

The Kwantung Army must convince, and gain absolute confidence of the Manchurian people as being their friend. So far, the Japanese government gave us those prohibitive instructions only, such as prohibiting us from participating in political and administrative matters, or instructing us to avoid restoration of Imperial regime, and no definite indication as to the future policy of the Kwantung Army has been shown by them.

We presume it is only natural under the circumstances. What we should do at this juncture is, while devoting our undivided attention to our primary duty as an army, we must make close observation upon the future relation between Manchuria and Japan in order to be able to report the true aspect of the situation to the central government, and, at the same time, should be determined not to interfere with their political movement which is intended to represent the unanimous desire of thirty million Manchurian people of immediately saving the present situation of turmoil. While we should not be reluctant in giving assistance within our power to the Manchurian people whenever asked for it, we must not force ourselves upon them.

9. I had been taking every opportunity to talk with the Chinese leading authorities and powerful civilians to ascertain their views, so that I could report them to the Military Commander.

I learned that among those personages there prevailed, as a common sentiment, a strong feeling of

animosity against CHANG Hsue-Liang, a dislike of the Koumintang politics, and, consequently, the observance of the principle of the "Hokyo Anmin" (the border security and the peace for people), that is to say, ardent desire for independence of Manchuria. Mr. LO Chen-yu, the authoritative person of the faction of the Restoration, came from Lushun (Port Arthur) to see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, at Mukden, on the 23rd September, immediately after the incident. He told me then that the faction for the Restoration wished to call the Emperor HSUAN Tung to Manchuria. He then went to see HSI Chia in Kirin where he met CHANG Hai-peng at Taonan, and came back again to Mukden on the 26th September. He then told me that at Kirin, CHANG Hai-peng who was preparing for the independent movement was desirous of welcoming the Emperor HSUAN Tung to Kirin, and of the firm decision of General CHANG Hai-peng for independence and his intention to support the Emperor HSUAN Tung. Mr. YU Chung-han had an interview with army commander Honjo on the 3rd, November, and suggested to him the necessity of establishing a new state on the basis of his cherished principle of the "Border security and the peace for the people." Within a short time after the incident, in many provinces and districts, independence was declared. At that time we got information to the effect that the movements of establishing an independent state were gradually growing among the principal political leaders in various districts, since the general tendency in the provinces of Mukden, Kirin and Heilungkiang had been settled, by the entry of the Japanese army into Tsitsihar in the middle of November of the 6th Year of Showa (1931). So I successively interviewed, by order of the army commander, during the period from the latter part of November to the middle of December, the political leaders of the various districts who were the supporters of independence.

Among them: Mr. CHANG, Ching-hui at Harbin  
Mr. MA Chen-shan at Hailun  
Messrs HSI Chia and HSEH Chief-shin at Kirin  
Messrs TSANG Shih-i and YUAN Chin-kin at Mukden

I thus met with the leaders of independent states and heard their opinions about the problem of establishing a new State. They were, without exception, against the return of the CHANG Hsueh-liang regime to Manchuria, and they did not want the Nanking Government in Manchuria, as they hated the politics of the Kuomintang. Their common and earnest desire was to take active steps to establish an independent state, on the basis of the principle of "border security and the peace for people". They earnestly and frankly told me that, for the construction of a new state, the support of Japan was absolutely necessary, that for the time being the defense must be assumed by Japan, and that the new state required general modern knowledges for which they would depend upon Japanese aid, and that in order to realize the fruit of cooperation, the Japanese and Chinese should stand on equal footing. There were some differences of opinion among them about the question of its polity and sovereignty. Such well known personages of the Restoration faction as HSE Chia, Governor of the Province of Kirin; and HSEH Chieh-shih, both of the Kirin faction, strongly advocated calling in Mr. PU YI as the sovereign, after making Manchuria an independent state, rather than persistently sticking to a mere theory of restoration itself, TSANG Shih-i, Governor of the province of Mukden, and YUANG Chin-kai, both of the Mukden faction, were strongly opposed to the maledministration of CHANG Hsueh-liang, and though they were advocators of the principle of the "border security and the peace for the people", they did not agree to the monarchical restoration. They desired an independent state with a republican regime. As to the sovereign, however, they were of the opinion that they would agree to install Mr. PU YI as the President, rather than



to decide the ruler by election. MA Chan-shan of the Province of Heilunghiang was not the Governor or the Province at that time, but he was a man of real worth possessing his own troops. It was said that regarding the question of establishing a new state he would yield entirely to the opinion of CHANG Ching-hui who, having almost the same view with the men of Mukden faction, was against the Restoration, but was in favour of an independent state in the republican system. All the Mongolian princes were of the same opinion as the Kirin faction. Accordingly, the authoritative persons of the Mukden and Kirin factions were in the position to dominate the general trend of the affairs as to the questions of polity and sovereignty.

It was clear that all the political leaders of the various districts unanimously agreed on the formation of an independent State. This was mainly due, I found out, to the peculiar geographical and historical position of the "East Four Provinces", and especially to the fact that the "East Four Provinces" had heretofore often declared themselves independent, and that by the Japanese declaration of non-occupation of Manchuria the unsatisfied political leaders who were indignant with CHANG Hsueh-liang over his maladministration, came to the surface of the political scene, and moved by political aspiration desired to eternally solidify their position, rejecting the CHANG's return to Manchuria. I made a detailed report to the Military Commander Honjo about the matters above related.

9. I, having been called by telegram from the Central authority and comprehending the designs of the army commander Honjo, left Mukden for Tokyo on the 4th day of January 7th Year of Showa (1932). Presenting myself at the Military Headquarters and War Ministry, I made reports as follows:

(i) That the general tendency of Manchuria was toward an independent State. After having assiduously sounded the prominent authoritative persons and men of real worth in the outside of official circle, I could affirm that they were all earnestly advocating the creation of an independent State, and that the general public, too, were against, not only the return of CHANG Hsueh-liang's regime to Manchuria, but also against the advance of Kuomintang Government to Manchuria.

(ii) That the Kwantung Army was entirely absorbed in the maintenance of the public peace, and that it placed no limit on the political desires of the native people;

(iii) That if the matter should go as it was, an independent State would undoubtedly be formed, so that the Japanese Government should be well prepared to meet the situation;

(iv) That the Commander Honjo was of the opinion that there remained no other way than to adopt the theory of an independent State, in view of the general trend of the situation at that time."

Then the War Minister ARAKI told me that though the Government policy was not decided yet, as the new cabinet had just been constructed, his principle was to observe the actual situation on the spot, but as to the issue of the independence of the State he did not interfere one way or the other. During my stay in Tokyo I explained in detail the new conditions in Manchuria and the Central authorities well understood regarding the actual situation.

Coming back to Mukden, I submitted my report to the Commander Honjo, concerning the above liaison affair with the Central authorities.

13. By order of Commander Honjo I had an interview with Mr. PU YI in Port Arthur on January 29, 1932 (7th Year of Showa). An enthusiastic desire for the creation of an independent State had become extremely strong among the powerful as well as the general public of Manchuria at that time and the tendency of forming such a new State, apart from the Restoration movement reached its high pitch with the probability of having Mr. PU YI, the ex-Emperor of HSUAN Tung who has a close connection with Manchuria, as the sovereign of the new State.

So Commander Honjo ordered me to meet officially with Mr. PU YI and ascertain his intention regarding this matter. I first gave Mr. PU YI a general information concerning the establishing a new state, and then asked his opinion about it. Mr. PU YI was already aware of the trend in Manchuria for the establishment of a new State through the information he had obtained from various sources. He declared that it was of great necessity to establish a new independent State in Manchuria, seceding from China, and to have a good administration for the sake of the 30,000,000 inhabitants there, in close cooperation with Japan. He also stated that he had the intention to accept the sovereignty of the new State. He also insisted upon the Restoration and the conversation lasted for several hours. The main reasons were as follows:

- (1) The courteous treatments and conditions afforded to the CHING Family did not abolish the title of "Emperor". So he was still an Emperor. Consequently, he could not accept any post which did not carry this title;
- (2) The cultural level of the people of Manchuria being low, the Imperial Rule was necessary;
- (3) As to the system of the Imperial Rule, a general cabinet had to be established, in

subordination to a political organ under the direct control of the Emperor who shall decide himself all the state affairs.

I wondered whether the real intention of Mr. PU YI was to decline to accept the sovereignty of a new state if the State was not formed according to the principle of the Monarchial Restoration, or whether he would accept the offer to be the head of a new state any way. However, as the interview lasted pretty long already, I took my leave, and in another room I met CHENG Chui, the son of CHENG Hsiao-hsu, whom I asked if Mr. PU YI had an idea to refuse to become the head of a new State. He was very much astonished at that and said that could not be so; on the contrary he thoroughly understood the present day political situation, and was ready to accept the offer to become the head of a new State. He further explained to me that, though he did not know the true meaning of Mr. PU YI's talk to me, he thought that it must have been, perhaps, a simple expression of his desire before accepting the office. Then I asked him if I could construe the attitude of Mr. PU YI, as meaning he would agree to become the head of the new State, and if I could make report to Commander Honjo to that effect. He said "Yes". Then I left Part Authur for Mukden, and submitted my report to the Commander Honjo.

The object of my interviews with Mr. PU YI was not to persuade him to become the head of the new State, but merely to learn his intention. I had absolutely no notion whatever or acted in such a way as to coerce or intimidate Mr. PU YI, or to cause his advisor CHENG Chui to make Mr. PU YI agree to become head of the new State.

Later on, on the 21st of February LO Chen-yu and

his son came to see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, saying that they were sent by the Emperor PU YI. They said that the Emperor was still contending for the Imperial Rule of the new State. However, at that time the North-East Administration Committee had already issued, on the 18th of February, the Declaration of Independence, and decided on the 19th that they should establish republican State and that Mr. PU YI, the ex-Emperor HSUAN Tung be requested to accept the administratorship.

We, therefore, considered that this move of LO Chen-yu was due to the lack of adequate knowledge on the part of Mr. PU YI of the atmosphere of the North-East Administration Committee. So we saw the necessity of directly communicating to Mr. PU YI the actual situation of the North-East Administration Committee, and by order of Commander Honjo I took the night train that day for Port Arthur. On the next day, the 22nd, I met Mr. PU YI and conveyed to him that information. Mr. PU YI understood the circumstances, was already acquainted with the decision taken by the North-East Administration Committee, and expressed his approval. Mr. PU YI, who had insisted, at our first interview, on February 29, on the Imperial Rule for the new State as his doctrine, and who later indicated to us through his chief retainer LO Chen-yu, that his intention was unaltered, gladly adopted, nevertheless, the decision of the North-East Administration Committee, immediately upon being explained the details of that decision. He also gladly accepted the decision of the North-East Administration Committee in regard to the title of the State, the national flag, the site of Metropolis and the name of era. In the midst of our talk I had a telephone call from the Commander Honjo and reported the progress of our interview to him.

The incident of the 18th September was a pure accident and I definitely state that the Kwantung Army did not plan it. As to the establishment of Manchukuo and the installation of Mr. PU YI, I state they were carried out by the naturally created enthusiasm of the native people, and there was no so-called puppet state or puppet administrator created by the schemes or threats of the Japanese Government, or of the Kwantung Army.

The allegation by the prosecution that I and a few other staff officers schemed and acted arbitrarily without following the desires of the Commander-in-Chief, General Honjo, is a fabrication and as far as I am concerned, I affirm, there is not an iota of truth in it.

II. MY SECOND PERIOD OF SERVICE IN THE KWANTUNG ARMY.  
(August 1, 1932 - 1 March 1937)

1. I was attached to the Kwantung Army's Headquarters (Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps at Mukden - - 1 August 1932 - June 1933), to the General Staff (on a inspection tour in Europe - June 1933), to the Kwantung Army's Headquarters (Supreme advisor of the Military Administration Department of Manchukuo - 1 August 1934- 10 Dec. 1934) and then was assigned to the position of the Vice Chief Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army (concurrently of an Attache to the Embassy 10 December 1934 - 21 March 1936) and of the Chief Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army (concurrently of a member of the Japan-Manchurian Joint Economic Committee, 21 March 1936 - 1 March 1937).

2. The following was the situation about 1934 or 1935:

(a) After the truce at Tangku, continuous efforts were made by Chinese and Japanese well informed circles to alleviate the tension between the two nations and to eradicate the causes of future evils. Consequently, traffic was opened and mail system established between the two nations after September 1934. Foreign Minister HIROTA made a speech on the two nations rapprochement before the Diet in January, to which replies were made by CHANG Kai-Shek and WANG Chiao Ming and finally, in June, an Amity Law was promulgated.

(b) In view of the Chinese Communist Army's northward expansion with the aims to intensifying the strain between Japan and China, the Chinese Government issued an order to exterminate that army (February 1935), assigning LU Hsun-Chung at the head of the expeditionary army (June 1935). The Chinese communist army, nevertheless, broke through the Kwantung Army and was drawing near the Mongolian Region.

(c) The U.S.S.R. persisted in accusing Japan of being imperialistic and aggressive. It was double tracking the Siberian Railway and proceeding with fortification of the Far East for military bases.

The strength of the U.S.S.R. was four times as large as that of the Kwantung Army and was being still further increased.

(d) Armed communists and bandits in Manchuria were much curbed by the Japanese and Manchurian expeditionary forces, though not entirely suppressed.

(e) Some Japanese and Manchurian notables were beginning to advocate that Japan should abolish her extraterritoriality in Manchuria.

Judging from the situation stated above, the principle of co-prosperity advocated by Japan and Manchuria should succeed in forcing out the program of the communist strength.

Japan, Manchuria and China would be able to pursue the way of prosperity in peace.

Whereas, the three nations would be thrown into the guagmire of war and revolt, if co-prosperity should not be realized and the situation should develop in favor of the communists. The above prospect became all the more probable after the commintern, holding a general meeting at Moscow in July 1935, passed a resolution to concentrate on efforts to overthrowing Japan and accomplishing world revolution. The Chinese communist party issued a proclamation on the basis of the said resolution, to substitute the principle of "resist Japan and save the nation movement" for that of "Bolshevize and save the nation movement", and also was threatening to resort to the tactics of the anti-Japanese united front and announced its resolution to put these programs into action.

3. The consensus of opinion of the Kwantung Army's Headquarters under the commander and the chief of the General Staff was that the basic policies to be adopted by Japan and Manchuria should be as follows:



- (a) Strengthening the ability by real ability:
1. Construction of co-prosperity society.
  2. Financial construction centering around improving the national wealth and enriching the national resources.
  3. Securing the national defensive power enough to ensure peace and order, and in an emergency strong enough to check any enemy invasion.
  4. Establishing international friendship by diplomatic means.

(b) Tiding over the impending crisis through the above measures.

(c) The realization of harmonious co-operation of the races in Manchuria.

4. While I was Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantun Army, Manchukuo had many persons of broad views and high personality. As for me, I trusted and co-operated with them in their policy in accordance with the authorities.

In June, 1936, the first abolishment of the extra-territoriality took place. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident I had favoured this. So, also, in consideration of the trend mentioned above, I tried to aid the work of the concerned Japanese and Manchurian personages and to facilitate its materialization.

I assisted concerning the personal affairs of the Japanese officials in the service of the Manchurian Government, in accordance with the order of the Commander of the army. I had nothing to do with the internal personal administration and the personal affairs of Manchurian officials.

The Kwantung Army did not coerce the Manchurian Government in its selection or rejection<sup>of</sup> its officials.

5. Implementing the national defense against the U.S.S.R. was the basic duty of the Kwantung Army and the basic principle

thereof was established at the time of Chief of Staff NISHIO, whom I succeeded as Chief of Staff. The program established by the Kwantung Army, however, was based, of course, upon the instruction of the General Staff and was of purely defensive nature with the object of providing for the emergency which would<sup>be</sup> precipitated by an attack by the U.S.S.R. I never made any aggressive war plan, much less one for aggressive war against the Soviet.

6. There were many Mongolians in the interior of Manchuria and their living places were found even along the railway between Chanchun and Deiren. Accordingly the trends in the outer and inner Mongols involved sharp repercussions on the Mongolians living in Manchukuo, of the domestic peace and of the defense of Manchukuo.

Accordingly the Kwantung Army and Manchukuo always had a special interest in Outer and Inner Mongolia.

Inner Mongolia was assigned as a region in charge of the Kwantung Army for collecting information concerning the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia, and it was under this assignment that the Kwantung Army collected information in Inner Mongolia near the frontier line between Manchuria and Mongolia.

The influence of the northward expansion of the Chinese communist army and the foundation of Manchukuo and other factors combined to give rise to Inner Mongolian's voluntary movement for uniting all Mongolians under the banner of co-prosperity. In this connection Japan and Manchukuo hoped for its healthy growth from the angle of defense against the U.S.S.R. and prevention of the spread of Bolshevism, but the Kwantung Army did not seek to induce or support the movement, so far as I know.

The Kwantung Army, from the viewpoint of defense against the U.S.S.R., was interested in the North China

problem to secure peace in the rear in case of emergency, but even that interest was diverted to concentrate on the defense of the northern and internal fortification toward December.. Accordingly, it is by no means a fact that the Kwantung Army sent troops to the North China.

III. IN MY DAYS AS THE COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH DIVISION  
(Between 1 March 1937 - 3 June, 1938)

1. On 1 March, 1937, I was personally transferred from the position of the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to Hiroshima, in Japan, as Commander of the Fifth Division. At that time, the 5th Division was a division on peace footing and I, the divisional commander, was in charge of controlling all my subordinate units and responsible for the military preparation, within my jurisdiction. Regarding other matters, however, I was not in a position to state my opinion with any authority nor to give any advice.

2. When so-called the Lukouchiao Incident occurred, on 7 July, 1937, I was, as usual, on duty at the Headquarters of the 5th Division in Hiroshima. I learned about the incident by reading about it in the newspapers of the following morning. I did not consider it was serious, as I believed that it was only a trouble that an expeditionary unit usually has, and that the incident would soon be settled on the spot. I did not dream that this incident would develop into such a great affair as the China-Japanese Incident. Knowing that the Japanese policy at that time was localization and the settlement on the spot, I expected that it would be so settled.

3. However, the negotiation between Japanese and Chinese armies on the spot, which was based on the Japanese policy of localization was ineffectual. Despite a hope for such settlement, owing to the defiant attitude of the Chinese, the situation became anything but reassuring.

In this situation, on 27 July, an emergency mobilization order was issued to the Fifth Division. On 2 August of the same year, the emergency mobilization had been completed. The first and second trains left the Ujina Harbour on 3rd and 7th of August, respectively. After passing Korea and South Manchuria by railroad, they reached Peiping and then participated in various battles in North China. At the end of May, 1938, on order from Tokyo, I left the position of the Commander of the Fifth Division and was en route to Tokyo.

4. In December, 1937, the main force of our Fifth Division was concentrating in the direction of Paoting from Shansi. When I was in Paoting, on 17 December of the same year, I heard of the formal entry into Nanking of the Japanese Army despatched to Central China, but I had no knowledge of or responsibility concerning the so-called "Nanking Incident".

5. As Commander of the Fifth Division, I only did my duty in accordance with the order of my superior Commander - the Army Commander. In the control and command of the subordinate units, I paid special attention to the establishment of stern military discipline. Above all, I warned my men against any misbehaviour toward the residents. If a soldier did anything wrong, he would have been punished according to military law. In addition to such punishment, both the commander of the unit to which that soldier belonged and the responsible persons for the control of that soldier were punished according to their responsibility.

IV. MY PERIOD OF SERVICE AS THE MINISTER OF WAR.  
(From 3 June 1938 - 29 August 1939)

1. At the end of April or the beginning of May, 1938, when I had been at Ihsien in Shantung Province, North China, as the Commander of the Fifth Division, Mr. FURUNO, Inosuke,

who had been the director of the Domei News Agency, unexpectedly visited me as Premier Konoye's representative to convey the premier's desire to me. The gist of Konoye's desire was as follows:

Despite the Konoye Cabinet's policy of localization, since the outbreak of the Lubouchiao Incident, the war was extended from North China to Central China. In view of such situation, it was necessary to have a person, as Minister of War, who would be able to change the policy toward China to a peace-policy and who could carry it out. For this purpose, considering my career and my ideas, Konoye thought I was the best man for the post. Therefore, with that in mind Konoye wished to know whether I would accept the post as Minister of War.

I knew that Premier Konoye's intention coincided with my idea at that time, namely the withdrawal of the entire Japanese forces and the peaceful settlement of Japan-China conflict. Later, toward the end of May of the same year, Anami, the Chief of the Personal Affairs Bureau, War ministry, visited me, carrying the official informal order, for my appointment as Minister of War, which same had the recommendation of the big three directors of the Army (the Sub-chief of the General Staff TADA, the Inspector-General of Military Education, NISHIO and the Minister of War, SUGIYAMA), and requested me to accept that position.

I decided to accept the appointment and went to Tokyo. On 3 June of the same year, I took office as the Minister of War.

## 2. My fundamental attitude as Minister of War.

(a) Japan and China must not contend with each other but join hands. This was the consistent principle of the Japanese diplomacy toward China. However, the Japanese efforts towards localization and settlement on the spot were all in vain, and a local conflict that occurred in North

China between the Japanese and the Chinese gradually developed into a large scale conflict between the two nations, extending over a large area. While Japan was thus reluctantly forced into such a situation, the Soviet Union, to the North, increased her national strength enormously after completing several units of her five-year-plan. Her armaments in the Far East were overwhelmingly superior, threatening Japanese rear gate. On the other hand, Anglo-American powers finally assumed an attitude of aiding Chiang and interrupting our military movements.

Especially, we were concerned about the United States pressure upon Japan (consisting mainly of financial pressure). If such things would go on, Japan should be doomed to stand alone internationally under the encirclement by Britain, the United States, Soviet Union and China. Therefore, Japan must accomplish peace with China, without a moment's delay. And, with regard to the relation with China, I firmly believed that the two countries must bring to an end all the past conflict between them and rebuild mutual diplomacy on the basis of a broad point of view, thereby realizing mutual benefit, equality and harmonious relations.

(b) Based on the above mentioned fundamental attitudes, I, as the Minister of War, decided the outline of the policy for dealing with the State affairs as follows:

As the policy for the fighting forces:  
To firmly establish military discipline and to attempt maintenance of fighting power against the menace of the Soviet Union. As the policy of State, to alter peace terms with China and to accomplish peaceful settlement quickly. To attempt an innovation in the management of national government, recognizing the fact that the situation is grave, in order to reinforce our defending powers against the Soviet menace and to supplement fighting materials which are being rapidly consumed as the policy for China, to lead the

debouchment by the military power to the end, to attempt transfer of military strength, and adjustment of the front line, thereby stabilizing the situation in the occupied area, and to endeavour to bring about a settlement of peace with CHIANG Kai Shek. As the policy regarding the Soviet Union, to keep watch of her debouchment and to maintain peace with her. As the policy regarding Britain and France, to endeavor to get them to stop their CHIANG aid and act in concert with us for terminating the hostilities. As the policy for Germany and Italy, to ask of each of them their co-operation in the settlement of the Japan-China hostilities, To maintain friendship with the United States and trust that friendship would be the means of bringing about an end to the China-Japan hostilities.

3. My activities as Minister of War.  
(3 June 1938 - 29 August 1939)

(1) It was immediately after the Hsuehchow battle that I took office as Minister of War. At that time, as it was believed that the Hangkow Operation would be unavoidable in view of the general situation, the Central Supreme Command of the Army (the Army Department of the Imperial General Headquarters) had just commenced preparations for the operation. The circumstances at that time (about June, 1938) were as outlined below:

(a) The peace terms offered China were not so exacting as the ones we had proposed when Mr. TRAUTMAN acted as go-between. Unless the Japanese authorities would lessen them further it appeared unlikely that the Chinese would accept them. However, both the Japanese public opinion and the Government's policy had still been far from further reducing those terms.

(b) In order to conclude peace with China, we had to make it possible to deal with CHIANG Kai Shek. Nevertheless,

being confronted with the Konoye declaration of 16 January, this year (1938), which included the statement that Japan would not deal with the Kuomintang Government (even though Premier Konoye himself understood the wrongfulness of that declaration) things were not such as were likely to develop a tendency favourable to the further re-examination of this declaration as a national policy.

(c) As one of the important keys for the reorganization of the Konoye Cabinet, enjoying the great confidence of the people, Mr. UGAKI succeeded Mr. HIROTA and a little ahead of my entry took office as the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 May. However, it was still not long after his inauguration and no progress had been made about its concrete policy.

(d) China asked the League of Nations for help and was successful in making the League resolve to help China. At the end of May, the United States, British and French Governments denounced reported raids on Central and Southern China by the Japanese navy planes.

(e) The Japanese Supreme Command had counted greatly on the Hsuechow Battle as the decisive battle with the main force of the Chinese Central Army, for bringing about the termination of operations, the end of war and the settlement of the incident. However, owing to the great difference in strength and the extent of the fighting area, the Japanese finally could not achieve its strategical object, thereby missing the prize as well as the opportunity, to settle the incident peacefully. Compared with this, the Chinese concentrated great strength in front of Hankow and had been vigorously preparing for counter attacks. If things would go on as they were the few Japanese forces which were posted in many scattered places in a large area would be exposed to extreme danger.



Therefore, the Army Supreme Command considered that the only way for us was to deliver another counter-attack on the Chinese and to make it a turning point for seizing the opportunity for peace. Thus the Supreme Command was obliged to prepare for the Hankow operation; and some parts of our forces began to move.

(f) On the other hand, we would discern that there were important defects in our preparations for defense against the Soviet Union in the north and that that weakness on our part would increase in the future. Under such circumstances, I, having but recently assumed my post, could not help being aware of the extreme difficulties of the task of leading the situation to peace. That is to say we had to aim at the end of the Hankow operation for the purpose of taking the next opportunity for peace, while on the other hand, we had to devise measures that would become materials of the peace-settlement.

At the same time, the situation required us to replace the fighting materials that were being consumed rapidly and not to neglect to maintain the national power for the purpose of defending against the Soviet Union.

The reinforcement of the various emergency policies that were necessary for the national mobilization (Exh. 856) and the revision of the plan of demand and supply of important materials (Exh. 857) were made for remedying the defects of the defending strength and was not for preparing for aggressive war.

(2) Although Hankow Operation (Canton Operation was a subsidiary one to Hankow Operation) was planned and executed as above mentioned, by the Japanese High Command with a view to cover its own weak points and to make a turning point for the termination of hostilities and peaceful settlement, its object of immediate peace could not be attained even after

the ending of the Operation (Hankow fell on October 27, 1937) and the year of 1938 passed over fruitlessly.

The important matters with which I was confronted, during this period, as the War Minister of the Konoye Cabinet, were the following, and the circumstances resulting from executing her measures forced Japan into a prolonged war it feared most.

(a) To keep our relation with Soviet Russia tranquil was one of the absolute essentials. It was also an important factor in exhibiting internally and externally, the safety of her national defense. So, Japan was quite astonished when the CHANG Ku Feng Incident unexpectedly broke out in July - August, 1938, when she was still engaged in the task of preparing for the Hankow Operation.

In dealing with this incident, I hoped for settlement by diplomatic negotiations, embodying the Governmental principle of non-expansion, and endeavoured to achieve immediate and local settlement with accord of views between the War Ministry and the General Staff. Disregarding anticipated serious disadvantages, the Japanese Army firmly stuck to the principle of localization and non-expansion and was barely able to terminate the incident before it became too serious. It brought about, however, greater need for attention to the menace in the North and realization of the superiority of the Soviet mechanized forces over the Japanese Forces and, consequently, lessened the margin of the Japanese preparedness for China. Thus, it resulted in doubts, internally and externally, of the preparedness of Japan.

(b) Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese incident, Japan refrained from establishing military government, and stood upon the policy and principle of leaving the civil administration and maintenance of peace to the Chinese. Nevertheless, not a few such accomplishments were due to the management by Japanese (taking the military operations into consideration) in the Department of Special Affairs.

This placed a considerable load on the Army. Thus, the organization of the China Affairs Board (i.e. KOA-YIN) was proposed by the Army, and adopted by the cabinet as the national policy, of relieving the army of their tasks/view of bringing about the unification of administration.

With such views of organization as above mentioned the China Affairs Board was established on December 18, 1938, as the unifying organ, with the Premier as President and the Ministers of Navy and War as Vice-Presidents. It was about the middle of the following March when the liaison offices on the spots started their work in cooperation with the Chinese Administration, to promote co-operation with the Chinese Administrations, to promote political, economical and cultural measures. The intervention of the Army was held to a minimum.

(c) It was sine qua non for the realization of peace to amend the peace proposals to China, and convert Japan to a policy of dealing with Mr. CHIANG Kai Shek. I, therefore, attached prime significance to re-examining the fundamentals of the national policy regarding the adjustment of the relations between Japan and China; making the true intention of Japan understandable to China, demonstrating to the world that it be embodied in the national policy, and be carried out faithfully; and developing our national policies so as to make for good prospects for the realization of peace.

In the Konoye statement issued at the time of the fall of Wuhan Three Cities on 3 November, 1938, (Exh. 268) Japan hoped to establish the relations of mutual aid, ranging over all the fields of politics, economy, culture, etc., establish international justice, achieve the anti-communism objective, create a new culture, and realize the economic combination, between Japan and China.

In the interest of realizing those policies, the Policy of Adjusting New Relations Between Japan and China (No. 209) was decided on the 30th of the same month. Furthermore, as a detailed explanation the Konoye statement (Exh. 261 2535) was issued on 22 December 1938. This declared to the world, that it was self evident that what Japan wanted of China was not territory, nor reimbursement of war expenses, but that Japan was willing, not only to respect the sovereignty of China, but also to withdraw her extra-territoriality, as well as to give consideration to returning the settlement. I did my utmost, as War Minister, to promote that policy. However, China's reaction, especially Mr. CHIANG Kai-Shek's, was very weak. It was, therefore, not a suitable time to carry on peace negotiations.

(d) Before that, in the interests of peace, it had been deemed advisable to join hands with important persons of China who were believed to possess an ardor for peace, to aid them, and hope to bring about peace. In July, 1938, Premier Konoye gave the instruction to Mr. BANZAI, Rihachiro (recommended by UGAKI, War Minister) to make liaison with Mr. TANG Shao-i and Mr. WU Pei-fu, men of high reputation who had a desire for peace, and asked them for their co-operation. The army sent Lieutenant General DOHIMARA, and Navy, Lieutenant General TSUDA to co-operate in it, but the plan failed, due to the assassination of Mr. TANG Shao-i in December, 1938.

(e) The problem of the coalition of Japan, Germany and Italy was already under study by the affairs authorities of the three departments of Army, Navy, and External Affairs before I occupied the post of War Minister (about May, 1938). As the proposal of Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of Germany, arrived in the first part of August, 1938, we sent a formal answer after consulting the Five Ministers' Conferen

and waited for the formal proposal of Germany. Early in November, the initial proposal to be used as the basis of discussion arrived from Germany, I wanted to utilize it as a means to obtain Sino-Japanese peace immediately after the end of Hangkao operation, and proposed the discussion of this matter before the Five Ministers' Conference on 11 November. But, my proposal met with difficulty in the accord of cabinet opinion, and we became unable to make the speedy conclusion of the Japan-German negotiation serve to accomplish the rapid realization of Sino-Japanese peace.

(f) Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, which was decided through consultation in the conference of the Board of Council on 2 November, 1938, (Exh. 271) was, as was made clear in that conference, carried out because Japan could not continue cooperation with the League and, at the same time, maintain its national dignity.

I made no statements at this Conference.

(g) The conclusion of an agreement between Japan and Germany regarding cultural cooperation which was discussed in the Board of Council Conference on 22 November, 1938, (Exh. 589), it was not Japan's intention to conclude this kind of treaty with Germany only, but with other nations as the circumstances dictated, and contribute to general purposes of diplomacy, and it was evident that it did not have any political meaning.

(h) It is as mentioned before that the policy of adjusting the new relations between Japan and China was discussed in the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 November, 1938, and decided by the Imperial Council on the 30th of the same month. The project of securing Hainan Island, proposed by the Navy at that time, was approved by the same conference as a purely military measure and a temporary one which came about inevitably in order to cut the economic resisting power of China. This gave further effect to the blockade operations, and was hoped that same would accelerate the solution of the incident.

(1) That Japan should pay careful attention regarding the observance of the laws of war in military activities; respect and protect the interests of third powers in China; make it a principle to remove the temporary obstacles made necessary by military operations, and restore former conditions as soon as possible after the war. That Japan would stand by the principle of equal opportunity, was often declared by the Japanese Government, in answer to the complaints of the third powers (among others, America) up to October or November, 1938, and Japan tried faithfully to carry it out.

However, that the third powers pressed Japan for strict observance of treaties which did not conform to the current situation, and utilized it as an excuse for assisting CHIANG, and the tendency of the powers to be against Japan and aid CHIANG became more pronounced.

Thus, the Konoye Cabinet, being unable to accomplish the solving of the problem of securing Sino-Japanese peace, was forced to resign.

(3) When the HIRANUMA Cabinet was organized on January 4, 1939, succeeding to the Konoye Cabinet, I remained as War Minister upon the earnest request of Mr. HIRANUMA. My fundamental attitude as War Minister was the same as when I was in the Konoye Cabinet. As before stated, as it became almost impossible to bring about a speedy peace between Japan and China, there was nothing left to do but to take measures to cope with the existing situation for the purpose of gradually breaking down the Chinese anti-Japanese attitude, and that meant the demonstration, on the one hand, of our determination not to shun even a long war, and, on the other hand, to lay great importance on the principle of urging our policy by measures other than the military activities. Although this doctrine was carried out ever since the end of the Konoye Cabinet, it was intensified in the period of the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

Now, the principal matters dealt with while I was War Minister of the HIRANUMA Cabinet were as follows:

(a) The bill "General Principles of the Replenishment of the Productive Faculties" (Exhibit No. 842), drafted by the Planning Board and approved by the cabinet meeting of January, 1939, was the one previously studied at the War Ministry on the basis of "The Plans of the Replenishment of the Important Industries (5-year Industrial Plan), proposed by the General Staff Office at about April of the 12th year of SHOWA (1937), and transferred to the cabinet council. The real purpose of the plan was to establish Japan's economy, in order to acquire security of national defense against the menace of the Soviet Union, and then secure the safety of Manchukuo in general so that our plans might be realized in accordance with the 5-year plan for the development of Manchurian industries projected by the Government of Manchukuo. But as it had taken a long time in various studies on the plans, the plan was changed to a 4-year plan, and the scope was also diminished, as was testified by the witness OKADA, Kikusaburo (March 30, 22nd year of SHOWA - 1947). Thus, just at the

uncture of our unavoidable change of course to a long period war, our plans were such that they could not keep pace with the new situation.

(b) Referring to the participation of Manchukuo and Hungary in the Anti-Comintern Pact, discussed at the Privy Council on February 22 of the same year (Exhibit No. 491), this much may be said; that, in view of the aim of the Anti-Comintern Pact an increase of participating Powers was always welcome, and, accordingly, Japan merely intended to strengthen the Pact quantitatively so that the level of her international position under the aforementioned circumstances might be raised. Negotiation also under way between Japan and Germany about the method of qualitatively strengthening the spirit of the Anti-Comintern to meet the attitude of the Comintern and the Power behind it - the Soviet Union. I attended this session of the Privy Council, but did not make any statement.

(c) Concerning the story appearing in the Japan Advertiser of March 17 of the same year (Exhibit No. 2200) purporting to report a Diet speech by me, I never made such a speech as appeared in that paper in all my utterances throughout the whole sessions of the 75th Imperial Diet of that year.

(d) Concerning the question of closing the British Settlement at Tientsin, Premier HIRANUMA informed me about June 26 or 27 that the British had made a proposal wishing the question to be carried to diplomatic negotiations at Tokyo, but as the of the Army must be predominant in this affair, he wished to know the intention of the Army before he would have liaised with the Foreign Office authorities. I at once agreed to that proposal. We summoned the representatives from the spot to Tokyo, and had them cooperate in the talk so that the elimination of the differences in views between the authorities at the center and at the spot be effected, thus in endeavoring to lead the parley toward success we achieved our purpose so far as the problem of the public



peace was concerned. On the problem of general principles we also succeeded in the issue of the Anglo-Japanese Joint Declaration on

The problem of the American loan: In view of the success of the Anglo-Japanese talk as above mentioned, I believed that we would eventually find solution of the problems vis-a-vis the British. In regard to our relations with America, I believed that we might perhaps improve them, when the loan negotiations with America, which had been pending since the previous January, carried on by civilians and supported by Mr. HIRANUMA, should succeed.

(f) The problem of Mr. Wang Chaoming: As I felt that a good opportunity was approaching for the realization of peace, I asked Mr. Wang Chao-ming to accelerate the peace movement.

(g) In regard to the NOMONHAN Affairs, I endeavoured, after deliberation with the Supreme Command, and with the consent of the Cabinet, to bring about a speedy settlement, approving the policy of the Kwantung Army, which was to settle the matter locally and defensively.

(h) On the negotiation between Japan, Germany and Italy I thought it was the way to relieve the Japanese from death by suffocation; to save continental China; to elevate the international position of Japan; to cause the Chinese Government to give up her policy of tolerance to communism and resistance to Japan, in order to give the Powers opportunities to turn China to the cause of anti-communism, co-prosperity and co-existence, and at the same time strengthen her defence against the militaristic and communistic menace of Russia in the north.

At the first five-ministers conference of the HIRANUMA cabinet, the counter-proposal of the Foreign Office against the German proposition received at the beginning of January was discussed.

After it was revised to some extent, the proposition was made the instruction, and then the conference decided to send to Europe a group of special envoys composed of persons from the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Office. The essence of the instruction the envoys took with them was as follows:

The main objective was Russia, but Britain and France might sometimes come within the objective, according to situations. Military assistance would be given if the matter concerned Russia. When Britain and France were under consideration, it would depend on the situation. For instance, in case of their being Bolshewized, the matter of military assistance and its extent/<sup>would</sup>subjectively be decided. Another mission of the envoys was to explain it to the world as an extension of the Anti-communistic agreement. Nevertheless, the German side, aiming at the general political effect, requested relaxation of the above limitation of militaristic assistance against Third Powers, except Russia, to which the Japanese Government, after repeated discussions, sent a message from Mr. HIRANUMA to Hitler on May 5 and told him he should appreciate that Japan's situation was such that it could not relax the limitation regarding assistance against Third Powers other than Russia, and asking that Germany concede that point. But just at that time complications gradually began to set in. Mr. Wantiao-ming visited Tokyo (June 1st) and the problem concerning the blockade of the British settlement in Tsintsin occurred (June 14), followed by the attack of Nomonhan (June 15) by Russian and Mongolian troops, while in Europe the situation was threatening on account of the occurrence of the Danzig question.

Meanwhile, in view of there being no alternative but to require Germany to concede, I dispatched Major General Machijiri, the Chief of the War Service Bureau, on 11 August, to request German Attache Ott to make a concession on the part of Germany. However, the conclusion of the non-invasion treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia was officially announced on August 22, and that

ended the matter of the proposed pact. Thus Prime Minister HIRANUMA, on the 23rd, indicated his intention of resigning, and with which I agreed. After presenting our resignations to the Throne, I conferred with the three heads and recommended Lieutenant General Tada, who advocated peace enthusiastically, to become Minister of War. I resigned my post with the resignation of the HIRANUMA cabinet on August 29, 1939, and was appointed as a member of the General Staff (a sinecure office).

V. The period during which I held the office of the Chief of the Staff of the China Expeditionary Army (Sept. 12, 1939 - July 7, 1941).

Throughout the period of my being the War Minister, I was sincerely desirous of restoring an early peace between Japan and China and of evacuating the Japanese forces from the whole Chinese territory. For that purpose, I took every possible measure, and did what I could to attain the object speedily. However, it was regrettable that, on account of the situation, I was obliged to resign my post in the cabinet, leaving the China Incident unsettled.

On September 12, 1939, when the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army was organized, I was unexpectedly appointed as the Chief of Staff under Commander-General Nishio, and left for the post in Nanking, where I remained up to July 7, 1941. Meanwhile, according to the actual situation in the field, I tried strenuously to bring to a speedy settlement the problem of restoration of a peace between Japan and China, which I had been unable to realize while War Minister.

(a) As to our military operations, meantime, there was nothing but small, supplementary operations in order to strengthen the blockade of the supply route to the fighting strength of the Chungking regime. So we tried to secure our occupying areas, maintain public order and stabilize the living of the people.

(b) The collaboration with Wang's Government was chiefly in charge of Ambassador ABE, but the Expeditionary Army gave facilities and assistance to the Ambassador, to the extent that it did not interfere with the military operations. In particular it supported Mr. Wang Chao-ming's "National Salvation Peace Movement" and wished the Nanking Government to aim ultimately at joining with the Chungking Government.

(c) Since the possibility of peace negotiation with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek through the offices of Mr. Sun Tzu-chieh, a younger brother of Mr. Sun Tzu-wen, was found by the Hongkong Organ early in 1940, I supported it most enthusiastically and was ready to meet Mr. Chiang Kai-shek myself in Changsha. In anticipation of its success, I requested the delay of the establishment of Wang's Government, but, despite our wishes, the negotiation ended in a failure.

(d) In January, 1941, Mr. Chang Yen-hsiang, who was then in Peiping, informed me of the desire of Doctor Steward, the President of the Yenching University, to have a talk with me. As I thought it highly desirable to inform Doctor Steward of our attitude of seeking a speedy settlement of the incident, and to obtain his opinion and assistance, based on deep experience, I despatched a member of the staff to get in touch with Doctor Steward, who agreed to convey our wishes to the President of the United States that she would act as a mediator in an endeavor to solve the Sino-Japanese Incident amicably. So I advised the central military authorities to that effect and wished them to earnestly promote peace, but, later on, the American-Japanese negotiation became so aggravated that we could not obtain any result.

(e) The South China Expeditionary Army in Canton was, by orders of the Imperial Headquarters as of July 5, 1940, released from the command of our China Expeditionary Army and placed under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Headquarters. Tow.

the end of September in the same year, a detachment of the South China Expeditionary Army was, by order of Imperial Headquarters, ordered to proceed to North Indo-China. Neither I nor the China Expeditionary Army requested or advised this and we had no control over it or responsibility concerning it.

VI. The period of my being the Commander of the Korean Army (July 7, 1941 - April 8, 1945) and that of my being the Commander of the 7th Area Army (April 8, 1945 - war's end).

(a) I was the Commander of the Korean Army from July, 1941, up to April, 1945.

As the Army had been organized on peacetime footing up to February, 1945, I was not at all concerned in the promotion of the Pacific War. In other words, I had no operational duties concerning the Pacific War, until the Korean Army was reorganized on wartime footing, as the 17th Area Army, and detailed on the service of protecting Korea on January 1, 1945.

As regards the telegram dated February 28, 1942, from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to the Vice Minister of War, requesting the sending of prisoners to Korea, and also the telegram dated March 23, 1942, from the Army Commander to the War Minister, reporting on the plan of accommodating the prisoners, they were both dispatched, sent at the request of the Director-General of the Prisoners Information Bureau, according to the report of Major-General Takahashi, Hiroshi, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army. I have been informed that the purpose was to transport the prisoners from the southern fighting areas to an atmosphere of quietness in the Japan areas. I made it a rule to treat the prisoners fairly, gave them as much in the way of facilities and provisions as possible. I never saw the above-mentioned despatches, did not know of their being sent and did not order them sent.

(b) I was appointed Commander of the 7th Area Army (in Singapore) on April 8, 1945, and took command of the Army there from April 22nd on. The duty of this Army was to defend its defense area, but before we could open hostilities against the enemy, the war came to an end. Such conditions existed that communications with various quarters were destroyed by the allied forces.

Finally, I state positively that I never became a Supreme War Councillor throughout my career.

Def. Doc. 2555

On this 11th day of September, 1947  
at Tokyo

DEPONENT ITAGAKI, Seishiro (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the  
above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed  
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this  
witness.

On the same date  
At the same place

Witness: (Signed) BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

Def. Doc. 2555

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

DEPONENT ITAGAKI, Seishiro (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the  
above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed  
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this  
witness.

On the same date  
At the same place

Witness: (Signed) BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

DEPONENT ITAGAKI, Seishiro (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the  
above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed  
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this  
witness.

Ex 3316

Def. Doc. 2555

FERRATA SHEET

Affidavit of ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Page 31, paragraph (d), please delete the second sentence which begins with the words "At the end of May", and ends with "Japanese navy planes."

Def. Doc. 2555

FERRATA SHEET

Affidavit of ITAGAKI, Seishiro

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ERRATA SHEET

AFFIDAVIT OF: ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Please insert the number "7" at the top of page 9, in front of "The battle".

Page 16, line 2, "Governor or" should read "Governor of".

Also on the same page the last paragraph should be numbered "10" instead of "9".

Page 22, 5th line from the bottom of the page the words "Kwantung Army" should be changed to "Chinese Nationalist Army".

Page 23, beginning with the 3rd paragraph "Judging from the situation" and ending with the words "programs into action" please change as follows:

"Judging from the situation stated above, if the principle of co-prosperity advocated by Japan and Manchukuo should succeed in forcing out the designs of the communist power, Japan, Manchuria and China would be able to pursue permanently the way of prosperity in peace.

Whereas, the three nations would be thrown into the guagmire of war and revolt, if Japan's advocacy should fail and the situation should develop in favor of the communists. The above prospect became all the more probable after the commintern, holding a general meeting at Moscow in July 1935, passed a resolution to concentrate on efforts to overthrow Japan and accomplishing world revolution, and the Chinese Communist party issued a proclamation on the basis of the said resolution, to substitute the principle of "resist Japan and save the Nation movement" for that of "Bolshevize and save the Nation movement", and also by their threat to resort to the tactics of the anti-Japanese united front and announcing its resolution to put these programs into action."

Also on Page 23, the last line change "Manchuria" to read "Manchukuo".

Page 24, 1st line, delete "the ability by real ability" and insert "ourself by:"

Page 24, sentence marked "(c)" should read as follows: "The realization of harmonious co-operation of the races in Manchukuo in order to achieve the above mentioned principles,

Page 24, 1st paragraph under "4" should read thusly: "While I was Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, Manchukuo had many persons of broad views and high personality, such as Premier CHIANG and successive Chiefs of General Bureau. As for me, I trusted and co-operated with them in their policy in accordance with the intentions of my superior officers."

Same page as above, 4th and 5th lines from the bottom of the page, "Manchurian" should read "Manchukuo"; and 3rd line from the bottom "rejection" should be "dismissal".

Page 25, 7th line from top of page "I" should be "We", and add to the end of this sentence the words "and Mongolia",

Page 25, 2nd sentence under "6" should read as follows: "Accordingly the trends in the Outer and Inner Mongolia involved sharp repercussion on the Mongolians living in Manchukuo, and became problems of the domestic peace and of the defense of Manchukuo."

Same page, 20th line from top of page insert after the words "Kwantung Army" the following:  
"dispatched intelligent agents and"

Also on the same page, 7th line from bottom, delete the word "co-prosperity" and insert "local self-government".

Page 26, 3rd line from top of page insert after the word "fortification" the words "of Manchukuo" and in the 4th line insert the year "1935" after "December".

Page 26, 1st sentence under "III" delete the word "personally"; and in the same paragraph, 2nd sentence the word "preparation" should read "administration".

Page 27, 4th line from top the word "train" should be "contingents".

Page 27, at the end of "5" please add the sentence "And thus I tried to enhance the prestige of the Army."

Page 27, the 1st paragraph under number "IV" should begin as follows:  
"1. The circumstances of my appointment as War minister,"

Same page, 2nd line from bottom the words "had been" should be changed to "was".

Page 29, 8th line from top of page delete "finally assumed" and insert "were increasingly assuming".

Page 30, please change paragraph marked "(a)" to read as follows:

"(a) The peace terms to be offered to China should not be so exacting as the ones we had proposed when Mr. TRAUTMAN acted as go-between. Unless the Japanese authorities would mollify the terms and make them more certain and reasonable, it appeared unlikely that the Chinese would accept them. However, both the Japanese public opinion and the Government's policy had still been far from further reducing those terms."

Page 31, 13th line from top, "its" should be changed to "his".

Page 34, 9th line from top of page, please insert after "Navy and War" the words "and Foreign Affairs".

Page 34, lines 12 and 13 from the top, delete the following "co-operation with the Chinese Administrations, to promote".

Same page as above, 15th line from top change "a minimum" to "the minimum"; last 4 lines on page 36 to read as follows: "about inevitably in order to make this blockage operation more effective, and it was hoped that same would accelerate the solution of the incident."

Page 41, 4th line from top, add after "Foreign Office" "They sailed on 2nd February".

DD 井 2555 (訂正表其ノ二)

頁	四三
行	百十二
正	削除
誤	<p>而して五月末、日本海軍機が行          った中南支爆撃に付、米、英、          佛、国政府は日本の行動を批難し          つつあった。</p>
摘要	四三三三削除

辯護側書類第二五五五號  
 板垣征四郎宣誓供述書

訂正表(二)

Ex 3316

Def. Doc. 2555

ERRATA SHEET



Def. Doc. 1947, Page 1, between line 12 and line 13  
insert the following:

"reciprocated by similar attitude on the part of China, and",

Line 13 to be altered and read as follows:

"atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety was thus created.  
A detachment of".

Def. Doc. 1910, page 3, third line from bottom the  
word "attack" should read "attach".

Def. Doc. 2143, page 5 and 6, last 2 lines page 5 and  
1st line page 6 should read as follows:

"The Japanese military clique apparently think they have an  
inexhaustible flow of ingenious stratagem. In reality, it  
is mere obstinacy and stubbornness. They think that".

Def. Doc. 1979, page 3, 9th line from top "that art"  
should be "that part"; line 4 from the bottom of page 4  
after "preparation" add the word "of".

Def. Doc. 2039, page 1, 1st paragraph 2nd line after  
the "Chief of the" add "Staff of the"; page 2, line 9,  
"office" should be "camp"; same applies to the word "office"  
in the 12th line from top; page 5, last line "INOUE" should  
be "IHARA"; same applies to the last line on page 6.

Def. Doc. 2638, page 3, line 4 from top of page, add  
word "oil" between "11 g" and "15-17 g"; page 5, line 15,  
"present" should be "number".

Def. Doc. 2038, page 2, 1st paragraph beginning "One  
of my subordinate" and ending with "the camp chief" should  
be deleted.

Def. Doc. 2606, page 2, paragraph "4", line 3, after  
"took office" add "of minister of".