

1 Mr. Lane: The request of Senator Ferguson at page 13,966
 2 and Congressman Keefe at page 13,996 concerning data appearing
 3 on the log dated December 6, 1941 kept by the Navy Department
 4 Operations Watch Officer, now Rear Admiral Catos D. Glover,
 5 U.S.N., has been replied to by the Navy Department, and we
 6 ask that the information contained therein be spread upon the
 7 record.

8 The Chairman: Be so ordered.

9 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

10 and 13,996, respectively) including the name of Rear Admiral
 11 Cato D. Glover, U.S. Navy, by dispatch #180519 of April 1943
 12 to ascertain his recollection in respect of the incident noted
 13 in the Record of Proceedings at pages 13,946 - 13,947)
 14 written by him in the log of the Operations Watch Officer
 15 on the night of 6 December 1941 at 2331, and his reply by
 16 dispatch #180835 of April 1943 has been received. Photographs
 17 copies of each of these dispatches are forwarded herewith.

18 Rear Admiral Glover is not the holder of any
 19 records in respect of the incident noted in the log. It
 20 will be noted that while he remembered the incident as being
 21 stated at the latter's home between 1941 and 1943 concerning
 22 the northern movement of the Japanese convoy that ultimately
 23 landed near Koto. It may be stated he is unable to recall
 24 the date of 6 December 1941 incident noted in the log, but
 25 he suggests a possible additional source of information
 would be a log kept by the Ship Movement Division.

Insert
11-E

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

JLL 1

1 1083 A
2 R. #168DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

3 WASHINGTON

4 26 April 1946

5 MEMORANDUM

6 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

7 In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson
8 and Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,966
9 and 13,996, respectively) inquiry was made of Rear Admiral
10 Cato D. Glover, U.S. Navy, by dispatch #152019 of April 1946
11 to ascertain his recollection in respect of the item (read
12 into the Record of Proceedings at Pages 13, 946 - 13,947)
13 written by him in the log of the Operations Watch Officer
14 on the night of 6 December 1941 at 2000, and his reply by
15 dispatch #160636 of April 1946 has been received. Photographic
16 copies of each of these dispatches are forwarded herewith.

17 Rear Admiral Glover is not the holder of any
18 records in respect of the incident noted in the log. It
19 will be noted that while he remembers contacting Admiral H. R.
20 Stark at the latter's home between 0000 and 0200 concerning
21 the southern movement of the Japanese convoy that ultimately
22 landed near Kota Baru yet he states he is unable to recall
23 the 2000 of 6 December 1941 incident noted in the log, but
24 that he suggests a possible additional source of information
25 in the form of a "log kept by the Ship Movement Division."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

JLL 2

1 A search has been instituted to identify and locate any such
 2 "log," and also to obtain the other information in respect
 3 of the incident noted in the log which would be responsive
 4 to the further requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Pro-
 5 ceedings, Pages 13,953 and 13,956), referred to in Items #2
 6 and #3 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946. As of the present
 7 time these searches have not been successful but they are not
 8 yet completed. You will be advised by subsequent memorandum of
 9 such event and of the ultimate results.

10 John Ford Baecher

11 Commander, USNR

12 - - - -
 13 NAVAL COMMUNICATION

14 FROM: SECNAV (JAG)

15 TO: COMAIRPAC

16 DATE: 15 APR 1946

17 152019

18 RESTRICTED

19 FOR REAR ADMIRAL CATO D. GLOVER USN X IN CONGRESSIONAL IN-
 20 VESTIGATION OF JAPANESE ATTACK ON PERAL HARBOR QUESTION HAS
 21 ARISEN AS TO WHEREABOUTS OF ADMIRAL H R STARK ON NIGHT
 22 6 DECEMBER 1941 AND ADMIPAL STARK CANNOT RECOLLECT THAT DETAIL
 23 X LOG OF OPNAV DUTY OFFICER FOR 6 DASH 7 DECEMBER 1941
 24 INDICATES YOU STOOD WATCH FROM 1900 to 0200 X THIS LOG
 25 CONTAINS OVER YOUR SIGNATURE THE FOLLOWING ENTRY QUOTE AT 2000

JLL 3

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 MAJOR F L HARRISON COMMA AIDE TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR COMMA
 2 TELEPHONED THAT THE SECRETARY OF WAR DESIRED THE FOLLOWING
 3 INFORMATION BY 0900 SUNDAY 7 DECEMBER COLON COMPILATION OF
 4 MEN OF WAR IN FAR EAST COMMA BRITISH COMMA AMERICAN COMMA
 5 JAPANESE COMMA DUTCH COMMA RUSSIAN COMMA ALSO COMPILATION OF
 6 AMERICAN MEN OF WAR IN PACIFIC FLEET COMMA WITH LOCATIONS
 7 COMMA AND A LIST OF AMERICAN MEN OF WAR IN THE ATLANTIC
 8 WITHOUT LOCATIONS X ADMIRALS INGERSOLL COMMA STARK AND THE
 9 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WERE CONSULTED AND THE SECRETARY
 10 DIRECTED THAT THE INFORMATION BE COMPILED AND DELIVERED TO
 11 HIM PRIOR TO 1000 SUNDAY 7 DECEMBER UNQUOTE X THIS ENTRY DOES
 12 NOT RECALL TO ADMIRAL STARK ANY RECOLLECTION AS TO HIS
 13 WHEREABOUTS X HE ACCEPTS THE ITEM BUT THINKS IT MAY POSSIBLY
 14 BE INACCURATE BECAUSE HE CANNOT SEE WHY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
 15 NECESSARY TO HAVE CONSULTED ALL THREE PAREN INGERSOLL HIMSELF
 16 AND KNOX PAREN IN THE MATTER REFERRED TO X ADVISE BY DISPATCH
 17 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER YOU RECOLLECT CONSULTING ADMIRAL
 18 STARK AS INDICATED COMMA AS WELL AS THE MANNER IN WHICH AND
 19 THE APPROXIMATE TIME YOU CONTACTED HIM AND WHERE HE WAS
 20 LOCATED WHEN REACHED BY YOU X

- - - -

22 FM COMAIRPAC 160636

23 TO SEC

24 P (JAG) WASHN D C

25 RESTRICTED X

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1 I REGRET THAT I AM UNABLE TO RECALL THE INCIDENT REFERRED
 2 TO IN YOUR 152019 X INFORMATION OF THE NATURE REQUESTED BY
 3 THE SECRETARY OF WAR WAS NORMALLY COMPILED BY THE SO CALLED
 4 QUOTE WAR ROOM UNQUOTE WHICH WAS THEN A NEW SECTION OF THE
 5 SHIP MOVEMENTS DIVISION OF OPNAV X THIS SECTION WAS HEADED
 6 BY CAPTAIN FRANK LEIGHTON NOW DECEASED X EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE
 7 ORIGINATING FROM THE WAR ROOM WERE ENTERED IN THE LOG KEPT
 8 BY THE SHIP MOVEMENT DIVISION X IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CAPT
 9 LEIGHTON WAS THE CONSULTANT X I DO REMEMBER VERY DEFINITELY
 10 HAVING TELEPHONED ADMIRAL STARK DURING THE NIGHT CONCERNING
 11 THE MOVEMENTS OF A JAPANESE CONVOY WHICH WAS WEST OF THE
 12 PHILIPPINES HEADED SOUTH X THIS WAS THE CONVOY THAT MADE THE
 13 INITIAL LANDING ON THE MALAY PENINSULA NEAR KOTA BHARU X I
 14 AM CERTAIN THAT THIS CALL WAS MADE AFTER MIDNIGHT AS IT WAS
 15 TOWARD THE END OF THE WATCH AND THAT ADMIRAL STARK WAS THEN
 16 AT HIS HOME X FROM REAR ADMIRAL CATO D GLOVER X

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

- - - -

18 1083 A
 19 R. #173

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

20 WASHINGTON

21 7 May 1946

22 MEMORANDUM

23 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

24 In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson
 25 (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,953 and 13,956) referred to

JLL 5

1 in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 11 April 1946, a
2 thorough search, as heretofore indicated in the memorandum to
3 you from the undersigned dated 26 April 1946 (1083A R#168),
4 has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department to
5 locate the data or document in respect of the compilation of
6 ship locations requested by the Secretary of War on 6 December
7 1941 as noted in the 2000 entry in the log of the watch officer
8 of Naval Operations and for the records used to give that in-
9 formation to the Secretary of War. The search has now been
10 completed but with negative results.

11 There was found, however, a copy of a statement of
12 locations of U. S. Naval forces and foreign naval forces as of
13 7 December 1941, which on comparison is found to be in part the
14 same as or a copy of and in other parts to contain information
15 substantially identical with that stated in the similar docu-
16 ment found in the files of the War Department on the outside
17 sheet of which there appears the notation "Secnav (2) 1000."
18 A study of the two documents indicates that the one found in
19 the files of the Army is most probably a copy of that which
20 was prepared in pursuance of the request noted in the watch
21 officer's log, and which probably was delivered in duplicate
22 to Secretary of the Navy Knox and by him a copy to Secretary
23 Stimson at their conference at 1000 on 7 December 1941, while
24 that now found in the files of the Navy was either a subse-
25 quently typed document of the same date or more probably

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LL 6 1 the rough draft on which was based the final draft of the
 2 document delivered to the Secretary of the Navy. A copy of the
 3 document which has been found in the files of the Navy is
 4 forwarded herewith.

5 Information of the nature reflected in ship loca-
 6 tion summaries such as those referred to above is based on
 7 dispatches and other internal Navy intelligence as to the
 8 locations and movements of United States ships, and on Intel-
 9 ligence Reports and Estimates such as are in the Record of
 10 the Congressional Investigation as to foreign ships.

11 (SGD) John Ford Baecher

12 John Ford Baecher

13 Commander, USNR

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
 14
 15 Mr. Lane: Congressman Murphy at page 7496 of the transcript
 16 requested copies of any report that after a trial a plan for
 17 readiness of aircraft at Hawaii, was abandoned due to wear
 18 on planes and crews. Under date of May 8, 1946 the
 19 Navy Department has replied to this request and we request
 20 that the reply be spread upon the record.

21 The Chairman: So ordered.

22 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)
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AL-34

INSERT
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1070/JFB:ms
R. #182

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

8 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 7496), referred to in Item #7 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department for a report submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the effect that because of the wear and tear on airplane crews and planes there was abandoned after a few days trial at some indefinite time prior to 7 December 1941, a plan whereby all Army and Navy planes, including pursuit planes but excepting search planes, should be warmed up, manned, and ready to take off before sunrise to 0800, and for one hour before and after sunset. No such report could be found.

(SGD) John Ford Baecher

John Ford Baecher

Commander, USNR.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson at page 13,527-13,529 of
 2 the record requested copies of any message sent by Captain
 3 John Creighton, Naval Observer at Singapore, to Admiral T. C.
 4 Hart, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 4, 5 or 6 December,
 5 1941, concerning the sighting of a Japanese convoy south of
 6 Siam.

7 Under date of May 10, 1946 the Navy Department has
 8 replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread
 9 on the record.

10 The Chairman: So ordered.

11 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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JLL 8

1 1070/JFB:ms
2 R. #180

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

3 WASHINGTON

4 10 May 1946

5 MEMORANDUM

6 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

7 In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson
8 (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13527-13529), referred to in
9 Item #20 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough
10 search has been made of the files of the cognizant activity
11 of the Navy Department for the message which Captain John
12 Creighton testified was sent by him on 4, 5, or 6 December
13 1941 from Singapore to Admiral T. C. Hart in respect of
14 information received from the pilot of a British reconnaissance
15 plane that a Japanese convoy had been sighted south of the south
16 point of Siam, headed west, and that Japanese fighter planes
17 had taken off from a Japanese carrier in the escort to pre-
18 vent the British plane from approaching the convoy. No
19 message containing such information could be found in the
20 files of the Navy Department.

21 (SGD) John Ford Baecher
22 John Ford Baecher,
23 Commander, USNR.

1 Mr. Lane: A request of Senator Lucas, at page 152 of
 2 the transcript, concerning long distance reconnaissance from
 3 Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941, the Navy Department,
 4 under date of May 2, 1946, has replied to that request, and
 5 we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

6 The Chairman: Be so ordered.

7 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1083A

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

R#101

Office of the Secretary

R#122

Washington

2 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Senator Lucas (Record of Proceedings, Page 152), the regular air search including the dawn patrol of the fleet operating areas from Oahu was first prescribed on 15 February 1941, by Paragraph 3 (B)(1) of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 of that date, and was put into effect on 25 February 1941, by Paragraph 2 of Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, of that date.

There are enclosed photographic copies of (1) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, dated 15 February 1941, and (2) Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1CM-41, dated 25 February 1941.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baecher
Commander, USNR

2

1 Cinepac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 2 A2-11/FF1/ U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 3 A4-3/QL/(0271) Pearl Harbor, T. H. DESTROYED
 4 February 15, 1941 Cy #5

5 CONFIDENTIAL

6 PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41

7 From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
 8 To: FLEET.
 9 Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
 10 Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
 11 (b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
 12 (c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
 13 (d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
 14 (e) Section 3, Chapter II, U.S.F. 10.
 15 (f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U.S.F. 10.

16 1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by
 17 this letter.

18 2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the
 19 Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

20 (A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke
 21 war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet
 22 or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of
 23 such powers may attempt:

24 (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based
 25 in Pearl Harbor,

3

1 (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor
2 by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,

3 (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches
4 to Pearl Harbor.

5 (B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by;

6 (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.

7 (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in
8 operating area.

9 (3) a combination of these two.

10 3. The following security measures are prescribed here-
11 with, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the
12 Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer
13 Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

14 (A) Maintain continuous patrols:

15 (1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer
16 moored near coal dock.

17 (2) Boom.

18 (3) Harbor.

19 (B) Intermittent patrols:

20 (1) Patrol Wing TWO shall search assigned
21 operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operat-
22 ing forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

23 (2) An off-shore destroyer patrol of three
24 destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or
25 entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a

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1 radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by
2 the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by
3 Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force
4 Commander.

5 (3) An air patrol shall be established at least
6 two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search
7 that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the en-
8 trance channel buoys which is South of latitude $21^{\circ} - 20' N$.
9 This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship
10 or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Office Present Afloat
11 of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie
12 Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander
13 entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the
14 Task Force Commander entering.

15 (4) Daily sweep. Sweep for magnetic and
16 anchored mines.

17 (C) Operating areas:

18 (1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters
19 (U.S.C. & G.S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters.
20 Observe requirements of reference (e).

21 (2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor
22 they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned
23 destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each
24 task force shall be organized offensively and defensively.
25 These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port

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1 and shall provide for the following:

2 (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and
3 attack hostile submarines.

4 (b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships
5 in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the
6 priority:

7 Priority 1 - BBs

8 Priority 2 - CVs

9 Priority 3 - CAs

10 Priority 4 - CLs

11 (c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier
12 (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing
13 TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

14 (d) A concentration of operating submarines
15 preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

16 (D) Sortie and Entrance:

17 (1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.

18 (2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above,
19 shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander ex-
20 cept when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be
21 established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task
22 Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the
23 command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task
24 Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task
25 Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released

6

1 by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of sortie
2 only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry
3 or successive sortie and entry.

4 (3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be
5 energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the En-
6 trance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander
7 Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship
8 without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which
9 the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty
10 fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

11 (E) Conditions of ships at sea:

12 (1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor
13 in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected
14 anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat
15 patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored
16 as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

17 (2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if di-
18 rected by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for dis-
19 position or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

20 (3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar
21 as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating
22 alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not em-
23 ployed in plane guarding.

24 (4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on
25 torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness

7

1 in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges
2 ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially
3 directed.

4 (5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equi-
5 valent, in all ships.

6 (6) Steam darkened at night in defensive dis-
7 position either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

8 (7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required
9 for carrying out operations.

10 (8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

11 (9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in
12 the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prear-
13 ranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or
14 for services to other types.

15 (10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall
16 be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and
17 M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may
18 request additional areas from the officer responsible for
19 assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the
20 general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all
21 Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. While submarines are operat-
22 ing submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on
23 the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

24 (11) Except as specifically directed for exercise
25 purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered

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1 in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

2 (12) Submarines may anchor in the following
3 places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahu-
4 lui, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

5 (13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they
6 have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed sub-
7 marine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface
8 task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly no-
9 tified thereof.

10 (F) Condition of ships in port:

11 (1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall
12 carry out applicable measures, outlined in references (b), (c)
13 and (d).

14 (G) Defense against air attack:

15 (1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense
16 of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries
17 which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an
18 approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the
19 middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the
20 Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these
21 stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the
22 circle of three-inch gun positions.

23 (2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any
24 part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-
25 based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I - Berths F2-F8, K2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).

Sector II - Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths).

Sector III - Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).

Sector IV - Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port.

10 1 He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for
2 this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall nor-
3 mally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

4 (5) The Senior Officer Present in sector pre-
5 scribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Command-
6 er, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

7 (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is
8 the Naval Base Defense Officer (N.B.D.O.). As such he will:

9 (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervi-
10 sory control over the defense against air attack.

11 (b) Arrange with the Army to have their
12 anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

13 (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval
14 shore-based aircraft arranging through Commander Patrol Wing
15 TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort between the Army
16 and Navy.

17 (d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire
18 with the base defense by;

19 (1) Advising the Senior Officer Em-
20 barked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief,
21 U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

22 (2) Holding necessary drills.

23 (3) Giving alarms for: attack, black-
24 out signal, all clear signal.

25 (4) Informing the Task Force Commander

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1 at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

2 (5) Arranging communication plan.

3 (6) Notify all naval agencies of the

4 air alarm signal prescribed.

5 (7) The following naval base defense conditions
6 of readiness are prescribed:

7 Condition I - General Quarters in all ships. Condition of
8 aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense
9 Officer.

10 Condition II - One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships
11 in each sector manned and ready. Condition of
12 aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense
13 Officer.

14 Condition III- Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned
15 sector) of at least one ship in each sector
16 manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required
17 for each sector). Condition of aircraft as pre-
18 scribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

19 (8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in
20 event of a night attack.

21 (9) In event of an air attack, the following
22 procedure will be followed by the task forces:

23 (a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.

24 (1) Direct destroyers to depart as
25 soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

12 1

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

3

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

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(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

7

(b) Task Force Commander operating at sea.

8

(1) Despatch striking unit.

9

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

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11

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

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(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

14

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(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

16

17

(c) Naval Base Defense Officer.

18

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

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(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

22

23

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

13

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units

2 available.

3 (H) Action to be taken if submarine attacks in
4 operating area:

5 (1) In the event of a submarine attack in the
6 operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

7 (a) Ship Attacked. Proceed in accordance
8 with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language des-
9 patch, urgent precedence, containing essential details and ad-
10 dressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure
11 rapid delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the at-
12 tacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present
13 in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio
14 Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval
15 District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is
16 damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at
17 best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using
18 zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

19 Ships other than one attacked.

20 (b) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum
21 speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not
22 approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder
23 of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to
24 enable them to join quickly.

25 (c) Carriers. Same as for battleships,

14

1 except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed.
2 Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed.
3 (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become
4 available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol
5 as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

6 (d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships,
7 except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for
8 own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of
9 attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol
10 for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its
11 own inner air patrol.

12 (e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at
13 maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive
14 action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned.
15 Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for de-
16 parture. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Re-
17 port to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

18 (f) Submarines. Surface if submerged. Re-
19 main in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until
20 directed otherwise.

21 (g) Minecraft. Augment screening units as
22 directed by Task Force Commander.

23 (h) Base Force. If ship attacked is
24 damaged, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best
25 speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts

15

1 abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie
2 on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing
3 vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of
4 attack.

5 (i) Patrol Wing TWO. Assume readiness for
6 offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force
7 Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius
8 from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next suc-
9 ceeding daylight period.

10 (j) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to
11 relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl
12 Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instruction issued by
13 Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

14 (k) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor
15 Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive
16 damaged ship(s) for repair.

17 (l) S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare
18 destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure
19 of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at
20 sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force
21 Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

22 (m) Task Force Commander at sea. Co-
23 ordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate de-
24 fensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and
25 issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the

16

1 Task Force.

2 (2) It must be remembered that a single attack
3 may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines await-
4 ing to attack.

5 (3) It must be remembered too that a single
6 submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable
7 surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by
8 a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble
9 his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight condi-
10 tions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy
11 ships that may be located by air search or other means.

12 H. E. KIMMEL

13 DISTRIBUTION:

14 (List II, Case 1):

15 O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3;

16 NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

17 P. C. Crosley

18 Flag Secretary.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

17

1 CINC File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 2 A2-11/FF1/ U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.
 3 A4-3/QL/0312 Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
 4 25 February 1941

5 CONFIDENTIAL

6 PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 1CM-41

7 From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
 8 To: FLEET.
 9 Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating
 10 Areas - Measures to be effective.

11 Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

12 1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, directs
 13 that the following security measures of reference (a) be ef-
 14 fective as of the date of this letter.

15 2. Paragraph numbers herein correspond with those in re-
 16 ference (a).

17 (A) (1).

18 Channel Entrance and ready duty destroyer - administered
 19 by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished
 20 by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

21 (A) (2).

22 Boom - administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District
 23 with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships
 24 present.

25 (A) (3).

18

1 Harbor - administered by Commander Base Force with ser-
 2 vices furnished by Commander Battle Force, from all ships pre-
 3 sent.

4 (B) (1) (2) (3).

5 (B) (4).

6 Administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with
 7 own services. Commander Base Force will augment if so requested
 8 by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

9 (C) (1).

10 (C) (2) (a) (b) (c) (d).

11 Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander
 12 will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment
 13 permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

14 (D) (1) (2) (3).

15 (E) (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13).

16 (F).

17 The provisions of reference (b).

18 (G).

19 Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be
 20 as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding
 21 General, Hawaiian Department.

22 (H).

23 Entire article.

24 3. Force Commanders and Commandant Fourteenth Naval
 25 District will issue the necessary orders to make these

19

1 measures effective.

2

H. E. KIMMEL.

3

DISTRIBUTION: (List II, Case 1).

4

O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

5

/s/ P. C. Crosley

6

P. C. CROSLY,

7

Flag Secretary.

8

9

AL-37

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

10

Mr. Lane: On the last page of Exhibit 160, reference

11

is made to a statement by the late President Roosevelt con-

12

cerning a report from a Captain Smith. The Navy Department

13

was asked to identify this Captain Smith, upon request of

14

Senator Ferguson, and under date of May 9, 1946, the Navy

15

Department has advised that this officer was then Lieutenant

16

Commander now Commander C. D. Smith, U.S.N.R., Commanding

17

Officer, USS WAKE, and we ask that the full reply of the Navy

18

Department be spread on the record.

19

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

20

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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12-D

gibs-1
P.H.
5/23/46

14,572

1 1070/JFB:ms DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
2 R#174 Office of The Secretary
3 WASHINGTON

4 9 May 1946

5 MEMORANDUM

6 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

7 In response to the request of Senator Ferguson of 16 April
8 1946, forwarded by your memorandum of 19 April 1946, the Captain
9 Smith referred to on the last page of the 13 December 1941 memo-
10 randum of the remarks made by the President on 7 December 1941,
11 on the occasion of the meeting of the Cabinet was then Lieuten-
12 ant Commander (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U.S.N.R., Commanding
13 Officer, U.S.S. WAKE (River Gunboat). The U.S.S. WAKE was
14 captured by the Japanese at Shanghai, China, and Captain Smith
15 was taken prisoner. He escaped from a Japanese prison camp in
16 China and returned to naval jurisdiction in November 1944.

17 The phone call from the Japanese received by Captain Smith,
18 which President Roosevelt mentioned, was reported to the State
19 Department in a message filed by Consul General Stanton with
20 Radio Shanghai at 2210 (10:10 P.M.) 7 December 1941 (Greenwich
21 Civil Time), which was 1710 (5:10 P.M.), 7 December 1941,
22 Washington local time and 6:10 A.M., 8 December 1941, Shanghai
23 local time. The message was received in Washington at 1913
24 7:13 P.M.) 7 December 1941, Washington local time. A photo-
25 static copy of the message is enclosed herewith.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The following is a chronological summarization of the events surrounding the phone call and receipt of knowledge of it in Washington.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1. 07:13 AM - [Faint text]
 2. 07:15 AM - [Faint text]
 3. 07:18 AM - [Faint text]
 4. 07:20 AM - [Faint text]
 5. 07:25 AM - [Faint text]
 6. 07:30 AM - [Faint text]
 7. 07:35 AM - [Faint text]
 8. 07:40 AM - [Faint text]
 9. 07:45 AM - [Faint text]
 10. 07:50 AM - [Faint text]
 11. 07:55 AM - [Faint text]
 12. 08:00 AM - [Faint text]
 13. 08:05 AM - [Faint text]
 14. 08:10 AM - [Faint text]
 15. 08:15 AM - [Faint text]
 16. 08:20 AM - [Faint text]
 17. 08:25 AM - [Faint text]
 18. 08:30 AM - [Faint text]
 19. 08:35 AM - [Faint text]
 20. 08:40 AM - [Faint text]
 21. 08:45 AM - [Faint text]
 22. 08:50 AM - [Faint text]
 23. 08:55 AM - [Faint text]
 24. 09:00 AM - [Faint text]
 25. 09:05 AM - [Faint text]

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Local Time and Date

<u>Event</u>	:	<u>In Greenwich</u>	:	<u>In Washington</u>	:	<u>In Hawaii</u>	:	<u>In Shanghai</u>	:
Attack on P.H. started.	:	071820 : 6:20 pm 7th	:	071320 : 1:20 pm 7th	:	070750 : 7:50 am 7th	:	080220 : 2:20 am 8th	:

Elapsed time between attack and phone call: 1 hour, 55 minutes.

<u>Call received by Capt. Smith.</u>	:	072015 : 8:15 pm 7th	:	071515 : 3:15 pm 7th	:	070945 : 9:45 am 7th	:	080415 : 4:15 am 8th	:
--------------------------------------	---	----------------------	---	----------------------	---	----------------------	---	----------------------	---

Elapsed time between call and filing message: 1 hour, 55 minutes.

<u>Message filed in Shanghai.</u>	:	072210 : 10:10 pm 7th	:	071710 : 5:10 pm 7th	:	071140 : 11:40 am 7th	:	080610 : 6:10 am 8th	:
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Elapsed time between filing message and receipt in Wash. 2 hrs. 3 min.

<u>Message received in Washington</u>	:	080013 : 12:13 am 8th	:	071913 : 7:13 pm 7th	:	071343 : 1:43 pm 7th	:	080813 : 8:13 am 8th	:
---------------------------------------	---	-----------------------	---	----------------------	---	----------------------	---	----------------------	---

Elapsed time between receipt in Wash. and mention by Pres. 2 hrs. 17 min.

<u>Phone call mntd. by President.</u>	:	080230 : 2:30 am 8th	:	072130 : 9:30 pm 7th	:	071600 : 4:00 pm 7th	:	081030 : 10:30 am 8th	:
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/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

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NPB 1535 RDO SHANGHAI CK XX GOVT STATE PRIORITY SEVENTH 2210
GOVT STATE SECSTATE WASHN INFO AMEMBASSIES CHUNGKING PEIPING
NANKING AMCONSULS HANKOW HONGKONG SWATOW AMOY CANTON CHEFOO
TSINGTAO
CAPTAIN C D SMITH COMMANDING USS WAKE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL
AT FOUR FIFTEEN THIS MORNING PERIOD A JAPANESE NAVAL OFFICER
STATED QUOTE A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN MY COUNTRY AND YOURS
AND I AM TAKING CONTROL OF WAKE UNQUOTE PERIOD ALL COMMUNICATIONS
WITH WAKE CUT OFF AND NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE
REGARDING HER PERIOD HMS PETEREL SMALL BRITISH GUNBOAT BLEW UP
AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME PERIOD JAPANESE IN CONTROL OF WATERFRONT
BUT HAVE NOT TAKEN OVER SETTLEMENT OR FRENCH CONCESSION CITY
QUIET PARA ALL CONFIDENTIAL CODES AND PAPERS DESTROYED INCLUDING
THOSE ABOARD WAKE EXCEPT DITOF

STANTON

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Mr. Lane: Request of Senator Ferguson at page 11,220 of the transcript, concerning time of interception and translation of a message from Berlin to Tokyo, Serial 1405, mentioned in a series of dispatches by Captain Kramer in his testimony before the committee, the War Department under date of May 1, 1946 and the Navy Department under date of April 15, 1946 have replied to this request, and we ask that their replies be spread upon the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

by the Signal Intelligence Service on 5 December 1941, but was not decoded and translated until 10 December 1941.

/s/ Robert M. Rife
ROBERT M. RIFE
Capt., AUS

10234(JFB) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington
15 April 1946

MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Records of Proceedings, page 11,220), referred to in Item 18 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, it has been ascertained that the Berlin to Tokyo message 1405 was intercepted and translated by

Insert
12-E

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

1 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON

With reference to the question raised by Senator Ferguson on page 11,220 of the transcript as to whether Message No. 1405 from Berlin to Tokyo was received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a search of the files of the Signal Intelligence Service discloses that the message was dated 2 December 1941, was received by the Signal Intelligence Service on 5 December 1941, but was not decoded and translated until 20 December 1941.

/s/ Robert M. Diggs

ROBERT M. DIGGS

Capt., AUS

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

1083A(JFB)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

R#148

Office of the Secretary

Washington

15 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, page 11,220), referred to in Item 16 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, it has been ascertained that the Berlin to Tokyo message #1405 was intercepted and translated by

1 the Army, and therefore the files of the Navy do not indicate
 2 whether it was received before the Japanese attack on Pearl
 3 Harbor on 7 December 1941.

4 /s/ John Ford Baecher

5 JOHN FORD BARCHER

6 Commander, USNR

AL-39
 WLC

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

7
 8
 9 Mr. Lane: At page 9671 of the transcript Congressman
 10 Murphy requested monthly reports from the Interceptor Station
 11 at Winter Harbor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Maryland, for
 12 November and December 1941. Under date of May 3, 1946 the
 13 Navy Department replied to this request and we ask that the
 14 reply be spread on the record.

15 The Chairman: So ordered.

16 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

INSERT
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1 1083A DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 2 R#183 Office of the Secretary
 3 Washington
 4 3 May 1946

5 MEMORANDUM

6 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

7 In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of
 8 Proceedings Page 9671), referred to in Item #13 of your memorandum
 9 of 29 March 1946, the November and December 1941 Monthly Reports
 10 of the Navy Intercept Stations at Winter Harbor, Maine and at
 11 Cheltenham, Maryland were taken on several occasions by the under-
 12 signed to the regular daily hearings of the Joint Congressional
 13 Committee.

14 At one such time it was explained to Congressman Murphy
 15 that in addition to the material referred to in the testimony of
 16 Captain Safford (Record of Proceedings Page 9672) those reports
 17 contained considerable technical and operational data which were
 18 pertinent to the Pearl Harbor inquiry and which the Navy desired
 19 not to be disclosed for important reasons of security. On receiv-
 20 ing that information Congressman Murphy quickly acceded to the
 21 request of the Navy and stated that he was desirous of cooperating
 22 to the fullest extent to preserve the security of the data re-
 23 ferred to and that he would be satisfied to obtain for the Record
 24 a statement that the Monthly Reports were physically present in
 25 the Navy Department and available to authorized persons at that

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 time and had been since 1941. The desired statements in the
 2 affirmative were made by the undersigned in behalf of the Navy
 3 Department in answer to questions put by Congressman Murphy on
 4 16 February 1946 (Record of Proceedings Pages 12,640 - 12,641),
 5 and, to the extent it may be deemed necessary, those statements
 6 are confirmed.

7 In view of the above it is believed the request of Congress-
 8 man Murphy has been complied with to his satisfaction. If this
 9 assumption is not true please advise and any further desired
 10 information will be supplied.

11 /s/ John Ford Baecher
 12 John Ford Baecher
 13 Commander, USNR

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AL-40
 WLC

15 Mr. Lane: Request of Senator Ferguson and Congressman
 16 Murphy, page 13,856 of the transcript, for copies of corres-
 17 pondence between Admiral Kimmel and President Truman concerning
 18 the examination of certain Navy Department files. Under
 19 date of April 26, 1946 the Navy has furnished the information
 20 requested and we ask that the material be spread on the record.

21 The Chairman: So ordered.

22 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

23 INSERT
 23 13-A

24
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Office of the Secretary

Washington

26 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murthy (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,856 and 13,857), referred to in Item #1 of your memorandum of 19 April 1946 for copies of the exchange of correspondence between Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired) and President Truman there are enclosed copies of the following:

- (1) Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to the President dated 13 November 1945.
- (2) Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of the Navy dated 29 November 1945.
- (3) Letter from the President to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 29 November 1945.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
Commander, USNR

J1
13-A

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 1N90 Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

13 November 1945

My dear Mr. President:

I have been informed that there are in the files of the Director of Naval Communications of the Navy Department copies of despatches forwarded by the White House to London and other cities, in 1941.

I submitted a request to the Chief of Naval Operations under date of 8 November 1945 that I be given access to these files for examination, with the view to selecting individual despatches in those files that relate to Pearl Harbor and to the events leading thereto, and this for the purpose of obtaining photostat copies thereof for use in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee.

I have been orally informed today that this request to you is necessary for your approval before I may be given access to these files. I am, therefore, submitting this request to you through the Secretary of the Navy.

Very respectfully,

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.)

To the President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

29 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Navy:

Replying to your memorandum dated 23 November 1945, forwarding a request from Rear Admiral Kimmel for access to confidential files of the Navy Department for use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, access to files that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack is made available to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of October 23, 1945, to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and to the Joint Chief of Staff.

I have found it necessary to lay down a policy that confidential files of the Department may not be available for examination by individuals.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have sent to Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ Harry Truman

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Mr. Lane: On the request of Senator Brewster, page 8208,
 2 for any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
 3 on the report of the Roberts Commission, the Navy Department
 4 has replied under date of April 26, 1946 on this request and
 5 we ask that the reply of the Navy Department be spread on the
 6 record.

7 The Chairman: So ordered.

8 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

Insert
13-B

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 1083A
2 R#109

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

3 Office of the Secretary

4 Washington

5 26 April 1946

6 MEMORANDUM

7 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

8 Response to the request of Senator Brewster (Record
9 of Proceedings, Pages 8208-8211), referred to in Item #10
10 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, was made by prior memo-
11 randum to Counsel for the Committee dated 21 January 1946
12 (File 1083A R#109), which advised that no record had been
13 found in the Navy Department of any report made by the Judge
14 Advocate General of the Navy on the report of the Roberts
15 Commission. Further search has not disclosed any such Report.

16 However, there was prepared by an officer on the working
17 level in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
18 a rough draft from which were typed smooth copies constituting
19 what that officer conceived as a statement of possible charges
20 and specifications in respect of Rear Admiral Husband E.
21 Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired), but as to which no record has
22 been found indicating it was ever approved or passed on by
23 either the Judge Advocate General of the Navy or the Secretary
24 of the Navy and which, therefore, never became a part of
25 the official records nor a document of the Navy. In the
event this paper may be considered at all responsive to the

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 request of Senator Brewster, or in case either you or the
2 Committee may have any interest in it, a carbon copy is
3 forwarded herewith.

4 /s/ John Ford Baecher

5 Commander, USNR

6 - - -

7 NAVJAG-63-B

8 OO-Kimmel, Husband E./A17-20

9 NAVY DEPARTMENT

10 Washington, D. C.

11 To: Judge Advocate, General Court-Martial,

12 Subject: Charges and specifications in case of Rear Admiral
13 Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

14 1. The above-named officer will be tried before the
15 general court-martial of which you are judge advocate, upon
16 the following charges and specifications. You will notify
17 the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused
18 of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses,
19 both for the prosecution and the defense.

20 CHARGE 1

21 CULPABLE INEFFICIENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

22 . SPECIFICATION

23 In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy,
24 Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in
25 Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S.

1 Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel while so
2 serving as the said commander in chief to take all prac-
3 ticable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for
4 battle, did, in Hawaiian waters, from about 1 February 1941
5 to 7 December 1941, while so serving as aforesaid, fail to
6 issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary
7 to keep the ships of his, the said Kimmel's, command ready
8 for battle, as it was his duty to do, by reason of which
9 inefficiency an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941
10 resulted in a number of the said ships being damaged and
11 destroyed.

12 CHARGE II

13 NEGLIGENCE IN OBEYING ORDERS

14 SPECIFICATION

15 In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy,
16 Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in
17 Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S.
18 Navy, having, in Hawaiian waters, on or about 27 November
19 1941, been lawfully ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations
20 to execute a defensive deployment of forces under his command
21 in preparation for carrying out war tasks, did, during the
22 period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941,
23 at the place aforesaid, neglect and fail to make appropriate,
24 adequate, and timely defensive deployment of naval forces
25 under his command preparatory for carrying out war tasks

1 as required by the imminence of hostilities and in obedience
2 to the aforesaid orders, and as a result of which neglect
3 and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7
4 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of
5 the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

6 CHARGE III

7 NEGLECT OF DUTY

8 SPECIFICATION I

9 In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy,
10 Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in
11 Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S.
12 Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel, while so
13 serving as said commander in chief, to protect the territory
14 within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier against hostile
15 expeditions, and he, the said Kimmel, well knowing of the
16 possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States, did,
17 in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about 16 October
18 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to protect
19 the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier
20 against hostile expeditions, as it was his duty to do, by
21 neglecting and failing to provide and cause to be provided
22 a proper and sufficient distant reconnaissance although
23 means were available for such reconnaissance, as a result
24 of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by
25 Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy instal-

1 lations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged
2 and destroyed.

3 SPECIFICATION 2

4 In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy,
5 Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in
6 Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S.
7 Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with
8 the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense
9 of the Hawaiian coastal frontier and well knowing of the
10 possibility of a surprise attack by Japan on the United
11 States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about
12 27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail
13 to consult, confer and cooperate with the aforesaid commanding
14 general with respect to measures to be taken under the then
15 existing plans for joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal
16 frontier and the adaptation of the said plans in whole or
17 in part as required by the imminence of hostilities, as
18 it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result
19 of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by
20 Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy instal-
21 lations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged
22 and destroyed.

23 SPECIFICATION 3

24 In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U.S. Navy,
25 Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch on or about 24 November 1941 that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility, and on or about 27 November 1941, that negotiations with Japan had ended and Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days, and on or about 29 November 1941 that Japanese action was unpredictable and hostilities on their part were momentarily possible, did, in Hawaiian waters, neglect and fail to consult and confer with the said commanding general with respect to the meaning and intent of the warnings issued by the said despatches and the appropriate measures of defense required by the indicated imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

SPECIFICATION 4

In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired, while serving on active duty as the Commander in

1 Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral,
2 U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible
3 with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the
4 defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having on or
5 about 27 November 1941 been informed by the Chief of Naval
6 Operations by despatch that negotiations with Japan had
7 ended and that Japan was expected to make an aggressive
8 move within a few days and that said despatch was to be
9 considered a war warning, did, in Hawaiian waters, between
10 said date and 7 December 1941 neglect and fail to put into
11 effect within his command a state of alert and of readiness
12 such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the
13 said despatch, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do,
14 in that a distant reconnaissance was not inaugurated and
15 maintained and shore batteries of the Navy and antiaircraft
16 artillery on board vessels of the fleet were not manned and
17 supplied with ammunition, and as a result of which neglect
18 and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on
19 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of
20 the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.

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Mr. Lane: In response to the request of Congressman Keefe, page 11,033 of the record, the Navy Department has replied to the request, concerning the location of certain cards in respect of the winds code, and we ask that the Navy Department reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows.)

Insert
13-C

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

1083A(HLB)
R#165

Office of the Secretary

Washington

23 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings, page 11033), referred to in item 15 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a thorough search of the pertinent files of the cognizant activity of the Navy Department has been made to find the cards in respect of the winds code which were prepared at the direction of Rear Admiral Noyes, and no information or material of the type described has been found.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,

Commander, USNR.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Mr. Lane: In respect to the request of Senator Ferguson
2 for information as to the number of airplanes sent to Hawaii
3 and the Philippines during the period 1 February 1941 to 7
4 December 1941, in the transcript at page 12,997, by reply
5 dated April 22, 1946 the Navy Department has furnished this
6 information and it has been included in Exhibit 172 of the
7 committee.

8 Mr. Murphy: In connection with that I would like for
9 the record to show that there are letters in the President's
10 file that are pertinent to that very question, letters from
11 Secretary Stimson to the President and from the President to
12 the Secretary, in regard to the planes to be sent to Hawaii.

13 The Chairman: Go ahead.

14 Mr. Lane: In response to Senator Ferguson's request
15 at page 13,995, for the various messages noted in the Operations
16 Watch Officer log, the Navy Department, under date of April 22,
17 supplied this material, and it has been made Exhibit 162-A.

18 At page 14,064 of the transcript, a memorandum from the
19 Navy Department concerning the notes and drafts of Admiral
20 Inglis' statement before this committee was spread on the
21 record. A correction of the Navy Department memorandum has
22 been received under date of 18 April 1946. We ask that the
23 correction be spread on the record.

24 The Chairman: So ordered.

25 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

1083A(JFB)
R101
123

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

18 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In respect of the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, pages 200-201) concerning the drafts and notes assembled in connection with the preparation of the statement of Admiral Inglis, my previous memorandum (dated 25 January 1946, R#101, 123)(Record of Proceedings, page 14,065) erroneously advised as to the date when the final draft was completed and the work material destroyed. The date of the occurrence of those events was 14 November 1945 and not 24 November 1945.

/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.

Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson requested whether or not the Opnav dispatch 061743, December 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, was a priority message. The Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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gs:1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

16 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of proceedings, page 7812) referred to in Item 8 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Dispatch 061743 of December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac for action and to CinCAF for information, was sent with deferred precedence.

This message, as indicated in part in my memorandum (1083A (HLB) R#105 dated 29 January 1946) to you, was transmitted from Washington to radio Honolulu on 6 December 1941 at 2254 Greenwich Time, which was 1754 Washington Local Time and 1224 Hawaiian Time (10:54 PM Greenwich Time, 5:54 PM Washington Local Time and 12:24 PM Hawaiian Time) all of 6 December. Since this message was transmitted by radio, it was received in Honolulu at the moment of transmission. No record has yet been found at Pearl Harbor indicating the exact time of delivery of the message to Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAECHE

Commander, USNR.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson's request, at page 207 of
 2 the transcript, for records relating to the phrase "provide
 3 necessary escort" in the dispatch marked Exhibit No. 3 of
 4 this committee, has been answered by a reply of the Navy
 5 Department dated the 17th of April, 1946. We ask that this
 6 reply be spread on the record.

7 The Chairman. So ordered.

8 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

9
 10 In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record
 11 of Proceedings, Page 207), referred to in item 1 of your memo-
 12 randum of 23 March 1946, the direction in dispatch 252307 of
 13 November 1941 from COMNAV to COM12 for police and guard
 14 duty, COM12 and COM13 for information (Cong. Inv. Exhibit 2),
 15 reading "COM12 and COM13 provide necessary escort", which
 16 follows the instruction for the routing of all trans-Pacific
 17 shipping through the Torres Straits, is said Navy policy
 18 whereby it was indicated to the Fleet Commander that they should
 19 detail as a protective escort such ships as in their discretion
 20 they considered necessary to accomplish the purpose of guarding
 21 the trans-Pacific shipping in question from any unprovoked
 22 or aggressive attack.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

R#124
(JFB-efb)
(1070)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

17 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 207), referred to in item 1 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the direction in dispatch 252203 of November 1941 from OpNav to Coml2 for action and to CinCPac, CinCaf, Coml4 and Coml6 for information (Cong. Inv. Exhibit 3), reading "CinCPac and CinCaf provide necessary escort", which follows the instruction for the routing of all trans-Pacific shipping through the Torres Straits, is usual Navy phraseology whereby it was indicated to the Fleet Commanders that they should detail as a protective escort such ships as in their discretion they considered necessary to accomplish the purpose of guarding the trans-Pacific shipping in question from any unfriendly action or aggressive attack.

/s/ JOHN FORD BAESCHER,
Commander, USNR.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Lane: In reference to page 14,127 and page 14,129 information was recorded as received from the Navy Department concerning the time of Japanese attacks in various Pacific locations at the outbreak of war. This additional information has been received from the Navy Department and we ask that it be added to the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

Insert
14-A

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

R-18

1 1083A(HLB)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

2 R#112

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

3 WASHINGTON

4 17 April 1946

5
6 MEMORANDUM

7 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

8 Subject: Time Table of Japanese Attacks - source of material.

9 Reference is made to my memorandum file 1083A R#112
10 dated 4 April 1946 (Record of Proceedings, pages 14127-14129),
11 in which the times of the Japanese attacks at Clark Field, P. I.,
12 and Nichols Field, Manila (Record of Proceedings, page 14129)
13 were reported to be 9:27 am (December 8th, local time) and
14 3:00 am (December 9th, local time).

15 Further and later information received from the War
16 Department now places the times of the attacks at these places
17 as follows:

18 <u>Place</u>	<u>Local time</u>	<u>Greenwich time</u>	<u>Washington time</u>
19 Clark Field, P.I.	Between	Between	Between
20	12:17 and	4:17 and	11:17 and
21	12:20 pm	4:20 am	11:20 pm
22	Dec. 8th	December 8th	December 7th
23 Nichols Field,	3:15 am	7:15 pm	2:15 pm
24 Manila	Dec. 9th	Dec. 8th.	Dec. 8th

25 /s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER
Commander, USNR

1 Mr. Lane: Congressman Murphy's request at page 12,635
 2 of the transcript, the Navy has supplied four intercepted
 3 dispatches, in response to that request, mentioned in the
 4 statement of Captain L. F. Safford, and Opnav dispatch No.
 5 282301 also requested at that time has been included as a
 6 part of Exhibit.No. 142 of this committee, and we ask that
 7 the four dispatches be included in the record now.

8 The Chairman: So ordered.

9 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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(In your memorandum of 23 March 1941, there are enclosed herewith copies of the following documents:

- (a) No. 843, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941.
- (b) Serial 1197, Washington to Tokyo, 27 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6908).
- (c) Serial 482, Tokyo to Tokyo, 10 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6982).
- (d) Serial 768, Tokyo to Tokyo, 29 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6981).

/s/ John Ford Bascher
 JOHN FORD BASCHER
 Commander, USNR

Insert
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington

1083A(JFB) 15 April 1946

R#172

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, page 12635), referred to in Item 17 in your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are enclosed herewith copies of the following documents:

- (a) No. 843, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941.
- (b) Serial 1197, Washington to Tokyo, 27 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6908).
- (c) Serial 482, Rio to Tokyo, 30 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6982).
- (d) Serial 768, Rome to Tokyo, 29 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6981).

/s/ John Ford Baecher

JOHN FORD BAECHER

Commander, USNR

Encls. (4)

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FROM: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6 p.m.	To Pacific Coast	JVJ	12275
6:30 p.m.	To Western Hemisphere	JUO	9430 and
		JVJ	12275
7:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JVJ	12275
8:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
9:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
10:00 p.m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160
10:30 p.m.	To Europe	JHP	11980

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D C

JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

Encl (A)

- - - - -

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#1197

Re your #798* and #843**.

Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence

1 information - Morse code - broadcast) being weak, we desire
 2 that you change these to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP
 3 (13,065 kilocycles), the change to be made immediately.

4 Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast)
 5 so arrange to use above wave length for this, too.

6 Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be
 7 heard at all.

8
 9 * JD-1: 6658 - Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing
 10 troops from Southern Indo-China.

11 * JD-1: 6899 - Tokyo broadcast schedule.

12
 13 JD-1:

SECRET

Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)

14 ENCL (B)

15 - - - - -

16 From: Rio (Ishii)

17 To: Tokyo

18 November 30, 1941.

19 Purple.

20 #482.

21 I am making a general test of the reception of dispatches,
 22 and find that at present we cannot receive the 10:30 P.M.
 23 (Japanese time) transmission at all. At present the only one
 24 we can hear is the 6:30 P.M. (Japanese time) transmission from
 25 JVJ to the United States, so please bear this in mind. Argentina

df 4

1 reports the same.

2 As I would like to find out whether conditions are
3 favorable here for reception between 4:00 and 6:00 A.M. (Japan-
4 ese time), it seems best to send to South America at that
5 time over a wavelength of from 10 to 15 megacycles.

6 25571

7 ARMY 6982

SECRET

Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

8 ENCL (D)

9 - - - - -

10 From: Rome.

11 To: Tokyo.

12 29 November 1941

13 (Purple)

14 #768

15 Re my #762*

16 In regard to the Japanese language radio broadcasts to
17 Europe recently, JLT cannot be heard at all and while JWV
18 can be heard fairly well still there is interference from
19 other wave lengths during the news broadcasts and static, etc.
20 Added to this is the fact that the announcer apparently speaks
21 in a low tone, very rapidly and swallows the ends of his words,
22 and the occasions when we do not get good reception are
23 numerous. There is great danger that we may miss some important
24 announcement such as was referred to in your telegram. Please
25 take up the following points that I am going to mention and

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

df 5

1 please arrange to do something about it, temporarily at
2 least.

3 1. Select an announcer who can speak slightly louder
4 than the present one and who can enunciate clearly, one who
5 does not intone and who can pronounce even the last syllables
6 of his words correctly and clearly.

7 2. In selecting the news please continue to place the
8 most important news first followed by items of lesser importance.
9 However as some time is usually consumed in adjusting the
10 machine, sometimes the important news is missed so please re-
11 peat this again at the end of the broadcast even if this re-
12 quires cutting down on the entertainment features.

13 3. Before the Japanese news broadcast please be sure
14 to always play several minutes of Japanese patriotic music
15 by way of introduction.

16 Relayed to Berlin.

17 * Not available.

18 JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (G-TT)

19 ENCL (C)

20 - - - - -

21 Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson requested at page 6374 memo-
22 randum attached to letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark
23 to Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department replied under date of
24 May 1, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.

25 The Chairman: It is so ordered.
(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AL-48

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R-19

1083A

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

R/131

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

1 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

1. In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 6374), referred to in Item # 6 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a careful search has been made of the files of the Navy Department for the memorandum mentioned in the letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. Neither the memorandum nor a copy can be found.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

John Ford Baecher

Commander, USNR

Mr. Lane: Congressman Gearhart requested, at page 299 of the transcript, orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic or vice versa from May to December 1941.

Under date of May 1, 1946 the Navy Department replied and we ask that their reply be spread on the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 10E3A

2 R#47B

3 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

4 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

5 WASHINGTON

6 1 May 1946

7 MEMORANDUM

8 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

9 1. In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart,
10 (Record of Proceedings, Page 299), referred to in Item #3 of
11 your memorandum of 29 March 1946, for copies of orders trans-
12 ferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice versa
13 from May to December 1941, reference is made to the following
14 documents:

15 (a) CNO Secret letter, Serial 06538, dated 7 April
16 1941 which lists battleship Division THREE; either
17 the LEXINGTON OR THE ENTERPRISE; Cruiser Division
18 EIGHT; Destroyer Squadron EIGHT (DesDiv 3 and 15),
19 and Destroyer Squadron NINE (DesDiv 17 and 18) as
20 the units which are to be transferred from the
21 Pacific to the Atlantic "because of the existing
22 and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic
23 Ocean."

24 (b) CNO Serial 152153 dated 15 April 1941 (Narrative
25 Statement, Page 156; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document

1 122) which modified item (a). This dispatch
2 orders that transfers indicated in item (a) are
3 to be held in abeyance until the international
4 situation clears; that the ENTERPRISE or the
5 YORKTOWN are to be substituted for the transfer
6 of the ENTERPRISE or the LEXINGTON; that when
7 the carrier is ready she is to proceed accompanied
8 by the McDOUGALL and DesDiv 18.

9 (c) CinCPac Serial 162346 dated 16 April 1941 (Narra-
10 tive Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Docu-
11 ment 123) which reports the YORKTOWN and the
12 destroyers specified in item (b) ready to depart
13 approximately 21 April.

14 (d) CNO Serial 132919 dated 13 May 1941 (Narrative
15 Statement, Page 167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document
16 125) which modifies item (a) and orders that
17 three groups, each consisting of one battleship,
18 one light cruiser and three destroyers from the
19 units specified in item (a), be organized, as
20 well as a fourth group consisting of one light
21 cruiser and DesDiv 3. This dispatch specifies
22 the intervals between departures for these groups.

23 (e) OPNav Serial 242155 dated 24 May 1941 (Narrative
24 Statement, Page 168; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document
25 127) which orders two destroyers of the Cimarron

1 class to the Atlantic Fleet.

2 (f) CNO Confidential letter Serial 023638 of 22 May
3 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the under-
4 signed R#47B dated 8 February 1946) which out-
5 lines the reorganization of DesRon's 2, 8, 9,
6 11 and 13 by individual ship name. All of the
7 ships named in this letter with the exception
8 of the LIVERMORE, EBERLE, KEARNEY, ERICKSSON,
9 GWIN, MEREDITH, and GRAYSON were at the time of
10 the writing of the letter in the Pacific.

11 (g) CNO Confidential letter Serial 021938 dated 16
12 May 1941 (forwarded with memorandum of the under-
13 signed R#47B dated 8 February 1946) reporting
14 the intention to transfer the USS BRIDGE and the
15 USS ANTARES to the Pacific Fleet.

16 2. With the exception of CNO Secret letter Serial 06538
17 dated 7 April 1941 (item(a) above) all of the above references
18 have previously been forwarded to the Committee, and, there-
19 fore, a copy of only that letter is forwarded herewith.

20 /s/ John Ford Beecher
21 Commander, USNR.
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23
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NAV. Op-38-MG 4/5

ORD. Serial 06538

ENG. SECRET

AERO-

C. & R. From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Y. & D. Subject: Transfer of Units from the Pacific Fleet
S. & A. to the Atlantic Fleet.

M. & Reference: (a) CinCus Secret letter A16/0140 of
J. A. G. 28 January 1941.

1. Two battleships of the Atlantic Fleet are now
M. G. under Navy Yard overhaul, one a routine overhaul and the
BU DC other of an emergency character. Both these battleships
will be absent from the Fleet until about the middle of May;
thereafter, a certain period of time will be required for
training before they would be ready to undertake their
Op. 12 assigned duties if the United States were then in the war.
The RANGER is scheduled for Navy Yard overhaul from July 1st
Op. 13 to September 1st for essential alteration of arresting gear
and for routine work. The Chief of Naval Operations con-
Op. 14 sidered that this overhaul cannot be indefinitely postponed.

2. Because of the preceding circumstances and the
Op. 15 existing and prospective strategic situation in the Atlantic
Ocean, it has now become apparent that the Atlantic Fleet
Op. 16 must have a greater initial strength in order to perform
effectively the tasks that will be assigned it in war. It
Op. 18 has therefore been decided to transfer certain units from
the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.

3. The following is a list of the units which will
Op. 21 be ordered to the Atlantic:

Op. 22. Battleship Division 3

Op. 23. Either the U.S.S. LEXINGTON or the
Op. 30. U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, as may be later
Op. 35. directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Op-38-MG
Serial 06538
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Cruiser Division 8

Destroyer Squadrons 8 (Desdivs 3 and 15)
and 9 (Desdivs 17 and 18) as now con-
stituted.

Vessels under overhaul are to be dispatched as soon as ready.

4. The movement of these units to the Atlantic must be accomplished with the utmost possible secrecy. In order to promote secrecy, it has been decided not to transfer all vessels at once but to make the transfer in several groups, with about two weeks elapsing between departures of groups. The Chief of Naval Operations will instruct you by secret dispatch as to the final dates for departure of each group from the Hawaiian area.

5. The groups and tentative dates of departure will be as follows:

Group 1.

Tentative date of departure from Hawaii April 15, 1941.

- 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
- 2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
- All available 1850 ton vessels of Destroyer Squadron 9.

Group 2.

Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 1, 1941.

- 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
- 2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
- Destroyer Division 17.

Group 3.

Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 15, 1941.

- 1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
- LEXINGTON or ENTERPRISE, as may later be directed.
- Flagship of Destroyer Squadron 8 and Destroyer Division 15.

Op-38-MG
Serial 06538
SECRET

SECRET

6. After passage of the Canal, all groups will proceed to Hampton Roads, unless otherwise directed.

7. You will direct that all vessels of the Atlantic detachments maintain radio silence, except in emergency, from the time of departure from Hawaii until arrival in Hampton Roads. During transit of the Canal, the commander of each group will report by dispatch, through the shore communication organization, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, for duty.

8. With regard to item (19) of paragraph one of reference (a), in which you recommend that Destroyer Division 12 remain with the Pacific Fleet instead of being assigned to the Southeast Pacific Force, you are informed that in a forthcoming revision of WPL-44, Table USF-2 will be changed to require one destroyer division, of the long range type, having five guns and two torpedo tubes. After the transfers directed by this letter, two such divisions will remain in the Pacific Fleet, viz., Destroyer Divisions 1 and 2.

9. Acknowledge receipt by dispatch, referring to the serial number of this letter.

Copy to:
CinClant

1 Mr. Lane: Congressman Murphy requested at page 9525
 2 of the transcript, information concerning identity of ship
 3 located to the north of Hawaii on a chart dated 6 December
 4 1941, which chart is a part of Exhibit 109. Under date of
 5 April 30, 1946 the Navy Department has replied to this request
 6 identifying the ship.

7 We ask that the reply be spread on the record.

8 The Chairman: So ordered.

9 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

Insert
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R#144

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

30 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings, Page 9525), referred to in Item #12 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the ship indicated on the chart labeled "Secret, 5 Dec. '41" (one of the documents of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation) as located northward of the island of Oahu at 27° North Latitude and 153° West Longitude is the Royal Canadian naval vessel PRINCE ROBERT (XCL-38).

The chart in question, and the others of similar nature that are parts of Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation, are copies of photographs of a wall chart which was maintained in the Navy Department for the purpose of plotting the approximate locations of naval vessels of the United States and of friendly foreign powers. The position of the PRINCE ROBERT stated above as shown on the chart is only approximate, and it has been ascertained that at noon G.C.T. 5 December 1941 this ship was located at the position 25° 30 minutes North Latitude and 152° 30 minutes West

CB-2 1 Longitude. There is attached hereto a further chart on which
 2 are indicated the two locations which have been mentioned,
 3 that is (1) 27° North Latitude - 153° West Longitude, and (2)
 4 25° 30 minutes North Latitude - 152° 30 minutes West Longi-
 5 tude.

6 The PRINCE ROBERT departed from Pearl Harbor at 2030
 7 Greenwich Civil Time on 4 December 1941 for Esquimalt, Van
 8 Couver, D. C., where it arrived 11 December 1941.

9 /s/ John Ford Beecher,
 10 Commander, USNR.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

11
 12 Mr. Lane: Congressman Gearhart requested, pages 780-782
 13 of the transcript, a list showing ships transferred from the
 14 Pacific to Atlantic or vice versa between May 1, 1940 and
 15 February 1, 1941. The Navy Department replied to this request
 16 under date of April 29, 1946 and we ask that the reply be
 17 spread on the record.

18 The Chairman: It is so ordered.

19 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

INSET
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3 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

4 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

5 WASHINGTON

6 29 April 1946

7 MEMORANDUM

8 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

9 In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart
10 (Record of Proceedings, Pages 780-782), referred to in Item
11 #5 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there are forwarded
12 herewith two tables showing (1) Ship transfers from the
13 Pacific to the Atlantic Fleets and from the Atlantic to the
14 Pacific Fleets between 1 May 1940 and 7 December 1941, and
15 (2) Ships, new or re-commissioned, that were sent (otherwise
16 than by transfers from Fleet to Fleet) to the Pacific to
17 augment the forces of the Pacific Fleet between 8 October
18 1940 and 7 December 1941.

19 /s/ John Ford Beecher

20 Commander, USNR

21 Enclosure: (a) Twelve (12) copies of tables (1) and (2).

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TABLE NO. 1

TRANSFERS OF SHIPS FROM THE
PACIFIC AND ASIATIC FLEETS TO
THE ATLANTIC FLEET AND VICE VERSA

	From 1 May 1941 to 1 Feb 1941		From 1 Feb 1941 to 7 Dec 1941	
	Pacific To Atlantic	Atlantic To Pacific	Pacific to Atlantic	Atlantic to Pacific
Battleships	None	None	BatDiv THREE IDAHO MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	None
Aircraft Carriers	None	None	YORKTOWN	None
Cruisers	LOUISVILLE CHESTER CINCINNATI MILWAUKEE OMAHA MEMPHIA Note: Also the AUGUSTA from Asiatic to Atl.	LOUISVILLE CHESTER TRENTON	1. CruDiv EIGHT PHILADELPHIA BROOKLYN SAVANNAH NASHVILLE	None
Destroyers	SAMPSON MOFFETT ANDERSON HAMMANN HUGHES SIMS MUSTIN RUSSELL MAYRANT RHIND TRIPPE	CRANE CROSBY KILTY KENNISON ANDERSON HAMMANN HUGHES SIMS MUSTIN RUSSELL O'BRIEN WALKE BUCK	DeaRon EIGHT ANDERSON MUSTIN HAMMANN ROWAN LANG STACK STERETT WILSON DeaRon NINE: McDOUGALL MORRIS ROE WAINWRIGHT BUCK DAVIS JOUETT WARRINGTON SOMERS	None

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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TABLE NO. 7

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

	From 1 May 1941 to 1 Feb 1941		From 1 Feb 1941 to 7 Dec 1941	
	Pacific to Atlantic	Atlantic to Pacific	Pacific to Atlantic	Atlantic to Pacific
Submarines	None	None		None
Auxiliary Vessels	None	None	CIMMARON SANGAMON SANTEE RELIEF WM. P. BIDDLE FULLER HEYWOOD LITTLE MANLEY STRINGHAM McKEAN BRANT PARTRIDGE ALGORMA KALMIA	None

NOTE: All transfers were between the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet except as expressly noted.

Auxiliary Vessels		
	ALDERMAN	AVOCET
	CASCO	BALLARD
	CURTIS	ERESK
	FULTON	GILLIS
	HARRIS	HULBERT
	KUALA	REGULUS
	PELIAS	SACRAMENTO
	PROCYON	SEMINOLE
	SABINE	THORNTON
	SOLACE	
	TANGIER	
	ZELEN	

*All classified as ODD (old destroyer, recommissioned) on December 7, 1941.

1 TABLE NO. 2

2 AUGMENTATIONS IN SHIP STRENGTH OF PACIFIC FLEET
 3 OTHER THAN BY TRANSFERS FROM OTHER FLEETS DURING
 4 THE PERIOD 8 OCTOBER 1940 - 7 DECEMBER 1941

5	NEW SHIPS SENT TO THE PACIFIC FLEET	OLDER SHIPS SENT TO THE PACIFIC FLEET
7 Battleships	None	None
9 Aircraft Carriers	None	None
10 Cruisers	HELENA	ST. LOUIS
12 Destroyers*	None	ALLEN CHEW MACFARLAND SCHLEY
15 Submarines	CAR CUDGEON TAMBOR TAUTOG THRESHER TRITON TROUT TUNA	None
20 Auxiliary Vessels	ALDEBARAN CASCO CURTISS FULTON HARRIS KUALA PELIAS PROCYON SABINE SOLACE TANGIER ZEILEN	AVOCET BALLARD BREESE GILLIS HULBERT REGULUS SACRAMENTO SEMINOLE THORNTON

26 *All classified as ODD (old destroyer, recommissioned) on
December 7, 1941.

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Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson requested, page 14,069 of the transcript all duty officer logs kept for the Office of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941.

The reply of the War Department has been received to this request, and we ask that the reply, dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows.)

For all duty officer logs kept for the offices of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941. Inclosed herewith is a letter from Major General John R. Deane, who was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the period mentioned, describing the duty officer system of the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and stating that no logs were maintained by the duty officers of that office. The foregoing duty officer arrangement served both the office of the Chief of Staff and the office of the Secretary of War.

/s/ CARL R NELSON

Captain, AEC

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Room 4D761

The Pentagon

23 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

At page 14,069 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for all duty officer logs kept for the offices of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December 1941. Inclosed herewith is a letter from Major General John R. Deane, who was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the period mentioned, describing the duty officer system of the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and stating that no logs were maintained by the duty officers of that office. The foregoing duty officer arrangement served both the office of the Chief of Staff and the office of the Secretary of War.

/S/ CARL R NELSON

Captain, AUS

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

19 April 1946

Capt. Carl R. Nelson
 Rm 4D761 The Pentagon
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Captain Nelson:

In reply to your telephone request this date the following represents to the best of my recollection, knowledge and belief the system that was employed concerning duty officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff just prior to Pearl Harbor.

There were 6 or 8 officers designated as Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff, all of whom were on a roster as night and weekend duty officers. When acting as duty officers they were required to remain within reach of a designated telephone so that they might be called by the Adjutant General's Office in case anything unusual occurred outside of the regular hours.

I was Assistant Secretary of the General Staff during the few months preceding Pearl Harbor and was one of the officers on the roster referred to above. I do not recall ever having been called by the Adjutant General's Office because some unusual situation had arisen. There was no log kept of the activities of the duty officers. If anything arose that called for imme-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

gs 3

1 diate action such action would be taken at once; otherwise
2 the circumstances would be reported to the Secretary of
3 the General Staff upon his arrival at the office on the
4 following day

/s/ JOHN R. DEANE

Major General, USA

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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9 Mr. Lane: In response to the request for information
10 concerning Japanese estimates of the United States air strength
11 in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
12 War Department by memorandum dated May 21, 1946 has furnished
13 information obtained from the Chairman, United States Strategic
14 Bombing Survey, and we ask that this information be spread on
15 the record.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 4D761

The Pentagon

21 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

In response to your request for information concerning Japanese estimates of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is inclosed herewith a memorandum dated 21 May from the Office of the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

/s/ ROBERT M. DIGGS

Captain, AUS

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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1 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

2 Office of the Chairman

3 21 May 1946

4 Captain Robert M. Diggs, A. U. S.

5 Room 4D 757

6 Pentagon Building

7 Washington, D. C.

8 Dear Captain Diggs:

9 In reply to your question concerning Japanese estimates
10 of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior
11 to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Survey can offer the following.

12 Last November in Tokyo Admiral Yonai, the last Japanese
13 Navy Minister, gave the Survey a document, the translated
14 title of which is "Estimation of Japanese Strength at the
15 Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War (December 1941),"

16 This paper which was used by the Japanese Cabinet for planning
17 purposes during the late fall of 1941 has the following esti-
18 mated disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific:

19	Hawaii	Wake-	Philippines	Aleutian	Avail-
20	Area	Midway	Area	Area	able
21					for tran-
22					fer to
23					Far East
24	Fighter	About	Wake-	About	About
25	Planes	200	About 12	10	1,000

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1	Large Planes	About 40	About 40	About
2	(4 engines)			60
3	Medium Planes	About		About
4	(2 engines)	100		200
5	Small attack	About		
6	planes	150		
7	Reconnaissance	About	About	
8	& patrol planes	35	20	
9	Reconnaissance		About	
10	Seaplanes		10	
11	Flying Boats	About	Wake-	About
12		110	About 6	35
13			Midway-	
14			About 9	

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Yours very truly,

/S/ WALTER WILDS,

Commander U. S. N. R.

Mr. Lane: We have received answers to inquiry at page 13,760 of the transcript for further information regarding the proposed British warning to Japan sent to President Roosevelt on December 6, which involved the reply of the Australian Government.

We ask that this material now be spread on the record.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

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April 9, 1946

R-20

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARKS:

With reference to your undated letter advising that clearance has been obtained from the British Government for documents numbered 6 and 8 referred to in Mr. Masten's memorandum of February 23, 1946, the Joint Committee desires the following further information regarding document No. 8 (which is the memorandum dated December 7, 1941, apparently from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, enclosing a draft of a proposed declaration by the British Government to the Japanese Government):

1. The basis for the assertions made in the message from the Australian Minister at Washington, mentioned in the telegram from the then Australian Minister for External Affairs enclosed with your letter, regarding the procedure to be followed by the President. It is requested that, if necessary, appropriate inquiry be made of the then Australian Minister at Washington as to the basis for these assertions.
2. All information in the State Department files concerning (a) the above-mentioned document No. 8, and (b) the above mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs.
3. The date and hour of dispatch of (a) the above-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

mentioned telegram from the Australian Minister
for External Affairs, and (b) the above-mentioned
message from the then Australian Minister at
Washington.

These matters were discussed at the Committee's hearing this
morning, and a prompt reply will be greatly appreciated.

/s/ S. W. Richardson

General Counsel

April 17, 1946

Dear Mr. Richardson:

I refer to your memorandum to Mr. Marks dated April 9,
requesting information concerning a British memorandum of
December 7, 1941 to President Roosevelt and an Australian
telegram regarding that memorandum, a paraphrase of which
the Department recently furnished to you.

In regard to point 2 of your memorandum, the files of
the State Department have again been searched, but no material
has been found relevant to these papers.

In regard to points 1 and 3, your request has been
communicated to the Australian Government. While, under
ordinary circumstances, the Department of State does not
feel it should request other governments for documents in
their files, an exception has been made in this case because

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of the fact that the Australian telegram in question was placed in the record at the request of the Australian Government.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph W. Ballantine

Special Assistant to the Secretary

The Honorable

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel,

Joint Committee on the Investigation

of the Pearl Harbor Attack,

Congress of the United States.

.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1946

Dear Mr. Richardson:

In further reference to your letter of April 9, there are enclosed two copies of a letter received from Mr. L. R. McIntyre of the Australian Legation which contains information requested by you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Joseph W. Ballantine (per one)

Joseph W. Ballantine

Enclosure

Mr. Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel,

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

R-24

1 Dominion Affairs beyond the fact that it was despatched in
2 the evening of December 7th, Canberra time.

3 Yours sincerely,

4 /s/ L. R. McIntyre

5 Mr. Arthur L. Richards,

6 Room 377, State Building,

7 United States Department of State,

8 WASHINGTON, D. C.

9

10 April 10, 1946

11 Dear Miss Tully:

12 There are enclosed with this letter mimeographed copies
13 of two documents which you furnished the Committee from the
14 files of the late President Roosevelt. The first document is
15 dated December 7, 1941 and appears to be a memorandum from
16 Prime Minister Churchill to the President, and the second docu-
17 ment is the draft declaration attached to the first. There is
18 also enclosed a mimeographed copy of a paraphrase of a tele-
19 gram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the
20 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom.
21 Permission to use the first two documents was granted the
22 Committee by the British Government only upon the condition
23 that the third document be released at the same time.

24 At the public hearing last Tuesday, the Committee asked
25 that a further check of the records and files of President

R-25

1 Roosevelt be made to ascertain whether any further information
2 or documents are available concerning the enclosures. You will
3 note the description of the "President's subsequent procedure"
4 in the third document and the assertion that "he will issue
5 his warning" on Tuesday afternoon or evening. The Committee
6 desires to know whether the records and files of President
7 Roosevelt contain any memoranda relating in any way to the
8 three documents mentioned above, and to the basis for the
9 assertion made by the then Australian Minister at Washington
10 in the third document regarding the intentions of President
11 Roosevelt. In particular, the Committee would like to know
12 whether President Roosevelt's records and files contain any
13 memoranda of conversations between the President and the then
14 Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, or copies of
15 memoranda or messages from the President to Mr. Casey which
16 might have served as the basis for the Australian Minister's
17 assertions.

18 We will greatly appreciate your usual prompt attention
19 to the Committee's request.

20 Sincerely yours,

21 /s/ S. W. Richardson

22 General Counsel

23 Miss Grace Tully
24 3000 Connecticut Avenue
25 Washington, D. C.

WARD S PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

R-26

3000 Connecticut Avenue,

Washington, D. C.

April 17, 1946.

Dear Mr. Richardson:-

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of April tenth, but I have just returned to Washington from New York.

I have made a further search of the files but I am unable to find any additional documents or memoranda regarding the enclosures.

My feeling about the message from the Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, is that he and the late President discussed the subject but, of course, no record was ever made of such conversations.

I regret that I cannot be more helpful.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Grace G. Tully

GRACE G. TULLY

Hon. S. W. Richardson,
General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States,
201 Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Lane: At page 34 of the Committee transcript, Senator
2 Brewster requested that the final draft of a memorandum from
3 the Committee for the President, which the Committee proposed
4 the President send to the various executive departments and
5 agencies, be spread on the record. It was so ordered by the
6 Committee Chairman. We request that a copy of the letter dated
7 November 2, 1945 from the Committee Chairman to Honorable
8 Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, which letter
9 quoted the Committee's proposed memorandum, be spread on the
10 record, together with a copy of the reply dated November 7,
11 1945 from Mr. Connelly to the Committee Chairman, which
12 enclosed a copy of the memorandum the President sent to the
13 executive departments and agencies that day. This latter
14 memorandum appears in the full in the Committee transcript
15 at page 30, however the letter of transmittal does not appear
16 at that point. We ask that this material be spread on the
17 record.

18 The Chairman: So ordered.

19 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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November 2, 1945.

Honorable Matthew J. Connelly,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Connelly:

The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack respectfully asks that the President approve the following memorandum:

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS AND BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor A ttack in its desire to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, and to supplement previous directives and arrangements for full disclosure to an cooperation with the Joint Committee, and to add to the protec- tions given in that provision in Section 3 of the Concurrent Resolution creating the Joint Committee, which reads as follows:

SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be

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used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

You are directed to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies whether in the armed services or in a civilian status, and whether or not called to testify before the Joint Committee, if interrogated by the Committee or any of its members or counsel, to volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the Committee's investigation, and whether or not so interrogated, to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the Committee, or to any of its members or its counsel, any information such persons may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the Committee.

Respectfully,

Chairman

.....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1945

My dear Senator Barkley:

This is to acknowledge your letter of November second, written on behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum the President

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1 is today sending to the Chief Executives of all Executive
2 Departments, Agencies, Commissions and Bureaus, including the
3 Joint Chief's of Staff.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Matthew J. Connelly

MATTHEW J. CONNELLY

Secretary fo the President

8 Honorable Alben W. Barkley,
9 United States Senate,
10 Washington, D. C.

11 Enclosure

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

12
13 Mr. Lane: The Committee has received, under date of
14 April 23, 1946, certain corrections requested by Captain
15 Zacharias to be made in the transcript of his testimony. We
16 ask that his request be made a part of the record.

17 The Chairman: So ordered.

18 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington

23 April 1946

1083A(HLB)

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. Captain Zacharias has reviewed the transcript of his testimony before the Committee and has requested that the following typographical errors be corrected:

- Page 8717 Line 13 Change "Jacinto" to "Isidro".
- Page 8718 Line 15 Change "come" to "came".
- Page 8720 Line 5 Delete "then".
- Page 8722 Line 19 Change "northern" to "northward".
- Page 8723 Line 19 Delete "for".
- Page 8724 Lines 12 At end of line 12 change period to comma, and 13 and at beginning of line 13 change capital "T" to small "t".
- Page 8738 Line 2 Change "made" to "make".
- Page 8743 Line 23 Change "nand" to "and".
- Page 8755 Line 3 Change this line to read: "Why, here I am a Reserve Intelligence Officer in G-2 and".
- Page 8755 Line 6 Delete "I said,"
- Page 8760 Line 6 Change "that in" to "that in".
- Page 8763 Line 24 Delete "Vice".
- Page 8763 Line 25 Change "of" to "on".

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

- 1 Page 8995 Line 19 Insert "not" between "by" and "having".
- 2 Page 8996 Line 23 Change "sai" to "said".
- 3 Page 8998 Line 3 Change "1924" to "1926".
- 4 Page 9007 Line 22 Change "from" to "into".
- 5 Page 9014 Line 4 Change "defer." to "refer to."
- 6 Page 9014 Line 7 Change "If you knew" to "In view of".
- 7 Page 9023 Line 2 Change "it" to "these".
- 8 Page 9024 Line 4 Change "Tmayer" to "T. Mayer".
- 9 Page 9024 Line 21 Before "Juno" insert "It says".
- 10 Page 9039 Line 12 Change "ability" to "a billet".

/s/ John Ford Baecher
Commander, USNR.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Lane: Under date of April 25, 1946 we have received a list of corrections suggested in the testimony of Admiral Stark, by the Admiral. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

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