HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/TLT/wn1 5750 10 July 1975

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

(2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF

(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 30 June 1975

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1D

(b) FMF PacO 5750.8B

(c) DivO P5750.1E

Encl: (1) 2d Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. Subject chronology is submitted as enclosure (1) in accordance with references (a) through (c).

R. W. AUSTIN

45/04

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

Command Chronology

# 1 January 1975 TO 30 June 1975

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# UNCLASSIFIED

# PART I

# ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION	COMMANDER	PERIOD
2d Battalion, 9th Marines		1 JAN-28 MAR 29 MAR-30 JUN
SUBORDIN	ATE UNITS	
F Co., 2d Battalion	1stLt. A. P. YOUNG Capt. M. E. STAHL Capt. R. S. GUNTER Capt. M. R. McCARTY	1-14 JAN 15 JAN-30 JUN 1-14 JAN 15 JAN-30 JUN 1 JAN-7 APR 8 APR-30 JUN 1 JAN-30 JUN 1 JAN-30 JUN
E Btry, 2d Bn, 12 Marines 2d Plat., B Co., 3d Tank Bn 3d Plat (Rein), B Co, 1st Am Te 2d Plat, C Co, 3d Recon Bn. 2d Plat, B Co, 3d Engr Bn.	HMENTS rac Bn	9-30 JUN 9-30 JUN 9-30 JUN 9-30 JUN 9-30 JUN

2

# 2. LOCATION

1 JAN-14 MAY
15 MAY-17 MAY
18 MAY-30 JUN
CAMP SCHWAB, OKINAWA
UTAPAO AFB, UTAPAO THAILAND
CAMP SCHWAB, OKINAWA

# 3. STAFF OFFICERS

EXECUTIVE OFFICER	MAJ. J. R. RIN <b>DFLETSCH 1</b> JAN-20 FEB MAJ. L. R. MORAN 21 FEB-30 JUN
	1stLt. P. A. WILBUR 1 JAN-20 APR 1stLt. H. M. McILROY Jr. 29 APR-30 JUN 2dLt. W. E. MEADOR Jr. 1 JAN-28 MAR 1stLt. H. M. McILROY Jr. 9-28 APR WO1 R. D. WRIGHT 18-30 JUN LT(jg) R. E. GARDNER 1 JAN-30 JUN
S-2 S-3 S-4	Maj. J. B. HENDRICKS IN APR-30 JUN Capt. J. R. SCHIEDLER 1 JAN-30 APR
Supply Officer Comm Officer	Capt. W. T. TUCKER 1 MAR-30 JUN 1stLt. J. G. COOPER 1 JAN-30 JUN Capt. J. W. HUST 1 JAN-30 JUN

# UNCLASSIFIED

# 4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

a. Average strength by month:

	US	MC	΄	JSN
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN	29 34 31 35 35 38	364 297 488 768 949 949	1 1 2 2 2 2 2	26 21 23 17 27 34

b. Personnel joined during each month:

	OFF	ENL	TOTAL
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN TOTAL	12 2 1 5 0 3 23	32 229 340 265 79 29	44 231 341 270 79 32 997

c. Personnel transfered during each month:

4

#### PART II

#### NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines has spent the entire period 1 Jan-30 June 1975 forming and participating in pre-deployment phase training. This endeavor was interrupted at times by the requirement to form or support air contingency BLT's.

LtCol RANDALL W. AUSTIN took command of the Battalion on 29 March 1975, from LtCol GENE A. DEEGAN.

On 5 Apr 1975, one company was placed on standby for Operation "Frequent Wind." At that time 90 Marines were sent to augment the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines for the same operation. On 18 April the remainder of the battalion was alerted. On 1 May 1975, the alert was withdrawn and shortly thereafter the 90 Marines returned to the Battalion.

Pre-deployment phase training commenced on 7 April 1975. On 22 April 1975, the deployment date was set at 9 June and a week later was extended to 9 July. The priority of assignment of personnel was given to the 1st Battalion during this time period. Consequently, the 2d Battalion did not reach manning level until 3 May 1975.

On 8 May 1975, the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon was formed as an integral working part of the Battalion, the first such platoon in the 3d Marine Division.

The most noteworthy event of this period commenced on 13 May when BLT 2/9 was alerted as the primary air contingency BLT for Operation Mayaguez. One day later the entire battalion was in Utapao, Thailand, readying for the operation which was conducted on 15 May 1975.

By 21 May the entire Battalion had returned to Camp Schwab and resumed pre-deployment training. Training culminated in a Battalion CPX (graded) on 26-28 June. The Battalion is presently readying itself for a series of pre-deployment inspections and for embarkation arrangements. Embarkation is anticipated on or about 15 July 1975.

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#### PART III

### 1. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Number of Personnel Promoted.

	Capt-2	TSTLT-T	GySgt-2	SSgt-8
	Sgt	Cpl	LCp1	Pfc
JAN FEB	2	5 49	47 21	21 24
MAR APR	ō 0	3 0	12 38	68 163
MAY JUN	2 4	$rac{\check{6}}{7}$	40 57	113
TOTAL	10	70	215	72 461

- b. Awards Presented.
  - (1). Certificate of Commendation -3
  - (2). Meritorious Masts -79
- c. Disciplinary Totals.
  - (1). Battalion Office Hours -49
  - (2). Summary Courts Martial -17
  - (3). Special Courts Martial -11
  - (4). General Courts Martial 6
- 2. INTELLIGENCE. The Intelligence Section of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines has provided timely and accurate intelligence information to the officers and men of 2/9. This Battalion was on Air Alert for Operations Eagle Pull and Frequent Wind. The S-2 kept the Battalion Staff advised of the deteriorating situation in Indochina. While participating in Operation Mayaguez, the S-2 coordinated with the Air Force intelligence section to provide what information was available for use by the assault force.

6

3. <u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>. During the second half of fiscal year 1975, the communications platoon initiated a vigorous training program in preparation for deployment. The platoon made maximum effort to supply qualified input to Division comm/elect schools. The Communications Center processed a total of 3,630 messages, 200 out-going and 3430 incoming. The tech shop opened 524 Tero's and completed 502.

# 4. TRAINING

a. During this period the following Division Schools were utilized:

```
Advanced Leadership School (29)
Radio Chief Refresher Course (1)
Jungle Environmental Survival Training (8)
Communications Security Course (9)
NCO Leadership School (27)
Special Defense School, Monitor/Survey and Decontamination
   Course (6)
Correspondence Clerk School (2)
Generator Operators Course (12)
Service Record Book Clerk Course (5)
Unit Diary Clerk Course (4)
Drug and Alcohol Counselor Training (3)
Defense Packaging and Packing Course (1)
Administrative Chief Course (2)
CMS Custodian School (2)
CMS Clerk Course (1)
Refrigeration School (1)
Unit Discussion Leader School (11)
Team Embarkation Officer/Assistant School (6)
Field Bakery Training (1)
Career Planning School (2)
   ( ) - indicates number of people completing each course.
```

# 5. LOGISTICS.

During this period the Battalion experienced a complete turnover of personnel with most of the replacements having no training or experience in the logistics field.

Financially, the Battalion was in an excellent position with

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the receipt of \$30,000 mid year funds and another \$42,000 year end funds.

The Battalion lost eight pieces of Combat Essential Equipment (CEE) and components of one other during combat operations. As of 30 June only three items and the one component had been replaced. Additionally, the Battalion experienced shortage of two other items for a final 95% on hand.

# 6. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

- 29 Mar Battalion change of command. LtCol Randall W. Austin relieving LtCol Gene A. Deegan.
- for Operation Frequent Wind. 90 persons transferred to supplement Battalion 1/9. Verbal order from Commanding Officer, 9th Marines.
- 7 Apr Pre-deployment phase training commenced.
- 18 Apr Remainder of Battalion alerted as backup A. C. BLT for operation Frequent and. Verbal order from Commanding Officer, 9th Marines.
- 22 Apr Scheduled to deploy 9 Jun 1975. Reference: (c) CG, 3d Mar Div msg dtd 220826Z Apr 1975.
- 25 Apr Rescheduled deployment for 9 Jul 1975. Reference: (c) CG, 3d Mar Div msg dtd 250245Z Apr 1975.
  - 1 May Stand down from backup AC. BLT. Verbal order from Commanding Officer, 9th Marines.
- 3 May Battalion reached manning level.
- 5 May Personnel returned from BLT 1/9.
- 8 May S-2 formed Surveillance Target Aquisition Platoon (STAP). See Tab A.
- 13 May Alerted as primary air contingency BLT for Operation Mayaguez. See Tab B.
- 14 May BLT 2/9 moved to Utapao AFB, Thailand. OPCON to III MAF. See Tab B.



- 15 May Operation Mayaguez. See Tab B
- 21 May All units of 2d Battalion returned to Camp Schwab.
- 1 Jun Assumed A. C. BLT. See Tab C.
- 2 Jun Tactical Air Control Parties to Philippines for close air support exercise (CASEX). See Tab D.
- 15 Jun Battalion redesignated as BLT 2/9. Reference: (c) CG, 3d Mar Div msg dtd 220826Z Apr 75.
- 16-18 Jun Battalion Landing Team Field Exercise.
- 26-28 Jun Battalion Landing Team Command Post Exercise.
- 30 Jun Stand down from AC, BLT. See Tab C.

## PART IV

# SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- 1. TAB A- Details of STA Platoon (Intelligence)
- 2. TAB B- Command Summary for Operation Mayaguez.
- 3. TAB C- Bn Bulletin 3000 dtd 31 May 1975
- 4. TAB D- AIO, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ltr 3/BIC/wnl of 3120 dtd 21 June 1975

# SURVEILLANCE TARGET ACQUISITION PLATOON (STAP)

STAP was formed on 8 May 1975, as a platoon within H&S Company, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, the first such platoon in the 3d Marine Division. It was composed of sixteen Marines coming from the rifle companies, a radio operator from communications platoon, and a corpsman from the Battalion Aid Station.

TAD A

## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 13 May 1975 the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines received a warning order to make ready for air contingency BLT operations. All four rifle companies were located in the Central Training Area, which is normal for the predeployment phase. Companies were instructed to remain in the field, but ordered not to disperse for night operations. At 2030I, 2d Battalion received orders to move. All rifle companies were notified immediately, and retrograde operations were begun. Movement to Camp Schwab was accomplished by truck. Upon arrival at Camp Schwab, the companies prepared themselves to move to Kadena Air Force Base.

At 0145I on 14 May 1975, the first trucks got underway bound for Kadena. The first C-141 took off from the airport at 0615I, with the Command Group following at 0712I. Subsequent flights took off as aircraft became available.

The Command Group landed at Utapao Air Force Base, Thailand and effected liaison with the Ground Security Force Commander and members of the command element of III MAF. (The remainder of the Battalion continued to arrive via C-141, with the last elements arriving at approximately 1400G.) At 1300G, the Battalion Command Group was informed of their mission: "To sieze and hold the island of Koh Tang, for a minimum of 48 hours, and to rescue any crew members of the SS MAYAGUEZ found on the island."

Subsequent planning involved a visual reconaissance of Koh Tang Island via US Army U-21 aircraft. The Battalion Commander, S-3, Assault Company Commander, and Battalion Air Officers took part in this VR. Minimum altitude over the island was 6000' msl. A planning conference followed the VR, during which several options were discussed. Due to the limited helicopter assets available, it was necessary that the landing force consist of only 179 men. The first wave consisted of Co "G" (reinforced), a section of 81mm mortars, and a small command group. The joint USMC/USAF planning conference ended at 1930G, and preparations were commenced to launch at 0415G.

With the completion of necessary planning, a meeting for all battalion officers was held at approximately 2200G, during which the order for the assault was given by the Battalion Commander. After this meeting, all those concerned set about rehearsing heliteams and readying their men for the operation.

On 15 May 1975 at 0230G, the landing force was staged at their assigned aircraft. The landing force consisted of Co "G" (reinforced), commanded by Capt J. H. DAVIS, and a headquarters group, commanded by LtCol R. W. AUSTIN. At 0415G, the first aircraft lifted off and departed for Koh Tang. They numbered 179 officers and men, and were embarked in eight aircraft.

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TAD B

As the first wave approached the island at approximately 0615G, it became evident that the landing would not be unopposed. The first two helicopters to approach the eastern shore, Knife 23 and Knife 31, were shot down. The eastern LZ's were immediately closed to prevent further loss of aircraft, and all aircraft scheduled for these zones were diverted to LZ's 1 and 2 on the western shore. Meanwhile, on the western shore, landings in LZ's one and two were also contested, but 5 of the 6 remaining aircraft managed to land. Knife 22, carrying "G" Company Commander, Capt J. H. DAVIS, was forced to return to Thailand. The helo landed just inside the Thai border and its passengers were transported to Utapao via another aircraft. (Capt DAVIS was eventually inserted to join his company on the second wave.) Of the five aircraft which managed to land, four landed in LZ's 1 and 2, containing elements of the assault company. The fifth, carrying the Command Group and mortars landed in an unscheduled LZ approximately 1200 meters to the south. (This LZ will henceforth be called X-Ray.)

Elements of Company "G" set up and expanded their perimeters around LZ's 1 and 2 under the command of the Company "G" XO, 1stIt J. D. KEITH. The command group worked it's way north along the shore in an effort to link up with the main body of the landing force. The 81mm Mortars were employed by the fire support element of the Command Group in order to fire on enemy positions in close proximity to Company "G" perimeter. It KEITH utilized TAC-air available - U. S. Airforce A-7's with MK 82, MK 83 bombs and cannon during the entire link up operation. Meanwhile, there was a very small packet of the landing force pinned down on the Eastern shore of Koh Tang, under the command of 2dLt M. A. CICERE. This unit, numbering 22 Marines and corpsman was from Knife 23 and had made it to cover on the beach. These 22 men remained pinned down all day and were extracted shortly before dark at approximately 1815G.

The second wave of the assault, carrying elements of Company "E" (commanded by Capt M. E. STAHL) and the Company "G" Commander, landed at approximately 1230G. This wave was embarked in five helicopters, which were the total remaining helicopter assets after the morning's action. Four of these helicopters landed on the western shore of the island, and one attempted a landing on the eastern shore but ran into heavy ground fire receiving heavy damage. A forced landing was accomplished inside the Thai border and occupants transferred to Utapao via a SAR helo.

A link up of the Command Group and the main landing force body was accomplished at approximately 1300G. The remainder of the afternoon was taken with consolidating their position, destroying captured enemy stores, and conducting air strikes against known enemy positions. The landing force numbered some 200 men at this time, and their position was well consolidated. There was doubt as to whether the landing force would be extracted before the next morning.

At approximately 1800G, the extract began on very short notice. The 22 man unit on the eastern shore was extracted, and at approximately 1830G, the extraction was begun from the western shore. Wounded personnel, fire support personnel, and the command group departed on the first wave. The perimeter was progressively tightened as personnel were extracted, and the last helo departed Koh Tang at approximately 2000G. The landing force was transferred to three ships — the USS Coral Sea, USS Holt, and the USS Wilson.


The remainder of BLT 2/9 was moved from Thailand on the night of 15 May via C-141.

The first elements of BLT 2/9 arrived back on Okinawa at 0615I 16 May 1975 with remaining elements arriving every 15 minutes thereafter. All attachments were sent directly from Kadena to their parent commands. The Battalion, minus the landing force, arrived at Camp Schwab in total at 1000I 16 May 1975.

The landing force, embarked upon the three ships previously mentioned, was enroute to Subic Bay Naval Base, in the Republic of the Philippines.

The landing force was enroute to the Philippines, arriving on 20 May 1975.

The landing force was transported via C-130 from NAS Cubi Point, to Kadena AB, Okinawa Japan. They were then transported to rejoin the Battalion at Camp Schwab Okinawa, Japan on 21 May 1975.




# III HELICOPTER ASSIGNMENT

# WAVE 1

AIRCRAFT NO	CALL SIGN	NO PAX	SENIOR MARINE	REMARKS
926	Knife 21	20	2dLt McDANIEL	Landed 0630 Western LZ
928	Knife 22	20	Capt DAVIS	Damaged Aborted Landing Returned to Thailand
627	Knife 23	20	2dlt CICERE	Shot Down 0600 Eastern LZ
925	Knife 31	22	lstlt TONKIN	Shot Down and Burned 0600 Eastern LZ
932	Knife 32	15	SSgt BURNETT	Landed 0605 Western LZ
795	Jolly Green 41	27	2dlt ZALES	Landed 0930 Western LZ
785	Jolly Green 42	27	lstit KEITH	Landed 0610 Western LZ
792	Jolly Green 43		LtCol AUSTIN	Landed 0615 1500m South of Western LZ
794	Jolly Green 13	28 <u>WAV</u>	E 2 Capt STAHL	Landed 1230 Western LZ
<b>7</b> 93	Jolly Green 12	26	2dLt DAVIS	Landed 1230 Western IZ
364	Jolly Green 11	27	SSgt HALE	Landed 1230 Western LZ
Unknown	Unknown	27	lstlt MARTINOLI	Damaged Aborted Landing Returned to Thailand
Unknown	Unknown	20	Capt DAVIS	Landed 1230 Western LZ

1








#### V PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KOH TANG

- TERRAIN: The terrain of Koh Tang is flat with several ravines running east to west. A large grassy area was utilized as the western landing zone. The grass in the zone was approximately knee\_deep. Rock shoals jutted out into the ocean on the northern and southern boundaries of the LZ. The beach was approximately 20 meters in depth.
- VEGETATION: The vegetation of the island is predominately dense junglelike double canopy intermingled with vines and thorn bushes. Small trails were found running throughout the area mainly in an east-west direction. A cut approximately 50 meters in width ranged across the island from east to west. This cut consisted of fallen trees and bushes. It was obvious this cut had been improved within recent weeks as axes and saws were found on the edges of it.
- MAN-MADE STRUCTURES: One large hut was located on the eastern side and several small huts were found on the western side with one centered in the LZ. The hut in the LZ was a straw roof open pavillion estimated to house approximately 10 persons. Clothes, books, currency and bags of rice were found in this hut. Next to the hut was what appeared to be an ammo storage bunker. Inside this bunker was found 1 case of 60mm mortar rounds and several cases of M79 rounds. This bunker was constructed of logs and baked clay. Prepared fighting positions were found ranging along the western shore also of the same construction.
- WEATHER: Early morning was hazy, clearing by 0900. The temperature was in the 90°s at midday with high humidity. The sun set at approximately 1730. There was no moonlight in the evening, providing almost total blackout conditions.





# VII LIST OF KILLED/MISSING IN ACTION

## KILLED IN ACTION

LCPL Aston L. LONEY
PFC Lynn BLESSING
PFC James R. MAXWELL
PFC Walter BOYD
PFC Kelton R. TURNER
PFC Daniel A. BENEDETT
PFC James J. JACQUES
PFC Antonio R. SANDOVAL
PFC Richard W. RIVENBURGH
LCPL Gregory COPENHAVER
LCPL Andres GARCIA
HN Ronald J. MAINING
HM2 Bernard GAUSE JR

# MISSING IN ACTION

PFC Gary L. HALL PFC Joseph N. HARGROVE PVT Danny G. MARSHALL



## VIII AWARDS SUMMARY

The following awards were recommended for individual actions on KOH TANG ISLAND

## SILVER STAR

MAJ J. B. HENDRICKS  1stLT J. D. KEITH  2dLT J McDANIEL 5th	Bn S-3 Co ExecO Plt Cmdr	H&S Co Co G Co G
BRONZE STAR		
CAPT J. H. DAVIS	Co Cmdr	Co G
CAPT M. E. STAHL	Co Cmdr	Co E
1stLt T. L. TONKIN	FAC	H&S Co
2dLT R. H. ZALES	Plt Cmdr	Co G
2dlT M. R. CICERE	Plt Cmdr	Co G
2dLT D. J. HOFFMAN	Plt Cmdr	Co G
2dLT J. W. DAVIS	Plt Cmdr	Co E
2dLT R. E. KING		Co E
		H&S Co
1st3GT L. L. FUNK	1stSGT	Co G
GySGT L. A. MCNEMAR	Co GySGT	Co G
SSGT F. T. TUITELE		Co G
SSGT S BEINAL		Co G
LCPL G. C. LUTZ		Co G

## BLONZE STAR (POSTHUMOUSLY)

LCPL A. N.	エ へりていてと		a , , , ,		
11.P1. 4 N	I I III II V	*	Squad Leader		in G
	LIC/III LII L		Dillag Dealer		467 69

Rifleman

## NAVY COMMENDATION

LCPL L. J. BLANSON

LT (USN) J. R. WILCOX	Bn Surgeon	H&S Co
SSGT C. D. WRIGHT	Plt SGT	Co E
SSGT C. H. HALE	Plt SGT	Co E
SSGT R. E. PRUITT	Plt SGT	Co G
SGT C. C. ANDERSON	Plt Guide	Co E
SGT H. S. HEALD	Radio Operator	H&S Co
CPL G. H. TANAKA	Squad Leader	Co G
CPL R RODRIQUEZ	Plt Guide	Co G
HM3 M. A. HAUCK	Corpman	Co G
LCPL R. L. SHELDON	Mortarman	H&S Co
LCPL L BAINETT	Squad Leader	Co G
LCPL K. Y. CHIEF	Squad Leader	Co G
LCPL N RIVERA	Squad Leader	Co G
PFC J BENJAMIN	Grenadier	. Co G
PFC A HOPKINS	Grenadier	Co G
PFC R. A. FRAZEE	Radio Operator	Co G
PFC T. W. TREBIL	Rifleman	Co G

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H&S Co

# HAVY ACHIEVE ENT

2dLT W. L. SMITH	Plt Cmdr	Co E
SGT V. G. SALINAS	Plt Guide	Co G
SGT J. N. WYATT	Plt SGT	Co G
HM1 G CONWORS	Medical Chief	H&S Co
LCPL K LEWIS	Rifleman	Co E
LCPL R. J. WILLIAMS	Fire Team Leader	Co E
LCPL D. A. VALENTINE	Rifleman	Co G
LCPL D. C. TAYLOR	Machine Gunner	Co G
LCPL C. A. GEISELBRETH	Radio Operator	Co G
PFC F RIOS	Grenadier	Co E
PFC J BEARD	Rifleman	Co∈E
PFC S. R. HANSON	Fire Team Leader	Co E
PFC L. R. GALLAGHER	Rifleman	Co E
PFC T. G. LAMBERT	Fire Team Leader	Co E
PFC G. W. WAGERS	Radio Operator	Co G
HN D. J. FOLEY	Corpman	Co G
PFC B. L. FULLER	Rifleman	Co G
PFC R. D. DOCHNIAK	Rifleman	Co G
PFC M. S. COOPER	Rifleman	Co G
PPC R GALCIA	Rifleman	Co G
PFC W. A. AKERLY	Asst Machine Gunner	Co G
PFC J. K. PEARSON	Automatic Rifleman	. Co G
PFC B. D. CRISP	Rifleman	Co G
PIC M. D. HENNEN	Rifleman	Co G
PIC M. G. DICK	Rifleman	Co G
PFC J. N. WEMITT	Rifleman	Co G
PFC G. O. HAGEN	Rifleman	Co G
PFC A. E. BAILEY	Rifleman	Co G
PFC C. D. SPINKS	Automatic Rifleman	Co G
PFC R. G. CAMPBELL	Radio Operator	Co G
PIC W. J. OVERTON	Squad Leader	Co G
PFC D. R. GIBBS	Rifleman	Co G
PFC A. L. LOPEZ	Automatic Rifleman	Co G
PFC R. J. TOWNLEY	Rifleman	Co G
HN R. G. KARR	Corpman	Co G
PVT S. G. HAUN	Rifleman	Co E
PVT J. E. CALTER	Rifleman	Co G
PVT J. M. KERN	Rifleman	Co E
PVT C OLIVER	Rifleman	Co G
PVT M. E. CARRET	Rifleman	Co G
ag v an a 3 € and e van de 1 € van de 10	A CAMPA A CALL CAMPA	-5 4

# PURPLE HEART

LCPL G COPENHAVER	(POSTHUMOUSLY
LCPL A. L. LONEY	(POSTHUMOUSLY
LCPL A GARCIA	(POSTHUMOUSLY)
PFC L BLESSING	(POSTHUMOUSLY
PFC J. R. MAXWELL	(POSTHUMOUSLY
PFC W. BOYD	(POSTHUMOUSLY

# PURPLE HEART (CONTD)

PFC K. R. TURNER
PFC D. A. BENEDETT
PFC J. J. JACQUES
PFC A. R. SANDOVAL
PFC R. W. RIVENBURGH
HN R. J. MANNING
HM2 B. GAUSE, JR

(POSTUMOUSLY)
(POSTUMOUSLY)
(POSTUMOUSLY)
(POSTUMOUSLY)
(POSTUMOUSLY)
(POSTUMOUSLY)

CAPT M. E. STAHL
CAPT J. H. DAVIS
lstLt T. L. TONKIN
2dLt J. McDANIEL 5th
SSGT R. C. PRUITT

SSGT D. R. DAVIS SGT V. G. SALINAS

SGT G. C. LUTZ

SGT J. H. JONES SGT R. RODRIGUEZ

SGT G. H. TANAKA

CPL T. E. DUKE

CPL C. L. MITCHELL

CPL D. L. TAYLOR

LCPL J. D. MAINELLA

LCPL M. E. APODACA

LCPL M. G. DICK

LCFL C. A. GIESELBRETH

LCFL J. N. WEMITT

LCPL S. T. MORGAN

LCPL M. A. MEARS

LCPL D. A. VALERTINE

LCPL T. W. TREBIL

LCPL J. GRAICHEN

LCPL R. L. HUGHES

LCPL A. D. WYATT

LCPL R. J. FRANCIS

LCPL D. L. FOWLER

LCFL F. D. JOHNSON

LCPL W. GOODPASTER

LCPL L. W. SMILEY

PFC R. J. MONTOYA

PFC M. L. LOUALLEN

PFC D. R. GIBBS

PFC K. E. DECKARD

PFC L. D. YERG

PFC M. S. COOPER

PFC D. M. CARRESCO

PFC K. E. FRY

PFC H. WALTON

HM3 D. J. FOLEY

HM3 S. J. POORE

1stIt M. S. EUSTIS

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

3d Marine Division (-)(Rein),FMF

FPO San Francisco 96602

BnBul 3000 JBH/cnl 31 May 1975

#### BATTALION BULLETIN 3000

From: Commanding Officer To: Distribution List

Subj: Air Contingency Battalion Landing Team (ACBLT) assignment as

Ref: (a) CTF Operation Order 201 (b) BLT 2/9 Operation Plan 7-74

1. Purpose. To promulgate information about and assignments to the ACBLT Standby Company.

#### 2. Information.

- a. In accordance with reference (a) this Battalion has been assigned ACBLT responsibilities for the period of 1-30 June 1975.
- b. In accordance with reference (b) one rifle Company will be designated as the primary ACBLT standby company. Attachments as indicated in reference (b) will report to the ACBLT standby company commander, as appropriate, upon reciept of this bulletin.

## 3. Action

- a. Company commanders will familiarize themselves with references (a) and (b), and stand ready to move to the point of embarkation within the time required.
- b. Companies will assume the duty as standby Company as indicated below:

1-7 June Co F (assume 0001; 1 June 1975)
7-14 June Co H (assume 0800, 7 June 1975)
14-21 June Co G (assume 0800, 14 June 1975)
21-30 June Co E (assume 0800, 21 June 1975; stand down 2400, 30 June 1975)

4. Self-Cancellation: 31 July 1975

) J. B. HENDRICKS

TALC



2d Mettalion, 9th Marines 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF FRO San Francisco 96602

> 3/21C/ml 3120 21 June 1975

#### JEP OF ANDIM

Prom Air Lisson Officer

To: Air Lieson Officer, 3d Marine Division

Via: Air Lisson Officer, 9th Marines

Subje TACE CASEX in the Republic of the Philippines

Ref: (a) Div0 3120.2

Rncl: (1) Frequently Used Telephone Numbers

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted for the period 4-14 June, 1975.

2. Najor REED or Major PACE, III MAF Lieson, will assist in transportation, billeting, logisties and any problems that might arise.

## 3. Trenspertation

a. Vehicles will be procured by III MAF Limson. At least one member of the TACP must have a government drivers license, however, since the TACP must check out the vehicle.

b. In the event that Marine helicopeters are not eveilable, station hele's will provide transportation to and from the range. These can be scheduled by phone through NAS Cubi Point Flight Schaduling. Scheduling should be reconfirmed during the afternoon prior to the day desired.

c. In the event that here are not evailable, books will have to be used. The initial liason party should make a tentative request to Port Services via a personal visit and a memorandum covering the entire period. In the event that a boat is needed, a phone call to Port Services prior to 1900 the day prior will suffice.

4. Squipment Requirements. It is resommended that all available UNF assets, and a minimum of two (2) VNF redice be taken. In addition, spare handsets, parts, and external speakers should be taken. If PEC-41's are utilized, one anode Kit for each day of operation should be taken.

- 5. COMMAVEASE Subic has all the target schedules for the Cubi Complex. Contact this office for all target coordination.
- 6. Philippine Constabulary requests should go through the Base PMO, and should be made by the advanced party upon arrival. The PC must be picked up the TACP each day at PMO.
- 7. The participating squadrons should be contacted and briefed prior to the exercise, regarding range regulations and safety procedures.
- 8. Units should bring their own corponer.
- 9. The following training was accomplished:
- a. 56 sorties were controlled for a total of 641 runs. Aircraft used were CV-10, AV-8, and F-4, all from Marine squadroms.
- b. Ordinance expended consisted of 66 MK 76's 48 MK 81's, 83 MK 82's, 4 CBU 55's, 245 2.75 inch rockets, 112 zumi rockets, 14,000 rounds of 7.62 mm, and 2,000 rounds of 20 mm.
- c. TACP classes were conducted in the field during breaks in flight operations. It included map reading, evaluation of terrain, and ordnence equabilities.
- d. A brief by the squadrons and a tour of the strike aircraft was given on 12 June 1975.
  - e. 36 hours of JEST training was completed on 10 and 11 June 1975.
- 10. Problems Encountered:
- a. Upon arrival at Subic, it was learned that the range could not be used from 10-12 June, due to a previously scheduled RGF exercise. Just: School and squadron briefs were used to fill the time.
- b. The PRO-75 radio is entirely unsuitable for TACT use. After two days of operation all three (3) of the PRO-75 radios were down because of malfunctions in the R/T unit.
- c. On 4 June, we had no snode kit for our PRC-41, and had to relay all transmissions to F-4 sixeraft through an OV-10.
- d. Transportation to and from the exercise was not blocked by III MAF Liason, even through such action was requested. Blocking of scate is necessary to ensure proper transportation is provided.





e. The number of targets available on the range is limited. A direct hit on any target will destroy it, thus limiting the training available. It is felt that an attempt should be made to increase the number of targets in the impact area.

Respectfully Submitted

B. L. CASSIDY Capt USMC



3 MAF Liason-Major REED/Major PAGE
COMNAVBASE Subic- Chief ROPER
PMC (Philippine Gonslatinley Mr. O'BRIEN
Port Services (Mine Boats)
SOO Mam Camp
Deployed Marine Squadron
Cubi PAX Terminal
Cubi Base Ops
Cubi Fit Scheds (Navy Helos) TJC CLIFFORD
Marine Gunfire School
JEST
3rd FSR (C-RATS) Okinama
Marine Liaison MSD (C-EATS)
Cubi BOQ

43674/49792 49907/49908 43887/43769 43457 53430 56115/56116 53441/53478 53106/53257 53252/53259 49586 53501/53544 635-6905 43473/43494 56241

ENCLOSURE (1)