

RE: TANAKA, Shinichi

1. In connection with par. A(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) appearing on pp. 7, 7a and 8 of the affidavit, the following exhibits may be considered pertinent:

a. Exh. 638 (R. 7029) is a document which was found in the files of the German Foreign Office. It is a telegram dated July 4, 1941, signed by German Ambassador Ott, in which he states that military attache reports following personal impression from conversation with Japanese General Staff "the occupation of Saigon in the not too distant future. It is the preliminary condition for an eventual further southern move for which however there are as yet no tangible footholds discernible."

b. Exh. 639-A (R. 7031) is a telegram dated Bangkok, July 4, 1941. It relates to the preparation in carrying out of certain military operations in the Netherlands Indies and Indo China by the Japanese forces. It states among other things that "failure of Japan's economic negotiations with the Netherlands Indies would oblige her to take over the oil resources there by force since her fleet would otherwise be incapable of action. Prior to this there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo China in order to procure a concentration area and jumping-off ports against the Netherlands Indies." Telegram is signed Thomas and is marked "Secret Affair of the Reich."

c. Exh. 639-B (R. 7033) is a telegram dated July 10, 1944, from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, which states among other things "all symptoms are pointing to the fact that the Japanese movement against Indo China is now imminent . . . According to confidential information from a reliable source the key-day for action is to be July 17."

d. Exh. 640 (R. 7037) is a telegram addressed to Ambassador KATO in France, sent July 12, 1941. It states among other things "in order to meet the serious international circumstances of the recent days and to make headway to establish the East Asia co-prosperity sphere, Japanese Government has decided in the Cabinet Council to take possession of military bases and to dispatch Japanese forces to South French Indo China." It requests Ambassador KATO open negotiations at once with the French -- that it was most preferable that France give her consent to the dispatch of troops and that if she refuses and Japan has her troops advance from her own standpoint, it is possible that a grave change might occur in the situation of French Indo China. This telegram was found in the office of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

e. Exh. 641 (R. 7041) is an intercepted message from Canton to Tokyo dated July 14, 1941. It states among other things "the immediate object of our occupation of French Indo China will be to achieve

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our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is when the international situation is suitable to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise."

f. Exh. 642 (R. 7044) is a telegram signed "Rintelen", addressed to German Foreign Minister, and is dated July 1941. It states among other things "Japanese Government has started negotiations with the French Government with a firm decision in order to secure for herself among other things naval and air bases in Indo China. An appendix attached to the telegram provides for among other things "the dispatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops, fleet units and air units to South Indo China. Use of the following eight localities as air bases; Saigon being one of them."

g. Exh. 644 (R. 7052) is a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated July 20, 1941, copy of which was found in the files of the German Foreign Office. The telegram relates to the contemplated action by Japan with respect to Indo China and states "should the French answer not be in the affirmative, the Japanese Government would resort to force."

h. Exh. 645 (R. 7053) is a telegram from Bangkok, dated July 18, 1941, marked "Secret Reich Matter" and is signed "Scholl". A copy of this telegram was also sent to Tokyo. It states among other things "to carry out the planned Siberian operation, Japan is asking a defensive front against America, England, China and Netherlands Indies aimed at the same time at the suppression of the de Gaulle movement through the occupation of Indo China. Deployment in Indo China should be finished at the beginning of August."

2. The same exhibits may be applicable to par. B(a), (b) and (c) appearing on pp. 8, 8a and 9 of the affidavit.

3. The same exhibits may be applicable to par. C(a), (b) and (c) on pp. 9 and 10 of the affidavit.

4. I have not been able to allocate to any one of the above mentioned paragraphs of the affidavits any one of the specific exhibits mentioned. However, it appears to me that the contents of the exhibit did relate to the general subject matter of the paragraphs cited. At the discretion of the person cross-examining TANAKA and he may decide to cite these exhibits to the Tribunal.

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16,147

He believed it was on December 1 or 2 when he was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write or issue an order. They were sent that day after signature by SUGIYAMA. On November 27 or 28, 1941, SUGIYAMA told the witness that X-Day would be December 8, 1941.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Okamoto

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The witness stated that when he used the word "preliminary" conference he used the word preliminary as an adjective and not as a noun and meant the liaison conference. In order to make the decision of the liaison conference legal, there must be a Cabinet meeting. \* He did not know whether any liaison conference decision had been modified by Cabinet conferences.

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The witness stated that the power to decide operational plans rests in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff. \* The witness stated that the nation's operational plan is based upon the nation's policy. The War Ministry is in charge of national defense policy and the outline of national defense is also under his charge. The Chief of General Staff is in charge of national defense and operations. An operational plan is complete only when the policy and the defense policy and the defense operations are coordinated and integrated. Both in theory and in fact there can not be an operational plan separate from national policy and defense. If a nation is to set up or formulate an operations plan it must take into consideration diplomatic policy related to the matter. And it must build up its military manpower strength and its materiel equipment.

16,155

Materiel, personnel and budget necessary for operations \* is in charge of the War Ministry, and is under the charge of the Cabinet or government itself. An operations plan is formulated on the basis of equipment and materiel, personnel and money available, and within the limits of them. The Chief of General Staff, however, formulates the operations plan.

16,157

Matters concerning employment of military force and operations are in charge of the Chief of Staff. It is not true to say that after \* the Chief of the General Staff has

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16,158 made his decision that an explanation is made to the War Minister and his understanding sought. \* In an operations plan men and materiel are included. They are fundamental elements in it. With respect to the important items in an operations plan such as men and material the Chief of General Staff discusses the matter with the War Minister. \* Actually 16,159 these are the principal matters, but the relationship is very intimate with general policy.

16,160 He recalled being directed by SUGIYAMA, following the conference of July 2, 1941, to make operational studies on the campaigns against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Bismark, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. He was ordered to make a study and the orders were given separately on different occasions. \* The study was started about the time of the order, but it was not completed until the first part of December. He had definitely heard following the conference of September 6 from SUGIYAMA that while efforts were mainly concentrated on diplomatic negotiations, they were making 16,161 preparations to cope with a possible exigency. \* The Chief of General Staff also talked to him in line with the decision reached at the Imperial Conference of September 6.

16,162 The reason that the telegrams sent to the field commanders were communicated to the War Minister is that it is impossible to conceive that in an important matter like this it would not be reported or made known to the War Office. The War Minister was more than notified. There were regulations concerning that matter. There is a regulation which 16,163 stipulated \* that approval should be obtained from the War Minister and his subordinates. This is because it applies not only to military administration but relates to national defense policy in a very large sense.

16,164 Power to issue orders rests with the Chief of General Staff. There is no case in which any order is issued in which the approval or agreement of the War Minister has not been obtained. \* The power to issue orders, however, with respect to operations resides in the Chief of Staff.

He received a statement from General SUGIYAMA that in the event there was a successful settlement the operational plan would be abandoned. Shortly after SUGIYAMA

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- 16,165 issued the order for him to make plans, the Chief of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry came to see the witness. He stated that an order had been issued, but if the diplomatic negotiations would be successful \* the Japanese forces sent to the South Seas would have to be brought back, and he inquired whether it would be possible to return them peacefully. The purpose of the visit was that the War Minister had said that if the negotiations should reach a successful culmination, the forces would be returned, and told him to go see the witness and discuss the matter whether the soldiers could be brought home peacefully. While the witness told him it was not a very simple question since there would be nothing better than a successful conclusion of the negotiations, he assured his visitor that the General Staff would take full responsibility for returning the forces. The Chief of the Personnel Bureau was General TOMINAGA.
- 16,166 The witness stated that if the War Ministry refused to provide \* the materiel, men, or other things required by the Chief of the General Staff, the operational plans conceived by the General Staff could not be formulated. The Chief would have to as a matter of course formulate a plan within the limitation of men and materiel guaranteed by the War Ministry.
- 16,168 \* By operations the witness meant combat and forward advance of troops and stationing of troops. He therefore included advance into Indo-China within the meaning of operations.
- 16,170 MUTO negotiated with the witness on order of TOJO. As far as the witness knew MUTO carried out his duties within strict limits. The witness felt \* that he respected TOJO's
- 16,171 orders to the point where he wondered that one should be able to respect the orders of TOJO to the degree that he did. MUTO was a man rich in common sense, realistic and somewhat conservative. He did not know whether in those days MUTO's \*
- 16,172 opinion was especially favored and adopted by TOJO. The plans of many people, including MUTO, were rejected by TOJO. He had no concrete example where MUTO's plan had been rejected, but he felt sure that such a situation existed. There had been cases where MUTO's signature had been affixed to a document
- 16,173 which was later rejected by TOJO. \* Where MUTO and the witness could not agree the matter was brought for consultation between the Vice Chief of Staff and the Vice Minister of War, and where they could reach no solution it was taken up by the Chiefs of Staff and War Minister themselves. A Bureau chief had no power of decision on any matters of importance.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, SHINICHI.

23302 \* The witness stated that he lived in Mie Pre-  
23303 fecture. \* He identified exhibit No. 2676 as his affi-  
davit and verified it. The affidavit stated that the  
witness was chief of the First Operations Department in  
the General Staff from October 12, 1940, to December 7,  
23304 1942. \* In accordance with the custom, the Army's plan  
of operations against the Soviet for 1941 was formed in  
the winter of 1940, and technically prescribed the opera-  
tions necessary to defeat Japan, Manchuria, and Korea, and  
the basic principle consisted in shifting from a protracted  
defensive to the offensive. In the beginning of November,  
1941, SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff responsible for national  
defense and tactics, indicated to the Vice Chief and the  
witness that in drawing up and deliberating on operations  
plans against the Soviet, they should adhere strictly to  
23305 the national policy established in regard to \* adjusting  
Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and the policy shown  
to the Kwantung Army in August 1940; that is, the basic  
policy of reserving a part of the army against Soviet  
attack and to maintain peace in the north. The witness  
was informed by SUGIYAMA that he and the War Minister had  
reached complete agreement on the fundamental principle.

23306 The Intelligence Division came to the conclusion  
that in the winter of 1941 the Kwantung Army had ten  
divisions and 500 planes, as against 30 Russian Sharp-  
shooter Divisions in the Far East, and 2500 planes, which  
was the main strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East.  
If the two Japanese divisions in Korea and the four Russian  
divisions \* in the Siberian military district were added,  
Japan would have twelve divisions against 34 for the Soviet.  
Usually the Soviet had aimed at maintaining three times  
the strength of the Kwantung Army, but the growing number  
of airplanes and tanks tended to increase the fighting  
power of her strength against Japan, and the Russian  
strength was judged to be about 50 divisions.

With the progress of the various five year plans  
Soviet preparation for mobilization, concentration, and  
engagement in war increased the speed of its effectuation,  
and would have been completed, it was believed, in three or  
four months. Japan had to take precautions, because even  
in peace the Soviet Army of the Far East had adopted a  
quasi-wartime organization and more than 100 long-range  
bombers were in a position to raid Tokyo and other areas.

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23306           Of the total mobilized strength of the Soviet  
23307           Union, there were 150 sharpshooter divisions, of which 50  
              \* were in the Far East. Even in the cast of a two front  
              war, let alone a one front one in the Far East, it had to  
              be considered that more strength would be available to the  
              Soviet in the Far East. Russia was also in a more advant-  
              ageous position in regard to supply of strength after  
              hostilities opened. In addition to 4500 first-line planes  
              she had 2,000 second-line ones instantly available as first-  
              line craft. Judging from the fact that in the Russo-  
              Finnish war in 1939 Russia carried on operations on a line  
              of communications over 200 kilometres in 50 degrees below  
              zero, and in view of the efficiency of her supply at  
              Nomonhan, they could not make light of the Soviet capacity  
              to supply.

23308           The total Japanese war-time strength for 1941,  
              approved by the War Ministry, consisted of 48 divisions,  
              and if its employment in war-time was estimated at about  
              30 divisions against Russia, ten in China, and about five  
              against Anglo-Americans and a few in reserve, it was  
              evident that there would be considerable shortage \* in  
              every quarter, especially with respect to aircraft, tanks,  
              rear services and liquid fuel. With only 30 divisions it  
              would be difficult for Japan to take the offensive and  
              overcome the Soviet Army, which it was estimated would  
              reach 50 divisions at the beginning. After consultation  
              and investigations with the War Ministry on the relative  
              rapidity of concentrating forces and the capacity for  
              production and supply, it was concluded that Japan was in  
              a more difficult position to take the initiative.

23309           If relations with the U. S. and Britain grew  
              more strained, they would have to estimate more than ten  
              divisions against these powers, about ten for China, more  
              than 20 against Russia, and a few for reserve, and it was  
              feared in such a case there would be little hope for Japan  
              to succeed in a protracted defensive struggle. The  
              strategic danger from this wide disparity in numerical  
              strength between Japan and Russia \* was aggravated by the  
              fact that a basic defense organization against the Soviet  
              had not been established because of lack of peacetime  
              strength of the Kwantung Army. These circumstances  
              suggested that even if Japan carried out operations most  
              favorably she would come to a standstill strategically  
              and would be at a loss to end the war. \* This was the  
23310           result of First Department investigations.

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23310

Immediately before assuming office, SUGIYAMA, who had inspected Manchuria in the autumn of 1940, reported that even on the eastern borders, to which the Kwantung Army attached greatest importance, strength of the divisions was so weak that only about 60 soldiers of each company were available for emergency, to say nothing of division shortage. Though fortifications had been completed in the front, there was no vertical depth on the second and third lines, and if an emergency arose these lines would easily be broken. The division commanders on the spot had stated that in the early stages it would be most difficult to resist Russian attacks for three months, and impossible to do so for more than four. There were many defects, especially in the air force.

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The Chief of Staff \* approved the results of these investigations, and concluded that the policy of totally avoiding war be adhered to from a strategic standpoint, since should a war break out Japan's shortage of fighting power not only endangered the operations, but would force Japan to leave the China Incident unsettled. Further, if the U. S. and Britain should become involved there would be little or no hope of success for Japan, particularly with respect to air forces. They therefore decided that Japan should adhere to strategically avoiding war totally. On this point the witness thought the Chief was in complete agreement with the War Minister.

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The witness approved the conclusion of the First Section, that the Kwantung Army with forces at the most 60 to 70% of Russian forces, would be obliged to employ defensive strategy in the early periods. The details were, the troop strength \* relationship, and the fact that concentration and transportation of forces and materials would compel Japan definitely to adopt a defensive strategy; to secure a troop strength of 30 wartime divisions Japan would be required to transport 20 from Japan and China to reinforce the ten in Manchuria, although the forces to be drawn were actually engaged in China operations. In other words, 70% of Japanese wartime strength against Russia and war material needed rapid increase in transportation, even if circumstances were most favorable and railway and shipping were orderly and smoothly, it would take about 140 days for mobilization to complete the whole strength of the Kwantung Army. Even if they hurried it would take 120 days to change to the offensive and begin on the eastern border area.



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23312 They therefore took the indisputable conclusion  
23313 \* that the Soviet would take the initiative in starting  
the offensive during this period. The Kwantung Army was  
therefore obliged to take as the basis of its operational  
plan that it adopt a passive strategy at the beginning,  
check the Russians for a long time by a delaying type of  
defense, make every effort to speed preparations for  
battle, and shift to the offense in the east about the  
fifth month after the outbreak.

23314 In taking this decision, they did not consider  
the practical claims of the Kwantung Army that there would  
be one or two months preparation for battle after concentra-  
tion of forces. According to the judgement of the Second  
Section, it would take a longer time for the Kwantung Army  
to complete preparations for beginning the attack if they  
took into account the Soviet well-developed intelligence  
net, the real conditions of peace in Manchuria and the  
existence of superior Russian air forces \* which could  
destroy transportation. Furthermore, the Russian forces  
in the Far East retained a high standard of organization  
in ordinary times, and were far superior in speed of  
concentration. It was clearly indicated that Japan would  
face a prepared attack from Russia with her operations  
unprepared, irrespective of whether it was to the west,  
east, or north. They had to pay serious attention to the  
inevitability and intenseness of early air-raids on Japan  
and Manchuria. They reached the conclusion that it would  
take a much longer time than the planned estimate to  
transport Japanese forces, and that this period would  
constitute a grave crisis in operations against Russia.

23315 According to the First Section investigations,  
the Kwantung Army should shift to an offensive following  
delaying defense in the early period, and should especially  
in the eastern area sweep and destroy \* the long-range  
bomber bases in the southern Maritime Province to complete  
the defense of Japan. This was a minimum from the defense  
standpoint, and explains why Japan must take the offensive  
without falling into mere defense compelling it to stay  
on the borders for a long time. As the war situation  
developed, she should open an offensive movement on other  
borders to complete her defense and to carry out operations  
needed to end the war.

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23316 In the eastern border areas the offensive would require about two months after changing over to the attack. During that time Japanese forces would check Russia's attack in the north while in the west they would withdraw if necessary to the line of the Great Hsingan Mountains to obtain time. With the completion of organization of a passive offensive in the east, they would again attack in the northern area of Blagoveschensk. A strength of ten divisions of ground forces and the main strength of the air forces \* had to be transferred from the eastern to the northern front after the seventh or eighth month of hostilities. According to the investigations made with the transportation and communication section, the transfer of forces to the north would take about three months under most favorable conditions. It was therefore figured that the concentration for an attack in the north would continue until the end of the tenth or 11th month. The success and completion of concentration would be greatly influenced by the war situation and extend of Russian air-raids. The most important problem was preparing munitions for the attack in the north. After consultation with the War Ministry in August 1941, the program was to prepare and store munitions for two battles of eight months each in Manchuria, but it was felt it would be exhausted by the seventh month after beginning when the battle in the eastern area occurred.

23317 The ammunition for transition to the attack in the north had to depend on new production after hostilities began. \* The preparation of ammunition for a total of 60 divisions, that is, two battles for 20 divisions in the north and west, and one for one battle for other forces in Kwantung, would require seventeen months even if extreme economy was practised. The attack on the north would be decisively curbed by this, and production and supply of ordinance other than munition would be a circumstance postponing the attack.

23318 In the north Japan would face a Russian begun attack from the beginning, and would not take an offensive for at least a year. During the interim there would be many changes. The conclusion was that the realization of attack in the north was very doubtful. The chief and vice-chief of staff approved these conditions and ordered that they form the basis of annual operations plans. They were asked to investigate a policy to speed up the time of shifting to the attack in the east and not to weaken the aggressive \* spirit of the Kwantung Army in the early delaying type of defensive operations.

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The Chief further asked that all plans should be based on the fact that operations in the Far East should be considered overseas ones to Russia, compared to colonial operations. As to Japan, they were interior operations around her very heart. According to his own inspections, defensive operations at the spot were serious and required the strengthening of the guard organization of the Kwantung Army. He therefore indicated that the system of 16 divisions in Manchuria required to be realized. This had to have the consent of the War Ministry, and the Ministry had to get the government's consent to the outline of materials and expenditure. It having connections with diplomacy, they were asked to continue investigations therefore.

23319 In forming operational plans for 1941, the Tripartite Pact had no influence. Both the Chief and \* the Vice Chief held the view that the Pact neither contributed to nor influenced the operations plans of 1941. If a war with Russia broke out, Japan would not expect operational assistance from Germany and Italy, and did not feel obligated to help them in case of war with Russia. No one then dreamed of a Russo-German war breaking out.

23320 Immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident on August 1937, the Russo-Chinese Non-Aggression Pact was signed. It was not then clear whether there was a military treaty attached, but in 1939 there was a secret agreement. A Russo-Chinese trade pact was concluded with the chief aim of supplying China with arms. In March 1939, following Stalin's address, Molotov's policy of assisting China was confirmed. Considering this series of facts, the principle of two-front operations \* in the east and west, the five-year plans which included industrialization and militarization of the Far East, and the Russian attitude toward the anti-Comintern Pact and Tripartite Pact, it was concluded that Russia in the future would interfere with Japan.

23321 \* Immediately after the decision on national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff gave an explanation of Japan's relations with the Soviet. There will be the most favorable situation for Japan, since it will rectify the Soviet menace to the Far East, prevent Germany from mustering power to threaten the Far East, and realize cooperation among the three. The resort to arms is aimed at settling the northern problem. If the problem could be settled diplomatically with armed forces in the background, it would be desirable.

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The long-term and protracted use of arms must be strictly decided. This idea presupposes the evasion of large-scale operations in a concrete form. Therefore military preparations against the Soviet is not preparations for war, and resort to arms is not yet decided.

23322 Japan's northern defense, Sakhalin and northern waters will be rationally solved. It is hoped ultimately by establishing a demilitarized zone in the border regions that disputes will end. Sakhalin and fisheries problem will be solved and Japan freed of menace, even if a German Soviet war broke out, the Tripartite Pact does not oblige Japan to give aid to German operations, and Japan's actions are not restricted. This national policy is not the deciding factor for using arms against the Soviet. It only stipulated that preparations must be made in view of possible need for arms in accordance with future developments. They had made no commitment on mistakes of Germany.

) 23323 In hastening preparations for a possible war with Britain and the U. S. and the policy to be adopted toward Russia, the elimination of obstacles to maintaining the basic policy toward U. S. and Britain was a restraining influence in drawing up measures against Russia. The question of use arms was looked on as most important, and an order was issued to the Vice-Chief and the Department Heads requiring \* careful examination.

23324 The judgements of the second part, covering the period from the beginning of the German-Soviet war to the end of July 1941, was that the development of the war could not be easily predicted, and there is no little fear of protraction. The report of TATEKAWA to the Foreign Ministry and that of the military attaches in the Soviet contain the same opinion. Germany's declaration as to the end of the war must be carefully considered. While the transportation to European Russia of Soviet forces in the Far East will take place, abandonment of the Far East is inconceivable. This will restrict the transportation of forces to the west and will not allow the cutting of actual strength by half. If it is halved, 15 divisions will be left east of Lake Baikal and the hasty use of arms would inevitably result in an unexpected emergency. To settle northern problems it is necessary to concentrate sufficient forces in Manchuria. Requiring particular consideration \* is a possible conflict between Japan, U. S., and Britain, in view of the difficulty in negotiations since the outbreak of the Russo-German War.

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The Soviet attitude toward Japan must be strictly watched, since the Soviet, long a menace to Japan, had entered into a state of war with Germany, an ally. Closer rapprochement between the U. S., Britain, and the Soviet, might give impetus to U. S.-Soviet military cooperation and in the advance of American air forces to the Far East.

They must take into consideration confusion in the Soviet and lack of peace and order in Manchuria, and they must strengthen defense, vigilance and war preparations in Manchuria as self-defense whether or not they intend to settle the northern problem.

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The change in relations with the U. S. \* and the attendant change in future relations, along with the affairs in the Soviet, is the most important item in deciding Japan's defense policy against the Soviet. According to Ambassador TATEKAWA in Moscow, the Soviet will not yield to Germany, and compromise is inconceivable. The war will be protracted, communism being vehement nationalism and patriotism. There is fear that the Soviet may take positive steps in the Far East in case she should be strongly supported by the U. S. and Britain.

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The relations with the U. S. suddenly became worse with the freezing of Japanese assets and on the agreement with France for joint defense of FIC. It was therefore judged that they must consider the measures for settling the northern problem in view of the situation as at the end of July 1941. At the beginning of July 1941, the Chief intended to send \* more troops to Manchuria after he had compared the actual Soviet strength with the Kwantung Army and judged the future of Soviet moves, taking into consideration relations with the U. S. and Britain. After consultation with the War Ministry, reinforcements by two divisions was decided on in early July.

The agreement provided that in view of the situation, especially the smallness of reinforcements for Manchuria, it seemed more urgent to reserve the hope of military preparation to settle the northern problem and to streamline the 16 division system with the long-pending object of defense and vigilance. If the opportunity became ripe to settle the northern problem, this would be a preliminary step. The result was the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria, the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver.

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23327 It was the desire of both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff \* to drive home the idea that it did not mean commencement of military operations. Frontier incidents were to be avoided.

23328 From the end of July 1941 they began to study a plan against the Soviet different from that of 1941. This was necessitated by the declaration of July 2 of the national policy to prepare for war with the U. S. and Britain, if unavoidable. In consideration of the previously mentioned matters and the change of the times, the Chief again ordered the Vice-Chief and his Division Chief to settle the new operation plan against the Soviet, as well as the plans against Britain and the U. S. which were correlated with it. Because the Chief came to consider that if operations against the U. S. and Britain were to be taken into consideration at all, a considerable increase in strength for defense \* against the Soviet was unavoidable they concluded that they could not help reducing the scope of defense operations against the Soviet to some 20 divisions.

Nevertheless the policy was unchanged on the principle that operations would be based on self-defense to insure defense of Japan by a protracted defensive and passive offensive. The result of the studies was that strict vigilance be maintained relying on existing strength, the defence would be further reinforced and utmost efforts made to prevent war from breaking out. If the Soviet challenged they would immediately send reinforcements, destroying instantly enemy air forces from the Far East, to rapidly destroy their air forces in the Southern Maritime Province. Time elapsed while these studies were going on.

23329 The reinforcements of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1941 \* or the Special Maneuver was meant to complete the 16 division system in line with the former study. Both the War Ministry and Staff held the opinion that this purported to rectify and strengthen the Kwantung Army defence and guard system, which had many defects and implied preliminary measures to be used in case the policy of July 2 developed. This was decided on through the agreement between the Ministry and the Staff, subsequently approved by the government, to contributing to carrying out peace-time duties of the Kwantung Army. Its peace-time duty is to defend Manchukuo and Kwantung.

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23330      Aside from this, in 1939 the Staff had assigned a part of the army to maintain peace in the north as against the Soviet, thus establishing the principle of the duties and actions of the Kwantung Army. In July 1941 Imperial Headquarters instructed the commander of the Kwantung Army that the purpose of the reinforcements, the so-called \* Special Maneuvers, was to strengthen preparation against the Soviet. The Kwantung Army main strength at the time was ten divisions, plus two not completely organized and 500 airplanes. Intelligence deemed it not more than 30% of the Soviet Far Eastern forces. Unless the 16 division system, the minimum requirement for defense materialized, peace in the north could never be maintained, according to SUGIYAMA.

23331      The main features of the Special Maneuver included reinforcement of the divisions in Manchuria, the sending of two divisions, the additional dispatch of forces under the direct control of the Kwantung Army such as air forces and artillery, and additional supplies, the organization of defense headquarters to command all independent garrisons in Manchuria, \* establishment of the 20th Army Corps Headquarters, and increased munitions. All matters required by these items were considered and dealt with. For the mobilization required emergency enlistment was adopted, and each unit was placed on the basis of full equipment, but not on a war-time basis. This was the substance of the Special Maneuver and did not imply a war program, operational or strategic plans.

23332      \* Its execution took from July to October 1941. At the end of 1941 the Kwantung Army strength consisted of 13 divisions, two having been sent from Japan Proper and two others organized in Manchuria, one of which was diverted to south China, and other units, so the total strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was a little over 600,000.

The air forces had some 700 serviceable planes but since many had been transferred, 280 remained at the end of 1941. This strength contained not only the increase under the Special Maneuver program, but also that realized in 1941 by the previously established unrelated program. The organization of two divisions in Manchuria belonged to the previous program.

Page

23333

\* The Special Maneuver was placed under routine control of the Vice Chief, after having been decided on at a conference with the War Ministry. Steps for each question were decided and disposed of each time without waiting for the overall plan of execution.

Even after the Special Maneuver had been carried out, the Army's defensive and guard preparations along the frontiers was weak, and it was feared whether Japan's defensive operations could be conducted as provided in the operational plan on the basis of 15 divisions in case of a Soviet attack. Around November 1941, when part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army was sent to Europe, its strength consisted of 33 divisions, four other divisions, some 1500 planes and 1300 tanks. The Kwantung Army was estimated as inferior by 50%, even after reinforcements by the Special Maneuver.

23334

In the middle of August 1944, \* the General Staff estimated that the frontier districts would likely be stabilized, and there would be no sign of military cooperation in the Far East between the U. S. and the Soviet. The Soviet would not challenge Japan for the time being. In the middle of August, the Chief of Staff approved this estimate of the situation and acknowledged that there would be little chance of the Soviet Army taking a defiant attitude if the Special Maneuver were perfectly carried out. The War Minister also consented. It was therefore decided not to slacken the Kwantung Army preparedness and to spur execution of the Special Maneuver as much as possible, preparing for the coming winter. Surveillance of executing the established plan for maintaining peace in the north was further tightened to avoid incidents on the frontiers, \* and efforts were made for defense and self-protection with utmost precautions not to arouse friction and adherence to a policy of peace at any cost.

23335

The plan in the north included steps such as withdrawing outposts in districts where trouble was likely to start, while forbidding the forces to advance, to dispense with defense duties in areas where frontiers were disputed or actions difficult, and by localizing frontier troubles in case they arose. Efforts were made thus to maintain peace in the north. While reinforcement was being made, delay due to shortage of transportation, the cold season in Manchuria finally necessitated abandonment of part of the plan.



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23336 Later the unsatisfactory negotiations with the U. S. and Britain worsened the situation, and with the new national policy in the beginning of September a considerable proportion of Manchurian strength was withdrawn and diverted to South China, Formosa, and FIC. The chief forces diverted were one division and considerable tanks, heavy artillery, \* anti-aircraft guns, auxiliary forces, air corps headquarters, fighters, and light and heavy bombers.

23337 The Special Maneuver was not meant to be a preparation for aggression against the Soviet. Since the main emphasis of national policy had come to be directed against the U. S. and Britain under the decision of September 6, Japan not only clung to its policy of peace toward the Soviet, but reduced precautions and preparations against the Soviet. The units transferred to the south included, one division, three tank regiments, 5 heavy artillery regiments, 20-odd anti-aircraft artillery companies, \* 3 air brigade headquarters, 4 fighter regiments, 3 light bomber and 2 heavy bomber regiments, 5 scout plane squadrons and some ground service units.

After July 1941, the Japanese Army in China was planning the Changsha operations for September and October, and operations to restore peace and order in the triangular area of Nanking, and operations for aerial advance into interior China. At the Liaison Conference in the middle of November 1941, the decision was reached that in the event of war against the U. S. and Britain they should by all means avoid making enemies of other countries, and especially from entering into war against the Soviet. They should try to make a reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet, if they were so disposed, win the Soviet over to the Axis camp, and thus adjust relations between Japan and the Soviet.

23338 \* The order issued by Imperial Headquarters to the Commander of the Kwantung Army December 3, 1941, stated that it was the intention to capture major points in the southern regions and dispose of the China Incident, in the meantime making utmost efforts to prevent war against the Soviet. The Kwantung Army will carry out its duties of defending Manchukuo and Kwantung, and preparing for defense operations against the Soviet to meet any development. In settling boundary disputes, efforts will be made to localize the affair. In special areas, armed force defense may be dispensed with if the situation demanded.

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23339 The witness was informed by the Chief of Staff that at the Liaison Conference at the end of November, it was agreed that although on \* outbreak of war with the U. S. and Britain, it was hardly probable that Russia would take positive action against Japan, which was possible if the U. S. would utilize Russian territory for military bases and that Russia would act in various ways against Japan, and that according to later developments it was also possible that the Soviet would wage war against Japan. However, concrete measures were not decided on excepting a defensive plan against the Soviet.

23340 The Chief decided that the 1942 operational plan against the Soviet should be drafted along the line of the previous year's plan, and generally based on the policy that the Kwantung Army maintain its disposition but assume strict precautionary measures, strengthen defenses and strive to the utmost to prevent an outbreak. In case the U. S. and Russia jointly challenge Japan from the north or Russia should independently challenge, without delay Japan should send divisions from Japan and China to destroy \* Russian air forces in the Far East, especially the Maritime Province. The objective was not to fulfill a minimum defensive requirement by assuming passive offensive in place of protracted defensive operations.

23341 The plan was decided on the basis of a separate plan against Russia studied since July 1941, and matters relating to the War Ministry were decided after consultation with it. According to intelligence, Russian strength in the Far East at the beginning of 1942 was a total of 23 divisions, including one tank and three cavalry. In addition there were twelve divisions south of Habarovsk. The Air Forces had a total of 1200, including 60 heavy bombers, 80 long-range bombers, \* 330 light bombers, 450 fighters, 60 assault planes, and 200 seaplanes.

The Kwantung Army had 13 divisions and 500 airplanes, of which 250 were operational, including 50 heavy bombers, 100 light ones, and 130 fighters. The Japanese ground forces were less than 60% of the Russians.

The Liaison Conference of March 1942 decided to conduct necessary operations against vital spots outside occupied areas to hasten the end of the war by forcing the U. S. and Britain into passive defense, to strive for prompt settlement of the China Incident, taking advantage of operations in the south, and to prevent the occurrence

May 29, 1947

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TANAKA - Direct

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23342 of a new incident with Russia and strengthen precautionary measures against war with Russia. According to the estimate \* of the Kwantung Army, the Russian strength consisted of 23 divisions, 20 of which were sharpshooter, 1300 tanks and 1200 airplanes. The lowering in their fighting standard was perceptible, but the entire fighting personnel totalled over 800,000. The Kwantung Army had only 14 divisions of 600,000 men and about 600 airplanes. The Kwantung Army was about 60% of the Russian forces.

23343 \* In May 1942, Imperial Headquarters was considering operations against the Aleutians, Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, and Eastern New Guinea, as operations against the outer strategic points in the Pacific. However, the operations carried out were the Aleutians, Midway, and New Guinea. After that spring, Imperial Headquarters was conducting various studies to conduct a future offensive, with the occupation of Chungking as the objective.

23344 \* As to the offensive into the inland of China to reduce Chungking, a definite plan was formed in the General Staff, and it was agreed that whether it be put into execution was to be finally settled in the autumn of 1942. The nucleus for this operation was to be 15 divisions. Of the necessary strength and equipment, two divisions, 200 planes, two-thirds of the motor vehicles and communications, and all river crossing material were to be taken from Manchuria, and the greater part of fuel and ammunition were to be taken from there for the Kwantung Army. The personnel to be transferred totalled 200,000. The plan was abandoned in December 1942, because of adverse developments around Guadalcanal.

23345 Japanese strength was transferred to the southeast of the Pacific from posts, including Manchuria, to cope with the U. S. counter-attack around the Solomons and Guadalcanal after August, 1942. This made it all the more urgent to prevent outbreak of an incident against Russia, so that absolute peace might be maintained. According to intelligence at the end of 1942, the strength of the Kwantung Army was 14 divisions and 500 planes against the Soviet's 20 divisions and 1,000 planes. Japan's strength was 70% of Russia's, with Russia continuing to maintain a superior strength. \* With respect to operational plans against outer strategic points in the Pacific and the reduction of Chungking, the Staff was worried that they might endanger the execution of passive defensive operations of the Kwantung Army against Russia in reference to military strength, especially planes, tanks, vehicles, rear corps, munitions, and liquid fuel.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, S.  
by Colonel Ivanov

23,353

The witness wrote that he had been appointed in October 1940 Chief of the First Division of the General Staff by the person holding the power of appointment, the Minister of War. He did not know why he was dismissed as chief in 1942, but he did not think that he would have been dismissed because of disagreement on matters pertaining to war guidance and war plans with TOJO and SUGIYAMA. \* He worked under both TOJO and SUGIYAMA, but never engaged in the formulation of aggressive war plans or the prosecution thereof.

23,354

23,355

By order of the Chief of Staff he drew up the operation plans in 1941 and 1942 against the Soviet, Malaya, Java, Borneo, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. He did not have any documents bearing on the plans he wrote about in his affidavit. They are primarily written from his accurate memory.

23,356

He contended in his affidavit that Japan was threatened by the Soviet Union in 1941. \* Despite the fact that in the autumn of 1941 the German troops were attempting to cease Moscow and Leningrad, there were reasons to believe this. There were sufficient reasons why Japan felt a Soviet threat in 1942, even when the Germans had reached Stalingrad and created grave danger for the Soviet in the west. The war in 1942 had entered a state of protracted attrition as a result of the Soviet winter offensive.

23,357

Japan in her war against the United States and Britain entered on extreme and serious difficulties following the defeat at Midway in June 1942. At this period the military alliance of the United States, Britain and the Soviet was very strong and they feared and estimated in accordance with the situation that either the Soviet alone, or the Soviet combined with the United States, might attack Japan from the north. He admitted \* that the period up to the end of 1942 was a very hard one for the Soviet Union, but the Soviet-German war was already a protracted one. It is true that the estimate of the Chief of Staff in August 1942 was that it was very unlikely that the Soviet would start war against Japan by August 1942. It was an estimate that the danger would be relaxed tentatively and temporarily because of winter and the freezing in the north which would prevent active operation.

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He could not recall that in July 1941 Japan decided to start secret preparations for a war against the Soviet. When asked whether he had heard of Exhibit 779, the resolution of the Imperial Conference, July 2, 1941, which provided that while they would not intervene in the Soviet-German war, Japan would take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet, continue diplomatic negotiations, and as the war progressed favorably to Japan they would execute arms to solve the northern problems. The witness stated he heard of the decision from the Chief of Staff at the time. It was not a mistake. However, he also received an explanation from the Chief at that time that the decision did not relate to a preparation for war against the Soviet.

23,359

The so-called Kan-Toku-En of July 1941 was not preparation for war against the Soviet but the reinforcement of defenses against the Soviet. When asked whether it was not the Kwantung and Korean armies which would have to be used according to the decision of the conference of July 2nd, the witness stated that if the situation arose which would require the exercise of armed force, the Kwantung and Korean armies would have been used as a matter of course.

23,360

The operation plans of 1941 provided that reinforcements be sent from Japan and China. When asked whether the Kan-Toku-En was not to prepare in the shortest possible time to strengthen the Kwantung Army for war against the Soviet, the witness stated its purpose was to reinforce and strengthen the \* defensive organization of the Army, which had been extremely weak. It was not a war preparation. It was a plan for reinforcing troop strength to carry out the purposes referred to and not an operational war plan. It included no operational items.

23,361

When asked which organ, the General Staff or War Ministry, drafted the instructions sent in 1941 to UMEZU with respect to measures for strengthening the fighting power of the Army for a war against the Soviet, the witness stated the matter was not clear to him and he would like it explained. He had not stated anything in his affidavit with reference to strengthening offensive preparations against the Soviet.

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23,362

In effecting the Kan-Toku-En it is true that the first replacement and second replacement reserves were called up. He stated that he had not said in his affidavit that this was an emergency or extraordinary mobilization. It should not be called mobilization, but a temporary muster order or temporary calling up. In the Japanese Army the word mobilization was used when the organization is changed from a peacetime to a wartime footing. In the Kan-Toku-En the Army was not placed on a war footing. It was not a mobilization. \* It was true that the calling up of the reserves for replenishing of the Kwantung Army was about the same time when the Soviet-German war started.

23,363

23,364

When he was read an excerpt from Exhibit 830, a telegram sent July 5, 1941 by Kretschmar to Berlin, in which he spoke of the calling up of the reservists and the drafting of materials going on in Japan, the witness stated that that telegram was absolutely \* not based on fact. He was impressed by the manner in which the telegram was written, and it gives the impression that Japan was about to join in the German-Soviet war, which was not so. The mobilization of 900,000 or 500,000 mentioned was not based on facts at all.

23,365

It also stated that Japanese males from 28 to 42 throughout the nation were mobilized. This was a complete distortion. All call-ups were effected within the scope and requirements of the Kan-Toku-En.

23,366

When it was pointed out that this same excerpt stated that since about July 10th they had been transporting troops and reservists from Japan and the goal was Seishin and Rashin for troops and reservists and Tientsin and Shanghai for reservists; and since the middle of July preparations for billeting and arrival of troops in Manchuria were being made, \* the witness stated that Section 6 of his affidavit as reread by the prosecutor, was devoted to the Kan-Toku-En. He had written about it and it was written as read, but he also recognized that there was great divergence between the telegram referred to and what he had stated in his affidavit. He stated that all measures of the Kan-Toku-En named in his affidavit and in the telegram coincided, but there are differences.

First, the telegram was written on the premise that the Kan-Toku-En was a preparation for war against the Soviet, whereas its real purpose in Japan was passive and negative in

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23,369 nature and it was for the purpose of reinforcing the defense and vigilance of Japanese troops. \* He further stated that there were important vital differences, such as the great difference in the number of troops to be sent to Manchuria.

23,370 The order on the Kan-Toku-~~an~~ issued in July 1941  
23,371 was issued by the Imperial Headquarters, \* but the order was drafted by the Chief of Staff, who consulted with the War Minister. Following the drafting of the order, the Chief of Staff consulted the War Minister.

On hearing the passage from his affidavit read to him he could not say that there had been any contradiction to what he had stated so far. While he thought the use of the words "war operational plans" would invite misunderstanding, it was a fact that the General Staff Office drew up annual plans with regard to possible war against the Soviet.

23,372 Asked why he had failed to mention in his affidavit what Soviet cities it was planned to seize at the first stage of war and in the second stage \* with respect to the plan drafted from the beginning of 1941, the witness stated he had stated at length the reasons for the operational plans drawn up at the beginning of 1941. He had explained the basis on which the plans were drawn up because he felt that by understanding them he would convey a better understanding of Japan and her situation.

23,373 When asked what Soviet cities the Japanese troops were planning to seize as provided in the plan of 1941, the witness stated he would like to say it appears from the question that Japan was planning an aggressive war. That is not so. \* This was an operational plan after war broke out. After a war broke out and the operational plan took effect, Japan was to strike an offensive eastward and to destroy the bases for long-range bombing.

Reference being made to the testimony of Colonel SEJIMA, in which he laid out the plan of the Kwantung Army for 1941, which provided for taking many Soviet cities, the witness was asked whether when he used the term protracted defense in his affidavit he meant this plan of seizure of Soviet territory, the witness stated this was not so. At the beginning of operations

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

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Japan will take a position for protracted defensive operations in the frontier district of Manchuria and Russia.

23,375

As to the operational plan for the fiscal year 1942, the witness recalled that the outline was drawn by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army directed to act in accordance with the outline and prepare the details.

23,376

The witness stated he knew General MATSUMURA, former chief of the Russian Sector of the 2nd Section of the 2nd Division of the General Staff and later vice-chief of the Kwantung Army. \*

23,377

When the witness was asked whether he called the operations for seizing the Maritime Province, as mentioned, passive offensive, and did he not understand that under the terms of actual offensive it would be the seizure of the Siberian Urals, the witness stated that whether the offensive was negative or passive would be merely a form of strategy, but the occupation of the Maritime Province is negative, as was that of the Urals and other areas. That has no connection with the matter. At the outset of operations the Japanese were to take a stand for protracted defense. Meanwhile, \* following the completion of operational preparations new action would be taken. This was called a peaceful offensive and was the operation to be taken by the Kwantung Army.

23,378

The question of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is a political one, with which the General Staff had no connection. When it was pointed out that in Exhibit 675A HASHIMOTO had included the Soviet Far East in the Greater East Asia Sphere, or at least in the sphere of influence, \* and the witness was asked whether the operations plans did not reflect in some nature these intentions, the witness stated that these opinions and views were not reflected in the operations plans of the General Staff. HASHIMOTO was just one of the common people, a civilian, and had no position of leadership or influence at the time.

23,379

They were formulating operation plans for defensive purposes against various countries. He stated that operation plans never existed as regards Australia. \* The Philippines was included in the annual plans drawn for the fiscal year 1941. There were no plans against the Netherland

23,380



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East Indies, Java and Burma. The idea of operations existed against Malaya.

When asked whether the General Staff did not during the last two decades draft plans for attacking the Soviet Union and seizure of Soviet territory, the witness stated that he did not know all about the twenty years. He went to the General Staff for the first time in 1940. When he read the documents there he found no evidence for any plans against the Soviet during the past twenty years and discovered to what extent the staff had made every possible effort for defensive purposes while being apprehensive of Japan's situation in the face of Soviet strength.

23,385

The troops transferred from the Kwantung Army late in the autumn of 1941 to the southern regions were: 1 division, 3 tank regiments, 5 artillery regiments, 24 anti-aircraft companies, 3 air corps headquarters, 4 fighter squadrons, 3 light bomber squadrons, 2 heavy bomber squadrons, 5 reconnaissance companies, and ground crews. There were also some others.

23,386

When asked as to the number of units and types of plans in the Far East in the beginning of 1942, the witness stated that what he said in his affidavit was not an estimate. This is intelligence, in possession of the 2nd Division of the General Staff and the estimate made by the staff with regard to Soviet air strength in the Far East was 1200 planes, which was broken down to 60 heavy bombers, 80 long distance, 330 light, 450 fighters, 60 assault and 200 seaplanes. At present he had no documentary data on the units of the Soviet Army in the Far East for 1940-42. These figures came from his very reliable, accurate memory. At the end of the war he had a number of conversations \* and talks with his subordinates on these matters, which confirmed his memory. The responsibility for drafting plans for war rests with the Chief of Staff.

23,387

23,389

From Exhibit 705, the affidavit of TOMINAGA, it was stated that in the plan \* the time of opening war was not indicated because it had to be decided by the Emperor after discussion in the Supreme Council. The plan was preserved after Imperial sanction in the Operations Section of the 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters. A copy of the plan was sent to the Kwantung Army. A senior officer went with it and handed it to the commander of the Kwantung Army to put into practice. It was sent to the Kwantung Army in beginning of April 1940.

4 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS.  
FROM : Lester C. Dunigan.  
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi.

Case #235 relates to the above-named individual although the first name in that file is spelled "SHIZUICHI."

TANAKA was interrogated on 10 June 1946, and a copy of the interrogation is contained in Case #448, Serial #20. Another interrogation of the same individual on 10 June 1946, and a copy thereof, appears in Case #448, and although it bears no serial number is between #38 and #39. A copy of the same interrogation as is contained in Case #448, Serial #20, appears in the file of the defendant WUTO, which is Case #319. None of these interrogations appear in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

It is suggested that copies of these interrogations be placed in the file pertaining to TANAKA or a memorandum setting forth where such interrogations may be found be placed in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

Copy to: Mr. David H. Sutton

LCD/nb

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

2 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Russian Division  
FROM : D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi  
Def. Doc. No. 1323

I hand you herewith a copy of the interrogation of TANAKA, Shinichi dated 10 June 1946. This is found in case file No. 448, serial No. 20. A copy of this also appears in the case file of the defendant MUTO, No. 319. Mr. Lopez interrogated TANAKA on both 10 June and 11 June 1946.

The affidavit of TANAKA, Shinichi was introduced when he was presented as a witness by the Prosecution on 24 January 1947, IPS Doc. No. 2925, Exhibit No. 2244. In the affidavit there is contained a substantial portion of the facts which appeared in the interrogations of TANAKA. Although cross-examined at some length by the Defense, TANAKA maintained the position taken in his affidavit. His testimony appears in the record at pages 16140 - 16174. I call your attention to this as I know you would not wish at this time to refer to any part of the interrogation which contains the same substance as was contained in the affidavit presented by the Prosecution at the time we put this witness on the stand.

D. N. Sutton,  
Assistant Counsel

Enc.

cc: Mr. Tavenner  
Mr. Lopez  
Mr. Dunigan

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS  
20 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi

Former Lt Gen serving on Army General Staff prior to and during Pacific war.

Case #115 USSBS 292.

✓ File 378, Serial 154: Request for interrogation by the Russian Division; Chief of the 1st Department of the General Staff.

✓ File 448, Serial 20: Prior to being Chief of Operations the above held the position of Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia until August 1940. Believed to have been appointed Chief of Operations by General SUGIYAMA and Premier TOJO; had three assistants - Col AKIMODOI - Col YOSHITAKE (both missing) -- could not recall the third man's name. Duties -- worked directly under Chief of Staff who had full responsibility, planned operations which was concerned with the organization of troop units and concerned with strategy.

✓ File 319, Serial 122: The above assumed office as Chief of Operations in October 1940; work was completed in November 1942; stated that General MUTO was one of the liaison men who worked between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff; stated the work of General Staff was mostly paper work concerning operations, strategy and tactics. Basic outlines of plans were submitted to War Ministry and later discussed with the Cabinet. The above gave the duties of the Chief of General Staff, the assistant in charge of General Affairs, Transportation and Supply, etc.

✓ File 441, Serial 5.

✓ File 4, Serial 34. Contains same information.

✓ File 459, Serial 13: Full translation of Russian interrogation of the above.

✓ File 319, Serial 121: The above learned through SUGIYAMA that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 8. After giving up his job as Chief of Operations, the above left for Singapore and did not

*Tanaka's duties  
Sawao 441*

TANAKA, Shinichi - cont.

return until after the end of the war. Subsequent to November 28, 1941, the above worked on operations for the invasion of Malay, Philippines and the DEI.

File 234, Serial 134: Above was responsible for gathering workers in Tokyo to work on the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railroad.

✓ File 378, Serial 97: Report for interrogation to Lt. Leonidov, Room 352, War Ministry Building.

✓ File 459, Serial 16: Full translation of an interrogation of the above by the Russian Division.

✓ File 00, Serial 212: Appointed by TONO as Chief, 1st Dept. of General Staff Headquarters, succeeding Maj Gen TOMINAGA.

✓ File 378, Serial 122: Request for interrogation.

COPIES: 3 File  
1 Mr Newbill

29 May 1947

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO :** Mr. David N. Sutton  
**FROM :** Lester C. Dunigan  
**SUBJECT:** TANAKA, Shinichi.

Reference is here made to my memorandum dated 17 April 1947 concerning the above named individual.

This person appeared as a Prosecution witness and his testimony is contained in pages 16,140 - 16,174 of the Record.

He was also called as a witness for the Defense and was cross-examined by Mr. Tavenner starting at page 20,705 of the Record.

He has now submitted a new affidavit dealing with matters pertaining to the Soviet Union. In this connection, there is in File #459, Serial #16, an interrogation of TANAKA by the Russian Division. The subject matter of that interrogation would have bearing upon the contents of his new affidavit.

His prior testimony mentioned above related primarily to the China Incident. I have examined it and compared it with the contents of the present affidavit and find no matters therein which would be of value in cross-examination.

LOE/nob

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 17 April 1947

TANAKA, Shinichi

The above named person appeared as a witness for the Prosecution, and his testimony is contained in pages 16,140 to 16, 174 of the Record.

Very little is contained in TANAKA's interrogations of June 10 and June 11, 1946, attached hereto, which is not set forth in his direct testimony.

Pages 16,140 to 16,144, inclusive, of the Record describe the work of the General Staff Office. Pages 16,145 to 16,147, TANAKA discusses Imperial Conferences of 6 September 1941 and 1 December 1941 and persons who attended those conferences.

TANAKA's testimony in the Record and the summaries of his interrogations do not relate to matters set forth in his affidavit, Defense Document #925. I have examined the contents of his affidavit and have not been able to locate any specific information in the IPS files which pertains thereto.

File #459, Serial #16, is a translation of an interrogation of TANAKA by the Russian Division, but the matters discussed relate primarily to the years 1942 and 1943 and have no bearing upon the subject matter of his submitted affidavit.

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date: 19 March 1947

TANAKA, Shinichi

He is supposed to testify regarding plans concerning the Soviet Union and the objectives of such plans.

Summary of his interrogation on 10 January 1946

From February 1939 to August 1940 he was Chief of Staff of Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia.

From October 1940 to November 1942 was Chief of Operations (Chief of First Section) of Army General Staff - was placed in that position by General SUGIYAMA and TOJO (page 1, 10 January 1946).

General SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time he held office as Chief of Operations and SUGIYAMA's assistant was General TSUKADA, Osamu, (page 2).

As Chief of Operations he worked directly under Chief of Staff and his duties were to plan operations (page 3).

His section was divided into three parts: (1) organization of troop units, (2) strategy, and (3) air defense of Japan proper. Colonel AKAMADOI and Colonel YUCHITAKE were his assistants (page 3).

In June 1941 operational plans for Indo-China were worked out (page 3).

The time for the operational plans did not take long TANAKA said because of the treaty between Vichy and Japan whereby troops could be brought into Saigon and vicinity peacefully. There were only two plans made regarding Indo-China: (1) for the occupation of Northern Indo-China, which had been completed in 1940 before he took office, and (2) the plans drawn up for the peaceful occupation of Saigon (page 4).

His predecessor, Lt. General TOMINAGA, Kyoji, made the plans for the occupation of Northern Indo-China (page 4). SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time.

(File #00, Serial #212, contains a translation of the December 1945, #1 issue of the weekly Asahi and on page 20 referred to changes in the TOJO line-up, says in part "First of all, he drove out War Minister ANAMI and brought in Lt. General KIMURA, Heitaro, who was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. He then got rid of Major General TOMINAGA by holding him responsible for the faux pas in connection with the invasion of North Indo-China, and appointed Major General TANAKI, Shinichi, as Chief of the First Department of the



TANAKA, Shinichi - continued

General Staff Headquarters." The article continues "as the result of differences of opinion in the frontal Pacific campaign, Major General TANAKA, Shinichi, was sent away to Burma and his place as First Department Chief of the General Staff Headquarters was filled by AYABE, Tachiki, assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army."

Summary of interrogation of 11 June 1946 - File #441, Serial #5

General MUTO did most of the liaison work between the War Minister and the Army General Staff (page 2).

The nature of the liaison work at the General Staff was concerned with operations, strategy, and tactics. The basic outline of these plans including all matters involving politics, foreign relations, and finances were submitted to the War Minister and the War Minister in turn took them up with the cabinet for discussion and approval (page 2).

Pages 1, 2, 3, and 4 discuss the routine of his office (Chief of Operations of Army General Staff).

After Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, he was directed by General SUGIYAMA to make operational plans on the advisability of a campaign against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Dutch East Indies and the Philippines (page 5).

About 10 September 1941, following Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, he was instructed by General SUGIYAMA to begin preparations for operations against these countries, and General MUTO as Chief of Staff was aware of SUGIYAMA's instructions. MUTO was well informed as Chief of Staff on supply and money matters (page 5).

KONOYE, TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, TOYODA, and NAGANO he thought were present at Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941.

MUTO also knew of plans made for Indo-China in June 1941 (page 6).

After plans were completed by General Staff, requisitions for personnel, materials, shipping, ammunition, etc., were made to War Ministry. (page 6)

Operational plans for Java, Malaya, Borneo, Dutch East Indies and Philippines were completed in November 1941, for Bismark after the war started (page 8).

TANAKA discusses operational plans against Malaya (page 8), against Pearl Harbor and the part played by SUGIYAMA, TOJO, MUTO, and others (page 11), for Hainan Island, Singapore, East Indies (page 12).

The remainder of his statements concern events prior and leading up to 7 December 1941.

TANAKA, SHINICHI

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1934	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun, 2nd Class	China In- cident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Golden Kite	China In- cident	War Ministry

TANAKA, Shinichi - continued

General Staff Headquarters." The article continues "as the result of differences of opinion in the frontal Pacific campaign, Major General TANAKA, Shinichi, was sent away to Burma and his place as First Department Chief of the General Staff Headquarters was filled by AYABE, Tachiki, assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army."

Summary of interrogation of 11 June 1946 - File #441, Serial #5

General MUTO did most of the liaison work between the War Minister and the Army General Staff (page 2).

The nature of the liaison work at the General Staff was concerned with operations, strategy, and tactics. The basic outline of these plans including all matters involving politics, foreign relations, and finances were submitted to the War Minister and the War Minister in turn took them up with the cabinet for discussion and approval (page 2).

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The remainder of his statements concern events prior and leading up to 7 December 1941.

Resume by: L. C. Danigan

Date: 19 March 1947

TANAKA, Shinichi

He is supposed to testify regarding plans concerning the Soviet Union and the objectives of such plans.

Summary of his interrogation on 10 January 1946

From February 1939 to August 1940 he was Chief of Staff of Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia.

From October 1940 to November 1942 was Chief of Operations (Chief of First Section) of Army General Staff - was placed in that position by General SUGIYAMA and TOJO (page 1, 10 January 1946).

General SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time he held office as Chief of Operations and SUGIYAMA's assistant was General TSUKADA, Osamu, (page 2).

As Chief of Operations he worked directly under Chief of Staff and his duties were to plan operations (page 3).

His section was divided into three parts: (1) organization of troop units, (2) strategy, and (3) air defense of Japan proper. Colonel AKAMADOI and Colonel YUCHITAKE were his assistants (page 3).

In June 1941 operational plans for Indo-China were worked out (page 3).

The time for the operational plans did not take long TANAKA said because of the treaty between Vichy and Japan whereby troops could be brought into Saigon and vicinity peacefully. There were only two plans made regarding Indo-China: (1) for the occupation of Northern Indo-China, which had been completed in 1940 before he took office, and (2) the plans drawn up for the peaceful occupation of Saigon (page 4).

His predecessor, Lt. General TOMINAGA, Kyoji, made the plans for the occupation of Northern Indo-China (page 4). SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time.

(File #00, Serial #212, contains a translation of the December 1945, #1 issue of the weekly Asahi and on page 20 referred to changes in the TOJO line-up, says in part "First of all, he drove out War Minister ANAMI and brought in Lt. General KIMURA, Heitaro, who was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. He then got rid of Major General TOMINAGA by holding him responsible for the faux pas in connection with the invasion of North Indo-China, and appointed Major General TANAKI, Shinichi, as Chief of the First Department of the

29 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Dunigan**

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - TOJO

WITNESS

**TANAKA, Shinichi**

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info. on purges  
furnished by G-2

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

SUBJECT: Information on Purges furnished  
by G-2, GHQ, SCAP

> TANAKA, Shinichi fell into Category B as a career Army man.

2. Definitions of the categories referred to above are to be found in appendix A of SCAPIN 550, subject: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office," 4 January 1946. This may be ascertain in Room 300 for your information.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, S.  
 by Mr. Tavenner

20,705

The witness stated that the War Service Bureau was a Department of the War Ministry, in charge of organization of military forces, regarding their equipment, mobilization, replacement, and policy with regard to national defense. Prior to March 1937 he served as Chief of the Military Service Section for about a year.

20,707

When he stated in his affidavit that a plan of operation against China could not be realized by the General Staff without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, he meant that matters concerning the strength of forces and materials necessary for operations is a function of the War Ministry. This means that the General Staff, without the cooperation of the War Ministry, would be unable to draft operational plans or to carry them out. Plans could not even be made without their approval, cooperation, and functioning.

20,708

The strength of a Japanese division \* in peace time was between 10,000 and 12,000. The witness stated he had not said there were 20,000,000 troops, but that there were 2,000,000

20,709

Chinese troops. \* He further stated that he did not testify that there were 45 Russian cavalry divisions, but 4.5 divisions.

He stated there were other errors in his affidavit. The affidavit had been read with respect to a decision on government policy as though he had said the policy was decided either in July or August. The date should be July 7 or 8.

20,710

In connection with the Captain OYAMA incident, the affidavit read as though it took place on August 10, 1932, and it should be 1937.

20,711

The source of his information on the strength of Russian troops was the staff office in Tokyo, but he did not know the source of their information. He stated that the conclusion was reached that it would be dangerous and undesirable to carry out operations in China in light of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. right after the outbreak \* of the Marco Polo incident.

Page

When asked whether Japan had not in fact entered into a treaty with Germany which was a military alliance against Russia in November 1936, he said he did not know whether such a military alliance was signed or not, that there was no Japanese-German alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

20,713

When asked when it was first decided it was dangerous to attack the Soviet Union without first subduing the forces of the National Government of China, the witness stated that the conclusion reached was not that the forces of China should be subdued before taking up matters with the Soviet Union; the conclusion reached was that to carry on a full scale war against China in itself was very dangerous \* for Japan, and in addition, if war were waged, the existence of Russia made it even more dangerous for Japan. When asked whether he did not consider that before becoming involved in war with the U.S.S.R. it was imperative to defeat China, he said this was a matter on the national policy level, and in his position it was not for him to decide or think of such a matter. It was outside his scope. He believed, however, that the national policy of the time was not to wage war against the Soviet Union, and it is unbelievable that the forces of China should be defeated for that purpose.

20,714

20,715

When asked whether the order \* of the General Staff for immediate settlement in July 1937 was made before directions were given to conduct negotiations with the Hopei-Chahar political group, the witness stated that negotiations with the Hopei-Chahar Regime began immediately after the outbreak and the explanation of the Staff to seek immediate settlement was conducted parallel with the negotiation.

20,716

He had not said that there was a possibility of a headon, protracted war with China. He had testified that there were some misgivings that such a situation might arise. The explanation was made that at the same time these negotiations were being conducted, there was a possibility of a head-on collision. He stated he did not have ideas of an all-out war with China as early as July 8 or 9, but the General Staff explained it that way.



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TANAKA, S. - Cross

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20,717 The witness stated that the troops sent on July 11 were not sent from Japan but were forces from the armies in Korea and Manchuria. No replacements were made to the Korean or Manchurian forces. When it was pointed out in his affidavit that he mentioned expenditures of the forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria, \* he said those expenditures were the ones necessary for the forces which were sent from Korea and Manchuria as expenditures in North China. The language section said that the affidavit translation should be - about the expenditures of Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria. \* According to the language section the original did not say where these forces came from. The witness insisted that it meant forces sent from Korea and Manchuria.

20,721 The witness said, however, that when troops in Japan were mobilized on July 27, he believes troops were sent from Japan to China. Three divisions were sent. He denied that he said in his affidavit that four divisions were sent. \* After the passage was again read to him, he said the troops sent on July 27 were definitely three divisions.

20,722 The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time at the front was Lt. General HASHIMOTO, his Vice Chief of Staff \* was Lt. General IMAI. What he meant by referring to documents was the telegram sent by the Vice Chief of Staff. The original was circulated after it had been sent and he saw it. The witness stated that the four divisions mentioned in his affidavit as being sent in July were the three divisions sent from Japan on July 27, and the one division sent from Korea on July 11.

20,723 When asked what documents he was referring to with respect to the order of the General Staff of July 9, \* he said the original of such order was circulated in those sections where it was considered necessary. When asked why directions were given to negotiate with the Hopei-Chahar Political Committee, he said he did not know much about it, but believed that since immediate settlement was sought it was better to conduct negotiations on the spot. He further believed that the Hopei-Chahar Regime at the time possessed the authority and ability to settle the incident. He did not know clearly whether the chief motivation was the fact that SAKURAI, a member of the Japanese Garrison Army, was the advisor to the political group and the Chinese Army.

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20,724

When asked whether he knew that no directions were given to negotiate with the National Government, he stated he believed it natural that since the order was sent to the Japanese forces in North China that they would conduct negotiations with the local Chinese authorities. He said that he had heard that the Chinese Foreign Minister on July 12 proposed to the Japanese that mutual concessions be made, but since this was not closely related to his duties, he did not know much about it.

20,725

When asked how he knew so much about the Hopei-Chahar negotiation and knew nothing about the Nanking Government, he stated that under his work he was quite interested in what was going on with regard to the Hopei-Chahar Regime because it was a matter of very grave concern for the military. \* Negotiations with the Central Government were a governmental matter with regard to policies and diplomacy. He was not familiar with the nature of this and did not know about those negotiations.

20,726

When asked whether such negotiations were had by the Japanese Government, he said he heard that negotiations were conducted in Nanking on July 18 or 19. When asked whether this was not based on a letter from Nanking suggesting settlement diplomatically and mutual withdrawal of troops to original positions, he said he had not seen anything that would give him an idea as to the contents of such a letter. He merely heard that such negotiations took place. He had heard \* that such a proposition was made. He did not know whether there were any negotiations by Japan after the receipt of this letter.

20,727

He had heard that Japan made overtures to Nanking that the Chinese cease immediately all warlike activities and Nanking not interfere in the North China negotiations for a local settlement. It was this communication \* which gave rise to the letter from Nanking referred to.

20,728

He had not heard that Japan had demanded recognition of Manchukuo and he did not believe that such a proposal was made. He had no recollection of whether Japan considered making such a proposal and had no time to think of such matters. He had not heard of any proposal of a military alliance as condition for settlement. If so, he would have heard of it, but he \* had not.

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20,729 USHIROKU was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and the witness's superior. When asked whether he meant that the order of Chinese divisions to march toward the frontier occurred at the same time as the illegal firing, the witness stated that he heard from the General Staff Office that the ordering of four Chinese divisions near Suchow to march to the frontier, and the illegal firing, \* occurred about the same time, successively. He did not know whether they occurred at exactly the same time, but both occurred about the 10th.

Asked whether he was contending that the action of sending troops on July 11 to Manchuria and Korea was based on the Chinese troop movement, he stated that in view of the fact that the lives of Japanese in the Peiping-Tientsin area were endangered because of this act of China, the government on July 11 issued a statement of policy and in accordance with this the decision to send troops from Manchuria and Korea was made.

20,731 As a result of reinforcement of Chinese troops, the position of Japanese garrison troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area became dangerous and resulted in the lives of the Japanese nationals being in utmost danger. This was the reason for sending the barest minimum of troops. Since the Chinese troops in the area were strongly anti-Japanese, there was a danger that there would be a critical situation arise as to the lives of Japanese nationals. The Japanese forces were between 6000 and 7000, while the Chinese troops without reinforcements had totalled 50,000 to 60,000.

20,732 His statement that the Chinese divisions were being marched north on July 10 was based on information gathered by the General Staff. He denied the statement that no Chinese troops were sent north until after Japanese action sending troops to China and after they had been sent from Manchuria and Korea. Even prior to Japan's decision, the General Staff had gathered information that Chinese troops had been ordered to march north.

He did not know definitely how far the border of Honan Province was from Peiping, but he did not believe it was as much as 300 miles.

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He admitted that he had heard much later that the troops sent by China north were stopped at Paoting, where they were held voluntarily by the Chinese authorities. He did not know at the time whether the act was voluntary or for some other reason. He would say that Paoting was a little more than one hundred miles from Peiping.

20,734

The witness stated that General TADA replaced IMAI as Vice Chief of Staff. In view of his statement that the decision to capture Nanking was made on December 1, when he was asked whether it was not a fact that TADA had prepared the plans for Nanking's capture during the battle of Shanghai, the witness stated he was not familiar with the preparations within the General Staff, but the decision to capture Nanking was taken the 1st of December.

When asked whether TADA had not drawn the plans for operations against Hankow in June or July 1938, the witness stated he did not know when the plans were first begun, but he did know that the decision to take Hankow was made the early part of December 1938.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Brooks,  
Counsel for MINAMI

20,737

When asked whether once materials had been supplied and agreed upon, was the use of these materials and operations conducted thereunder solely in the hands of the General Staff, the witness stated that materials provided in accordance with operational plans were not supplied to the General Staff. They were in the hands of the War Ministry, which delivers them to the units directly.

20,738

When the General Staff wishes to change operational plans, it would have to consult the War Ministry, \* since these materials must be transported from this place or that and produced to the various units, and the function of transportation rests with the War Ministry. \* The War Ministry

20,740

had no authority to give orders stopping or changing military operations in the field. The War Ministry could limit the use of materials. There were no regulations or stipulations regarding the extent of such limitations.

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20,741      When asked after Imperial sanction for an operation was given whether the War Minister could withhold further supplies, \* the witness stated that once an order for operations had been given and the operation begun, the War Ministry must authorize the use of such material to attain the object of the operations. When an operational order is given the Chief of Staff customarily consults the War Ministry and the War Ministry, taking various factors of material into consideration, either gives his approval or not, when consulted.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Banno,  
Counsel for ITAGAKI

20,743      The witness stated that in the preparation of operational plans the War Ministry has something to do with it. \* Definite decision is made at the time when the Chief of Staff and the War Ministry have agreed and are seeking to obtain Imperial sanction. It is most clear when the Imperial sanction has been granted.

TANAKA, Shinichi

Request by: TOJO

Present address not given.

Former Lt. General serving on army general staff prior to and during Pacific war.

This witness is able to testify regarding plans concerning Soviet Union and the objective of such plan.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

A F F I D A V I T

TANAKA SHINICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I, Tanaka Shinichi, am a former Lieutenant-General. My present residence is No. 2042, Mizusawa-Mura Yokoseko, Mie-gun, Mie Prefecture.

2. I held the office of chief of the First Department (operations) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942.

3. The following is my deposition regarding operations plans against the Soviet Union and the proposed expansion of armaments in Manchuria in 1941, in planning which I took part.

4. In accordance with custom, the Army's plans for operations against the Russians for 1941 were formed in the winter of 1940. They technically prescribed as the operations necessary for the defense of Japan Proper, Manchuria (in conformity with the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol which stipulated the joint-defense duties), and Korea, and the basic principle of the plan consisted in shifting from a protracted defensive to the offensive.

I shall hereinafter furnish necessary data about this matter:

(1) At the beginning of November 1941, General Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff (who took command of the General Staff Office as a whole and was responsible for national defense tactics), indicated to the Vice-Chief (who conducted the general affairs of the office and was in charge of coordinating policy and operations) and myself, chief of the First Department (in charge of matters relating to operations), that in drawing up and deliberating on the plans of operations against Russia we should steadfastly adhere to the lines of national policy which had been established in regard to the adjustment of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and to the policy which had been clearly shown to the Kwantung Army by the Supreme Command in August 1940; that is, the basic policy of reserving a part of the army to provide against Soviet attack and to maintain peace in the North. I was at the same time informed by the Chief of the General Staff that he and the War Minister had reached complete agreement on that fundamental principle.

(2) The Second Department of the General Staff Office whose duty it was to obtain intelligence and judge the situation; and whose chief was Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu until the beginning of 1941, later succeeded by Major-General Okamoto Seifuku) came to the following conclusion regarding the situation at that time.

In the winter of 1940-41 the Kwantung Army had 10 divisions and 500 planes as against 30 sharpshooter divisions

(according to information, the Russian forces stationed in the Far East, east of Baikal, reached 38 divisions, but I, for one, roughly estimate them at 30 divisions in this case) and 2,500 planes which formed the main strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East. If the two Japanese divisions in Korea, and the four Russian divisions stationed in the Siberian military district, were added respectively, Japan would have 12 divisions as against 34 sharpshooter divisions of the Soviet Army. As a rule, the Soviet Army in the Far East had in the past aimed at maintenance of three times the strength of the Kwantung Army, but in those days the growing number of her planes and tanks tended to increase further the ratio of the Soviets' fighting power against Japan; and the Russian strength judged to be used in the Far East in wartime reached about 50 divisions.

With the progress of her successive five-year plans, the Soviet preparation for mobilization, concentration and engagement upon the outbreak of a war remarkably increased the speed of its effectuation; it would, in our judgment, have been completed in three or four months at the latest. Japan had to take precautions especially because the Russian Army stationed in the Far East had adopted even in peace time a high standard of quasi-wartime organization and more than 100 long-range bombers stationed south of the Ussuri were in a position to raid Tokyo and other important areas in Japan Proper at any time, these being well within their bombing range. Out of the total mobilized strength of the Soviet Union, the sharpshooter divisions amounted to about 150, of which about 50 were on the Far Eastern front. Therefore, even in the case of a two-front war, to say nothing of a single-front war in the Far East, it must be calculated that considerably more strength would be available for the Soviets in the Far East. Russia stood in a more advantageous position than Japan in regard also to the supply of strength after the commencement of operations. In addition to 4,500 first-line planes she had 2,000 second-line planes which could be instantly used as first-line aircraft. Moreover, judging from the fact that in the Russo-Finnish war in the winter of 1939 the Russian Army carried on operations maintaining a line of communications extending over 200 kilometres in 50 degrees below zero, and in view of the efficiency of the Russian supply at the time of the Nomonhan Incident, the capacity of the Soviet Army supply to assist the operations could by no means be made light of.

(3) Next I will mention the direction of operations. The total wartime strength of the program for 1941 as approved by the War Ministry consisted of 48 divisions and if its employment in wartime is estimated at about 30 divisions against Russia, about 10 in China operations, about five against Anglo-Americans and a few as reserve under the Imperial Headquarters, it was evident that a considerable shortage of strength would be felt in every quarter, especially in regard to aircraft, tanks, rear services and liquid fuel. In particular, with only about 30 wartime divisions, it would be extremely difficult for us to take the offensive and overcome the Soviet Far Eastern Army on a wartime footing, which it was judged would reach about 50 divisions at the commencement of operations. After consultations and investigations with the War Ministry bureaus concerned in regard to the relative rapidity of concentrating mobilized forces and the relative capacity for production and supply of war-materials of Japan and Russia, it was concluded that we were in a more difficult position to take such an initiative in these respects.

Moreover, if our relations with the United States and Britain should grow strained, we should have to estimate at the least more than 10 divisions against these Powers, about 10 for China operations, more than 20 against Russia and a few for reserve under the Imperial Headquarters. In such case, it was feared, there



would be little hope for Japan of even succeeding with defensive strategy to carry on a protracted defensive struggle. And the strategical danger from the above-mentioned wide disparity in numerical strength and war-materials between Japan and Russia was aggravated by the fact that even a basic defensive organization against the Soviets had not been established owing to the insufficient peace-time strength of the Kwantung Army at that time. The aforesaid circumstances also suggested that even if Japan could carry out her operations most favorably, she would come to a standstill strategically and would be at a loss how to discover the means to end the war.

The above was the result of investigations made by the First Department.

Regarding the fact that Japan lagged far behind Russia in preparations for defensive operations on the Russo-Manchurian borders, General Sugiyama, who had inspected Manchuria in the autumn of 1940 immediately before his assumption of office as Chief of the General Staff, reported as follows: Even on the eastern borders (Tungning and Suifenho) to which the Kwantung Army attached the greatest importance, the strength of divisional units was so weak that only about 60 soldiers out of an infantry company were available for emergency dispatch, to say nothing of the shortage of divisions themselves. Moreover, though the fortifications on the eastern borders had been somehow completed in the front, on the first line, there was no provision of vertical depth, on the second and third lines. Should an emergency arise, those lines would be easily broken through. The division commanders in charge of defense on the spot said that in the early stages of operations it would be very difficult to resist Russian attacks for three months, and quite impossible to do so for over four months. Many defects were to be seen, especially in the air force, he concluded.

(4) The Chief of the General Staff approved the results of the aforesaid investigations and concluded that Japan's policy of totally avoiding war should be adhered to from a standpoint of strategy as well; because, should a Russo-Japanese war break out, her shortage of fighting power as mentioned above not only would endanger the execution of operations but also would force Japan to leave the China Incident without any solution; and further if unfortunately the United States and Britain should become involved in the war, there would be little or no hope of success on the part of Japan, particularly in regard to air forces. He decided, therefore, that Japan should always adhere to her principle of totally avoiding war from a standpoint of strategy. I thought that on this point he was in complete agreement with the War Minister.

(5) Now I will discuss Japanese strategy, which was based on shifting from a delaying type of defense to the offense. I approved the conclusion of the First Section that the Kwantung Army--whose ground forces in wartime would not be more, at the best, than 60 to 70 per cent of the Russian forces which would be engaged in wartime--would be obliged to employ defensive strategy at least in the early period of operations. The details of this were as follows: Their troop-strength relationship with ours was as above mentioned. The relationship of concentration and transportation of forces and materials in the event of opening of hostilities would compel Japan definitely to adopt a defensive strategy in the early period of operations; that is, in order to secure a troop strength of about 30 wartime divisions against Russia, she would be required to transport about 20 wartime divisions from Japan Proper and China to reinforce the 10 divisions stationed in Manchuria; the forces to be drawn from China and transferred to Manchuria were then actually engaged in the midst of China operations.

In other words, about 70 per cent of the Japanese total wartime strength against Russia and wartime matériel would require rapid increase and transportation, and assuming that circumstances took the most favorable turn for Japan, and that railway and shipping throughout Japan Proper, Korea and Manchuria went most orderly and smoothly, it would take about 110 days from the time of mobilization to complete the concentration of the whole strength of the Kwantung Army. In the meanwhile, even if we hurried it would take 120 days after mobilization at the earliest to change to the offensive and commence it in the eastern border area (Tungning and Suifenho), and we reached the indisputable conclusion that the Russian Army would take the initiative in starting the offensive during this period in view of general strategy and progress of Soviet preparations for operations. The Kwantung Army, therefore, was obliged to make it the basis of its operational plans that it should adopt a passive strategy at the beginning, check Russian aggressive attacks for quite a long time by a delaying type of defense, making every effort to speed preparations for battle and overcome all obstacles during that time, and shift to the offense in the eastern border area first about the fifth month after the outbreak of war. We reached the above conclusion.

Regarding the decision on the time for assuming the offensive, we did not take into consideration much of the practical claims by the Kwantung Army that at least one month or generally two months for preparation for battle after the concentration of forces would be necessary for the eastern border operations. Concerning the above, according to the judgment of the Second Section, it would obviously take a longer time for the Kwantung Army to complete preparations for commencement of attack, if we took into account the extremely well-developed intelligence net of the Soviet Union, the real conditions of peace in Manchuria and the existence of the well-equipped and superior Russian air forces, which could freely destroy our transportation. In addition, the Russian forces stationed in the Far East not only retained a high standard of quasi-wartime organization in ordinary times, but were far superior to the Japanese in their speed of concentrating mobilized forces. In other words, from the aforesaid various circumstances, it was clearly indicated that Japan would surely face a prepared Russian-initiated attack with her operations unprepared, irrespective of whether it was to the east (Tungning and Suifenho), the north (Heiho) or to the west (Hailar and the Great Hsingan Mountains). We had especially to pay serious attention to the inevitability and intenseness of early air-raids on Japan Proper and Manchuria by Russian planes. In short, we reached the conclusion that it would evidently take a much longer time than the planned estimate to concentrate and transport Japanese forces to the Kwantung Army in wartime, and that the period of this concentration and transportation would constitute one of grave crisis in operations against Russia.

(6) According to the investigations by the First Section, the Kwantung Army should shift to the offensive following the delaying type of defense in the early period of the hostilities and should, especially in the eastern border area, at least sweep and destroy the bases of long-range bombers in the southern Maritime Province of Siberia, in order to complete the defense of Japan. This was a minimum requirement from the viewpoint of defense, which is why the Japanese Army must take the offensive, without falling into a mere defense which would compel it to stay on the borders for a long time. With the development of the war situation thereafter, she should open an offensive movement on other borders between Manchuria and Russia to complete her defense and positively carry out operations necessary for the termination of the war.

(7) Now I shall discuss operations in the north--Blagoveshchensk--as viewed by the First Section.

In the eastern border area, the offensive operations would require about two months after changing over to the attack, it was considered. During that time the Japanese forces would check the Russian attack and invasion in the north (Peiho), while in the west (Hailar) they would withdraw, if necessary, successively to the line of the Great Hsingan Mountains to obtain sufficient time. Along with the completion of organization of a passive offensive in the east, attack would be opened anew and changed over to the northern area of Blagoveshchensk. For this purpose a strength of about 10 divisions of ground forces and the main strength of the air forces must be transferred from the eastern front to the northern one after the seventh or eighth month after the opening of hostilities. According to the investigations in cooperation with the Third Section (which dealt with transportation and communications and whose chief was Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaku), the transfer of Japanese forces to the north would require about three months even under the most favorable conditions. It became clear, therefore, that the concentration of forces for an attack in the north would figure out to continue at least until the end of the tenth or eleventh month after mobilization; needless to say, however, success and completion of the concentration would be greatly influenced by the general war situation and extent of Russian air-raids. By far the most important problem was that of preparing munitions necessary for the attack in the north. According to consultations over the matter with the War Ministry about August 1941, the program was to prepare and store the ammunition necessary for two battles (eight months each) in Manchuria, but it was considered that it would be exhausted by the seventh month after mobilization when the battle in the eastern border area occurred. Therefore, the ammunition necessary for transition to the attack in the north must depend upon new production after the outbreak of hostilities. The preparation of ammunition necessary for a total of 60 divisions, namely that for two battles for about 20 divisions in both the north and the west, and those for one battle for other forces of the Kwantung Army, would require seventeen months after mobilization, even if extreme economy in the amount of preparation were practiced. That is, the opening of attack on the northern front would be decisively curbed by this fact, and consideration of production and supply of ordnance other than ammunition would all the more be a circumstance requiring Japan's postponing the attack.

In short, in the northern area of Peiho, Japan would face a Russian-initiated attack from the beginning of hostilities, and would not take the offensive until at the least more than a year had passed. During this time, there would be many changes occurring in the situation. The conclusion was that realization of shifting to the attack in the north was very doubtful.

(8) The chief and vice-chief of the General Staff approved the aforesaid conditions and ordered that they form the basis of annual operations plans. We were asked to investigate in the future a policy of speeding up the time of shifting to the attack in the eastern area and at the same time to pay close attention to not weakening the aggressive spirit of the Kwantung Army's officers and soldiers in the early part of the delaying type of defense operations. The Chief of Staff further asked that formulation of all plans should be based on the fact that Russo-Japanese operations in the Far East might be considered overseas ones to Russia, and could be compared to colonial operations; but to us they were interior operations, a battle around the area of our very heart. According to his own inspections in Manchuria, however, defensive preparations at the actual spot were a matter of serious anxiety and required the strengthening of the defense and guard

organization of the Kwantung Army in ordinary times. For this purpose, he indicated firstly that the system of 16 divisions being stationed in Manchuria and Korea must be realized. This system, of course, had to have the consent of the War Ministry, and the Ministry itself had, furthermore, to get the Government's consent to the outline of materials and expenditure, among other things. Not having, further, connections with diplomacy, we were asked to continue investigations on its realization thereafter.

(9) In the formation of operational plans for 1941, the existence of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy had no influence whatsoever. The Chief of Staff and the Vice-Chief clarified, in this connection, the view that the Tripartite Pact neither contributed to nor influenced the operations plans of 1941 against Russia; and therefore, if a Russo-Japanese war broke out, Japan would never expect operational assistance from Germany and Italy, and similarly Japan did not feel obligated to help Germany and Italy in case of war between Russia and those two countries.

At that time, further, no one even dreamed of the likelihood of a Russo-German war's breaking out.

(10) At this time the Second Section of the General Staff had the following opinion on the general situation concerning Russia beside the aforesaid ones on operational situations; namely, immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident, that is, in August 1937, the Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact was concluded; it is not clear whether a military treaty was attached to it, but in 1939 there was a Russo-Chinese secret agreement. Further, a Russo-Chinese trade pact was concluded, the chief aim of which was to supply China with arms. Again, in March 1939, following Stalin's address at the Moscow Communists mass meeting in which he showed his support of China, Molotov's policy of assisting China was confirmed. Taking into consideration this series of facts, the principle of two-front operations in both east and west which was established in 1935, the five-year plans which included industrialization and militarization of the Far East, the Russian attitude toward the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, it was concluded that Russia would resort in future to interference with Japan.

5. Regarding the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I state as follows.

(1) The Chief and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave to the Department Chiefs under their jurisdiction immediately after the decision on the national policy, the following explanations of Japan's relations with the U S S R.

Such will be the most favorable situation for Japan as it will rectify the U S S R's character menacing the Far East, prevent Germany from mustering power to threaten the Far East and, further, realize cooperation among Japan, Germany and the U S S R. Resort to arms is aimed at the settling of the northern problem; if the northern problem could be settled by such diplomatic means with armed force in the background, it would be more desirable. In any case, the long-term and protracted use of arms must be strictly avoided; that is to say, the idea of the use of arms pre-supposes the evasion of a large-scale operations in a concrete form. Therefore, in this case, military preparation against the U S S R is not synonymous with preparations for war. And resort to arms is not decided upon at this time.

The problems of Japan's northern defense, Sakhalin and the rights in northern waters, will be rationally solved. It is hoped that ultimately by the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the

border regions of Manchuria and Russia, border disputes will end, the Sakhalin and fisheries problems will be solved and Japan freed from menace. Even though a German-Soviet war may break out, the existence of the Tripartite Pact, needless to say, does not obligate Japan to render aid to German operations and our actions are not restricted by it. This national policy was not the deciding factor for the use of arms against the U S S R; it only stipulated that the required research or preparation must be made in view of the possible necessity for the use of arms in accordance with future developments. As to whether we shall resort to arms we have made no commitments to Germany.

In the hastening of preparations for a possible war with America and Great Britain and the policy to be adopted vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, the elimination of possible obstacles to the maintenance of the basic policy towards America and Great Britain was a great restraining influence in the drawing up of measures vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. Among the above matters, the question concerning the use of arms was regarded as the most important and an order was issued to the vice-chief, the department chiefs and the head of the 20th office requiring the careful examination thereof.

(2) To sum up the judgments of the second part, which covers the period from the German-Soviet war to about the end of May 1941, they are as follows.

The development of the German-Soviet war cannot be so easily predicted. But there is no little fear of the protraction of the war. The report of Ambassador Tachikawa to the Foreign Ministry authorities, and that of the military attachés in the U S S R contain the same opinion. The German declaration as to the end of the war needs careful consideration. Though the transportation to European Russia of the Soviet forces stationed in the Far East will naturally take place, Soviet abandonment of the Far East is certainly inconceivable. This will restrict the extent of the transportation of the Far Eastern forces to the west and will not allow of the cutting of the actual strength by half. If it should be halved, 15 sharpshooter divisions would be left in the area west of Lake Baikal and the hasty use of arms against them would inevitably result in an unexpected emergency. Therefore in order to settle the northern problem it is necessary to concentrate sufficient forces in Manchuria. That which requires particular consideration is a possible conflict between Japan and the Anglo-American camp in view of the growing difficulties of the negotiations between Japan and America since the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Also, the Soviet attitude toward Japan must be strictly watched, since the U S S R, which has long been menacing Japan, has entered into a state of hostilities with Germany, one of our allies. The would-be closer rapprochement between the United States, Britain and the U S S R in the Far East may give impetus to US-Japanese military cooperation and especially to the advance of Japanese air forces into the Far East.

Furthermore, when we take into consideration the confusion in the Soviet territory, and the lack of peace and order in Manchuria caused by the German-Soviet war, it is necessary that we should strengthen the defense, vigilance and war-preparations in Manchuria as a measure of self-defence regardless of whether we have the intention of settling the northern problem.

In addition, the change in Japan's relation with the United States, especially in view of the difficulties in the negotiations between the two countries since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and the attendant change in future relations is, along with the change of affairs in the U S S R, the most important item to be considered in deciding Japan's defence policy against the U S S R.

According to the judgment of the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, Lieutenant-General Tatekawa, in connection with the prospect of the German-Soviet war, the U S S R will not yield to Germany. Such a thing as a compromise is inconceivable. The war will be protracted. Communism is vehement nationalism and patriotism. The U S S R will not totter. There is apprehension that the U S S R may take positive steps in the Far Eastern area in case she should be strongly supported by the United States and Britain.

Then, the relations between Japan and the United States took a sudden turn for the worse with the American-British freezing of Japanese assets upon Japanese-French agreement for joint defence of French Indo-China. Therefore it was judged, most serious consideration would be required as to what should be the measures for settling the northern problem in view of the situation as of about the end of July 1941.

(3) At the beginning of July 1941 the Chief of the General Staff intended to dispatch more troops to Manchuria in view of the circumstances, after he had compared the actual strength of the Soviet Army with that of the Kwantung Army and made a judgment of the future moves of the Soviet Army, taking into consideration our relations with the United States and Britain. And then, after consultation with the War Ministry, reinforcement by two divisions, as the nucleus, was decided upon in early July.

But the agreement reached between the War Ministry and the General Staff was as follows. In view of the general situation, including Japanese-American relations, and especially the smallness of the reinforcements for Manchuria, it seemed more urgent to reserve the hope of military preparation for settling the northern problem and to streamline the 16-division system in Manchuria and area with the long-pending object of defence and vigilance. And in case the opportunity became ripe in future for settling the northern problem, this would have significance also as the preliminary steps thereto. What resulted from this was the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria, or the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver. But it was the desire of the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to drive home to the officers and men, on the occasion of this reinforcement, the idea that it did not mean the commencement of military operations. Frontier incidents were also to be avoided by them.

(4) Since the end of July 1941 we started a study of a plan of operations against the U S S R which was different from that of 1941. The study of the new plan of operations against the U S S R which would fit the situation was necessitated by the declaration on 2 July 1941 of a national policy of preparedness for war with the United States and Britain, if unavoidable. But in consideration of the foregoing paragraph (2), and the changes of the trends of the times, which required serious consideration of our relations with the United States, the Chief of the General Staff again ordered the vice-chief and the 1st Division Chief to study the new operation plan against the U S S R, as well as the operations plans against Britain and America which were correlated with the former. It was because the Chief of the General Staff came to consider that if operations against the United States and Britain should be taken into consideration at all, a considerable decrease, contradictory to the annual operations plan, in the strength available for the defence against the U S S R was unavoidable, that is to say, we could not help reducing the general scope of the defence operations against the U S S R to some 20 divisions. Nevertheless, the policy remained unchanged as to the principle that the operations would be based upon self-defence for insuring the defence of the Japanese mainland by a strategy of protracted

defensive and passive offensive. The results of the studies were approximately as follows: Strict vigilance would be maintained relying on the existing strength, defence would be further reinforced and utmost efforts would be made to prevent war from breaking out. In case the U S S R should challenge us, we would lose no time in dispatching necessary reinforcements, destroying in an instant the enemy air forces in the Soviet/Far East in order to destroy the enemy air force in the southern part of the Maritime Province and thus insure our defence. Time elapsed while the General Staff members were still studying those plans.

I now discuss the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria in 1941; the so-called Kwantung Army Special Manöver.

(1) The reinforcement of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1941, or the so-called Kwantung Army Special Manöver was intended to complete the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea in line with the former study. Both the War Ministry and the General Staff were of the opinion that this step purported to rectify and strengthen the Kwantung Army's defence and guard system which had formerly many defects and drawbacks and implied preliminary measures, to be adopted in case the national policy of 2 July be developed in future. This was one of the steps decided upon through the agreement between the War Ministry and the General Staff, with subsequent approval of the government, with a view to contributing to the execution of the peace-time duties of the Kwantung Army.

(2) The Kwantung Army's peace-time duty is to defend Manchoukuo and Kwantung Province. But apart from that, in 1939 the central Supreme Command decided to assign a part of the Imperial Army for maintaining peace in the north as against the U S S R, thus establishing the principle concerning the duties and actions of the Kwantung Army. Then, in July of 1941, on the occasion of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Manöver, the Imperial Headquarters gave an instruction to the commander of the Kwantung Army to the effect that the purpose of reinforcement, the so-called Kwantung Army Special Manöver, was to strengthen preparedness against the U S S R.

(3) The main strength of the Kwantung Army at that time consisted of 10 divisions (in addition, two divisions not completely organized and of meager strength) and 500 airplanes. It was, according to the judgment of the 2nd department (of the General Staff), not much more than 30 per cent of the Soviet forces actually existing in the Far East. In these circumstances, unless the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea, the minimum requirement for defensive preparedness, materialized, peace in the north could never be maintained, according to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sugiyama.

(4) The main features of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Manöver included reinforcement of the divisions stationed in Manchuria, dispatch of two divisions (one of which was diverted to South China in September), additional dispatch of forces under the direct control of the Kwantung Army such as air forces and artillery, additional dispatch of supply forces such as automobile and transport units, organization of the Kwantung Defence Headquarters to command all independent garrisons existing in Manchuria, establishment of the 20th Army Corps Headquarters, and increased supply of munitions. Also such matters required from the above items as mobilization of men, collection of materials, organization and equipment of the forces, transportation of men and materials, training, disposition and billeting of the forces were dealt with. For the mobilization of the required men the form of emergency en-

Decision was adopted and each unit was placed on the basis of full equipment, but not on the wartime basis. The above-mentioned constituted the substance of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver and did not imply a war program, operational plans or strategic plans.

(5) Its execution covered the period from July to October 1941. As the result, the Kwantung Army's strength at the end of 1941 consisted of 13 divisions (in addition to the 10 divisions which had existed in Manchuria prior to the Maneuver, two were dispatched from Japan Proper and two others were organized in Manchuria, in line with the formerly established program; but one of them was diverted to South China) and other units, so the total strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was a little over 100,000 men. Among them the air forces had some 700 serviceable planes after the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, but since many of them were transferred, 280 serviceable planes remained at the end of 1941. The above-mentioned Kwantung Army strength contains not only the increase by the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver plan, but also that realized in 1941 by the previously established program unrelated to the former. For example, the aforesaid organization of two divisions in Manchuria belongs to the previously established program.

(6) The Kwantung Army Special Maneuver was placed under routine control of the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, in line with the Chief's direction, after having been decided at a conference between the General Staff and the War Ministry. But the steps for each question were decided and disposed of each time without waiting for the over-all plan of execution.

(7) Even after the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver had been carried out, the Kwantung Army's defensive and guard preparedness along the Soviet-Manchurian frontiers was weak, and it was greatly feared at that time whether Japan's defensive operations could possibly be conducted, as was provided in the operational plan on the basis of 15 divisions in Manchuria and Korea, in case of Soviet attack. Around November 1941, when a part of the Soviet Western Eastern Army was transferred to the European zone, its strength consisted of 33 sharpshooter divisions, about four other divisions, some 1500 airplanes and 1300 tanks, while the Kwantung Army was estimated as inferior by about 50 per cent to the former, even after the reinforcement by the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver.

At about the beginning or the middle of August 1941 the Intelligence Department of the General Staff estimated the situation as follows: The Soviet-Manchurian frontier districts would likely be considerably stabilized, and there would be no sign of materialization of military cooperation in the Far East between the United States and the U S S R. Judging from the general situation, the Soviet Army would not challenge Japan for the time being; that is to say, positive offensive action by them would hardly be possible so long as we maintained this degree of strength (based on the reinforced strength by the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver).



At about the beginning or in the middle of August, the Chief of the General Staff approved the aforesaid estimate of the situation and acknowledged that there would be very little chance of the Soviet Army's taking a defiant attitude for the time being, if the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver were perfectly carried out. The War Minister also gave consent to it. And after a consultation it was decided not to slacken the Kwantung Army's alertness and preparedness and to spur the execution of the established plan of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, as much as possible, making preparation for the approaching winter. Then the surveillance of the execution of the established plan for maintaining peace in the north was further tightened in order to avoid untoward incidents on the Soviet-Manchurian frontiers, and efforts were exerted for defense and self-protection, taking utmost precaution not to arouse friction, and adhering to a policy of peace at any cost.

The established plan for peace in the north included such steps as suitably withdrawing the outposts in those districts where troubles were likely to start, while strictly forbidding the forces to advance, to dispense with defense duties in those areas where frontiers were disputed or the actions of forces were difficult, and to do the most possible in localizing frontier troubles in case they should arise.

Thus efforts were made to maintain the peace in the north. While the materialization of the reinforcement was being delayed day by day owing to the circumstances of shortage of transportation, the approaching cold season in the Manchurian area finally necessitated abandonment of a part of the plan. Later, the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations with the United States and Britain worsened the situation, and with the establishment of the new national policy in the beginning of September, a considerable proportion of the strength in Manchuria was withdrawn and diverted to South China, Formosa and northern French Indo-China.

The chief forces diverted were one division and a considerable proportion of tanks, heavy artillery; anti-aircraft guns, auxiliary forces, air corps headquarters, fighters and light and heavy bombers.

I have stated as above the substance and circumstances of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, and I believe that I have made it clear that that plan was not meant to be a preparation for aggression on the part of Japan against the U S S R.

7. In connection with developments thereafter, I will now offer material to explain the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union.

(1) Since the main emphasis of our national policy had naturally come to be directed toward the United States and Britain, according to the decision of 6 September, it followed that we not only clung to the established policy of peace toward the Soviet Union, but also reduced our precautions and war preparations against the Soviet Union. I have already referred to the major transfers from Manchuria to Southern China, Formosa, and Northern French Indo-China, which took place between September and November of the year 1941. To explain in detail, the following units were transferred:

- 1 division
- 3 tank regiments
- 5 heavy artillery regiments
- 20-odd anti-aircraft artillery companies
- 3 air brigade headquarters
- 4 fighter regiments
- 3 light bomber regiments
- 2 heavy bomber regiments
- 5 scout-plane squadrons and some ground service units

(2) After July 1941 the Japanese Army operating in China was planning, firstly, the Changsha operations, to be executed about September and October of the same year; secondly, operations for the restoration of peace and order in the triangular area comprising Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchow; and thirdly, operations for aerial advance into the interior of China. These constitute some of the factors to help judge the attitude of Japan toward the Soviet Union.

(3) At the Liaison Conference held toward the middle of November 1941, the following decisions were reached: that in the event of the outbreak of a war against the United States and Britain, we should by all means avoid making enemies of other countries, and especially entering into a state of war against the Soviet Union; and that we would endeavor to effect a reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union, should they be so disposed, and winning the Soviet Union over to the Axis camp, adjust relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. This also helps to form an opinion concerning Japan's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

3. I now come to materials to explain the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the war against the United States and Britain.

(1) The gist of the order issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, on 3 December 1941, was as follows:

It is the intention of Imperial Headquarters to capture the major points in the southern regions and at the same time to dispose of the China Incident, in the meantime making utmost efforts to prevent the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. The Kwantung Army will perform its duties of defending Manchoukuo and the Kwantung Province, and in particular it will make preparations for defensive operations against the Soviet Union, in order to meet any development of the situation. In settling any boundary dispute, efforts shall be made to localize the affair. In the case of special areas, defence by armed forces may be dispensed with, if the situation so demand.

(2) I was informed by the Chief of the Army General Staff that at the Liaison Conference toward the end of November 1941, it was agreed that although at the outset of an outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and the United States and Britain on the other, it was hardly probable that Russia should take positive action against Japan, it was quite possible that the United States would utilize Russian territory in the Far East for military bases, and that Soviet Russia would act in various ways against Japan; but that according to later developments it was also possible that Soviet Russia would wage war against Japan. Nevertheless concrete measures towards these eventualities were not decided upon, excepting the existence of the following defensive plan against Soviet Russia.

(3) The Chief of the Army General Staff decided that the operational plan in 1942 against Soviet Russia should be drafted along the line of the principle of the previous year's plan, and that it should generally be based upon the following policy: That the Kwantung Army should maintain its disposition up to that time but should assume strict precautionary measures, strengthen defenses and strive its utmost to prevent outbreak of a war. In case the United States and Soviet Russia in concert should challenge Japan from the north, or the Russian Army should independently challenge us, without delay Japan should transfer necessary divisions from Japan Proper and China in order to destroy Russian air forces in the Russian Far Eastern territories, especially in the Maritime Province of Siberia. Thus our objective was not to fulfill the minimum defensive requirements by assuming a passive offensive in place of a protracted defensive operation.

The above plan was decided upon the basis of a separate operations plan against Soviet Russia which had been studied since the end of July 1941, and the matters in it relating to the War Ministry were decided upon after consultation with that Ministry.

(4) According to intelligence obtained by the Second Department, the Russian strength in the Far East at the beginning of 1942 was as follows:

Total strength:	19 sharpshooter divisions
	1 tank division
	3 cavalry divisions
Total...	23 divisions

Ground forces south of Hebarovsk:	
	10 sharpshooter divisions
	1 tank division
	1 cavalry division
Total...	12 divisions

Air Forces:	60 heavy bombers
	80 long range bombers
	330 light bombers
	450 fighters
	60 assault planes
	200 seaplanes
Total..	1200

The Kwantung Army around that time consisted of 13 divisions and about 500 airplanes, of which about 280 were operational (50 heavy bombers, 100 light bombers, 130 fighters), and in comparative ratio of the two ground forces ours were below 50% of the Russian forces.

(5) The decision of the Liaison Conference about the middle of March 1942 was as follows:

To conduct necessary operations against vital spots outside the occupied area in order to hasten the termination of the war by way of forcing the United States and Britain into a position of passive defense; to strive for the prompt settlement of the China Incident so far as circumstances permitted, taking advantage of the result of operations in southern regions; and to prevent as much as possible the occurrence of a new incident with Soviet Russia and to strengthen precautionary measures against the eventuality of war with Soviet Russia.

(6) According to the estimate of the staff of the

Kwantung Army, the Russian strength in the Far East consisted of 20 sharpshooter divisions, or 23 divisions including other divisions, 1,300 tanks and 1,200 airplanes. Though the lowering in the standard of their fighting strength was perceptible, the entire fighting personnel totalled over 300,000. Against this the strength of the Kwantung Army was composed of 14 divisions, about 500,000 men, and about 600 airplanes. Thus the strength of the Kwantung Army was about 60% of the Russian forces then in the Far East.

(7) Beginning in May 1942, Imperial Headquarters were examining operations against the Aleutian Islands, Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, Eastern New Guinea, etc., as operations against the outer strategic points in the Pacific area. However, the operations which were actually carried out were those of the Aleutian Islands, Midway, Eastern New Guinea, etc. After the spring of 1942, Imperial Headquarters were conducting various studies with the intention of conducting a future offensive with the occupation of Chungking as its objective. This series of such operational plans by the Imperial Headquarters in 1942 is a fact indicative of Japan's attitude of peace toward Soviet Russia.

As to the offensive into the inland of China, aiming at the reduction of Chungking, a definite plan was formed through the study of the Army General Staff, and it was agreed that whether it should be put into execution was to be settled finally in the autumn of 1942. The nucleus of the strength necessary for this operation was to be 15 divisions. Of the necessary strength and equipment, 2 divisions, 200 airplanes, two-thirds of the motor vehicles and communications units, and almost all the river-crossing matériel were to be taken from those in Manchuria, and the greater part of the necessary fuel and ammunition were to be taken and transferred from the Kwantung Army. In accordance with this plan the personnel to be transferred from Manchuria totalled 200,000. This plan, however, was abandoned in December 1942, as a result of adverse developments of the operations centering around Guadalcanal.

(8) Our strength was transferred to the south-east sector of the Pacific from various quarters, including Manchuria, to cope with the counter-attack by the United States forces centering around the Solomon Islands and Guadalcanal after August 1942. This concentration of our forces made it all the more urgent to prevent the outbreak of any incident against Soviet Russia, so that absolute peace might be maintained between the two countries.

(9) According to intelligence obtained from the Second Department, at the end of 1942, the strength of the Kwantung Army consisted of 14 divisions and 500 airplanes as against the Far Eastern Russian Army's 20 divisions and 1,000 airplanes. Our strength was <sup>capable of</sup> 70 per cent of theirs. Thus the Russian Army in the Far East continued to maintain a strength superior to the Kwantung Army even in this period.

(10) As to the operational plans against the outer strategic points in the Pacific area and the reduction of Chungking, the Army General Staff was worried since they might endanger the execution even of the passive defensive operations of the Kwantung Army against Soviet Russia, in reference to the military strength, especially airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles, various corps in the rear, and munitions, especially liquid fuel.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Shinichi (seal)

On this 14 April 1947

At International Military Tribunal  
for the Far East

DEPONENT Tanaka Shinichi (seal)

I, Kiyose Ichirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: Kiyose Ichirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

Charles D. Sheldon and Yukio Kawamoto, of the defense, hereby certify that they are conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of their knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Charles D. Sheldon

Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo  
27 May 1947

Def. Doc. No. 925

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TANAKA, Shinichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I. I, TANAKA, Shinich, formerly a lieutenant-general, live at No. 2,042, Mizawa-mura Yokoseko, Mie District, Mie Prefecture.

I occupied the post of the chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, from March of 1937 to February of 1939, and had charge of the affairs concerning the organization, equipment, budget, mobilization and reinforcement of our forces, under the command of the director of the bureau.

It was about the middle of March, 1937, that I arrived at my post. When I paid a visit of courtesy to Minister of War SUGIYAMA, he pointed out that the time had come to try strenuously to avoid all foreign troubles and devote ourselves to the completion of national defence; that the Army would try to modernize its armaments and particularly to improve and complete its war materials; and that the Military Affairs Section should make a special effort to improve the organization and equipment of our forces.

II. As to whether or not our Japanese Army had a plan of operations against China before the outbreak of the China Incident, the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army had no plan of operations for the war with China before the outbreak of the China Incident. While I was engaged in the affairs concerning the organization, reinforcement and mobilization of our forces, as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, I never received any report or information concerning the mobilization and operational preparation necessary for any plan of operations

against China, either from the General Staff or from the superior authorities. This means that the General Staff had no preparatory plan of this kind at that time. For the plan of operations as well as that of mobilization and operational preparation were just in its charge, but the realization of such plans was necessarily accompanied by the strength, munitions and expenditure. Therefore they could not be realized without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs Section would have had to be informed of the business concerning such plans, all the more so because I arrived at my post in March -- at the end of the fiscal year.

III. As to whether or not the Japanese Army was then so situated as to be able to attempt Chinese operations in China, in view of the strength and munitional materials of the Japanese Army at that time, it would have been almost impossible to attempt operations in China.

1. In 1937, when the China Incident broke out, Japan had only a peace-time strength of 17 divisions and a war-time one of 30 divisions. In the judgment of the General Staff as well as of the War Minister, as later referred to in this affidavit, it was very dangerous for the Army to operate in China with the fighting strength available at the time in view of the fact that China had a force 20,000,000 strong (200 divisions), and a vast land as well as the social idiosyncracies of the Chinese people.

In addition, we had to be greatly concerned in the Russian military preparations in the Far East. According



to the information received by the General Staff as to the Russian preparations for war with Japan, she had a standing peace-time strength of 28 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 6 mechanized brigades and 1,900 aircraft for the Far East, including the Siberian Military District, together with a peace-time force of 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia. The minimum war-time strength that she could use against Japan amounted to 31 or 50 divisions, of which mobilization, concentration and reinforcement were to be sufficiently secured. It was concluded, therefore, that it would be dangerous and inadvisable to carry out operations in China under such circumstances, taking into consideration the movements of the Soviet Union. In this connection, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in July, 1937, the General Staff gave the following explanation:

"Considering the Chinese situation, the present incident is liable to turn into a head-on, protracted war between Japan and China. If so, we could use only 11 divisions in these Chinese operations, or, adding the reserve corps of the Army, 15 divisions in total. But, if we should use half our war-time strength, totalling 30 divisions on the plan of mobilization, in the Chinese Area for a long time, then we are sure to meet with a serious crisis from the viewpoint of national defence. So it is necessary to take every possible measure for the immediate settlement of the incident."

As I was present when this explanation was made, I know that the War Minister was in entire accordance with

the explanation.

2. The production and maintenance of munitions were under as much difficulty and disadvantage as the abovementioned problem of military strength.

According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry, having charge of the production and maintenance of munitions it was very difficult to mobilize and dispatch about 15 divisions and even to maintain operations in the incident at the time, in view of our conditions of production and supply of munitions. In 1937, our Army had only an eight months' stock of ammunition for fifteen divisions. As to the ability of munitions mobilization, we could barely hope to meet the operational consumption of 15 reinforced divisions in about eight or nine months after the mobilization was commenced, and a continuous supply of special materials was impossible. As regards the arms, supposing that we were able to use all the arms we had in stock and bring our munition mobilization to a maximum, it would have been difficult to meet the operational consumption of 15 divisions, and this was especially the case with special materials. Therefore, if we should go to a protracted war with China, it would not be sufficient to use all the stocks and maximum munitions mobilization in the operations in China, and if our relations with another country should be strained under such circumstances, we were sure to be at a loss what to do for self-defence. Generally speaking, with our anticipated munitions mobilization for 1937, and guaranteed a supply of 70 per cent of munitions, including arms and

ammunitions, for the estimated war-time strength of 30 divisions for the fiscal year, we planned to be able to mobilize in about ten months after such munitions mobilization was commenced. However, far more materials were expected to be consumed in the China Incident, so we admitted that it was extremely difficult to maintain operations with 15 divisions.

iv. Data indicating that the incident was not planned from the Japanese point of view.

In addition to the data in the above II and III, I wish to refer to the following:

1. Establishment of non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength. On July 8, when the Army was informed of the clash at the Marco Polo Bridge early in the morning, it immediately determined the general policy of non-enlargement of the incident as well as non-exercise of military strength, and informed the Chief of the Staff of the Army at the front to that effect through the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. This I know from documents. About July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government established the policy of non-enlargement, desiring for the smooth settlement of the incident by reconsideration on the part of China, and simultaneously decided to take proper measures for self-preservation, according to the circumstances, though it was too early to send more forces at that time. This I heard from Lieutenant General USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau who was informed thereof in the Bureau-directors Council by the War Minister.

2. Effort for speedy settlement at the front. On July 9, the General Staff instructed the army at the front to nego-

tiate with the Hupei-Chahar authorities for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which I know from documents. The gist was to avoid reference to political issues under such circumstances, and to obtain the approval of the Hupei-Chahar Political Committee and fulfil as soon as possible our demands, such as the suspension of stationing the Chinese forces on the left bank near the Marco Polo Bridge, its necessary guarantee, and the punishment and apology of those persons directly responsible.

According to the reports which I received from the army at the front, our occupation forces in China prohibited promptly any military movement, following the policy of non-enlargement of the incident and its speedy settlement at the front. In order to save the situation, Major-General MATSUI, Daikuro, Chief of the Peiping Special Service Agency, was negotiating with the Chinese military authorities, and it seemed that an agreement would be reached in conformity to the above-mentioned policy of negotiation with Hupei-Chahar.

However, according to the information received by the General Staff, the Chinese authorities ordered four divisions of her central army near Suchow to march for the frontier of the Honan Province and all her air forces to move out. Moreover, there was no indication that the northern Chinese situation might be mitigated; the Chinese forces in North China were strengthening preparations for war, such as construction of their positions or transport of munitions, and also illegal firing was being repeated near the Marco Polo Bridge.

If the state of affairs had been left as it was, the lives and properties of our residents in Peking and Tientsin would surely have been forced to face unavoidable danger. Thus the General Staff HQ's was compelled to adopt the following judgment of the situation:

"The authorities in Peking and Tientsin as well as the Nanking Government, seem to be exerting themselves to prepare for armed hostilities against Japan. As a result of the aggravation of the situation, caused by the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North China, the lives and properties of our residents are, now, on the verge of utmost danger. It is high time for us now to dispatch a minimum possible number of forces to the Peking-Tientsin area, in order to protect our residents. A grave situation is arising also in areas other than Peking and Tientsin, which comes to call our careful attention with regard to protection of our nationals."

I was informed of the above adoption by the report and explanation of a high class officer of the Military Affairs Section.

IV. Our government made the following point clear in an official statement on 11 July, that we were utterly compelled to send forces to North China to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions, planned by the Chinese side. But upon being informed that the Hopei-Chahar Government authorities had accepted our proposal, we took steps, in the afternoon on the same day, as to reserve our preparation for the mobilization and dispatch of our home divisions. Furthermore, orders

were issued by the General Staff HQ's, with the approval of the Government, to dispatch only a part of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and of the Chosen Army respectively.

The latter step was taken in view of the situation as mentioned above, to ensure the achievement of peace-time duty by our garrison in China under aggravated situation in the Peiping-Tientsin area.

V. According to an information I got around 13 July from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the outcome of the Cabinet Conference was as follows:

"It is extremely doubtful whether the Nanking Government has the sincerity to settle the matter in peace. For the Chinese Central Army forces are now advancing hastily to the north and anti-Japanese actions and unlawful firing cases are being repeated everywhere. Thus not only in North China but also in Shanghai and Chingtao the situation is very dangerous in regard to the protection of the Japanese residents there. Therefore, it will be advisable for us in accordance with our firm policy of localization, to pay constant attention to the future course of things; urging on the one hand, the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfil the stipulated terms, and abstaining on the other hand from provoking the Chinese."

In conformity with this principle, the governing body of the General Staff and of the War Ministry decided upon the so-called 'policy for the settlement of the North China Incident' on the night of 13 July.

The outline of the above 'policy' is as follows:

"All possible measures should be taken to avoid the expansion of the incident to an all-out war, adhering to the principle of localization and settlement at the spot. For this purpose, it is desirable to accept the terms for settlement proposed by the representative of the Chinese 29th Army and signed on 11th instant, and to see to it that these terms are fulfilled by the Chinese. Whether or not our forces now in homeland should be mobilized is a matter to be decided in the light of the future course of things. In case however the Chinese ignore the above terms and show no sincerity to put it into practice, or in case the Nanking Government removes their central army forces to the north to prepare for attack, resolute steps must be taken on our part."

It was that it is necessary for the garrisons stationing in China to receive beforehand the recognition of the central headquarters. This was what Lieutenant-General ATOMIYA who was the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau participating in setting up the plan (regulation) reported directly to me.

VI. As I was connected with mobilization, I wish to explain the real circumstances under which mobilization and dispatch were carried out with cautious attitude.

A. It was a fact acknowledged by the government on July 9th when the incident broke out that the mobilization and dispatch of divisions at home might be necessary to meet the emergency circumstances, although it was not considered necessary at the beginning of the incident. (I knew this through the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau as a report from the minister after a cabinet meeting.)

B. Taking consideration of the dangerous state of Japanese residents in the Peking-and Tientsin district, increasing preparation of fighting power and repeated attacks of Chinese forces in the same district, as well as the insincerity of Hopei-Chahar authorities in negotiations of reconciliation and the northward advancement of the Chinese central armies, the Japanese Government announced on 11 July the dispatch of troops to north China.

C. But in the afternoon of July 11th, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted our proposal, the mobilization, and dispatch of divisional troops at home and other preparations were discontinued.

D. On 13 July it was decided as the policy of dealing with the north China Incident that the mobilization of divisions at home would be considered properly according to circumstances which might occur afterwards.

E. As a new circumstance which appeared up to 15 July I mention an increase and concentration of Chinese armies in the area of the north Lancho-Haichow railway, the activity of the Canton air forces, the delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces from the left side along Yungtinho, which withdrawal had been accepted by an agreement. Not only that, further construction was continued and more army forces were concentrated (a report from the General Headquarters). Considering the above report, it was decided at a cabinet meeting that the carrying out of mobilization of divisional armies at home which had been discontinued on 16 or 17 July should be prepared as to be practicable whenever



necessary after 19 July. The officers and officials concerned in the General Headquarters and the War Ministry proceeded with preparations in their respective sections. But the authorities decided to persevere as much as possible considering self-defense, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted once our proposals, in spite of the report that Chang-Kai-shek revealed his firm determination against Japan on 19 July. Besides the acceptance of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, expecting the conclusions of the Hanking Conference, the preparation for mobilization of divisional armies at home was postponed and reserved for the future on 22 July.

F. After the Langfang incident on 25 July and the Kwangan Gate Incident on 26 July, the condition in north China became finally serious. A report was received from a higher officer stating that the Japanese Government had decided upon a program on 27 July to mobilize and dispatch divisional armies at home. And the purpose of the mobilization and dispatch was to eliminate the threat of the Chinese forces to the lives and property of Japanese residents and transportation and communication and also accomplishment of self-defense of the already dispatched garrison troops in north China. The mobilization and dispatch at first for the time being were emergency operations with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable or sufficient for actual operations. These operations were only for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents and to carry out the duty of self-defense.

G. There was no definite expression of intention of the authorities of the General Headquarters whether further mobilization of divisional armies at home would be carried out

or not in the future besides the above stated one. I recognized that the Minister, the Vice-Minister of the War Ministry and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau who were the highest staff authorities, maintained a passive attitude in regard to further mobilization.

H. Since then higher officers adopted the policy of taking proper steps in regard to further mobilization after consideration and investigation of developments which might occur in the future. When the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divisions were sent to cope with the emergency and when it became urgently necessary to protect the residents of Tsintao, a plan to send out one division was set up and when faced with the necessity of carrying out operations in the area of Paotai, Hopei Province in central China, a hasty mobilization at home was begun. As above stated, patching and supplementary mobilization and dispatch were carried out as circumstances required. Eventually after the outbreak of the incident up to October 1937, army forces totaling 15 divisions, were mobilized and dispatched on eight different occasions, to say roughly 4 divisions in July, 7 divisions in August, and 4 divisions in September and October.

I. In 1938, prior to the execution of operations in Hankow and Canton, the number of the divisions in China reached 23 but among them there were several divisions which were organized in <sup>the</sup> fighting zone as the circumstances required. Therefore, although the number of army divisions in China increased generally, the number of soldiers decreased in each division and the predisposition of each division and equipment were lowered.

VII. As examples of lack of unity and non-planning of military action, I wish to make mention of the capture of NANKING, operations in HSU-CHOW, capture of KUANGTUNG and operations in HANKOW.

The following is necessarily confines of my duties as announced by the General Staff and other quarters.

1. Concerning the capture of NANKING, I was, at first, informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that the General Staff had no intention to realize it and the War Minister had the same opinion as the General Staff. I approved of this. But because of the tendency of the tide of war on the spot and because of the desire to seize the opportunity of terminating this incident, the decision to capture NANKING was firstly decided on December 1, 1937 (the 12th year of SHOWA) and the order for the taking NANKING was issued.

2. Carrying out of the HSU-CHOW operations.

In May 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA), an agreement of views between the War Minister and Vice-Chief of the General Staff was not reached until immediately before the decision to carry out operations was made. The point at issue was that if it was possible to preserve the contact between north China and central China by securing permanently the important area of HSU-CHOW after the occupation of this area and to supply needed army strength because of the necessity to increase by 2 or 3 divisions the strength necessary for securing the important area of HSU-CHOW, but the fundamental fact was the disagreement of views as to the anticipation of settling this incident in accordance with the policy of non-expansion.

Finally, agreement of views to carry out this military operation was arrived at due to strategic demand in the light of the entire situation. Part of it, I personally heard at the above-mentioned conference and the rest I learned from my superiors.

3. As to the HANKOW and KUANGTUNG operations, decision was not made so quickly. Only in September 1938 it was decided to carry out the HANKOW operation about October 1938 and capture KUANGTUNG about that time to cut the communication and supply route from abroad.

4. Under these circumstances, the army budget passed at the ordinary session of the Diet in 1938 had not anticipated these military operations. Therefore a great deal of inconvenience was felt in the matter of expenses for the year as explained in the following:

VIII. I, as one of the men who were connected with the military budget, wish to state as follows; by way of proposing materials to indicate that the operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG were not planned well before they actually occurred. After about October 1937, in TOKYO, prospects were entertained for putting an end to the positive operations against China and, moreover, plans and preparations were promoted regarding the adjustment of and extraction from the military strength in China, on the premise that the Incident would be concluded in the near future. To explain more in detail, at about the end of 1937, our military strength in China consisted of 16 divisions, forming its main part. As the first step, these were to be reduced to about 10 divisions.

Following this, in the units, which were to remain in China, the reservists were to be relieved from active service. The enforcement of this program was first to be started from the early spring of 1938, and, pursuant to the anticipated establishment of peace, an all-round withdrawal of the armed forces was planned. With respect to this matter, both the department quarters and the out-post army authorities were unanimous in their opinion.

Accordingly, the budget, agreed upon at the ordinary session of the Diet at that time, was also based on the above; namely, it was made on the premise that (1) the military strength in China was to be reduced roughly by half; (2) the repatriation of those troops who had been inducted; (3) the continued stationing of armed forces to such an extent as to presuppose no positive operations.

But, as it was, the situation did not favorably develop as was expected, and after the failure of peace negotiations and the occupation of NANKING, the consequent operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG necessitated the total abandonment of the attempted adjustment of the military strength as aforementioned, not only this but in the 1938-1939 fiscal year an enormous deficiency was found in the budget.

IX. I wish to submit the following materials about how the military budget was actually prepared. About the expenditures of our expeditionary forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11, 1937, I was asked by my superiors in the War Ministry to negotiate with the Finance Ministry with a

view to meet current expenses with a reserve fund and to open a three months' budget covering August, September and October for the troops that had already been sent, including their evacuation expenditures and supposing their stay to be about three months. But in fact, after negotiation with the Finance Ministry it was reduced to two months. A budget for two months of August and September was presented at an extraordinary session of the Diet in July and passed. A budget for four months from October till January of the next year for about 11 divisions already mobilized by the end of August, passed at a session convened at the beginning of September.

Thus budgets were prepared little by little according to the number of the expeditionary forces, instead of making a wholesale estimation for a long period in expectation of aggravation and protraction of the incident. This is also clear by the fact that the budget for the fiscal year of 1938 proved greatly deficient as hereinbefore stated.

X. Realization of Japan's policy of non-aggravation.

1. What I have already stated shows efforts to realize a policy of non-aggravation.
2. As a reference to strict execution of non-aggravation policy on the spot, I wish to mention a verbal report made to the Minister of War, in my hearing, by Lt. Col. WACHI, a staff officer of the expeditionary forces in China, who had been called up to the central government to make a report of the situation developing on the spot.

Its gist is as follows:

The policy of non-aggravation and peaceful settlement of the Incident was thoroughly disseminated to the commanders and all the rest of the Japanese forces in North China and utmost care was being taken for it. For instance, the transportation of any Japanese troops was prohibited by the railway between Peking and Tiensin. Any Japanese soldier in uniform was also prohibited to make use of the railway between Fengtai and Peking.

And though all the Japanese who passed through the gate of the Peking Castle were examined and interrogated by the Chinese military police. They submitted to it.

Every castle gate in Peking was closed by the military force of the Chinese 37th Division, Chinese machine guns were turned upon the Japanese houses within Peking Castle, and 6,000 Japanese were guarded by only two Japanese infantry platoons.

In spite of being in a position enabling us to go into action immediately against any Chinese bombardment, we were operating upon the instructions of the Army headquarters in Tientsin as they came to us one by one. Being afraid of aggravating the situation, we refrained from carrying the wounded into Peking Castle to be operated upon; likewise we left the bodies of the dead as they were, etc. This was but an example of our policy of localization to prohibit actions which might provoke magnification of the incident. Thus to carry out this policy, we submitted to any humiliation or inconvenience.

As for the Chinese forces, anti-Japanese sentiment was high among officers and soldiers alike, and especially among those in the grade of second major. The Chinese in the Pintsin Area were convinced that the Chinese 29th Army had won at Marco Polo Bridge, that the Chinese losses were small

and that the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn. We endured the rising anti-Japanese sentiment.

In addition, it was said that the Central Operations Staff had advanced to Paoting.

3. Concerning the strict observance of the localization policy of the local Army Commander, I will state what General Terauchi, the Army Commander in the North China area, told me when I was there about October 1937 (Showa 12), for liaison work.

That was as follows:

Hitherto the Central Supreme Command has made the technique of leading actual operations difficult by not clearly showing beforehand the general purpose of operations and the points of operation. Instead they have simply given the purpose and time of each local operation (such as the Central Hopei operation and the Taiyuan operation). To facilitate operations the Supreme Command should clearly show the general scope and purpose of the operations as a whole and leave the details of local operations to the Army Commander at the front. However, this case being merely an "incident" and having no bearing on our general national policy, it is necessary to sacrifice perfection in technique to the preservation of our general localization policy. In the future, it will be necessary for both the central and local commands seriously to consider various technical methods which would relieve the disadvantage to actual operation, brought about by strict observation of the localization policy.

4. On the policy of localization in the Pingtsin Area in July 1937 (Showa 12) it was decided that the occurrence of the Langfang and Kwangan Gate Incidents, together with the lack of sincerity on the part of the Hopei-Charhar authorities to fulfill the terms of agreement as well as



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the aggressive actions repeated everywhere by the Chinese, made it at last necessary to mobilize our divisions now in the homeland.

On the night of July 26, the General Staff gave me a notice: "Hitherto we have avoided the mobilization of the home divisions but the actual situation in China admits of no further delay." Even the then Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, who was one of the strongest opponents to the mobilization of forces for fear of conflict between Japan and China, at last admitted on the 26th the necessity of mobilization by way of self-defense.

On the 27th the governing body of the War Ministry also recognized the unavoidability of mobilization.

Then a draft was prepared for adoption by the Cabinet conference concerning the mobilization of three home divisions, and the War Minister issued orders in the evening of the same day with the approval of the Cabinet conference about the mobilization of three home divisions.

After a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that on the 27th of July the government had decided as follows:

To mobilize three home divisions; to maintain the policy of localization and settlement at the spot even in case of the outbreak of a self-protective battle in the Pingtsin Area, such a battle should be purely for the achievement of the peacetime duties of the commander of the Japanese Army in China; to do its best not to bring about a situation which might require despatching soldiers to Tsingtao and Shanghai for the protection of Japanese residents -- though such a situation may eventually come about; and to do no damage to the personnel of third Powers.

Besides I learned that the Minister gave an explanation at the said meeting of the Bureau Chiefs to the following effect:

Exercise of military force in Pingtsin Area which might be required in the future would be purely self-defensive action and as such it would never be contradictory to the policy of localization adhered to by Japan. And even if despatch of forces to Shanghai or Tsingtao should be required for the protection of the Japanese whose security was being seriously menaced at that time; it would never run counter to the policy of localization. And the actions of the Japanese forces had hitherto been in strict conformity with the localization of military movements, and could and should remain so in the future as well.

I also learned from a document that the mobilization of home divisions was ordered in the evening of the 27th, and the Chief of the General Staff approved the application of the Commander of the Japanese Army in China for taking military action against the Chinese 29th Army, and that at the same time he ordered that the actual shooting be limited to the line of the Yungting River.

5. I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that at the Five Ministers' Meeting held about the 20th of July, they debated upon the advisability of the Japanese policy to improve the situation by taking means to clarify our observance of the principle of equal opportunity in North China, in order to satisfy the Western Powers, as well as China herself; and upon the plan to withdraw the forces at that time in the Pingtsin area, which had been despatched there from Manchuria and <sup>Korea</sup> after the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and then to take diplomatic means for the solution of questions pending between Japan and China. The Five Ministers' Meeting was a conference

held at the time by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and the Finance Minister. I also heard directly that at the end of July, there was an opinion among the governing body of the General Staff that contemplated neutralizing the situation by gathering and moving all the Japanese forces in North China back to the area of Tientsin in order to bring about prompt settlement of the incident, and then to hold a personal interview between Konoye and Chiang Kai-shek, and thus to smooth out the difficulty between Japan and China. However, since the attitude on the part of the Chinese was against this plan, it was not realized after all.

6. Circumstances after the Oyama Incident at Shanghai:

About the Incident Captain Oyama, I received a report on the morning of the 10th of August 1932 in the War Ministry from Hoshina, the Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry. It purported that the Japanese authorities in Shanghai would not take further steps until they were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by negotiating with them, and that the circumstances might require preparations for despatch of troops.

On that day the government authorities seemed to be of the opinion that adequate measures for the protection of our residents in Shanghai should be taken after the real circumstances of the Oyama Incident came to light, but that it would be worth while to study the Navy Minister's proposal demanding preparations for eventual mobilization as a last resort. But I learned later that on the 13th, the Cabinet conference took up a plan to despatch forces, and that on the 14th this plan was being subjected to re-consideration. Then a statement was made by the Imperial Government on August 15. In accordance with this

statement, it was decided to despatch a 'despatched force' to Shanghai of which two divisions from the homeland formed the main body, for the purpose of protecting the Japanese subjects in Shanghai. The word 'despatched force' was used to show that it had nothing to do with pure military operations thoroughly. The mobilization for this purpose was ordered on August 15.

As for Tsingtao, I heard that it was talked about at the Cabinet conference that the situation in Tsingtao being calm, it would be possible to maintain the status quo, provided that nothing happened to disturb it, but some measure would be taken for the protection of residents there in case the worst should happen.

About August 15 or 16, 1937, the General Staff concluded that the Chinese had decided upon the policy of beginning over-all military operations. This conclusion was based on the report that the Chinese had established headquarters on August 15th, made Chiang Kai-shek Supreme Commander of all the land, sea and air forces and divided the whole country into four war zones (the 1st war zone, Hopei-Chahar; the 2nd, Chahar-Shansi; the 3rd, Shanghai, the 4th, South China), and that general mobilization was ordered on the same day.

About the 16th or 17th of August, I was duly notified at the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs as usual that the following has been decided at the Cabinet conference:

"It is becoming difficult to solve the affair in strict conformity with the policy of localization, as the Chinese have determined to carry out a long war. Therefore, the utmost efforts should be made to restrict the war to the minimum in point of time as well as strategically, and territorially.

As the original object of the Shanghai operations lay chiefly in the protection of the Japanese residents, they had to be confined to a minimum. To check the danger of creating a general clash between Japan and China on the one hand, and to avoid trouble with other countries on the other, Japan at first despatched less than two divisions temporarily with the idea of carrying out the operations with minimum forces. Nevertheless the difference of forces between Japan and China was so great that the war situation did not take a favorable turn as it was expected. The central Supreme Command, therefore, despatched first five battalions during the period from the end of September to the beginning of November, and then five more divisions from North China; in addition, the beginning of November three divisions landed at Hangchow and again in the middle of that month one division landed at Paimaokiang. By supplying forces temporarily as stated above, the battle continued for three months, and at last in the middle of November the Chinese Army made a general retreat to the west. Thus the operations which were executed to protect the residents in Shanghai were brought to a conclusion. But the fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in such a way as was considered to be an error from a viewpoint of strategy shows the circumstance under which Japan was curbed by her own policy of localizing the Incident. In fact, General Sugiyama, ex-Minister of War, who was afterwards appointed Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army, pointed out these circumstances, saying that the delay in occupying Shanghai was an important cause that prolonged the Incident, but the fundamental cause lay in the numerical shortage in military forces and amount of materials, so the Japanese policy of solving the Incident in a short time should have been carried out more thoroughly. The

General told me so personally when I made a business trip to North China in the winter of 1938 (Showa 12). He was then the Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army.

The headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was reorganized into the headquarters of the <sup>Central</sup> China Expeditionary Force, and at the same time was entrusted with the duty of operating in the vicinity of Shanghai with the aim of creating an opportunity to settle the Incident. This meant that the authorities wanted to find an opportunity of settling the Incident in the operations near Shanghai, and had no intention of capturing Nanking at that time. After the battle near Shanghai the Central Authorities of the Supreme Command instructed our forces not to advance beyond the line of Changshu-Soochow-Kashing so as not to give an unnecessary provocation to Nanking. Later I learned from documents that confidential instructions had been given to the forces not to enlarge the theatre of operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

8. In our country the Imperial Headquarters Ordinance was enacted on November 17, 1937, and the Imperial Headquarters was established in Tokyo for the first time on November 20 of the same year.

In the same month the munitions mobilization program was begun. However, the order for the national general mobilization had not yet been put into force (T.N. in that year).

The General Mobilization Law was promulgated in March of the following year, that is, 1938. But it was in May 1938 that a part of the law was applied for the China Incident.

With this I bring my affidavit to an end.

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947



TANAKA

~~S.H.H.~~  
Shanichi


<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1934	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	"	"
29 Apr. 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun, 2nd Class	China Incident	"
29 Apr. 1940	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Golden Kite	"	"

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

17 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan  
FROM : Mr. Lopez  
SUBJECT : Defense Document 925, Sworn Deposition  
of Shinichi TANAKA

1. You will be interested to know that TANAKA, Shinichi, was a prosecution witness during the MUTO Phase. His testimony appears on pp. 16,140-16,174 of the Record.



Pedro Lopez  
Associate Prosecutor

cc: Mr. Sutton

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 17 April 1947

TANAKA, Shinichi

The above named person appeared as a witness for the Prosecution, and his testimony is contained in pages 16,140 to 16, 174 of the Record.

Very little is contained in TANAKA's interrogations of June 10 and June 11, 1946, attached hereto, which is not set forth in his direct testimony.

Pages 16,140 to 16,144, inclusive, of the Record describe the work of the General Staff Office. Pages 16,145 to 16,147, TANAKA discusses Imperial Conferences of 6 September 1941 and 1 December 1941 and persons who attended those conferences.

TANAKA's testimony in the Record and the summaries of his interrogations do not relate to matters set forth in his affidavit, Defense Document #925. I have examined the contents of his affidavit and have not been able to locate any specific information in the IPS files which pertains thereto.

File #459, Serial #16, is a translation of an interrogation of TANAKA by the Russian Division, but the matters discussed relate primarily to the years 1942 and 1943 and have no bearing upon the subject matter of his submitted affidavit.

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date: 19 March 1947

TANAKA, Shinichi

He is supposed to testify regarding plans concerning the Soviet Union and the objectives of such plans.

Summary of his interrogation on 10 January 1946

From February 1939 to August 1940 he was Chief of Staff of Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia.

From October 1940 to November 1942 was Chief of Operations (Chief of First Section) of Army General Staff - was placed in that position by General SUGIYAMA and TOJO (page 1, 10 January 1946).

General SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time he held office as Chief of Operations and SUGIYAMA's assistant was General TSUKADA, Osamu, (page 2).

As Chief of Operations he worked directly under Chief of Staff and his duties were to plan operations (page 3).

His section was divided into three parts: (1) organization of troop units, (2) strategy, and (3) air defense of Japan proper. Colonel AKAMADOI and Colonel YUCHITAKE were his assistants (page 3).

In June 1941 operational plans for Indo-China were worked out (page 3).

The time for the operational plans did not take long TANAKA said because of the treaty between Vichy and Japan whereby troops could be brought into Saigon and vicinity peacefully. There were only two plans made regarding Indo-China: (1) for the occupation of Northern Indo-China, which had been completed in 1940 before he took office, and (2) the plans drawn up for the peaceful occupation of Saigon (page 4).

His predecessor, Lt. General TOMINAGA, Kyoji, made the plans for the occupation of Northern Indo-China (page 4). SUGIYAMA was Chief of the General Staff at the time.

(File #00, Serial #212, contains a translation of the December 1945, #1 issue of the weekly Asahi and on page 20 referred to changes in the TOJO line-up, says in part "First of all, he drove out War Minister ANAMI and brought in Lt. General KIMURA, Heitaro, who was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. He then got rid of Major General TOMINAGA by holding him responsible for the faux pas in connection with the invasion of North Indo-China, and appointed Major General TANAKI, Shinichi, as Chief of the First Department of the

TANAKA, Shinichi - continued

General Staff Headquarters." The article continues "as the result of differences of opinion in the frontal Pacific campaign, Major General TANAKA, Shinichi, was sent away to Burma and his place as First Department Chief of the General Staff Headquarters was filled by AYABE, Tachiki, assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army."

Summary of interrogation of 11 June 1946 - File #441, Serial #5

General MUTO did most of the liaison work between the War Minister and the Army General Staff (page 2).

The nature of the liaison work at the General Staff was concerned with operations, strategy, and tactics. The basic outline of these plans including all matters involving politics, foreign relations, and finances were submitted to the War Minister and the War Minister in turn took them up with the cabinet for discussion and approval (page 2).

Pages 1, 2, 3, and 4 discuss the routine of his office (Chief of Operations of Army General Staff).

After Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, he was directed by General SUGIYAMA to make operational plans on the advisability of a campaign against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Dutch East Indies and the Philippines (page 5).

About 10 September 1941, following Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, he was instructed by General SUGIYAMA to begin preparations for operations against these countries, and General MUTO as Chief of Staff was aware of SUGIYAMA's instructions. MUTO was well informed as Chief of Staff on supply and money matters (page 5).

KONOYE, TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, TOYODA, and HAGAHO he thought were present at Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941.

MUTO also knew of plans made for Indo-China in June 1941 (page 6).

After plans were completed by General Staff, requisitions for personnel, materials, shipping, ammunition, etc., were made to War Ministry. (page 6)

Operational plans for Java, Malaya, Borneo, Dutch East Indies and Philippines were completed in November 1941, for Bismark after the war started (page 8).

TANAKA discusses operational plans against Malaya (page 8), against Pearl Harbor and the part played by SUGIYAMA, TOJO, MUTO, and others (page 11), for Hainan Island, Singapore, East Indies (page 12).

The remainder of his statements concern events prior and leading up to 7 December 1941.

TANAKA, SHINICHI

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
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29 Apr. 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun, 2nd Class	China In- cident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Golden Kite	China In- cident	War Ministry

**TANAKA, Shinichi**

Request by: **TOJO**

Present address not given.

Former Lt. General serving on army general staff prior to and during Pacific war.

This witness is able to testify regarding plans concerning Soviet Union and the objective of such plan.

TANAKA, Shinichi

Request by: Tojo.

Present address not given.

Former Lt. General serving on Army general staff prior to and during Pacific war.

This witness is able to testify regarding plans concerning Soviet Union and the objectives of such plans.



## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: TANAKA, Shinichi

Date of Birth: 23 March 1893

Permanent domicile: Hokkaido

29 May 1911	Graduated from Central Military Preparatory School.
1 Dec. 1911	Entered Military Academy
26 May 1913	Graduated from above Academy
25 Dec. 1913	Appointed infantry Sub-lieutenant. Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
6 Aug. 1917	Promoted to Infantry Lieutenant
7 Dec. 1920	Entered Military University
15 Aug. 1922	Promoted to Infantry Captain
6 Nov. 1922	Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
15 Dec. 1923	Appointed Company Commander of 52nd Infantry Regiment
15 Dec. 1924	Assigned to Military General Educational Superintendence Bureau.
20 Jan. 1925	Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
1 May 1925	Appointed to 31st Infantry Regiment
7 Aug. 1925	Appointed Member of Military General Educational Superintendence Bureau
10 Aug. 1928	Promoted to Infantry Major
21 Apr. 1932	Appointed Staff Officer of Kwantung Army
8 Aug. 1932	Promoted to Infantry Lieutenant Colonel
23 Dec. 1933	Assigned to General Staff Office
29 June 1935	Assigned to 59th Infantry Regiment
28 Mar. 1936	Assigned to Central Bureau on Military Technique, concurrently appointed Member of Military Affairs Bureau (Gunmu kyoku) of War Ministry.

27 June 1936 Appointed Member of Deliberation Committee on Military Supplies

1 Aug. 1936 Promoted to Infantry Colonel; Appointed Chief of Military Service Section of Military Service Bureau (Heimu Kyoku) of War Ministry

1 Mar. 1937 Appointed Chief of Military Section of Military Affairs Bureau of War Ministry

15 Apr. 1938 Appointed Member of Arrangement Committee on Mobilization of Military and Naval Munition Industries

18 May 1938 Appointed Manager of Estimation Committee on Assets invested by Government for North China Development Company and Central China Development Company

17 Feb. 1939 Resigned from above Post

9 Mar. 1939 Promoted Major-General

15 Apr. 1939 Resigned from Member of Deliberation Committee on Military Supplies

10 Feb. 1939 Resigned from Private Secretary to War Minister in Imperial Headquarters; Appointed Chief of General Staff of Japanese Army stationed in Mongol.  
Resigned from following Posts:  
Member of Execution Committee on Construction of Fortresses.  
Member of Entrance Examination Committee of Military Paymasters' Academy  
Member of Deliberation Committee on Mobilization of Military and Naval Munition Industries  
Member of Operation Committee on Properties of Military Mutual Benefit Society

15 Oct. 1941 Promoted to Lieutenant General

18 Mar. 1943 Appointed to Commander of 18th Division

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: TANAKA, Shinichi

Date of Birth: 23 March 1893

Permanent domicile: Hokkaido

- 29 May 1911 : Graduated from Central Military Preparatory  
School
- 1 December 1911 : Entered Military Academy
- 26 May 1913 : Graduated from above Academy
- 25 December 1913 : appointed infantry Sub-Lieutenant  
Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
- 6 August 1917 : Promoted to Infantry Lieutenant
- 7 December 1920 : Entered Military University
- 15 August 1922 : Promoted to Infantry Captain
- 6 November 1922 : Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
- 15 December 1923 : Appointed Company Commander of 52nd Infantry  
Regiment
- 15 December 1924 : Assigned to Military General Educational  
Superintendance Bureau
- 20 January 1925 : Assigned to 52nd Infantry Regiment
- 1 May 1925 : Assigned to 31st Infantry Regiment
- 7 August 1925 : Appointed Member of Military General Educational  
Super Intendence Bureau
- 10 August 1928 : Promoted to Infantry Major
- 21 April 1932 : Appointed Staff-Officer of Kwantung Army

- 8 August 1932 :Promoted to Infantry Lieutenant Colonel
- 23 December 1933:Assigned to General Staff Office
- 29 June '1935 :Assigned to 59th Infantry Regiment
- 28 March 1936 :Assigned to Central Bureau on Military Technique,  
concurrently appointed Member of Military  
Affairs Bureau (Gunmukyoku) of War Ministry
- 27 June 1936 :Appointed Member of Deliberation Committee on  
Military Supplies
- 1 August 1936 :Promoted to Infantry Colonel,  
Appointed Chief of Military Service Section of  
Military Service Bureau (Heimu Kyoku) of War  
Ministry
- 1 March 1937 :Appointed Chief of Military Section of Military  
Affairs Bureau of War Ministry
- 15 April 1938 :Appointed Member of Arrangement Committee on  
Mobilization of Military and Naval Munition  
Industries
- 18 May 1938 :Appointed Manager of Estimation Committee on  
Assets invested by Government for North-China  
Development Company and Central-China Development  
Company
- 17 February 1939:Resigned from above Post
- 9 March 1939 :Promoted Major-General
- 15 April 1939 :Resigned from Member of Deliberation Committee  
on Military Supplies