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Folder 3

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A F F I D A V I T

JOHN GOETTE, formerly foreign correspondent for International News Service in the Far East, being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

I reside at 340 East 63rd Street, New York City, and am presently engaged in writing, lecturing and radio work. I was chief correspondent for International News Service in China from 1924 to December 8th, 1941.

My work in China began in 1921, from which time my headquarters were in Peiping, North China. From 1924 until December 8th, 1941, I was continuously correspondent for International News Service. During that time I covered the major events in Manchuria and North China. From July 7th, 1937 (date of the Battle of Marco Polo Bridge) I was formally accredited to the Japanese Army in the China theatre of operations as an American war correspondent. In that period I accompanied the Japanese army into every occupied province of North China. This was in addition to periodic visits to Manchuria and Japan over the whole length of my service in Asia.

From the inception of the Manchurian Incident at Mukden on September 18th, 1931, as a neutral correspondent, I was closely associated with Japanese army and civilian officials, Chinese Nationalist officials, and subsequently with Chinese puppet officials.

The early days of November, 1931, were marked by repeated statements made to me by Chinese officials of fear that Japanese operations in Manchuria would spread to North China. They reported General (then Colonel) Kenji DOHIHARA as being in North China, and his presence always implied intrigue and possible political disturbances. On November 10th, I was at the Peiping headquarters of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Manchuria's military governor, when a telephone message from Tientsin reported that mysterious street fighting had broken out. Two days previously

I had spoken to Tientsin by telephone with Princess Pu Chieh, sister-in-law of Pu Yi, subsequently puppet emperor of Manchukuo. The Princess confirmed that a basket of fruit containing a bomb had been delivered to the Pu Yi home. The bomb did not explode. The Princess could give no explanation. However, at Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's headquarters it was commonly accepted as part of the plot of Colonel DOHIHARA to create the impression that Pu Yi was in danger whereupon the Japanese could intervene.

The street fighting at Tientsin was viewed at Marshal Chang's headquarters as a continuation of the fruit basket bomb plot. Hirling Chinese dressed in civilian clothes emerged from the Japanese Concession, fired on police and military posts, and withdrew just as mysteriously back into the Concession. I saw the main thoroughfare of Tientsin turned into a battle ground. On November 12th, 1931, I learned at Marshal Chang's headquarters that Pu Yi had been spirited out of Tientsin and carried to Dairen, Manchuria, on a Japanese vessel. The Chinese blamed Colonel DOHIHARA for engineering that step.

Colonel DOHIHARA was active in the Peiping area in 1935 when he brought pressure upon General Sung Chieh-yuan, head of the Hopei Political Council, to agree to head what the Japanese planned as the North China Autonomous Federation. This was to include the northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung and Honan. It would have virtually severed from the Nationalist government control an area of approximately 600,000 square miles with a population of 170,000,000 Chinese. Pressure of the most weird sort was brought to bear upon General Sung Chieh-yuan to accede to Japanese wishes.

On June 28th, 1935, a mysterious railway train drew up on the tracks outside the south wall of the Chinese City of Peiping. Shells were fired over the wall into the surprised and peaceful city. Then the train withdrew. The city police hurriedly reinforced the south gate with many tons of sand. I was present at the

gate when a Japanese army officer arrived and insisted that the police shovel the sand away so that he might go out and inspect a Japanese military telegraph line which connected their Peiping Embassy Guard with their forces in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin. I went out with the Japanese officer and did see a severed telegraph wire. Such a coincidence arising out of this mysterious train attack at once suggested to me the same Japanese tactics as had been employed at Mukden in 1931. At other times during 1935, Japanese airplanes dropped leaflets on Peiping denouncing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In November, 1935, motor cars sped through the streets of Peiping scattering handbills reproducing spurious petitions from the people of the five northern provinces demanding autonomy from the Nationalist Government of China. There was no doubt but this was part of the DOHIHARA intrigue.

Despite this continued pressure, General Sung Chieh-yuan refused to yield, and the frustrated Japanese then created the first actual puppet regime in North China at Tungchow, fifteen miles east of Peiping. In November, 1935, at the invitation of the press section of the North China Japanese army I went to Tungchow, and saw Yin Ju-keng inaugurated as the head of the so-called East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government. Jin Yu-keng denounced Chiang Kai-shek and claimed that his regime included 10,000 square miles of Hopei province. Since this ran to the sea coast, the area became a haven of Japanese and Korean smugglers and drug importers. Jin Yu-keng had a Chinese gendarmerie recruited, drilled and officered by Japanese. There was also a Japanese army garrison in Tungchow. Under such conditions, the customs officials of the Nationalist Government were powerless to prevent the smuggling of commodities or drugs which were then moved duty free into other parts of North China. This rebel regime of Jin Yu-keng lasted until

the Japanese army formally invested Peiping in July, 1937.

During the 1935 intrigue, Colonel DOHIHARA kept out of sight of the foreign correspondents. However, I spoke with him twice in 1936, once on February 17th and again on March 2nd. At that time there was a generally accepted report that Colonel DOHIHARA was plotting to bring Pu Yi from Manchuria to Peiping. There he would be installed on the throne which he abdicated in 1912, to rule over a consolidation of Manchuria and North China. Those two interviews with Colonel DOHIHARA produced no conclusive facts.

In January, 1932, when a Japanese ultimatum was served on the municipal authorities of Shanghai, I went there from Peiping. As I crossed the Yangtze River to Nanking, I saw five Japanese warships drop anchor, placing an American destroyer between them and the Tiger Hill Forts of Nanking. I went on to Shanghai, and the next day learned that those Japanese warships had shelled the Tiger Hill Forts.

I covered the Sino-Japanese fighting for Shanghai's native city until March 13th after the Chinese defenders had withdrawn. I repeatedly saw the bodies of Chinese farmers with hands tied behind their backs lying before their burned out houses. I witnessed the daily Japanese aerial bombing of the native city in which thousands of non-combatants were still trapped. I watched Japanese destroyers methodically shelling the Woosung forts on the Whangpo River with no answering fire from the forts.

The Shanghai attack was started by the Japanese Naval Landing Party which soon discovered it was no match for the resisting Chinese 19th Route Army. In those early days when I went into the Japanese sector I was met by Japanese sailors and officers who pointed their cocked revolvers at my chest. However, when Japanese army troops were landed in the confines of the International Settlement which they illegally used as a base for operations against the Chinese, the nervousness of the naval sentries was gone and I no longer had to face cocked revolvers.

a base for operations against the Chinese, the nervousness of the naval sentries was gone and I no longer had to face cocked revolvers. It was this same panic of the naval party which caused them to wire up the hands of innocent Chinese civilians who were openly dragged through the streets of the Japanese area of the International Settlement.

In 1933 I covered the Chinese army as the Japanese forces moved southwards inside the Great Wall into North China. There was no declaration of war and the Japanese never gave any definite official explanation as to what they sought. In that area I inspected the damage done by Japanese aerial bombs and artillery fire to at least two American mission properties, namely at Miyun and Tungchow. On one occasion I arrived at a Chinese outpost trench just after a Japanese plane had flown low dropping bombs which killed several and wounded other Chinese soldiers who had no means of defense against that pre-meditated and unwarranted Japanese attack. I saw the dead and the wounded at a nearby command post.

Under pressure of the better armed Japanese, the Chinese troops fell back to a line within a few miles of Peiping. Japanese garrisons in North China were continuously enlarged. Squadrons of new, twin-motored Japanese bombers roared over Peiping, even above the American Embassy, as Japan tried to frighten China's Minister of War, General Ho Yin-ching, then in Peiping. In May, 1933, the Japanese army showed its hand and on May 31st, the agreement was signed between General Ho Yin-ching and General Yoshijiro Umezu. The area between the Great Wall and Peiping was to be demilitarized to the Chinese but not to Japanese troops.

Even that agreement did not appease the Japanese military which continued its tactics of confusion and disturbance of the peace of North China. Twice during 1933 after the Ho-Umezu

agreement, large bands of armed, renegade Chinese were sent by the Japanese from their occupied areas into the demilitarized zone. Then they disappeared back into the Japanese lines. I spoke with officers and men of these renegade bands who gave no explanation of their presence. Two of these roving bands were headed by Liu Kwei-t'ang and Fang Chen-wu.

On the night of July 7th, 1937, I was a guest at dinner in Peiping of American Ambassador and Mrs. Nelson T. Johnson. Other guests included General (then Colonel) Joseph W. Stilwell, American military attache, and General (then Colonel) John Marston, United States Marine Corps. Colonel Marston was commandant of the U.S. Embassy Guard Detachment, and as such, was senior officer of all the foreign forces garrisoned in the Diplomatic Quarter of Peiping, composing those of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States.

Colonel Marston that evening told us that the Japanese Embassy Guard commandant had that afternoon advised him as senior officer present that the Japanese guard would hold maneuvers that night in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge across the Hun River. Ambassador Johnson, Colonel Stilwell, and I discussed with Colonel Marston the fact that embassy guards did not hold night maneuvers outside the Peiping city walls, and usually they held day time maneuvers only to the east of Peiping where there was an international rifle range. We all agreed that it was peculiar for the Japanese embassy guard to go to the Marco Polo Bridge area at night.

At seven o'clock the next morning (July 8th, 1937) Colonel Stilwell telephoned me that the Japanese guard troops and the Chinese garrison of the small walled town of Wanping were fighting. I could hear the artillery barrage in Peiping. Wanping was some ten miles southwest standing at the eastern approach to the Marco Polo Bridge, known to the Chinese as Lukouchiao.

With Mr. A. T. Steele, an American newspaper correspondent, I motored to Wanping shortly after Colonel Stilwell telephoned

me. There we joined Colonel (then Major) David Barrett, assistant military attache under Colonel Stilwell. Wanping is a city with brick walls about twenty-five feet high, a massive gate at the east and west sides, and whose walls are approximately a quarter of a mile on the east and west sides and a half mile long on the north and south sides. Some 3,000 peaceful people lived within its walls.

We three Americans found the east gate closed. Chinese soldiers on the top of the wall said they could not open the gate because it was sand bagged on the inside. Speaking Chinese, we asked the soldiers what had happened during the night. They explained that the Japanese had opened fire on Wanping. We asked where the Japanese were and the Chinese waved to a railway embankment about a quarter of a mile to the north across a dry river bed. We three decided to go to the Japanese lines for an explanation, but as we turned the northeast corner of the Wanping wall, there was a burst of machine gun fire. We dropped back but when the firing was not repeated we crossed the no-man's land and went through an under-pass in the railway embankment. There we ran into a Japanese machine gun post and were escorted to the Japanese officer in command. As we walked beside the embankment, the Japanese troops stood above us in hastily-dug firing positions but not showing their heads above the embankment. In this short walk we noted a dead Japanese officer stretched out in a millet field. The Japanese would give us no explanation as to what had happened during the night, and eventually ordered us to climb over the embankment and return to Wanping. Since no Japanese showed his head there, it seemed dangerous for us to do so, but the officer was menacing and we three Americans rushed to the top of embankment to walk back without the Chinese firing upon us.

We returned to Peiping. That evening Mr. Steele and I went back to Wanping. The east gate was still closed but we found the west gate partly opened while Chinese soldiers prepared a

crude land mine from hand grenades just outside the gate. We were told that the Japanese had served an ultimatum that they would bombard Wanping at seven p.m. unless the garrison surrendered. Mr. Steele and I asked permission to enter Wanping to speak with the commanding officer but just as the orderly returned to invite us in, the time limit expired and the Japanese bombardment opened up. There was firing of rifles and machine guns down the river toward the Chinese infantry on the Marco Polo Bridge which was a few hundred feet from where we stood at the west gate of Wanping. Shells were dropping into the city. Japanese artillery was so close we could hear the muzzle explosion and then the explosion of the shell. Mr. Steele and I after a hurried conference decided we had better run for it. This involved nearly a mile all told, since our car was parked outside the east gate. We made it safely, but stopped long enough to receive shouted reports from soldiers on the wall as to where the Japanese shells were dropping and the property and human damage they were inflicting.

On July 10th, during an armistice, I entered Wanping together with Major Barrett and Mr. Steele. We saw the shelled-out municipal buildings and military headquarters. Since the roofs of none of these buildings projected above the high city walls of Wanping, we speculated as to the likelihood of the Japanese army having worked out the exact range prior to the hostilities of the night of July 7th. No reconnaissance air planes were used in the Wanping fighting at that time, but the town was subsequently bombed.

Mr. Steele and I next saw Wanping on July 30th after the city of Peiping and the surrounding areas had formally been captured by the Japanese army in its all-out military offensive against Chinese garrisons in the four suburbs of Peiping. At Wanping that afternoon we were told by Chinese survivors that Japanese tanks had pushed into the walled city the day before and hurried to the southwest across the Marco Polo Bridge. ~~we~~

We noted especially that the walls of every building on each side of Wanping's single wide street were marked by a continuous line of machine gun holes obviously made by the passing tanks which feared Chinese stragglers might be left behind. Wanping fell when the Chinese garrison moved across the river. The garrison never surrendered. (Shozo?)

I saw General Torashino Kawabe ride into Peiping at the head of his troops and establish himself as military governor on August 8th, 1937. In the next few months I moved from front to front watching the wide scale Japanese military campaign swing southwards from Peiping in two prongs and northwest along the Peiping Suiyuan Railway. With a spokesman of the North China Headquarters of the Japanese army, I went up the railway to Hwailai just outside the Nankou Pass in the Great Wall. General Seishiro Itagaki had just captured Hwailai. On August 31st, 1937, in the course of an interview given us American, European and Japanese newspapermen, I asked General ITAGAKI whether he was going further toward Inner Mongolia or if he would strike southwards for the Yellow River. He admitted that he might do the latter. This was startling since at that early moment, the Japanese kept insisting the fighting was merely an "incident."

I next interviewed General ITAGAKI at Nanking on March 21st, 1940. He was chief of staff to the commander-in-chief of all Japanese forces in China. The Japanese had just created the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei, and I was in Nanking for its inauguration. Thus in the period between my Hwailai interview and March 1940, General ITAGAKI and other Japanese had fought their way across a large part of China, but still there was no declaration of war, and still the Japanese talked of the widespread devastating hostilities as the "China Incident." But I had followed the Japanese army across the eight northern provinces of China. In the numerous battles the Japanese reported the taking of prisoners. In all that time I recall seeing but one Chinese prisoner. Repeatedly I asked to see prisoners or prisoner of war camps, but neither

were ever produced for my inspection. Actually, Japanese officers explained to me their aim as smashing and killing Chinese troops rather than extension of occupied territory once the major strategic areas were in their hands. Hence, in my experience, few Chinese soldiers were taken prisoners, or if they were taken prisoner, they were quickly slaughtered.

In my travels with the Japanese armies (over 20,000 miles) I entered scores of cities and towns which were in ruins, sometimes without a living thing in sight. Property destruction, either during battle or by systematic looting, was an every day sight. I saw thousands of frightened refugees and hundreds of civilian dead, often with hands tied behind backs. In some Shansi towns, Chinese Christians were persecuted for attending chapel. British missionaries in Shansi were given long jail terms for taking wounded Chinese soldiers into their missions. Civil populations everywhere were in mortal terror of giving offense to the Japanese army which forced every man to take off his hat and bow to sentries even though he were carrying a heavy load on his back or pushing a loaded wheelbarrow. American and European missionaries told me of the endless stream of Chinese girls and women brought to them for medical treatment after assaults by Japanese soldiers. The Chinese commonly accepted the practice of official Japanese demands upon village elders to produce specified numbers of girls and women for physical misuse by the troops.

Frequently Japanese war correspondents returning from the front would tell me tales of rape and plunder which sickened them so much they were moved to reveal them to an American. In that vein, one Japanese correspondent who went through the Nanking outrage told me of the speech which General Iwane MATSUI delivered to his command after the first few days of Nanking. That correspondent said he would not have believed that a Japanese general would speak so to his command, more especially since an imperial prince was included. The general, according

to the Japanese correspondent, spoke his mind on the outrages perpetrated by his troops. The correspondent could give me no explanation as to why General MATSUI had not stopped his troops from such excesses. However, the spokesman for the North China Army advised me that the outrages were committed by Japanese reservists whose discipline was poor. When I pointed out that such reservists were the older troops, the fathers of families in Japan, the spokesman did not withdraw his explanation. As army censor, he permitted me to file a story of his comments.

Once the excesses of Japanese occupation were passed, both army and Japanese civilian officials set about regimenting Chinese civilians. They organized in North China the Hsin Min Hui, or New Peoples Society, and in Central China, the Tung Ya Hui, or East Asia Society. Through such societies they forced the Chinese to parade in celebration of Japanese victories. School children, teachers, laborers and shop assistants were ordered to parade with Japanese flags and banners of congratulation to the Japanese. They listened to speeches by Japanese and Chinese puppets, and these ended with the Japanese shout of "Banzai." Advertising balloons were raised over cities with Chinese characters proclaiming each Japanese victory in China. Japanese-run newspapers displayed pictures of such mass meetings while headlines just under them boasted that 20,000 Chinese were killed in a battle.

Posters covered the countryside showing Chinese and Japanese girls marching arm in arm, or Japanese soldiers carrying Chinese babies or giving them candy. I saw such posters in captured towns where I heard stories of inhuman treatment in sad contrast to the happy scenes portrayed by the posters. School children were forced to write essays on their love of the Japanese army. These were shipped back to Japan by the hundreds of thousands to convince falsely the people there of Chinese welcome to their armies.

School books were revised or replaced by those printed in Japan which deleted any patriotic or nationalist Chinese theme. Schools were forbidden to teach English, and Japanese was substituted as the second language. Japanese were placed on the

staffs of higher schools and colleges, such as remained intact after deliberate Japanese bombings or were permitted to operate.

I saw numerous American and British missions, schools, orphanages and hospitals which had been bombed by Japanese planes. Always when with the Japanese air force I watched for American or British flags painted on mission roofs. They stood out clearly, and when a mission was hit, there could be no denial of malicious intention.

Japanese civil officials like Toshio Shiratori, on his way back from his post as ambassador to Rome, visited Peiping and spoke of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the alleged high motives of Japan which were in direct contrast to what I saw happening. Such Japanese invariably used the word "sincere" as meaning anyone who bowed to Japanese will. All others were "insincere". After listening to Mr. Shiratori, I remonstrated that the Japanese were distorting the usage of the English language with these fabulous claims. Thereupon Mr. Shiratori sarcastically advised me that the fault was not Japanese. What was needed, he explained, was a new dictionary of the English language more in conformity with new Japanese concepts in East Asia.

Other Japanese diplomats like Yakichiro Suma and Ambassador Kato who subsequently died in a fall from the window of the Japanese Embassy at Vichy, France, talked to me about "military necessity" as the sole reason for the ever-strangling restrictions upon American and European trade in occupied China. They tried to blame it on the army and exigencies of war. When I retorted that most of the restrictions were the creation of Japanese civilian advisers and experts sent to China from Tokyo and the proclaimed long-range policy of the China Affairs Board, they had no plausible answer and always fell back on "military necessity".

On one occasion I asked Mr. Suma just how far the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere went in Asia. Did it include the Philippines, Malaya, Burma or India? I inquired. Mr. Suma

avoided the issue by suggesting that I ask him some other time. "My knowledge of geography is not so good today," said Mr. Suma. It was not long before the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere reached from Pearl Harbor to the borders of British India, hence Mr. Suma's reluctance to define it at that time.

More realistic was General Teiichi Suzuki when I spoke with him in Tokyo in October, 1939. He was then returned from a military career in China and was associated with the China Affairs Board. General Suzuki referred to the Japanese puppet, Wang Ching-wei. I questioned his worthiness, and the General admitted that Chiang Kai-shek was the one strong man in China and that Japan, having failed to win him to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, must go on fighting Chiang Kai-shek and China no matter how long the struggle. And General Suzuki expressed the opinion that it might take many more years to break China's will to resist Japan. In that conversation, General Suzuki also emphasized the anti-communist character of Japan's brutal crusade in China.

I witnessed the active implementation of that anti-communist campaign in occupied North China. It was at the Hwailai railway station in August, 1937, that I watched Japanese military trains passing. An English-speaking Japanese colonel made the gratuitous comment - "Those are our second rate troops. We are saving our best men for use against Soviet Russia."

In North China were several thousand White Russians who had lived there since 1918. They held Chinese passports. When the Japanese army came, it organized those White Russians under a system known as the Russian House. All former passports were voided and new ones could only be obtained through the Russian House which was directed by a puppet White Russian and a Japanese army officer. The White Russians were forced to contribute a stipulated portion of their earnings to the Russian House. They were organized into military companies, uniformed and armed, and drilled by Japanese officers several days a week. The

Japanese encouraged them to show the Imperial Russian colors.

This treatment by the Japanese was detested by the helpless White Russians, and many of them confessed to me that if the Japanese planned to have them fight against Soviet Russia, then the Japanese were misled. However, the Japanese never did employ such White Russian units against the Nationalist Chinese as was done in the case of Manchurians, Mongols or Chinese puppets of the Japanese.

After the creation of the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime at Nanking in 1940, a yellow pennant was added to the Chinese flag. On it were Chinese characters for "Peace-Reconstruction-Anti-Communism." Likewise, the Japanese army annually staged what they called anti-communist week during which fresh anti-communist posters were put up and mass meetings held. Just prior to Pearl Harbor the Japanese erected in Peiping a giant statue of a man cutting at a snake with his sword. This was located at an important cross-section. An inscription on the base announced that the statue was dedicated to anti-communism.

Along with everyone else, Chinese or foreigners, who ever came in contact with the Japanese Kem Pei Tai, or military police, I developed a well-founded fear and loathing of their manners and their tactics. When they cross-examined my Chinese servants I protested to the spokesman of the North China army with whom I was in constant contact. I demanded that he call off these molestations of my servants. Thereupon the spokesman, a full colonel, actually quivered with fright at my daring suggestion that he intervene with the military police.

I was with this same colonel and Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor, now Commandant of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (then Captain and assistant military attache to General Joseph W. Stilwell). Captain Taylor spoke Japanese and we left our train during a station halt to look casually at a captured Chinese artillery piece on the platform. A sergeant of the Japanese military police addressed Captain Taylor in a rude manner although he was wearing the uniform of an American army

officer, and was a guest observer with the Japanese army. I was outraged and called to our spokesman colonel. The military police sergeant then turned on the colonel and shouted as sharply to him as he had to Captain Taylor. The colonel herded us back on the train without admonishing the sergeant.

On one occasion the correspondent for Reuters, the British news agency, sent a true story of mistreatment of the wife of a Chinese puppet official in Peiping by a Japanese Kem Pei Tai at the railway station. A major of the Kem Pei Tai threatened the British correspondent unless he would retract the story although the major refused to deny its truth. For days the Japanese army deliberately stationed a squad of buglers outside the home of the correspondent so that his life was made unbearable by the crude bugling. An appeal to regular Japanese army officers who knew the correspondent was in vain. They did not dare cross their own military police in this act of intimidation although they knew his story was correct.

On the morning of December 8th, 1941 (equivalent to the time of the bombing of Pearl Harbor) Japanese military police, Kem Pei Tai, entered my Peiping study and arrested me. I was taken with several other American and British civilians to the barracks of the U.S. Marine Embassy Guard. There the Japanese had overpowered the 150 U.S. Marines and pulled down the American flag as the first surrender of any American fighting force to the Japanese.

As I was escorted to the American barracks, I noted English posters on my own house and at other points declaring that war had started and giving instructions. Likewise with each party of military police was a Japanese civilian speaking either English or Chinese. Such preparation which covered widely separated and isolated sections of the large city of Peiping could only have been activated after many days of preparation. I knew the slow workings of the Japanese army and speculated on how long before the actual attack at Pearl Harbor the Japanese in Peiping were

warned to prepare, as they did for the eventual moment of war.

I continued as an internee approximately seven months,
leaving for America on the first trip of the GRIPSHOLM.

John Goette

JOHN GOETTE

Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this 23 day of July 1946:

Thos H. Morrow

Colonel
^{Inspected}
Inspector General's Department

U. S. A.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2482

23 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Affidavit of John GOETTE, INS
Correspondent on Japanese Military Aggression 1929 - 1941

Date: 23 July 46 Original () Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: John GOETTE

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUI, Iwane; DOIHARA, Kenji; SHIRATORI,
Toshio; SUMA, Yakichiro; SUZUKI, Teiichi, UMEZU, Yoshijiro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: CHINA Military Aggression;
CHINA Affairs Board; GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere; Relations with
USSR; Declaration of War on U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

DOIHARA engineered North China Autonomous Federation by bringing pressure to bear on General SUNG, Chieh-Yuan, and later setting up own puppet regime, 1935. Japanese used this area for smuggling in goods to all parts of CHINA.

After HO-UMEZU agreement which allowed armed Japanese in certain areas but forbade them to Chinese troops, ~~later~~ Chinese brigands were permitted to raid these areas by the Japanese.

MARCO POLO Bridge Incident: Japanese informed Americans including then Col. Stillwell that Japanese Embassy Guard would hold night maneuvers near Marco Polo Bridge, a most unusual step. Hostilities followed, notable among which was fact that WANPING, a high walled city, was being shelled

Doc. No. 2482

Page 1

Doc. No. 2482 - Page 2 - SUMMARY Cont'd

accurately from a distance, leading to the belief that ranges had been plotted and firing prepared some time before.

General ITAGAKI, in an interview in August 1937, shortly after capturing HWAILAI, admitted he might strike southward toward Yellow River, in spite of fact Japanese at time called it only an "Incident". GOETTE believes few Chinese were taken prisoners in ITAGAKI's drive across China, almost all being slaughtered.

General MATSUI is reported as having spoken to his troops on their conduct in NANKING, to Japanese correspondent so reporting being unable to give any reason for his not halting the outrages.

SHIRATORI and SUZUKI are quoted as expressing opinions on the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the "New Concepts" therein.

December 8, about the time of actual Pearl Harbor Attack, Japanese troops in Peiping arrested GOETTE and other Allied personnel, and placed posters stating the war had begun and giving instructions in widely scattered parts of Peiping, indicating that many days of preparation had preceded such action.

Analyst: W.H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2482
Page 2

Section Two

Document 2482

The Affidavit of John Goette

checked by
Mr KUROSAWA

Doc # 2482 (affair of T. Soeta)
Pages 1-4 include

Translated by Hironde YOSHIDA
Checked by Kotaro KUROSAWA

宣誓口供書

前國際通信社極東外國通信員「在ジョン・ゲラティ」ハ正式ニ宣誓

ノ上、左ノ如ク證言シ陳述スル。

紐名目

私ハ「在キョーモリ」市、東六十三番街三百四十番地ニ居住シ、現在デハ

著述、講演及ビ放送ノ仕事ヲシテ居ル。私ハ、千九百二十四年/大正十三年/

カラ千九百四十一年/昭和十六年/十二月八日ニ至ル迄、國際通信社ノ中國在

主任通信員デアタタ。

中國ニ於ケル私ノ仕事ハ千九百二十一年/大正十年/ニ始マリ、其ノ當時

カラ私ノ本據ハ華北北京ニ在ツタ。千九百二十四年/大正十三年/カラ

千九百四十一年/昭和十六年/十二月八日ニ至ル迄、間、私ハズツト國際通信社

ノ通信員デアタタ。其ノ間、私ハ滿洲ヤ華北ニ於ケル主ナ出來事ヲ

報道

總編 總過シタ。 千九百三十七年 / 昭和十二年 / 七月七日 (蘆溝橋テ戰闘

米國

ノアツタ日)以降私ハ一 ~~アメリカ~~ 從軍記者トシテ中國作戰地域ニ於ケル

日本軍隊ニ公式認證ヲ受テ派遣サレタ。其ノ期間中私ハ華北ノ ~~事~~ 凡

占領地域ニ日本軍隊ニ隨伴シテ行ツタ。コノ外ニ亞細亞在任ノ全期間

中、定期的ニ滿洲ヤ日本ヲ訪問シタ。

千九百三十一年 / 昭和六年 / 九月十八日 奉天ニ於ケル滿洲事變ノ發端

以來中立國通信員トシテ、私ハ日本ノ軍人ヤ官吏達、中國ノ國民黨ノ官吏達、

ソカラ後ニハ中國ノ傀儡官吏達ト密接ナ交渉ヲ生ジタ。

千九百三十一年 / 昭和六年 / 十二月上旬、自立タコトハ中國ノ官吏達ガ

私ニ向ッテ日本ノ滿洲ニ於ケル軍事行動ガ華北ニ擴大サレハシナイカト云フ

懸念ヲ繰返シ述ベタコトデアツタ。彼等ハ土肥原賢ニ大將(當時大佐)

が華北ニ居ル^ルソシテ彼ノ居ル^ルハ何時モ陰謀ヤ政治的ノ紛擾が起ツタリスル
コトヲ意味スルト云フ様ナコトヲ言フ居ツタ。十一月十日、私ハ滿洲ノ軍人總督

張學良將軍ノ北京。司令部ニ居タガ、其ノ時天津カラノ電話ハ不可解^テノ

市街戦が起ツタコトヲ報ジテキタ。是ヨリ二日前ニ私ハ天津ニ向ケ後ニ

滿洲國ノ傀儡皇帝ニナツタ溥儀ノ義妹ニラタル溥傑令夫人ト電話テ話

ラシタ。夫人ハ爆彈入りノ果物籠が溥儀ノ家ニ届ケラレタコトヲ確認シタ

爆彈ハ爆發シナカッタ。夫人ハ何モ説明スルコトが出来ナカッタ。ケレドモ

張學良將軍ノ司令部デハ此ノ事件ハ溥儀ガ危険ナ状態ニ在ツテ、日本人ナラ

諷停ニ立ツコトが出来ルト云フ印象ヲ植エ付ケル爲ノ土肥原大佐ノ密謀ノ一部デ

アルト云フ風ニ一般ニトラレテ居タ。

天津ノ市街戦モ、張學良將軍ノ司令部デハ、果物籠爆彈密謀事件

ノ繼續テアルト看ラレテ居ツタ。一般人ノ服装ヲシタ傭ハレタ中國人が

日本租界カラ現ハレ 警察署ヤ軍ノ屯所ニ發砲シテ又租界ノ中ニ不可解

ニモ引込ニテ仕舞フタ。私ハ天津ノ大通リガ戰場ニ變ッテ仕舞フタノヲ見タ。

千九百三十一年ノ昭和六年ノ十一月十二日、私ハ張ノ司令部デ溥儀ガ天津カラ

密カニ連レ去ラレ 日本船デ滿洲大連ニ運ハレタコトヲ知ツタ。中國人ハ是ノ

手段ノ畫策ヲ土肥原大佐ノ仕業トシタ。

土肥原大佐ハ千九百三十五年ノ昭和十年ニハ北京地區デ活動シテ

居タガ其ノ年彼ハ^{冀察}滿地政務委員會委員長宋哲元ニ壓迫ヲ加ヘテ

日本人ガ華北自治聯合トシテ計畫シタモヲ主宰スルコトニ同意サセヨウトシタ。

是ハ河北・察哈爾・綏遠・山東・河南ノ北部諸省ヲ包含スル^{冀察}。

ソレハ畢竟國民政府支配下カラ一億七千萬ノ中國人人口ヲ持ツノ凡ソ

六千萬^平方哩ノ地域ヲ切り離シテ仕舞フコトデアラフ。日本ノ希沙エニ同意サセル

爲ニハ宋哲元將軍ニ對シテ最モ恐ロシイ種族ノ壓迫ガ加ヘラレタ。

千九百三十五年 / 昭和十年 / 六月二十八日、北京ノ中國人街ノ南城壁

外側ノ線路上ヲ一ツノ不可思議ナ鐵車、列車が逆付イテ来タ。砲彈が

城壁越シニ不意討ヲウケタ平和ナ町ノ中へ發射サレタ。ソレカラ列車ハ

撤退シタ。市ノ警察ハ急イテ何噸モノ砂ヲ南ノ門ヲ補強シタ。私ガ

其ノ門ニ居タ時ニ一人ノ日本人將校ガ来テ、外、北京ノ日本大使館護衛隊ト

ノ爲ニ出ラレル

天津日本租界ノ日本軍隊トヲ連絡スル日本軍用電信線ヲ検査

様ニ警察ハ砂ヲシヤベルデ橋キ出セト主張シタ。私ハ其ノ日本將校ト一語ニ

外ニ出テ事實切レタ電信線ヲ看タ。是ノ不思議ナ列車攻撃カラ

生ジタ斯ウイフ偶然ノ一致ハ、スグト私ニ千九百三十一年 / 昭和六年 / 奉天

テ使ハレタト同ジ日本ノ策略ヲ暗示シタ。千九百三十五年 / 昭和十年 / 中

ノ他ノ時ニハ、日本ノ航空機ハ蔣介石軍事委員長ヲ非難シタヒラ

ラ北京ニ撒布シタ。千九百三十五年 / 昭和十年 / 十一月ニハ、自動車ガ北京

ノ街路ヲ、中國ノ國民政府カラ、自治ヲ要スル華北五省ノ民衆
ノ願ノ請願ヲ複寫シテ散ラシ、ヲ撒キテ疾驅シタ。是レガ土肥原陰謀
ノ一部テアルコトハ疑ヒナカク。

此ノ引續キノ「壓迫ニモ拘ラス、宋哲元將軍ハ讓歩ヲ肯ニシナカク」
ソコニ

失敗シタ日本人ハ、北京カラ十五哩東ノ通州ニ最初ノ實際ノ傀儡政權
ヲ創シタ。一九三五年ノ昭和十年ノ十一月、北支那方面軍ノ新聞班ノ

招待ニ依リ私ハ通州ニ赴キ、所謂冀東共自治政府首班トシテ就任
シタ殷汝耕ニ逢フタ。殷汝耕ハ蔣介石ヲ非難シ、是ガ政權ハ河北省ノ

一萬方哩ヲ占有シテ居ルト主張シタ。是ノ地域ハ海岸迄及ニテ居ルヲ
是ノ地帯ハ日本人ヤ朝鮮人ノ密輸業者ヤ麻藥輸入業者ヲ庇護スル

場所トナラ。殷汝耕ハ日本人ニ依ッテ徵募サレ、訓練サレ、日本人ヲ將校ト
シタ密輸兵隊ヲ持ッテ居タ。通州ニハ又日本軍ノ守備隊ガアツタ。

シタ

シタ

シタ

シタ

斯ニテ狀態ダツタノデ國民政府ノ稅關官吏ハ華北ノ他ノ地方ニ無稅

テ入り込シテタル商品ヤ麻藥ノ密輸ヲ阻止スル力ハナカッタ。殷汝耕ノ

此ノ反逆政權ハ千九百三十七年ノ昭和十二年ノ七月、日本軍ガ正式ニ

北京ヲ攻圍スル迄續イタ。

千九百三十五年ノ昭和十年ノ密謀事件中、土肥原大佐ハ外國通信員カラ

姿ヲ隱シテ居タ。ケレドモ私ハ、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ二回、一度ハ

二月十七日、モウ一度ハ三月二日、彼ト話ヲシタ。其ノ當時、土肥原大佐ガ

溥儀ヲ滿洲カラ北京ニ連レテ來ルコトヲ畫策シテ居ルト云フコトガ專ラ取沙汰

サレテ居タ。其ノ北京、溥儀ハ彼ガ千九百十二年ノ大正元年ノ二退位シタ

皇位ニ就キ、滿洲ト華北トヲ併合シテ國ヲ支配スルヲロウト云フノデアアル。

土肥原大佐トノ二回ノ會見ハ何等ノ結論的事實ヲモ生マナカッタ。

日本ノ最後通牒が上海ノ市當局ニ送達サレタ
千九百三十二年ノ昭和七年

一月ニ私ハ北京カラ上海ヘ行ツタ。私ガ南京ニ向ツテ揚子江ヲ渡ツタ時

五隻ノ日本ノ軍艦ガ南京ノ虎山要塞トノ間ニ一隻ノ力ヲ驅逐艦ヲ

米國

其足

挾ニテ碇泊シテ居ルヲ見タ。私ハ更ニ上海ニ行ツタガ亦日定等ノ日本軍艦

ガ虎山要塞ヲ砲撃シタコトヲ知ツタ。

私ハ中國ノ防衛軍ガ撤退シタ後ノ三月十三日ニ至ル迄ノ上海ノ中國人街

ヲ報道

ニ對スル、中國ト日本トノ戰鬥ノ總キ經過シタ。私ハ幾度モ両手ヲ背中

挿ハ

テ縛ラレテ燒キ盡サレタ家ノ前ニ横ハツテ居ル中國ノ農民ノ身體ヲ見タ

死骸

私ハ幾千ノ非戰鬥員ガ未ダニ毘ニカカツタ様ニウカマツテヤル中國人街ニ

對スル日^々ノ日本ノ空爆ヲ眼ノアタリ見タ。私ハ日本ノ驅逐艦ガ應戰

シテ發砲モミナイ黃浦江上ノ吳淞砲臺ヲ規則的ニ砲撃スルヲ

目撃シタ。

見守リ

上海攻撃ハ日本ノ海軍陸戦隊ニ依ッテ始メラレタリテアルガ陸戦隊ハ
間モナク彼等ガ抵抗スル中國十九路軍ノ敵デハナイト云フコトヲ發見シタ。

斯ウ云フ初期ノ頃ニハ、私が日本軍ノ占據地區ニ入ッテ行クト、私ハ日本ノ

起シタ

水兵ヤ士官ニ撃鐵ヲ掛ケテ拳銃ヲ胸ニツキツケラレタ。ケレドモ日本ノ陸軍

軍隊ガ共同租界ノ境界内ニ上陸シテ其處ヲ不法ニモ中國軍ニ對スル作戰

根據地トシテ使用シタ頃ニハ海軍哨兵達ノ神經過敏ハナクナツテ、私ハモウ

起シタ

撃鐵ヲ掛ケテ拳銃ニ面ト向フニハ及バナカッタ。



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飛
中国
機が低く飛んで行くと、その後、兵隊が哨隊に整頓を列着

シタ。私に死者や負傷者ヲ司令部より見タ。

準備の備
押サ 中国
其那軍隊ハ北京カ

内側線迄後退シタ。其那ニ於ケル日本ノ準備

隊ハ砲兵強サシタ。新三ノ双巻ノ日本爆撃機ノ飛

行中隊ハ、日本ハ当時北京ニ居テ中国陸軍大臣、何應欽

北京上空ヤンニテ米口大使館ノ上ヲサシタ。

一九三三年 昭和八年 五月ニ日本人其ノ方策ヲ鮮明ニ
五月三十日ニ協定ハ

何應欽 梅津吉次郎大將ト向テ果在サレタ。

万里ノ長城ト北京ノ向ノ地域ハ、日本軍隊ノ侵入ヲ
中国軍

隊ハ
第一武装解除セラルニナツタ。但日本軍隊ハ其ノ限ヲ
テナカワメ。

フシテシテ元

華北

策略

該協定

北東部ノ混乱ト平和ノ妨害ノ所ヲ示スル所

部 宿大ニ誤ニユカナカワタ。何應鈞梅津

日本軍ヲ鎮メオカフ者 補 梅津協定後一九三三年昭和八年

中ニ 其東 團ガ 軍ニシテ

中ニ 二回 武装ニテ裏切者ノ東国人ノ大敵ト日本ノ

占領地域カラ武装解除サレタ地帯ヘ送ラレタ。ソレカラ彼等ハ

日本ノ限界内ヘ消エ去ツタ。私ハ其情ヲ 彼等 能ク示シ

士官ヤ兵隊

カガ、彼等ハ

其説明ニテカキテ裏切者ノ軍隊ノ到達ト誤シ其

如何ニテソノ所ニ居ルカノ説明ハシテ是レナカワタ。

之等ノウシ 之テナル軍隊ノニハ 劉桂堂ト方振武ニ

率キテラレテキタ。

一九三七年 昭和十二年 七月七日ノ夜 私ハ来口大使ト「ネルソン・テイ」

晩

デアフタ。

ジョンソン夫人トノ北方面ニ於ケル 餐ノ客 他ノ客ニ

米國陸軍武官ムジョセフ・タフルユー・ステルウェル大將(当時大佐) 合衆國

マリン隊ノ 上 ジョン・マーストニ大將(当時陸軍大佐)

等カ

斗夕。コーストニ陸軍大佐ハ朱口大使館護衛分遣隊

テアリ、該隊司令官トシテ

司令官カシメソフン敬 日本・英王・佛蘭西・伊太利及

米^ビ合衆^コノ軍隊^カ成^ル北京ノ外交^團地^区ニ配備^サレ

凡

テキル^合テノ外^子部隊^ノ先^任將^校デ^アツタ。

晚

コーストニ陸軍大佐^ノ身 日本大使館護衛司令官^ガ

其^日

彼^ニ

日^ハ午^左当^面、先^任將^校ト^シテ 日本護衛隊人^其夜^永定^河

~~陸軍大佐~~

ヲ横^切ル^ヲマル^コホ^ノ稿^所テ演習^ヲ行^フト^イフ^ヲラ^セタ

知

ト語^ツタ。コ^シニン^ニ大使[、]ス^キル^ウ元^レ陸軍大佐、^レ私^トハ

大使館

護衛隊ハ北京市城壁外^テ夜^間演習^ヲ行^フタ^リハ^タク、^レ而^テ

畫問^シ

普^通ノ^口際^射撃^場ノ^ル北京^東方^ニ於^テノ^ミ畫^問

演習^ヲ行^フタ^リコ^シニン^ニ陸軍大佐^論シ^タ。

皆

我々八ヶ部、日本大使館護衛隊が夜「マルホーロ」橋地域

変夕ト云フ事ニ

予ハ特別ニマルホーロ意見が一致シタ。

翌朝七時(一九三七年七月廿一日)「ステルウエル」大佐ハ私ニ

隊 中国

日本護衛軍ト東部ノ宛平ノ(トカ)壁ヲ圍ミシタ町ノ守備隊ト

ガ戦ツテキルト、電流ヲカケテキタ。私ハ北京ノ掩護砲火ヲ聞ク事

ハ十哩許シ西南デ「マルホーロ」橋、東ノ袂ニアリ。

ガ出来タ。宛平ノ(トカ)壁ヲ圍ミシタ町ノ守備隊ト

中国

今南西キナル町キ、~~那人~~ニ「蘆溝橋」トミテシラシテ

中タ。

「エイ・テイ・」

私ハ米口新聞通信員「A」スタートル「私ト共ニ私」ステイル

私ニ

ウエ止大佐ガ電流ヲ非カケタスガ後テ、自動車デ「宛平」

世

ニ行ツタ。ソコテ我々ハ「ステルウエル」壁軍大佐麾下ハ大使館

附陸軍副武官コレイグトバリス上陸軍大佐(當時陸軍少佐)

上緒キツク。

中加ノツク。宛平ハ石ヲ五尺ノ高升ノ練瓦ノ壁ト

倒

東上西側ニ大キナ内ノアル町テ、ソノ壁ハ東西側ニ約半丈

四分一哩

ソシテ北(南)側ニ半マイルアル。約三千人ノ平和ナ人カ其ノ

町壁ノ中ニ住ンデキタ。

ヘ行クト、其レハ

我々三人ノ米國人ガ東ノ内(南)サレテキトモ見附キタ。

上

中国

成衣テ塞イテ

城壁ノ北(南)ニキタ東那兵ノ内側ハ砂ヲ由カオイキアルキ

内ヲアケルコトハデキナイト云ツタ。

中国語テ話シテ、東那語テ話セトテ、我々ハ

社内ニ何が起リタノカ兵士ニ尋ネタ。

彼等ハ日本軍カ

宛平ニ射撃ヲ始メタト説明シタ。

我々ハ日本人カ

何處

其中口矣

トニ居ルカ尋ネタ。スルト東那人ハ靴イタ河床ヲ横切リ

軍

北方へ界ノミール許リノ由ノ鉄道ノ綫路ヲ手ニテキ

シタ。我々三人ハ説明ヲキク為ニ日本ノ地ニ入ル平ニ決メ

ガ、夕ノ平ノ城壁ノ北ノ角ヲ曲ラタ時、機關銃砲

ノ爆裂ガ起ツ。我々ハ後へ下ツタガ、砲火ハ纏リ匠ナカ

ク、我々ハ兩者對待ノ中間地ニマシ、我々ハ後へ下ツタガ、砲火ハ纏リ匠ナカ

下ノ道ヲ通リ行ツ者、我々ハ日本ノ機關銃陣地へ走り

込ミ、日本ノ指揮將校ノ護衛ヲシ、我々ハ藥堤キリキリ

テ、日本軍が藥堤全ニ頭ハ見セテ、不測ニ我々ヲ

然能ハ我々ト立ツテキタ。コノ短距離、歩クテキル中ニ我々ハ

覆林ノ中ニ一人死ニテ日本人將校ガ見エテ見タ。日本ハ

起ツタ事ニ實ニテ説明シヨウトハシテカッタ、而シテ遂ニ我々ニ藥堤ヲ

綫路

東

起ツ

綫路

其處ニ

所ニテ

世實ヲ行ツタ。

側ヲ

急板へ陣地ノ中ニ入ツテ、但

我々ノ立ニハ

伏ツテ

軍

越エテ

歸レト

其所テハ日本兵ハ

キキホホカニ宛平ニカケルカサ命ジタ。 且誰モ日本兵

出シテハ

ハ様ナカシカ

頭ヲサナカツタノテ、我ニカシラスルハ危陰ヲ見テ、ニカサ様校ガ

嚇シツケテホクノテ、

堤ノ上ヘ走リソリ、中国兵ニ

威嚇ニシタ、我々三人ノ米兵人ハ、我ニカシラスルカサニ

歸ツタ。

先イテカケルカサニ築堤ノ上ニカケルキタ。

兵

我ニハ北京ニ飛ツタ。

其ノ夕方、スチール氏ト

宛平ニ飛ツタ。

未

東ノ内ハセテ閉サレテキタ。然シ我々中國兵ガ甘州ノ外テ手榴

弾ヲ使フツテ

名。

彈ヲ使フツテソニザイナ地雷ヲエカケテモ、西ノ切ガキバアツキルヲ

見附ケル

我ニハ

若シ

日本兵ガ

降服ニナラシムルハ、午辰時

ニ宛平ヲ砲撃スルヲ許サレト云フ、最好通譯ヲ設ケテ、

サレタ。→スチール氏ト私ハ指揮官トシテ、宛平ニ入ル許可ヲ

求メタ。然シ下ニ命令ガ我々ヲ拒キ入レルガニエド、時限ガ

過ギ、

日本砲撃隊が開始サレタ。我々の五ツテキル宛平ノ西

内カラ数百石ノ「中国」方ノ橋上ノ東部歩兵隊高井

河下井ノ銃中機関銃が指ササタ。砲弾ハ市内ニ落タタ。

兵隊ハ極ク近クテ、我々ニヤ彈丸ノ破裂ト破片ノサイシヨク聞ク

日本ノ砲ハソキニ近クテ我々ノ砲口ノ破裂ト破片ノサイシヨク聞ク程ガツタ。

事ガデキ者「北」方ノ私トハ急キテ會議ヲ行テ北ガ方ガ

ナレト「北」方ト云フ所ニ、我々ノ自動車東門ノ外ニ駐車サセラレテキタノデ、

何ノ彼ノト大方一哩歩カネハナラナカツタ。立停リテ

合計「北」方ノ意味ナシ。我々ノソレヲ安全ニヤッテノケタ。然シ

ハ何處ヘ

日本ノ砲弾、落テテキルカ、又砲撃ノ加ヘテキル所ナドヤ人向ノ

損害ニ関シテ壁上ノ兵士カラトナツテ報告シテ不市時間内ナリ

七月十日、休戦中、私ハ陸軍少佐「北」方ノ司令部

氏ト一緒ニ宛平ニ入ツタ。我々ノ砲撃サタ市ノ建地ト陸軍大木建地ト

ヲ見タ。之等ノ建物ノ屋根ガ、高イ市ノ城壁ヨリ突出セテルガ、

毛ナクテ、我々ハ日本軍隊ガ七月七日ノ夜ノ敵ニ先ツテ、正確ニ距離

射程

ヲ事細カニ調ラシメテ

當

交戦ニ於テハ、偵察機ハ一機モ使ハレナカシキ。ガ、引續キ所ノ爆撃カ行ヒタ。

スライル氏ト私ハ次ニ宛テ、七月三日北京市トシテ


地域ガ北京ノ四郊外ニ在ル中国軍備隊ニ付ル日本軍ノ全カヲ

撃テノ軍中攻撃ニ付テ、形テ前日ニ見タ。七月三日ニ宛テ

其日ノ午後宛テ我々ハ、其日ノ生存者ヲ前日ニ日本ノ戦車ガ

城壁カノ市ノ突入、橋ヲ横切リテ南西ニ

急下ト云フヲ



（轉回スル）

日本軍

沿ソテ北西進トシテ広々範圍ニワタル作戰規模ヲ見テ廻リカ

ラ糸線カラ糸線ヘト移リ歩クタ。日本軍北支最前司令部

代甚者以^{（一語ニ）}是萬里、長城曲、南口^{（峠）}外側ニ當ル懷來ト

所迄、鐵道ニ沿ソテ上テ行クタ。板垣征四郎陸軍大將ガ

丁度懷來ヲ占領シテ所デアラタ。一九三七年（昭和十二年）

八月三十日 吾々^{（亞米利加・歐洲及び）}アメリカト對シテ及日本、新報記者ニ李（ラシ

夕^{（曾見）}彌大南軍中ニ新ハ板垣大將ニ更ニ内蒙古ニ向ツテ進ン

テ行クモリカ、ソレトモ黄河ヲ守ル爲メ南方地区^{（ハト南方ニ轉進スル）}日軍ヲモリ

テアムカト尋ネタ。彼ハ好者ノテヲ^{（取）}ムテアラウト云ツタ。

了^{（初）}期^{（日）}日本軍ガ其^{（戰鬪）}ハ^{（軍）}ナル事件ニ沿ギテ

ト主張シテ平夕々々驚クベキ事アリ
初期ニ於テ之ヲ返奉

私ハ次ニ板垣大將ト個人面会ヲシテ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

三月三日南京ニ往リテ彼ハ支那ニ於ル日本軍

總 附
參謀司令長官ニ對シテ參謀總長ニアリ

日本ハ丁度汪精衛ノ傀儡政府ヲ造リテ所デアラス

私ハ其政府ノ發足式ノ為ニ南京ニ居ル。斯ル如クテ自分

ノ懷來ニ非ル個人面会ヲ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)三月ニテ

ノ期皆ニ板垣大將及他ノ日本人達ハ支那ノ大部ノ表ノ地域ヲ

横切リテ難ヲ排非進ニテ来タテアタガ来カ高 宣戰布告

ハシナカッタシ又未日本人ハ此ノ広範圍ニ足ル蹂躪ノ戰年

ヲ支那事ト云テナク

然レ日本軍ニツイテ支那ノ

華北

断シテ

北部ハ省ヲ横切リテ

夥シク戦ニ於テ日本

軍ハ俘

捉

シテ其間全部ヲ

外捕虜ヲ(夕事ヲ報年々虜ノ時全テ通シテ

俘

夕夕人シカ捕虜ヲ見ナカク事ヲ思ヒ出ス。

交ハ私ハ

俘

ヲ見

捕虜又ハ捕虜收容所捕虜ニ食メテフレル様ニ頼ニテ

何レモ視察ニ供セ

(中東)

ガ余ノ事ナカク

現ニ日本ノ將校達ハ彼等ノ目的ハ

上

地

一旦主要戰略地域ガ彼等ノモトナク其ハ占領領土ノ

(寧)

中国

破碎シウテ殺ス

(テ見)

拡張トイフヨリハ支那軍隊ヲ敗北セ又消滅サセシム

中国兵ヲ

後ハシク。

此ノ故ニ私ノ經驗ニ依リテ強ク支那兵

俘

トシテ者ガ少ク

直

隊捕虜ニテナカク又ナクトシテモ不ニ殺サレタムテア

到ル
一般入

系才所^レ居ル市民ハ、夕ト(重ク)荷物ヲ比月員^ニ居様モ

誰^ニ送^ル

又ハ荷物ヲ積ンダ手押車ヲ押シテ中様トモ帽子ヲト^リテ

歩哨^ニ米^ヲ糞^ヲサセル^ヲ又^ハ張^ル先^ニ日本軍^ニ討^ツテ

何カ無礼ヲシ^ンガ^クナ^クカト非常^ニ決心^シテ^キタ。

米子及ビ欧洲ノ宣教師達ハ日本ノ兵隊ノ攻撃ヲ受ケ

夕^ハ茶品ノ治療ヲ受ケ^ニ支那^ノ婦女子ガ續々ト果モ^トク

列ヲナシテ運^ルル^事ヲ私^ニ話^スタ。

一般^ニ支那人^ハ軍^ニヨル肉^體酷用^ノ為^ニ指定^セタ^クタ^ク

婦女子ヲ出^サセ^ル事^ヲ村^ノ年長者^達ニ討^ツテ

日本側^カラ出^シタ^ル公式

實^ニ軍^ノ中^ニ西^ノ女^ヲ承諾^シテ実行^シテ^キタ。

(主軍)

此日本從軍記者、話ニヨリ、大將、~~緬~~軍隊ニヨリ行ハ

シ夕暴行ニ関シテ意見ヲ達スルハ、~~其~~表明スル。其、記者、

何故麼トノ

松井大將が緬軍隊カ、如キ無印制ナ事ヲスル

ノヲ止メカッタカト事ニ就テハ、~~私~~由説明スル事カ出来ナカッタ

然シ乍ラ、北支軍代表者ハ、~~私~~暴行ハ、~~私~~紀ノナリテアライ

日本ノ予備兵ニヨリ行ヒタモテ、~~私~~知ラヌ

私、此、様ナ予備兵達ハ、年ヲトシタ人達、~~私~~軍隊ニアリ、~~私~~等

ハ日本テハ家長テアル人達、~~私~~ハ、~~私~~指商シテ、~~私~~其、代弁者

檢閲

説明ヲ取消セカッタ。軍監察官トシテ、彼ハ、~~私~~が、~~私~~説明ヲ

ニスル

~~私~~話ヲ書キ、~~私~~手置キ、~~私~~了ラシメ、~~私~~了ラシメ

一旦 日本 占領ノ不節制ナ行動ガ消滅 兵ト、

軍ト日本官吏 中国一般人口
ハ支那市民ヲ組織化スル事ニ着手

シテ 彼等ハ北支テハ 華人会ヲ、華東テハ 東亞会ヲ
シシ・ミン・フイー 即チ トウシヤ・フイー 即チ

組織シテ 此様ナ会ヲ通ジテ 紳士ト支那人達ニ
被等ハ日本ノ勝利ヲ祝賀スル中子

勝利ノ祝賀 行 行進 行進 行進
列 行 行進 行進 行進 行進 行進 行進 行進 行進

労働者、店員 日本 旗ト日本 旗ト日本 旗ト
ニ討スル 祝賀、旗ト

ヲ持テ行進スル 殊命令セシテ 彼等ハ日本人
ヤ中口

、傀儡師達、演説ニ耳ヲ傾ケ、最古ニ萬歳ト日本

語テ叫ビテ終ワテアタシ 中国 支那ニ

於テ日本ノ勝利ヲ軍トテ告気球カ町ノ上ニ揚ゲ、
表シテ

之夕。 日本人宮葉、新安、此、様、民衆大会、写真ヲ

写真揚分、^而、^直、見出シハ、二萬、

中国 支那人が戦場ヲ殺セタト自慢シテ申ス。

中名 支那ノ女セト日本ノ女セトが手書ヲワケテ歩イテ申ス。

或ハ 自東ノ兵隊が支那ノ幼兒ヲ連テ申ス子供達

二鉛ヲ子(三牛)所^{トカ}が書イテ申ス地方ノ木ヲ

澤山^{ホスター}私ハ此ノ様ナ^悲ホスター一描カ

シテアノ様ナ幸福ナ場面トハ^正及討ノ^非人道的待遇ノ話ヲ

ウイタリ^台攻略^領町ヲ見タ。^子日本軍

ニ対スル^多各情^題トシテ^作又^ヲ書カシタ。

~~幾も幾も~~

が、中国

此等ノ作文ハ澤山東京其日本ノ人民達ニ支那ノ人達ハ

幾百幾千

日本軍ヲ歡迎シテ牛ノト~~馬~~マテ飼得タル様ニ具

トナリ船デ日本へ

解送ラレタ。

白安国

主義 中国

抹殺

教科書ハ英雄的又ハ口先の十~~五~~部ノ話題ヲ彈劾

シテ日本テ印刷セシ教科書ニ改訂~~正~~又~~反~~取代ラレタ。

学校テハ英語ヲ教ヘん事日^が禁ジラレ、日本語カ第一~~非~~子流ト

ニテ置キカラレタ。

其~~書~~

故立忘

孰考~~考~~トナ、日本ノ爆撃~~手~~ト~~均~~被害ヲ蒙ラズ

其ノ健康

又

リシテ上級

大文字

ニ~~残~~ツタリ、経営スル事ヲ許サレタ中~~等~~学校モ校内各校ノ

ニハ日本人ガ配置サレタ。

職員ヲ職~~手~~トナ。

私ハ日本ノ飛行機ノ三爆撃サレタ澤山ノ米子及ビ英子ノ
傳道院ニ学校、孤兒院、病院等ヲ見タ。

日本ノ空軍ト一緒ノ時ハ何時デモ私ハ傳道院ノ屋根ニ描

カレタ米子又ハ英子ノ旗カナイカト見テキタ。ソレ等ノ旗ハハッキリ

際立ッテキタ。^{ソレニテスカラ}傳道院ニ彈カ命中シタ時は、~~甚~~甚

^無甚ガナカフソナトトハ云ヘナカフタハテアル。
標ヲ考事止メサセル術ハナカレタ。

羅馬駐劄大使ノ役ヲ果シテ歸国ノ途ニキリ
白鳥敏夫トテ標ヲ日本人官使カ中込ヘ大使ノ一テ

役ヲ果シテ歸ル途ニ北^北京ヲ訪問シ大東亞

共ニ米國ニヤ私カ實際ニ見タモノトハ正反對ナ日本ノ

主眼ニシテ
確實ト是做サノ高ノ理想ニツイテ述ベタ。

（第ニ）輔機等

際ニ

誠實具志

此ノ様ナ日本人ハ常ニ親愛庶民トイフ言義ヲ日本ノ意志

ニ従フモノトイフ意味ヲ使ツタ。 外人達全欲ニ不減實

テアツタ。 白鳥氏ノ活ヲ守リテ好ムハ日本人ノ英徳ノ

使ヒ方ヲ此等ノ海外ノ言語ヲ以テ曲解スルヤト諫書

シタ。 云ト白鳥氏ハ皮肉タリト尙違ヒ日本人ニ

ハナイ云ツタ。 練言ナリ。 彼ハ必要ナリハ東西ニ於ケル日本ノ新ニ

概念ニモット一致シテキル新英法ノ辞書ナニタト云ツタ。

伸須磨彌吉印ヤ 佛蘭西 為ニカキテノウイシノ日本大

便館ノ定カラ落テ死ニタ 加之膝大使トイフ様ナ地ノ外交官

達モ占領東那ニ於ケルアリカトナ軍中ノ貿易ニ討ル

下ノ中国

絶エサル
ヲ加ヘテ制限

永年ニ抑圧スル東縛ニ付スル唯ノ理由ニ付テハトモテ

一云々ニ付テ。

彼等ハソレヲ軍ト戰軍ノ急迫ノセイニシ様トシタ。

制限

私カ東縛ノ大詔令ハ東京カラ派遣セシタ民間指書者ヤ

アリ又興亜院有リヤイナクハ

尊内象ガシワザテカオヤキ支那事妻委員余ノ言ハ

岩遠^{ヤル}ン政策ノ活キ出シタモノデハナイカト云ヒ返

返
相亦タラス

尤ラシイ答ヲセズ^ト軍事は要セザラ持去^{シタ。}

款^{ヤル}ヲ^{ヤル}ヤ

亞細亞デ

或ル時、私ハ正確ナ所一休大東亞共栄圏ハトノ範圍

ニ直ル

東亞^{ニ直ル}ニ固執スル事モ一カト言フネク。此種實ニ馬車

緬甸

モ^シ中^シ東^シモ^シ印^シ及^シモ^シ合^シ見^シノ^シ力^シカト^シ言^シフネク。私ハ

Document no 2482
Glossaire of J. Spalte)
pages 13-16 incl.

Travel by M. MORAHATSO

村松 譯 34

十三頁の平假名ヲ片假名ニ直シテ打ツル

(たうよつと云ふ様を)

須磨氏は何時か別の時に ~~私~~ 彼に尋ねて来た事がある

手紙を以て此の問題

今日では私の地理の知識は立派なものではなからずと須磨氏は語った

ゆか ~~と~~ 發書と 避けた

問もなく 大東亜共榮圏

ニルゴニ

真珠湾から英領印度の國境まで達した時

より以前に下なかりた。其の故に須磨氏は当時

確言を混ったのである。

一九三九年(昭和十四年)十月、東京に於て私 ~~は~~ 鈴木貞一

が、大將の方

大將と語った時 ~~は~~ 彼は ~~おつと~~ 現實的であつた。彼は

興亜院

この時 中國に於ける軍務から退き 對華事務局に

関係してゐた。鈴木大將は日本の徳田 ~~は~~ 汪精

する

衛に言及した。私は彼の價値如何を問ふた。大將は

蔣介石は中國に於ける唯一の力ある人間であり、日本は彼を

大東亜共榮圏に引込るるのに失敗したので、如何程長く

かつても蔣介石及び中國と戦ひを続けねばならぬ旨

語つた。更に鈴木大將は、中國の抗日の意志を挫く

には、更に多くの年を要するであろうと意見を述べた。

其の會談の際、鈴木大將は中國に於ける日本の野蠻性

討伐戦争の防

軍事行動の非目的性格を強調した。

私は北支領地に於て此の防共運動の實施行動を

目撃した。一九三七年（昭和十二年）八月 懷來驛

の事であつたが、私はこの防共運動の實施行動を
で日本軍用列車の通過と見た。一人の英誌と話

が先方から次の様な説明をして呉れた。
日本軍の大佐は、此の根拠の確かさを諷刺

二流所の軍である。精銳な兵士は蘇
軍に對して

十三頁

3の2490

36

に備へてとつてあり

華北

北其には一九一八年（大正七年）以来任んでゐる数千の自

系露人がゐた。彼等は中國の旅券をもつてゐた。

日本軍がやつてくると、

主筆の

白系露人を

所謂

露西亜館

と云ふ

一で知られてゐる一つの組織の下に編成した。以上の

旅券は全部無効とすべし、新しい旅券は傀儡白系露人

二人の

露西亜館

及び日本軍特任の監督する日本軍と通じてのみ

手に入るることが出来た。白系露人は彼等の収入の一定

露西亜館

させられた。

額と此の日本軍に収められ、命ぜられた。彼等は軍

を著して

させられ、毎

隊に組織され、制服が軍用になり、武装も一週毎に日本の特

校によつて訓練された。

十四頁

色

ある挿

日本は彼等に帝政露西亞の本質と發揮と激
教唆した。

勵作

軍のやりかた

此の日本人は取り扱は寄辺なき白系露人
に嫌から

若

軍

蘇聯

水 彼等の多くは日本が彼等と軋つて蘇聯と
は

せる企てをいする

軍は飛んだ威嚇をいする

ならば、日本人は誤解される
初に語つた 併し乍

軍

或は

ら、日本は 満洲人・蒙古人・
日本の傀儡たる中

國人の時務に 是等白系露人と 中國國民軍に對す

使

る點には決して偏はなかつた。

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)南京に汪精衛傀儡政權の創設

後、中國國旗には黄色の小旗が附せられた。
其の上

には 和平復興防共
と云ふ漢字が
中国未嘗か其か、此をるた。

44頁

同様に、日本軍は毎年所謂^防共圓周なるものを行つて、

その期間には新^防しい共のポスターが掲げられ、^{又群民}大集會

が行けられた。真珠湾の一す前^{日本人は}北平に劍で蛇に斬

りつけてある人向の巨大な像を建てた。是は重要な

交又桌に置かれてゐた。その台には、此の像を反共産

主義に捧ぐ^{と云ふ}旨の銘が書かれてゐた。

中国人たると外国人たるとを問はず、
日本の憲兵隊と折衝したところある他の人々——中國

人、外国人を問はず——と同様、私も十分根拠がある

恐怖を抱き、彼等のやり方、策略に^{嫌悪する所}になつた。

彼等が、私の中国人召使を訊問した時、絶えず交渉

のあつた北支軍の代表者に抗議をした。私は彼が

十四頁

こゝに小迷惑を私の名便にさせない様に要求をした。

するとその代表者の陸軍大佐は私の大膽を申出に

驚いて文字通り身震ひをし憲兵との間に仲介に入つて

た。

と云ふ

~~私~~

私は此の大佐と、現代の「エスト・ポイント」の米國陸軍士官學

校の副有官である「マックスウエル・テイラー」准將と

あつた。当時大尉で「ジョセフ・ダブリュー・スチルウエル」大將

の補佐陸軍武官と共になつた。テイラー大尉は白

本語と話した。吾々は駅に停車中列車を降り

に在つた獲されたの大砲

第14プラットホームに捕虜中隊が在りた中國砲兵部隊

る為下車した。

と見れば日本憲兵中隊長は「テイラー」大尉に仲介

何心ぞ

千五百頁

2. 日本陸軍に視察のため来た迎へらるゝ人である

米國陸軍の制服を着てゐるにも拘らず、無作法な

憤慨し

態度で話しかけた。私は暴行を蒙り、その軍代表

に來て世間をつた。すするとし、

此の大佐の方に向きながら

の大佐を呼んた。實兵曹長はすまませ、^{「テイラー」}大尉に

言葉で鏡く

「たと同じくはけし」此の大佐をとなりつけた。

大佐はこの曹長に注意も年一すに、我々を列車内に追

ひ戻した。

或時、英國の報道機内「ロイターの通信員が、北~~東~~京

居た

に~~一~~中國僑領~~の~~官更の妻が停車場で日

本憲兵に虐待された事、真相を送ったことがあつた。

自分も

日本軍一憲兵少佐は其の真相であるを否み難かつた

其の話を取消さなくとは

にも拘らず、其の英國通信員にその話の撤回を迫つた。

四五夏

数日に亘つて、日本軍は故意に此の通信員の家外に

一隊の喇叭手を置き、そのいよいよ喇叭の音で彼が

暮してをられなれにいた。通信員を知つてゐた正規日本

陸軍將校への懇願も効を奏さなかつた。彼等は其

報道の真実を知つてゐるたれも拘らず自國の憲兵隊に

のその脅迫行為を敢て止めさせなかつた。

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月八日の朝 真珠湾爆撃

と同時刻) 日本憲兵隊は其の北東(東京)なる書齋に入つて

来て、私を捕縛した。私に数人の米國及び英國の民間人

と共に米國大使館守備の海兵隊の兵舎に連行された。

其處(百五十名の) 日本軍は、其の米國海兵隊を降し、米國國旗

千五百頁

隊

を引降したるは是は米國戰鬥軍の日本軍に對する

最初の

降服

の第一のものがある

は降された

具

戦が始まった事を宣し、諸指令

を予する

私が米軍兵舎一護送土れる時、私は英文のポスターが

私の自宅、其の他の地裏に掘げられて、戦の始りを知

ら、塙守を早とるの眼が、ついた。同様に亦、憲

兵隊のどの隊にも、英語か中国語の話せる日本の民間人

が居た。

北京といふ此の大きな街のぼろくになつた。又

行直

遠く離れた部分にまでも普く、さき出せる。かういふ進十

備は多くの目録を費しての用意の後でなければ行けれ

難いものであつた。私は日本軍の緩慢な活動を知つて

るた、そして、真珠湾の實際の攻撃のどの位前に北

京

十六頁

43

にるる日本軍は戦の勃発の場合に備へて、^{万の}實際彼等か

やつた様な準備をなすことと警告をいれおたのかを考へて見^{みた。}

私は凡そ七月間抑留生活を続け「グリッポホルム」のオ一回

＊航海の際に米國へ向はるお弁一丁。

~~署名~~ ジョシゲツテ (署名)

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)七月二十三日、余の前日に署名と行ひ、余の署名、抄写ひて。

陸軍大佐

~~署名~~ トコス、エイチ、モロー (署名)

米國檢閲總監部 陸軍大佐

ml 82

armed Japanese in certain areas but forbade them to Chinese troops. Later Chinese brigands were permitted to raid these areas by the Japanese.

MARCO POLO Bridge Incident: Japanese informed Americans including then Col. Stillwell that Japanese Embassy Guard would hold night maneuvers ~~xxxxxxx~~ near Marco Polo Bridge, a most unusual step. ~~xxxxxxx~~ Hostilities followed, notable among which was fact that WANPING, a high walled city, was being shelled accurately from a distance, leading to the belief that ~~xxxxxxx~~ ranges had been plotted and firing prepared some time before.

General ITAGAKI, in an interview ~~xxxxxxx~~ in August 1937, shortly after capturing HWAIIAI, admitted he might strike southward toward Yellow River, in spite of fact ~~xxx~~ Japanese at time called it only a n "Incident." Goette believes few Chinese were taken prisoner in ITAGAKI's drive across China, almost all being slaughtered.

General MATSUI is reported as having spoken to his troops on ~~xxxxxxx~~ their conduct in NANKING, the Japanese correspondent so reporting being unable to give any reason ~~xxx~~ for his not halting the outrages.

SHIRATORI and SUZUKI are quoted as expressing ~~xxx~~ opinions ~~xxx~~ on the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the "New concepts" therein.

December 8, about the time of actual Pearl Harbor Attack, Japanese troops in Peiping arrested GOETTE and other ~~xxx~~ Allied personnel, and placed posters stating the war had begun and giving instructions ~~xxxxxxx~~ in widely scattered parts of Peiping, indicating that many days of preparation had preceded such action.