


THE PROBLEM OF EVIL



SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS
1969

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P R E F A C E

Under the auspices of Dr. Ranade Academy of Comparative Philosophy and Religion, Belgaum, a three-day seminar on the PROBLEM OF EVIL was organised in Belgaum which was presided over by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Principal, Karnatak College, Dharwar.

Dr. S. G. Mudgal, Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa, Principal V. W. Karambelkar, Dr. S. R. Talghatti, Shri M. S. Deshpande, Dr. B. R. Modak, Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, Shri B. N. Kulkarni and Shri V. G. Jamkhandi and Shri P. M. Datye participated in the seminar. Dr. S. S. Antarkar and Dr. J. V. Joshi had sent apologies for their inability to attend the seminar.

The seminar commenced on 22nd November 1969 at 10 A. M. in the Gurudev Mandir, Belgaum.

After the Introductory remarks by Shri J. V. Parulekar, Secretary of the Academy, Professor B. R. Kulkarni introduced the participants to the audience. Principal T. G. Kalghatgi who presided, expressed that he was

much impressed by the selfless work done by the office-bearers of the Academy and he hoped that the Academy would soon develop into a Research Institute of Philosophy and Religion. This was followed by reading of the Paper by Dr. S. G. Mudgal on 'Evil in the systems of Indian Philosophy'. In the discussion that ensued, many points emerged. It was suggested that the Dvaita solution of the Problem of Evil, though not the final one, had its own merits in as much as it did recognise the fact of Evil and chalked out a path for its eradication. Neither evil nor the Jīvas are created by God; hence He is not responsible for evil and the wrong things which are the creations of Jīvas. He is a moral judge and every one gets what he deserves.

In the afternoon seminar which commenced at 3 P. M., Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa read his paper: 'Evil and Art Experience'. There was a lively discussion about the relation between Art experience and the mystical experience. It was pointed out that while mystic experience transcends both good and evil, art experience takes place in and through both the good and evil of the world. The Art experience enables the experient to have a disinterested awareness of the values as well as the disvalues of life.

(iii)

The first day of the seminar ended with a public lecture in Kannada at 5-30 P. M. by Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa on 'Mūlyagaḷu' (Values).

The morning session on 23rd November began with the reading of the Paper by Shri M. S. Deshpande on 'the Problem of Evil'. There was a lively discussion in which the relation between man-made evil and natural evil was examined.

As Dr. J. V. Joshi could not attend the seminar, his paper on 'Existential Interpretation of Evil' was read by Prof. B. R. Kulkarni. In the discussion, such points as meaning of Existence, Sartre's views on Evil were analysed. It was suggested that as there was insistence in Existentialism on personal commitment, Existentialism had its own philosophy to convey.

In the afternoon session, Dr. S. R. Talghatti read his paper on 'the Problem of Moral Evil'. Such questions whether God is both omnipotent and good emerged in the discussion; and it was noted that on the phenomenal level we could never completely conquer moral evil and that our efforts should be directed to minimise it as far as possible. Prof. B. R. Kulkarni then read his paper on 'Some Thoughts on the Prob-

lem of Evil'. In the discussion the nature of evil was analysed and it was suggested that evil did contain an element of good. Further it was pointed out that evil was a powerful incentive to moral and spiritual life. Then followed reading of the papers by Shri Datye on 'the Problem of Evil' and by Principal Karambelkar on 'What is Evil?'. In the evening a public lecture was arranged when Dr. S. G. Mudgal gave a talk in Marathi on Astāṅga-Yoga.

In the morning session of 24th Dr. B. R. Modak presented his paper on the Problem of Vaiṣamyā and Nairghrṇya in the Brahmasūtras. A very lively discussion followed where topics such as a sinner's redemption, the Doctrine of Karma, came up for examination.

Shri V. G. Jamkhandi in his observations pointed out that the problem of Evil was mainly a matter of adjustment with the environment. Some evil consists in our sense of frustration. Faced with a certain situation, when we find that our expectations are shattered, we think that evil has occurred. It is our weakness when we find ourselves frustrated. Really speaking the evil phenomenon is neutral, just like heat or electricity which are neither good nor bad. It is a question of understanding our environment.

and getting over it. If I had been discrete in eating, the evil of indigestion would not have been there. So by failing to be discrete, I have created evil. In saying that the orange should be only juice and there should not be its outer cover, we are quarrelling with the very nature of things. Evil has a necessary function to perform in the scheme of the universe. Death, for example, is regarded as the most dreadful evil. But is it really so? Saints, like Jñāneśvara entered into a voluntary Samādhi. They laughed at death. Limited as we are, we do not know the unlimited and infinite power of God. If we take a total view or integral view of things, evil would not be found, Shri Jamkandi concluded.

Principal T. G. Kalghatgi concluded the session with his presidential remarks, which are printed at the end of this book.

Dr. B. R. MODAK




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Participants in the Seminar.



1. Dr. B. R. Modak, 2. Shri. M. S. Deshpande, 3. Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa, 4. Dr. V. W. Karambelkar,
5. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, *President*, 6. Dr. S. G. Mudgal, 7. Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, 8. Prof. S. R. Talghatti.



Shri. J. V. Parulekar, *Trustee* garlanding the President.

“EVIL” in the Systems of Indian Philosophy

Dr. S. G. Mudgal

The problem of Evil is an ethico-religious problem and a border land problem in Metaphysics. “The Problem of Evil concerns the contradiction or apparent contradiction, between the reality of Evil on the one hand and religious belief in the goodness and power of God or of the Ultimate on the other”. In the light of this Evil is no problem to the Cārvāks or the Lokayatas. For them there is no self different from body, there is no God. There is one and only one goal viz., pleasure. Pain is natural. Yet no wise man gives up a rose because it has thorns. There is no sin, no vice and no virtue. Virtue according to them consists in amassing and enjoying the greatest quantum of pleasure for one-self. Past is dead ; future uncertain and unborn; come, fill the present moment with the utmost quantum of pleasure. Pleasure essentially is sense pleasure.

The four Ārya Satyas of the Buddha are worthwhile considering. They are Sarvam

kṣaṇikam, sarvam duḥkham. sarvam anātmam and nirvāṇam śāntam. The Buddha was very much struck by the problem of evil. Dukha and Doṣa are the two words used in the Indian philosophical literature for evil. Good is defined as “anukūl vedanīya” and evil is defined as “pratikūla vedanīya”. Thus Indian thinkers equate “good” with happiness and “Evil” with pain. Three kinds of dukhas are usually accepted viz., adhyatmika, adibhautika and adhidai-vika. These dukhas are continuously pestering man from the cradle to the crematorium and “call no man happy unless he is dead”, is no mere proverb but a fact of life. But is the man free from misery after death? No, says Buddha. The cycle of Birth and Death is itself an evil. All is misery. Kṣaṇikatva is one of the causes of misery. There is dukha is a fact But there must be reason for it and must be a way out of it. In the philosophy of the Buddha there is no God and Ultimate. Yet, evil is a problem. His whole philosophy is an essay at explaining the cause of evil and way of overcoming it. Death is the law of life. All fulfilment of desire is not unmixed. “Tormented by thought, cheated by chance, defeated by the forces of nature, oppressed by massive weight of duty, the horror of death, the dread consciousness of coming lives where the tragedy will be repeated, the indivi-

individual cannot help crying “let me escape, let me die”. The Buddha’s answer to those searching for an escape is a resort to Nirvāṇa – where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest.

What is the origin of Duḥkha? The Buddha gives a chain of reasons for suffering. The main culprit is Avidyā or ignorance, which leads to Jaramarana and suffering and misery. This creates more problems than it solves– 1) what is the nature of Ignorance? Whose ignorance and of what? It is the ignorance we are told, which is responsible for “I” sense. There is no “I”. There is no individual, no individuality, no attā, nothing permanent and substantial. It is true the Buddha refuses to say anything about the trans-empirical. What is Nirvana? Even as nothing can be said about Ignorance which (it appears) is anādi, so is Nirvāṇa which is ananta, and about which nothing can be said. Thus we are required to dispel ignorance – the one about which we know nothing – by Nirvana– the other about which we are equally ignorant. 2. Is ignorance like Nirvāṇa trans-empirical? Or is Ignorance the Buddha’s own humble submission about his inability to state the first link in this concatenation of causes of duhkha? However, the Buddha acknowledged the fact of evil, but

failed to account convincingly both for its emergence and removal.

Again all advaitic schools, orthodox and heterodox, more or less follow the Buddha in his footsteps. The mādhyamika, accepts that Bondage and liberation are both make believes. Writes Lankāvatāra – muktasya gamanam kutra, badhaḥ kaḥ, kena muccyate? or as Nāgārjuna puts it – baddhasya mokṣaḥ na sambhavati bad-dhatvāt, muktasya mokṣaḥ na vidyate. sa tu muktaḥ eva” as there is no bondage, there is no evil and hence no struggle for freedom and no problem of escaping from evil.

Again Gauḍapāda with Nāgārjuna’s- anāgamam anirgamam – maintains – na nirodho na co’tpattiḥi, na baddho na ca sādhaḥ na mumukṣuḥ na vai muktaḥ; very often these advaitins take shelter behind a transcendental logic of two satyas viz Paramārtha satya and Saṁvṛti satya. Saṁvṛti however is relative Paramārtha is the ultimate Saṁvṛti is the world of appearance and Paramārtha the only Reality. Hence evil is an appearance and not a reality. Hence we have to see what is the nature of saṁvṛti. Lankāvatāra puts it – yathā nimnonnatam citre dṛśyate na tu vidyate; rajjuryathā hi ajānānāḥ sarpam gṛṇhanti bāliśāḥ or samāropā’ pavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate...The saṁvṛti thus dṛśyate, na

tu vidyate; ultimately— Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are not two. Na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiñcid asti viśeṣaṇam. na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiñcid asti viśeṣaṇam. Hence the unorthodox buddhist advayavādins like their master shelve the problem by raising; for, there is no individual, no world, no self. none in bondage and none to be liberated, hence ultimately nothing good and none evil. A very fine summersault indeed !!

Now I turn to the Sāṃkhya system. These are profoundly influenced by the buddhist approach to the problem of evil. Sāṃkhya is a spiritual pluralism and metaphysical dualism. Puruṣa is no kartā and is attributeless in the state of liberation. He is cetana and the puruṣas are many. Sāṃkhya puruṣas and jivas are not clearly distinguished by the sāṃkhya. Embodied puruṣas are jivas. The proofs for the existence of plurality of puruṣas are in fact the proofs for the existence of plurality of jivas. Again bondage and liberation have no meaning with regard to Puruṣa. As they put it—

tasmān na badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate
nāpi saṃsarati kascit,
saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca,
nānāśraya prakṛtiḥ.

Hence evil belongs to the world of matter. It is Prākṛta. Puruṣa does not suffer in reality. The three duḥkhas are really the trick of aviveka – another amorphous meaningless word like the buddhist avidyā – The puruṣa unrelated to the prakṛti due to aviveka feels he is related to her and his woes start due to non-apprehension of non-relation. No, prakṛti's woes start and Puruṣa identifies them as being his falsely. Evil thus is a product of the failure of the sense of discrimination does not affect puruṣa, so much as it does prakṛti. With the dawn of viveka, the evil disappears. The curtain falls on the stage as the dancing girl retires. The girl danced and calves and shins of the spectator pained. The spectator realised that he was not the dancer and so the pain disappeared. The sāmkhya thus seems to hold that evil is an appearance due to aviveka. The sāmkhya open their duḥkha jijñāsa with a thunder and end their treatise with a whimper, saying after all duḥkha is an appearance.

Of all the schools the orthodox advaita school needs a closer consideration. The vaiśeṣika school has been sometimes described as “kaṇabhakṣa pakṣaḥ”. The advaitic school may be described, without being much misunderstood as the “Bhramiṣṭa pakṣaḥ” or the system of the

“Bhramiṣṭa”. For in this school everything is a bhrama. The world is a bhrama, savikalpa jñāna is bhrama, jivas are products of bhrama, bondage is a bhrama, liberation is bhrama, good and evil are bhrama, god is bhrama. What is advaita? Is it also bhrama? He who says it is, is in bhrama and he who says it is not, he too is in bhrama.

The world we are told has no reality. It is not as some try to interpret relatively real. For, the advaita does not accept degrees of reality. The world appearance does not add or contribute to the richness and fullness of the Absolute. It is not therefore, an appearance, in the sense of having a lesser degree of reality. For, brahma bhinnam sarvum mithyā, brahma bhinnatvāt, or jāgrad bhāvāḥ svapna bhāvavat asadeva, or svapna samatvāt asat jāgaritam api. The world is vikalpa and not vastu. Yet the advaitins argue it has an empirical reality. It is mithyā in the sense of paratantra. It is māyā in the sense of vyavahāra. The advaitin thus has a double personality. He is a paratantra Jiva and also swatantra Brahman. But the double, i.e., the jiva which is paratantra is a mithyā. So too evil is an appearance. It is the product of bhrama as the advaita siddhi puts it—vṛthā rodiṣi manda buddhe, tava bhramāt eva hi duḥkham

etat—” Fat headed fellow! why are you unnecessarily moaning? Evil is your bhrama only”. What is the nature of this bhrama? Whose and about what? Individual is post-bhrāmic and the Brahman is non-bhrāmic. “Universal bhrama” is a combination of words which have meaning severally, but is a nonsense collectively.

Again this advaita view is defective in that it redescribes the problem, but does not attempt to solve: for, it leaves unexplained the evil of our suffering from the compulsive illusion of evil. Under the garb of a mysterious avidyā or māyā, the problem is raised and, instead of being solved, it is erased.

Again by their very nature the advaita jivas are non-substantial. They are not kartā and they are therefore not agents. Kartṛtva again is due to their philosophical ‘abracadabra’ of māyā, for which they nurse ‘a foolish fascination. And this māyā is double edged; it bolsters all problems if raised, dissolves all problems already raised and finally, it is itself nothing. If there is no real kartṛtva and if all kartṛtva of the jivas is due to the play of avidyā and is thus adhyasta, then there is no problem of evil, as all the activities of the jivas is a make-believe. Kartṛtva in fact belongs not to the self but to the mind.

This theory thus appears to be in the ultimate analysis a fusion of the buddhist and sāmkhya theory of evil.

Jainism is a godless system. Hence the problem of evil understood as a contradiction of the goodness of the ultimate and reality of evil is not their problem. However, jainas have made an attempt at facing the problem directly by accepting the reality of evil and bondage. Jiva is real. The jivas are many. They are distinct and different from one another, are eternal, formless in their disembodied state and their form is of the same extent as their body in an embodied state. Jivas are essentially free and possess cognition, are real enjoyers of the fruits of their own actions, are active agents and they make their own destiny. They have the power of feeling and are conscious. On account of jiva's connection with the ajiva dravyas, the jivas are in a state of bondage and suffering. The saṃsāra is beginningless. Though jiva has been in bondage during the infinite past, it will be emancipated as soon as it extricates itself from the clutches of matter— i.e., karma. Jivas are of two kinds viz. Bhavya – mukti yogyas and abhavya - nitya saṃsārin. Jivas thus differ in their yogyatā too.

The Jainas hold that when the conscious principle of the jiva becomes filled with passions i.e., attachment, envy, infatuation etc. karma particles alien to soul substance flow into it. These limit the freedom of the soul. Since the souls differ in their yogyatā, the quality of their acts also differ in their quality. As a result of the flow of the karma the soul finds itself in a state of bondage and misery. Freedom from bondage and misery consists in freeing oneself from the karmāvaraṇa; the mumukṣus are thus told to take recourse to various moral practices like three guptis, five samitis, as a result of which, further flow of karma is stopped. Purging out the old karma and its effects, is due to karma phala bhoga and gradual destruction due to moral practices. The total destruction of all the karma and restoring the soul to its original pristine purity is its mokṣa, where the soul has its four infinite attributes viz., ananta jñāna, ananta darśana, ananta ānanda and ananta vīrya. This is attained by samyak darśana, samyak jñāna and samyak charitra. The jaina sādhana mārga is remarkable in its details and in its guidance which it gives to a mumukṣu. While other schools indulge in pious platitudes, the jainas alone give a practical system of discipline, to one who seeks to destroy karmalepa and the cessation of acquisition of new karma.

Thus the jainas accept evil as a real fact of real life and face it bravely, far from running away from it. We may not accept all that they have said. But at least, they have not behaved like frightened children who want to put on a brave face by saying that there is nothing to fear.

I will now turn to the last of the systems viz., Dvaita system, whose approach to the problem, if I may be permitted to say is bold, consistent and which system has tried to avoid most of the difficulties, which we have found in the other systems. But I do not claim nor do I substantiate to its claim to be faultless. However, considered in comparison with other views it is weighty and needs a more studied consideration. It is this one school (and the other is that of Rāmānuja) to whom the problem of evil means what we have stated in the opening paragraph of this paper. Evil is real and God is good. To the advaitins of any shade, the ultimate being the only real there is no real evil and hence no real problem. To the Jainas there is no god and hence there is no problem of the contradiction of god's goodness with the evil. To dvaitins and Rāmānujīyas, God is good and not an attributeless somewhat; the souls are real and many, and are not the products of anādi

māyā; and evil is real and not an appearance - which is an apology for unreal; and hence the problem is a real problem - therefore it needs, an impartial, a more sympathetic and less partisan a consideration, free from all passions and prejudices, and from personal and sentimental predilections.

I will present the problem in two phases a) generally and b) specifically with reference to the dvaita school of philosophy. St. Augustine's poignant agony of his soul raises the problem tellingly thus- "who made me? Did not God who is not only good, but goodness itself? whence then come I to will evil and nill good, that I am thus justly punished? Who set this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was wholly formed of my most sweet God?"

Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser in his 'Philosophy of Theism' makes an approach to the problem which reminds one of dvaita approach. His conclusion affords a striking parallel to the position of the dvaitins. Hence Prof. Fraser's analysis of the problem will be a good introduction to the dvaitin's handling of the problem. Fraser writes :

“The mixture of good and evil in the Universe is a sure enigma to Theism and a challenge to it. To believe in perfect goodness is to believe that all is as it ought to be and this is destroyed if anything is found existing that ought not to exist, however; insignificant the place in which it is found or however rare the occurrence. Pain, error, sin and death are the chief evils in our world. Sin is absolutely evil. Pain is the correlative of pity and sympathy. It is natural, and therefore, divine means of education of spiritual life. But the continued presence of what is unconditionally bad cannot be disposed of in this way. How to relieve the mystery of moral evil, including what seems an unfair distribution of pleasure and pain and an unequal adjustment of opportunities for moral growth, has been a human perplexity from the beginning. It finds expression in the Hebrew poets like Job and in the Greek dramatists like Aeschylus. How can it be reconciled with the goodness of God?”

He points out that monism suffers in this that it concludes either that the Universal Power is itself a mixed good and evil or that both good and evil are unreal. Manichean Dualism in the form of two eternal powers or a monism of a single eternal power partly good and partly evil

or else indifferent to good and evil are both inconsistent with the indispensable moral hope and faith.

“Can moral evil be a necessity of finite personality or of the intractableness of matter or a mere negation? Several attempts have been made to explain the fact of evil in a morally governed Universe. Some are conjectures formed at the expense of moral perfection of the Universal Power. Others explain away moral evil as an unconditional necessity of finite existence or treat it as an unreal negation or hide the difficulty by referring to a Tempter”.

After having raised the problem and considered the other views, Professor Fraser propounds his own view as follows :-

“The question why God admits into his Universe what is bad seems to involve an unproved assumption. What ought not to exist, it is assumed, cannot co-exist with God. But this dogma has never been proved. As moral agents, persons must be free to originate voluntary acts that are bad or undivine as well as those which are in harmony with the Divine order. To say that if God is perfect, free agents cannot produce volitions that they ought not to,

is not to vindicate divine perfection, but to destroy it! Omnipotence cannot be power to realise contradictions. God cannot make two and two five; cannot make a square circle. Inability in morally responsible persons to make themselves bad is as much a contradiction, though less obvious. If free to act, one must be able to originate evil acts as well. Offences must needs be, if persons exist. It does not appear that even Omnipotence can exclude what ought not to exist, while there are beings whose essential character is that they are able to bring this into existence.

“Is the existence of persons who can make and keep themselves bad, only a transitory episode in the history of the Universe; or must there be ever bad persons increasing in number and increasingly bad? The question is incapable of settlement. That the moral agency of persons, their personal power to depart from their moral ideal, deepened and confirmed by the habit may become, an absolute final “election” to evil by themselves, which even Omnipotent God cannot overcome, consistent with the free personality of those who persist in keeping themselves undivine, is one conjecture. It involves the mystery of existence, in the Divine Universe, of innumerable persons increasing in number and becoming

worse. Another possible view is that such persons and their acts are capable of extinction by God and only morality progresses so that only the good are allowed to survive; those who persist in ungodliness being reduced to unconsciousness. Perhaps, man's present moral education requires that this mystery should remain unsolved as a teleologically needed mystery".

What is it that we expect from any philosophy? Writes Dr. Radhakrishnan – "We want hard and straight thinking and not soft or emotional or sentimental thinking. Philosophy should say what is true. It does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. It must prove, logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs, pious wishes and pleasing imaginings. It would be unphilosophical to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality". In the light of Professor Fraser's analysis and Dr. Radhakrishnan's remarks, let me now turn to the dvaitin's analysis of and solution to the problem of evil.

The dvaitins are distinctionists. They believe in the essential difference between self and self. Each self is distinct from the other. They also believe in the plurality and reality of

individual selves. They shun metaphysical democracy and socialism i.e., the fundamental sameness of all individuals. If karma has any meaning, if volition and choice mean anything, then the inherent difference between self and self must be recognised. We have in the world varying types of individuals from saints to swines. Volition which rises from desire and choice, differs from individual to individual. The difference thus is a fact of experience and not an apologia for sameness. Knowledge, power and bliss constitute the Svarūpa of the self. But there is a difference in degrees of Svarūpa of self and self. Based on the varying degrees of Svarūpa, the dualists have conceived an intrinsic gradation among the Jivas. This is known as the doctrine of Svarūpa - tāratamya. The dualists give three fold classification of the jivas viz, 1) Mukti-yogyas- those who deserve to attain salvation or are salvable 2) Nitya saṁsārin- eternally transmigrating and 3) Tamo yogyas- those who deserve to be damned or damnable. In this connection I may mention that Ramanuja accepted two classes of souls viz. Nitya-sūris and Nitya-saṁsārins. Why some can take decisions which others cannot? Answer is that they differ in their individual nature fundamentally. The moral responsibility thus suggests the difference intrinsically between self

and self. Intrinsic gradation is also thus a demand of reason. The śāstras also support it. Experience testifies it. Why are some jivas Socrates and Śankara, living a life of self-denial and why are some jivas living the life of a pig in search for sense pleasure? Because of the yog-yatā-tāratamya mentioned above.

Jivas are free to choose and yet they are dependent upon God who is the only independent. Jivas are agents or kartā (Kartā śāstrārtha vatvāt). Yet jivas' kartṛtva is not inconsistent with his dependance on God. The jiva's choice and actions are determined by their past karma, by their deep-rooted nature and inclinations. The right to choose between the right and wrong is Jivas' and hence jivas are responsible. Even the Lord tells Arjuna- "Yatheccasi tathā kuru". God has given Jiva the power to act in conformity with his own nature. For this Jivas depend on Him; but that does not make jivas the puppet of God. As Bādarāyaṇa Sūtra puts - kṛta prayatnāpekṣaḥ. God enables the jivas to act, to follow a course of action, in relation to his past life and deserts. God does not interfere with jivas' decision. "God sustains, but does not constrain. The jiva chooses out of his own free will, a particular line of action for good or for bad, with sufficient fore-knowledge of its moral

worth and has himself to thank for its consequences". Since there is an intrinsic difference between jiva and jiva, the decisions of different jivas differ. Again a man chooses what his nature determines him to. "The nature of the soul is thus allowed to have its course. Whatever it may, there is no fear of the sovereignty of God being compromised on this view. For, one can accuse God of partiality and cruelty only when He changes the nature of some in preference to others". Theoretically God may have the power to do whatever pleases him, but the fact remains— that He does not choose to upset the moral law or change the nature of beings.

Evil is a fact of experience and is real. It does not pose a challenge to the goodness of God, for He did not create it, nor is God responsible for the creation of jivas, all of which are co-eternal with God and yet dependent upon him for their power to act in accordance with their intrinsic nature. The jivas suffer the evil which is their own creation and they can therefore unmake what they have made. In this Universe presided over by God, each one gets what he deserves and God grants it, as the supreme moral judge. Evil thus must be faced bravely. It does not disappear either by saying it

is not or by saying that the world itself is not. We must fight it out or be fought out. It is one of the tasks of philosophy and religion to tell us how to overcome evil and attain goodness.

Evil serves, another ethico-philosophical purpose. It purges the individual of all its dross and turns his attention to the Lord. It ultimately makes one to be aware of the futility of saṃsāra and turn inwards to the Antaryāmin for the guidance. Sādhana mārga is the method, practical and moral, to a life of purity and godliness. Thus the alleged incompatibility of evil with the goodness of God, is no serious a problem to dvaitins, who look the evil in its eyes. They are not escapists nor do they try to find a solace by saying "What a fool was I! I was dreaming of this Ghost and running away from it. In fact nothing happened, therefore, nothing need be done".

I conclude by repeating Dr. Radhakrisnan's quotation again "It is unphilosophical to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality".

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Evil and Art Experience

Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa

1) Evil as a Disvalue

Disvalue is a more inclusive term than evil. Because the latter is only a moral-cum-religious disvalue. So far as ethics is concerned, the term bad is adequate. But while 'bad' is always an adjective, describing the quality of an act or conduct, the concept of evil has a religious and speculative overtone about it. Just as the notion of good grows into that of the holy as our experience passes from the purely ethical to the religious level, so also the concept of 'bad' gives rise to the idea of evil.

For clarity of understanding we must accept this distinction between these two terms: 'Bad' remains an adjective, while 'evil' becomes a noun; there is a mythical personification about it. Because of this nature there is so much of dramatisation by both religious leaders and literary artists of its powers and functions. The Satan, the Mara, the Maya have more an aesthetic substance in them than possibly the pure ontological. In some cases even the opposite of evil is

personified into a character, like Dharmadeva. It only shows the mythical side of these notions. A myth is an aesthetic-metaphysic-moral explanation of certain basic problems of life. At the early stage when philosophy had not yet branched off into a pure intellectual discipline, philosophical questions were answered in a predominantly aesthetic tone; and the explanations grew into myths.

In most myths evil originates at the beginning of knowledge i.e. at the break of original innocence. To explain it epistemologically: break of original innocence or rise of intellect marks the origin of distinction between the mine and the thine and that is the basis of all evil. Since this is an incomplete knowledge claiming completeness it is also false or *mithya*. Thus the epistemological *mithya* and the ethico-religio-metaphysical evil are of the same basis. In art the disvalue namely ugliness is also the result of break in the unity of art experience; a stage in which the ordinary work-a-day consciousness of the experient rises up. Thus the three disvalues - the false, the evil and the ugly - are of the same origin.

Ethical evil is not the whole of the phenomena. There are what are called natural evils

like earth quakes, floods, hurricanes, pestilence and epidemics. These have nothing to do with the rise of the knowledge of mine – and – thine. If evils are purely moral these are not evils. But they are and are treated as the agents or media through which the Satan operates or God revenges the evil in man.

This problem cannot be completely analysed without reference to the ontological status of evil. Is evil a part of existence? To this, only an anthropocentric answer is possible. Man cannot live on the moon, the summer heat of North India is horrible, and serpent is a pernicious creature are all anthropocentric facts. In themselves they are neither evil nor good. Therefore, I treat evil only in so far as it can be understood as a disvalue. It does not mean that evil has no existence whatsoever in any sense. It only means that the existence of disvalues is only in the same sense in which their positive values are said to exist. This point is appreciated when, in the absolutistic philosophy of advaita, reality is described as beyond all thought predicates i. e., beyond all values and therefore of disvalues.

2) Nature of Ugliness

When we speak of evil in art, we must distinguish two senses in which it can be understood

(1) the kind of disvalue in art which corresponds to evil in moral and religious experience. (2) How moral and religious evil itself is treated in works of art.

1) **Ugliness** : Ugliness is always relative to beauty and a thing or piece of experience which cannot claim to be beautiful cannot be ugly. All that is not beautiful is not necessarily ugly. Beauty is the harmony of imagination which develops through a medium for the enjoyment for its own sake. This is also a process of development of emotion. Art experience draws on the ordinary raw emotions of life; but what is actually experienced is a transformed stage of these emotions which are called rasas.

When a thing is not created with the purpose of aesthetic realisation and when it does not claim the aesthetic value—i.e., realization of coherence in imagination purely for its own sake -- it is neither beautiful nor ugly; it is not an aesthetic category at all. But when a thing claims some imaginative value but actually fails to fulfil or satisfy that claim, the question of ugliness arises. When we read a poem, listen to a musical composition or see a picture, we imaginatively transform ourselves to the mode of that particular piece of art. Its tempo or the

central note sets our imagination in a particular mode and our emotion starts with a certain depth, profundity and seriousness. A certain 'logic' unique to that work of art is felt by us and our experience is governed by that 'logic'. In this process now and then a divergence from the main note takes place; and this divergence as a contrast adds to the vividness, complexity and subtlety and thus it forms a part of the aesthetic whole. If the divergence is too far away from the main note or too violent from the measure of the central movement or too much contrasting that the unity of experience is marred or destroyed, we experience acute dissatisfaction. And this is what is called ugliness. So ugliness is the distorted turn of aesthetic imagination, which leads to violent disharmony between it and the set mood which results in displeasure, pain and disappointment. It is imaginative derailment. This derailment may be due to inadequacy of the experient himself to follow the depth, intricacy and emotional strain of the artistic content.

Ugliness is not a moral category; still we can examine in which sense it can be called or compared with evil. Both are disvalues, claiming and competing for a place along with their respective positive values. Ugliness is a stage

at which experience though imaginatively is distorted, broken and marked with intense pain. The pain on the face of a connoisseur when the singer either spoils the character of a *raga* or falls into *apaśṛti* can be easily seen. Though pleasure and pain by themselves are not the criteria of good and evil they are one of the sure marks of these value and disvalue.

3) Moral Consciousness and Ugliness

Art experience is a stage of "willing suspension of disbelief". All our critical consciousness, sense of values and judgments are kept suspended to enable the imagination to flow with the artistic process. Our ideal of monogamy should not disturb when we read the story of Dasharatha. But there is a limit up to which the other value-sensibilities can be kept quiet. If a coward is unnecessarily praised or a traitor glorified or a religious bigot respected in earnestly reverential words in a story, our imagination will be disturbed; we become reflective and this reflection, the sudden awakening of our sense of criticism, disharmonises the development of aesthetic experience. If any of the factors claimed is too strong for the work of art to bear, it repulses us or blinds us to the more difficult task of realizing positive aesthetic merit. Bartram Morris gives an interesting example: "When in

his altar piece, designed for a colony of syphilitics, Mathias Gruenwald depicts Christ as suffering from the dreaded disease, we find it much simpler to censure the work and to rest smuggly in moral elation than to comprehend the aesthetic reality". (*The Aesthetic Process* – p. 134).

This is not merely the problem of relation between art and morality. The example shows a point very relevant to our topic: Even in art experience, i.e. the stage of willing suspension of disbelief, our consciousness will be vigilant about any positive evil. If our consciousness is made to accept any evil in the aesthetic sway, it rejects it with the result, what should otherwise have been an experience of beauty falls into ugliness with an acute disappointment, repulsiveness and pain.

4) Evil as the Substance: Tragedy

Evil is a tale of sorrow and suffering, it is the repellent aspect of life that creates pain in our consciousness and because of pain, it creates things which as civilized souls we abhor even to look at. It is the "ugly" aspect of life.

Has this aspect any place in art, or has it not? If it has not, to that extent, art is less revealing of the forces and the realities of life.

There is no aspect of human experience that cannot be included in aesthetic imagination. But how does art retain its autonomy, undisturbed by this painful and "bloody" side of life?

The answer to this question can be found in the form of art known as tragedy. The term means on the face of it a certain literary form, but it also connotes a certain profundity and depth, revealing the truth of human degradation. In the words of one of the greatest authorities on Shakespearean tragedy, A. C. Bradley, it is "essentially a tale of suffering and calamity conducting to death." (*Shakespearean Tragedy* p.7). Another writer puts it: "it is a spectacle of evil. Evil is that which we do not enjoy. Yet we do enjoy tragedy". (Henry A. Myers: *Tragedy: A View of Life*, Cornell University Press. 1965. page 6):

How is it that our moral consciousness does not enter into the course of aesthetic experience and block its way though tragedy is a "spectacle of evil" which "we do not enjoy in real life?" When the story of evil is told in a tragedy it is done with a moral lesson implied but without being didactic. It is not evil as such – the brute spectacle of horror and cruelty – that is shown in it, but a picture of a man in whom evil works

and ultimately devours him. In Marlow's *Dr. Fastus*, we find successive stages of how the learned hero falls into the power of evil. To start with, it is due to his flaw that he willingly submits himself to temptations by the evil spirit. It is a picture of human weakness and the whole of the subsequent development of the drama is the gradual explication of the function of evil, culminating in the complete subjugation of the soul of the hero. It is this vision—the philosophical vision—that is the substance of a genuine tragedy. Or else, in a movie a rail accident might be shown in which many innocent men and women lose their limbs and many others become terribly disfigured. Can it be a tragedy? If it is shown purposelessly, it is only a sight of pain and horror, creating disgust and repulsion in the spectator. To the repelled spectator, it is an ugly sight. We may contrast this picture with that of Kurukshetra on the seventeenth night of the great war, Duryodhana, having lost all his kith and kin, his heroic brothers and beloved Karna, moves alone in the battlefield identifying the corpses of all the important heroes who fought for him till death. It is a picture of disjointed limbs and broken skulls, livers drawn out of stomach, the soil profusely soaked in blood. Yet it does not create disgust in the mind of the reader (or of the specta-

tor if the same is filmed) because, the whole situation is philosophised in the background of the wholeness of the story showing how in the *dharmayuddha* the supporters of adharma have parted with their lives. If taken the other way, it helps to study the intensity of the tragic situation of Duryodhana.

If evil, horror and pain appear in works of art, they should be in a wider perspective. In this manner the nature of evil revealed in art undergoes a transformation and in the new transformed condition it deepens our understanding and evokes our sympathy instead of creating repulsion and disgust. Instead of breaking the unity of aesthetic experience it intensifies its depth. It does not become a misfit – which is ugliness – but adds a powerful significance to the aesthetic whole and makes the whole all the more strong and binding. And thus the aesthetic distance is kept up.

Just as in life, in art too, understanding of evil always presupposes a consciousness of value-scale. Suffering, the most concrete aspect of evil is also better understood. The hedonistic ethics identifies evil with human suffering and outrightly rejects it. Though no healthy ethical thought condones suffering for its own sake, it

has a positive role in moral development. One who has gone through the test of suffering is proved to be morally strong and tempered than a person with mere theoretical ideals. However, if suffering becomes too acute for a man to bear, it breaks him down, demoralises him instead of strengthening his moral will. Evil teaches this moral when it becomes the subject matter of a work of art.

It is said that Indian literature has no tragedy. If it means that India has not produced the form of drama as in Greek or in English which tells the story of a person possessed by evil who gradually loses his personal self and finally succumbs to it, it is true. There might be other literary reasons why such drama did not develop in India; but a very important reason is that Indian poets did not accord the all-absorbing power to evil in life. It is significant to note that the *Mara* of Buddhistic mythology or *Manmatha* of Hindu mythology are not as stark embodiments of evil as the Satan of Europe, who is a veritable and aggressive rival to God. Evil in India has been conceived as a test that should be applied to the seeker of higher values.

Though tragedy as a special literary form was not developed in India, the tragic profundity

was grasped in all its significance. Are not Ravana and Duryodana and Karna tragic heroes? Is not Seeta a tragic heroine? Does not the Mahabharata abound with a tragic feeling when the Pandavas set on a journey on foot to Kailas which is veritably a suicide pilgrimage? What was the end of Rama and Krishna? There cannot be any great work of art, of epic dimension, without what the literary critics call the "vision of evil" or a complete grasp of the problem of evil. But the vision of evil depends on the total vision of life; for, after all evil is only a part of life and not the whole of it. The stories of Ramayana and Mahabharata are full of pathos and tragic depth without being pessimistic while the Shakespearean tragedies stand on the loud thesis that the power of evil is inevitable and once you become a victim to it there is no possibility of escape. The Greek tragedies are based on the belief in an inexorable destiny before which the effort of man cannot do anything. *Oedipus* is a great drama as a literary construction but philosophically crude; because its "vision of evil" is not at the same time an acceptable vision of life - i.e., philosophy.

5) Evil, Holy and Sublime

When moral goodness matures into what Otto calls a *mysterium tremendum* it is called

holy. While goodness is relative to badness, the holy is goodness par excellence, unrelated to any negative value. Evil cannot approach it.

The holy is compared with the sublime. The former is the transcended stage of moral goodness; the latter, that of aesthetic beauty. Beauty is relative to ugliness; but sublimity is not. It has within itself a character which if separated from that height can easily become ugly. Beauty is the stage at which imagination realizes a sweet harmony and when the limits of this harmony are overpowered it becomes sublime. We see the appearance of evil from some specific angles in the level of beauty; but we meet the roots of evil at the sublime. Specially in literature when the situation reaches tragic heights we become dumbfounded at the mysterious nature of evil. Elements of pain and fear (terror) are always present in the sublime. But it is a stage at which the fear is held in an attracted suspense; as for example, if one is overpowered by physical fear in the presence of mighty roaring waves, instead of experiencing the sublimity of the spectacle, one will run away. If we concentrate on the heroic effort of sailors it is a sight of beauty; but when we become one with the sight of the imperiously mountainous waves and reconcile ourselves to the inevitability of the

heart-rending death of the sailors, it is sublime. That is, at this height we accept evil, its roots and inevitability and yet we cannot pass any moral judgment. "We fail to sympathise with the struggling sailors because we sympathise too much with the wind and waves. And this mystical cruelty can extend even to ourselves; we can so feel the fascination of the cosmic forces that engulf us as to take a fierce joy in the thought of our own destruction". (Santayana: *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 168. Collier Books).

Here the aesthetic height of the sublime can be contrasted with the moral-religious climax of holiness. The sublime accepts evil and sees it in the total context of the situation of meaning. It is a direct and close confrontation with evil without abhorring it. But evil just cannot exist at the holy. It is too radiant, too effulgent and too pure for evil even to approach it. It either denies the existence of evil or transforms it into good or remove its evilness. To use the words of Hiriyanna: "The elimination of *kama* and *karman* while their cause *avidya* continues in a latent form, marks the aesthetic attitude; the dismissal of *avidya* even in this latent form marks the saintly attitude". (*Art Experience* p. 9). That is, the complete removal of *avidya* (the root of evil) is a precondition of holiness;

but even in the highest level of art experience, *avidya* can remain in a latent form, to become active once the experient comes to his normal self. In relation to evil the holy person is completely out of it. While the experient of the sublime is not.

One may not accept this explanation, and may hold that the meaning of the sublime should be further heightened and widened so that it should become one with the holy; and that it should be a stage at which the moral-religious and aesthetic experiences merge. Dr. Ranade suggests this (*Bhagavadgita*, see the last chapter). If we accept this view, only those who have completely overcome evil (*avidya*), can have sublime experience and whatever the height we reach in art should be described with another term. We will not propose to discuss this question here: because our purpose here is only to see the nature of evil in art experience including its highest stage. And secondly if complete overcoming of evil is a precondition of sublime experience, it becomes a part of the study in mysticism. We do not mean that the saintly experience is not higher than what we call sublime even in aesthetic quality. But it cannot be art experience. Art is the experience of harmony within (and in so far as it lasts) the

stimulus of a particular medium like paint sound or words. But a saint can have his mystic experience without the support of any external stimulus. Therefore to insist that evil must be overcome even in its roots to have the real experience of the sublime is to pass on from aesthetics to mysticism. But the two are different.



The Problem of Evil

M, S. Deshpande, M.A., Athani.

At the outset I should like to point out that my approach to this problem is not that of a student of Philosophy but that of a student of life. Naturally it would be more practical than theoretical. I propose to discuss today the four aspects of Evil viz. i) its Origin, ii) its Nature, iii) its Influence, and iv) its Elimination.

ORIGIN

If we analyse the conception of Evil we find that there are two factors in it – one constituting its substance and the other, the idea associated with its effects on human life. The origin of the substance of Evil, can be traced to the origin of Creation itself and that of the idea, to the birth of moral consciousness in man. Our Creation is, as is well-known, a multiplicity manifested from the Ultimate Unity viz., God. The five elements together with intellect, mind and ego, and the life-principle, form, according to the Gita, the lower and higher Nature – the Parā and Aparā Prakṛti – of the Lord. The three modes – Gunas – born of this Nature together with the innumerable products evolved out of the

combinations of all these, are the pairs of opposites – the Dvaṅdvās. The original pair of Vidyā and Avidyā in the spirit, that of attraction and repulsion in the Cosmos, of light and darkness and heat and cold in Nature, of birth and death in the living organism, of knowledge and ignorance in the evolved human intellect, of joy and sorrow in his mind, love and hate in his heart, pleasure and pain in his senses – all these also play their part in the Cosmic Drama of the Lord. These form the substance aspect of Evil.

They all obey their laws and carry on the functions allotted to them by the Lord. By themselves they are neither good nor evil. It is only when they come in contact with man, and affect him that the ideas of good and evil are applied to them. So long as the respective laws are properly observed and harmony maintained on both sides, their contact proves a blessing to man. But when the laws are violated on either side, resulting in disharmony, the contact becomes a curse. It is only then that the substances receive the appellation of Evil.

The origin of Evil can also be traced to the presence of unbridled kāma – desire for lust, lucure, power and fame – in the human heart.

This Kāma, when frustrated, generates Krodha - anger, and when fulfilled, is transformed into Lobha - greed. These then, become the source of Evil. About these sources the Gita tells us :

Trividham narakasyedaṁ dvāraṁ

nāśanamātmanaḥ I

Kāmaḥ krodhastathā lobhastasmādetattra-

yaṁ tyajet II 16-27 II

“Desire, anger and greed form the triple gate of Hell. They destroy the self. Hence these three should be abandoned”. This Kāma along with its associates, anger and greed, reside in the senses, mind and intellect of man. It envelops the wisdom of man, intensifies his selfishness, deludes him and brings about his ruin. And when this selfishness grows on a national scale, it engenders international conflicts and wars. Thus, “wars begin in the minds of men”, declares the Unesco manifesto. “and it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace should be laid.” Such is the mischief which Kāma is capable of performing.

About the existence and origin of Evil Gāndhiji writes : “I cannot account for the existence of Evil, by any rational method. To want to do so, is to be co-equal with God. I am humble enough to recognise Evil as such.

And I call God, long-suffering and patient, precisely because He permits Evil in the world. I know that He has no evil in Him and yet if there is evil, He is the author of it and yet untouched by it.”

NATURE

Now what is the nature of the Evil that we observe in the world? There appear to be three main types of Evil here, viz. Super-natural, Natural and Human, corresponding to the three types of calamities mentioned by our Saints, viz. Ādhidaivika – Celestial, Ādhibhautika – Material and Ādhyātmika – Physico-mental. Persons who have developed extra-sensory perception, tell us that there are some mysterious forces that affect the lives of human beings. When they contribute to their well-being they are regarded as good, and when they bring about misery, they are considered as evil. The accidents in our lives that give them a sudden turn either for the better or for the worse, are generally attributed to the working of these unknown forces. Thus we know practically nothing about this type of Evil as it is beyond the ken of our comprehension.

About the Natural Evil also our knowledge is quite inadequate. We don't know when and

how Nature violates its laws, bringing about terrible catastrophies everywhere. The horrible earthquakes, torrential rains, followed by devastating floods, terrible tornadoes, freezing cold-waves and burning heat-waves, famines, pestilences etc. are all fraught with immense destruction and misery to all living-beings. This is an Evil beyond the control of man. He has been trying to minimise the intensity of its disaster to a certain extent by trying to understand their laws and taking all-possible precautions for preventing and facing its fury. Still, this wrath of Nature has remained an inevitable Evil creating havoc in the world.

Such violations of laws by Nature, however, are few and far, between. So this Evil also is a rare phenomenon. But man very often violates the laws of his nature and is hence required to suffer from the Evil resulting from it. He violates the physical laws of regularity and moderation in food, drink, sleep, exercise and recreation; the moral laws of truth, love and self-control; social laws of justice, charity and fraternity and the spiritual laws of devotional prayer to and soul-ful meditation on the Lord. This upsets the balance and harmony in life. Naturally he forfeits his claim to healthy pleasure, mental purity and peace, social harmony and spiritual

bliss. He is required to suffer from the evil of pain, sorrow, unrest, conflict, worry and fear. He becomes incapable of enjoying the blessings of life, as he is forced to battle against these evils.

There is another type of Evil which results from our ignorance. We very often don't try to ascertain the real worth of certain objects and persons and pronounce our final judgement about them. We either raise them to the skies or relegate them to perdition. In either case we do injustice to them as our judgement is likely to be hasty and ill-placed. But when we intentionally 'call a dog a cur and beat him' we commit a double crime. In this connection we should note that 'there is nothing either good or bad but our thinking makes it so.' Secondly, such an ignorance of ours makes us use them also in a wrong manner. We try to put square pegs in round holes and dub both of them as useless misfits. In this respect we should do well to heed the following words of wisdom of a wise poet :

Amañtramakṣaram nāsti, nāsti

mūlamanauṣadhatm I

Ayogyaḥ puruṣo nāsti, yojakastara

durlabhaḥ II

“There is no letter without any power of a Mantra - charm; no root without any medicinal merit; no person without any worth. All that is required is a wise person who can know their real worth and use them properly” Then all would prove their worth. Here too, if such a wrong use is intentional, done with an ulterior motive, we commit a double crime, and bring about chaos in the affairs of life. Thirdly, we are very often ignorant about our very nature - our natural capacities and tendencies. We try to perform functions not suited to our inherent capacities and prove a curse to ourselves as well as to others. We know that thorns are meant to protect a garden and blossoms are meant for spreading delight there, with their beauty and fragrance. But then, if the thorns leave their fence, occupy the centre and begin to toss their thorny heads in ugly dance, and if on the other hand, the blossoms take their station on the fence by arming themselves with their delicate shields and arrows for protecting the garden, both would be a curse to the garden. There would neither be proper protection to it, nor any delight in it. Hence, the Gita stresses the urgent need for all, to observe their respective Swadharma -to perform the functions suited to their nature. The attempt to adopt Paradharma -

functions foreign to their nature, would prove to be a dangerous Evil.

Evil in human life, thus, assumes the form of physical pain, mental worry and fear, emotional egoism and hatred, intellectual confusion and delusion, moral waywardness and wickedness, social unrest and conflict and finally spiritually 'Dark Night of the Soul.' In this manner, this Evil keeps us away from Perfect Truth, Wisdom Goodness and Bliss viz. God. Hence we may say that Evil is that which takes and keeps us away from God.

INFLUENCE

Evil, thus, exercises a tremendous influence on the life of man, making it a veritable hell for him. The sphere of its influence is extensive and its power is also immense. As a Sanskrit poet has put it :

Puṇyasya phalamicchanti puṇyanneccchanti
mānavāḥ I

Na pāpa-phalamicchanti papamkurvanti
yatnataḥ II

'Men desire to have the fruits of merit, but don't want merit itself; they don't want the fruits of sin, but they try their utmost to commit sin.'

Why do they dislike merit even though it grants them happiness? Why do they like sin even though it brings about untold misery? What is the secret of its irresistible influence? The secret is not far to seek. The influence of Evil is two-fold. Firstiy, it appeals to the natural tendencies - the inherent weakness of man. And secondly it possesses a deceptive initial attraction. Due to the original Avidyā, man identifies himself with his body as a result of which he develops a strong attachment for it and a passionate craving for sense-pleasure. Moreover, he wants to attain sense-pleasure with the least possible labour and in the shortest possible time. Hence he tries to make use of any means fair or foul - more foul than fair - and falls an easy prey to Evil. Secondly, Evil possesses an initial attraction. Like a villon, Evil offers 'honey' at the start and hides its 'poison' in the heart. Attracted by the immediate pleasure it grants, man fails to notice the sting in its tail and comes to grief.

There is another factor which enables Evil to cast a magic spell on its votary and enslave him for good. It assumes the guise of goodness, deludes the intellect and makes man perpetrate even ghastly crimes in the name of lofty objectives, high ideals. History bears ample testi-

mony to such a death-dance of Evil. Hitler massacred millions of Jews for establishing the supremacy of his chosen Aryan race. Lenin drenched Russia with horrible blood-bath for the perpetual dominance of the proletariat there. Comrade Mao is prepared to sacrifice even half the population of China so that the other half might live in luxury. It is Evil in the guise of goodness, that made Socrates drink hemlock, that crucified Christ and murdered many a Mahatma in the world.

Thus does Evil tempt and pervert the intellect, flatter egoism, inflame passion for lust, lucre, power and fame, and force man to adopt any means and commit the most heinous crimes. It transforms man into veritable devil. It also creates a band of hypocrites who put up a show of goodness to achieve success in their nefarious designs. Thus are the ways to hell paved with good intentions by Evil.

ELIMINATION

Now about the elimination of Evil. Can we eliminate Evil completely from the world? The answer is an emphatic 'No'. Because Evil is indissolubly interwoven with the fabric of Creation. To try to eliminate Evil from the world is to try for an impossibility. If so, are

we 'like flies to wanton boys' to allow ourselves to be perpetually tormented and crushed by Evil? No. That is also not inevitable. We need not be helpless victims to its ravages if we try to know and practise the proper remedy, already discovered and practised by the Saints and Sages of the world. We would thereby not only be able to ward off Evil but would realise the highest good namely God, as they had done before.

Instances are not wanting of high-souled Saints who have overcome Evil, kept it at an arm's length and even banished it from the holy precincts of their lives. They bloomed like lotuses, unaffected by the muddy waters below, rose superior to them, developed their beautiful purity and enjoyed the life-giving sunshine of the Grace, Presence and Bliss of the Lord. They not only enjoyed such a blissful life, but they taught others also to enjoy the same. Their noble life and mission have been aptly described by a poet in the following fine verse :

Santā mahānto nivasanti santāḥ .

Vasantava llokaḥ hitam carantaḥ I

Tirṇāḥ svayam bhīmamahārṇavam janān

Aḥetunānyānapi tārayantaḥ II

“The high-souled Saints lead a life of perfect peace. Like the spring season, they bless the world with the joy of fresh life. They have crossed the terrible ocean of worldly life themselves. And they enable others also to do the same, with no ulterior motive but that of sheer compassion”. With the help of their actual experience, they have chalked out a good path leading to this Supreme Bliss for the benefit of the future aspirants. These Saints are our sure guides. If we faithfully and sincerely try to act up to their instructions, we can not only keep the Evil at bay, but would actually have the privilege of enjoying the Bliss of the Lord.

Now what is the remedy – the path – which the Saints have discovered, practised and preached? It can be briefly summed up in the following six words: Discrimination, Dispassion, Devotion, Dedication, Meditation and Surrender. We should first develop, according to them, our power of discrimination by listening to the words of wisdom of the Great, keenly observe the life around us and reflect deeply on the words listened to and the factors observed by us. This will enable us to distinguish the eternal from the ephemeral, the real from the unreal, and the good from the bad factors in life. When this knowledge grows into a con-

viction by repeated discrimination, we would feel dispassion for the latter and develop love for the former – detachment for objects of sense and sense-pleasure and attachment for the Lord and Bliss Divine. This attachment would naturally evolve itself into devotion for the Lord. For intensifying our devotion, we should then lovingly dedicate all our actions to the Lord and constantly engage ourselves in prayerful meditation on His chosen Form and Name. This practice carried on for a long time would awaken our latent Intuition and bless us with various spiritual experiences associated with varying degrees of Bliss. These experiences would intensify our devotion still further, resulting into complete self-surrender to the Lord. Such a loving surrender would then attract His Grace and enable us to enjoy Supreme Peace (Parā-śānti).

In a couple of significant Dohās, one attributed to Saint Kabīr and the other to his son Kamāl, we are told how those who stray away from God are crushed by Evil while those that are attached to God remain unaffected by it. Here are the Dohas :

Calatī cakkī dekha ke, diyā Kabīrā roya ।
Do patan ke bīca me, sābita bacā na koya ॥

“Merge your mind in Me! My Grace would free you from all calamities... Take refuge in Me! I shall liberate you from all sins!”



Existential Interpretation of Evil

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The most bewildering Problem of Life is an inseparable dualism in Nature between a bright and dark, noble and ignoble or good and evil. We cannot ignore or sophistically explain away the repugnant, intolerable, harmful, undesirable elements in Man, Society and Nature. At the same time, it is our obligation to search for and preserve the attractive, desirable, noble and ideal aspects of the same. To declare the Evil as a fiction of imperfect, ignorant human mind; or to accept it in the spirit of a Fatalist, as an inscrutable decree of Providence, is either to express our ignorance or to ignore our responsibility. The Existential approach takes realistic view and holds man to be the destiny unto himself.

Broadly defined, Existentialism means a descriptive analysis of the structure, constitutive conditions, potentialities and limitations and ethical interests of human existence. Its standpoint is subjective, personal, introspective, relative and experiential. It is a protest against Self-estrangement, dehumanization, mechanisation and objectification of experience. It is broadly against the metaphysics that refers to the abstract, absolute, transcendent, supernatural reality. Considering man as always in the making, it holds his actual, concrete, felt and lived personal reality as prior and basic to his so-called conceptual, ideal essence. He is free to make choice and act, which give shape to his unique personal existence. Instead of "general, universal and impersonal deindividualized" man as the centre of inquiry, existentialism considers the private, inner depths of his personality as the source and centre of philosophical wisdom. The existentialists have made strong complaint against (i) the mechanistic materialism of science that reduces man to a machine, (ii) traditional religious dogmatism, that asks from the followers mechanical, blind, faithful obedience of its dictates; (iii) metaphysics of transcendentalism, that asks him to ignore the realities of 'this' world; and (iv) the totalitarian social structure, that makes his creativity meaningless. It is a

protest against all ideologies, which make man's uniqueness, individuality and freedom insignificant.

This forms the background of the existential approach to the problem of Evil. According to it the suffering, sin, evil, wickedness that is there is due to "INAUTHENTIC" life lived by us in our long history of social behaviour. For Heidegger, it is behaviour set and standardised by the Impersonal Man; for Marcel it is dominated by the Social Function, for Sartre, it is 'given' by 'others' or 'they'. We lose our self in the crowded, chaotic, anarchic life full of opinions, standards, modes of understanding and action "Given to us by Others". Therefore, our self-image is shaped by what others feel, do, know and expect.

Life of pleasure-seeking, boredom, melancholy, despair, sense of vacuity, worthlessness, meaninglessness, absurdity, nothingness etc. characterise the Inauthentic existence. The Authentic life consists in self-examination, self-criticism, self-exploration and self-judgement. All truths should be subjected to experiential verification, all values be accepted on personal choice without the pressure of authority, blind conformity and self-deception. Non-ego-centric

disinterested knowledge and action can alone help us in the Encounter with Nothingness.

Generally, the existentialists interpret both good and evil as man-made. They do not wish to impose any responsibility about pain, suffering and evil on any natural or supernatural agency. It is the wrong use of personal freedom, inauthenticity, blindness, indifference that give rise to them. Impersonal or Personal God, Fate, Unconscious, Blind, Evil Force or Energy etc. need not be invited to explain the Evil or to cure and prevent it. Man is responsible for his Fall, for his Crimes and Punishments, Agonies and Frustrations. That means any ontologic or metaphysical reference is neither necessary nor useful in this context.

Obviously, the view of (i) Absolute Idealism, which declares Evil as Phenomenal; (ii) the view of Dualistic, Theistic Creationism, which accepts Good and Evil as both co-eternal and co-ordinate principles e.g., (1) Good: Ormazd, Evil: Ahirman as in Zoroastrianism; (2) Good: God, Evil: Satan as in Christianity]; are not accepted by the existentialists. They will not also admire the attempts of classifying the various types of Sins and prescribing various types of remedies (Prāyascittas), as found given

in Indian Śruti, Smṛti, Purāna and Sūtra literature. Instead of such attempts the Existentialism insists on analysis and reform of concrete problems and realities of personal and social life. God, Self, Immortality, Heaven and Hell, Karma and Re-birth are the theological and metaphysical commitments or the postulates which are accepted in the traditional explanations of Evil. These explanations create many difficulties regarding 1) nature of God, 2) nature of Soul, 3) relation between God and the World on one hand and of Soul with World and God on the other. The existentialists question the possibility, acceptibility and validity of these commitments and postulates; prefer to discard them and try to explain the problem in terms of Self-estrangement, Self-alienation and Inauthenticity. Just as in Buddhism the moral agent is held responsible for inevitable fruit of his actions, the existentialists accept the same inevitability and responsibility. In Buddhism God and Sin as understood traditionally are not accepted. Man commits mistakes out of ignorance. They are termed as Vice and Crime. Man has to shoulder their responsibility. He has to pay the price for his self-forgetfulness which he pays by living the Life of Bondage i.e., inauthentic existence.

Sense of Vacuity, self-contradictoriness and Absurdity, Futility of human effort and the perception of Pain and Suffering etc. make the existentialists pessimistic about the future of life. Death as the Final Destiny and Destruction as dominant trend which they accept, make them 'weeping' philosophers. Here too they follow the footsteps of Buddha and Schopenhauer. However, they ask us "to accept what is as it is" and to face it with courage. In the words of J. Krishnamurti, they prefer to look at life and live it "without Identification, Condemnation and Justification". The life of the individual is the product of Conditioning. The existentialists recommend its Deconditioning. The traditional religion recommends its Reconditioning with the aid of various types of ritualistic prescriptions. The existentialists prefer the motto of Socrates: Know Thyself. According to them proper understanding of one's own self-existence, its potentialities and limitations will enable him to know that he is the centre of Freedom and Creativity. Only then he can succeed in his Encounter with Nothingness. Here they come very close to the essential spirit of mysticism which consists in "the flight of the Alone to the Alone" or to the spirit of true religion, as defined by A.N. Whitehead, as "What one does in Solitude".

A broad comparison between the Hindu philosophical outlook and the Existential thought shows that both believe in human finiteness, death, misery, worthlessness etc. But for the former these attributes characterise only transitory, superficial aspects of man's spiritual pilgrimage in which man has to face and overcome the crises and trials. For the latter, they constitute permanent features of Existence. Therefore, the former has become the Philosophy of Faith, while the latter the Philosophy without Faith. The former gives us the picture of life in which there is Peace, Bliss and Tranquility (Sthitaprajnatva), a level of the Trance-valuation of Values; while the latter proves to be the philosophy of Relativism and Pessimism.

The primacy of self and its analysis advocated by the existentialists as the starting point of philosophical wisdom can be welcomed by the Hindu approach. However, the existentialism analyses the personality only up to the levels of body, mind, intellect, ego, empirical self etc. Naturally, their Encounter with Nothingness, Absurdity etc. pertain only to the lower stage of spiritual development. If they go still further and analyse the depth of our true being they will come to know that one is the centre of Creativity and Freedom, but that centre is not

empirical existence. It is the Transcendental Self which is the Spark Divine. To realise it is to live really authentic life. In that life there is no Agony but Ecstasy. There is no question of Dread and Death. The person attaining that stage becomes spontaneously virtuous. It is a life not of tension but of Tranquility. Perhaps, that was the implication of the teachings of Kierkegaard and Marcel who believed in God and who held that man can attain an Eternal and Immortal state of being in relation to God and that is the ultimate spiritual purpose of man's authentic existence. In absence of such trans-empirical faith the views of Heidegger, Sartre, Camus etc, have turned out to be the philosophy of torture.

The ancient upanisadic seers prayed;

ॐ असतो मा सद्गमय ।

तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय ।

मृत्योर्मा अमृतं गमय ।

Contemporary atheistic and pessimistic existentialism overemphasizes the first half of the said prayer, i.e. vacuity or nothingness (Asat); darkness and dread (Tamas); destruction and death (Mrtyu). On the other hand Hindu outlook emphasizes the latter half of the said prayer, i.e.

the real and the ideal (Sat); light and hope (Jyoti ; immortality and bliss (Amṛtatvam). For the Integral Realisation of Life one may begin with existentialism but in the attainment of its destiny one has to go beyond Existentialism.



The Problem of Moral Evil

Dr. S. R. Talghatti

Evil, natural or moral, is primarily a matter of experience. It constitutes a problem only when we start reflecting on it. The problem itself can be conceived in two ways: In its wider form, the problem is concerned with Evil as such – its origin (cause), nature and removal. In its narrower form, it is related specifically to the religious theistic conception of God. In this form, the problem of Evil is one of the most perplexing problems of the Philosophy of Religion. It is essentially a problem of reconciliation between the metaphysical and moral attributes of God on the one hand and the existence of evil in the world on the other. Thus in the restricted sense, it is a problem for a believer surrounded by evil of all sorts. For a non-believer there is evil but not the problem of Evil which arises out of incompatibility between God's omnipotence, omniscience, kindness, etc. and the presence of abundant evil in His creation. In this paper, we shall discuss the problem in both the forms, but confine ourselves to moral evil only.

Let us start with the concept of Evil itself. Generally it is taken as opposed to the concept of 'Good'. This is evident from such titles as "Beyond Good and Evil". Moral Evil will thus be what is opposed to Moral Good. Now, Good has two-fold meaning - adjectival and gerundive e.g. '*a good act* of man' and '*the good* of all'. In the former sense 'good' is a moral adjective expressing the quality of moral goodness; in the latter, it generally means 'well being' and specifically, 'morally desirable or prescribed end i.e. the moral good'. The two are, of course, basically inter-related. If, now, evil is taken to be the opposite of 'good', then it would mean - adjectivally - bad, immoral, morally wrong etc.; and gerundively, the 'ill-being' or in other words 'misery, suffering' in general, and morally forbidden end, object or pursuit etc., in particular. In fact, the concept of evil includes much more than is suggested by taking it to be only a negative concept. Considering the natural and moral evils together, we realize that everything in the world that represents error, disorder, wrongness, badness, and above all, pain is described as 'evil'. Moral evil means vice, moral error or lapses, badness etc. and their expressions. It is more helpful, therefore, to take evil as a positive concept. Its content in the ultimate analysis is seen to be 'suffering, misery,

unhappiness'. When it is caused by natural objects, events etc., we call it natural evil; and when it is caused by moral lapses, vices – either of others or of our own, we call it moral evil. I know that some thinkers will find it difficult to accept this description especially of moral evil in terms of suffering. They will say that, strictly speaking, vice, moral lapses, error etc. themselves are the moral evil, not the suffering due to them. But on closer examination it will be found out that moral evil in order to be 'evil' must invariably be related to suffering in some way. At least I for one think so.

Galloway is not quite clear on this point though on the whole he seems to support the view here taken. According to him – “Broadly speaking, we term natural evils the evils which are involved in the course of nature, and affect not only man, but all other finite creatures as well. Moral evils, again, are those which spring, directly or indirectly, from the exercise of human will, and are made possible by the activity of conscious beings”.¹ While moral evil means transgressing the law or norm of society i.e., the law of man, sin, its religious counterpart

1. Galloway, George *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 557.

means "a transgression of, or a failure to conform to the Law of God rather than the law of man"² In the case of both moral evil and sin or religious evil, their effect on man and society in terms of suffering or conditions of suffering is what makes them 'evil'.

In the light of the above discussion regarding the nature of the concept of evil, we can appreciate better the profound significance of the general purpose, of Indian Philosophy viz. getting rid of misery and also of the all important concept of 'Mokṣa'. Sāṃkhya clearly states the purpose thus - दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् जिज्ञासा,³ the three kinds of misery being आध्यात्मिक, आधिभौतिक and आधिदैविक. It can be seen that the mental part of आध्यात्मिक and the आधिभौतिक caused by other people are what we call moral evil and the rest natural evil. The four Noble Truths of the Buddha are significant for the same reason.

We now come to the question of the origin of moral evil or sin. Here we are concerned with what Galloway⁴ calls the metaphysical problem of moral evil, and not the psychological. That is to say the question is not regarding

2. Ibid. p. 520.

3. Sāṃkhya Kārikā 1.

4. Op. cit. pp. 522-523.

the development of the consciousness of moral evil or sin in man's mind, but regarding the ultimate cause - explanation - rationale - of the existence of moral evil or sin in the world at all and more specifically, regarding its compatibility with God's goodness.

At the outset we may cast aside as unacceptable the view that evil - natural or moral - is only apparent and has no reality. This goes against actual experience and it will help in no way to turn our back on so potent a fact or actuality as evil. So far as moral evil is concerned, we have to accept that the vicious or bad tendencies, selfish and wrong desires etc. do exist. Another view admits the existence of evil along with 'good' but holds that the balance being in favour of the good, the world is on the whole good and God need not be blamed, because this is the best of all possible worlds. We can easily see that both these views try to undermine the gravity of Evil and to preserve God's goodness in face of evil. Yet another view tries to justify evil by saying that it is ordained by God to be necessary either for purification or for greater good or, again, for punishment of our transgression of His law etc. In doing so, however, these views indirectly admit that it is God who is responsible for Evil; including moral

evil, in the world. So far as moral evil is concerned, I don't think that we can hold God responsible for it when clearly it is made possible only by conscious human will. A more serious difficulty about these and such other theories which consider and try to explain evil only in connection with the idea of a good God is that they do not go to the root-cause of moral evil and, therefore, can neither explain the real nature of moral evil, nor suggest a way of getting over it. All these efforts, which are called Theodicy, are, by their very nature, bound to fail. One of the main reasons for this is that, as said above, they consider evil only in relation to God's goodness, and not in its own right. This diverts their attention from evil to God, thus making the analysis especially of moral evil superficial. I know that there is a view which places the responsibility of moral evil on man, not on God, as the others do. But in so far as this view gives the credit of moral (or any other) 'good' to God and not to man, it is inconsistent, because the credit and discredit of the good and the evil respectively should go to the same agency, whether God or man.

The whole problem of moral evil or sin needs a more careful study. The view that man is sinner by nature and that he can do no better

than confess it and repeat over it, does not lead us any-where. It is true that there are in man bad tendencies, selfish interests and various other expressions of a baser mind. But it is also true that the same man also contains nobler emotions like love, sympathy, kindness etc. plus many other good tendencies in his bosom. As Butler says, the human nature is constituted of all the four factors viz. particular passions or impulses, self-interest, benevolence and conscience. This way then, we can not go any further. The basic question is, what is it that prompts man to transgress the Law either of man or of God? It is not true to say that man is by nature a law-breaker. Had it been so, the 'law' itself would not have seen the light of the day. The fact is that man has and wants 'law', but at the same time he can and does break it when he is so prompted.

To my mind, the cognitive, affective and conative workings of a man's mind are all directed, consciously or unconsciously, towards the attainment of good, primarily of himself. Whatever a man thinks, feels or does, is always ultimately in the interest, immediate, remote or ultimate, of his own good self. It is in their own interests that people come together to frame moral codes or laws in the name of 'social good',

'justice' and so on. There is nothing inherently wrong or bad in this. In fact, the whole of morality is concerned with inter-personal behaviours of people in a society; i.e. its content is social in nature. The transgression of this law for any reason whatsoever, constitutes the moral evil. Now when we try to analyse the motive behind the transgression itself, we realize that it is the same thought of self-good which prompts it as it prompts the creation of moral system itself. The system we do want to exist because we know that it is in the interest of us all. But at times it appeals to an individual that it is in his interest more to break it than to follow. These are the moments when individuals are tempted to transgress the 'law' or in other words commit sin or moral evil. In other words, the origin of both morality and moral evil is the same in the last analysis, viz. the idea of one's own good. The thought that it pays to go by the way which we call morally evil, will always be found to be lurking at the back of a vicious person's mind. Nobody will commit sin for nothing.

Now, the question is, 'Is this thought of the person committing moral evil or sin, true?' or in other words, 'Can breaking of the moral law i.e. the way of vice, really serve any body's

interest or do any body good, or really pay?" The answer is 'no'. On the contrary we have to pay for it, and sometimes very heavily. Then, how is it that the sinner comes to think of the way of sin to be 'good' for himself is the next question. The answer, however, is not quite simple. The thought may be ascribed either, to 'human weakness' which in turn may be ascribed to God, or to a 'defective notion of one's own good (in fact of 'human good') i.e. to the ignorance of the real 'good'. In any case, the source of moral evil is complex and has to do with the attitude of the individual towards the world outside and himself within.

As I said, it is the ignorance of our 'real good' and a lack of courage to pursue it when known, which is at the back of moral evil. So far as moral law is concerned, how can it come in the way of anybody's interests when actually it is meant to serve them? It is only when we try to pursue our ends at the cost of others' good that we have to break it. Why do we try to do so either? Because we think it possible and desirable while, in fact, it is not so. At the basis of all this is the supposed antagonism between 'I' and 'thou', 'mine' and 'yours' or in other words, between 'self' and 'not-self'. The latter terminology leads us to the heart of the

problem. Before discussing it any further let us first try to define the 'real good' of man. It is not much difficult to find it out, but it certainly requires great strength of mind to follow the path leading to it. 'The good' is what we commonly call 'happiness', its crude name being 'pleasure'. Everybody, we know, wants happiness. But even before this notion of happiness, comes physical and mental well-being. To put it negatively, the 'good' means, to the minimum, absence of suffering. This well corresponds with the Sāṃkhya or the Bauddha inquiry or, for that matter, with the general outlook of Indian Philosophy itself. But it is better to accept the positive notion of happiness or Ānanda than the negative one of absence of suffering – which is already included in it.

Man suffers from, and for want of, many things. Again, as to the nature of happiness and its means there are a variety of views. Each seeks happiness of his conception in his own way. Moreover, there are certain basic common needs like food–shelter,–clothes and so on, to be satisfied. Then come more complex needs. Psychology tells us in detail about these things under the heading of motivation. Thus, so long as we live on the physical and mental plane of existence, we have needs, desires, vāsanās and all

that. There is also conflict of needs and desires of the same man as also of different people; in other words, there are conditions in which moral evil arises. By living on the plane of physical and mental existence, I mean identifying ourselves with our bodies and our minds moving them. 'I' means body-mind complex and consequently 'my' happiness or suffering means that of this complex which is essentially distinct and separate from others. Hence, the antagonism is between 'I' and 'thou' or better 'self' and 'not-self' as mentioned earlier. Thus the basic features of living on this plane are two, viz. constant pressure of needs and desires, and constant confrontation of self with not-self. Both of these are the original source of suffering to avoid which our every effort is directed. Even moral sin arises only to get rid of this misery or suffering though in that attempt individuals inflict suffering on others, thus giving rise to the problem of moral evil. The fact is that we all want to ourselves, absolute, permanent happiness - *Ānanda* - without the possibility of pain or suffering; but actually we seek or rest satisfied with happiness which is by its very nature relative, temporary and fraught with pain. It is because we live always on the physical and mental planes of existence identifying ourselves with our bodies and minds. The term ignorance

assumes profound significance here. We are ignorant of our real 'good' means we are ignorant of our 'real self', of the plane of existence which is beyond what we call good and evil. Hence the supreme injunction – 'Know thyself'.

Coming, now, to the way of over-coming moral evil, in fact, evil as such, we have to bear in mind the distinction between these two planes of existence viz. phenomenal and transcendental or vyāvahārika and pāramārthika. On the former level we cannot completely conquer moral or any other evil. Our effort, there, can only be to minimise it as far as possible. This can be done firstly, by providing for the satisfaction of the basic needs of all and, secondly, by properly educating the people into cultured beings. The object is not to give any occasion for the moral evil to arise and further, to keep it under control or check by developing morality into a force through good education or saṁskāras.

If, however, we want to overcome moral evil completely, then we must follow the way which leads to the complete cessation of misery or suffering. This can be done only by going beyond the phenomenal plane and living in the transcendental one. We saw that the features of the former are ever increasing needs and desires

on the one hand and opposition of self and non-self on the other. These, in turn are due to identification of 'self' with body-mind complex. In order to go beyond this, therefore, one must give a fight on three fronts, mustering all the strength and courage of spirit against body-mind, viz. (a) one must reduce the needs and desires to the minimum, in fact, to zero almost, (b) one must enlarge the conception of 'self' so much as to include almost the whole of 'not-self' within it so that duality of self and not-self comes to naught; and (c) one must realize oneself to be different from body-mind complex, to be the still ocean of peaceful consciousness of which body, mind, intellect ego etc. are but ripples. All the mārgas or ways prescribed by Indian Thought and Religion, such as - Jñāna (knowledge), Bhakti (Devotion), Yoga, Niṣkāma Karma and so on, are meant to achieve the state in which all the above three conditions are fulfilled and thereby bliss supreme attained. This very state of existence is variously called as Mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, Swarupe Avasthānam, Brāhmī Sthiti and so on. It is in this state alone that man is completely immune to moral evil or any kind of evil, for that matter, in the form of suffering. To realize it - call it self-realization or God-realization or whatever else you like - is the supreme goal of human life since it alone is the

'highest good' of man which may be called simply 'Sānti'.

I have given only an outline of the way of getting over moral evil in particular and also evil in general. A detailed discussion of how this way is the only path leading to Ānanda beyond good and evil will be very much in order and even necessary. But it is not possible to undertake it here for want of space. I would only say that we live on the phenomenal plane which is, essentially, relative and evil is the necessary outcome of it. Unless, therefore, we transcend it, there is no possibility of getting over evil completely. Incidentally, this brings out clearly the importance and great significance of the Indian approach to life and Philosophy.

There remains to be discussed now, the last point regarding evil and God, which forms the corner stone of the problem of evil, at least in the western thought. So far as moral evil is concerned, I think that we cannot blame God for its existence since it is we, along with our free wills, who are responsible for it. No doubt, it is essentially a product of finitude—'the human condition'; but still, it is through the exercise of our free will that it comes into being. In truth, the notion of morality itself is a human creation.

If 'evil' is a value-word then it also is of human origin along with 'moral'. It is true that what we call 'evil' or 'moral evil', does exist; but we must remember that it is we who call it 'evil' or 'moral evil'. Thus, it is man who is responsible for the judgement of 'evil' and it is the finitude, ignorance, weakness of man, which I have called 'the human condition', which gives rise to 'moral evil'. We can, of course, hold God responsible for human finitude and weakness. He should have made us in his own image - all good and none evil! But there also, He has given us 'free will' and a capacity to transcend evil of our making by the way outlined above. Moreover, who are we to tell God to do one bidding? On the contrary, we must thank Him for creating us at all though as finite beings. Leaving aside this polemic, let us reaffirm the truth that 'evil' is not an entity created by God, but a description of human experience of suffering resulting from the finite mode of man's reaction to the external world including other human beings. It is possible to change this mode of reaction in such a way that it results not in suffering but in bliss, as described above. Instead of blaming God, therefore, and creating the 'problem of evil' we must blame ourselves for not caring to follow this path of bliss. The fact is that to solve the

problem of evil is really to dissolve it. And this can be done only by abiding for ever in the 'self' which is 'Peace Abounding'. Hence the prayer—

s'āntiḥ ! .. s'āntiḥ !! .. s'āntiḥ !!!



Some Reflection on the Problem of Evil

Prof. B. R. Kulkarni

Evil is not considered as a part of moral science by some thinkers. There are writers whose treatises on morals do not deal with the problem of Evil. It is considered to be a theological problem. But moralists like Taylor are emphatic that sin is distinctively a moral problem and hence evil should form part of moral treatises. Of course, a thorough examination of the problem necessarily involves theological and metaphysical considerations.

Various explanations of the problem of evil have been offered. Socrates held that the choice of wrong is due to ignorance. If so, the question arises, how is ignorance or mistake possible? The Platonic Socrates grapples with the problem in the dialogue *Thaetetus*. To say that choice of evil is due to mistake only throws the difficulty back one stage. The evolutionist's explanation is that our understandings are not completely developed, but are in the process of making. This is the cause of error. But this explanation is unsatisfactory because morality is

not a matter of development from the animal world, it is essentially a human consideration. It is only human beings who feel that guilt is indelible and very little of it is wiped out completely. Man reproaches himself if he sincerely thinks that he has done wrong. We demand punishment as a retribution for the wrongs committed; but the feeling remains that the stain is still there; what has been done cannot be undone though the wrong act may not be repeated in future. This is of course true in the case of highly developed sense of morality.

St. Augustine held that evil is a privation of good. Good alone is substantial while evil is its corruption. Evil has to exist in some entity. Evil is a negative concept. It is a deficiency. Even the case of man's fall or original sin is explained by Augustine by his doctrine of deficient causation, i.e., there is no efficient or positive cause of evil willing, rather evil willing is itself a deficiency. To find out a cause for it is trying to hear silence.

Schleiermacher who described sin as a failure to maintain a clear distinction between that on which men are entirely dependent i.e. God and that on which men are relatively dependent i.e. objects in the world. The feeling of comp-

lete dependence should be in relation to God and not the world. Not to realise this is evil or sin. Discrimination is thus important. This is exactly what S'ankara means by prescribing Nityānitya vastu-viveka i.e. discrimination between the eternal and the transitory and says that failure to do this leads to Adhyāsa.

The absolutists also negate evil i.e. give it only a relative existence. Evil, for them is an appearance, the ultimate reality being beyond good and evil.

The realists on the other hand emphasize that evil is a stark reality and that suffering is a fact of experience. It does not disappear only by calling it an appearance. Philosophers like James, however, hope that ultimately God will triumph over evil.

The existence of evil requires no arguments. The day-to-day experience vouchsafes for it. Pessimists and optimists put forward arguments to prove the predominance of evil over good and vice versa respectively. We may give a passing reference to the pessimistic argument put forward by Schopenhauer and see how they are met.

The apriori argument given by Schopenhauer runs as follows: the present alone is actual.

The past experience is dead, future experience is not yet born. This is the 'no-longer' and 'not yet' of James. Schopenhauer further says that we are always dissatisfied with the present and hanker after future which in turn becomes a new present and again dissatisfies us so that we again look to the next future. This goes on—the futures becoming presents, but having no capacity to satisfy our will; so change is unceasing because no given present gives contentment to the will. Change is thus associated with dissatisfaction.

But this argument is met by saying that the past cannot be dead absolutely. Though it has slipped from our hands so that the fulness of its experience is no longer there, it is not dead for God who may possess it fully. Even a memory of our good act gives present satisfaction. Though the present is changed for future, it is not destroyed but preserved in God. We find our joy in contributing to divine richness. The present therefore need not be entirely evil.

The empirical argument which Schopenhauer has given points to the fact that life is full of sorrow, we have too many burdens to bear or we become burdens to ourselves. Therefore the goal of life is to fly away from misery.

But it is retorted: though there is a tendency to go away from pain, the goal is not merely negative. Mere cessation of pain cannot be the end; otherwise death would be ideal for it puts an end to all pain. Again life cannot be said to be merely sorrow; there are pleasant moments even in the life of slaves who are supposed to be unhappy.

In spite of the arguments and counter arguments, it remains a truism to say that they are far from conclusive. There is an inevitable note of subjectivity in the goods and evils of every day life. As the poet puts it: nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so.

There are very few things which will be considered good by every person in the universe. It would be extremely difficult to define good life. Volumes have been written on whether happiness or reason is a moral ideal. Even if we accept good life to be developed life, there is the conflict between active life and contemplative life as we find in Plato and Aristotle.

If we look to Plato's idea of the ideal or the most happy, most wise and most just man—the philosopher-king – we find that even this man – as a man – is a mixture of appetite, spirited element and reason though reason may outweigh

the other two. The philosopher-King who in Plato's Republic is without family and without property and who lives only on the salary which is paid to him in kind by the workers is supposed to be the most happy man. But E. Barker asks whether by keeping the appetite and the spirited element dissatisfied—and he has to do it as he has no family and private property—he is not doing injustice to those elements. Thus justice is to be based on a bit of injustice. The spirited element and appetite which are kept in abeyance try to dominate, and as they do so, there arises first the oligarchic man and then the democratic man—the very butt of ridicule. He is a man without definite ends or rather as many ends as his desires or idiosyncracies. The point is that Plato's idea of justice does not do justice to spirited element and appetite for in subordinating them to reason, they are suppressed, they as if foment jealousy in themselves and they ultimately burst out. So the ideal of justice is not so practicable, otherwise seeds of degeneration would not have loomed large in its very conception. After all intellect is not the whole man and the totalitarian rule by intellect will not be everlasting.

Similarly very few things will be pointed out as absolutely evil. If the theory of Karma is

accepted, even the tearing away to pieces of an innocent deer by a cruel tiger may not be called absolutely evil. The theory of Karma implies the idea of retribution, and we have to reap what we sow - whether good or evil - either in this life or in the life to come. To bear fruit is in the nature of Karma and it will take its own course. So in the killing of a deer by a tiger whether the deer is paying for its past sins, or the tiger is sowing seeds of future suffering is unknown; it is just one moment in the cycle of Karmas.

If this act of killing of a deer by a tiger is arranged by Providence, to strike a balance between the previous Karmas and their rewards in the case of the deer or tiger or both, ever remains unknown. Hence from our limited point of view, we cannot pronounce an act evil or talk of superfluous evils only because they happen to touch us to the quick.

It is again pointed out that some evil is necessary so that moral qualities will be evoked. Unless there is pain and suffering, courage and sacrifice to relieve them have no meaning. Some little deficiency or pain seems to be a precondition for the exercise of virtues. It happens, however, that the moral qualities remain un-

rewarded for some time; and the consolation offered is that they will be rewarded in an after life. But it may be objected: Why assume a first order evil in the form of pain in order to evoke a second order moral quality like courage and then evoke eschatology for equating virtue and happiness! In this latter there will be no evil; and no necessity of evoking moral qualities. Why not begin with such a state? Why go through all serpentine wanderings of evil, moral qualities and the rewarding eschatology only to land in an evilless world? Is not the assumption of the necessity of evil in the beginning superfluous?

The superfluity of necessity of evil will have to be determined not by a finite observer but by an Infinite creator. A serpent's poison is evil: but it has wonderful medicinal qualities; and if we want to eliminate serpents, with every poison an invaluable medicine will be lost. In the infinite scheme of the universe, they have their own place – the deadly poisonous serpents, the cruel hunting hawks, the ugly creatures and many of the loathsome marine animals. But they have come into existence by the law of sufficient reason and the sufficient reason will have to be determined not by us but by Him.

In the orderly scheme of God's creation, we may seem to find delusions and illusions, diseases and injustices, but His dispositions are justified by net results. Nature may seem to squander her material, may seem to work by trial and error method, but in the economy of creation the occasional lapses and exceptions and unsuccessful trials may lead to ultimate perfection. As Boyce Gibson says while commenting on Descartes the bitter and continuous struggle and sacrifice may draw us profusively nearer to the fuller unity. In a similar spirit, Leibnitz eulogises this world as the best possible world. There were infinite possibilities which would have been turned into actualities, but the best possible world is discerned by God's wisdom, chosen by His goodness and effected by His power.

From the point of view of timeless eternal reality the whole is good. The variegated creation including evil is a display of God's power and richness. Every piece of creation, different and unique, adds to the glory of the Maker. It shows his infinite capacity, a potentiality of multiple creativity which Lovejoy calls the principle of Plenitude. The richer the creation, the more adequately does it express his perfection.

We can imagine two universes: in the one there is happiness distributed at random, and in the second the same amount of happiness is distributed according to deserts. Now as McTaggart remarks, the total value in both the universes is the same, though the value of the second universe is greater than the first. In a similar vein we can think of two universes of comparable value. In the one case, we eliminate a particular evil, say serpents, and do not mind forgoing the medicinal value lost with it. In the second, both the evil poison and its valuable medicines are there. Here we may suppose that the good and bad cancel each other; the negative value of poison and the positive value of the medicine make it comparable to the first universe. The evil decreases its value, but it is compensated by the potentiality of the poison as a medicine. Which of the two universes is preferable then? I have used the word comparable and not equal, because we do not know whether the evil of the poison outweighs the good potentialities of the medicine or it is vice versa. The only question worth consideration is whether we are satisfied with the universe without evil, having had a fright of evil, or whether we are prepared to fight the evil and hope to develop its infinite potentialities to our advantage. A critic of Schopenhauer has pointed out that the

tragic is not absent from the divine happiness. Elimination of evil would not enhance but reduce the total value of the universe. This is the implication of Whitehead's insistence that pain is a half way house between full harmony and utter indifference. Both for us and for God our sorrows are better than mere difference.

Royce contends that evil is necessary for the experience of good. Man wants not only the victory but the play with all its risks. He loves victory but would not accept it if it is certain in advance. He shuns defeat but welcomes its lurking possibility while playing; he does not want defeat to be eliminated just at the beginning. This is true of all pleasures. There cannot be an absolute elimination of all evil. Tension is essential for real enjoyment of good. Herakleitos has said that everywhere we find tension between opposite forces. If life is like that it is no use trying to do away with evil.

Let evil remain a problem. To say that you have found out a solution to the problem of evil either by saying that it is real or not real, is crystallizing it into a positive or a negative dogma. Let it remain a live issue. Let not the juice be drained away from it so that it is nothing but skin and bone. Rather than being a

static and crystallized dogma, evil should remain a tantalising problem.

The moral and spiritual implication of evil should not be lost sight of. It is one of the powerful and effective incentives to spiritual life. Consciousness of old age, disease, the inevitable death and the imbalance many a time between our desert and the reward turn us toward a life in God. If evil is not there who will remember God? That is why Kunti prayed विपदः सन्तु नः शश्वत् यासु संस्मर्यते हरिः ॥

Let the sorrows and sufferings fall to our lot so that we remember God.

How imperfection points to perfection is reflected in the ageold prayer:

असतो मा सद्गमय
तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय
मृत्योर्मा अमृतं गमय ॥



The Problem of Evil

P. M. Datye

Before the creation of the universe there was the unique, supreme, almighty, Reality, the spirit, the existent in its original pure form. After dissolution the same principle will remain. The multiplicity which has arisen is alone manifest—neither the original nor its finale which are equally unmanifest. The different things that we feel are relative phases of Unique Reality divided by three-fold phenomena, namely Knower, Known and Knowledge. Now we shall directly consider the subject. What we think as 'Evil' is nothing but the manifestation of the Reality. Christ has said, 'Resist not evil'. So did Swami Vivekanand say, 'Vedanta recognises no sin'. The question now arises what is meant by the word evil? This cannot be defined directly so as to point out a specific thing. Generally we consider misery as a fruit of our evil deed. This cannot be an adequate defi-

Apparent bad things done for good through a certain view will not be labelled as sin; the cause of evil, the intention or the aim of the action is to be taken into consideration. On the contrary we see some personalities like saints who were found to have suffered much physical misery. So evil as such cannot be defined definitely. But a general definition we can put forth: evil is that which is against the natural universal flow towards the ultimate destiny, namely eternal happiness or against the help of eternal Reality. Automatically the origin of evil can be understood as origin of barrier to Real knowledge and eternal happiness, i.e. ignorance and misery respectively. Whatever things which are the cause of ignorance and misery constitute evil.

Bhagwan Shri Ramakrishna said that Ego is evil as it keeps the man or being aloof from uniting with the ultimate Reality. A so-called evil thing is temporary, and exists relatively in relation to a particular phase of life. Even good things or actions are temporarily good, i.e., good with respect to a particular situation of life.

What we say evil will be of much help to a man on the path of Realization. Worldly happiness is transitory and increases crave for more

happiness. But the evil induces sharp and acute misery which will induce renunciation which is one of the requisite virtues for Realization. Thus evil is a teacher to a man.

So theoretically and practically considering the matter, evil is no Evil for a devout aspirant, while there is evil for ordinary people who try to get rid of the condition by means of secular sciences. This thing we are not to explain here. We are to deal with spiritual aspect of the subject :

For aspirants there is no evil. But a mere statement like this cannot get rid of the thing. We have to see what factors are responsible for eradicating evil from our life. To eliminate evil from our life, we must know the meaning of life in the beginning. What is life? There are so many definitions according to various sciences.

For our purpose the following definition is sufficient. Life is a reflex action of environmental stimulus against internal strata i.e. precultivated fund of Knowledge as reflecting surface. Thousands of kings and doctors have seen innumerable oldmen, diseased men and corpses. But very few of them are heard to have become realizers of the reality. But Gautam who witnessed one old man and a diseased man and

corpse was turned into Buddha or the enlightened one. Knowledge is dependent on our internal strata which should be purified so as to reflect real knowledge from within

Fear of evil will vanish when duality between man and evilness of a thing will vanish. It will vanish after the knowledge of oneness of the Reality and ourselves. To know means to be, or to become. We see cow and our mind takes the form of cow and the experience is kept in internal strata for recollection. A name as a literary symbol is associated with a form. At the time of recollection even that arbitrary name is sufficient to signify the object.

Our lives are more coarse or secular rather than spiritual. The saint's life is spiritual; so the saint alone knows the real nature of the objects in the world. They have become Brahman, and when they know objects of the world, they know them as manifestation of Brahman. In a way they know them by becoming those objects.

To know reality means to become reality. How to become one with the reality? The original (Almighty Unique Real Spirit) was one and got itself divided for becoming happy. Thus there occurs limitation to its uniqueness. It is

our usual experience of amusing ourselves in the game of playing cards. Cards are kept in many rows, one below the other. And the player restricts himself by some rules for joining the cards. He has got full power to take any card irrespective of rows and to join them in order. There is nobody to keep a watch on him. But the player does not do so. Disobeying the limits laid by himself, if he joins the cards dishonestly, he will be happy. In case of impossibilities he will rearrange the cards and play again honestly. After much effort within the restrictions, if he is successful he is so much happy. Exactly the same is the case with the supreme Reality which manifests itself in infinite creation and presents itself to outer forces created by itself in the form of universe. He is the oppressor; he is the sufferer; he is the ruler; he is the ruled; he is the cow, he is the butcher; he is misery, and he is the miserable and so on. In this way evil and the victim of evil are one and the same thing in the scheme of Reality. Thus we will console ourselves that evil is not a foreign thing for us to deal with. This kind of knowledge of unique Reality is alone able to eliminate the evil from our life. This we can do by means of intense love and faith. Due to the fact that the spiritual element is hidden, not manifest we the finite creatures are under a sort of a hypnotic spell.

We should get out of this spell by surrendering completely to God so that we transcend our finite nature.

This is quite accurately noted in a famous verse .

सर्वेऽपि सुखिनः सन्तु । सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः ।

सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु । मा कश्चित् दुःखमाप्नुयात् ॥

All should see good things: to see good everywhere one must be good oneself.



What is Evil?

Prin. V. W. Karambelkar

The essential feature of ethical teaching is the overcoming of evil. There is no use of any moral education for a person who has no evil impulse. But what is evil? The Upanishads answer this question:

“अशनाया हि मृत्युः” (ऋ० उ. I. II. 1) “उभे तीर्त्वाऽशनायापिपासे (क० उ०-I. 12)” “ता एता देवताः सृष्टा अस्मिन्महत्यर्णवे प्रापतंस्त-मशना पिपासाभ्यायन्ववार्जत् ।” (ऐ० उ०-II 1)

Hunger is death. Hunger is not usually evil but hunger in the sense of desire is evil. Here hunger is identified with desire because it has two characteristics common with natural cravings: All cravings demand immediate satisfaction, so does hunger. Similarly cravings and hunger are purely individual, unconnected with environment. Hence the Upanishads have identified hunger with death i.e. evil. Hunger or evil can then be defined on the tendency to satisfy the present needs without any thought of conse-

quences and without any connection with environment. The Upaniṣads have therefore aptly used the word अशनाया (craving) which is evil and consequently death. Therefrom we discover the need for moral teaching in two stages, though not clearly distinguished in the Upaniṣads— (1) in the case of satisfying the present needs thoughtlessly and (2) in the case of obligatory deeds which are connected with the environment. The Upaniṣads are found invariably mentioning two types of Karmas whenever there is an occasion to do so viz. the काम्य and नित्य wherein the emphasis is graded upward with a view to moral teaching.

2. The Five Koṣas

The तैत्ति० उ० has a description of the five Koṣas or “Sheaths” which in simple language turns out to be a statement of five different phases of man’s being (ब्रह्मवल्लि) अन्नमयकोश physical state, प्राणमयकोश subconscious state, मनोमयकोश conscious state, विज्ञानमयकोश self conscious state and आनन्दमयकोश blissful state. Of these five, only two states— मनोमय and विज्ञानमय the 3rd and the 4th are directly concerned with moral behaviour of man. Now the Upaniṣad describes them as

3. तस्माद्वा एतस्मात्प्राणमयात् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः ।
 (तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं

पुरुषविधः)-तस्य यजुरेव शिरः ऋग्दक्षिणः पक्षः । सामोत्तरः पक्षः । आदेश
आत्मा । अथर्वाङ्गिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ।

विज्ञानमय. तस्य श्रद्धैव गिरः । ऋतं दक्षिणः पदः सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः । योग
आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ।

The मनोमयकोश is expressed in terms of Vedic Sanhitas and Brāhmaṇs which are our traditional moral codes. The विज्ञानमयकोश is described in terms of truth, righteousness which are unmistakably associated with the moral conduct. Those two are successive stages in moral training. संहिताs and ब्राह्मणs are external means of instructing moral teachings. They enjoin us to practise virtue and avoid vice. The next stage is internal तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः, ऋतं दक्षिणः पक्षः, सत्यमुत्तरः। योग आत्मा, महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । faith is head, purity of thought is the right side, purity of deed, the left side, application the trunk and the Great Universal mind the tail that supports.

The moral life is complete here. First one learns through external commands and then practises internally. The practice of virtue is through ऋत i.e. purity of thought and purity of deed i.e. सत्य both through श्रद्धा i. e. intrinsic faith. Of the remaining कोशs the first two have no concern with moral behaviour and in the last आनन्दमयकोश the moral behaviour ceases altogether

For that is the culmination of ethical teaching. Thus Upaniṣads lay down the rule that life has a larger scope, the moral part of it is narrow and even that tends to disappear when the highest principle is realised.

5. The process of overcoming evil

The काम्यकर्म's foster selfishness. Still a person performing काम्यकर्म's is definitely superior to those who lead mere animal life, for he exerts, with an understanding of the means to fulfil immediate needs. Then again though he pursues his selfish ends, he is not unaware of the environment. The काम्यकर्म's are performed with selfish thought yet they are beneficial to the society also. In them there is not contradiction between individual interest and well being of society. The two may not be co-extensive but they are not opposed to each other. The only point worth considering is that in काम्यकर्म's reference to society is implicit. But in the next stage of नित्यकर्म's the reference to society is explicit; नित्यकर्म's are the duties ordained for वर्ण's and आश्रम's. They are meant to afford moral training to reconcile the claims of the individual and the society consciously. Individual desires are adjusted with those of the society. Moral training is required to overcome the conflict that may arise there. Hence there is more emphasis on नित्यकर्म's. Thus in both

types of duties individual and society are benefitted and neither is neglected.

But the Upaniṣads hold that no perfection can be reached only by doing voluntary and obligatory duties for according to them no action is intelligible without some reference to the self. In the मैत्रेयी ब्राह्मण it is expressly stated – आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति । (वृ० उ० II-4-5) “Nothing is loved for its own sake, but only for the sake of one’s own self”. This only means that absolute unselfishness is not possible as long as the conception of the self is not enlarged to comprehend all. Hence याज्ञवल्क्य tells मैत्रेयी “ सर्वं वा इदं ब्रह्मदं क्षत्रमिमे लोका इमे देवा इमानि भूतानि इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ”। (II. 4.6)

6 Vairāgya

When a man finds that, in spite of all his moral training in the first stage of मनोमयकोश through scriptures and in the second stage of faith etc., there still persists the tinge of selfishness, he gets dejected. The deficiency in his moral behaviour causes deep dissatisfaction in him. He therefore tries to rise above the individual and the social stages. The Upaniṣadic sages had reached this super-social stage which is known as “Vairāgya” and the entire Upaniṣadic literature is meant for those who have attain-

ed the stage beyond moral teaching. The preliminary teaching of the moral conduct is found in the Dharma-Shastra literature. The तैत्ति० उ० has only summarized it in its passage dealing with मनोमयकोश and the विज्ञानमयकोश quoted earlier. The पुरुषविधवाह्यण of the बृ० उ० has also indicated the path of Varnāśrama Dharmas.

But the Upaniṣads state very clearly that until one gets beyond relative morality and reaches the level of आनन्दमयकोश there will be no cessation of moral strife. The individual needs fulfilled by काम्यकर्म's and social needs fulfilled by नित्यकर्म's must be coordinated and then transcended in such a way that both the individual and the society are harmoniously related as two aspects of a single whole. The कठ उप० says : मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इहानेव पश्यति । He who perceives variety here passes from death to death. Such a harmonious relation brings the realization that an individual is not different from society and that society is made up of such many individuals यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति । सर्वं भूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते ॥ ईश उपनिषद् ६. The ultimate happiness experienced in the आनन्दमयकोश is in the form of common good.

7. Enquiry into Happiness

When the stage of आनन्दमयकोश is reached what

happens "युवा स्या साधु युवाऽध्यापकः । अशिष्ठो दृढिष्ठो बलिष्ठः । तस्येयं पृथ्वी सर्वा वित्तस्य पूर्णा स्यात् । स एको मानुष आनन्दः...।

स एकः । स य एवं वित् । अस्माल्लोकात्प्रेत्य । एतमन्नमयात्मानमुपसंक्रामति । स तं प्राणमयात्मानमुपसंक्रामति । स तं मनोमयात्मानमुपसंक्रामति । स तं विज्ञानमयात्मानमुपसंक्रामति । स तं मानन्दमयात्मानमुपसंक्रामति । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ।

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कुतश्चन ॥

All distinction between pleasures disappears. Moral perfectness is experienced; all desires are fulfilled; true freedom is attained. The Upaniṣadic seers have described peace and tranquility of this condition which is super-moral. In this condition evil, as defined before with its roots in narrow selfish desires is completely overcome. The distinction between duties and rights is cancelled though duties remain duties to be performed till the end of life. (ईश ३०-२). The moral qualities remain merely as ornaments and not as means to an end.



The Problem of Vaiṣamyā and Nairghṛṇyā in the Brahma-Sūtras.

Dr. B. R. Modak, M.A., Ph.D.

The problem of evil has been haunting the minds of thinkers since time immemorial. They have tried to unravel the mystery of the Universe through reflection and meditation. They asked the questions such as “What is man?”, “What is the goal of life?”, “What is happiness and suffering?”, “Why does a man suffer?” etc. They have given the replies in accordance with their attitude towards life and the school of thought they subscribe to.

In the Veda we have god Varuṇa, the upholder of *Rta* which is the Cosmic Law, with its two aspects the natural law and the moral law. He favours the good men who follow the law, punishes the wicked persons who transgress the law and thus sustains the cosmic order. In the Upaniṣads we read the Paramātman, concealed in the heart of every being, a witness to all our

activity and a dispenser of happiness or suffering according to our good or bad actions respectively. The Upaniṣadic thoughts regarding evil are crystallised in the *Brahma-sūtras* II. 1 34-36 :

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथा हि दर्शयति ।

न कर्माविभागादिति चेत् न अनादित्वात् ।

उपपद्यते च अपि अलभ्यते च ।

Śaṅkarācārya, (8th century) while commenting on these sūtras, puts forth the *prima facie* view in the following manner: If God is the creator of this universe, he should be held responsible for the inequality and suffering that we find in life. The divinities are said to be quite happy, the animals suffer much, whereas human beings are somewhat happy. That means God loves some beings and hates others. The suffering of the beings and their destruction shows that God is quite cruel.

Śaṅkara replies : “ This is incorrect, because God acts with reference to *karma* of every individual. If he were to act without taking this into consideration, he could be thought of as being partial or cruel. God should be looked upon as the rain (ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवत् द्रष्टव्यः). The rain is the common cause for the growth of rice, wheat etc. As regards the distinction between the crops,

that is caused by the innate potentiality of the seeds themselves. Similarly God is the common cause for the creation of the various beings. As regards the differentiation among them the specific *karmas* of those beings are the cause. The same is supported by Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (3.2.13) which states that a man becomes meritorious by his good action and sinful by his bad action. (पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन ।) and also by the Gītā (4.11): Howsoever men approach me, so do I respond to them (ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।)

The Pūrva-pakṣin then asks : Prior to creation there was no *karma*, so how can it lead to any differentiation ? The reply is that the *samsāra* is *anādi* (beginningless). Like the seed and the sprout the cycle of life and action goes on. This is corroborated by the R̥gveda (X.190.3) सूर्यचिन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वम् अकल्पयत् “The creator planned the Sun and the Moon before,” by the Chāndogya (6.3.2) अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य “Having entered with the self in the form of this Jīva” and the Gītā (15.3) न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिर्नच संप्रतिष्ठा । “Its form is not here understood, not its end, nor its beginning, nor yet its support.”

Govindānanda in his Śāṅkarabhāṣya-Vyākhyā called Ratnaprabhā supports the above argument

by quoting from the Śvetāśvatara Upa (6·19) निरवग्नं निरग्नम् “blameless free from defect” and the Gītā (9·29) न मे द्वेष्योऽस्ति न प्रियः “None is hateful to me or dear.” Then he says; “If धर्म and अधर्म are the cause of the variety in life, what is the necessity of God at all? He points out that the common cause is essential in addition to special cause. Just as even in the case of a seed with all its potentialities for becoming a tree, there is also the positive need of rain which can by no means be ignored; so also the necessity for a god-head is not annulled by the presence of *karma*.

Similarly Vācaspati in his *Vyākhyā* called Bhāmati points out that God is like the speaker in the assembly. He restrains a person who is speaking irrelevantly and allows a person to speak when his words are to the point. That does not mean that he is partial to one of them. Similarly God would be partial if he favours the man of wicked actions and punishes the man of good actions. But such is not the case with God. He is just.

Ānandagiri in his *Vyākhyā* called Nyāyā-nirṇaya points out the impartiality of God by quoting from the Gītā (7·11) बलं बलवतां चाहं कामराग-विवर्जितम् “I am in the powerful men the strength which is free from desire and attachment.” He

further points out that a king cannot be called dependent if he rewards his servants according to the services rendered by them.

Rāmānujācāry (12th century) points out that God is distinct from all the other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent and though, He is one and indivisible before creation, He is capable of creating this manifold world due to His great power which is beyond imagination. But this would mean that He is partial as he creates beings of different order, namely the divinities, human beings and animals. Moreover he would be cruel as he causes so much pain to the beings. Rāmānuja points out that such need not be the case as the inequality of creation depends upon the *karma* of the particular individual (*Kṣetrajña*). He quotes from the Bṛhadā. Upa. (4·4·5) साधुकारी स धुर्भवति पापकारी पापो भवति । “ One becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds.” He quotes also from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I·4·51–52)

निमित्तमात्रमेवासौ सृज्यानां सर्गकर्मणि ।
 प्रधानकारणीभूता यतो वै सृज्यशक्तयः ।
 निमित्तमात्रं मुक्त्वैव नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ।
 नीयते तपतां श्रेष्ठ स्वशक्त्या वस्तु वस्तुताम् ।

“ God is only the operative cause in the creation of new beings; the material cause is

constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which it is to occupy in the new creation).”

But prior to the creation, the beings did not exist at all, as can be seen from सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । “*Sat* alone was there in the beginning.” So there can be no *karma*; then how can we account for the inequality? The reply is—the individual souls and their deeds form on eternal stream. Previous to the creation the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, destitute of names and forms. This is supported by the Kaṭha Upa (1·2·18) न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् and also by the Bṛhadā. Upa (1·4·7) तद्धेदं तर्हि अव्याकृतमासीत् । तन्नमरूपाम्यां व्याक्रियत । “This was the unmanifest. It became manifest through name and form.” This is further corroborated by the Gītā (13·19) प्रकृतिं पुषंश्चैव विद्वयनादी उभावपि । “Know Prakṛti and Purusa both to be eternal”.

Sudarśansūri, the first commentator on the Rāmānuja-bhāṣya, states in his Śruta-Prakāśikā —“ God does not engage a person in merit or sin. If a man acts sinfully, He punishes him; but this does not mean that God is cruel. Kindness

is not always a virtue, and punishment not a defect.” (भगवतः पुण्यपापयोः प्रयोजनर्यितृत्वं नास्ति ।... दया चेत् गुणः, निग्रहः चेत् दोषः इति न नियमोऽस्ति ।)

Vedāntadeśika, the well-known expounder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita School, points out in his Tattavamuktākālāpa (III·1) that the creation of the world is sport for God, He is compassionate and even his anger springs out of love for our good :

व्याप्ताद्यव्याकुलाभिः श्रुतिभिरधिगतो विश्वनेता स विश्वं
 क्रोडाकारुण्यतन्त्रः सृजति समतया जीवकर्मानुरूपम् ।
 रोषोऽपि प्रीतये स्यात् सुनिरसविषयस्तस्य निस्सीमशक्तेः
 स्वेच्छायां सर्वसिद्धिं वदति भगवतोऽवाप्तकामत्ववादः ॥

Madhṛvācārya (13th Century) also states that God is not tainted by partiality and cruelty as he gives the results in accordance with our actions. He quotes the Praśna Upa. (3·7) पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयति, पापेन पापम् Jayatīrtha in his *Vyākhyā* on the Madhvabhāṣya states the Pūrva-pakṣa thus : Does God act in accordance with the actions of the beings or independently ? In the earlier case it would mean that God has no freedom (स्वातन्त्र्य) and how can he be all-doer if he has no freedom? In the second case there will be partiality and cruelty, as it would mean that God grants happiness etc. without any particular reason and

moreover this would come in the way of the Vedic injunctions such as ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत । then Jayatīrtha replies that God is all-doer (सर्व-कर्तृ) yet the defect of partiality and cruelty does not accrue to him, as he dispenses happiness and suffering according to the good or bad actions of a man. Further he points out to the अनादित्व of कर्मपरम्परा.

Nimbārka, (13th Century) a champion of the Dvaitādvaita school, has written on the Brahmasūtras a brief commentary known as Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha. Therein he says: The fault of partiality and cruelty due to the unequal creation as well as destruction do not accrue to the lord who is the author of the origin etc., of the world; as the creation by God is with reference to the *karma* of the beings, like rain which is the common cause for diverse crops. He adds that *karmas* done by the beings in the earlier creation have, again, their antecedents. An earlier creation is justified by the fact that a new creation cannot come into existence out of nothing. विषमसृष्टिसंहारादिनिमित्तवैषम्यनैर्घृष्ये जीवकर्मसापेक्षत्वात् पर्जन्यस्येव जगज्जन्मादिकर्तृर्न स्याताम् ।... कर्मणां पूर्वसृष्टिस्थजीवकृतानामना देत्पात्तदानीमपि सत्त्वात् । पूर्वसृष्टिरपि अकस्मादुत्तरसृष्ट्यनुपपत्योपपद्यते च ।

Vallabhācārya. (15th Century) the pro-
 pounder of the Śuddhādvaita school, follows the
 the same line of argument in his Aṇubhāṣya. He
 states that defending God as the dispenser of
 happiness or suffering according to a being's
 good or bad deeds is only to satisfy the conten-
 der. In fact partiality and cruelty cannot be
 there at all because God is like the rain, *karma*
 is like the seed. जीवानां कर्मानुरोधेन सुखदुःखे प्रयच्छतीति ।
 वादिबोधनार्थैतदुक्तम् । वस्तुतस्त्वात्मसृष्टेः वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यसम्भावनैव नास्ति ।
 वृष्टिवत् भगवान् बीजवत् कर्म ।

It is implied in his commentary that when
 the deluge takes place, all the Jivas merge into
 the Brahman along with their *karma* in a minute
 form and when the new creation starts, they are
 born along with that *karma*. If this is not so,
 there will be the contingency of कृतहानि and अकृता-
 म्यागम i.e. the loss of what has been done and the
 accruing of what has not been done. He also
 supports the beginning-lessness of Samsāra by
 referring to the Śruti अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य “Having
 entered with the self in the form of this Jiva”.
 He also quotes from the Bhāgavata (III.9)
 तपसैव यथापूर्वं स्रष्टा विश्वमिदं भवान् । “Through penance
 you created this universe as before.”

∴ In श्रीकरभाष्य, a commentary on the Brahma-
 sūtras according to the Vīraśaiva school, Sripati

paṇḍitācārya (14th Century ?) tries to prove the impartiality of God, by quoting from the Upaniṣad—साधुकारी साधुर्भवति, पापकारी पापो भवति । He also refers to the verses of Vyāsa निमित्तमात्रमेवासी... (quoted above by Rāmāuja). He further points out that the प्रपञ्च is beginningless like the waves in a stream. He interpretes the words उपपद्यते and उपलभ्यते as उत्पद्यते सृष्टिकाले and प्रलयकाले सूक्ष्मरूपत्वं प्राप्नोति respectively. He adds that just as a kind father punishes his son who does not obey him, so does God.

It can be seen from the above that all the आचार्य's generally agree as regards the import of the Brahma-Sūtras and the corroborating quotations from the Upaniṣads they refer to. They unequivocally point out that God cannot be blamed for the inequality or for the evil in life. Suffering is due to our own *karma* and *karma* is अनादि. This may raise another side-issue. Does this mean that *karma* is अनादि like ब्रह्म ? If so the श्रुति ' एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ' will be violated. So we have to explain in the following manner :—Our happiness and suffering in this life are determined by our actions in the past life; the happiness etc. in that life depending upon our actions in the previous life and this would go on endlessly. It is beyond the power of our mind to know when a particular

individual soul started living. It is in this sense that *karma* is called अनादि.

The अनादित्व put forth may appear to bypass the main problem. But here we must admit the limitations of the human mind. If a question is asked whether there was the seed in the beginning or the tree, we have to say that this cycle is beginningless (at least we do not know its beginning); or we have to assume that there was a tree which needed no seed to grow, or there was a seed which was not produced from a tree. This latter position is not quite logical and the question of the first creation arises only out of logical exigency.

Or we may try to explain in Sāṅkhya terminology that when the evolution started due to the disturbance in equilibrium of the three *guṇas* of Prakṛti, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, it was but natural that some Puruṣas (Sāṅkhya believes in the multiplicity of Puruṣa) came in contact with that part of Prakṛti having a predominance of the Sattva quality, others a predominance of Rajas and the rest a predominance of Tamas. Accordingly their life and action were moulded. (cf. Gītā 13·21 :

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गृणान् ।

कारणं गुणसङ्गोऽस्य सदसद्योनिजन्मसु ।)

Here a question may arise : why was it that a particular Puruṣa came across the portion of Prakṛti having the predominance of a particular *guṇa*. But such questions are endless. (If it is replied that it was due to the previous *karma* of that Puruṣa, we are again lead to the *anāditva* of *Samsāra*.)

What is 'evil' from the stand-point of the Individual may be 'good' from the point of view of God. A mother refuses to give chocolates often to her child knowing well that it will spoil the child's health. This may be 'evil' from the view-point of the ignorant crying child but is 'good' from the point of view of the wise and careful mother. It is in this sense that everything is said to be good ultimately.

Moreover good and evil are subjective and relative terms. What is good for one may be evil for another. A disease is evil for the patient who suffers but may be good for the researcher who is interested in the iteology of the disease.

The Śruti एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषते, एष एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषते। (Kauṣ Brā 3·8) is quoted by some Ācāryas. The form कारयति which is, grammatically speaking, a causal form and निनीषते a desiderative form, may appear

to imply that God desires to raise a person and hence makes him do good work, he desires to put down some other person and hence makes him do bad work. But this is not correct. God has given the freedom of choice to the individual (यथेच्छसि तथा कुरु : Gītā 18·63) along with the knowledge of both the good and the bad things. He has given us the will-power and the capacity to work. If we choose the right path, God is ever ready to help us scale the spiritual heights.

One more question may be asked here. If God is all-powerful (Omni-potent), why does He not check a person from taking to the wrong course? The reason is this: God has given the freedom of choice and action to man. Why should he withdraw that freedom? If a devotee comes forth to surrender himself and his freedom completely to God, He is always there to guide him properly.

The बीजाङ्कुरदृष्टान्त mentioned above is significant in another way also. The sprout comes into existence due to the seed. The same sprout further develops the seeds for the future sprouts. If the seed is roasted, the sprout will not grow from it (cf. भर्जनं भवबीजानां... ..रामरामेतिगर्जनम् । *Rāma-rakṣa*). Similarly if our *karma* is annihilated

through तपस् (penance), through भक्ति (devotion),
through निष्काम कर्म (desireless action) or through
आत्मज्ञान (self-knowledge), the problem of evil
need no longer be there for us.



Problem of Evil

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1. The problem of evil is one of the most difficult and persisting problems facing man. In fact it has been one of the strongest incentives to man to turn to philosophising and to seek some cure for the ills of man. Equally it is true that no solution of the problem has given full satisfaction to man though several theories have been evolved from time to time since man set out to philosophise.

2. The difficulty arises from the very nature of the problem and the way it is formulated. Essentially it is not an abstract problem like a problem of arithmetic or astronomy but it varies from man to man. Thus though it is in a sense a universal problem it is in a more precise and real sense a purely individual problem, arising out of the particular context of facts and circumstances.

3. It is therefore necessary to clear the field by a careful and accurate analysis of the

problem. One thing that strikes us at the outset is that it is purely a problem for man who, as a rational animal, thinks about his environment and develops a conscience, and, as a moral being is acutely conscious of the evil that he feels in all spheres of life. . Thus it is purely a human problem and its genesis is in the thinking of man. Therefore it is, as a psychological problem subjective, and as a moral problem also, it is, in the ultimate analysis relative and subjective - depending on the particular community and the degree of development of the conscience of the particular individual concerned. Codes of morality differ from clime to clime and from age to age and it follows that what one regards as evil may not be - and need not be - evil for all times. Because it is subjective. The same occurrence may be regarded as evil by some and quite in a different light by others. Wars are common instances in point.

4. It is true that natural calamities like floods, earthquake etc, do occur and destruction of life and property follows on a huge scale. It may be said that they are evils in a really objective sense. Here again we have to admit that man is a part of nature and as such he is subject to all the processes of nature. Nature is from man's point of view both benign and malignant

and man is bound to accept both aspects. He has no choice and he is not allowed to choose only the benign aspect and renounce the other. Eventually it would follow inevitably that the evil that man feels is a necessary concomitant of his finitude and as a finite being he has to suffer the incidental consequences whether he regards them as good or evil.

5. On the moral plane man is apt to regard as evil all that comes in the way of his attainment of the moral goal, the summum bonum which he deems to be the highest good. It would appear that morality itself – the moral consciousness – is the outcome of our limitations; all morality is relative and the moral effort of man is directed at overcoming the impediments in his way. It is the plane of conflict, the attempt to overcome the resistance offered by so-called evil. It therefore would follow that if one could rise above the plane of conflict and reach a stage where there is no resistance either internal or external one would be moral by nature just like any phenomenon of nature and the problem of evil does not survive. Whether it is possible at all to reach such a stage is quite a different question.

6. It would be desirable to clarify what is meant by describing the problem of evil as sub-

jective. Man has come on this planet as a part of nature in the course of natural evolution. There was time when man was not on the face of the earth and a time may come when he may cease to live at all on the planet. The origin of man in the process of evolution shows that he is just an insignificant phase in the vast and infinite and eternal movement of nature and thus his finite existence is subject to all the limitations of his origin. Nature is his cradle as well as his grave and what we call evil is only another name for his finite existence. Evil arises because man, forgetting that he is just a speck in nature, cherishes the impossible ambition of becoming the monarch of all he surveys. Man would not have come at all if the natural conditions were different and having come into being under certain conditions he has got to live, move and have his being and ultimately vanish under the very same condition. Man is not the end or goal of nature. But only a phase in nature's ceaseless advance and unless man seeks to understand nature and adjust his own life to the irresistible forces of nature he cannot survive at all.

7. Forces of nature are – at least from the pragmatic point of view, if not from the ultimate metaphysical stand point – steady, constant and

enduring and this characteristic of natural process makes possible the existence of man and acquisition of knowledge. If forces of nature did not possess permanency and continuity of character life and knowledge would be both impossible. Because fire burns and possesses the quality of burning for all time – according to our belief – we can act on that basis and build up the superstructure of our knowledge. Fire would burn an innocent child and several people say also get burnt by accident or even by design but the quality of burning is not by itself evil. Similarly with regard to other elemental forces of nature it is quite obvious that though certain undesirable catastrophes may occur we cannot blame the natural forces and their working. They are essentially neutral and it is only their impact on human life and our reactions thereto which give rise to the idea of evil. Here again we think of evil because we make the unwarranted assumption that forces of nature are intended for the service of man whereas, in reality, the objectives of nature are entirely different. Instances are not wanting where a minor accident at one place has been the cause of immense benefit at some other place. Floods are familiar instances of the kind. It is common experience that natural forces properly utilised contribute to the growth and substance of life.

8. In the sphere of human affairs, what one regards as evil is mostly dependent on his individual outlook and standpoint. What is supposed evil at one stage of one's life ceases to be regarded as evil at a later stage. The child in its obstinacy craves for something impossible and suffers great agony and sorrow for not getting what it desires but the parents have genuine laugh at the stupidity of the child. A candidate does not study and fails at the examination and feels that he should have been promoted. Man harbours ambitions reasonable and otherwise and fails to realise them. There is clash of interest and things do not happen according to our choice but one's loss may be another's gain and there are some people who by their very temperament take a peculiar delight in the failures and miseries of others and do not hesitate even to inflict suffering on others.

9. Now dealing with another class of evils— which undoubtedly we feel to be evil — namely poverty, disease and death. It is again a matter of outlook and response to a particular situation. Poverty is a relative concept and what one might regard as wealth another may consider to be a mere pittance. In India at least among certain communities the vow of poverty is supposed to be a lofty ideal and is voluntarily accepted by

some. One would indeed not like the imposition of poverty and destitution - the sight of one's beloved kith and kin having nothing to eat is a hard fact and very difficult to explain specially when we find extremely good people living in a miserable plight. So also disease and death which are hard facts and which everyone feels to be evil.

10. In all these cases we are apt to look at them from a narrow standpoint of the individuals concerned or at best from the humanistic point of view. But it may not be correct to adopt such a narrow point of view when, as stated above, at the outset, man is not supreme but it is nature that is supreme and when man wishes that nature would act according to his behests, he is seeking the impossible. Man's vandalism against man and nature, through the ages, is well known and it is difficult to appreciate man complaining against nature for the existence of evil. "Man biologically considered is the most formidable of all the beasts of prey, and, indeed the only one that preys systematically on its own species" If nature is pursuing her own objectives and man's complaint that he is not getting what he desires is on a par with the complaint of the child seeking the impos-

sible. The existence of poverty more often than not is due to the misdeeds of men rather than to the processes of nature and we have instances where surplus food is either destroyed or allowed to waste, but it is not sent to people who are in want. It only means that poverty of some is welcome to some others and is not evil to them.

11. Disease is a common incident of all creatures including man and in the economy of nature diseases of man provide food for other creatures who have an equal right to live. Even in the human fold diseases provide occupation and living to a large section of men and women. So also death is common to all creatures and man is no exception to the rule. Even death is not always unwelcome but only when it is untimely and unexpected and sudden. In wars where patriots vie with each other to rush onwards death is not regarded as evil. In cases when man has become a cripple due to age disease etc., death to him is a positive and the only relief. In our parts here there is a story current as under :

“A great sage was staying in a holy place and he requested a young man to fetch for him some oil. The young man thought that he could secure some boon from the sage and asked

the sage what if something happened to him before he fetched oil. The great man assured him that he would not die until he brought oil to him. This was really a boon and the young man intending to take the fullest benefit of the boon did not heed the sage's request and did not bring oil to him. Years rolled by and the sage passed away. The young man grew old and became a victim of malignant disease when his own body became his deadly enemy. He very much wanted to die but the God of death would not approach him. Then an old mate of his reminded him of the words of the sage and so he was helped to take the oil to the Samadhi of the sage. Only after having done so he could die. Such instances are not wanting and they teach us that nothing by itself is an evil but we are apt to regard it as evil in a particular context with a particular outlook and from a particular point of view. We may safely venture a guess that consensus of mankind as a whole would certainly be for the continuance of death rather than for the elimination of death in nature. It would be really dreadful and horrible a prospect if none were to die at all.

12. The considerations above referred to only prove that the idea of evil arises because man has not properly appreciated his own place

in nature and consequently there is no attunement with nature but only maladjustment. We have to realise that we are finite beings in the infinite and eternal movement of nature and we must further realise the limitations which are imposed on us by nature. We cannot claim to have mastery over the processes of nature and evil that we complain of is the product of our mal adjustment with nature and the irrational ambition to be Supreme and infinite. No individual could become Supreme and evil is not eliminated until and unless every one born became Supreme. Otherwise there would be tyranny of one over others. But obviously the very idea of every human being becoming supreme is so irrational that it cannot be entertained at all.

13. No one can deny that every one has necessarily the feeling of evil. But the above analysis would indicate that only the feeling of evil does exist and is quite genuine but it is altogether different from actual objective evil. There is no evil nor good as such in nature. The category of good and evil is inapplicable to nature. Hence it is clear that the problem of evil is really a matter of individual feeling and is thus a subjective and psychological fact. We feel the agony, the sorrow and the anguish of happenings.

The feeling is a fact for the persons feeling but outside there is no evil, though it may be that some external events have roused the feeling of agony etc.

14. The above analysis is of course no solution of the problem but it determines the approach to the solution of the problem just as a correct diagnosis is necessary preliminary to a proper and adequate treatment of any ailment. Man has been able – in the course his evolution through several milleniums – to understand the environment around him and to adjust himself to some extent to it. He has sought to devise some means of protecting himself against the incliencies of nature and to the extent possible so far, has secured some measure of immunity from the onslaught of some diseases etc. He has learnt to move through turbulent seas and recently he has been able to fly in the air. The advances in science and technology during the last few years have been unprecedented and historic and man has been able to set his feet on the Moon. It is really a marvel of co-operative effort in harnessing the resources available to men and further developments are eagerly awaited.

15. But all this advance – with due appreciation of the benefit that it may hold out for man - does not touch the problem of human

evil. For one thing the benefits cannot be made available to everyone, in view of the staggering cost and labour involved. Another more important factor is that the benefits even if available are withheld for various reasons. This is the crux of the problem. So long as individuals and communities and nations are motivated by self interest either in the narrower or larger sense and an attitude of exclusiveness persists, the problem of evil cannot be solved. Those in possession of valuable resources may, for certain reasons, right or wrong, deny the use of the same to large masses of men and women. The root cause of the problem is one of the inward consciousness of man and it is impossible to convert every one present and yet to be born into a sage. The evil is, in the last analysis, in the heart of man. And any external approach to the problem is doomed to failure.

Therefore any possible solution, if available at all, can be attained by an inward approach. The evil that lies in the heart of man has to be rooted out, the problem being subjective as indicated at the outset the solution has also got to be subjective. Since man is a part of nature and has to live as an integral aspect in the evolution of natural processes, it would be certainly possible to understand the functioning of nature and

adapt oneself to the surrounding environment. Only if and when man attains to a complete understanding of the essential working of nature and succeeds in reconciling himself thereto he would be free from the evil that is the necessary concomitant of normal human life. If man is regarded as independent of Nature, and the natural environment is regarded as entirely different from man and hostile to him and, if evil is regarded as having an independent objective existence outside man, evil cannot be eradicated at all.

17. In India the problem has been tackled from a practical point of view and a way has been found for the eradication of evil from the human heart. It is a process of transformation of human consciousness itself, a transcendence thereof by which man rises to a higher plane where he is supposed to enjoy uninterrupted divine Bliss which is above the plane of pain and pleasure, happiness and sorrow. The subjective outlook and reactions to surrounding nature are all eliminated and the whole of nature is seen from an entirely different standpoint. Though nature appears to be mechanical in its external operations it is obvious that there is an underlying spiritual principle which permeates the functioning of nature through all her manifestations. It is not within the scope of the present

paper to go into metaphysical aspects and it is enough to say that man would rise to the higher plane of bliss when he succeeds in establishing a harmonious contact, a sort of rapprochement, with the Spiritual Principle whose centre is every where and circumference nowhere, as Shree Gurudev Ranade has put it. All scientific and technological advance is only the demonstration of the power of God and in case spiritual values are repudiated and rejected by science it would reduce itself to rank materialism.

18. It is this kind of spiritual knowledge which in Vedānta is described as Atma Jñāna Atma Sākshātkār or God Realisation. This knowledge would lift man to a higher plane of consciousness and enable him to achieve transcendence over the limitations of nature. The process may be difficult but the goal to be achieved is infinitely great by attaining which a man reaches a stage where he is in enjoyment of beatific bliss and is not bothered by any sorrow. This knowledge has been described in Sri Mad Bhagawadgeeta in its thirteenth Adhyāya in verse Nos. 7 to 11 both inclusive, and the description ends with categorical statement that whatever is otherwise is ignorance.

अमानित्वमदम्भित्वमहिंसा क्षान्तिरार्जवम्
आचार्योपासनं शौचं स्थैर्यमात्मविनिग्रहः ॥७॥

इन्द्रियार्थेषु वैराग्यमनहंकार एव च
जन्ममृत्यु जराव्याधिदुःखदोषानुदर्शनम् ॥८॥
असत्किरणभिष्वङ्गः। पुत्रदारगृहादिषु
नित्यं च समचित्तत्वमिष्टानिष्टोपपत्तिषु ॥९॥
मयि चानन्ययोगेन भक्तिरव्यभिचारिणी
विविक्तद्वेषसेवित्त्वमरतिर्जनसंसदि ॥१०॥
अध्यात्मज्ञाननित्यत्व तत्त्वज्ञानार्थदर्शनम्
एतज्ज्ञानमिति प्रोक्तमज्ञानं यदतोऽन्यथा ॥११॥ (Geeta)

In the Sixth Adhyaya in verses 20, 21, 22, 23 and 29 we find the transcendent status referred to.

यत्रोपरमते चित्तं निरुद्धं योगसेवया ।
यत्र चवात्मनात्मानं पश्यन्नात्मनि तुष्यति ॥२०॥
सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
वेत्तियत्र न चैवायं स्थितश्चलति तत्त्वतः ॥२१॥
यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः ।
यस्मिंस्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते ॥२२॥
तं विद्याद्दुःखसंयोगवियोगं योगसंज्ञितम् ।
स निश्चयेन योत्कव्यो योमोऽनिर्विण्णचेतसा ॥२३॥
सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।
ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ॥२९॥ (Geeta)

The harmony established variously described in the Geeta as Sthitapragna, Trigunateeta, Yogi Brahmabhoot etc. and it is said that there is no

sorrow once that status is acquired and one experiences spiritual unison with the whole creation and there is no question of any fear or misery. I will close my talk with the following quotations one from the Geeta, Adhyāya 18 verse 54, one from the Ishawāshya Upanishad, verse 7 and the last two from Mundakopanishad Mundaka 3(1) 3 and 4.

ब्रह्मभूतः प्रसन्नात्मा न शोचति न काङ्क्षति ।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु मद्भक्तिं लभते पराम् ॥५४॥ (Geeta)

यस्मिन् सर्वाणि भूतानि

आत्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।

तत्र को मोहः कः शोक

एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥७॥

(Ishavashya)

यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णम्

कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् ॥

तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय

निरंजनः परमं साम्यमुपति ॥३॥


प्राणो ह्येष यः सर्वभूतैर्विभाति

विजानन् विद्वान् भवते नातिवादी

आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावान्


एष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः ॥४॥

(Mundaka)



Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, *President*, Addressing.

Participants with Members of Management.



Sitting . 1. Shri. J. V. Parulekar, 2. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, 3. Dr. V. W. Karambelkar, 4. Shri. V. G. Jamkhandi,
5. Shri. G. D. Saraff.

Standing . 1. Prof. K. D. Tangod, 2. Shri. T. S. Kulkarni, 3. Dr. S. L. Bhyrappa, 4. Shri. M. S. Deshpande,
5. Dr. B. R. Modak, 6. Dr. S. G. Mudgal, 7. Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, 8. Dr. S. R. Talghatti.

Presidential Address

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, M.A., Ph.D.

I. So far we have listened to the enlightened papers on the problem of evil by eminent scholars and have participated in the fruitful discussions on the philosophical implication of this problem. The problem has been ably presented by Dr. Karambelkar and Dr. Modak, as depicted in the classical Sanskrit Literature. The panoramic view of the history of Philosophy shows that the problem of evil has been a perennial problem of philosophy both in the East and the West. Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, Dr. J. V. Joshi, Dr. Talghatti and Dr. Mudgal have surveyed the Indian and Western philosophy in this aspect. Dr. Bhyrappa has given a searching analysis of evil as art-experience. Other scholars like M. S. Deshpande and Datye have contributed to the study of this problem. Discussions have been fruitful, analytic and interpretative. We have all been benefitted by this discussion.

II. Evil is a fact of life. To human experience evil is related to good. Primitive man considered good and evil as benevolent and malevolent spirits in the world. But with the development of religious consciousness in the direction of monotheism, it became difficult to justify the ways of God to man if evil is to be considered as malevolent spirit. Physical and moral evil had to be explained. Philosophical speculations presented diverse solutions to the problem. Some have denied evil from the highest point of view. For Augustine, everything is good just in so far as it exists and evil is an illusion and negativity. Spinoza identified reality and perfection. Regarded 'sub-specie aeternitatis' everything is good. For Hegel evil is unreal, existing from a partial point of view, but disappearing from the point of view of the whole. Leibnitz's world view is a little different from that of Spinoza or Hegel. He does not say that evil is unreal. He regards evil as ultimately due to privation, and traces it to 'metaphysical evil', the limitation of being which necessarily belongs to everything less than God.

We are, here, reminded of the general current of thought in Indian Philosophy, wherein we are told that all evil is due to Avidyā. Even the Buddha, who emphasised suffering, traced it to

Avidyā, the first in the chain of causation, pratītya. As Dr. Mudgal points out the orthodox and heterodox systems of philosophy more or less follow the Buddha in his foot steps. Mādhyamika accepts that bondage and liberation are both make-believe. The Advaitin explains away evil by the transcendental type of two satyas i) Pāramārtha and ii) Saṁvṛtta Satya.

Some philosophers accept good and evil as equally real. This is the Dualistic hypothesis by which the universe is analysed into two principles which are ultimate. We have it in the religion of Zoroaster, in Platonism and in the earlier Christian centuries in the teachings of the Gnostics. We have it also in a modified form in popular Christian theology. In Indian thought, the Sāṁkhya presents a metaphysical dualism and a spiritual pluralism. Evil belongs to the empirical world. It is a 'Prākṛta'. Puruṣa does not suffer in reality. Puruṣa feels related to prakṛti due to *aviveka*. Thus, sāṁkhya appears to believe that evil is an appearance due to *aviveka*.

However, the Jaina pluralism accepts evil as a fact and enjoins us to face it. If the self is to free from the suffering and to attain perfection

it must cleanse itself from the taint of karma. This is possible by the triple path of Saṃyag – Darśana, Samyak–Jñāna and Samyak–cāritra. Dr. Mudgal has pointed out that the Jainas accept evil as a real fact of real life and face it bravely, far from running away from it. They believe in the essential difference between self and self. “If Karma has any meaning, if volition and choice mean any thing, then the inherent difference between self and self must be recognised. Jīvas differ in quality and status because of the ‘yogyatā tārātamyā’”.

Dr. Joshi presents the Existential approach to the problem of evil. Evil, according to the Existentialist, is due to the ‘Inauthentic’ life lived by us in our social behaviour. Good and evil are both man-made. “For Heidegger, it is behaviour set and standardised by the Impersonal man; for Marcel it is dominated by the social Function, for Sartre, it is given by others. Therefore, our self-image is shaped by what others feel, do, know and expect”.

The Existentialists have turned pessimists but they ask us to accept what is as it is and face it with courage. They prefer the motto of Socrates “Know thyself”. Dr. Joshi says, “here we come very close to the essential spirit of

mysticism which consists in the flight of the Alone to the Alone.” He rightly points out that the essential difference between the Existential approach and the Hindu approach consists in the fact that the former considers finiteness and misery as permanent feature of existence; while the Indian thinkers have shown its transitory aspect in man’s spiritual pilgrimage. So far, we have traced the historical development of the problem of evil.

Dr. Bhyrappa looks at the problem of evil from the aesthetic point of view. He considers evil as a ‘Disvalue’. At the early stage of civilization, philosophy had not yet become a purely intellectual discipline. Philosophical questions were answered in a predominantly aesthetic tone and explanations grew into myths. In most myths evil originates at the beginning of knowledge—‘at the break of original innocence’ which marks the distinction between mine and thine. This is the basis of all evil. The other two disvalues – ugliness and ignorance –have the same type of origin.

III. Evil is a fact of Life. To say that it is an illusion is to explain it away. To recognise the duality between good and evil is to admit the eternal conflict between the two; and to pro-

claim the triumph of the good over evil is to objectify our personal inclinations.

In fact, evil is a subjective appraisal of the facts of life. What we find as evil may not be evil at all. There is nothing good or evil except that we make it so. Good and evil are anthropocentric facts. In themselves they are neither good nor evil, and to treat evil or good as having objective reality is to project ourselves into the facts of life. If at all there is evil, who are we to say that there should be no evil at all. It may be, there is a Cosmic purpose behind all that we have in life. To think of evil and to justify the ways of God to man is to read wishful meaning in life. It is essentially the hedonist outlook on life that makes us look at life in this way. After all life is not a pleasure garden, nor is God a Santa Claus whose main duty is to make his creatures happy. They assume that the perfect world would be one in which there is unalloyed happiness. But all pain with no ingredient of sorrow would be too insipid for the human beings to enjoy for any length of time. In the words of Shelly, 'our sincerest laughter with some pain is wrought', 'Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought'.

But mere enjoyment is not an adequate end of the creative purpose. Evil has its function. It

chastens the personality and ennobles our lives. Life is 'a vale of soul making, and souls are made by purifying through the fire of suffering. "It is not in the pampered and coddled lives that we find the richest character developed; but in the lives that confront and overcome difficulties and have come forth out of fiery furnaces purified".

"Do you not see", asked Keats, "how necessary a world of pain and trouble is to school an intelligence and to make a soul?"

