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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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TEXT  
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SUBJECT: 212(A)(33) CASE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2007

FOR COORDINATION WITH ed State

1. MR. ROEPKE'S RE-INTERVIEW HAS OPENED NEW LINES OF RESEARCH WHICH HAVE CONVINCED DEPTOFF THAT HE IS TELLING HALF-TRUTHS AND CONCEALING INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES DURING THE WAR. AT THIS POINT, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT MR. ROEPKE IS WILLING TO FURNISH THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE ADJUDICATION OF HIS CASE. DEPTOFF RECOMMENDS THAT CONSOFF REFUSE HIM UNDER 221(G). PLEASE MAKE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT HE CANNOT BE ISSUED A VISA UNLESS HE COMES CLEAN. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF HIS CASE IS FOR POST'S BENEFIT, AS THERE ARE INTERSTING HISTORICAL ASPECTS WHICH COULD APPLY TO FUTURE CASES. POST MAY CONVEY THESE CONCLUSIONS TO MR. ROEPKE. IT IS APPARENT THAT HE UNDERESTIMATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH HIS STORY CAN BE CHECKED BY REFERRAL TO CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND THAT HE HAS ALREADY CRAFTED PART OF HIS TESTIMONY TO FIT THE FACTS AS WE KNOW THEM.

2. ROEPKE'S INSISTENCE THAT HE WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE

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SD IS FLATLY UNTRUE. BDC RECORDS SHOW THAT HE JOINED THE SD IN 1937, AND WAS ASSIGNED TO SD-UNTERABSCHNITT GROSS BERLIN. THIS INFORMATION IS ABSTRACTED FROM HIS OWN PERSONNEL FILE. THIS MAKES PERFECTLY LOGICAL HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN ROMANIA. ACCORDING TO HIS TESTIMONY, HE REPORTED TO A MAN NAMED VON BODERSCHWING. AN OTTO-ALBRECHT VON BOLSCHWING IS LISTED AS ATTACHE TO THE LEGATION IN BUCHAREST IN THE ALMANACH DE GOTHA FOR 1941. WILLIAM HOETTEL, CHIEF OF BALKAN AFFAIRS IN AMT 6 (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE) OF THE SD, IDENTIFIES VON BOLSCHWING AS THE SD CHIEF OF STATION FOR ROMANIA IN HIS BOOK "DIE GEHEIME FRONT". THIS INFORMATION IS CONFIRMED BY THE SS OFFICER'S LIST OBTAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT, WHICH LISTS VON BOLSCHWING AS AN SD OFFICER. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT ROEPKE WAS AN AGENT ON ASSIGNMENT IN ROMANIA AND THAT HE REPORTED TO THE SD STATION CHIEF IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST.

3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT INVOLVED IS QUITE INTERESTING. HITLER HAD, IN SEPTEMBER 1940, ENGINEERED THE ABDICATION OF KING CAROL AND HIS REPLACEMENT AS HEAD OF STATE BY A STRONG-MAN, ION ANTONESCU, A PRO-GERMAN FASCIST. THE SD HOWEVER, FAVORED THE OPPOSITION TO ANTONESCU, CALLED THE LEGIONARIES. IN OCTOBER 1940, HIMMLER SENT AN SD MAN TO ROMANIA TO FORM A LEGION LIASON GROUP, TO REMOLD THE LEGIONARIES ON THE PATTERN OF THE GERMAN SS. THIS MAN SUCCEEDED IN THE ATTEMPT, AND ON 21 JANUARY 1941, THE LEGIONARIES ROSE AGAINST ANTONESCU. WITH THE AID OF THE GERMAN MILITARY MISSION, WHICH NUMBERED TWO DIVISIONS, ANTONESCU PUT DOWN THE REVOLT. HITLER WAS FURIOUS, THREATENING TO STAMP OUT THE SD FOR ITS SUPPORT OF THE OPPOSITION. A NEW AMBASSADOR, MANFRED VON KILLINGER, ASSURED ANTONESCU OF GERMAN SUPPORT, AND VON BOLSCHWING, THE SD CHIEF, WAS ARRESTED BY THE GESTAPO.

3. MR. ROEPKE'S ASSIGNMENT TO THE SONDERKOMMANDO DES REICHSFUHRER-SS LASTED FROM FEBRUARY 15, 1940 UNTIL MARCH 1, 1941, A TIME PERIOD WHICH COVERS ALL THE IMPORTANT EVENTS COMPRISING THE OVERTHROW OF THE MONARCHY AND THE RISE OF ANTONESCU. HE CONSISTENTLY REFUSES TO EXPLAIN THIS PERIOD OF HIS CAREER. DEPTOFF HAS DISCOVERED SEVERAL POSSIBLE TASKS MR. ROEPKE COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMING, ONE OF WHICH, AT LEAST, COULD LEAD TO ROEPKE BEING DECLARED INELIGIBLE UNDER 212(A)(33):

A. HE COULD HAVE BEEN THE SD MAN DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHO ORGANIZED THE TRAINING OF THE LEGIONARIES ALONG SS LINES.

B. HE COULD HAVE BEEN RECRUITING FOR THE SS AMONG ETHNIC GERMANS IN ROMANIA. HIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE ON THE STAFF OF THE SS-MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER WAS PROBABLY A RECRUITING POSITION, WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIM EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA. THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST WAS, AT THE TIME, TRYING TO RELOCATE THE THOUSANDS OF ETHNIC GERMANS LIVING IN THE PROVINCE OF BESSARABIA. THIS PROVINCE, SUBJECT TO A SECRET



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AGREEMENT BETWEEN STALIN AND HITLER IN 1939, WAS OCCUPIED IN 1941 BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE COULD HAVE BEEN REPORTING TO GENERAL WALTER LORENZ, WHO WAS HEAD OF THE VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE (ETHNIC GERMAN ASSISTANCE OFFICE) IN ROMANIA.

C. HE COULD HAVE BEEN AGITATING ON BEHALF OF GERMANY AMONG THE ETHNIC GERMANS IN ROMANIA. THIS WAS ALREADY BEING DONE BY A.A. KONRADI, WHO WAS THE LANDSGRUPPENLEITER FOR THE AUSLANDS-ORGANIZATION, UNDER COVER IN THE BUCHAREST EMBASSY AS THE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE. THE AUSLANDS-ORGANIZATION WAS A WELFARE AND PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION OF THE NAZI PARTY THE AIM OF WHICH WAS TO RECRUIT GERMANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE REICH INTO THE PARTY, AND TO USE THEM FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES. KONRADI HAD BEEN PROPAGANDIZING THE ROMANIAN GERMANS TO SUPPORT GERMAN CONTROL OF THE ROMANIAN OIL INDUSTRY AT PLOESTI.

D. HE COULD HAVE BEEN ORGANIZING THE DEPORTATION OF JEWS FROM ROMANIA. THE JUDENREFERENT (JEWISH EXPERT) IN THE BUCHAREST EMBASSY, GUSTAV RICHTER, WAS A PROLIFIC OBSERVER AND REPORTER OF THE SITUATION OF JEWS IN ROMANIA. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPROPRIATING JEWISH-OWNED INDUSTRY, AND REPORTED THE EFFECTS OF ANTONESCU'S POLICY OF REQUIRING JEWS TO DO FORCED LABOR ON THE RUMANIAN ECONOMY. ROEPKE COULD VERY WELL HAVE BEEN ASSISTING HIM IN HIS ENDEAVORS.

E. A MOST INTRUIGING SCENARIO, HOWEVER, IS THAT MR. ROEPKE WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN FOILING THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE TO DESTROY THE PLOESTI OIL FIELDS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, BLOCKING THE NAVIGATION OF THE DANUBE RIVER, WHICH TRANSPORTED THE OIL. ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED ARCHIVES OF THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE, THERE WERE TWO MAJOR SABATOGUE EFFORTS UNDER WAY AT THE SAME TIME MR. ROEPKE WAS SENT TO ROMANIA. THE FIRST WAS

SPONSORED BY SECTION D OF THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE SIS STATION CHIEF IN BUCHAREST WAS EDWARD BOXHALL, AN EXECUTIVE FOR THE VICKERS CORPORATION. HE HAD THREE ASSISTANTS UNDER COVER IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY AS VICE CONSULS, STANLEY GREEN, TIM WATTS, AND GEOFFREY HOUSEHOLD. THIS PLAN WAS ABOUT TO BE EXECUTED WHEN THE GERMANS GOT WORD OF THE PLOT AND POSTED GUARDS AT ALL THE SRATEGIC POINTS SLATED FOR DEMOLITION. DESPERATE, THE BRITISH TURNED TO AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN, STOPPING THE FLOW OF OIL BARGES DOWN THE DANUBE RIVER BY CLOSING THE NARROW STRAITS CALLED THE IRON GATES ON THE ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV BORDER. ANOTHER SIS MAN, MERVIN MINSHALL, WAS SUPPLIED WITH DIPLOMATIC COVER AND PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH. THIS AND SEVERAL OTHER OF HIS PLANS WERE FOILED, AND ON APRIL 8, 1940, THE GERMANS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THE DETAILS OF HIS PLAN AND REVEALED HIS POSITION IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS LENGTHY PRESENTATION IS TO

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DEMONSTRATE THAT BUCHAREST WAS NOT THE BACKWATER THAT MR. ROEPKE IS TRYING TO PORTRAY, BUT A CRITICAL AREA LITERALLY SWARMING WITH INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TRYING EITHER TO CUT OFF GERMANY'S ONLY SUPPLIES OF OIL, OR TRYING TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING DESTROYED. IN THIS LIGHT, ROEPKE'S CONSISTENT ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE HIS PARTICIPATION IN THESE EVENTS BECOMES LESS AND LESS BELIEVABLE.

4. HIS EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF THE SS-MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER LEFT DEPTOFF BREATHLESS WITH ADMIRATION FOR HIS CHUTZPAH. MR. ROEPKE PORTRAYS THE MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER AS A GROUP OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANS SOMEHOW RESISTING THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE NAZIS. IN FACT, THE MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER WAS AN SS STUDENT FRATERNITY, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO TRAIN AN IDEOLOGICAL ELITE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL FIELDS OUTSIDE THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. THESE STUDENTS WERE ALREADY MEMBERS OF THE SS, LIVED TOGETHER ON OR NEAR CAMPUS, AND WERE SUBJECT TO PARTY WORK, IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING, AND MILITARY EXERCISES DURING THEIR VACATIONS. IN DECEMBER OF 1937, THE REICH STUDENT LEADER ISSUED A PROCLAMATION STATING THAT THE SS-MANNSCHAFTER WERE "POLITICALLY AWARE PICKED TROOPS SELECTED ACCORDING TO SS PRINCIPLES AND ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN STUDENT UNION." AN ALLIED G-2 DOCUMENT DATING FROM 1944 CHARACTERIZES THE MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER AS A METHOD EMPLOYED BY THE SS TO

INCREASINGLY CONTROL ALL ASPECTS OF GERMAN LIFE. IT DIFFERED FROM THE SPECIALIST SCHOOLS, SUCH AS THE NAPOLAS AND ORDENSBERGEN IN THAT THE MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER INTENDED TO CREATE AN SS AND NAZI CONSTITUENCY IN TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROFESSIONS, AND TO EVOLVE THE CORE OF AN SS RULING CLASS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE MANAGERIAL SKILLS WHICH BOTH PARTY AND SS FOUND IN SUCH SHORT SUPPLY WITHIN THEIR RANKS.

5. MR. ROEPKE'S ACCOUNT OF HOW HE GOT ONTO THE BOOKS OF THE SD IS ALSO INTERESTING. HE STATES THAT IN ORDER TO GET INTO THE TRIAL OF SOMEONE NAMED NIEMULLER, HE GOT A FRIEND, VALENTINE PATZAK, TO GET HIM AN SD CARD "SOMETIME AROUND 1935". PASTOR NIEMOLLER, A FORMER U-BOAT COMMANDER AND AUTHOR OF A VERY POPULAR BOOK, "FROM U-BOAT TO PULPIT" WAS TRIED ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1938, ON CHARGES RELATING TO HIS RESISTANCE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NAZI STATE CHURCH. THIS WAS LONG AFTER THE TIME STATED BY ROEPKE, WHO HAD JOINED THE SD IN 1937, AND WOULD NOT HAVE NEEDED THE INTERVENTION OF MR. PATZAK TO ATTEND. THE ONLY THING THAT RINGS TRUE IN THIS ACCOUNT IS THE FACT THAT VALENTINE PATZAK DID INDEED EXIST, AND WORKED FOR THE SD.

6. MR. ROEPKE HAS ALSO DONE A GOOD JOB OF MINIMIZING HIS ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISCHES FREIKORPS. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOMETIME BETWEEN MARCH OF 1943 AND



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NOVEMBER OF 1944, WHILE WORKING FOR THE GERMANISCHE LEITSTELLE, HE WAS PUT IN CHARGE OF DEVELOPING THE BRITISCHES FREIKORPS. THERE IS A LETTER IN BDC DATED AUGUST 2, 1944, FROM GOTTLLOB BERGER, HEAD OF THE SS-HAUPTAMT TO HIMMLER, PROPOSING THAT THE TWENTY MEMBERS OF THE BRITISCHES FREIKORPS SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO THE FRONT FOR ACTION, AND THAT ROEPKE, BECAUSE OF HIS PAST INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROGRAM, SHOULD BE MADE THEIR LEADER. A SECOND LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 18, 1944 FROM SS-STANDARTENFUHRER (COLONEL) SPARMANN IN AMTSGRUPPE D OF THE SS-HAUPTAMT, REQUESTS AN ENGLISH-SPEAKING OFFICER FOR THE BRITISCHES FREIKORPS, BECAUSE ROEPKE HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE SS-FUEHRUNGSHAUPTAMT ON NOVEMBER 15.

7. FROM THIS DATE, ROEPKE STATES THAT HE WAS ASSIGNED TO A COMMANDO UNIT OF AN SS JAGDVERBAENDE, AND THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN THE ARDENNES COUNTEROFFENSIVE. THIS INNOCUOUS STATEMENT MAY EXPLAIN WHY MR. ROEPKE IS SO RETICENT ABOUT HIS PAST. SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER, 1944, HITLER, WHILE PLANNING THE ARDENNES MOVEMENT WHICH WE CALL THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE, SUMMONED OTTO SKORZENY, THE SS COLONEL FAMOUS FOR HIS RESCUE OF MUSSOLINI, AND ASSIGNED HIM TO A SPECIAL OPERATION. GERMAN SOLDIERS WHO SPOKE ENGLISH WOULD BE FITTED OUT WITH CAPTURED AMERICAN UNIFORMS AND ARMS, AND INFILTRATED BEHIND AMERICAN LINES AT THE START OF THE OFFENSIVE. THESE SMALL UNITS WOULD SOW CONFUSION BEHIND THE LINES, COMMIT SABOTAGE, AND PREVENT THE DEMOLITION OF THE BRIDGES ACROSS THE RIVER MEUSE, WHICH WAS THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK. DESPITE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS- THE ORDER ASKING FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING OFFICERS HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN CLEAR TO ALL CORPS COMMANDS, AND SKORZENY FELT THAT THE OPERATION WAS COMPROMISED FROM THE BEGINNING- HE RECRUITED A SMALL FORCE OF 2,000 MEN AND DID, IN FACT, COMMENCE OPERATION GREIF ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE OFFENSIVE. IT ACHEIVED LITTLE, BUT IT DID CREATE GREAT CONFUSION BEHIND AMERICAN LINES AND WAS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR EVEN THE LIMITED ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE OFFENSIVE.

8. DEPTOFF SUSPECTS THAT MR. ROEPKE HAD EITHER WORKED FOR SKORZENY, WHO WAS HEAD OF AMT S (SABOTAGE) OF THE SD, OR HAD HAD SOME CONTACT WITH HIM. WHEN THE CALL CAME OUT FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING VOLUNTEERS, MR. ROEPKE MAY HAVE VOLUNTEERED FOR OPERATION GREIF, OR BEEN ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE SD. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN HIS TRANSFER FROM THE BRITICHSHER FREIKORPS, OF WHICH HE WAS SLATED TO BE COMMANDER. MR. ROEPKE'S YEAR IN AN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN 1936 WOULD HAVE MADE HIM AN IDEAL LEADER IN THE OPERATION IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT HE ATTENDED MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE, WHICH WAS, AND IS, THE PREMIER AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR THE TEACHING OF LANGUAGES. DEPTOFF IS WILLING TO BET THAT MR. ROEPKE SPEAKS EXCELLENT, AMERICAN-ACCENTED ENGLISH. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT ROEPKE WAS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION. THE SS

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JAGDVERBANDE, WHICH HE ADMITS TO SERVING IN, HAD THE OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SS PANZERBRIGADE 150. IT PARTICIPATED IN THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE, AND ITS COMMANDER WAS OTTO SKORZENY. THE DISGUISED GERMAN SOLDIERS WERE DIVIDED INTO FOUR-MAN COMMANDOS, WHICH

WERE GIVEN AMERICAN JEEPS AND SENT OVER THE LINES IN THE CONFUSION OF THE FIRST ATTACK. MR. ROEPKE MAY BE AFRAID THAT HIS PARTICIPATION IN THIS OPERATION WILL BECOME PUBLIC. U.S. FORCES CAPTURED 18 OF THESE SOLDIERS WHO TOOK PART IN OPERATION GREIF, AND EXECUTED ALL OF THEM AS SPIES, SINCE THE WEARING OF ENEMY UNIFORMS WHILE ATTACKING IS A VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. AS A FOOTNOTE, SKORZENY WAS ALSO THE FOUNDER OF THE NOTORIOUS SS ORGANIZATIN ODESSA, WHICH ASSISTED THE ESCAPE OF MANY SS MEN AFTER THE WAR. SKORZENY INCIDENTALLY, WORKED FOR THE U.S. ARMY IN THE HISTORICAL DEPARTMENT BEFORE HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN 1949. HE ESCAPED.

9. TO SUM UP, GIVEN THE ABOVE, DEPARTMENT CANNOT PROCESS ROEPKE'S CASE TO A CONCLUSION UNLESS HE IS WILLING TO BE FRANK. UP TO NOW HE HAS MANAGED TO TELL AS LITTLE OF THE TRUTH AS POSSIBLE. DEPTOFF CANNOT CLEAR MR. ROEPKE UNLESS HE CAN RELIABLY VERIFY ELEMENTS OF HIS TESTIMONY, AND THAT POSSIBILITY DOES NOT EXIST AT THIS TIME. SHULTZ

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END OF MESSAGE

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TEXT  
TAGS: CVIS  
SUBJECT: 212(A)(33) CASE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2007

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

1. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS BDC SUMMARY ON THE FOLLOWING  
INDIVIDUALS:

-VOL BOLSCHWING (OR BOLSCHURING), OTTO-ALBRECHT, DPOB  
OCTOBER 15, 1909, SCHONBRUCH. SS NUMBER WAS 353603.

-PARSCH, OTTO, DPOB AUGUST 25, 1911, KRODSTADT,  
RUMANIA. SS NUMBER 477504.

-PATZAK, VALENTINE, DPOB JANUARY 9, 1912, FURSTENBERG A.  
O. SS NUMBER WAS 290189.

-BUTT, DR. ERICH, DPOB JANUARY 19, 1912, DOLITZ KR.  
PYRITZ. SS NUMBER 259931.

-RODDE-HANAU, WILHELM, DPOB MARCH 22, 1893, HANAU/MAIN.  
SS NUMBER 250064.

2. ALL THESE MEN ARE CONNECTED WITH THE CASE OF HERMANN  
ROEPKE (87 US BERLIN 981, 3997) ABOUT WHOM YOU HAVE

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ALREADY PROVIDED INFORMATION. DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, SUBJECT DENIES BEING MEMBER OF THE SD, AND DENIES HAVING DONE ANY ESPIONAGE WORK WHILE IN RUMANIA IN 1940-41. DEPTOFF IS TRYING TO PIN DOWN THE EXACT NATURE OF HIS ACTIVITIES THERE.

3. DEPTOFF WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK RESPONSE ON THIS REQUEST. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE BDC'S ADVICE AND COMMENT ON THE NATURE OF ROEPKE'S ASSIGNMENT TO RUMANIA, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF ANY OF THE ABOVE MEN TO HIM. THANKS AND PLEASE SLUG REPLY FOR CA/VO/L/C FRED SMITH. SHULTZ

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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2000

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TAGS: CVIS (NEUMANN, HANS HENDRIK)  
SUBJECT: 212 (A) (33) INELIGIBILITY

REF: A). VICTARS 082847, B). HAMBURG 1909

1. VISAS TWO HANS HENDRIK NEUMANN (33).

2. MR. NEUMANN HAS FAILED ONCE AGAIN TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INELIGIBILITY IN HIS CASE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HE HAS BEEN LESS THAN FRANK IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF HIS CAREER. DEPTOFF WISHES TO POINT OUT THAT, WHILE THIS IS THE THIRD REVIEW OF HIS CASE, AND THE THIRD FINDING OF INELIGIBILITY, THE DEPARTMENT WOULD, AS IN ANY CASE, BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER IT'S DECISION IN LIGHT OF NEW INFORMATION. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A LARGE GAP BETWEEN MR. NEUMANN'S TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

3. NEUMANN HAS MISREPRESENTED ALMOST ENTIRELY HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD). ON TWO OCCASIONS, ON MARCH 28, 1934, AND ON 22 AUGUST, 1938, HE EXECUTED AND SIGNED A LEBENS LAUF IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT HE JOINED THE SD ON DECEMBER 1, 1933. IN THE 1938 DOCUMENT, HE DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS "PERSONALREFERENT" AND

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DEPUTY ADJUTANT OF THE SD SECTION AT CHEMNITZ. FROM 1933 UNTIL 1945, HE EITHER WORKED FOR THE SD DIRECTLY, OR IS DESCRIBED AS BEING DETACHED FROM THE SD FOR SPECIAL DUTY AT THE REQUEST OF HEYDRICH OR HIMMLER.

4. AS HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ADMITTED, HIS SD CONNECTION DID NOT BEGIN WHEN HE WAS NAMED AS ADJUTANT TO REINHARD HEYDRICH IN 1935. HE HAD DONE SD WORK FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS BEFORE THAT, AND HAD UNDOUBTEDLY COME TO THE NOTICE OF HIS SUPERIORS. DEPTOFF'S SPECULATION REGARDING HERBERT MELHORN WAS INTENDED TO SHOW HOW THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NEUMANN AND HEYDRICH COULD HAVE ARISEN. NEUMANN AND MELHORN WERE BOTH IN THE CHEMNITZ SA, BOTH IN INTELLIGENCE WORK, AND NEUMANN FOLLOWED MELHORN INTO THE SD.

5. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT NEUMANN MAINTAINED HIS SD CONNECTION THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER. FROM 1935-1939, HE SERVED AS REINHARD HEYDRICH'S ADJUTANT. ON JANUARY 22, 1940, HE WAS CALLED UP FOR ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE WAFFEN-SS, AND WAS RETURNED TO HIS PERMANENT UNIT, THE SS REGIMENT "DEUTSCHLAND". IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS "ORDERED" TO THE REGIMENT (KOMMANDIERT) AND NOT "TRANSFERRED". IT IS ALSO INTERESTING THAT IN A LETTER DATED 5 JUNE, 1940, THE SOLDBUCH REQUESTED BY MR. NEUMANN IN THE LETTER MENTIONED IN DEPARTMENT'S PREVIOUS CABLE WAS SENT TO THE SD-HAUPTAMT FOR FORWARDING TO NEUMANN, AND NOT TO THE OPERATIONS OFFICE (KOMMANDOAMT) OF THE WAFFEN-SS. IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS THAT HE WAS ON A MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE SD IN NORWAY IN MAY, 1940, THAT HE WAS UNDER A DIRECT ORDER OF HIMMLER, AND THAT HE WAS USING THE ANCESTRAL HERITAGE SOCIETY (AHNENERBE) AS A COVER FOR HIS ACTIVITIES. DEPARTMENT HAS UNCOVERED DOCUMENTS WHICH INDICATE THE NATURE OF HIS ASSIGNMENT. THESE WILL BE DISCUSSED BELOW.

6. NEUMANN WAS THEN SENT TO THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF THE TOTENKOPF DIVISION, AND SUBSEQUENTLY "ORDERED" (EINBERUFEN) AND NOT TRANSFERRED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE BEFEHLSHABER DER WAFFEN-SS "NORD" IN OSLO WITH EFFECTIVE DATE APRIL 10, 1941, AS "I C". I C WAS PROFESSIONAL WEHRMACHT JARGON FOR THE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE OF AN ARMY UNIT. A NOTE AT THE BOTTOM OF A PERSONNEL ACTION NOTICE (PERSONALVERFUGUNG) SAYS THAT HE HAD BEEN PERFORMING SPECIAL TASKS (SONDERAUFGABE) IN NORWAY UNDER HEYDRICH, AT THE ORDER OF THE REICHSFUEHRER SS. IT APPEARS THAT ONE OR MORE OF HIS WAFFEN-SS ASSIGNMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD MAY HAVE BEEN ONLY

"ASSIGNMENTS OF RECORD" FOR BUREAUCRATIC PURPOSES SINCE THERE IS A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FROM PAUL WEGENER, HEAD OF THE EINSATZSTAB (NAZI PARTY ADMINISTRATION) IN NORWAY IN HIS FILE CONFIRMING THAT NEUMANN HAD BEEN DOING LIASON WORK WITH THE HIRD (NORWEGIAN STORM TROOPERS MODELED ON THE GERMAN SA) AND OTHER FASCIST



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ORGANIZATIONS FROM JANUARY 23 UNTIL JUNE 7, 1941. HE WAS IN CHARGE OF ALL TRAINING AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION FOR THESE GROUPS. HE IS THEN ASSIGNED TO THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF THE 6TH SS DIVISION "NORD", PRESUMABLY TO CARRY ON INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING WORK, WHERE HE WINDS UP IN HELSINKI.

7. IN ANOTHER PERSONALVERFUGUNG DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1941, HE IS TRANSFERRED BACK TO THE SD HAUPTAMT. HE IS THEN PUT INTO A RESERVE CATEGORY OF THE WAFFEN-SS, "RELEASED" FROM THE SD, AND ASSIGNED AS POLICE ATTACHE TO SWEDEN. HIS EXPLANATION OF THIS ASSIGNMENT LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. AS DEPTOFF STATED IN PRIOR CABLE, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR NEUMANN'S PRESENCE IN STOCKHOLM TO EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF WINTER UNIFORMS. THE IDEA THAT AN SS OFFICER WOULD BE CHOSEN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK ON BEHALF OF THE WEHRMACHT, WHOSE TROOPS FORMED THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE 200,000 OR SO GERMAN SOLDIERS IN NORTHERN NORWAY AND FINLAND SIMPLY DOES NOT MAKE SENSE. THE WEHRMACHT WAS RESPONSIBLE NOT ONLY FOR SUPPLYING ITS OWN TROOPS, BUT SUPPLIED MOST OF THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE SS AS WELL, THOUGH THE SS TRIED VERY HARD TO EVOLVE AN INDEPENDENT LOGISTICAL BASE, WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. A MUCH MORE LIKELY EXPLANATION IS THAT HE WAS THE SD STATION CHIEF IN STOCKHOLM, OR HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION BY HEYDRICH. THE POSITION OF POLICE ATTACHE IN GEMAN EMBASSIES WAS REGULARLY ASSIGNED TO THE HEAD OF THE SD. FOREXAMPLE, OTTO ALBRECHT VON BOLSCHWING WAS POLIE ATTACHE IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST, OMANIA, AT THE SAME TIME. HE WAS ALSO HEAD O THE SD STATION IN THAT COUNTRY AND AN SS OFFICE. AGAIN, WE HAVE NOT OBTAINED A REASONABLE EPLANATION FROM MR. NEUMANN AS TO THE PURPOSE OF IS ASSIGNMENT.

8. TWO DOCUMENTS, HOWEVER, SHOW THAT HIS RELATIONSHIP TO HEYDRICH WS MUCH CLOSER THAN HE HAS LED US TO BELIEVE. N A LETTER DATED OCTOBER 15, 1941 TO THE PERSONAHAUPTAMT, HEYDRICH TOOK THE TROUBLE TO REQUEST THAT NEUMANN BE PROMOTED TO STURMBANNFUHRER. INANOTHER LETTER WHICH HE WROTE FROM PRAGUE ON OCTBER 17TH TO THE

HEAD OF THE ORDNUNGSPOLIZE, KURT DALUEGE, HE EXPLAINS WHY HE WISHES TO END NEUMANN TO STOCKHOLM AS POLICE ATTACHE. PLITICAL TASKS, HE WROTE, HAVING TO DO WITH NRWAY AND ENGLAND, COMPELLED HIM TO SEND NEUMANN O SWEDEN ON BEHALF OF THE SD. EVIDENTLY, HEDRICH NOT ONLY HAD A HIGH OPINION OF NEUMANN, BT WAS VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE SUCCESS OF HIS MSSION.

9. AFTER RETURNING FROM STOCKHOL, NEUMANN WAS ASSIGNED TO A REPLACEMENT BATTALON OF THE 1ST SS DIVISION (LEIBSTANDARTE ADOF HITLER) AND "REJOINED" THE SD. IN JUNEOR JULY OF 1942, HE IS ASSIGNED TO NORWAY AGAIN BECOMING THE LIASON OFFICER BETWEEN THE REICHSOMMISAR

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JOSEF TERBOVEN AND VIDKUN QUISLING, TH NORWEGIAN HEAD OF STATE. HIS NARRATIVE THEREFTER REMAINS DOCUMENTARILY VERIFIABLE UNTIL THE ED OF THE WAR.

10. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM TE ABOVE, NEUMANN'S TESTIMONY REGARDING HIS SRVICE WITH THE SD IS IMPEACHED BY THE DOCUMENTAR EVIDENCE AT HAND. IN THIS LIGHT, IT IS DIFICULT TO ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE HIS OTHER ASSERTIONS REGARDING HIS ACTIVITIES. THE HEYDRICH/DALUGE LETTER DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS MR. NEUMANN'S ASSERTION THAT HE WAS DOING NO SPYING FOR THE SD WHILE IN SWEDEN. IT IS CLEAR THAT HE IS TRYING TO LIMIT REVELATIONS INTO THE EXTENT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE SD AND WITH REINHARD HEYDRICH.

11. DOCUMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOW THAT NEUMANN'S DIFFERRING ACCOUNTS OF HIS 1940 TRIP TO NORWAY ARE BOTH MISLEADING AND SERVE TO DOWNPLAY THE IMPORTANCE BOTH OF HIS MISSION AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE TOP OF THE NAZI HIERARCHY. IN A REPORT FROM WILJEM HAGELIN, A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF QUISLING TO HEINRICH LAMMERS, HEAD OF HITLER'S CHANCELLERY DATED JULY 7, 1940, NEUMANN IS REFERRED TO AS THE DEUTSCHES VERBINDUNGSMANN (GERMAN LIASON MAN). IN A SUBSEQUENT REPORT FROM HAGELIN DATED AUGUST 6, 1940, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IS INCLUDED: "I RECENTLY RECEIVED THE LIASON MAN, NEUMANN, WHO ASKED ME WHETHER PRINCE HARALD WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. HE SAID THAT, FOR GERMANY, THE KING WAS UNACCEPTABLE." IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS THAT NEUMANN WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND THAT HE CARRIED A GREAT DEAL OF WEIGHT. WHAT COULD MAKE A MERE CAPTAIN IN THE SS SO IMPORTANT THAT HE WOULD BE MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES IN DISPATCHES? OBVIOUSLY BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED SOMEONE OF GREAT IMPORT. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE NEUMANN HE

MENTIONS IS OUR APPLICANT. IN ANOTHER DOCUMENT APPENDED TO THE EARLIER REPORT, NEUMANN IS MENTIONED AS PART OF AN "INTERESTING CLIQUE" OF GERMANS OPPOSED TO QUISLING. NEUMANN IS DESCRIBED AS A MAN WHO WAS KICKED OUT OF THE NAZI PARTY IN 1936. WHILE THIS IS UNTRUE, NEUMANN DID HAVE A PROBLEM REGARDING HIS PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN 1936, WHEN HIS FILE WAS LOST AFTER HE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM CHEMNITZ. CORRESPONDENCE IN HIS PERSONNEL FILE SHOWS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED IN HIS FAVOR, BUT THE MISUNDERSTANDING MUST HAVE GOTTEN INTO THE GOSSIP MILL. THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION WERE FOUND IN THE CAPTURED ARCHIVES OF THE NSDAP (SERIES T-81, ROLL 696, FRAME 186-188,310-311).

12 THIS LEAVES US WITH A VERY DIFFERENT PICTURE OF MR. NEUMANN. HE IS OBVIOUSLY A YOUNG OFFICER HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM BY HIS SUPERIORS, A MAN WHO IS ENTRUSTED WITH SPECIAL TASKS THAT ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEM. IN THIS LIGHT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CREDIT HIS OTHER ASSERTIONS REGARDING HIS CAREER. WE DO NOT KNOW, FOR



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EXAMPLE, THE REAL PURPOSE OF HIS ASSIGNMENT IN TOKYO. JUDGING FROM THE ABOVE, IT CERTAINLY WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN EITHER AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION, OR SOME KIND OF LIASON WORK BETWEEN HIMMLER, HEYDRICH AND THE JAPANESE.

13. EQUALLY INCREDIBLE AT THIS POINT IS HIS DESCRIPTION OF HIS FIVE YEARS AS HEYDRICH'S ADJUTANT. WHY WOULD HE BE SENT TO NORWAY ON SUCH A SENSITIVE MISSION IF HE HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT ONLY THE MENIAL TASKS HE REPORTS? IN FACT HIS TESTIMONY IS CONTRADICTORY REGARDING THIS PERIOD. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HITLER'S GUARD REGIMENT IN ORDER TO ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION FOR HIS VISIT TO THE POLISH FRONT. AGAIN, THIS EXPLANATION SIMPLY DOES NOT JIVE WITH THE FACTS. HITLER HAD HIS OWN GUARD DETACHMENT, WHICH ROMMEL COMMANDED FOR A SHORT TIME, HIS OWN SPECIAL TRAIN AND AIRCRAFT. HE CERTAINLY DID NOT NEED THE ASSISTANCE OF A JUNIOR SS OFFICER TO MOVE TO THE POLISH FRONT. THE MOST LIKELY EXPLANATION FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT IS AGAIN, THAT HE WAS PERFORMING SOME TYPE OF LIASON WORK BETWEEN HEYDRICH AND THE FUHRER'S HEADQUARTERS. IT IS CLEAR FROM HIS OWN TESTIMONY THAT HITLER KNEW NEUMANN AT LEAST BY NAME. NEUMANN'S DESCRIPTION OF HOW HITLER BUTTONHOLED HIM AFTER THE MEETING WITH QUISLING IS REVEALING. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY OUT OF CHARACTER FOR ADOLF HITLER, WHO WAS NOT GIVEN TO QUICK INTIMACIES, TO HAVE ASKED THE

OPINION OF AN UNKNOWN AND UNIMPORTANT OFFICER REGARDING A MATTER OF STATE. THE INCIDENT MAKES MUCH MORE SENSE IF WE POSTULATE THAT NEUMANN WAS WELL KNOWN TO HITLER VIA THE HIMMLER/HEYDRICH CONNECTION, AND THAT HE WAS AWARE OF NEUMANN'S CONTACTS IN NORWAY AND HIS MISSION THERE. DEPTOFF HAS VERIFIED, FYI, THAT WEHRNER DAITZ, NEUMANN'S FATHER-IN-LAW, WAS A FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL.

14. IN CONCLUSION, DEPARTMENT FEELS THAT MR. NEUMANN HAS CONCEALED OR MINIMIZED MUCH OF HIS ROLE DURING THE PERIOD 1933-45. DESPITE THE ADMITTEDLY CURSORY EXAMINATION HIS CASE RECEIVED DURING HIS TWO PRIOR APPLICATIONS, DEPARTMENT UPHOLDS THE PRIOR FINDING. MR. NEUMANN'S NAME WILL REMAIN IN AVLOS.

15. DEPARTMENT AGAIN WISHES TO COMMEND POST FOR THE EXCELLENCE OF IT'S REPORTING AND ANALYSIS DURING THIS CASE. ALTHOUGH DEPARTMENT AND POST CAME TO DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS, POST'S ARGUMENTS WERE WELL THOUGHT OUT AND PERSUASIVELY DRAFTED. MANY THANKS.

SHULTZ

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TEXT  
TAGS: CVIS, GE (BESCH, KLAUS)  
SUBJ: POSSIBLE 212(A)(33) INELIGIBILITY

REF: A) VICTARS 080045 B) STATE 226233 C) MUNICH 2348 D)  
USBERLIN1404

1. POST REGRETS THAT STAFFING SHORTAGE IN THE CONSULAR  
SECTION HAS DELAYED THIS OVERDUE REPLY TO REFTEL. CONOFF  
SENT THE FOLLOWING LIST OF QUESTIONS TO MR. BESCH AND  
REPLIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. IN WHICH OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE SS  
DID YOU WORK IN 1935?

I NEVER WORKED IN A SECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
OF THE SS.

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2. WERE YOU A MEMBER OF THE SICHERHEITSDIENST UNDER HEYDRIEH?

NO.

3. WHAT WERE THE EXACT DESIGNATIONS OF THE OFFICERS/UNITS IN WHICH YOU WORKED?

- 3.1. SS SIGNAL BATTALION OF THE GENERAL SS SERVICE TROOPS, BERLIN- ADLERSHOF.
- 3.2. CENTRAL OFFICE OF THE ORDER POLICE STAFF OF GEN. WINKELMANN STAFF OF GEN. DALUEGE
- 3.3. SS-POLICE-DIVISION
- 3.4. 15TH AND 13TH COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, 1ST SS TANK REGIMENT.
- 3.5. SS MORTAR DETACHMENT 501.

4. WHO WERE YOUR SUPERIOR OFFICERS AND COLLEAGUES?

- 4.1. BATTALION COMMANDER SS LT. GEN. BALLAUF COMPANY LEADER (SIGNAL COMPANY) SS CAPTAIN SANSONI.
- 4.2. OTHER COMMANDING OFFICERS AND COLLEAGUES: CHIEF MAIN OFFICE ORDER POLICE GEN. V. BOMHARDT LT. GEN. WINKELMANN MAJOR BEKER LATER ON GENERAL DALUEGE IMMEDIATE BOSS
- 4.3. CHIEF OF STAFF (IA) SS-GENERAL KRUEGER
- 4.4. REGIMENTAL COMMANDER SS-COLONEL WITT BATTALION COMMANDER SS-MAJOR WEIDENHAUPT
- 4.5. STAFF OF SS PERSONNEL MAIN OFFICE (GEN. KLEINHEITSTERKAMP?) BESCH'S ADJUTANT WAS SS-1ST LT. PECKELSEN

5. WHAT WAS THE PRECISE NATURE OF YOUR ASSIGNMENTS IN EACH CASE?

- 5.1. TRAINING FOR RADIO-, TELEPHONE AND TELEXOPERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTION OF TELEPHONELINES.
- 5.2. STAFF OF GEN WINKELMANN: SETTING UP OF FIRE BRIGADES FOR ROMANIA UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIRFORCE STAFF OF GEN DALUEGE: COORDINATION AND PLANNING OF APPOINTMENT, ADMINISTRATION AND SAFE GUARDING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL, PRESCREENING OF INCOMING FILES, ADMINISTRATION OF MOTORPOOL AND AIRCRAFT-POOL, TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE WERE TELEPHONE, TELEX AND RADIO LINES ON OFFICIAL TRIPS, ACCOMPANYING GENERAL DALUEGE ON HIS OFFICIAL TRIPS.
- 5.3. THE SS-POLICE-DIVISION WAS AN INFANTRY DIVISION THAT WAS PUT TOGETHER WITH SECTIONS OF THE ARMY AND THE POLICE. I WAS AN ORDERLY OR STAFF OFFICER IN THE STAFF OF THIS DIVISION DURING THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN.

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5.4. THE 15TH HEAVY ARTILLARY COMPANY CONSISTED OF ONE INFANTRY PLATOON (SS-2ND LT. BODE) AND ONE ANTI-TANK DEFENSE PLATOON. THE COMPANY HAD TO ASSIST THE INFANTRY COMPANY ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE 13TH COMPANY WAS A PURE INFANTRY COMPANY. IN BOTH COMPANIES I WAS COMPANY LEADER.

5.5. AS COMMANDING OFFICER I HAD TO SET UP THE UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MUNICH 03379

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BERLIN FOR BDC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, GE (BESCH, KLAUS)

SUBJ: POSSIBLE 212(A) (33) INELIGIBILITY

MORTARCOMPY 501, WITH THREE LIGHT BATTERIES (10 CM MORTARS) AND ONE HEAVY BATTERY (15 CM MORTARS).

6. WERE YOU A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF GERMAN ARMY AND SD MEN WHO WERE SENT TO THE ROMANIAN OIL FIELDS TO GUARD THEM AGAINST SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS BY THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE?

NO.

7. DID YOU EVER WORK UNDER OTTO ALBRECHT VON BOLSCHWING?

I HAVE NEVER HEARD THE NAME VON BOLSCHWING BEFORE.

8. PLEASE PROVIDE THE NAMES OF YOUR COLLEAGUES AND SUPERIORS OF EACH UNIT TO WHICH YOU WERE ASSIGNED WHILE IN ROMANIA.

I NEVER SERVED IN ROMANIA AND I NEVER WAS A MEMBER OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OR A SS-MANNSCHAFTSHAUS.

9. DID YOU KNOW ANY OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

- HANS WERNER ROEPKE
- WERNER SCHRIEVER
- RUDOLF JEEP
- WERNER KOELLN
- DIETER RADBRUCH
- SS-LT WOLF?

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HEAR THESE NAMES.

10. WERE YOU AN ADJUTANT TO KURT DALUEGE, HEAD OF THE ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI FROM JAN. 1, 1940?

YES, I WAS ONLY AN ADJUTANT. I NEVER WORKED FOR AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

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11. PLEASE GIVE THE DETAILS OF YOUR TWO TRIPS TO FRANCE.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION IN DETAIL. I ONLY MADE ONE TRIP TO FRANCE AS 2ND ADJUTANT IN THE STAFF OF GENERAL DALUEGE RIGHT AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE. IT WAS A PRIVATE TRIP OF GENERAL DALUEGE WITH A VERY SMALL GROUP TO VISIT THE BATTLEFIELDS OF WORLD WAR I AND TO HAVE A LOOK AT PARTS OF THE MAGINOT LINE. ANOTHER TIME I WAS IN FRANCE A SHORT TIME AS COMPANY LEADER OF THE 15TH COMPANY 2ND BATTALION 1ST SS-TANK-GRENADIER-DIVISION SHORTLY NEAR CALAIS AND THEN FOR A LONGER TIME NEAR CAEN STATIONED IN FALAISE AS PART OF THE OCCUPATION TROOPS. OUR FIELD WAS TRAINING WITH WEAPONS, PROBABLY SIMILAR TO TRAINING FOR AMERICAN TROOPS. BEFORE THE INVASION, I WAS STATIONED IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE AS COMMANDER OF THE MORTAR COMPANY TO SET THIS COMPANY UP.

12. PLEASE GIVE THE NAME OF THE COMPANY TO WHICH YOU BELONGED WHILE IN NORTHERN ITALY IN 1943.

IN ITALY I WAS NOT PART OF A SPECIAL UNIT. I WAS THEN PROMOTED TO MAJOR OF THE POLICE AND WAS BATTALION LEADER OF THE RESERVE OF THE 1ST SS-TANK-DIVISION WHICH WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE 1ST SS-TANK-GRENADIER-REGIMENT (COMMANDING OFFICER SS-COLONEL FREY).

13. WHAT WAS THE NAME OF THE UNIT IN WHICH YOU SERVED DURING THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE?

ONLY ONE UNIT: SS-MORTAR-UNIT 501.

MR. BESCH HAS PLANNED A TRIP TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND HAS REQUESTED A TRANSIT VISA. ASSISTANCE APPRECIATED.  
FISCHER

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

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TEXT  
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SUBJECT: 212 (A) (33) CASE

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2007

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

REF: A) VICTARS 080045 B) MUNICH 2348 C) USBERLIN 1404

1. FOR BDC: PLEASE SEND COPIES OF BDC FILES ON KLAUS BESCH, DPOB APRIL 9, 1911, BERLIN. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY ELABORATION BDC MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE CONCERNING BESCH'S INVOLVEMENT WITH INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS, AND CONCERNING HIS TWO TRIPS TO FRANCE.
2. FOR MUNICH: MANY THANKS FOR YOUR EXCELLENT CABLE RE BESCH. THERE ARE SEVERAL INCONSISTENCIES WHICH NEED TO BE CLARIFIED BEFORE A DECISION CAN BE RENDERED IN HIS CASE. PLEASE RE-INTERVIEW MR. BESCH IN LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING.
3. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT BESCH WAS AN EARLY AND COMMITTED NAZI. HE JOINED THE PARTY IN 1930, AND THE ALLGEMEINE SS IN THE SAME YEAR. IN 1933 HE ENROLLED IN THE HILFSPOLIZEI, WHICH WAS A NOTORIOUS GROUP OF SA AND SS MEN WHO WERE OSTENSIBLY INTENDED TO ASSIST THE REGULAR UNIFORMED POLICE IN RESTORING LAW AND ORDER.

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THEY ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT ALL THE BRUTAL AND ILLEGAL TASKS WHICH THE NEW REGIME FELT THE REGULAR POLICE COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PERFORM. THIS INCLUDED THE ARREST AND PERSECUTION OF OPPOSITION MEMBERS, JEWS, CLERGY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL DISSENT.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY HE JOINED THE POLITISCHE BEREITSCHAFT, A SORT OF POLITICAL HIT SQUAD ATTACHED TO THE SS. IN JANUARY, 1935, HE CLAIMS TO HAVE JOINED THE "INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT" OF THE SS. HE MUST CLARIFY EXACTLY WHAT ORGANIZATION FOR WHICH HE WORKED. WAS HE A MEMBER OF THE SICHERHEITSDIENST UNDER HEYDRICH? WHAT WERE THE EXACT DESIGNATIONS OF THE OFFICES/UNITS IN WHICH HE WORKED? WHO WERE HIS SUPERIOR OFFICERS AND COLLEAGUES? WHAT WAS THE PRECISE NATURE OF HIS ASSIGNMENTS THERE? IT WILL APPEAR FROM INFORMATION BELOW THAT BESCH FITS THE PROFILE OF A GERMAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WORKING ABROAD.

5. BESCH'S TRIP TO AFGHANISTAN IS HISTORICALLY VERIFIABLE. HOWEVER, HIS CONTENTION THAT HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SENT TO RUMANIA TO FORM A FIRE-FIGHTING BRIGADE IS PROBABLY A COVER STORY. PLEASE ASK BESCH WHETHER HE WAS, IN FACT, A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF GERMAN ARMY AND SD MEN WHO WERE SENT TO THE RUMANIAN OIL FIELDS TO GUARD THEM AGAINST SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS BY THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE. AN EXCELLENT ACCOUNT OF THIS OPERATION IS GIVEN IN THE BOOK "AGAINST THE WIND" BY GEOFFREY HOUSEHOLD, ONE OF THE BRITISH AGENTS ASSIGNED TO DESTROY THE OIL WELLS. BESCH WAS PROBABLY ASSIGNED TO OTTO ALBRECHT VON BOLSCHWING, THE SD STATION CHIEF IN RUMANIA, WHO WAS UNDER COVER IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY AS POLICE ATTACHE. MR. BESCH SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK, PER SE, IS NOT GROUNDS FOR INELIGIBILITY UNDER 212 (A) (33). THIS GROUP, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN FRUSTRATING BRITISH SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS, BOTH AGAINST THE OIL FIELDS THEMSELVES, AND AGAINST THE OIL BARGES WHICH WENT UP THE DANUBE RIVER TO THE RHINE AND INTO GERMANY.

6. IN ANY EVENT, BESCH MUST PROVIDE THE NAMES OF HIS COLLEAGUES AND SUPERIORS AND OF EACH UNIT TO WHICH HE WAS ASSIGNED WHILE IN RUMANIA. IN ADDITION TO THE ARMY/SD UNIT MENTIONED ABOVE, THERE WAS ALSO A UNIT OF GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (ABWEHR) ASSIGNED TO RUMANIA AT THE TIME. THERE WAS ALSO A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT COMPRISED OF MEMBERS OF THE SS MANNSCHAFTSHAUSER, A UNIVERSITY FRATERNITY CONSISTING OF

SS MEMBERS. TO DEPTOFF'S KNOWLEGE, SIX MANNSCHAFTSHAUS MEMBERS WERE ASSIGNED TO RUMANIA DURING THIS PERIOD: HANS WERNER ROEPKE, WERNER SCHRIEVER, RUDOLF JEEP, WERNER KOELLN, DIETER RADBRUCH, AND AN SS LIETENANT NAMED WOLFF, FIRST NAME UNKNOWN. BESCH COULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WITH THIS GROUP.

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7. ACCORDING TO BOTH HIS NARRATIVE AND THE BDC SUMMARY, HE WAS THEN ASSIGNED AS ADJUTANT TO KURT DALEUGE, HEAD OF THE ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI AS OF JANUARY 1, 1940. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS GIVEN THE MISSION TO RUMANIAN OIL FIELDS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND THEN ON APRIL 28, 1940, IS DETAILED (NOT TRANSFERRED) TO THE 4TH SS DIVISION (POLIZEI) AS PART OF ITS STAFF. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER BESCH'S ASSIGNMENT AS ADJUTANT WAS REAL OR IN NAME ONLY, SERVING AS A COVER FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. HE MUST CLARIFY THIS POINT, AND EXPLAIN IN DETAIL HIS TWO TRIPS TO FRANCE. HIS DENIAL THAT HE MADE THESE TRIPS IS SPURIOUS.

8. BESCH MUST ALSO DETAIL TO PRECISELY WHICH COMPANY HE WAS ATTACHED WHILE IN NORTHERN ITALY IN 1943. WAS IT THE SAME UNIT AS THAT IN WHICH HE SERVED IN APRIL OF 1942? THE LEIBSTANDARTE ADOLF HITLER, WHILE DETAILED THERE, MASSACRED THE TOWN OF BOVES, KILLING MORE THAN 600 MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AN ANTI-PARTISAN CAMPAIGN. SIMILARLY, THE EXACT UNIT(S) IN WHICH HE SERVED DURING THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE ARE NECESSARY, SINCE ELEMENTS OF THE SS PANZER ARMY WHICH SPEARHEADED THAT OFFENSIVE MASSACRED SOME 150 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AT MALMEDY, BELGIUM ON DECEMBER 17, 1944.

9. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP AND PLEASE SLUG REPLY FOR CA/VO/L/C FRED SMITH. EAGLEBURGER

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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