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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 308

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 10 Nov 45

Division of Origin: Office of the Chairman.

Personnel Interviewed: Marquis KIDO, Koichi, Lord Keeper of
the Privy Seal.

Interrogators: Mr Franklin D'Olier
Mr Paul Nitze
Captain T. J. Hedding, USN
Mr Kenneth Galbraith
Mr Paul Baran

Where Interviewed: Conference Room, 7th Floor, Meiji Bldg.

Interpreter: Lt (jg) W. H. Gorham, USNR
Marquis Kido's Personal Interpreter
(Mr. T. Henry Shimanouchi)


Allied Officers Present: Brigadier General Grandison Gardner
Colonel Phillip Cole, AC
Commander Richard Reeve, USNR
Lt Comdr Walter Wilds, USNR

S U M M A R Y

Marquis KIDO discussed the political and military relationships and factors which developed during the period from the Marianas campaign to the surrender in August, 1945. He also reviewed Japan's initial war aims, relations between the army and the navy, effects of the atom bombs and Russia's entry into the war, and certain points concerning the negotiations with Washington in the Fall of 1941.

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I N T E R R O G A T I O N

- Q. Please thank the Marquis for us in coming over here. I understand that Comdr Wilds has already given the Marquis some indication of the nature of our work and has explained that we are trying to get the broad trends of the war from the Marquis' viewpoint.
- A. As I told Comdr Wilds this morning, all of my official documents were lost - burned, having been bombed out three times during the war, but I shall do my best to relate whatever is necessary and as accurately as possible from memory.
- Q. At what time did you believe that the military situation had developed to such an extent as to make it advisable to give reconsideration to the continuation of the war?
- A. Rather early - after the fall of Saipan. It was my opinion at that time that it was advisable to give consideration to dis-continuing the war. Due to various governmental reasons, it was difficult under the circumstances to do anything about it.
- Q. What, in your opinion, were the particularly significant factors in the fall of Saipan? What was the turning point in your opinion?
- A. Generally speaking, two reasons: First, the fall of Saipan meant the intensification of American air attacks upon the Japanese Home Islands. Secondly, the failure of the navy, upon which our Japanese people in general had placed a great deal of reliance; and the failure at that time had a very strong influence on our feelings in regard to the war.
- Q. How did you envisage the future developments of the war, were the war to continue? What stages did you foresee in the development of the war after the fall of Saipan?
- A. Following the fall of Saipan and the beginning of the B-29 air attacks on Japan, it became clear that our Japanese strategy could not be coordinated. Not only in the large cities, but also in the medium and the small cities Japanese industry was destroyed and robbed of its capacity to produce for war. Another thing that occurred to me was the eventuality of a landing operation on the Japanese Home Islands by the Allied Forces. I was very much worried that our civilian population at home would collapse because of the destruction that had been wrought upon the cities of Japan.
- Q. What might the consequences of such a collapse of the civilian population have been?
- A. It is rather difficult to project my imagination regarding that question. The collapse of the civilian population would have meant that it would be impossible for Japan to continue the war, and it is not difficult to imagine that there might have been peace movements among the populace, or these anti-war movements, although I did not expect such movements as early.
- Q. I do not understand "as early"?
- A. I will have to repeat my statement. I had not expected the development of any anti-war movement, but rather that the destruction of the cities and the consequent loss of homes and the increase of casualties and shortages of food would have produced a situation of an intensity which would have been most difficult to handle.

Q. I wonder whether you can give us a picture of the internal political situation at the time of the fall of Saipan. What groups had a general opinion, similar to your own, what groups had opposing opinions and what were the relationships between them?

A. The Japanese people in general had placed much expectation on Saipan. They had thought that Saipan was heavily fortified and heavily defended, but this proved otherwise, and the consequences greatly shocked the Japanese people. In order to meet that situation, General Tojo, the Prime Minister at the time, took upon himself another office -- that of Chief of the Army General Staff; and by assuming greater powers he incited a great deal of opposition against him, which was already growing in Japan and intensified from day to day to a policy of "Down with Tojo". War production at that time was not making any headway and the people's life was becoming more difficult.

As a consequence, the Tojo government, in order to meet the situation and to obtain results, intensified the various controls on the economic life of the people. This, in itself, was another point which drew strong criticism against him from the people. The opinion among the civilian population was to give a wide latitude to the people themselves and to permit them to exercise greater initiative. This they believed would secure better results than otherwise. These developments culminated in the fall of the Tojo Cabinet in July 1945. Preceding that, various groups, such as the Governmental Rule Assistance Association, were holding daily meetings advocating the idea of giving more initiative to the people in order to increase the war productive strength of the nation.

Q. Was there an increase in the split between the army and the navy about that time?

A. That question, of course, was very much in existence at that time and voices were raised advocating the unification or the combining of the High Command.

Q. Was Admiral Yonai active in that movement?

A. Admiral Yonai was not active at all at that time.

Q. What was the composition of the group which felt similarly to you at the time of the fall of Saipan as to the advisability of a reconsideration of the full prosecution of the war?

A. Generally speaking, the so-called Liberals of Japan, congregated at the clubs and quite a large number of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives and most of the so-called Elder Statesmen were of the opinion that something should be done.

Q. What was done?

A. It was merely an expression of views and opinions and nothing was done about it.

Q. Why was nothing done about it?

A. The answer to that question I do not know. I and others hoped that something would be done, but nothing came out of it.

Q. Was the question of the attitude of the army a controlling factor?

A. As you say, the army was a controlling factor and, furthermore, the gendarmerie (Military Police) had increased and intensified its network and suppressed expressions of views against the war.

- Q. In the event the Emperor had issued an Imperial Rescript at that time, could the army have been counted on loyally to obey it?
- A. There was the danger of a coup if the Emperor had prescribed a peace before the fall of Germany. It would be difficult for me to judge what would have developed had the Emperor issued an Imperial Rescript at that time. As a matter of fact, that sort of feeling or atmosphere was not sufficiently widespread even among the political people in general.
- Q. What, in your opinion, would have had to occur before the army could come around to the viewpoint that they could and would obey an Imperial Rescript for peace?
- A. It would have been necessary to come to a state of affairs in which the leaders of the fighting services would come to the point of view that it was necessary and, at least before the fall of Germany, there was no indication of anything like that in the fighting services.
- Q. Did the subsequent engagement in the Philippines in which the army - the Japanese Army - suffered a defeat have a bearing on that point of view?
- A. That was not clear at the time of the Philippine Campaign and the publicity of the time was that something was going to be done at Okinawa.
- Q. When Mr Koiso was appointed Prime Minister, after the fall of Tojo, did Mr Koiso accept the feeling that something should be done about reconsideration of the continuation of the war?
- A. He seemed to have entertained the feeling early that some reconsideration was necessary. As it developed, however, his Cabinet was determined to pursue the policy of all-out continuation of the war.
- Q. Does the selection of the Prime Minister require the unanimous sanction of the Jushin?
- A. Not necessarily, the selection - the designation of the Prime Minister is made by the Lord Keeper of the Seal, who consults the Elder Statesmen of the Jushin in making the decision.
- Q. Was the Jushin consulted in the selection of Admiral Suzuki to succeed Mr Koiso?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What factors led to the selection of Suzuki as against someone else?
- A. The point against the Koiso government was that it did not think of matters or problems fundamentally. Admiral Suzuki is a man without any attachments here or there - a man who would come down to rock bottom in considering a fundamental reconsideration of the war policy. The fundamental reconsideration of such a question would require a man of deep sincerity and enormous courage and there was no other man but Admiral Suzuki because the problem required that he stake his life in pursuing his task.
- Q. What steps did Admiral Suzuki take in "fundamentally reconsidering" this problem?
- A. I am not familiar with what steps he took, but the common sense view of the situation was not whether something would be done, but how to do it and when to do it.

Q. Could you give us some of the steps which finally did lead to the issuance of the Imperial Rescript?

A. The movement - the first steps were taken on, if I remember correctly, June 8th or 9th, that is, this year, when the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Service Ministers concurred in the view that certain definite steps must be taken. The general idea at the moment was to have the USSR mediate in the negotiations for peace. Talks were also going on to send Prince Konoye as the Emissary, if the Prince was acceptable to the Soviet Government. Our message suggesting that we would send Prince Konoye as an emissary probably reached Moscow after Commissar Molotov had left for the Potsdam Conference, and there was no reply. Then came the Potsdam Declaration and following the return of Molotov to Moscow, the Soviet Union entered the War against Japan. That raised the question of acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration since it was impossible to continue the war.

Several Cabinet sessions were held at the outset, but no agreement could be arrived at. Although the Minister of War felt that there was no choice but to bring the war to an end. The feelings and views within the Army, however, were not necessarily so. There were opinions on both sides of the matter. The atomic bomb had a strong effect upon bringing those - for want of a better term I would use "fence sitters" to the view that the war must be stopped. Is that outline satisfactory?

Q. In your opinion, was the entry of Russia into the war and the impact of her armies against the Japanese armies of greater importance than the effects of the dropping of the atomic bombs?

A. What you want to know is whether the impact of the Russian entry into the war or the effects of the atomic bombs - which of the two had the greater effect. As far as the atomic bombs are concerned, the army endeavored at first to minimize the effects of them and on top of that an investigation of the results had not been thorough enough to give us an idea of their real effects. To answer the question which of the two - the entry of Russia into the war and the dropping of the atomic bombs - had the greatest effect on the army - I can not say.

Q. Is it your opinion that a more or less unanimous agreement on the part of the cabinet, including the Navy and War Ministers, would have been necessary at all times before an Imperial Rescript would be issued?

A. Steps were made to obtain the agreement of the army and navy ministers before the issuance of the Rescript; otherwise it would have been an exceedingly difficult problem to keep the fighting services in order. The navy was in favor of this from the very outset, but the war minister, because of the forces behind him, was unable to give his consent at first.

Q. Was any attempt made prior to August 8th to secure the agreement of the Service ministries to more drastic action looking toward the termination of the war than the negotiations which were going on through Russia?

A. Yes, as I have stated before, steps to secure the agreement of the Service ministries had been going on ever since the first part of June and various moves in that direction were being made.

Q. Were any steps taken prior to June, April, for instance, when the Suzuki first came in?

A. An increasing number of opinions were being expressed, but as to concrete steps, there were none previous to those dates.

- Q. In the event that atomic bombs had not been dropped and Russia had not entered the war, how long in your opinion might the war have continued?
- A. As I have stated, our decision to seek a way out of this war was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped and Russia had not yet entered the war. It was already our decision.
- Q. The dropping of the atomic bombs and the entry of Russia into the war apparently did speed the agreement of the services ministries to end the war. What we would like to get is the degree to which this was speeded up?
- A. It was not the time factor. It was the fact that it made the task easier to bring the war to a close by silencing those who would advocate the continuation of the war. If there had been no dropping of the atomic bomb or entry of the Soviet Union into the war, I am inclined to be very doubtful whether the policy to bring the war to a close would have progressed as smoothly. A rather large-scale outbreak within the armed forces could easily be imagined.
- Q. Is it proper then to interpret it as being your opinion that the war might have been over in any case prior to November 1st even without the entry of Russia into the war and the dropping of the atomic bombs?
- A. I personally think that the war would have ended prior to November 1, as every possible effort was being exhausted to terminate the war.
- Q. Would you say the effect of the atomic bombs were very different in the minds of the government from the effects of the B-29 raids which took place previously? Did the government react differently than they did to the general B-29 air attacks?
- A. The effect was very much greater. The effect of the atomic bomb was much greater than the B-29 air attacks because one single plane with one single bomb eliminated some 100,000 people in a single strike.
- Q. I understand for instance that a B-29 raid on Tokyo in March 1945 was extremely damaging in terms of casualties and real damage. Was the effect of this raid similar to that which took place when the atomic bomb was dropped?
- A. As I stated before the effect of the atomic bomb was much greater in view of the fact that a single plane carrying a single bomb could eliminate such a large population in one strike, and also the fact that it affected people after the bomb was dropped and so the psychological effect of the atomic bomb was greater. Heretofore, a single B-29 meant that it was on reconnaissance, but after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the information that a lone plane was coming into the area would force every citizen to take shelter in his dugout.
- Q. What were the army's plans in the first days after the Soviet Union declared war against Japan? What were the strategic plans of the army to deal with the Soviet entry into the war?
- A. Since there is a military problem, I do not know anything of the details regarding it.
- Q. Do you think the army was fairly optimistic about the war against Russia?
- A. In my observation, the army was not optimistic at all. Although I am not acquainted with its equipment or installations, it did not appear to me that the army was optimistic at all.

- Q. Do you have the impression that the ground forces at that time were well equipped in military supplies to face an invasion of Japan proper?
- A. The equipment was poor and was becoming increasingly poor, and that information became widespread among the general population which created the similar view that it was difficult to continue the prosecution of the war.
- Q. Immediately after the German surrender, which left Japan in an isolated position to say the least, what were the discussions that went on at that time about Japan's position? Were discussions held as to the desirability of continuing the war?
- A. There was no active discussion at the time of the German surrender, but parallel with the discussion that the German situation was hopeless, the opinion was also being raised that something should be done from the point of view of the Japanese government bringing the war to an end.
- Q. In the event that the atomic bombs had not been dropped and Russia had not entered the war, would a successful invasion of one of the Japanese Home Islands have been necessary to force an agreement between the military services in order to take positive steps to stop the war?
- A. Every effort was being made to bring the war to an end without an invasion of any kind on the Home Islands. If the matter had been prolonged there might have been some confusion, but as the situation stood it was realized that the war could be terminated without much difficulty.
- Q. Did the army feel confident of their ability to resist an invasion and make an invasion unsuccessful?
- A. That was how it was explained to us by the army. There were confident.
- Q. We heard a story that at one stage the Emperor had called in the ministers of war and navy and had said: "As all wars have a beginning, so they must have an end. How does the army and how does the navy propose to bring the war to an end?" Is that a correct story?
- A. There were inquiries on the part of the Emperor from time to time on the subject.
- Q. Is the story correct in general?
- A. I think that there were such inquiries on the part of his Majesty. However, not having been in the presence of the interview, I do not know to what extent this was said, or what the contents of the story would be.
- Q. At approximately what time might that interview have been?
- A. I do not know, as interviews between the service ministries and the Emperor happened very frequently. I should imagine at one of these interviews such an incident took place.
- Q. Was it as early as April, or in the June period, or the August period?
- A. I should think that it might have been in June that such an interview had taken place.
- Q. One thing which has interested us very much is the relationship between the army and the navy, particularly in the early days of the war and the extent to which the plans of one were concurred in by the other. I wonder if you could give us a description of the way the plans of the army and navy were coordinated at a high level?

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- A. I believe that coordination between the two services at the highest level was being maintained at a rather high degree at the time of the outbreak of the war.
- Q. Was it considered that the war would be a naval war, a ground war or an air war?
- A. Not being a professional, I do not know the technical aspects of the question, but it was general opinion that if we lost supremacy of the air, we also would lose supremacy of the sea and/or land.
- Q. Was it felt that the major fighting burden would be conducted by the army or the navy?
- A. It was the view that since most of the operations would have to be conducted in outlying islands, the greater burden would have to be placed upon the navy in supporting and supplying these island bases.
- Q. We understand that Admiral Yamamoto was of the opinion prior to the outbreak of the war that the naval balance of power might be in favor of Japan for a period of two years or a year, but that thereafter he was doubtful. Have you heard of that opinion?
- A. Yes, I have heard of it.
- Q. In view of that fact it would appear to us that General Tojo and those who were in control of the situation must have hoped to secure these islands during the first year or year and a half; is that correct?
- A. I believe that is how it had been explained.
- Q. We also understand that at that time the opinion was prevalent that Germany would probably be successful in its war against Russia. Was that opinion given considerable weight?
- A. It was viewed that Germany would succeed in its campaign against Russia. It was hoped within the Japanese government that Germany would succeed in her war against Russia, but it was not necessarily the opinion of the Japanese government that Germany would succeed and it was felt that Germany should avoid a clash with the Soviet Union.
- Q. After Germany did go ahead with an attack on Russia, was the question considered of Japan's going to the assistance of Germany at that time?
- A. That was not considered and I recall that the Germans on their part did not consider receiving Japanese assistance.
- Q. Why wasn't it considered?
- A. It is my opinion that insofar as Japan was concerned sufficient preparations had not been made for a venture of that kind. The Germans were constantly informing the people here that the war against Russia would be completed within a very short time - a matter of three months or so.
- Q. If there was the prospect of Germany defeating Russia, what preparations were necessary to enter a war against Russia? Why was it not a good opportunity to attack Russia and to participate in a victory over Russia?
- A. It is my view from what I have been able to gather that - although I am not familiar with the strategic plans or the military plans of a possible war with Russia - so far as the preparations were concerned it was not sufficient and if those preparations were built up to a certain necessary point, it would become a winter campaign for which Japan was not prepared.

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- Q. In the event Japan successfully occupied those areas outlined in blue on this map (See Appendix A), which we understand from the Japanese Navy constitutes the area which was originally contemplated to be occupied, would not a victory by Germany over Russia have made it easier for Japan to hold that area in any peace negotiations which might follow?
- A. From the very outset there was no idea or intention on Japan's part to acquire these territories; or that the intention of Japan was the acquisition of new territory.
- Q. What was the intention, if it was not to hold that area?
- A. This was the intention as defined and clarified in the declaration of the Greater East Asiatic Nations - to secure or acquire natural resources for Japanese existence and to make these areas a peaceful area permitting free and peaceful exchange of economic goods.
- Q. Did the Japanese navy have any feeling that certain isolated bases might have been retained, such as Rabaul?
- A. As to such detailed items I have not heard at all.
- Q. How was it contemplated that the war might be brought to a termination?
- A. It was contemplated that an end to the war could be brought about along the lines set forth in the Greater East Asia Declaration, but in the final stage of the war it became extremely difficult to terminate the war in accordance with those principles and so the last stand had to be taken on the basis of national defense and survival.
- Q. I did not state my question clearly. I meant to refer to thought as it existed in 1941 - in November or December. How was it contemplated at the time Japan went to war that a unification of that area could be secured. The thing that is not clear is how Japan thought it would permanently secure these objectives. At some time or other a peace would have to arrive to secure that plan.
- A. The plan was to seek a termination of the war at an opportune moment and that opportune moment would be at a time when the armed forces of the countries would come to a point where the fighting would be fixed, but unfortunately for Japan such a time never came because of the strong pressure of the United States Armed Forces.
- Q. Previously you have stated that the coordination between the army and the navy in high levels was good in initial stages of the war. Did that remain so throughout the progress of the war?
- A. It was not necessarily good afterwards. I am not acquainted with what took place inside of the fighting services. The point is that both army and the navy were each trying to go its own way and fighting the war for itself. Then came a course in the war which the army and the navy had never before experienced - this war in isolated, outlying islands-and there came an attempt on the part of both the army and the navy to build up its own supply forces and thereby weakened the coordination between the two forces.
- Q. We have had explained very well the war aims of Japan and the means by which these war aims were to be accomplished. Which of the two services do you consider had a proper concept or understanding of the basic war aims of the Greater East Asia Plan?
- A. That is a difficult question to answer, but the understanding of both fighting services seems to have been insufficient as I see it.

- Q. Which of the two services had the most influence in the prosecution of the war?
- A. Normally in the past, it would be the army, but in this war I think the middle ranks of the navy had a powerful influence. It seems that it was because of the question of petroleum.
- Q. In the formulation of the broad plans of the war, do I infer that the navy had the greater influence on the formulation of national policies?
- A. In my understanding the high levels were not in favor of the war, but the pressure on that was put by the middle levels, but as to which had the most powerful influence I can not say.
- Q. Going back again to the plans at the time of December 1941, in the event that the desired islands had been occupied and the line stabilized for a period of time and negotiations had not resulted in favorably securing the long-term aims of Japan, was it felt that Japan could resist on that line for a long period of time?
- A. If it were possible to develop and utilize the natural resources of raw materials obtained from the occupied areas, it would have been possible to have fought this war for a considerable length of time, but actually, however, due to the insufficiency in shipping these anticipated developments did not take place.
- Q. At what time did it first appear that this original plan was going astray?
- A. Just about the time when radio-detecting devices, locators, appeared in large numbers and this began to increase your success in the sinking of our shipping and about the time when the German U-boats were also experiencing difficulties and suffering heavy losses.
- Q. When did the unfavorable developments first become apparent on the front line position?
- A. From the time the Japanese operations vis-a-vis Port Moresby fell and the failure at Guadalcanal.
- Q. How about the action at Midway?
- A. At that time it was not believed that the situation was bad because the various new equipment and weapons had not yet made their appearance.
- Q. Are you familiar with the document which was prepared by the war and navy departments in approximately October, 1941 comparing the military potential of Japan and the United States?
- A. I did not know about it.
- Q. On the fall of the Konoye Cabinet in October 1941, why was Prince Higashi-Kuni not selected to succeed Konoye rather than Tojo?
- A. It is not our policy to have a prince of the blood form a cabinet unless under entirely peaceful conditions. The situation at that time was that the military were already upon an open policy of war and when it was asked that Prince Higashi-Kuni form a cabinet inquiry was made of the army whether it proposed to make a 180° turn into a policy of peace, but since the policy was otherwise it was absolutely unsatisfactory to recommend Prince Higashi-Kuni as the chief of the succeeding cabinet. It is also difficult for an Imperial Prince to carry out a war policy and the Prince also had the support of the Rightist elements which were also set upon war and it was believed that the Prince was not the person to occupy that position under such circumstances.

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- Q. What arguments did the army use in order to decrease the concessions which Admiral Nomura was authorized to make in Washington to the point where the negotiations could not succeed?
- A. At first the military was rather enthusiastic in connection with the negotiations with the United States Government, but as the negotiations proceeded various concrete details were introduced which created divisions of opinions within the army. For instance, the question of withdrawal of Japanese Forces from China. If that had been the only point, there might have been a solution, but there were other points raised during the negotiations which because of their seriousness increased the power of certain elements within the army in opposition to a solution on the basis set forth.
- Q. What were those other points?
- A. I do not recall at the present moment the other points in detail, but the points were listed in the United States Government's note of November 26th, which was totally unexpected - a surprise.
- Q. What concessions at that time was Admiral Nomura permitted to make as a result of the conferences with Prince Konoye? What were his instructions - how far was he permitted to go in his negotiations with President Roosevelt?
- A. As to what extent the Ambassador could go, I could not say.
- Q. From all of these discussions I gain the impression that the army was an independent factor in political circles and that it was acting as a state within a state. What can you say as to the historical origin of this relationship?
- A. As a result of Japanese victories in the Russo-Japanese war the the Sino-Japanese wars, the army expanded to a considerable extent and as a result increased its voice in national affairs and parallel with the expansion and influence of the army the political parties also developed especially after World War I. The political parties made rapid strides and the nation was progressing towards democratization. Then came the world-wide depression which created many serious problems. This situation served only as a stimulus to the military. As is well known, most of our army comes from the rural areas - the agricultural areas which were seriously affected by the world-wide depression, and these events served as an impetus in bringing the military upward, resulting, for instance, in the Manchurian Incident. That, briefly, is the process of the historical rise of the Japanese army.
- Q. What was the relationship of the ZAIBATSU to the Manchurian Incident?
- A. They were related in that it was the feeling in the Army that their people were being exploited. These younger officers felt the necessity of taking the burden of national reform on their shoulders and brought on the Manchurian Incident as a means of alleviating the problem. They hoped to establish a communistic type of state in Manchuria and later bring it back to Japan. The ZAIBATSU did not support this because it was also the view of these younger officers to save their country by eliminating the ZAIBATSU.
- Q. Would you say the development in Manchuria was very slow in view of the lack of cooperation of big business in Japan?
- A. Yes, that might be considered legitimate.
- Q. Did the Army control the internal political life of Japan?
- A. There was no system of control within the country.


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- Q. Did the Regional Army Commanders exercise any actual control over the Prefectures?
- A. Not as strong as might sometimes be imagined. After the outbreak of the war their influence increased.
- Q. Do you think that the Emperor and the civilian authorities around him at some point could have curbed this military rise to power, or was this impossible?
- A. There were no concrete instances of this nature, and the influence of the army gradually increased.
- Q. Do you think that from the time of the Manchurian Incident Japan's foreign policy was mainly determined by the army, or was it an independent foreign policy?
- A. In form, the policy was determined by the civilian government, by the foreign office, but actually speaking the army had a voice in the determination of policy which made it difficult for the civilian government to pursue a policy of its own.
- Q. Are you familiar with the general broad economic plans which were envisaged for the organizing of raw materials from the southern resources area to permit Japan to continue for a long time the period of resistance?
- A. I have not heard the details, nor were there any detailed reports sent.
- Q. Was the failure to secure the necessary resources of the southern area more attributable to the loss in shipping, or to a failure to plan the exploitation of these islands adequately in advance?
- A. The main reason is to be found in the shipping situation, but I have frequently heard that the plans were always behind in execution, and one of the factors was because of the shortage of bottoms and therefore no plans were being carried out as scheduled.
- Q. We have been led to understand in other interviews that as early as December 1944, some of the groups who felt that the war must be brought to a close contemplated fairly drastic action. Are you familiar with those meetings?
- A. I do not recall anything specific, but as I have said before there were opinions that the war should be brought to an end.
- Q. Did you ever hear of any moves on foot to remove those in the military who objected to bringing the war to an end?
- A. There were various rumors to such effect, but nothing concrete. Also, because of the extreme secrecy I do not know anything about the personnel question within the army.
- Q. Do you have any estimate of the numbers in the military organization who would have had to be arrested in order to take drastic action toward peace without danger of interference by the military.
- A. It would be impossible to attain such an objective merely by shifting personnel or removing certain persons. The only logical alternative would be the policy which was actually followed in bringing this war to a termination by pressure from the top.

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LEGEND

- (Solid Line) Japanese Proposed Perimeter of Offensive
- - - - - (Dash Line) First Defense Line
- . - . - . (Dash-Dot Line) Second Defense Line
- > (Arrow) Points of Projected Occupation

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