

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO. 493

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 5 Dec 1945

SUBJECT: Airborne Radar: Operations and Tactics.

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Military Analysis

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED: Maj MIYTSURU IWAMIYA
Maj ENDO SHINSHI

WHERE INTERVIEWED: War Ministry, Air Headquarters.

INTERROGATOR: Lt B. W. Corey

INTERPRETERS: Mr. Dennis Kildoyle
Mr. Rokugo Shinya

ALLIED OFFICERS PRESENT: None.

SUMMARY

Major IWAMIYA and Major ENDO describe the allocation and operation of the airborne radar equipment. They explained that no airplane was ever built with the consideration of installing radar and that the main trouble that the Air Force experienced was insufficient radar equipment.

RESTRICTED

493-1-



Q. What was your duty during the war Major Iwamiya?

A. I was a bomber pilot, assigned to the Materiel section of the Army Air Headquarters.

Q. What was your duty Major Endo?

A. I was in the technical communication section.

Q. What was the first piece of radar employed in a plane?

A. Taki 1, for air search vessel purpose.

Q. When did you first employ this?

A. We first used this equipment at Davao in February 1943 to detect submarines. The operation was not successful. After Davao it was used in connection with finding task forces for torpedo groups.

Q. How many planes were installed with this piece of equipment?

A. About 100 planes were so equipped. A few Taki 1 were installed in the KI-49, a few in the KI-21, but most were installed in the KI-67. This piece of radar was used throughout the war. A few planes in Sumatra had Taki 1 and planes stationed along the coast of the Japanese homeland.

Q. What was the next piece of equipment employed operationally?

A. We had Taki 2 next, but it was never used operationally because of poor performance.

Q. But what was the next set used operationally after Taki 1.

A. Taki 13, a low altitude altimeter, was employed about June 1944. They were used very successfully off Saipan and Okinawa.

Q. How many planes were equipped with this set?

A. About three hundred planes were equipped with this set. The planes were for the most part stationed at Hamamatsu and in Kyushu. The Navy used the same set with different tubes. We were more particular about the tubes we used. The Navy used any tube that could be found.

Q. What was the next piece of equipment used operationally?

A. Taki 15, an IFF, was used for Ground Control Interception in Sept 1944, along with the ground set Tachi 13. About 50 planes were installed with Taki 15, but the GCI setup was restricted for use around Tokyo. This was operated only three or four times. The whole operation depended upon Taki 2, an Air Interception Set, for homing on the approaching enemy. But the Taki 2 never got out of the laboratory.

Q. Did you not have straight IFF set up?

A. That was Taki 15 type 2. It never got out of the laboratory.

Q. Did you not consider it important or did you feel that American IFF was the distinguishing feature for you as the Navy did?

A. We felt that IFF was important, but it never got out of the development stage. As for distinguishing American IFF, the Army could not do it. The Navy IFF worked on the same frequency as the American IFF and therefore, tripped on the American IFF.

Q. Did you use any navigational devices?

A. We used Taki 1 for finding an island, and used Taki 15 to carry on a position finding query in morse with the personnel who operated Tachi 13 on the ground.

Q. Did you employ jammers?

A. No, jammers were in the experimental stage.

Q. Did you use chaff?

A. Yes, in 1944.

Q. Did you not have chaff before this?

A. Chaff had been distributed to the various air forces precut to 75 cm. length at the factory, in 1943, but the air forces doubted its efficacy until it was used with noted success in Burma. After that, it was used widely. We really did not press use of chaff until intelligence from Germany had informed us of the effectiveness of chaff in the Hamburg raid in Germany in May 1944.

Q. How did you know chaff was effective?

A. Chaff cut down casualties and losses.

Q. Did you use infra red devices?

A. No.

Q. Did you employ any radio controlled weapons?

A. We studied them but never got to the point that we could utilize them.

Q. What could Japan have done to improve its performance during the war in electronics?

A. We could have developed better tubes, gotten better assembly methods, and obtained larger production of equipment. The air forces demanded planes and they were sent out without any radar equipment.

Q. When did Japan realize that radar was a weapon of war?

A. We realized that in 1943, but no plane had ever been built for the use of radar alone, nor was consideration given by aircraft engineers for installation of radar.