

[H.A.S.C. No. 110-75]

**MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED
(MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM**

JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER & EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
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THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2007

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**MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE PROGRAM**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH AIR AND LAND
FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, *Washington, DC, Thursday,
July 19, 2007.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. TAYLOR. The committee will come to order.

Today, the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee joins the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee in open session to receive testimony concerning our number one priority: the safety of American service men and women serving in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This hearing is focused on the procurement of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle, MRAP. The MRAP family of vehicles offers significant protection for the troops from mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) exploding under their vehicle. This is due to increased ground clearance and, most importantly, to a V-shaped undercarriage which helps channel the force of the blast away from the vehicle.

Make no mistake; this is not just another hearing on a Department of Defense program experiencing difficulty in cost and schedule. This is a hearing concerning the life and death of our soldiers, sailors and Marines serving in Iraq.

I have not been satisfied with the response of the Bush Administration to the force protection needs of our troops. In fact, I see this as the fourth verse of a really stupid song.

The first verse was that not every trooper needed the best body armor. The Guard and Reserve don't need it because they are going to be in the back lines. And only after people died needlessly did every trooper get the small arms protective inserts (SAPI) plates.

The second verse was on up-armor, that not every vehicle needs to be up-armored. And then the requirement was set artificially low. And for those of you who don't talk Department of Defense (DOD), the requirement was a number that the Department of Defense came up with as to how many vehicles that left the bases would be armored, and the DOD repeatedly told us that they had

met requirement, only for the moms and dads to needlessly lose their kids when we found out the requirement wasn't 100 percent of the vehicles; it was at different times 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, and then only belatedly 100 percent.

The third was with jammers, the same thing. For this member's second trip to Iraq in December of 2003, shortly being going there, the DOD very kindly showed me that I was going to be protected with something called a jammer. It was an electronic device to jam the signal of an improvised explosive device so that it would not detonate when the vehicle I was in passed by. And I remember asking, "Great. What about the troops?" "Oh, they are expensive. They are very expensive. We don't know if we can afford them for everybody."

So, once again, the third verse of this song was the civilian leadership of the DOD set an artificially low number percentage of vehicles that would be protected with these, and then they classified the number so that members of this committee could not even tell the American people how artificially low that number was. And only after people died needlessly was a requirement set at every vehicle.

Even now, troops training to go to Iraq and Afghanistan don't even see a jammer until they get to Iraq or Afghanistan. And just this week when I posed that question to an Under Secretary of Defense and the head of the Joint Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Task Force, I was told that, "Well, that is not so. You see, the regular soldiers do see a jammer before they get to the theater. It is just the Guardsmen and Reservists who don't."

I grew up in the Deep South, and I vividly remember double standards. They were wrong then; they are wrong now. If the regular Army troops can train with a jammer before they get to Iraq, then we sure as heck want to see to it that those Guardsmen and Reservists who are training right now at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and other places around our country get it as well.

And, Mr. Young, I would hope that you would take that message back to the Secretary of Defense, that that is totally unacceptable, and that is a conversation that took place this week. And, by the way, the vast majority of funerals that I have been to have been from Guardsmen and Reservists.

So this is the fourth version of this really stupid song, and that is, "Yes, there is a technology available to save young people's lives, but it is expensive." You know, we keep hoping this war will wrap up, so do we really want to buy this vehicle that is going to save lives because, if the war ends, then we are going to be stuck with them?

Well, that is contrary to what the President of the United States is telling people. He is telling people that we are going to be in this war as long as he is President, and there is a pretty good chance that the person who replaces him will feel the same way. After all, as a teenager, I remember a guy running for President who had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam—not to win it, to end it—and if I recall correctly, his secret plan took over four years.

So there is a pretty good chance another Presidential candidate will come along with another secret plan to end another war, and

it could well take four years. And if that is the case, the idea that kids will be traveling around Iraq in vehicles that expose them to death is totally unacceptable, and if it is just a matter of money, then let's fix it.

So, again, we have a very distinguished panel here. I have laid out my thoughts. But I want to tell you that I am like every American who read that USA Today story this week. I am absolutely appalled at how long this program has taken, that troops in the field requested these vehicles, according to published reports, starting in 2004, here we are in 2007, and that even today, after the secretary of defense correctly came back and said, "I will reprogram some funds to put about another thousand of those vehicles in Iraq," that we still only have now a target of about 7,700 vehicles when there are over 17,000 vehicles to be replaced.

So my message to you, gentlemen, is you tell us how much you need, and then tell us how quickly you are going to do it, and for God's sake, don't come up with some artificial number-called requirement if that number is one less than every vehicle that is going to leave the gate in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I now yield to the Ranking Member of the Air and Land Subcommittee, Congressman Abercrombie.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to associate myself with your opening remarks, but I think, particularly in relation to your concluding commentary, I want to take the opportunity to put some figures out there and I hope this will be helpful to you. It is not going to sound like it is, but it should give you some sense of direction with respect to what both committees are having to come to grips with as we try to combine the Defense Authorization bill and the Appropriations bill, and you will notice I say "we." This is not being done by party or by ideology.

The list of the Department of Defense programs experiencing cost, schedule, and performance difficulties is lengthy. That is not the issue. This program had a nearly 50 percent increase in cost in 3 months. That is one of the things you are going to have to come to grips with to try and assist us to be able to make good decisions. It really does very little good to have public pronouncements about the Congress trying to micromanage, let alone macromanage, either warfighting or preparation for war if the Congress cannot even get basic information to make decisions to enable us to provide for the armed forces.

I think that bears repeating. This program had a nearly 50 percent increase in cost, not in numbers. It is not the question of the change in the numbers. We can accept that. In fact, we have been dealing with it. Some of you gentlemen that are here before us now have briefed us in classified closed briefings about numbers changing, and I think it is fair to say without revealing anything that no member of these committees has ever indicated that that was of particular difficulty in the sense of us trying to come to grips

with it as committees in terms of recommendations either for authorization or appropriation.

But in 90 days, the costs that we were trying to associate with the change in numbers of vehicles that would be needed have increased 50 percent from \$8 billion to \$12 billion. This issue of course, is about the protection of men and women in uniform, not budget overruns, and as Chairman Taylor has indicated, we will do whatever it takes to meet their needs. But we have to know what it is we are dealing with, and we have to rely by definition on what is presented to us as to what the foundation for our deliberations is supposed to be.

From day one of this Congress, these committees have said to you, "Tell us what it will take to deal with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, known as MRAPs. We will provide you the money you need." That has just been reiterated by Chairman Taylor.

In February, the budget requested by the Pentagon was \$4.1 billion short of what the Pentagon said it would take to fund the MRAP Vehicle Program. I can tell you that Mr. Saxton and I tried to, as our part of the proposition, then deal with that funding shortfall by reallocating funds for which we were severely criticized. That comes with it, I understand, but we were criticized for reallocating funds out of some programs in order to try and meet the readiness requests that had been made to us since February and which were not accounted for in the budget proposals that were given to us.

I am taking some time with this because not everybody necessarily understands what the hearing is all about and why we are having it today and why we feel the necessity of having it. We have been trying to come to grips with this, and, again, I emphasize "we." This has not been a partisan endeavor, and we made a good faith attempt—at least the committee over which I chair and share responsibilities with Mr. Saxton and the other members—in our authorization proposals to come to grips particularly with the MRAP budget difficulties in our reallocation recommendations. We provided at that time an additional \$4.1 billion.

There are many questions about MRAP—why the Pentagon did not get started earlier, why we can't produce what we need faster, is there more commonality on vehicle configurations—all of which we have to come to grips with, particularly if this is to be a joint program.

Now I am mentioning this now because I am going to give you some statistics which you have given to me which are contradictory and make it much more difficult for us to come to grips with this.

Our first question is: What can we do to help you get this done faster?

The committees stand ready to provide the necessary resources to adequately fund the program. As I indicated, it was our committee that first provided the necessary \$4.6 billion in authorization required at the time of the House Armed Services Committee to mark up and fully fund the known vehicle requirements of 7,774 vehicles for fiscal year 2008.

Having made it clear that we intend to support you in fielding the MRAPs, we want to make it clear we expect to be kept in-

formed on the status of the program. Based on some of the information that we have been given, and which I will share with you in a moment, I hope you are getting better information than I am getting or that the committees are getting.

One day, we are told that the number of MRAP vehicles delivered in June was 78—this was delivered to me—I will enter this into the record, Mr. Chairman, with your permission—the Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected Vehicle Program Master Joint Production Schedule as of the 16th of July, 2007: total planned, 97; total actual, 78.

On the 17th of July, the next day, I get—again, this is not stuff I am making up. I asked to be kept apprised of the production schedule—Vehicles on Order Production Schedule as of 17th of July, 2007. It says that the monthly delivery has been 165. On the 16th, it is 78. On the 17th, it is 165.

I am bringing this up not to say, “I gotcha” or “I caught you.” That is not what I am doing. I am trying to figure out what do I tell the rest of the committee members we need to do? How do we make this work? There is a huge difference between 165 and 78. And on top of that, we get a projection that is as of June, the end of June. Then we get the projection. We jump from 165 to 250, then 197, 254, going all the way up to February of 2008. We expected to have 926 vehicles a month coming out.

How am I to recommend that we operate on this schedule if we cannot even get a difference accounted for between 165 vehicles and 78 vehicles?

Then on the cost, this is the MRAP Vehicle Program Funding Overview, the official overview, as of July 9th for the 7,774 vehicles that we have been dealing with up to this point. We are not even dealing with the 17,000 or the 23,000 or anything like that now. This is the schedule, the Vehicle Program Funding Overview. It says that \$3.9 billion has been funded to date, \$8.2 billion cost to complete.

I went back. So then I took a look to see, well, okay, what was it up to this time? I went back to June. It said in June, \$4.4 billion have been funded to date, \$7.7 billion needed to complete. We actually apparently lost half a billion dollars somewhere from the middle of June to the middle of July, and the cost went from \$7.7 billion to \$8.2 billion.

Now maybe it did. I don't know. Maybe, you know, you have better figures, but how am I supposed to make a recommendation with respect to the funding if from one month to the next I cannot even get the figures of what you actually have to date? I mean, it is very difficult, if we cannot even agree on how much money has come to date, to then go to the Appropriations Committee, let alone to the rest of the authorization committees that we have responsibility to here, to figure out what kind of money to recommend.

This is particularly difficult if we are trying in good faith to meet the readiness needs that you have right now for the warriors in the field, in the actual deployment. Surely you can understand my difficulty. I am not trying to create difficulties. I am trying to state the difficulties we have in coming to grips, if I cannot even get the basic amount of money that has been funded so far and coordinate that with the actual production that has taken place so far, let

alone trying to project the money that is going to be needed and the vehicles that we might likely be able to expect.

I had—in good faith again—tried to put together a chart of our own so that I could give it to the members of the committee, the funding requests versus the fiscal year 2008 requirements, authorizations and appropriations, and I will not enter this into the record because I gave up. I could not figure out how to put down anything that would make sense to the memberships on four basic things: what the requirements were, what the authorization was, what the appropriations needed to be and what was requested.

Now that is pretty simple. I mean, it is basic stuff that we have to deal with here in order for any of the members to make a reasonable decision. As a result of the material given to me to aid and assist me in this presentation today, I could not put together a chart to show those four basic things that I could give to the members that made any sense.

So my point is that we need to understand—and I do understand, believe me—the MRAP vehicle is no silver bullet. I am not trying to make some kind of a bad analogy there. We understand the difficulties associated with the vehicle in terms of protection for troops. You know, there is no Harry Potter here. We are not deluding ourselves on that regard. We know what the limitations of the vehicles are. But, again, we are operating on the basis of your good faith in presenting to us that, given our technology and our capacity to manufacture and so on, this is the best presentation that we can make with regard to trying to protect our troops.

It does appear, at least in this member's judgment, as a result of what has been presented to us, that this vehicle can increase the survivability—or the variations on this vehicle. There are at least three that I have been able to come up with that can increase survivability and operational effectiveness for our military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Obviously, we owe it to them to field this capability as fast as possible.

And, Mr. Chairman and members, I apologize to you for the length of my presentation, but I hope you understand why I am doing it, because I want to inform you as fully as I can as to what we have been going through and what the staffs have been going through.

Yes, we owe it to them to field the capability, but unless and until we can get from you accurate information upon which to base our decisions, we cannot adequately be prepared, let alone make the kind of recommendations to the Armed Services Committee and the appropriators as to what we should do in the immediate, let alone the long run.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie.

The chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Air and Land Subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

STATEMENT OF JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is very timely that we are having this hearing today. So thank you both for calling the hearing.

To our witnesses, thank you for being here today. We appreciate it very much. We look forward to hearing your testimony, and I am sure I can say on behalf of every member of the committee we appreciate very much your service to our country.

Mr. Young, congratulations on your nomination. I know that it is a great time for you to look forward to a new position, and I hope you enjoy it as much in the future as you enjoy having received the nomination.

As you know, the Secretary of Defense announced this week that he has asked Congress to approve a shift of \$1.3 billion to the MRAP Program in order to accelerate production between now and the end of the year, and, of course, we will support anything that helps our soldiers and Marines on the front line.

It is my understanding that the long pull in the path to maximizing production is at the supplier base level not at a prime contractor level. I look forward to hearing the details on this issue.

And thank you again for being here.

And, Mr. Chairman, if I may ask unanimous consent at this time that Mr. Bartlett's statement be placed in the record.

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, gentlemen, again, we appreciate you being here—all of you.

Secretary Young, you bring a great deal of expertise to the table, and, again, we are expressing our frustration that we feel like people have died needlessly, and for you gentlemen in uniform, we very much appreciate your lengthy service to our Nation, your commitment to our Nation. I personally don't think the problem is within the uniformed ranks.

I think, quite frankly, it is the civilian side of the DOD that isn't getting the message, that isn't doing their job, but you are the ones who are called to on a day-to-day basis to help make this happen, and we hope we will hear from you how this is going to happen and how it is going to happen quickly.

So the chair would now like to introduce: the Honorable John Young, the Director of the Defense for Research and Engineering as well as the Director of the MRAP Vehicle Task Force; Lieutenant General John Castellaw, United States Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources; Brigadier General Michael Brogan, United States Marine Corps, Commanding General of the Marine Corps Systems Command and Program Executive Officer for the Joint MRAP Program; Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army programs and requirements.

Secretary Young, you are recognized.

Secretary Young, it is the tradition of this committee to allow the witnesses to speak for five minutes. Given the importance of this, I am going to ask unanimous consent that we waive that. We would hope that you would keep in mind that at some point we will have votes, but given the importance of what you have to say and

what all of these gentlemen have to say, I am going to ask unanimous consent that we waive the five-minute rule.

Without objection.

The secretary is recognized.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE AND RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DIRECTOR, MRAP TASK FORCE

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I recognize the importance of your questions. I don't think I will have a problem with the rule.

But to both chairmen, the distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle, or MRAPs. The committee hearing is well-timed. There are some new developments for us to talk with you about, and I assure you we are prepared to provide as much information. I believe we can clarify some of the issues that were raised, and we want to do that.

We are here, as you know, bringing all the Department of Defense's resources to bear on accelerating the delivery of MRAP vehicles and deploying them to our troops as quickly as possible.

The secretary of defense has made the MRAP Program his top priority. On May 30th, Secretary Gates directed establishment of an MRAP Task Force with one objective: get as many of these vehicles to our soldiers and Marines in the field as possible in the next several months. The task force has met five times and briefed Secretary Gates three times.

The task force first looked at the availability of materials and parts to ensure accelerated production was possible. With Secretary Gates' approval, the Defense Department has taken specific actions to purchase MRAP tires and steel to avoid shortages or impacts on other programs. The task force team members have also reviewed an industrial capacity to produce steel, axles, engines and other components of these vehicles.

With key supply issues evaluated, the task force discussed with industry the potential to produce more MRAP vehicles sooner. Roughly three weeks ago, I asked the senior leaders of each MRAP industry team to evaluate their respective ability to build even more vehicles during calendar year 2007 either using a design on contract or partnering with another industry team.

The senior leaders of these industry teams are now confident that they can build more MRAPs in 2007. In these discussions, I told them I believed I had assurance from Secretary Gates we would find any and all dollars necessary to purchase these vehicles.

To be clear, in virtually every case, the MRAP companies will face challenges in increasing their rates of MRAP production, which means qualifying suppliers, increasing supplier manufacturing capacity, hiring and training workers and adding manufacturing facilities. This is an extremely aggressive program, and the Defense Department is accepting risk here.

As the chairman noted, facts about the program change every day, and an element of that is a good thing because people are moving to move this program forward every day. We may encounter manufacturing, spare parts and maintenance issues as we accelerate, but Secretary Gates and the entire Defense Department

leadership team agreed we should accept these risks in order to provide more capable vehicles to our troops as absolutely fast as possible.

The task force and the MRAP Program Office reviewed the industry acceleration plans and recommended an acceleration of the MRAP production to Secretary Gates this past Friday. Secretary Gates directed the Department to act on this recommendation. Our key point to you today is that we are submitting an urgent reprogramming action to the Congress to purchase additional MRAPs.

Using all remaining available funds provided by the Congress and a \$1.2 billion reprogramming, the Defense Department will be able to order an additional 2,650 MRAPs. Roughly 1,500 of these MRAPs will be delivered from industry to DOD by 31 December. The department will increase our total number of MRAPs on order to 6,415 and will increase our expected calendar year 2007 deliveries from industry to us to 3,900. The reprogramming is urgent. Thirty to 45 vehicles are estimated per day to slip into 2008 if we delay.

The use of available funds and the reprogramming action will give the MRAP Joint Program Office a total of \$5.4 billion to put on contract for MRAPs in 2007. This level of funding makes MRAP the third largest 2007 DOD acquisition program behind Missile Defense and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Eighty-two MRAPs were delivered in June. Let me make an important point here. Significant numbers of MRAPs are now being delivered for three reasons. The MRAP Joint Program Office leaned forward and awarded limited production contracts in some cases to vendors. Two, our industry partners assumed success and purchased materials and established limited production capability using their own corporate funds. And, three, the Congress provided robust funding for the MRAP Joint Program Office in the supplemental.

Before the task force was created, there was already aggressive work on MRAP by a capable government team. Paul Mann and the supporting team in the MRAP Joint Program Office have done Herculean work to get vendors under contract, to orchestrate testing and to negotiate production contracts.

The MRAP Joint Program Office and industry are moving extremely quickly to buy vehicles as fast as we can check only the key boxes: testing against improvised explosive devices, or IEDs; road tests with soldiers and Marines; and establishment of production facilities and processes. We are not delaying manufacture of these vehicles for documentation, extended testing and test reports. This is not a business-as-usual process.

Key to this testing is the exceptional and dedicated work done by Colonel Rooney and the team at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Aberdeen team has worked almost constantly for the last six months to test and evaluate MRAP candidate vehicles.

Finally, a number of government facilities are supporting the program, including the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Team in Charleston which is installing the government furnished equipment.

The combination of a strong Joint Program Office, a dedicated test team, supporting government teams and industry partners who took risks with their own funds has resulted in the delivery of vehicles from this program and the potential to provide more capable safer vehicles to our deployed soldiers and Marines.

Additionally, the leadership of the Marine Corps and Army has worked with tremendous collaboration. In one recent task force meeting, the respective service leaders agreed to purchase common equipment items for their MRAPs, reducing the complication of having completely service-unique items installed on different MRAPs.

I have seen tremendous coordination, collaboration and cooperation all in an effort to achieve the goal this team shares with Secretary Gates: urgent delivery of the maximum number of MRAPs to put this capability in the hands of our forces. The reprogramming action allows the department to continue and expand the work on improving the current MRAP vehicles and also to ensure that we can provide the best possible equipment in the future to our forces in harm's way.

The current MRAP designs we are buying are not a panacea, and the threat will adapt and adjust, and the Army and Marine Corps team will work to anticipate these steps and develop responses. The fact that increasing quantities of vehicles are being delivered today is a result of the tremendous work by the Joint Program Office, industry and the support the Congress has provided. The reprogramming action is the next critical step for this program and for the department's urgent efforts to get MRAP vehicles into the field.

Thank you, again, very much for your support in helping us to get MRAP vehicles to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who need them, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, Secretary Young.

The chair now recognizes Lieutenant General Castellaw.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN CASTELLAW, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General CASTELLAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, members of the committees, I think we all share Congressman Taylor's passion for ensuring that our soldiers and Marines, sailors and airmen get the equipment they need.

I attended an event last night that I thought was quite remarkable. We had the annual dinner for the Marine Corps Association, and the guest speaker was the secretary of defense, Mr. Gates, and during that meeting and during his presentation, he matched Congressman Taylor's passion in terms of talking about the needs and his obligation to those military members that are in combat.

I think the Marine Corps has been in the lead in terms of pushing to get this equipment out. I talked to Major General Walt Gasikin this morning. He has made all the preparations for these vehicles. He knows how he is going to use them, he knows how he is

going to incorporate them into the forces that are over there, and he is expecting that we will provide them.

For our part, the Marine Corps has identified the funding that we need to reprogram in this fiscal year, and we will continue to refine and identify the additional funding that we will need to reach the 3,700 vehicles that we see as being what the forces require.

I ask that my statement be put in the record, and I appreciate the opportunity—not the pleasure, but the opportunity—to represent the Marine Corps and the men and women who make it up.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Castellaw can be found in the Appendix on page 70.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, General.

The chair now recognizes Brigadier General Brogan.

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL BROGAN, COMMANDER,
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

General BROGAN. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, distinguished members of the subcommittees, I am honored to appear before you today and discuss with you the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Program.

As the chairman indicated, I am the joint program executive officer for the program, and this morning, I represent a dedicated group of civilian, uniform and support contractor professionals who are working very hard to deliver these vehicles to our warfighters.

Though many of them are from Marine Corps Systems Command, we have been supported by the Army's Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, and by the Navy's Naval Space Warfare Command in Charleston. We are in contact with folks at Special Operations Command. We have representation from the Air Force. This truly is a joint effort.

We are also very fortunate to get unprecedented support from the Defense Contract Management Agency to help us in the industrial capabilities assessment so that we can more fully grasp just how well our industry partners will be able to perform, the Defense Logistics Agency that is leaning forward to procure tires to ensure that that does not become a bottleneck in production, and the United States Transportation Command that currently is flying the vast majority of these vehicles into theater to get them there as expeditiously as possible.

Even though it is repetitive, I would like to reiterate Secretary Young's salute to Colonel John Rooney, United States Army. His folks at Aberdeen Test Center are responsible for moving this program forward. He worked three shifts, 24 hours a day, 6 days a week and on the 7th day brought in a skeleton crew that would assist with the scheduling so that we could move up quickly the next week. Their efforts helped us determine which of the vehicle designs from among the competing contractors met the standard and that we could take forward into production.

In addition, we would not be where we are today—and though I know it appears slow, 82 vehicles delivered last month—without our industry partners. They are working hard to expand our pro-

duction capacity. They are hiring new employees. They want to deliver these vehicles as rapidly as we want to procure them.

There certainly still is much more to be done, and we are not over all the pitfalls, but we are making progress. We continue to work aggressively with the vendors to look for ways to speed what they are doing as well as with the folks in Charleston to speed the integration of the government-furnished equipment into the vehicles.

This has been an unusual acquisition program. We had a dual-track acquisition strategy. If you recall, in November, we awarded a sole-source contract to the one vendor who had a hot production line so that we could keep him in production and continue to get his product.

At the same time, we issued a request for proposals. From that came nine competitively awarded contracts with an initial delivery order of four test articles, and even before we finished the test, gentlemen, ladies, we awarded some Low Rate Initial Production contracts at risk based on our evaluations of the proposals, their industrial capacity, in the belief that we could get them started producing vehicles even before we tested them so that we could jumpstart the process.

Subsequently, we have begun awarding additional delivery orders on those contracts. Part of that accounts for those differences in the numbers that you have before you and what has occurred. As recently as last week, we issued another delivery order for 1,170 vehicles.

Our goal right now is to field the MRAP as we know it today as rapidly as possible. We recognize there are additional threats that have to be dealt with, and we have a spiral effort working to incorporate those improved survivability features either into these vehicles or into a subsequent vehicle.

The Marine Corps and our teammates are committed to delivering them a maximum number of survivable vehicles that have test-proven performance in the shortest time possible.

I believe, sir, I will end there. I look forward to assisting you with additional information.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. Thank you, General Brogan.

The chair now recognizes Lieutenant General Speakes.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY G-8, U.S. ARMY**

General SPEAKES. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett, Ranking Member Saxton, ladies and gentlemen of the committees, it is an honor to appear in front of you today.

We are here to talk about a topic that is vital to all of us who are concerned about the welfare of soldiers and Marines, airmen in harm's way, and, today, we will address a major program that is our joint focus.

First, I would like to begin by providing the Army's full endorsement and full support for the Joint MRAP Task Force so ably led by Mr. Young and so capably directed by General Brogan. General Brogan and his team over the past months have done Herculean work to pull this program together to ensure that we are working

together with a common vision of providing protection as fast as we can to the combat zone, and we are proud to be a part of the team and working with them.

The Army's number one protection priority continues to be the soldier. We know that we face an enemy who every day is thwarting or attempting to seek to thwart our ability to provide that protection. What we must do then is provide a relentless series of improvements to soldiers who are in harm's way.

Over the past 4 years, the Army has provided 94 different programs with your support worth over \$100 billion to provide additional protection and capability to soldiers in harm's way. This has an enormous tribute to an Army that recognizes the priority to provide the capability to soldiers now, not to think about it, not to pontificate about it, but to deliver. With your help and support, we will continue to do that.

Our focus today is MRAP, but we see it as just one more stage in a continuing evolution of capabilities we must provide to soldiers in harm's way. We share your passion to ensure we do it, we share your commitment and concern, and we appreciate very much the chance to be here today.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General.

We have been joined by the Ranking Member of the Seapower Subcommittee, former Chairman Bartlett.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I understand that my prepared opening statement has been made a part of the record?

Thank you very much.

I apologize for being late. I had obligatory attendance on another committee for a markup. I am pleased that that markup ended so that I could be here for your testimony.

Secretary Young, good to see you here. Thank you very much for your service to your country.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your service to your country.

I look forward to the rest of this hearing and the question and answers.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized for the first questions.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

What you have done in expediting the acquisition of the MRAPs is near unprecedented in the military. Rarely do we move that rapidly. One of the consequences of this is that we are procuring these vehicles from several different vendors, which means that we are going to have a maintenance challenge in the field.

If this were procured in an ordinary way, we would have settled on one design and you might have half a dozen different companies building the one design. We now have several different designs. Have we thought through how we are going to maintain these in the field, and what are the long-term plans for MRAP when this emergency is over?

Mr. YOUNG. I might start and then General Brogan or my colleagues can add to it.

The task force has looked at the top level set of those issues. There is a team, an Army-Marine Corps joint team, Defense Logistics Agency team that has gone to theater and looked at whether facilities are adequate to support these vehicles, the gun to put in place, the plans for parts storage, all those issues. The vehicles as contracted come with initial contractor logistics support, and then we are going to look to train our teams and troops in theater to be able to maintain the vehicles. So all these issues are being worked very quickly.

You rightly said, as other members did, the program is moving very fast. In some cases, we will tell you we have identified the issues, we have teams on them, and we are working to solve them. We will not have all those answers today because of the speed the program is moving at, but people are looking very hard at those specific plans of maintenance and support and facility capacity in theater for the vehicles.

General BROGAN. Sir, as you correctly point out, we have created a logistics challenge. We believed that was an acceptable risk in order to have a number of producers producing vehicles simultaneously that have virtually similar survivability characteristics.

Had we waited until we completed all the testing and then down-selected the one vendor and then asked him to provide his design to other vendors, I believe, sir, that would have slowed up the process and isn't certainly what we wanted to do.

So, to help reduce that risk, as Secretary Young indicated, we have procured contractor logistics support from the original equipment manufacturers for the first year. We also have an option for that for the second year.

At the same time, we have an integrated product team. It is led by an Army civilian from the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command that is in Warren, Michigan, that is looking at how we could migrate from contractor logistics support to either organic or a third-party logistics provider, whichever proves to be the most effective.

What helps us in this, though, is that fundamentally these vehicles are trucks. Our mechanics, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines are capable of repairing diesel engines. They are familiar with the types of transmissions that are in these vehicles, and so they will be able to do the organic maintenance on them without a great deal of difficulty.

We are also aided in the supply chain in that there is a great deal of commonality at the component level on these vehicles. There are only two axle manufacturers involved in the program. A number of the vehicles have either Caterpillar or Cummins diesel engines. They all have an Allison transmission. So there is a lot of commonality at the subcomponent level which will help us.

Those vendors of transmissions, of engines have worldwide parts distribution networks. So that will help us in sustaining the effort.

Additionally, at the Red River Army Depot, working with Defense Logistics Agency, we are doing that initial provisioning to ensure that we have the repair parts that are required in theater so that we can maintain these vehicles once they arrive.

Mr. BARTLETT. For the long haul, we will have provided probably the best ever field testing for these vehicles. Do we anticipate an

ultimate down-select where that design might be built by a number of manufacturers so that we will have a single requirement for parts?

General BROGAN. Sir, as the program continues to evolve—and, as I mentioned, we have an effort ongoing to develop some capability for additional threats—that certainly is a possibility.

What I would offer to you, though, is that wheeled-tactical vehicles have a fairly limited lifespan even in normal routine service here in the continental United States. Certainly in theater, with the severe wear and tear that they see in daily operations, we are not going to have much life left in those vehicles, in all likelihood, when the conflict ends, and that would give us the perfect opportunity, as you have suggested, to pick that best of breed and carry them forward, at least until we get to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program that, in all likelihood, will be the future Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle for the armed forces.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

I want to make sure I understand the answer to Mr. Bartlett's question. Whether the numbers that we are dealing with at any given point are 7 or 17 or 23 and whether or not there are changes in numbers—which I recognize, as you go forward, there are bound to be changes in cost and so on, although I think that still needs to be addressed—how by increasing the numbers does the cost actually go up?

The usual formula is that if you get more, even if there are several varieties of MRAPs, as there are—I understand that. I have gone all through what has been presented—the Category I, Category II, Category III, and a lot of variants there—and there were experimental vehicles put forward, obviously, some of which met what we needed, some of which did not, some of which are going to be modified as we go along—

You can draw a parallel to the Stryker vehicles, for example, which have been through, by my calculation, at least six different variations so far that caused cost estimates to change and production schedules to change.

Taking all that into account, I believe the phrase was it is a program of record. It is a phrase of art essentially in trying to understand what to do.

I say all that by way of preliminaries because I am not quite sure what the answer was in terms of the long-term intent with regard to these vehicles. Do we intend to leave these vehicles in Iraq or Afghanistan? In other words are they throwaway vehicles essentially, or are they intended to be put into the inventory, if you will, to the degree and extent they can be?

General CASTELLAW. Let me take a shot at that first, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you understand the thrust of the question, why I am asking it?

General CASTELLAW. I think I do so, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General CASTELLAW. I guess my answer will indicate whether or not—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Fair enough.

General CASTELLAW. Sir, as we look at how the Marine Corps has addressed ground mobility, we started out with vanilla Humvees. As the threat increased, we put armor on them. We developed Marine armor kits. We went to fully up-armored Humvees. Now we are introducing the MRAPs.

As we look to the future, we will be looking at how the MRAPs will fit into our concept of operation. The vehicle is very heavy. It is difficult to transport, particularly on ships when the Marines come from the sea. We are doing an assessment now of what our ground mobility requirements are going to be.

I indicated I talked with the commander in the field this morning. In his view, when we look to the future, he is going to want something that has the armor protection that we are getting with the MRAP, but also the mobility we have with other vehicles. So this will probably be one in a series of vehicles that we have developed and we will develop to meet the requirements as they exist at any particular time.

The 3,700 vehicles that we see as being what we need to employ now are the ones that we need to match against the current fight. So we will continue to assess and evaluate, we will continue to look at other vehicles, and then eventually we will make a decision on what will be the end result of these particular vehicles.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. So then, on the question of program of record about looking forward, if there is a decision made to draw down the numbers in a place like Iraq or Afghanistan or any other place, that that might then affect the numbers that would be manufactured or the variants associated with it, right?

General CASTELLAW. Well, the Marine Corps, you know, is solid with our numbers that we are seeing, and for how we are projecting right now—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For right now, for calendar year 2007?

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And, hopefully, for the fiscal year 2008, that that isn't going to change, regardless of whether there is a chance in policy in the immediate future or near future, that these numbers can be fairly well relied on by these committees?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, I see 3,700 as the number.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Young, the information that we have here shows that the MRAP vehicle requirement has steadily progressed over the last eight or ten months.

Initially, apparently, we thought that we would acquire somewhere around 1,200, and then as testing went forward and the vehicle matured, apparently, the need was established for 4,000 or 5,000, and then the last time you folks were here we were told that

we needed somewhere around 7,700, and now the vehicle requirement has risen as of this month to a little over 23,000.

Could you talk a little bit about that requirement? And then I will ask another question about how we expect to meet that requirement.

Mr. YOUNG. I appreciate the chance, and let me maybe add some dimensions that might address Chairman Abercrombie's question also.

Back, I think, in the May timeframe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated a requirement for 7,774 vehicles. They recently produced a new document that says they endorse buying as many vehicles as we can as fast as we can and that we will continue to evaluate the need and requirement for those vehicles.

Secretary Gates in the task force meeting has specifically asked the Army and the Marine Corps to understand for certain their near-term needs and consider their long-term needs and how MRAPs might or might not fit in their longer-term force structure picture, and the services are looking at that and determining that answer.

The agreement in that task force leadership group with the Joint Chiefs of Staff there was they say a need for no less than that, roughly 8,000 vehicles, so we are going to march to buy those as fast as we can, and even with the funds we have and the re-programming, we will not cross that line. We expect to send a budget amendment to the Congress to revise our budget and tell you we want to buy up to 8,000 and do that here very shortly.

And then in the September timeframe, we expect to revise that budget amendment or send another budget amendment to tell you what we will do for 2008. That number will be informed by how successful we are in manufacturing and whether we achieve the rate now that we are shooting for, which is 1,300 vehicles a month manufactured in December. That will tell us how many we can buy in 2008.

We need some feedback from the field about their experience in those vehicles as we deliver them, and then we need to understand how the leadership makes adjustments in the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so I think in the September timeframe, we will give you a better picture of what we need in the 2008 budget and whether we are going to reach some requirement number or keep buying as fast as possible over the course of 2008.

Hopefully, that gives you a better picture of it.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

I am not sure what the genesis of this chart is, but it does show the 7,774 number that you just spoke of, but then over here on the left-hand side, there is a July 2007 invalidated requirement for 23,044 vehicles. Can you say where that came from and talk to that number, or is that subject to revision?

Mr. YOUNG. I think it is definitely subject to review and revision. The Army—and I will let my colleagues address that—specifically went in theater and looked at one of the genesis of that number. The theater initially suggested that. Elements of that number represent one-for-one replacement of up-armored Humvees with MRAPs.

We don't know yet if that is the right answer. Again, Secretary Gates has asked to make sure we get our needs addressed immediately for theater, but also asked the Army and Marine Corps to determine whether there is a long-term requirement here, and those two numbers, hopefully, will match up.

And then the other thing I wanted to mention to Chairman Bartlett's question, when we have more of this information, the Secretary is conscious that we have multiple vehicle types, and if we are going to have MRAPs in our inventory in the long term, we want to look very hard at how many variants we have and how we maintain those variants.

Let me give the military officers a chance to talk about the requirements.

Mr. SAXTON. If I could just—I don't know. Are we on the five-minute rule?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Saxton, we are trying to live by it, but, again, given the importance of this—

Mr. SAXTON. I don't want to run out of time. I want to—

Mr. TAYLOR. If you consider it to be an important question, I want you to ask it, and I would think—

Mr. SAXTON. Okay. Well—

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. That I would ask unanimous consent to—

Mr. SAXTON [continuing]. If the military officers expand on what Mr. Young just said, I probably will not have time to ask the rest of my questions.

General BROGAN. Sir, would you like me to tell you the growth of the requirement, sir?

Mr. SAXTON. What I would like to do, with all due respect, is turn to another chart that I have here and ask Mr. Young this question. I have another page here which talks about the Master Joint Production Schedule. As with any new system, production starts slow. We would all agree on that, right?

And this shows, for example, that in May of 2007, the total planned production was 62 vehicles. This chart shows that by February of 2008, we will have ramped up at a steady pace to 806 vehicles by February of 2008, which, I think, Mr. Young, you just said you are going to try to take to 1,300 vehicles per month.

Mr. YOUNG. The number I gave you assumes we are successful with the Congress on the reprogramming and accessible with this acceleration effort to buy another 2,650 vehicles between now and March, and so I think it would be on top of the number you have.

Mr. SAXTON. Here is my question. We are working with several manufacturers. Are there problems with getting to the numbers that we have projected here in terms of the production schedule that I made reference to? Are we going to be able to meet that schedule working with a variety of manufacturers?

Mr. YOUNG. I think that is probably the largest risk the program faces. What I can tell you is I have talked personally to in general the CEO or the next level of leadership of each of these companies in asking them can you deliver, because I did not want to go to Secretary Gates or come to you and tell you we can buy more vehicles that they cannot build. That will encumber money that we could use to do other things for our troops. So they believe they can.

And this program, as was said earlier, is not like any other program in the department. You can look every few months at many of the programs and get an update. This is a regular program. The fact that 82 vehicles were delivered in June was an important set of data every week for industry, and it was part of the data that led them to say to me, "I can build more vehicles between now and December."

We need to see how they do on July, but they already have the picture of July and August because their ability to deliver 250 vehicles in July is dependent on their subtier vendors getting axles and engines and steel in place for them to build. So they have what they did and they have a picture of how materials are flowing in.

But you have highlighted exactly the risk issue, but I think consistent with Chairman Taylor's comments, we are going to take this risk because the Secretary's orders to me are "Do not leave a vehicle that could have been built on the table for lack of a contract or money."

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Young.

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I just have one final thought, and that is that I hope that you will just, as a matter of course, keep us informed about how we are doing on this acquisition program.

Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for all your testimony this morning.

I was just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you could clarify when I see your first page of your statement at the bottom where you say that, "New MRAP vehicles are being delivered today to Iraq because of the excellent dedicated work of this government and industry." Can you clarify a little bit? Were we getting the same vehicles at the same time that the Iraqis were getting it?

Mr. YOUNG. No. I am specifically talking about MRAP vehicles. That refers to the candidate vehicles that were awarded in January and went through testing. They have been tested to a standard that was set by the theater and approved by the Joint Staff, and those are the vehicles that we are contracting for.

As General Brogan pointed out, we signed contracts because we had experience with some of these vendors before their vehicles completed the full set of testing and, indeed, to a question that was asked earlier, in several of the vehicles that we are buying, several of the vehicle types, we had already bought tens and twenties of those vehicles and had them in theater.

So the comments refer to a couple of things: one, a tremendous set of work by the Joint Program Office and Aberdeen in testing the vehicles and then the fact that we can deliver vehicles today, which General Brogan would tell you normally would have four-to-six-month timelines, but we are delivering numbers today because industry in many cases before they had a contract went and started buying parts and materials. So they assumed they would get a contract, and they could deliver vehicles and/or we gave them Low Rate contracts.

Mr. ORTIZ. So, when we do send vehicles down there, I know that some are being used by the Iraqi government, Iraqi troops. When they get there, are we giving our troops priority for them to get the vehicles?

Mr. YOUNG. I will let General Brogan—

General BROGAN. Sir, all the vehicles that I am procuring are going to U.S. servicemen. There were some foreign military sales cases that occurred outside of my program office that bought a vehicle called the Badger that were made by a U.S. company, were not tested to the same standard as my vehicles, in fact, were not even entered into my competition, and those vehicles are being given to the Iraqi security forces so that they can assist U.S. forces in accomplishing their mission. But every vehicle that I am buying right now through my program office under the MRAP label is going to the U.S.

Mr. ORTIZ. See, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, my concern is being able to maintain all these vehicles. Are you at any time thinking about integrating or bringing these vehicles to the depots that do some of this work so they can get familiarized with the vehicles so that the depot employees—and I know they deploy many times with the troops to fix them, to be sure that—and it has been a problem before—spare parts—

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. In fact, just recently, the Marine Corps logistics base at Albany sent forward a team of depot-level mechanics and welders to participate in the maintenance of those vehicles. Albany is teamed with one of our manufacturers to assist in building vehicles. Anniston is teamed with one of the manufacturers. The Red River Army Depot is involved in the provisioning of the repair parts. So we are, in fact, attempting to incorporate the United States depot base into what it is we are doing.

Mr. ORTIZ. And just one last question now: At one point, are you going to be able to furnish all the parts that will be universal? I know you have different companies who are building these MRAPs, but it would be easier. And I don't know whether this can be done or not, I mean, because, if we have different vehicles, different standards, different equipment and stuff, it is going to be harder than if you had all the parts universal where you can equip them right away because you have them in stock.

General BROGAN. Sir, you absolutely make a good point, and that was the tradeoff we made, rapid production versus a pristine supply chain that would ease our ability to maintain the vehicles. We believe in the interest of getting as many of these lifesaving vehicles into theater as rapidly as possible that that was an acceptable trade.

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you have any of the MRAPs at any of the depots here in the United States so that they can learn how to work on it?

General BROGAN. Not currently, sir. The first priority is to get the vehicles over into the hands of the warfighters. As the pipeline fills up, as we get to these much higher production rates, then the commanders in theater will tell us when they believe that some of these vehicles can go to home station training so that we can train the operators here rather than on-the-job training in theater and

to do the sorts of things that you suggest, develop the maintenance base at the depots.

Mr. ORTIZ. Because one of the things we want to be sure is that we have the right personnel to fix them so that our troops can have adequate equipment.

General BROGAN. No question, sir. In fact, right now, I have visibility through our maintenance system into the vehicles that are being used by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and the last snapshot I had when I briefed Secretary Winter on Monday, as I do every Monday, was 93 percent operational readiness for the MRAP vehicles in the hands of sailors and Marines. So these vehicles are doing very well in theater.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for joining us this morning.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today and your testimony.

Mindful of the opening statements of Chairman Taylor and Chairman Abercrombie and ranking members of how important this issue is and the decision the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, has made in regard to reprogramming and this program being of the highest priority, I do have some concerns in regard to balancing that need versus a risk of moving into something too quickly. I mean, it would be like an analogy of trying to spend \$6 billion producing a vaccine against a constantly mutating threat of bird flu.

And the report from the multinational force of Iraq estimated that the use of the MRAP vehicle could reduce casualties, deaths and injuries—casualties by 80 percent. Well, you know, that is a huge number, and if that is true, then, certainly, it is understandable why we would rush to produce, even though, as Mr. Bartlett mentioned, there is some risk in doing that, risking cost, risking not getting it right.

There are other things to consider besides the V-shaped hull. There is the weight of the door. There is the ability to get out of the vehicle quickly. And I say that because, in my own district, we lost one of our best and brightest young men because the up-armored Humvee—I don't know whether it was an after-the-fact add-on kit or manufactured at the facility before it got to the theater—basically rolled down a hill because the road would not support it, and worse than that, when they ended up in the canal, they could not get the doors open, and the four soldiers drowned.

So I have concerns. I have concerns about, well, even buy America. I am very agreeable with my Ranking Member Mr. Hunter in regard to that, but I was at a German embassy recently where some of their vendors said that this design that we are going after is not the best design, that they have something called the Dingo, I believe they referred to it, and so is buy America and the very amendment of these restrictions possibly hurting us in getting it right?

Mr. YOUNG. At this time, I don't believe that is the case. Secretary Etter worked with the legal team, and the determination is that these vehicles are for conflict and they are going directly into theater, and at that point in time, some of the restrictions with regard to specialty metal can be overcome because you are deploying the vehicles directly into a combat situation. So we are not impeded right now with those restrictions because they are going to combat operations.

Dr. GINGREY. With all due respect, I don't think you answered my question. I mean, have we looked at these other designs that maybe are not necessarily American?

Mr. YOUNG. Sir, I will let General Brogan talk to that. I was talking about for the designs we are building.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. I am familiar with that vehicle. I have been to Krauss-Maffei Wegmann in Germany. In fact, I am going later this month back to visit their facility.

We had a foreign open competition in November. All comers had the opportunity to bring their wares to the table, and that vehicle was not entered into the contest. As I mentioned also, we are looking at a second round. Colloquially now, it is referred to as MRAP II, but we have increased the requirements for threat level on that and, certainly, we would welcome them joining into that to prove that that vehicle has the increased survivability that the vendor offered to you.

We know that the threat continues to adapt. One of the criteria that we set as we selected our vendors was growth margin. You know, axles and tires are rated for a certain weight. We wanted to ensure that there was additional weight margin available in the design so that if we had to put armor on to deal with some of these other threats, that we would not overload the axles, overload the tires, make the trucks unusable, the sort of problem you described with the up-armored Humvees with additional FRAG Kits. So we have tried to consider that. We probably haven't been perfect, but we have done the best we could, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Maybe I could add to that. We are aware—the team is aware and I am personally aware—of other components and vehicle designs that did not go through the first round of testing and offer some, in their view, additional protection. So the task force has asked the Joint Program Office team to open that competition in the reprogramming before you include some funds to support those efforts because we do have to continue. As I think the committee members have noted, they understand this vehicle is not a panacea, and we are going to have to develop additional measures because the threat will adapt and adjust.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, I know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Just in closing, let me say it is important that we get it fast, but it is very important that we get it right.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from Georgia.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to salute your efforts on this issue, which was the first hearing, I believe, of this subcommittee back in January. You know, there are a lot of

numbers going around today about ordered, produced and delivered, and I just, again, want to be clear in my own mind.

Mr. Young, you said 82 was the figure for June. Is that 82 that have actually been delivered to Iraq?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, we are generally quoting numbers that are delivered from industry to us, the government, and there is a timeline to get the vehicles from the factory to SPAWAR in Charleston, and then that timeline, which Secretary Gates is laser-focused on and has put the pressure on me and General Brogan and the Joint Program Office team and the SPAWAR Charleston team, to reduce the time to install radios, jammers and other government-furnished items, and then there is a timeline to transport the vehicles to theater.

I would tell you at the current numbers that we are building the vehicles, they are all going by air because of the urgency of getting the vehicles there. So what numbers we quote you typically are from industry to the government to be followed by some number of days of work, government-furnished equipment installation in Charleston, and then transportation to theater.

Mr. COURTNEY. So, in other words, the 82 that were produced in June are not in Iraq right now?

Mr. YOUNG. They are not all in theater.

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. And there are notes here from the committee staff that all together, there are about 170 MRAPs in Iraq? Is that pretty much an accurate—

Mr. YOUNG. General Brogan might have the latest.

General BROGAN. As of the last time I looked at the numbers, sir, it is 176 that have been delivered from the MRAP Program Office. I need to be clear in the verbs. "Fielded" means it is in the hands of the users in Iraq, and so that is our metric, how many have we fielded to the warfighter. "Delivered" is when we take control of them from industry and then begin the process that Secretary Young outlined.

Mr. COURTNEY. So, given the fact we have about 158,000 troops over there and 176 of these vehicles, I mean, how you distribute them is kind of a Solomon-like decision given the statistics we know. And I wonder if you could help us sort of understand how they are distributed once they are there, given the fact that there are not enough for the troops that we have.

General CASTELLAW. Right now, for the Marine Corps, we have a little over 200 in theater, and what those are is a combination of the new MRAPs plus some legacy MRAPs that we have had in before. What General Gaskin uses them for, those right now, are route clearance and to transport explosive ordnance to detachments. As the numbers come up, then they will start replacing vehicles that are in the operational units that are doing the daily patrolling and the normal counterinsurgency operations.

Mr. YOUNG. Could I add to that, sir?

Mr. COURTNEY. Sure. Absolutely.

General SPEAKES. Sir, let me go ahead—

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Please.

General SPEAKES [continuing]. Let me just explain where we are from the Army's perspective, sir.

First, one of the times that we haven't covered yet is General Brogan's team brings this product in from industry. The next part of the plan that Secretary Young has put together is a joint distribution board, and that is critical because what it assures us is that the Solomon-like decision that you referred to is correctly executed.

Here is what happens. The supportive commander, the combatant commander in theater tells the Joint Staff where his priorities are for issuing the MRAP. Then that is important because what we are doing at the service level, our support to General Brogan, is to ensure that service-unique items, which are very few, are essentially configured so that when we get that piece of equipment to Charleston, which is where the equipment is given the final government-furnished equipment assembly, it gets the few items of service-unique equipment put on it so that we know where it is going, we know what kind of capability it is going to need, we are all working together then to make sure that equipment leaves Charleston with the right kind of equipment to operate in a way that is compatible with a particular service.

And so that is important because that joint distribution process assures us all that these very limited assets are going where the combatant commander wants them and, second, that we are linked to make sure that that vehicle arrives in an operational configuration.

We have also provided for the capability to ensure that the vehicles are essentially interchangeable. In other words, they all have the right accessory kits where, if the vehicle has to leave an Army unit and go to a Marine unit, it can quickly be transferred from Army to Marine or vice versa. That is another part of this joint task force that has been very successful in bringing us into convergence on the basic model and the basic interoperability of the piece of equipment.

The other part of the Army strategy has been something that we have been embarked on since 2004, and that is what we call route clearance teams. Early on, we recognized that the Army was underresourced with a combat engineer capability as a part of every brigade combat team that would enable us to do route clearance, and so what we did is created an organization that links combat engineers with explosive ordnance detachment personnel and gives them the kinds of vehicles we now call MRAP.

So, at this point, the Army has a little bit less than 500 of these vehicles that are in theater right now, distributed at the tactical level, and they are operating every day doing route clearance. That is a different mission than the general purpose force mission that we see now for MRAP where we go ahead and execute a transition where this vehicle now goes out to be a part of a routine combat patrol capability in the hands of basic combat troops instead of specialized forces.

So those are the kinds of things the Army sees as the way we are adapting the new capability called MRAP to the existing capability we have built for this war called Rapid Clearance.

Mr. COURTNEY. I am out of time. But any other comments you have about your own recent trip to Iraq and whether or not you

think this is the right way to allocate it? Again, I don't want to take other time up, but—

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair would ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be given two additional minutes.

General SPEAKES. Sir, I appreciate the chance to talk about it. General Logos, the Army G-3, and I went at the direction of the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army. The mission was to ensure we understood how we were going to support this MRAP Program with a clear understanding of what the needs of the commanders were forward. We were able to talk to all the senior commanders that we saw forward in theater, starting with General Petraeus, General Odierno, General Lynch, General Mixon, for example. We also talked to some of their key staff to get an idea of where we are.

Clear, number one, that the need of MRAP is preeminent. Where we saw the commanders, what they talked about was the vitality of seeing something that has the capabilities that MRAP has, and they also explained to us that they don't want to get in the business of micromanaging the distribution to that formation. What they want us to do is get the capability to them as fast as they can to respond to theater commanders in terms of where it is that it is going to be most effective and give it to them in a configuration that is immediately useable.

For example, we are no longer doing this expensive buildup of capability in Kuwait. The vehicles arrive, based upon the great work General Brogan's team is doing, already ready for combat. That is a huge gain in terms of time and effectiveness of people.

The other thing that we saw, I think, is very important. Focused, though, they were on MRAP, the other thing that we saw was some very important capabilities that enable us to have much greater utility of what we call left-of-the-bang technology, and what that means is that increasingly we are able to use some very, very good techniques that are enabling us to intercept the bomb maker before they are able to put the bomb off.

And those capabilities will be more appropriate to discuss in a classified forum, but they are taking shape, they are having effect today in combat, and they are saving lives, and so the other thing commanders told us is, "Keep those things going, keep this expensive investment in research and technology going, and keep fielding capability to us as fast as you can."

And then the other thing we saw which is what everybody sees, I think, which is, frankly, the heroic nature of those who are in combat, their selfless service, and that in itself was an encouragement to keep up this effort.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from Connecticut.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for your service.

I have a lot more questions than I have time. We have, I thought I heard you say, 3,700 Humvees in theater?

General SPEAKES. Sir, I could talk to the number of Humvees the Army has. At this point, the Army has about 18,000 Humvees in theater at this point.

Mr. MCKEON. When you say in theater, that is in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General SPEAKES. Sir, the total requirement right now for Humvees that I am speaking to is in Iraq, and that is based upon where we are right now with the formations that are directly employed in combat and then the additional capabilities we are trying to build in terms of a repair and replacement capability, which are located in Kuwait.

Mr. MCKEON. So 18,000 in Iraq?

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKEON. And I think Mr. Abercrombie asked were those going to be worn out or are they going to be left there, and I don't know if I heard that answer.

General SPEAKES. Sir, we don't believe so. What we have right now is a need for the Army right now for about 140,000 Humvees as a part of our existing formation. We are continuing to view the Humvees that we have put in theater as a part of the Army. In other words, they are not separate from anything we see as an end state whenever or whatever time it is that formations leave Iraq.

We will need the Humvees that we have. We fully expect to take them back with us, and part of what we have seen is a continuous focus on keeping them repaired and investing in the very, very important elements of reset so that we are cycling equipment back and trying to get it repaired and maintain it.

Now, as a part of up-armored Humvees, because they are so important, what we have invested in is forward repair capabilities that are resident both in Iraq at Balad and also resident in Kuwait so that we are able to keep these vehicles operational for an extended period. But we do not see them as give-aways. We see them as a part of something that is essential to the Army.

Mr. MCKEON. So the MRAPs are not going to totally replace Humvees?

General SPEAKES. Sir, we do not see that from the Army's standpoint. First, we don't know how many we are going to get, we don't know how many we are going to need, and we don't know how well commanders are going to respond to this as a general purpose vehicle. We will see that as has been very, very well-explained by Secretary Young and the team. We will get commanders' feedback, we will get an immediate understanding of how successful MRAP is, how the enemy attempts to counter it, and how useful it is as a general purpose vehicle.

We will obviously buy everything that is needed, and we will respond to commanders, and we will not stop until they tell us to stop.

But then the next thing we will have to do is evaluate where MRAP fits in the formation. The clear example, first of all, is that we have substantial engineer formations in the Army right now that do not have a modern combat vehicle. For example, they are still using the M113. We would see a large capability to use MRAPs, for example, for combat engineers. So there are a lot of uses that we could see for MRAP.

The other thing we see is we are going to continue to put the pressure on American industry and the research and development command to bring the critical parameters we need. MRAP is not

an end state. We see critical improvements that we will need both in terms of the performance, payload and protection that the Army is going to need as a part of a joint team.

We are never going to go separate from the Marines in the sense that we will be linked arm and arm as we look at our future Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategies. We will work together on it, but we see that there are capability improvements that we both need as we look toward the next general of vehicles, and so for us, MRAP is an interim solution for the needs of combat and not an end state.

Mr. MCKEON. I have a suggestion on this little chart here that shows total planned, total actual. I would suggest that from what I have heard earlier that you also add a line in the number that are at Charleston—is it Charleston where they go?—and then the number that are in theater so we could kind of track how they are moving through and how long it is taking them as we go through this.

As I have sat here today, I am very frustrated. The Senate stayed in all night a couple of nights ago discussing how soon are we going to get out of Iraq, and it looks like you are going full boar trying to get equipment over there, and we have members of this body and the other body going full boar trying to get us out. I don't know how we are going to resolve this. It seems like we are going to be running into each other coming and going.

If we have 18,000 Humvees over there and we are building these MRAPs and sending them over there as fast as we can, we have people trying to get the troops out of there as fast as we can, this is very, very complicated, and I don't know how this is going to all be resolved, but it is looking like a real problem that is a lot more complicated than a couple of speeches of how we can go there or come here or what we are going to be doing, and I get very frustrated by it.

I have some other questions, but I know my time is up, and I will try to get them submitted to—

Mr. TAYLOR. In fairness, the chair would ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be given two additional minutes.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much.

Let me ask just one specific question then. On this chart, we see the Marine Corps is asking for 3,700 vehicles. This is the latest chart where the Army is up to 17,770. The Marines are asking for 17 Category III Buffalos, and the Army is not asking for any. Why is the big difference there?

General SPEAKES. Sir, the reason for that is that I mentioned earlier the route clearance teams that are a part of what the Army has been building since 2004. We look right now at MRAP as the vehicle that is going to be the combat patrol vehicle. It is going to be the primary carrier of the squads that are most at risk right now in combat.

The other thing that MRAP provides, particularly the Category II, is the critical capability that is very lacking in the battlefield today, which is medical evacuation recovery and command and control capability to give commanders the mobile platform that affords them much higher security.

So those then are the critical parameters that we think are most essential right now, and at this point, the route clearance effort that we have appears to be something that has borne fruit. The organizations are in place, and we are continuing to field them, and we are fielding them in a separate program that is complementary to this effort.

Mr. MCKEON. And so you don't feel that you need the Buffalos to do that?

General SPEAKES. At this point, sir, through the MRAP Program, no, we do not, and the route clearance effort that we have is moving well. So the Army bought Buffalos separately outside of the MRAP Program, which is why I am not buying them for them. So they have Buffalos.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. So maybe we need another chart to show what we have also versus what we are buying and what we are building right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General BROGAN. If I could offer also, sir, I am tracking each MRAP that we produce by serial number, can tell you exactly where it is in the pipeline, or en route to theater, and we update about once a week a pipeline chart that shows the flow from industry through Charleston through the motor transportation intercontinental, and then transportation intratheater from where they arrive to their destination and the end state. As I said, our metric for success is vehicles fielded to the warfighters.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from California.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Admiral Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

If these questions have been asked, I apologize. I had to step in and out.

Mr. Secretary, can you name a couple of the programs presently that are under the DX priority within the defense priority and acquisition system?

Mr. YOUNG. There are additional programs.

General, do you know?

General BROGAN. The jammers.

Mr. YOUNG. The jammers are under DX rating.

Mr. SESTAK. Just, I mean, any programs across DOD.

Mr. YOUNG. I am sorry?

Mr. SESTAK. The jamming?

Mr. YOUNG. The jamming systems are DX rated.

Mr. SESTAK. Anything else?

Mr. YOUNG. Can we get you for the record a list of anything else that is DX rated?

Mr. SESTAK. Yes.

The reason I ask is the secretary placed this on the DX priority list in June. The requirement for this was established a year ago. Should we have placed it on the DX priority list a year ago if this is so important, General, for the various reasons you have mentioned?

Mr. YOUNG. The DX rating comes into play when you have a conflict, though. It assigns priority when capacity is consumed, and it—

Mr. SESTAK. But my understanding is challenges of high-speed alternators, challenges on tires, challenges on armor, you are competing.

My follow-on question, Mr. Secretary, have we actually, if this is such a priority, taken advantage of the special priorities assistance that we can go to the Department of Commerce under the PASS system and ask them to resolve for the good of our troops the competition for these material requirements? Has that step been taken, if this is so important to us?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, a board has been formed.

Mr. SESTAK. I know the board. That is an internal—

Mr. YOUNG. Priority allocation—

Mr. SESTAK [continuing]. DOD board.

Mr. YOUNG. Right.

Mr. SESTAK. If this is such an important issue and you have already highlighted material competition as a problem, why wait?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, we are analyzing the material competition issue, and to give you a specific example, as of June, the capacity to build tires for MRAPs and—that is really the only vehicle that requires this load class and load rating tire—was about 1,000 tires per month. Obviously, you can see that if we get to 1,300 vehicles per month in December, we need well over 6,000 or more tires per month.

The department has gone and worked with industry. We don't need those tires today. The department has gone and worked with industry. At least two vendors have agreed to increase their capacity and build volume for us.

And then we have worked with the Army Tank-Automotive Command and DLA, and we are going to buy tires as fast as they can produce them to hopefully get ahead of the mountain that is building and pace the fact that they are going to add capacity.

We are doing a similar activity in steel.

So, to the degree of our analysis, we have not identified issues yet where there—conflicts will emerge. The board has been formed so that when conflicts emerge, there will have to be priority allocation choices, but we have actually invested money to—

Mr. SESTAK. But, Mr. Secretary, why then have you placed it on the DX priority list?

Mr. YOUNG. Pardon me.

Mr. SESTAK. Why did you place it on the DX priority?

Mr. YOUNG. To assure that there were no impediments, and at this point in time, there are no impediments, and what we want to do is—

Mr. SESTAK. So you really did not have to put—

Mr. YOUNG [continuing]. Act to make sure impediments don't emerge because we would rather not have steel and other issues result in a choice between, say, Strykers or ships or MRAPs. So we are taking every step we can—

Mr. SESTAK. So DX priority was merely a precaution?

Mr. YOUNG. I would not say—

Mr. SESTAK. And if it is, why not take the next step to the SBA with Commerce?

Mr. YOUNG. No, I think that is a reasonable step, and we will go back and review the status of that, but, right now, we don't—

Mr. SESTAK. The only reason I ask is it just seems, despite all the good work, we have been shooting a little behind the rabbit on requirements, on funding, and we have watched this in pursuing the IED issue from the beginning. It is tough, but I don't know if we might want to shoot a little ahead on this. We do have some unique tools here that will help the system work under the PASS system.

My second question is when the secretary said we can go at 1,280 or so a month, did the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) agree with that? Were they asked? Again, I am kind of addressing the issue of the tyranny of optimism that, unfortunately, my experience in the building shows me goodhearted people want to do. Was DCMA asked if that was a good figure because they are the ones that said 900?

Mr. YOUNG. For the vehicles that have been put under contract—and General Brogan will expand on this—DCMA has taken a look with the program office at the ability to produce those vehicles. This discussion that occurred over the last three years was asking industry to look at based on their experience to date, can you build more, and to do so in light of the secretary's insistence that we get every vehicle that can be built in the hands of the—

Mr. SESTAK. So DCMA has not given an opinion?

Mr. YOUNG. So I don't believe they have looked in detail at the acceleration plan.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, my experience has been—

Mr. YOUNG. Can I let General Brogan add to that if he wants?

Mr. SESTAK. Please.

General BROGAN. So they were asked, and their preliminary estimate, which was given to us a couple of months ago, was that we could reach the rate of 977 vehicles per month in December, and they admitted to some conservatism in that number which is probably a good thing because, as you have indicated, optimism is what has me in trouble with the chairman for telling him I could do 4,000 vehicles by the end of this year, and I take responsibility for that.

We are asking them now to go back in their industry capabilities assessment and review that number, given the fact that we have taken some steps to improve tire production, that the reprogramming request includes a sum of money to buy steel ahead so that we don't reach a hump that puts us above the capacity that is able to be produced by industry, yet what is required for all of the defense programs.

So it needs to be revisited, and I will have to let Mr. Sydney Pope from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Industrial Policy go back and relook at that number.

Mr. SESTAK. So DCMA needs to look at it?

General BROGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. All right.

Mr. Chairman, I had two other questions. Should I hold off for the second round or—

Mr. TAYLOR. If you don't mind. We have been pretty generous on your time. We still have Colonel Wilson and Mr. Davis.

So the chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Colonel Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, all of you, for being here today, and I am particularly pleased that you are here because in my home state of South Carolina, we have been very vitally involved with the force protection located in South Carolina, General Dynamics, Armor Holdings. I will be visiting BAE tomorrow in Akin. I have also toured and visited SPAWARS. And everywhere I go, the professionals who work at these facilities are very, very dedicated to working with you and backing you up.

And I am also aware that there have been some real challenges, and General Brogan in particular with force protection, there has been a problem with production output difficulties, late deliveries. In your opinion, has force protection overcome these choke points in production?

General BROGAN. Not completely, sir. They missed by 12 vehicles last month, but by the 10th day of this month, they had caught up on those vehicles. When I looked at the work they have in progress right now, some 342 vehicles, my assessment of that is that they certainly have the opportunity to make their numbers this month, but it is not a foregone conclusion. We are going to continue to watch them.

As you know, they have formed a joint venture with General Dynamics Land Systems that they call Force Dynamics. That brings to bear some of the considerable experience of General Dynamics in material management and working with vendors, suppliers and sub tier folks, and we hope that that will help ameliorate some of the concerns that we have with Force Protection's ability to deliver so far.

Mr. WILSON. And I actually visited to have the opportunity to see the manufacturer of the Cougar and the Buffalo. I know Congressman Davis will be shocked to find out that I actually drove them safely, and, indeed, I can see the challenge they have of ramping up. We want the best for our military, and so I am very grateful that you all are keeping the pressure on.

Secretary Young, do you see any problems with the government-furnished equipment industrial base? Is this equipment properly resourced, and is the integration facility at SPAWAR prepared to handle this integration effort?

Mr. YOUNG. I will make a comment. I think General Brogan might want to expand on that. But we have chartered a team—the program office, I think, has led that effort—to look at the government-furnished equipment industrial base, the ability to supply, the ability to pace the rate of delivery of vehicles because that is critical. Positive signs on that.

The team has allocated budget for that. They have allocated that budget in a lean way because I think, going back to Chairman Taylor's comment, the program office—and General Brogan can address this in more detail—is managing their money to get the maximum number of vehicles on process and marching toward delivery.

Some of those vehicles, in fact, that we buy in 2007, we will need 2008 money for sustainment. We are not reserving that. So we are allocating the funds for vehicles as the first priority, then government-furnished equipment and only the things we need in 2007 to get the maximum number of vehicles delivered.

General BROGAN. So let me discuss the government-furnished equipment piece first. We have cash-flowed from the account that we normally would have used to buy the government-furnished equipment in order to place vehicles on order. That is why this re-programming action is so key to us. We need those coffers to be refilled so that we can ensure that as the vehicles are delivered that the government-furnished equipment is there so that it can be integrated by the professionals down there at SPAWAR, the Naval Space Warfare Command.

With respect to the integration facility, they have a great deal of experience. They have worked all of the up-armored Humvee integration, and they have translated that experience into what we are doing. They map each one of these individual variants to ensure that they know the locations for the racks and things like that.

They have some very talented folks that are trained in Lean Six Sigma. There are several black belts, as well as green belts, with that sort of training that are involved in this process to help shorten that timeline of integration. Their expectation is that we will be at a capacity of roughly 25 vehicles per day for integration down there on a single shift, and then they have plans, if required, to expand that to a second shift so that we could do 50 vehicles per day. So I believe they are capable of doing that, but it has yet to be proven, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, I appreciate your efforts in providing the best equipment for our troops. I have the perspective of being a veteran myself. Seven years ago this week, I was at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin for desert warfare training, and I tell you very positively that all the equipment I have is now in a museum.

And, Mr. Chairman, it has been replaced by the latest and best equipment, and I want to thank you for your efforts for providing that for our troops.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Just listening to the dialogue and going back to some comments that were made by Congressman McKeon and Congressman Sestak, I have some concerns looking at the way that we have moved into this process coming from both a military background and also a manufacturing and supply chain management background, as we have stepped in, admittedly on short notice, with increased costs to accelerate some of the production. I know we have talked about ways to mitigate the shortfalls. You know, hopefully, dealing with Canadian and French manufacturers isn't going to be the long-term answer to our own defense supply chain.

But one question that I have that this symptom points to and having heard both sides of the issue off line within the military—

and I would be interested in both a Marine and an Army perspective on this—do you see the MRAP now by default, because of the huge investment that is being made in it, becoming the default mobility platform for the Marine Corps and the Army going into the outyears?

And I come into this question from Chairman McKeon's comment about, you know, the political movement is in one direction, logistic and supply chain is moving in another direction, we are going to have all these vehicles, and I am just curious what the long-term plans are from a doctrinal standpoint.

General CASTELLAW. The vehicle, as we see it now, is addressing a short-term requirement. We are going to get it into combat. We are going to see how it operates. We think about 3,700 is the right number right now.

At the same time, we will continue to assess what our ground mobility requirement is, and when we talk about mobility, there is also a vertical portion of it, the V-22, the 53K and others. So we will assess where we are going to go.

This vehicle—some numbers of them—may be what we want to retain, but as we look ahead, we have what we call the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, JLTV. How it comes into play is something that we are still developing and we will look at.

So we don't have an answer right now on how long term, I think, the MRAP is going to be. We do know that right now it is what we need and what is going to save lives and what we need in combat, and then we will continue to assess the long term.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. So you are saying that this investment is an interim adaptation to an immediate threat versus part of a long-term procurement program?

General CASTELLAW. Well, I think, sir, that as we have been in war, we have found whatever war—pick one—whether it was Civil War or World War II or now, we have already gone through several iterations of vehicles, and as we continue, you know, we will improve these. We have spirals already planned for these vehicles, and so, you know, we will know more.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. General Speakes.

General SPEAKES. Sir, I see an identical approach to what General Castellaw identified. We are united in a focus on saving lives today for soldiers and Marines in combat. We also will have to evaluate how combat proves this vehicle to actually perform in its general purpose role. We are very positive and pretty optimistic on it based upon the clearance missions that they have performed for us the last year and a half.

The next issue is how fast can we move technology forward. We are focused in linking with the Marines to ensure that the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle becomes the future of modernization of our Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet, and to do that, we have a paradigm that expresses the request we put to industry, which is improve performance, improve payload and continue to focus on protection, and we have to have all three of those in order to be able to see a future vehicle that really attracts us all.

We fully understand and support the Marines' thought about the expeditionary nature of equipment. We, like them, share a need to be able to project our capability, and we are going to have to look

at a vehicle that doesn't have the same cumbersome weight capability limitations that we see in MRAP. That said, right now, our focus is war, our focus is saving lives, and we will keep it there.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Yes. I appreciate your perspective, and, you know, I want to commend both services on, the adaptability of new systems. As the general mentioned, every war, we have seen adaptation. From my own experience—I join with Congressman Wilson—when I went through the Junior Officer Maintenance Course about 200 years ago, all those vehicles are now in the museum as well, and it has been amazing to watch the adaptivity of this force.

You know, for the record, contrary to a lot of the political rhetoric that has been floating around that I hear from time to time, as we create greenhouse gases over in the House chamber, this is clearly the best protected, equipped force in the history of the world, and I appreciate your efforts to move forward. You know, hopefully, the lessons learned out of this will be able to be integrated into long-term plans to balance both the weight issue and the force protection issue.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

The chair would like to take this opportunity before I recognize Admiral Sestak to publicly thank Colonel Jim Littig, United States Army (Retired), who, just as a citizen, came by my office a year ago January and walked me through the importance of MRAPs, and for the record, I think it is important for the average citizen to understand it the way that he walked me through it.

A disproportionately high number of casualties have occurred in Humvees. That is because the Humvee has a flat bottom, and when that wave of energy from a landmine or from an IED explodes, it is like a wave hitting a boat. A flat-bottom boat hits that wave, it is going to be thrown back quite a bit. A V-bottom boat hits that wave. It is going to slice through it.

In addition to that, if you can increase the distance between that explosion and the bottom of your vehicle, the force of that blast is reduced exponentially. So if you are four feet off the ground, you are going to have significantly less exposure to that blast than if you are one foot off the ground or 16 inches off the ground.

I say all this to thank Colonel Littig who at one time worked in the Army liaison office, but to also point out my disappointment that it was a retired Army officer that made me aware of this and that the Rhodesians 20 years ago had found the solution and that the Russians or Soviets over 10 years ago had found a solution.

And as a member of this committee, I am the first to admit I am not omniscient, that we rely on the suggestions of others, and I would have hoped that it would have come from the active force that there was something better out there, and I think the USA Today article reinforced that.

So, having said that and having publicly said my frustration with what happened with SAPI plates, what happened with jammers, what happened with unarmored Humvees, I would like to ask Secretary Young, since in each of those instances, only reluctantly did the civilian leadership of the DOD finally say, "Yes, we are going to do it for each and every one"—it has been said today that we

have approximately 19,000 Humvees in Iraq—does the Administration have a plan to replace each of those vehicles with some variation of an MRAP?

What is the timeline for that? Where are the dollars you require from the United States Congress to make that happen? I am of the opinion it is going to happen, and we should not kid ourselves that it is not going to happen, that this war is somehow miraculously going to go away, and I for one could look my constituents and every American in the eye and say, “Yes, we spent a bunch of money and, okay, it ended up we did not need them,” and that would be the best news of all, that somehow we bought a bunch of vehicles for a war that ended sooner than we thought.

So what is your plan? Are you going to ask for that money in a supplement? Are you going to ask for that money in the form of next year’s budget request? We have been through this before. So what is the plan now?

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think Secretary Gates and the leadership are committed to revising the budget for what we believe is the minimum requirement, is some number like 8,000 vehicles and doing that here very shortly, and then over the next few months, hopefully by September, determining the success in manufacturing the vehicles because, as I think some members have said, there is some anxiety about putting money against vehicles that you cannot build.

But if we are having success, then we will take the optimistic view, as we are talking with you today, that we want to buy and build every vehicle that can be built and bought, and money will not be an obstacle. So the secretary’s guidance to us is to try by September to come to you and the Congress and tell you how successful we have been, how many can we possibly build in September, what does the theater want in terms of that number, and the highest numbers today reflect exactly what you have said, one-for-one replacement with Humvees.

I believe if we are successful in getting to December, we will be successful in building a very large number of vehicles in 2008, and so we will have to bring you a budget amendment for supplemental funds to build those vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Young, I hear some good news and some bad news. The good news is that you are flying every vehicle over there as soon as you get them. That shows me a sense of urgency. On the flip side, keeping in mind how many airplanes we have and the capacity of those airplanes, versus the ships that we have and the capacity of those ships, that also tells me that they are rolling off the assembly line in eyedroppers when we need to be addressing this with buckets.

Now, the question is, of these designs that the brigadier general is doing a good job of bringing on line, do we own the plan at the end of the day? Do we own the specifications? Can we take those specifications to Ford, Chrysler, GM, Toyota, whoever? Do you have the legal authority to say that this is a national emergency? Do you have the legal authority to go to an active production plant and say, “I want you to make these things right now.”

Mr. YOUNG. Can I address two things you commented about and then let General Brogan address it?

One, the initial plans while they are coming out, even at hundreds a month, are to take them by air, and then over time, we will transition to more by air, but some by sea, and then over time, a few more months, we will transition to more by sea and some by air because there is—this one I will not be able to explain well in a hearing—an optimization that the fastest way when you get to significant volumes is to have more go by sea in a load, and so TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, has talked to us, and they are planning that staged transition to get the vehicles there as fast as possible, but cost is not an issue with that.

Second, to the comment that General Brogan can add on, I had the discussions with industry from the perspective of, yes, we can potentially go buy the data rights, share them with other people and stand up other people to build.

Mr. TAYLOR. Whoa, whoa. You said potentially. I want to know for the record—

Mr. YOUNG. I am sure we can. We absolutely can.

Mr. TAYLOR. For the record, do we own those specs, or is it unique to the—

Mr. YOUNG. I want to let General Brogan answer that, but if I could, I went from the perspective of the best possible solution is two industry partners, conceivably one person who has capacity and/or did not win a contract partnering with someone and helping us get vehicles faster so that there is not paper changing hands and lawyers involved, with no disrespect intended. I wanted partners to help us build as fast as possible.

And then I will let General Brogan answer the question because we do have the ability to buy those rights and force other solutions.

General BROGAN. Sir, we do not own the data rights, and I am not certain at this point in time that that would be in our best interests. We continue to evolve the design.

By way of example, during the testing, one of the manufacturers had a problem, and he made a fairly significant design to the manner in which he mounted his seats which provided significant change in the amount of acceleration that was delivered to the anthropomorphic dummy that simulated the occupant in the vehicle.

So, as this technical data package continues to evolve, I don't think we want to buy it at this point. Particularly, as has been noted, there are additional threats that have to be addressed, and so as we incorporate those survivability features into the platform, we don't want to own it now and then be stuck with someone that is obsolete, if you will. So I don't think today is the right time for us to buy that tech data package.

Mr. TAYLOR. Colonel, again, this is, at this point, water under the bridge.

General BROGAN. Sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. I can tell you that to the greatest extent humanly possible, I think you would find that every member of this committee in the future wants to see that for every program that this Nation owns the specs, that this Nation has unlimited access to take those specifications to any vendor we want at any time we want and not be held hostage so that a lifesaving vehicle like this is available in only one or two places.

General BROGAN. Absolutely, sir, and we have a data rights clause—

Mr. TAYLOR. It is water under the bridge, but for the future—

General BROGAN. I am sorry, sir. I did not mean to interrupt you.

Mr. TAYLOR. I did not mean to interrupt you. I apologize.

General BROGAN. We have a data rights clause in the contract so that we can procure the data rights if we choose to. We are not being held hostage, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair recognizes once again the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SESTAK. I wanted to ask in the larger picture if future warfare somewhat has elements of what we see in Iraq or pieces of what I think the Marine Corps calls the Three Block War, the rapidity by which things happen and by which we have to respond. Are there lessons from this MRAP issue for the acquisition program?

It seems to me as though on the one hand we have this need for rapidness, whether it is the pursuit of finding and destroying IEDs, as we saw earlier, or getting a new protective vessel out there as the adversary quickly adapts, and you caution us on that in your testimony, there will be something else down the line in Iraq. On your other side of your acquisition, you have the more traditional approach, which has its own challenges, and I have forgotten what the terms are, but the AAV which I think starts with an E now—

General CASTELLAW. EFV.

Mr. SESTAK [continuing]. Thank you—or DD(X) which is now a DDG, I think, and the cost overruns and the length of time it takes. In the middle, we have an LCS, again, its own challenges, having to cancel a contract. We tried to bring rapidness to the acquisition program of the traditionals in this.

Are there any overarching lessons from any of you to be taken from this experience in view of this, at least what I see as some picture of trying to get quicker acquisition programs, traditional ones quicker, but yet having a challenge to do it? And, boy, the adversary is going to turn on a dime tomorrow once the MRAPs out there to come up with something else in real time.

General SPEAKES. Sir, I would certainly agree with your point. In fact, we were talking about this very issue with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. We are contrasting the incredible speed of this program with what we see right now is the Future Combat System (FCS) program that the Army is trying to put together.

Here is what I think is very, very important about the commendable elements of this program. First, everybody focused on a requirements document and got it done very quickly. It was focused on initial threshold requirements and then some basic identification of objective requirements that would be future spirals, but we did not get hung up chasing an ultimate solution that was impossible to achieve in the near term. So that was step one.

Step two was the supported commander was involved from the start in terms of validating that document, ensuring we were putting only what was essential in the document.

We then went to the testing community and got their full-fledged support. DOT down through everybody else went right to work on this thing in the paradigm of no big test plan, no months of staffing a concept of how you are going to test, but instead getting right to work, this paradigm of 6-days-a-week-24-hours-a-day immediate turn of lessons learned, and what General Brogan is overseeing of the ability to take lessons learned right back to the manufacturer and ensure that they are immediately making changes in terms of location of critical components to ease fire or other damage issues or crew access issues or recovery issues was just dramatic in terms of what you could see as the improvement.

And then the other thing was we did not let a fiscal strategy overwhelm us. The majesty of this program right now is it is a simple requirement, get as many as you can out the door and, frankly, we are going to work the funding as we go.

And so those elements then of this program are what I would suggest the Department of Defense services have to learn from, and we have to adapt these very, very stereotypical programs of how we do business and make them quicker and effective and suited to the warfighter.

Mr. SESTAK. If I could, I would be happy, Mr. Secretary, to have you follow up, but if you could in your answer maybe address this. In view of that last point you made of fiscal issues, the nice way you said it, looking back at maybe the fiscal year, the recent emergency supplemental, you talked about, you know, do we put money in this or do we put money in this.

Would any of you review the issues of having in—and this is, again, a larger point that I always wanted to learn from—in that emergency supplemental where the Congress added in \$4 billion? Would you in retrospect as king of the day have had that in there—anti-submarine helicopters, Navy Steaming Days that are traditionally funded in the normal budget, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) that will not be out there until 2012 or 2013?

So, when you are assessing in DOD the risk of a man or woman's life and how to try and allocate since we will not be there, was it worth it? I mean, how should we think about it, that those things happen to make it in, but not the \$4 billion for MRAP in an emergency supplemental bill?

Mr. YOUNG. I would offer a comment that addresses, I think, all the pieces of this. You know this business as well as anyone. You can set the requirements bar to a reasonable level. That can enable fast delivery, possibly higher quantities and lower costs. Or you can set the requirements bar very high. It is probably going to lead to slower deliveries, as you have said, lower quantities and very high costs. Calibrating that part of the process to the adversary is critical. We don't do that perfectly well. And then within that, having resources to execute, that decision sometimes will be a judgment decision.

One lesson to me for sure from the MRAP Program is Congress provided \$800 million in the bridge supplemental, allowed us to reprogram \$400 million to make \$1.2 billion as a cash flow that would eventually be paid back. We asked for \$1.8 billion in the global war on terror (GWOT) supplemental. Congress added another \$1.2 billion. Vehicles weren't successfully tested. We weren't

under contract. We could not tell you for sure that we would have 3,000 or 4,000 vehicles under contract. We do.

If Congress had not taken that step to resource the program for success, the requirements bar for the program was set at a reasonable point to get capability fast. That capability, as we have stated, is not a panacea. There is more we need to do to that vehicle, but the requirements bar was set at a reasonable point, and the Congress did an exceptional job of giving us money and believing we would succeed. We could not tell you today we were going to be delivering vehicles without those ingredients.

Mr. SESTAK. That was well-said. It is just that we are at war, and so my questions today had more on, you know, this ability to even affect the Department of Commerce, putting priorities on rated and unrated contracts priorities and the tough decisions you need to make with limited resources, and yet we are at war.

And you are right, Congress added that money in over years, but yet we chose other things, if we are at war, than this MRAP in that emergency supplemental. And that is kind of, when I step on this side—I know the tough decisions over there—tough to understand, if I could just say that.

But I have said I think the testimony today was terrific, and I don't say that lightly.

Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman.

And just for your information, number one, I want to thank each of you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service to our Nation.

It is my intention, should he so wish, to recognize Mr. Davis one last time, Mr. Abercrombie one last time, and that will be the end of the hearing.

So if you should, Mr. Davis, request—

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I would like to build on something that Admiral Sestak brought up in, you know, his comments, and having seen some different programs come, some very fast based on urgency particularly in the Special Operations Command and some very slow in other areas, you know, I hearken back to the days when some folks I used to do some work with rolled out the first prototype Cobra Attack helicopter in six months from the day they took the Huey airframe into the boiler room in Fort Worth, Texas.

That leads me to one comment. I hear from many of my former Army colleagues still on active duty right now—and I would address the general to this first—is that the common statement that I hear throughout the AOR is the uniform military is at war and the rest of the government and the Nation is not. Since we are talking about being at war, would you comment on that?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, first of all, Congress certainly is at war.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Well, that is just the normal business of the republic, you know, but—

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir, but I wasn't talking about your fistfights. I was talking about the fact that you support what we are trying to do. You know, within my purview, the people that I work with certainly take what we do seriously. They know what the objective is. Working with industry, the ones that I work with

understand the seriousness of the business that we are at, and so we have what I feel is a good partnership.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I am not disputing the partnership there, but if I could defer to General Speakes for a second to make a comment on that. The Army is at war, but the rest of the government is not or the country.

General SPEAKES. Sir, I think you can't point to what we have been able to do, to change the whole complexion of how soldiers are equipped and how soldiers are organized, and look back and realize we have done that for the Army essentially in 4 years. I mentioned in my opening statement 94 major new systems in the last 4 years with your help, \$100 billion spent to make this happen.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I appreciate that, General, and, again, remember my prior comments. I have been extraordinarily complimentary of the military's ability to adapt in what I consider a bigger national problem. A very small percentage, literally less than one percent, of our population is in uniform. Virtually none of it is connected to the military personally. Their view of the military is informed by Hollywood, albeit regrettably, or what they see on the evening news.

And this is where I, you know, direct the question to the secretary. We have had a lot of back-and-forth and programmatic information. We talk about spending regulations, how we are going to accrue funds, things like that. At the moment, that is largely irrelevant because when I go back to the 4th District of Kentucky, when I am going different places around the nation, when I took my kids to Disney World in February and talked with hundreds of people from around the country where the war became a subject of discussion, that is something over there.

And at the end of the day, it is amazing to me with the MRAP technology that it took this long to get the coalition together to begin to move in that area. This has nothing to do with the military, but coming back under the civilian side. I happen to believe that the Nation is not at war. The military is fighting one.

But my curiosity is what you have shared or what the Administration really needs to do to educate this Nation that we are at war, that we require the sacrifice of our people and that we need to prepare for a long and challenging struggle that is not simply going to go away with a few pieces of legislation. Our force is stretched.

I don't hear people in the Administration or in the Defense Department, particularly in the prior regime, coming out and publicly saying, you know, we can build these new systems. But, at the end of the day, what are we doing to educate the American people who are more than willing to sacrifice, you know, if we could take over 400,000 casualties in 3 years and people accept that and the rate of loss right, albeit tragic in each one, is consistent with what our annual losses in life of friends of mine and others have been each year since the late 1970's.

What is being done in DOD to educate the American people or to push this Administration to talk—credibly, I might add—to the Nation to get their unanimity in what needs to be done beyond these arcane arguments of support the troops or don't support the troops?

Mr. YOUNG. I think it is just a message we have to take home. You know, the answer I can give you with regard to the hearing topic is I believe I can say from my experience here in running the task force for a little more than a month, the MRAP Program Office, the team in Aberdeen and the industry partners are acting like we are at war. I think there is more we can do in other elements of the—

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. No doubt about your sense of urgency. I am not going to doubt that for one minute. Do you believe that the Administration has adequately communicated to the American people the national security urgency of real integrated support in a credible fashion?

Mr. YOUNG. You know, across the spectrum, I can adjust, but from briefing Secretary Gates Friday to have a reprogramming to you on Tuesday and a hearing before you on Thursday, that is fast and that is the Secretary of Defense personally leading the charge.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I am not disputing that. I am asking you a personal opinion right now. Has the Administration adequately communicated to the American people what we are really facing for the long term and why? Again, I go back to my Disney World example. Most of the folks who were going on the various rides and taking their families and living their lives have no idea why we are having these debates, and I applaud the urgency of dealing with this, but I think the bigger issue from a civil military standpoint, the military is carrying out their mission, but do the American people understand?

And I think just as a civilian leader, I just appreciate your opinion. Do you feel that the Administration in general has done a good job to explain to the American people why we are in what we are in, since it is not going to be an either-or? I don't think anybody on this committee believes we are going to walk out, simply walk away or stay the course in some oversimplified fashion because of the vast stakes that the Nation faces right now.

I think your silence is actually a very powerful answer at the moment.

Mr. YOUNG. I don't mean it to be.

I worked on the piece of the business. I am the director of defense research and engineering. I chair the MRAP Task Force. I work those issues very hard, and I urge my team to be conscious that we need technologies in the hands of the warfighter for the war today.

There have been people on the Congress and in the private sector that have been concerned that we have moved money out of research and into getting things in the hands of the warfighter, and I have said, "You should not be uncomfortable with that. We may shift some research and development funds to get things in the field because this is a Nation at war," and I believe up my leadership chain, people are trying to communicate that message.

Whether they use the right words and whether we have successfully gotten the public to understand that we are at war, and on the back end of this war, we have asked a lot of our men and women who serve in the equipment they use and there will be costs to reset those equipment pieces. I am not sure we have gotten that

message across as robustly as need to, and we are trying to do that.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from Kentucky.

And the chair would reiterate that he will recognize the gentleman from Hawaii, and this will be the end of the hearing.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Young, I think you are interested in a clean getaway, right?

Mr. Young, your background is considerable. I am pleased you are here actually because of the question that is going to evolve from my discussion with you. Your background is good for where I want to go with this, having been with the Appropriations Committee and defense-oriented, and I think you did some budget analysis as well as program work, right—

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. In your previous life? So your appointment here, in effect, I am going to say is like a civil servant as opposed to a political appointee. That is what I am driving at. I don't consider you a political appointee in that sense, and in that context is where I would like to have our discussion. In other words—

Mr. YOUNG. I am prepared to staff the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Pardon me.

Mr. YOUNG. I am prepared to staff the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, exactly, but, I mean, the staff that we have is professional. They don't have an ideology. I mean, they have their political views and so on, but the point is that the information that we get and the perspective we get is based on professional judgment. I am pleased that I am speaking to you in your present position, and I take it that you are there because it has been decided and asked of you that you exercise the kind of judgment that you indicated before.

And the reason I seize on that is I was very interested in a phrase that you used that this was a judgment decision in response to a couple of the questions that were posed to you, and I want to bring that up because I want to move into the Category I and Category II acquisition strategies.

Now, again, in the context of all the answers that have been given, which I think have been thoughtful and careful and very straightforward as to what the difficulty is—and I see General Brogan beginning to smile a little bit because you maybe see where I am going—I understand what your difficulties are in trying to figure out where to go and what to recommend.

Yesterday, very unfortunately—and you don't have to answer for this, but I am citing it as background for some of the difficulties we have. I don't know where the hell this person comes from—somebody representing the Department of Homeland Security apparently following up on the gut decisions that Secretary Chertoff operates on decided to say on national television, speaking for the Department of Homeland Security, that we are considering invading Pakistan.

Now how Homeland Security gets to do this or some political appointee in Homeland Security gets to put out to the public, as Mr.

Davis was saying, that we may just invade Pakistan because we don't have enough to do at the present juncture is beyond me, but that gets out into the atmosphere. It gets out into the political ether.

Now the reason I focus on that is not so much to throw brick baths at somebody in the Administration who decided maybe invading Iran isn't enough, we ought to go at Pakistan while we are at it. General Brogan, very, I think, succinctly put it. His phrase was there are additional steps which may need to be addressed, rather than just focusing on Iraq or Afghanistan, and the reason that—and you, General Speakes, whom, by the way, I want to say parenthetically, have provided invaluable information and perspective to me in the course of events over the past several months since I have been chairman. We have probably had more contact with each other than with some of the other folks, and I want to go on record as saying how appreciative I am of your candor and your ability to summarize situations.

I will give you a good example of your ability. You said that with regard to the MRAPs that your criteria for deciding where to go with the Army's acquisition is to be quicker, effective and suitable to the warfighter, which I thought was very, very important, with regard to pronouncements like "Let's go invade Afghanistan."

The reason I bring that up is under the multiple MRAP vehicle material that you folks have provided to us and the Category I, II and III—and forgive me if I go over this a little bit because people who are tuning in may not be familiar with the details as we might be—the MRAP Category I is to support in an urban environment and restricted confined spaces, and the MRAP II, the Category II, are reconfigurable vehicles for multi-mission operations, like convoy leads, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, even ambulance work.

The Category III is really another category entirely that affects more the Marines than the Navy, I think, your IED clearance operations and combat engineering, that kind of thing.

So the principal focus that our memorandum from our professional staff, Secretary Young, has to do with "maximizing the number of vendors for production as a bridge until MRAP vehicles complete the first phase of test and evaluation." The principal focus of the acquisition so far and the sole-source contract has been the Cougar vehicle, a couple of hundred of those, and then the 80 Buffalo vehicles are the Category III, and the totals before the ramp-up, as Chairman Taylor has indicated, is a lower number than where we are going to go.

But if that is the case, here is what bothers me—not bothers me, but what I am moving toward and why I had all these preliminaries—is our memorandum from our staff says that the program office is expected to solicit in terms of the request for proposals going forward. So, by the end of the month, a focus on MRAP II vehicles, which I presume is either the Cougar or a variant on the Cougar, within that category, that "would move faster, better protect troops against EFP, the explosively formed projectiles, and in some cases carry more armor, all requirements based on lessons learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."

And under the history, the Cougar, as I say, has been the main vehicle, but that is not the only one in those Categories I and II because there are a lot of variants in there, and the focus is on IED resistance or EFP resistance and, of course, are much—I am not going to say complicated—heavier, they are larger, they are more difficult than the Humvee.

And what I am concerned about is if there is a requirement to go into areas other than the kind of confined circumstances you might find in Baghdad, that you might find in other areas like Iran or in Pakistan. Believe me, I don't want to do this, but if you find yourself in a situation like Pakistan, that is not the same deal, and you are going to need much different troop transport circumstances to be met.

And so I am very concerned about where we are going to find ourselves because we are trying to react to circumstances which cause public consternation and congressional consternation, that you find yourselves going in a direction of acquisition that doesn't give you the kind of vehicles you really need for other circumstances.

Now the reason I have gone into this at such length is I want you to know, at least as far as this member is concerned, we can try to be flexible like you need to be flexible in terms of providing the kind of funding for quite a variety of vehicles that need to be forthcoming. I just don't want quantity, in other words, in order to say, "Well, we responded. The Congress was yelling and, you know, there was a lot of weeping and gnashing of teeth about vehicles, so we picked one and then we are going to produce as many of those as we can," if you don't think operationally that those are the kind of vehicles that you may need for the kind of circumstances you may be facing in the near future.

So what I want to know is, Secretary Young, do you think you have the kind of flexibility in terms of acquisition strategy? And by acquisition strategy, I mean the funding and the selection of the vehicles. Do you think you have done enough testing and evaluation to know the kind of vehicles that are likely to be available? Do you have enough flexibility in terms of funding and enough flexibility in terms of the kind of vehicles that you think are going to be capable of meeting any contingency that any of the three generals to your left can recommend about the circumstances they are likely to be facing? Do you have it or not?

Or do we need to do something in addition to what the chairman is suggesting in order to enable you to do that because we don't want to micromanage, we don't want to macro-manage, we don't want to tell you what kind of vehicles to be making or not making or what the circumstances should be, but we find ourselves doing that by default if we don't have this very clearly set forward and put into legislation.

Mr. YOUNG. That is a great question, Mr. Chairman. I will try to give you a direct answer, and I will say what I said in one of the task force meetings.

I am willing in this reprogramming to put any number of R&D in that reprogramming so we have the resources, going back to the answer I gave Congressman Sestak. You cannot do things without resources and dollars. We can come back and ask again, but here

is a shot to ask for what we need to go test components, energy-absorbing seats, all other materials we could put in these MRAPs and allow people to propose other MRAP designs that did not come through the first round, and we could look at them and test them because these MRAPs, as we said, are not a panacea.

There was a requirement set. They will survive certain things. They are not capable against everything the threat can throw against us, and we know the threat may throw some of those additional things against us. We should be out developing and testing against that. We have some dollars to do that now, and the program office team is doing that. We have some money in the re-programming to do more.

And the candid answer to your question—I said it in the task force, and I will say it again—is that may be the right amount of money, but I would not want to be short and have an opportunity to put additional protection on these vehicles or make changes to these vehicles or even buy a different vehicle if one proved to be significantly more capable.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And in that context, if you are dealing in mountain passes and snow, you are dealing with an entirely different situation than being in 130-degree heat in close circumstances in a neighborhood that is 4,000 years old.

Mr. YOUNG. Right. And I think, to answer that question, there is something you have rightly pointed out that is bigger than MRAP. It has been mentioned a time or two today, the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle. The department needs some resources in that area because of the requirements. As you heard today, we would like to have a light vehicle, a very agile vehicle, and you would like that vehicle to withstand IEDs and EFPs.

That is a pretty small space. I am not even sure there is anything in that set that may be the null set, so the acquisition team, industry and the requirements community have to talk about how close we can get to having a very light vehicle, a very maneuverable vehicle, a fast vehicle that can survive an aggressive threat.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I appreciate the time, and I will try to end this as quickly as I can. But we don't have you here every day so we want to take advantage.

I understand that in terms of requirements. What I am concerned about—and by extension certainly Chairman Taylor is concerned about—is the actual logistics of production. Mr. Davis has pointed out we are not fighting a war. Some people are fighting a war. Some of the manufacturers are geared up. Some people are having to do it. But the country is mostly watching TV and concerned about whether or not baseball players are on steroids.

So, you know, whether you have the flexibility to be able to do this is an open question because I am not sure the manufacturing lines can handle or the manufacturers can handle the range of flexibility that is going to be required to give you the kind of vehicles that you need under these varying circumstances. That is what my question is.

Do we need to provide legislatively anything more to you to enable the private-sector manufacturers to be able to conduct the business that is necessary?

Mr. YOUNG. I think we should take that away and think about it, and if there are comments to offer today, we have some of those dimensions right now. The team has Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts at firm, fixed prices with the vendors, and we have several vendors. These vendors know we can make a choice along the way to stop buying from them and buy from someone else. That is a big incentive. There are multiple vendors so we can talk to each different one about, "Well, are there things you can do to your vehicle to deal with some of the broader spectrum of issues you are talking about, show them to me, and let me decide if I want to buy them" is helpful—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I agree with that, but I don't want to have it out there as a threat. What I am saying is we may have to recognize as a Congress that we are going to have to pay for some of this, that we are going to have to go to manufacturing and say, "We are going to pay you to stay open."

Look, we subsidize farming. We put money out there. We make an investment in farming to say, "We want to make sure we have soy beans and wheat and corn" or whatever and ethanol and all the rest, and we put money into it, and it is controversial. People raise hell about it. "Why are you giving all the money to these guys to make sure that they grow?" Well, we even pay people not to grow food.

Now it seems to me if we are talking about the lives of the warfighters, we may have to pay manufacturers to stay open, and not because they are competing as they would ordinarily in the market. There is no social utility here. You know, we are not dealing with a situation where we have to fulfill somebody's ideological preconcepts about what is ideologically acceptable in economic theory. We are talking about whether we support warfighters or not.

We keep people working building submarines because you cannot put the workforce that can build the kind of submarines we have today in a freezer somewhere and then pull them out and put them in some kind of an economic microwave so that they can go build more submarines.

If we are going to maintain a certain industrial base here—and when I get out of these hearings and what I get out of these briefings that we have had—the Congress may have to provide, particularly when it comes to the vehicles that move troops, an industrial base that is not subject to ordinary competition, ordinary "Well, you know, you can build a better cell phone than somebody else so you stay in business and the other guy goes out of business."

When I take a look at the varieties that are here that you think are required for the various missions that the three generals have outlined here today and elsewhere, I don't think we have the industrial base capacity right now to be able to do this with the kind of flexibility required with the varying missions that may or may not face you, and it may be that we are going to have to provide for that and provide funding for that and tell people, "Yes, we are going to keep people in operation and pay for it, and it is not subject to ordinary competition." Am I making—

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Sense and am I making my point clear?

Mr. YOUNG. And I would offer a comment. I think that is an excellent discussion. It is clearly a much bigger hearing. I am not sure this is the most urgent area for that issue. What I have heard from some of the companies and their leadership is "We are leveraging a significant large base of production capability in the commercial heavy truck business. I have been told by a couple of CEOs there has been some downturn in that commercial truck business, so the bad news for us is that we are facing devastating losses and we need these vehicles.

The only small positive is that base has the ability to produce and can turn to and build MRAPs now for us. So we have a chance of not being in conflict with the commercial sector right now, and that commercial business base will stay and will always. As General Brogan said, these are basically very large heavy trucks. There are other pieces with the defense secretary where we do need to look very hard at this Nation's ability to sustain the organic capability to produce those defense systems because there is virtually no commercial—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Last thing on that. I agree with that, but just because somebody has a big name, a big corporate name, doesn't mean that they have the infrastructure commensurate with the name.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You could be dealing with General Dynamics or BAE, but the actual manufacturing investment that they have, the actual plant capacity, the actual number of people working may be quite small. It may be a little part.

And some of the big truck manufacturers don't want to get into this because we don't have, for example, capital budgeting. You know, they make long-term investments. They are thinking, "Hell. That is great. Yes, we make these MRAP vehicles for a year and a half and then the contract disappears and we are left holding the bag, so we don't want to get into it in the first place."

So my fundamental point is—and I don't think the uniformed services really need to comment on this. I mean, this is a policy question. This is a policy question—if we don't want to put the uniform services into the position of having to run around looking to see whether or not there is somebody that can produce the kind of vehicles in the short-term that we need, that we don't have because we were going in another direction, for good reasons, then we have to be prepared from an industrial base point of view to be able to turn on a dime and go in another direction.

It is easy for me to say. It is very hard to do, as has been evidenced by the conversation we have had today. It is very hard to do practically in terms of actually getting vehicles built and variations put into effect and changes made. So what we really need back from you and what the chairman, I think, needs most of all is a game plan for infrastructure flexibility, what the true costs of that are going to be and then what the Congress needs to do to facilitate that.

My guess is a lot of it can be done administratively and in terms of budgeting by us and we don't need much in the way of legislation. That is my guess. I think most of the legislation, acquisition authority and all that kind of stuff already exists. I think this is

principally a policy question and a political decision that needs to be made in terms of spending by the Congress.

Mr. YOUNG. Maybe I could privately offer you a couple more points that I think will be aligned to what you are saying.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. I appreciate the fact that you are in the position that you are in, and I appreciate the responsible answers you have given as opposed to some of the public pronouncements that I mentioned earlier.

Could you carry a message to Secretary Gates and ask him to ask the Secretary of Homeland Security to do things like making sure he can tell when visitors' visas are up before he gets us involved in World War III or IV?

That is an editorial comment.

Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Again, I want to thank each of you gentlemen. You have been very generous with your time. I think you have been very forthright with us.

Secretary Young, I did ask you some very direct questions on how many vehicles, how much money, is your goal a one-for-one replacement. I understand that is not something you can tell me off the top of your head, but I would like to know now what is a reasonable amount of time that I should expect before I hear from you on that.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, my understanding from the leadership is that we should hopefully by maybe even next week tell you what it will take in the supplemental to buy roughly 8,000 vehicles and then tell you that in September we are going to update that for how many vehicles we want in fiscal year 2008 and how much money that will take.

Mr. TAYLOR. Remember, I am talking a one-for-one replacement.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. So is hearing from you by next Thursday a reasonable request? Tell me what is a reasonable request and then stick to it.

Mr. YOUNG. I know, Mr. Chairman, you have highlighted a couple of times the civilian aspect of this, but there is a military aspect to this. Secretary Gates has charged the Joint Staff and the Army Chief of Staff and the Marine Corps commandant to determine their near-term and long-term vehicle requirements, and if that ends up being everybody says the requirement is one for one, I believe the leadership is going to try to support that requirement and buy those vehicles and come to you and ask you to support that requirement.

Mr. TAYLOR. You have been generous enough to listen for three hours. With three other programs, the Nation tried to do it on the cheap only to discover they had to do a one-for-one. You will eventually come to this conclusion on this program. Let's don't have one kid needlessly lose his limbs. Let's don't have one needless loss of life. I am asking a direct question. When can I reasonably expect an answer from you? Is a week enough time for you to get those numbers? If not, tell me how much.

Mr. YOUNG. I want to try to understand what you are asking of me.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure.

Mr. YOUNG. I have essentially now almost a blank check from the Joint Staff, buy as many vehicles as you can as fast as you can, and then if the Joint Staff wants to evaluate their need along the way, if I told you a number, it would mean nothing relative to a need for the theater and the Joint Staff to say, "This is what we think we operationally need," and I don't know how to tell you on what day they will give me that answer so I can parrot it back to you.

Mr. TAYLOR. I am going to request that within ten working days, which I think is very generous, that you supply that information, and if you cannot, you are basically telling this committee that it is not your goal to replace them on a one-for-one basis.

The second thing I did ask very pointedly is: Do you have the legal authority under the Use of Force resolution that passed this Congress to get us into these conflicts? Do you have the legal authority right now to go to an automotive or a truck plant and say, "Our Nation needs your assembly line to make this product." Do you have it under the existing Use of Force resolution? That is a yes or a no. And, again, I would like to know within ten days. And if you do have it, I would like to know that section of the law for future reference.

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to give you that. I don't know the answer to that question, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, and I hope I am giving you an adequate amount of time.

Mr. YOUNG. But we can get that answer certainly within ten days or less.

Mr. TAYLOR. And I thank each of you gentlemen for devoting a huge percentage of your lives to serving our country, for being here today.

And with that, this meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 19, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 19, 2007

**Statement of the Honorable Roscoe Bartlett
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces**

**Hearing on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle
program**

July 19, 2007

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our panel for being with us today. We are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country, and we are very fortunate to have you here with us. Mr. Young, please allow me to also congratulate you on your recent nomination. I wish you the best for your future success in this critical position.

As the Chairman has already mentioned, there have been recent articles in the press stating that early requests for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles were denied by the Pentagon. The allegations as reported are troubling and I know we will hear more about this from the witnesses. Why do we always seem to be in a reactionary mode? I understand that there is never such a thing as 20/20 foresight,

but it is troubling that we appear unable to respond more quickly to conditions on the ground.

Mr. Chairman, during the January MRAP-related hearing I mentioned in my opening statement that I would like to hear assurances from our witnesses that it was not going to take two or more years to meet this (MRAP) requirement and that the industrial base was being positioned to support this critical requirement. And today I ask the same question about the ability and commitment of our industrial base to produce these MRAP vehicles in a timely manner. I believe it is appropriate to ask the question again, because the requirement has changed, the results of test and evaluation are available, and the industrial base has already begun to ramp up production.

During the January hearing, we were told that the Department was hoping to get industry ramped-up to produce approximately 1,000 vehicles per month by using an innovative acquisition strategy of concurrently qualifying multiple vendors. I have no doubt that the companies who have passed the MRAP testing are committed to ramping-up as quickly as possible.

However, it is my understanding that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) recently conducted an Industrial Capabilities Assessment for the MRAP program. According to this assessment the limiting factor for producing large quantities of MRAP vehicles is material constraints and not the production capacity of the prime contractors. Tires and specialty mil-spec thin gauge armor plate are the two primary material constraints limiting production. We need to gain a better understanding of these industrial base constraints and understand what mitigating measures are being pursued in order to remedy these choke points. Moreover, it is imperative that we understand how the consumption of these materials for MRAP will impact other DoD programs. There is no reason why we should learn six months from now that another critical platform cannot be delivered or has experienced excessive cost growth because all the steel has gone to MRAP. It is incumbent upon the Department to do a thorough evaluation of these impacts now and for members to fully understand the hard choices that will have to be made.

Finally, although I think we can all agree that performance and production are the key drivers for this program. But I would also like to understand what measures the Department is putting in place to ensure we do not make foolish funding decisions. There is a minimum level of fiscal discipline that must be present in this program in order to serve as good stewards of the taxpayers' money. What are you doing to ensure that some level of fiscal reasonableness is maintained on the program?

Again, I want to thank all of you for your service to our country. You are performing an incredibly important job for our warfighters. Thank you for being here and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**HOLD UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE**

STATEMENT

**HONORABLE JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING**

**BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
AND
AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

July 19, 2007

Mr. Chairmen, distinguished members of the Subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) program. We are, as you know, taking steps across the Department to accelerate the delivery of these vehicles and deploy them to our troops as quickly as possible.

The Secretary of Defense has made MRAP his top priority. On May 30th, Secretary Gates directed the Department to establish an MRAP Task Force with one objective: “get as many of these vehicles to our Soldiers and Marines in the field as is possible in the next several months.” The Task Force’s focus is to ensure the Department acquires as many MRAPs as possible and prudent by the end of this calendar year. The Task Force draws its members from across the Department and the Services. I chair the Secretary’s Task Force, and I assure you the Task Force members are working with cooperation and determination to meet Secretary Gate’s objective. Task Force members are as committed to getting these new vehicles to the troops as is Secretary Gates.

The work of the Task Force is made much easier by the MRAP Vehicle Joint Program Office. Well before formation of the Task Force, the Marine Corps and Navy team (in close coordination with the Army and SOCOM) were competitively evaluating MRAP candidates and aggressively pursuing procurement of qualified MRAP vehicles. Additionally, industry has stepped up in many cases, buying materials in advance of contracts and at risk, in order to accelerate MRAP vehicle deliveries. New MRAP vehicles are being delivered today to Iraq because of the excellent, dedicated work of this government and industry team.

The strong support and commitment of your Committee and the Congress are the key to our success in fielding MRAP vehicles. We are able to take advantage of the excellent work of the MRAP program office and industry only because the Congress provided \$3.8 billion in FY 2007 Bridge and Supplemental Funds for MRAP vehicles. Your provision of an additional \$4.1 billion for MRAP vehicles in the House's version of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Bill is essential to the Department's efforts to maintain MRAP procurement momentum and to help us give the troops the tools they need to do the job and return home safely. Thanks to the continued support of Congress, the Department is finding ways to field as many vehicles as possible. In December 2006, we had an industrial capacity of less than ten vehicles per month. As of this month—July 2007—we have a capacity of at least 150 vehicles per month. With an aggressive test and evaluation program and industrial base ramp-up with multiple certified MRAP vehicle producers, this capacity will grow to more than 1,000 per month by the end of the calendar year.

The MRAP program office was originally created November 1, 2006, to respond to a validated CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS). MRAP became a Major Defense Acquisition Program in February, with the Navy designated the Executive Agent. In January 2007, after full and open competition, the Marine Corps Systems Command awarded nine Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts for both Category I and Category II vehicles. The ID/IQ contracts required delivery of four vehicles each for ballistic and automotive testing. Decisions for follow-on production orders have been and will continue to be based on successful test results, production capacity, and operational requirements. Consistent with the urgent need of

our operational forces and Secretary Gates direction, the focus of the program office, industry and the Task Force is purchasing and delivering as many MRAP vehicles as possible during calendar year 2007.

The final requirements and inventory objective for MRAP vehicles will continue to evolve in response to operational experience. In March 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) indicated the initial requirement would evolve from the original JUONS requirement of 1,185 vehicles to more than 7,700. From February to April, production contract awards were made to multiple contractors to produce and ultimately deliver a total of 2,853 vehicles. In May 2007, the JROC validated the increase in the MRAP requirement to 7,774 vehicles. In the same month, the Congress increased the Supplemental budget in order to provide \$3 billion which allowed the Department to substantially increase production orders currently on contract.

MRAP vehicles are actually a family of vehicles that meet three major mission profiles. Category I (Cat I) vehicles are used for small unit combat operations in urban or confined areas. Mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control are typical Cat I vehicle missions. Category II (Cat II) vehicles are used for convoy security, combat engineering, ambulance, troop and cargo transportation. Most ground logistics support operations are Cat II. The largest MRAP vehicles are in Category III. These vehicles are used to clear routes of IEDs, mines, and other explosive devices. All three categories of MRAP vehicles provide protection that the HMMWV cannot, and versatility that the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) was not built for.

Our acquisition approach is designed for flexibility and speed. First, we are buying a mix of Cat I, II, and III vehicles. Our near term goal is to purchase and take delivery as many MRAP vehicles as industry can produce during calendar year 2007. Thus, our near term production plan is based on industrial capacity. The MRAP procurement plan includes appropriate off-ramps over the course of 2008 and beyond, so the Department can reevaluate the acquisition as force structure and threats change. We are giving industry incentives to ramp up their production rates, and we are working diligently to remove or reduce production bottlenecks. To be clear, this is an extremely aggressive acquisition program which presents challenges to the industry and government team. We are accepting the risk that we will encounter manufacturing or technical problems as we execute the MRAP production program and acceleration. The Defense Department's leadership wants to take every step to provide a more survivable MRAP to our forces rather than delay any efforts because of technical or manufacturing risk.

The Defense Department has executed a prudent level of expedited test and evaluation for the existing MRAP designs. The MRAP vehicle JPMO and the U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) have developed and implemented an innovative and comprehensive test program that ensures vehicles are survivable and usable, supports rapid procurement and fielding, and meets statutory requirements for life fire test and evaluation. This test strategy has been extraordinarily successful and has allowed us to qualify vehicles and confidently make production awards with unprecedented speed.

As previously mentioned, the Secretary of Defense directed establishment of the MRAP Task Force on May 30, 2007 to integrate the planning, analysis and actions necessary to accelerate acquisition of MRAP vehicles. The MRAP Task Force is

reviewing key aspects of the MRAP program: requirements, resources, and development; oversight of acquisition, contracting, testing, production and distribution; vehicle integration, transportation and delivery, training, support, and ultimately disposition.

The first Task Force efforts focused on determining whether there were potential industry bottlenecks that could limit the MRAP vehicle production rate. The Secretary of Defense approved a DX rating for the MRAP program on June 1, 2007, to assure priority access to available material. DX ratings, however, do not resolve fundamental production capacity. Currently, tire production capacity for MRAP class vehicles is less than 1,000 tires per month. The Task Force directed allocation of funds to two tire providers who are rapidly progressing toward a tire production capacity to meet MRAP vehicle production rates. The MRAP Task Force also reviewed, with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the use of existing contract mechanisms to buy all available tire capacity as it becomes available to support MRAP vehicle production and sustainment. The DLA team has done a great job, working in conjunction with the Army and Marine Corps, and the tire production capacity and rate issues now appear manageable.

Production capacity for armor plate and high strength steel plate were also reviewed carefully. MRAP demand for special steel products at high volume production rates may create capacity shortages which could conflict with other defense programs. The reprogramming action before the Congress includes a request to purchase steel, reflecting the Task Force analysis and recommendation to mitigate the potential material shortfalls in steel plates. The Defense Department needs to acquire and temporarily stockpile steel in order to meet impending MRAP vehicle requirements and avoid inputs to other DoD production programs such as Stryker, combat surface ships and so forth.

The Department also convened a Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources (PAIR) Task Force. Composed of Joint Staff, OSD and buying activity members, the PAIR Task Force is actively evaluating current and projected DoD-wide requirements for material that may be in short supply. The Task Force is comparing aggregated DoD demand for MRAP-related components and materials, including armor and high strength steel plate with information already gathered on industrial capacities for these items. This enables a forecast of industrial constraints and develops risk mitigation strategies, including prioritizing operational requirements and adjusting delivery schedules as needed. The PAIR Task Force will advise the MRAP Task Force on matters associated with MRAP production capacities and priorities, who, in turn, try to find solutions to the potential shortages. For instance, the PAIR Task Force evaluated the issue of tire production, allowing the MRAP Task Force to focus on a solution.

One of the next priorities of the MRAP Task Force was the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) for vehicles. GFE items include turrets, jammers, intra-vehicle communication systems, radios, and other items. In a remarkably collaborative Task Force session, leaders from the Army and Marine Corps agreed to standardize GFE turret and intra-vehicle communication systems while also adopting radio and jammer installation kits that will allow interchangeability.

The Task Force has also considered plans for future upgrades and additional vehicle testing to address changes in the threat and improving vehicle safety. While we work to field MRAP vehicles, we must also prepare for the future. We are well aware of emerging threats to our troops, and we are exploring our options to quickly react to threat

evolution. In response, the MRAP Vehicle Joint Program Office has issued a pre-solicitation for a follow-on process to identify and evaluate potential improvements.

This solicitation (MRAP II) will be based on an enhanced performance specification and statement of work. Performance requirements will be greater for MRAP II vehicles and components. These follow on test and evaluation efforts provide an avenue for new vendors to propose components or vehicles that can increase force protection for adaptive and emergent threats.

The Task Force team has also made significant progress in MRAP product support and sustainment. A dedicated MRAP Vehicle Support Integrated Process Team, manned by logistics experts from the Services and Defense Logistics Agency has reviewed and established processes and procedures to maximize equipment availability and readiness.

The cornerstone of the MRAP support concept is its joint nature—from the wholesale-level through the in-theater management structure, maintenance concepts, and integrated supply chain. MRAP vehicle support will initially use Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) augmented and managed by organic Government personnel in order to rapidly establish a support capability. This initial CLS-based support will transition to a largely organic capability over the next 12 – 24 months.

So far we have made the following progress in MRAP vehicle support:

- We have completed MRAP Supportability, Maintenance, and Fielding plans.
- We have established a Joint Training IPT and developed revised contract requirements to support rapid fielding and in-theater training requirements.

- We have formed Dedicated Supply Support Teams to catalog and procure maintenance critical items.
- We have trained and deployed the first group of Government depot mechanics and welders.
- We have established a Joint Service Distribution Management IPT to work directly with TRANSCOM on transportation and distribution.
- We have developed interim New Equipment Training (NET) material and courses.
- We have established a Joint Parts Allocation Board to expedite the most efficient allocation critical spare parts.
- We established a Joint Sustainment Management and Execution team.
- We obtained agreements to use all logistics facilities and capabilities throughout the Department in support of MRAP.
- We contracted for a third-party logistics provider in-theater to manage the rebuild and remanufacture of repairable items, especially battle damaged items.

Finally, and most importantly, the Task Force has aggressively pursued opportunities and methods to build and deliver more MRAP vehicles during calendar year 2007. The reprogramming action before you is a direct result of these deliberations. We contacted the senior leadership of all companies involved in the MRAP vehicle program. We asked companies with contracts to evaluate acceleration of production, and we asked the companies to consider expanded partnering with other MRAP vehicle producers. Our goal was to accelerate and increase as rapidly as possible production rates for successfully tested designs. The plans and proposals to date were reviewed by

the MRAP Joint Program Office and discussed in detail in the most recent MRAP Task Force meeting.

Based on the most recent meeting, the MRAP Task Force recommended to Secretary Gates last Friday that the Defense Department purchase an additional 2,650 MRAP's in FY 2007. Secretary Gates approved this recommendation and directed the almost immediate submission of a reprogramming action to support the accelerated MRAP procurement. The reprogramming action before you represents an opportunity to build and deliver about 1,514 additional MRAP vehicles by December 31, 2007. Prior to the MRAP Task Force meeting, MRAP vehicle production plans called for delivery of 2,421 vehicles by December 31, 2007. These proposed additions could potentially increase deliveries in calendar year 2007 by over 60%. Pursuit of accelerated production is not without risk. However, Secretary Gates has made crystal clear to the Task Force that it is totally unacceptable for us to lose lives because we failed to purchase MRAP vehicles that could be delivered to Soldiers and Marines.

I would request your extremely urgent review and action on the reprogramming request. The reprogramming request allows us to purchase another 2,650 vehicles -- the number is greater than calendar year 2007 delivery number because we must buy deliveries into calendar year 2008 to maintain production rate and supplier base parts flows.

To summarize, we embarked on a streamlined yet rigorous joint testing regimen, testing all prototypes that meet MRAP requirements. We analyzed and incentivized the industrial capacity for producing these vehicles, paying particular attention to mitigating raw material shortages. We have reviewed plans for GFE equipment, GFE installation

process, MRAP vehicle transportation, MRAP fielding, and fielded vehicle sustainment. These efforts, accelerate procurement enabled by the reprogramming action, will give the government and industry teams an aggressive, coordinated plan to rapidly produce MRAP vehicles in response to the needs of our troops.

When I was asked to lead this Task Force, I could not have imagined the creativity, tenacity and professionalism of the personnel with whom I would come in contact. I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that everyone involved in this effort, both inside and outside the Department, shares the Congress' and Secretary Gates' goal of getting as many MRAPs in the troops' hands as quickly as possible.

The Department's highest priority is the combat effectiveness and force protection of our troops—ensuring that they have the best training and best equipment available to fight, win, and survive. We are absolutely committed to giving them the best force protection capabilities available: proven, tested and safe.

Before I close, I would like to thank the other members of the Task Force, the companies who competed for the opportunity to build these vehicles, and, especially, the men and women of the MRAP Vehicle Program Office. Paul Mann and his team have performed miracles under intense scrutiny, and I thank them for their patience as well as their competence, insight, and hard work. Finally, I would like to thank the Members of Congress and their staffs for their willingness to help us in this vital work. I thank you for your indulgence and cooperation as we navigate the funding challenges, reprogramming efforts and the finalization of the FY 08 budget pose. Thank you for your support for rapid fielding of MRAP vehicles in the numbers our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen require.

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN CASTELLAW
DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
AND AIR AND LAND FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEES
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED PROGRAM**

JULY 19, 2007

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE**

Lieutenant General John G. Castellaw Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources



Lieutenant General Castellaw assumed duties as the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources on 29 June 2007.

A native of Crockett County, Tennessee, he was commissioned via the Platoon Leaders Class Program from the University of Tennessee, Martin in 1972. His early tours were in the Marine units deploying to the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Middle East where he served as a platoon leader and company executive officer in the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, as an inspector-instructor with the 4th Tank Battalion, as a flight line officer in HMH-362 and as an assistant operations officer in HMM-264 and HMM-365. Promoted to major, he served as the executive officer of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 26.

In operational Marine forces, he has commanded HMM-264 during its Mediterranean deployment as the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Aviation Combat Element, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade on Okinawa, and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. LtGen Castellaw has also commanded Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1).

During the Balkans War, while assigned as a liaison officer to the United Nations Protection Force Bosnia-Herzegovina, he coordinated American air support during the Siege of Sarajevo. Later LtGen Castellaw commanded U.S. Forces assigned to the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) conducting stability and security operations to restore order on that island. In the current war, he has completed assignments as Deputy Commander Marine Forces U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND and as the Chief of Staff U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND.

LtGen Castellaw has served as a staff officer in both MAG-26 and MAG-36 and on two previous occasions in the Department of Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps. His joint experience includes a staff assignment in the J3 Operations Directorate U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND. Most recently General Castellaw was the Deputy Commandant for Aviation.

He attended The Basic School, the Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College and the NATO Defense College. LtGen Castellaw, a CH-46 pilot, is a graduate of the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course. He holds a Masters Degree in Military Studies from the American Military University.

LtGen Castellaw's personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and Legion of Merit with two gold stars. He was the 1990 recipient of the Cunningham Award as the Marine Aviator of the Year.

Brigadier General Michael M. Brogan Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command



Brigadier General Brogan is a native of Orrville, Ohio. In May 1980, he graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant. Following graduation from the Basic School, he completed Assault Amphibian Officers' Course as the Honor Graduate and was assigned as an Assault Amphibious Platoon Commander, Company D, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn), 3d Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. After returning from deployment to the Western Pacific in support of Battalion Landing Team 1/3, he was reassigned in August 1982 as the Maintenance Management Officer and Assistant Logistics Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and completed a second Western Pacific deployment.

In January 1984, Brigadier General Brogan reported to Marine Barracks, Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, Virginia where he served consecutively as a Guard Platoon Commander, Operations Officer, Guard Officer, and Executive Officer. He transferred to Quantico, Virginia in July 1987 and attended the Advanced Communications Officer Course. Following graduation as an Honor Graduate in June 1988, General Brogan reported to 3d AABn, 1st Marine Division and became the Assistant Logistics Officer. In March 1989, he assumed command of Company A, 3d AABn. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the company supported 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and was a part of Task Force Ripper.

In June 1991, Brigadier General Brogan assumed duties as the Logistics Officer at the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB), Camp Pendleton, California. While at AVTB, he completed work on a Master of Arts Degree in Business and graduated with Distinction from Webster University. He also attended the 20-week Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. General Brogan returned to Quantico, Virginia in July 1994 as a student. A Distinguished Graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he reported to the Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA) in June 1995, to serve as the Survivability Project Officer. In June 1998, he became the Program Manager for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Survivability Program.

Brigadier General Brogan reported to 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California in June 1999 and assumed command of 3d AABn. In July 2001, he transferred to the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC as a student in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). General Brogan graduated from ICAF in June 2002 with a Master of Science Degree in National Resource Strategy. He reported to the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia and was assigned as the Product Group Director, Infantry Weapons Systems. In February 2004, General Brogan reported to the Office of DRPM AAA for duty as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program Manager. In September 2006, Brigadier General Brogan became the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Brigadier General Brogan's personal decorations include: the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the Subcommittees; I am here to report to you on the current status and future requirements for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program. This is our number one ground mobility program.

The next few years will be challenging—not only in Iraq, but in subsequent campaigns of the Long War. This is a multi-faceted, tough fight that will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. To be successful, the Marine Corps must be able to rapidly adapt to broad tactical conditions and wide-ranging threats. The MRAP is an example of our adaptation to a rapid, evolving threat.

Evolution of the MRAP Requirement. MRAP vehicles are designed with a “V” shaped hull and are employed to protect against the three primary kill mechanisms of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration. These vehicles provide the best available protection against improvised explosive devices and experiences in theater have shown that a Marine is four to five times safer in an MRAP than in an up-armored HMMWV. There are three categories of MRAP vehicles: Category I, a Mine Resistant Utility Vehicle, accommodates up to six personnel and are employed in urban operations. Category II vehicles are similar to Cougar/Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles and accommodate up to ten personnel and are built to be multi-mission capable. Category III vehicles are used for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal missions.

The MRAP Vehicle program is a joint Service program led by the Marine Corps. Initial MRAP requirements for the Marine Corps, Navy and Army totaled 1,185 vehicles in July 2006; however, as the IED threat continued to evolve the requirement increased to the current 7,774 vehicles, which was identified by the Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) from the Central Command (CENTCOM) and subsequently certified by a Joint Requirements Oversight Council decision. A joint Service solution was the obvious response to meet the expanded and urgent need for MRAP vehicles.

MRAP Acquisition Initiatives. In November 2006 the Marine Corps stood up a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) to manage the MRAP acquisition. To accelerate the procurement of MRAP vehicles required by the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), an initial sole source contract with a U.S vendor was awarded in November 2006, with concurrent full and open competition contracts awarded to eight additional vendors on 26 January 2007. This acquisition strategy was designed to maximize MRAP production by expanding use of the industrial base. Meanwhile, low rate initial production orders were approved in advance of testing results by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) to further accelerate lower risk vehicle material solutions. With this aggressive program, the JPMO has contracted for delivery of approximately 2300 MRAP vehicles, which will be fielded to theater by February 2008.

The MRAP acquisition strategy supports four key decision points: award of competitive Indefinite Deliveries/Indefinite Quantities (IDIQ) contracts, Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), Full Rate Production and the program fielding decision review. The program has completed the first two decision points. Nine companies received Firm Fixed Price IDIQ contracts to produce two Category I and two Category II vehicles for testing and evaluation, with options to purchase up to 4,100 vehicles. In February 2007, the JPMO placed LRIP delivery orders with five of the qualifying companies for approximately 400 Category I and II MRAP vehicles. As these companies gear up to full production rate, deliveries will accelerate in the coming months; meanwhile, two additional companies are currently undergoing qualification testing, so the total maximum production rate for MRAPs has not yet been fully established. We continue to explore options to get more vehicles faster. The JPMO expects to complete the full rate production decision and fielding decision review by the end of the current calendar year.

Some production bottlenecks were encountered but have since been resolved. Swedish steel is currently used by two of the MRAP vendors and potential shortages in that commodity have been resolved with the Swedish government. Recently, \$4 million was provided to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to purchase additional tire molds to allow the sole source vendor, Michelin, to expand production to meet current and projected demand. Consideration of qualifying an additional tire source is ongoing. Key suppliers of MRAP components have been

alerted to our production plans so that they may take appropriate steps to adjust their manufacturing capability to meet vendor assembly needs.

To further emphasize the importance of MRAP vehicles in providing essential personnel force protection in Iraq and Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Gates has recently taken several additional steps to ensure program success by declaring the MRAP program to be considered the “highest priority department of defense acquisition program”, directing the stand up of a Department wide task force to integrate planning, analysis and actions to accelerate acquisition of MRAP vehicles. Secretary Gate further bestowed a DX industrial priority rating for the program, which allows it to receive any material or parts required for fabrication on a “head of the line” basis before any other vendor orders. These steps will greatly facilitate our efforts to accelerate the production and delivery of essential vehicles into theater on an expedited basis.

MRAP Funding Requirements. The JPMO currently estimates the total cost of the 7,774 vehicle program to be \$12.1 billion, of which \$3.9 billion has been funded to date primarily via Supplemental appropriations, resulting in an unfunded requirement of \$8.2 billion to complete the program. Table 1 below identifies MRAP funding received to date by Service/Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with the remaining (unfunded) requirement.

\$M	USMC	Army	Navy	USAF	SOCOM	Total
Estimated Cost for 7,774 Vehicles (as of 12 Jul 07)	\$5,365	\$4,369	\$802	\$926	\$614	\$12,077
Funded to Services						
FY06/Previous Funding	\$43		\$130			\$173
FY07 Bridge Supplemental	\$984	\$70	\$60			\$1,114
FY07 Supplemental	\$835	\$1,217	\$127	\$139	\$259	\$2,577
Total	\$1,862	\$1,287	\$317	\$139	\$259	\$3,864
Funds Retained/Spent by Services	\$566	\$473	\$106	\$33	\$148	\$1,326
Funds Received by JPO	\$1,296	\$814	\$211	\$106	\$111	\$2,538
Funds Spent by JPO	\$994	\$654	\$190	\$69	\$95	\$2,002
Remaining Cash	\$302	\$160	\$21	\$37	\$16	\$536

The 7,774 vehicle requirement was validated in January 2007, after the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding request were finalized and the latter was in the process of being submitted to the Congress. Through the generosity of this committee and the Congress, sufficient funds were made available in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental to address current year program requirements. However, we are exploring opportunities to accelerate production. We are prepared to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with the Congress to ensure that adequate funding is made available to continue MRAP production at the maximum achievable rate. Timely passage of the fiscal year 2008 Authorization and Appropriation bills is essential to continuing our efforts to meet critical warfighter needs; however, should passage be delayed, we would encourage consideration of Continuing Resolution language that would permit the JPMO to continue with acquisition of MRAP vehicles at the maximum rate.

MRAP Sustainability and Upgrades. The concept for long term sustainability of MRAP vehicles is an area under development. Initial support will be provided through contractor logistics support for up to two years. Contractor logistics support includes one Field Service representative for every ten vehicles and maintenance parts blocks. The initial support costs are included in the vehicle procurement costs and will be budgeted at least through the planned fiscal year 2008 buy. While sustainment funding will be required beyond fiscal year 2008; the Marine Corps views the MRAP vehicles as mission and theater specific and are not intended to become a program of record or retained in the permanent inventory. Our sustainment strategy will reflect that view.

It is also essential that we further improve MRAP's capability to provide the highest levels of force protection and improved mission capability. The JPMO is developing a spiral upgrade program specifically designed to develop improvements to counter the explosively formed penetrator threat, provide additional underbody protection, improved shock absorbing seats and a higher power alternator to run electronic counter-IED equipment operated from the MRAP. We will continue to upgrade these vehicles to outpace the threat and provide the maximum amount of protective capability technology can offer.

MRAPs and Other Tactical Vehicles. As previously stated, the MRAP is designed to meet a specific threat in a specific theater of operations. It is not a replacement for the HMMWV or the future Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) mission. The size and weight of the MRAP precludes its use for many of the expeditionary missions of the Marine Corps where transportability must be considered. The Marine Corps remains fully committed to the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle, which will eventually replace the HMMWV in our inventory. Marines in Iraq will transition to the MRAP vehicles as they become available.






Conclusion

The Marine Corps has taken an aggressive, leading role in pursuing the MRAP capability. We appreciate the support of many in Congress and our own Secretary of Defense have stated repeatedly that force protection for our brave men and women in uniform is a moral imperative. On behalf of all Marines, we deeply appreciate the continuing support of the Congress in providing all the tools necessary to accomplish the mission against our nation's enemies.


DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 19, 2007

Multiple MRAP Vehicle Variants




UAH vs MRAP Cat 1




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The MRAP Solution Categories and Variants




MRAP CAT I
 Support operations in an urban environment and other restricted/confined spaces; including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control.

- 4x4
 - 6 pax
 - Curb Wt: 30,000 lbs
 - Cbt Wt: 38,000 lbs
 - Payload: 6,000 lbs
- All Services and USSOCOM Procuring



MRAP CAT II
 Provide a reconfigurable vehicle that is capable of supporting multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, ambulance, and combat engineering.

- 4x4 and 6x6 variants
 - 10 pax
 - Curb Wt: 30,000/38,000 lbs (4x4/6x6)
 - Cbt Wt: 38,000/52,000 lbs (4x4/6x6)
 - Payload: 6,000/14,000 lbs (4x4/6x6)
- Army includes Ambulance Variant



MRAP CAT III
 Provide mine/IED clearance operations, giving deployed commanders of various units, and EOD/Combat Engineer teams survivable ground mobility platforms.

- 6x6
 - 6+ pax
 - Curb Wt: 45,000 lbs
 - Cbt Wt: 80,000 lbs
 - Payload: 38,000 lbs
- Navy and Marine Corps Only



MRAP Vehicle Program Joint Requirements - 7,774

	USMC	Army	Navy	Air Force	US SOCOM	Total
CAT I Requirements	3039	2000	421	624	333	6,417
CAT II Requirements	599	500	113	73	0	1,285
CAT III Requirements	62	0	10	0	0	72
Total	3,700	2,500	544	697	333	7,774


2 May 07 JROC validated this requirement.



MRAP Vehicle Program Joint Requirements - 23,044 with Army Increase

	USMC	Army	Navy	Air Force	US SOCOM	Total
CAT I Requirements	3039	13328	421	624	333	17,745
CAT II Requirements	599	4442	113	73	0	5,227
CAT III Requirements	62	0	10	0	0	72
Total	3,700	17,770	544	697	333	23,044

2 May 07 JROC acknowledged Army's intent to increase procurement objective.





**MRAP Vehicle Program Funding Overview- 7,774 Vehicles
(RDT&E, Procurement and O&M) (as of 9 Jul 07)**

\$B	Total Qty	Estimated Cost	FY06/ Prior Funds	FY07 Bridge Supp	FY07 Supp	FY08 GWOT Supp	FY08 Not Requested	FY09 Not Requested
USMC	3,700	\$5,365	\$0.043	\$0.603	\$1,266 <small>\$428M ATR approved \$22M ATR in Process</small>	\$0.090	\$2,874	\$0.490 <small>(O&M)</small>
Army	2,500	\$4,369	-	\$0.090 <small>\$20M BTR \$70M ATR</small>	\$1,217	-	\$2,753	\$0.310 <small>(O&M)</small>
Navy	544	\$0.802	\$0.130	\$0.060	\$0.142	\$0.223	\$0.178	\$0.067 <small>(O&M)</small>
Air Force	697	\$0.926	-	-	\$0.139	\$0.128	\$0.575	\$0.086 <small>(O&M)</small>
SOCOM	333	\$0.614	-	-	\$0.267	-	\$0.237	\$0.110 <small>(O&M)</small>
Total	7,774	\$12,077	\$0.173	\$0.753	\$3,031	\$0.441	\$6,616	\$1,063

\$3.9B Funded to Date \$8.2B Cost to Complete

Notes:

- RDT&E, Procurement, and O&M for Testing, Vehicles, GFE/integration and Contractor Logistics Support (through FY09)
- Input from each Service including realignments and reprogrammings to date
- Includes Transportation costs
- Includes estimated funding for spiral development/ECPs
- Includes updated GFE, Initial Support and Year 2 Sustainment estimates for all Services
- USAF FY08 GWOT Supp requested for ASV/HMMWV

9 July 2007

FOUO

Atch 4



MRAP Vehicle Program Cost Estimate Update

- Joint Cost Estimate updated with the following increases/decreases:

	USMC	USA	USN	USAF	SOCOM	TOTAL
Previous Cost Estimate	\$3,977	\$4,023	\$0,592	\$0,697	\$0,526	\$9,815
Transportation	\$0,256	\$0,046	\$0,073	\$0,025	\$0,053	\$0,453
Spiral Development	\$0,030					\$0,030
Spiral Upgrade Kits	\$0,463	\$0,313	\$0,068	\$0,087	\$0,042	\$0,973
MRAP II Testing	\$0,024					\$0,024
GFE		\$0,015		\$0,029		\$0,044
Initial Support	\$0,306	-\$0,443	\$0,046	\$0,058	-\$0,006	-\$0,039
Year 2 Sustainment	\$0,155	\$0,310	\$0,023	\$0,029		\$0,517
OTC/PVI Replacement	\$0,069					\$0,069
Tire Facilitization	\$0,004					\$0,004
DT-C2/3 Ballistic Testing (ATR)	\$0,022					\$0,022
DT-C2/3 Automotive Testing	\$0,022					\$0,022
BDAR/Other		\$0,105				\$0,105
Program Office	\$0,037					\$0,037
Total	\$1,388	\$0,346	\$0,210	\$0,229	\$0,088	\$2,262
Revised Cost Estimate	\$5,365	\$4,369	\$0,802	\$0,926	\$0,614	\$12,077

Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program
Master Joint Production Schedule

	Feb-07	Mar-07	Apr-07	May-07	Jun-07	Jul-07	Aug-07	Sep-07	Oct-07	Nov-07	Dec-07	Jan-08	Feb-08	Total
Category I														
Planned	0	0	0	0	15	41	123	191	335	463	663	730	746	3,307
Actual	0	0	0	0	13	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
Category II														
Planned	10	17	41	58	77	100	11	30	60	115	64	250	54	887
Actual	10	17	46	57	62	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	209
Category III														
Planned	0	2	3	4	5	6	6	6	6	4	3	7	6	58
Actual	0	2	3	4	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Ambulance														
Planned	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	16
Actual	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Planned	10	19	44	62	97	147	140	227	401	590	738	987	806	4,288
Total Actual	10	19	49	61	78	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	240

*Note - This Master Production Schedule does NOT include the 56 Test Articles and the 180 LRP under contract, which would bring the total number of vehicles to 3,765 (3,529 + 56 + 180 = 3,765)

UNCLASSIFIED

Attachment 6

Production, Integration, & Delivery Times

As Of: 16 July 2007 (14:06 hrs)



Services	A/O	Contract	Status of MRAP Vehicles												
			1	2	3	4	5	6a	6b	7	8	9	10	11	
USMC	3,700	1,623	238	4	67	0	17	7	2	0	0	0	0	2	139
Navy	544	297	95	4	38	0	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	37
USA	2,500	1,469	3	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF	697	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SCOM	333	170	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Test		89	28	0	10	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TBD		1,146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LRP		180	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	7,774	4,935	355	9	115	20	22	8	2	0	0	0	0	3	176

NOTES:
 -A/O = Acquisition Objective approved by the JROC.
 -MC procured 69 vehicles towards the 3,700 requirement under previous contract.
 -Navy procured 18 vehicles towards the 544 requirement under a previous contract.
 -Four of the Army vehicles on contract are for CONUS delivery.

MRAP Logistics Pipeline
 Step 1-2 - Production
 Step 3 - Integration
 Step 4 - CONUS Fielded
 Step 5-10 - Transportation
 Step 11 - Theater Fielded
 Surface Ship
 Air LIFT

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

JULY 19, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Department of Defense doing to leverage investments in depots/arsenals and use the military organic base, in partnership with industry, for increased production and sustainment of the MRAP?

Mr. YOUNG, General BROGAN, General CASTELLAW, General SPEAKES. The MRAP program is utilizing both Army Depots (Red River Army Depot (RRAD)) and Marine Corps Depots (Albany and Barstow) as a source of trained mechanics who are currently deployed (Barstow) and will be deployed (RRAD) in support of MRAP sustainment. The scope of these efforts is to develop field-level maintenance expertise to include Battle Damage Repair. Mechanics will be embedded with the unit to provide augmentation and OJT for a period of 45–60 days. All MRAP contractors are providing up front training for these mechanics and have agreed to work with the depots to ensure system level knowledge. Both contractor-provided Field Service Representatives and Government mechanics/technicians deployed in the field submit routine reports of deficiencies which are analyzed and used to improve production quality which works to improve throughput to the field.

Mr. SHUSTER. Will the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) evolving capabilities assessment of industrial capabilities to support the MRAP include an assessment of how military depots can support MRAP production and sustainment?

Mr. YOUNG, General BROGAN, General CASTELLAW, General SPEAKES. Answer: The purpose of DCMA's MRAP Vehicle Industrial Capability Assessment is to identify and validate private sector suppliers' ability to support the MRAP Vehicle production schedule requirements and to identify potential shortfalls. DCMA was not requested to assess military depot support to MRAP sustainment.

Mr. SHUSTER. How does the Department of Defense plan to sustain and maintain the MRAP and what depots are currently involved in that planning process?

Mr. YOUNG, General BROGAN, General CASTELLAW, General SPEAKES. Due to the urgency of the requirement and the Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) nature of the vehicles, MRAP vehicles will initially be sustained and maintained via Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). However, we will conduct a Depot Level Source of Repair (DSOR) analysis and a core logistics capabilities assessment, which will also consider Performance Based Logistics and public—private partnerships in determining the most effective and efficient sustainment support. Potential depot support facilities, such as the Army's Red River Depot, Tobyhanna, and the Marine Corps logistics depots at Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, and others will be considered as part of this analysis.

In addition, the MRAP program is utilizing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) centers to support organic supply chain management of MRAP spare and repair parts. DLA is also fully integrated in the parts identification, cataloging and provisioning efforts for MRAP spares. DLA is currently assessing requirements to store spares in the AOR to support the MRAP program.

Mr. SHUSTER. What actions is the Department of Defense taking to encourage contractors to work with military depots and take full advantage of the facilities, equipment, and skilled workers there to support MRAP requirements?

Mr. YOUNG, General BROGAN, General CASTELLAW, General SPEAKES. We will work with potential depot supporters to identify and evaluate public-private partnership alternatives during our upcoming Depot Level Source of Repair analysis. Currently, FPI, an MRAP product vendor, is teamed with the Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany, Georgia in the production and sustainment of USMC MRAP vehicles.

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