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Japan: 1931-1941 Vol. II

Page 601

Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo, September 5, 1941.]

In my meeting tomorrow with the Foreign Minister I shall confine myself to carrying out the explicit instructions contained in the Department's telegram No. 562, September 4, 8 p.m., and shall avoid discussion of the questions at issue pending a reply from the Department to my 1384, September 4, 9 p.m.

Admiral Toyoda has told me that he would like to have any further conversations which may be necessary before the proposed meeting between the Prime Minister and the President carried on in Tokyo rather than in Washington because, as he said, certain language difficulties appear to have arisen in Washington. I told him, however, that I could not make any such recommendation since I felt that it was up to my Government to decide where and by whom such conversations should be carried on.

After having carefully gone over the reports of the oral discussions which took place concerning our redraft of the original proposals advanced by the Japanese, it was apparent to me that there are four substantial points on which no agreement has been reached, i.e., (1) the question of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe, and (4) the question of military bases. It is pertinent to examine whether or to what degree the commitments which the Japanese Government is prepared to accept as set forth in points (e), (d), (c), and (b), in that order, of the latest Japanese proposal are considered by our Government as satisfactory in regard to the four points outlined above, and whether these new provisional commitments afford an adequate basis for the proposed meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.

It is obvious in this connection that no Japanese undertakings whether oral or in written form can be accepted as giving a complete guarantee that such undertakings can or will be carried out to our entire satisfaction. It is clear that the first step toward a return to the status quo ante in the Far East or the establishment of a situation in that area which would conform to the principles which we believe should govern decent relations between states involves the cessation on the part of Japan of its progressive acts of aggression. It would appear that the commitments contained in the latest Japanese proposal, if implemented, would fulfill this requirement. Since it is presumed that a detailed formulation of a general plan of reconstruction of the Far East could not probably be worked out in advance, it would be eminently desirable that the military and economic measures of the United States which are now inexorably pressing on Japan be relaxed point by point pari passu with the actions of the Japanese Government in the direction of implementing its proposed commitments. If our Government followed this suggested course it would always retain in its hands the leverage which

would contribute to Japanese implementation of its commitments. If an adjustment of relations is to be achieved some risk must be run, but the risk taken in the pursuance on our part of a course which would not only provide inducements to the Japanese to honor their undertakings but would also leave to the United States Government a certain leverage of compulsion would appear to be relatively less serious than the risk of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of economic sanctions which would result from a refusal to accept these proposals.

J[oseph] C. G[rew]

辯護書證　第一四〇〇―〇―六

「合衆國外交關係」よりの拔萃

日本　。。。一九三一年―一九四一年　第二卷六〇一頁

日本駐劄大使（グルー）の解說

（東京一九四一年九月五日）

私は明日の外務大臣との會合では國務省の九月四日午後八時發信の第五六二號電報に明記された訓令を遂行することに止めよう。そして私の九月四日午後九時發信の第一三八號電報に對する國務省よりの回答あるまで懸案の論議を避けよう

豐田大將は提案中の總理大臣、大統領會見前に必要なる如何なる今後の會談も、彼の言によれば或る言語上の困難がワシントンに生じたらしいからワシントンでなく東京で遂行されることを望む旨私に語つた。

私はしかしかゝる會談が何處で又誰によつて遂行せらるべきかを決定するのは我が政府の責任であると感じたから私はかくの如き勸告をなし得

ない旨彼に話した。

日本側により提供された原案を我か方に於て修正した案に關し行はれた口頭論議の報告を愼重調査の後私には何等意見の一致を見ない四つの重要なる點があることが明瞭になつた。即ち(一)中國に於ける機會均等及無差別待遇の問題(二)中國に於ける日本守備隊の存續(三)歐州戰に對する合衆國及日本の夫々の態度(四)軍事基地の問題の四である。日本政府が最近の日本提案に於て上の列擧順に從へばa、b、cの各點に於て表示された通りに受諾の用意ありとする公約が上に概括した四點に關し我が政府により滿足すべきものと考慮されるか否や、又どの程度かく考慮されるか、且つこれ等の新しい假公約が提案中の大統領、總理大臣會見に對し適切な根據を與えるか否かを吟味するのは適當である。

この關係に於て日本の約束はその口頭たると文書によるとを問はずかゝる約束が我が方の完全に滿足するよう遂行され得又は遂行されるならんという完全なる保障を與うるものゝ認められ難いことは明白である。極東に於ける前事態えの復歸又はその方面に於て我等が各國間

の妥當なる關係を支配すると信ずる主義に合致する狀勢の樹立の爲の第一の道として日本側に於て加速的な侵略行動を中止することが必要なるは明白である最近の日本提案に含まれた公約はもしそれが履行されるればとの要求を充すことは明かであらう。極東再建の一般計畫の精細な立案は恐らく前以て作製し難いと思われるから日本に對し今假借なく壓迫を加へている合衆國の「ヒ」又は經濟的手段がその提供された公約履行「」日本政府の行「」に伴い少しづつ緩和されること」とは極めて望ましいことであらう。もし我が政府がこの示唆された方向に從つたなら、政府は常にその手中に日本の公約履行に貢獻する槓杆の力を保持するであらう。關係の調整を成就するが爲には或る種の危險を冒さなければならない　併し日本側にその約束を重んずるよう誘導力を與えるのみならず、また合衆國政府に或る種の強制的槓杆の力を保留せしむべき方策の遂行上我が「」に於て冒すべき危險はこれ等の提議を拒否する結果執らるべき經濟制裁の加速的適用の爲生起すべき戰爭の危險程重大ではないと認められる。