

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DEPUTY DIRECTOR
 SEP 17 1945
 MR. HICKERSON
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 CHINESE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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BC
CA

Secret

September 14, 1945

EUR - Mr. Hickerson

On September 12, in the course of a conversation on another subject with Everson of the British Embassy, he asked when a reply might be expected to the Aide-Mémoire which Mr. Balfour had left with Mr. Dunn on August 30 in regard to control machinery for Japan.

I told him that Mr. Dunn had shown me the Aide-Mémoire and his record of the conversation just before he left and that my impression was (I did not have copies of the papers at hand) that Mr. Dunn considered his remarks to Mr. Balfour on the subject as an adequate reply. I said that, to the best of my memory, Mr. Dunn had related Mr. Balfour's inquiry to an earlier proposal for a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. I added that the British Government had not yet replied to our proposal. Mr. Everson asked whether the Soviet Union and China had done so. I said I believed they had, accepting the proposal.

We then turned to discussion of other Far Eastern matters.

Copies of the British Aide-Mémoire and of Mr. Dunn's memorandum are attached. I should like to have them back.

J.C.V.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-1445

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August 30, 1945.

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Balfour came in this afternoon and handed me the attached Aide-Memoire on the subject of control machinery for Japan.

I told Mr. Balfour that the whole fabric of the arrangements for the control of Japan had been built upon the Potsdam Declaration and the communication by you of August 11th to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government. Particular reference in your communication of August 11th is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who shall take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."

The next step taken was the communication of August 11th from the President to the Prime Minister stating that the President proposed to nominate General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied forces "to accept, coordinate, and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese armed forces". This designation was agreed to by the Prime Minister. It was not the intention of this Government to have a Control Council in Japan, as the control of Japan would be effectuated by the Supreme Allied Commander based on the above agreements.

I told Mr. Balfour that it was the policy and sincere desire of the President and the Secretary of State that our allies be consulted with respect to the policies to be carried out in dealing with Japan, and this was the reason why the Secretary of State immediately circulated to the other three major Allies the United States proposal to set up a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. It was the idea of this Government that all matters having to do with policies and methods of carrying out these policies could be discussed in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission; that it would be perhaps a few months in any event before it would be possible for any other than military commanders and their forces to go into Japan, as the business of securing the surrender was a very serious one and was a strictly military operation, but there was no reason, if this Far Eastern Advisory Commission were immediately set up, why it could not begin to discuss many matters relating to the application of the surrender of Japan.

I told

Mr. Dunn's conversation with Mr. Balfour re control machinery for Japan

I told Mr. Balfour that this explanation would seem to me to dispose of the British suggestion for discussion of the Control Commission, in other words that this would be a proper subject to discuss in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission but that we hoped that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would be the first body which would be set up in order to head up all these discussions in one place.

As far as concerned the communication of the British proposals for a Control Council to other governments, that was a matter which they would have to decide themselves, although I expressed the hope that in view of the proposed establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission the British Government might find it appropriate to withhold discussion of this matter until the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was set up.

As far as the British proposal that India be added to the proposed Advisory Commission, I said this was a matter which would have to be decided by the higher authorities of our Government and that I would bring this whole matter to the attention of the Secretary of State for his consideration.

James Clement Dunn

A-D:JCD:VH

(COPY:A-D:VH)

AIDE-MEMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be grateful if, before replying to the proposals made in Aide-Memoire which Mr. Dunn handed to Mr. Balfour on August 25th, they could have some broad indication of the views of the United States Government as to the machinery which should eventually be set up for the control of Japan. Without some such indication they find it difficult to estimate how far acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the proposals contained in the State Department's Aide-Memoire of August 23rd would prejudice the tentative suggestions for a Control Council in Japan which were made in the Embassy's Aide-Memoire of August 20th. At first sight, for example, it would seem difficult to persuade an Advisory Commission of Ten Powers to agree to the setting up of a Control Council of Five Powers.

In the meantime, as the American proposals are understood to have been communicated to the Chinese and Soviet Governments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel that they should now give those Governments an outline of their own tentative proposals.

If eventually an organisation is set up on the lines proposed by the United States Government, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have to insist on the inclusion of India in the proposed Advisory Commission in view of the great part which India has played in the war against Japan, and, pending consultation with the Government of South

/Africa

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Africa, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must reserve their position regarding the inclusion of a South African representative.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 30th, 1945

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1952, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By De laj NARS, Date 10/24/70

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

De/R

15 September 1945

NO. 1

Subject: The Present Situation in Korea

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington.

Sir:

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

I have the honor to submit a brief analysis of conditions in Korea as seen by this headquarters one week after the first landings by American forces were made at Chemulpo. This analysis is substantially the same as that sent by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), to General Douglas MacArthur.

On the face the Japanese have accepted the terms of surrender. In the area of occupation they have appeared to cooperate in withdrawing and disarming. However, reports are received from southern Korea indicating that they are looting and intimidating the Koreans and otherwise behaving in characteristic fashion. The Koreans do not understand that our occupation is only piecemeal and that USAFIK does not have enough troops to spread over the entire area. Extensive long-range patrols will start as soon as transportation can be arranged, but unless the Japanese forces are sent to Japan soon it will be necessary to put them in concentration camps.

Southern Korea can best be described as a powder keg ready to explode at the application of a spark. It was recently discovered that from the beginning the Korean translation of the term "in due course" in the Cairo Declaration has been the equivalent of "in a few days" or "very soon", and well-educated Koreans expressed surprise when the difference was pointed out to them. Hence the Koreans did not understand why they were not given complete independence soon after the arrival of American

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troops. There is great disappointment that immediate independence and sweeping out of the Japanese did not eventuate.

Although the hatred of the Koreans for the Japanese is unbelievably bitter, it is not thought that they will resort to violence as long as American troops are in surveillance.

The removal of Japanese officials is desirable from the public opinion standpoint but difficult to bring about for some time. They can be relieved in name but must be made to continue work. There are no qualified Koreans for other than the low-ranking positions, either in government or in public utilities and communications. Furthermore, such Koreans as have achieved high rank under the Japanese are considered pro-Japanese and are hated almost as much as their masters. The two most difficult problems at present are: The Koreans continue to be subject to Japanese orders, and conditions in the police department and among the rank and file of the police are bad. It is believed that the removal of the Governor General and the Director of the Police Bureau, both Japanese, accompanied by wholesale replacements of police personnel in the Seoul area will mollify irate Koreans even though the government itself is not strengthened thereby.

There are an unknown number of political parties and groups in Korea, many of which have mushroomed since the Japanese surrender was announced. The long period of oppression and the difficulty of underground activity have prevented the formation of clear-cut political groups. On September 12 General Hodge spoke to representatives of political groups on the basis of two persons from each group. More than twelve hundred attended the meeting. All groups seem to have the common ideas of seizing Japanese property, ejecting the Japanese from Korea, and achieving immediate independence. Beyond this they have few ideas.

Almost all Koreans have been on a prolonged holiday since August 15. To them independence apparently means freedom from work; no thought is given to the future, and "the Lord will provide". There has been no show of industry in this area since our arrival and no interest in returning to normal pursuits. General Hodge and others have constantly stressed the necessity for Koreans to stay on the job and to build up their own country, but they find it difficult

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to reconcile this idea with the fact that the Japanese still own or control most business and industrial establishments. Korea is completely ripe for agitators.

The most encouraging single factor in the political situation is the presence in Seoul of several hundred conservatives among the older and better educated Koreans. Although many of them have served with the Japanese, that stigma ought eventually to disappear. Such persons favor the return of the "Provisional Government" and although they may not constitute a majority they are probably the largest single group.

The monetary system is still a questionmark. The few investigators available to USAFIK are endeavoring to ascertain conditions and present indications are that inflation is underway and may not be controllable. The circulation of Bank of Chosen notes increased from about 3.5 billion yen in March to 7.5 billion yen on September 12. The result has been that wages and prices have skyrocketed beyond immediate control. Labor costs about thirty yen a day, and other prices are similarly high. Although USAFIK was directed to peg prices at the August 15 level, this will be difficult to accomplish and will only strengthen the already well-established black market.

Except in a few instances the Soviets have respected the 38 degree boundary. However, they have not respected the rights of individuals, either Japanese or Korean, and constant reports of indiscriminate rape, pillage and looting are received from all areas occupied by Soviet forces. There is little doubt that Soviet agents are spreading their political thought throughout southern Korea, and several parades and demonstration in Seoul have admittedly been communist-inspired. Communists advocate the seizure now of Japanese properties and may be a threat to law and order. It is probable that well-trained agitators are attempting to bring about chaos in our area so as to cause the Koreans to repudiate the United States in favor of Soviet "freedom" and control. Southern Korea is a fertile ground for such activities because USAFIK lacks sufficient troops to expand its area of control rapidly.

Contact has been established between USAFIK and Russian headquarters to the north through the Soviet Consul General

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here, who never left his post or was interned. No understandings have been reached but definite information may be available soon.

The splitting of Korea into two parts for occupation by armed forces of nations having widely divergent political philosophies, with no common command, is an impossible situation. Southern Korea contains the capital city, which is the center of communications. It also has most of the cereal crops. Northern Korea has most of the coal as well as the sources of electric power.

There are two critical shortages in our area: coal and food cereals. Coal is short because communications to the north have been cut; negotiations on the subject with the Russians have the highest priority. Cereals are short because of large shipments of last year's crop to Japan. This situation should ameliorate when the new and good crop is harvested at the end of October. Food distribution is difficult because the railways are not functioning properly and motor transportation is lacking. USAFIK is doing everything possible to repair Japanese Army transportation facilities to assist in the distribution of food.

In addition to the voluntarily unemployed, as described above, there are thousands of Koreans out of work because of the collapse of Japanese war industries. Manufacturing is at a standstill because of the lack of raw materials, and there is no immediate prospect of converting from a war to a peace footing. This problem, to which is added the release by the Japanese Army of many Koreans utilized by them, will become increasingly difficult as winter approaches.

General Hodge feels that stable conditions cannot be established in Korea until the Japanese Army has been removed to Japan. Demobilization in Korea is impossible, and the army will have to be kept in formed bodies and removed to Japan as soon as its disarming is completed. It cannot be effectively controlled unless put into concentration camps, where it would have to be fed and housed by USAFIK. USAFIK has requested permission to move the Japanese Army through Fusan at the earliest practicable date.

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USAFIK is operating under two great difficulties, neither of which can be corrected at this end. The first is that this headquarters has no information in regard to the future policy of the United States or its allies as to the future of Korea. What is going to happen to the nation and what will be the solution of the now almost complete division of the country into two parts? What will be our general policies beyond immediate military necessity? The second difficulty is that USAFIK is in small strength, and has too few competent military government and other officers that it can operate only in a limited area and with little overall effect. There is urgent need for expansion of areas of control, and although small groups could venture with safety into any part of the country, their presence would be so disturbing that police and governmental functions might break down while the Americans would not have sufficient personnel to take over the control of the area. It is essential that the entire force designated for the occupation of Korea be sent here as soon as possible.

A reconnaissance party will leave for Fusan tonight, for a stay of a few days, and arrangements are being made to send a force to Saishu (Quelpart) Island in a few days to disarm the 60,000 Japanese troops there.

The newspaper correspondents covering Korea as a group have behaved badly. They arrived by air after our landing, most of them from Japan with no knowledge of the local situation and without orientation took advantage of the American uniform to run rampant over the area, committing acts of personal misbehavior. There is reason to believe that by open sympathies with Korean radicals some of them have incited Korean group leaders to greater efforts at agitation for overthrow of everything and to have the Koreans take over all functions immediately. Before they got any glimmer of conditions as they existed, they were highly critical of all policies of the nation, of General Headquarters and of this headquarters relating to the occupation. This latter condition is now rectifying itself slowly as they begin to see the picture. One group arrived by air one afternoon, filed stories that evening and left the next morning, feeling that they knew all about the Korean occupation.

General Hodge has made the following recommendations to General MacArthur:

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"It is recommended that:

a. A control group on an international policy level be established at Keijo for the purpose of establishing and announcing international policies concerning the political and economic future of Korea. This group must function on the ground to be worthwhile and effective.

b. Pending consummation of recommendation a., I be given definite instructions as to policy with respect to the future of Korea or that Washington officials empowered to speak of the future be added to my staff. Recommendation along this line has also been forwarded by my State Department representative.

c. Every effort be made to get high-powered officers for my staff who are experienced in governmental affairs and who know orientals.

d. Consideration be given to returning the Chungking Government in exile to Korea as a provisional government under Allied sponsorship to act as figureheads during occupation and until Korean people stabilize to where there can be an election.]

e. The door be opened to American business men who can and will help reestablish Korean business and industry and assist in effecting transfer of Japanese property to Koreans.

f. Early establishment of a new monetary policy abandoning the use of any currency that has formerly been used by the Japanese.

g. Future policy for Korea include removal of all Japanese nationals from the area.

h. International trade be reestablished at an early date."

With reference to recommendations "a" and "b", I should like to call the attention of the Department to the extremely great difficulties under which this headquarters is operating, and to request the urgent transmission of policy directives which will guide USAFIK in its relations with the


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Russians and in its treatment of the serious political, social and economic problems which continue to mount from day to day.

Respectfully yours,


H. MERRELL BENNINGHOFF,
Foreign Service Officer,
Political Adviser,
Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

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DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Telephone
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 17, 1945

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SUBJECT: General MacArthur's Statement on Occupation Forces.

PARTICIPANTS: The President;
The Acting Secretary, Mr. Acheson

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COPIES TO: CA EUR

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
OCT 8 1945
MR. MATTHEWS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 19 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-1745

CS / Confidential File

740.00119 Control Japan 9-1745

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At the request of Assistant Secretary of War, McCloy, I called the President and directed his attention to the statement in today's paper attributed to General MacArthur to the effect that he thought that it would be possible to garrison Japan with 200,000 regular troops and that hence it would be possible and would be the policy to return the soldiers taken from civilian life to the United States. The statement also quoted General MacArthur as saying that this was possible because he was going to use the Japanese Government to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The President broke in to say that he thought the statement was incorrect, would do a great deal of damage and was wholly uncalled for. I went on to say to the President that the War Department was sending a cable to General MacArthur ascertaining the facts regarding this statement. It wished to say in the cable that no such statements should be made by General MacArthur or any of his officers in the theater, that in the judgment of the War Department we could not rely upon garrisoning Japan with the number of troops stated and that the statement itself would greatly impair the efforts of the War Department to bring about an orderly replacement program through the continuation of the draft. It was stating also as a

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result of prior conversations with me that the State Department was much disturbed at this statement both because it gave a wholly erroneous impression of our policy in the occupation and would lead to the general belief throughout the East that American power in the Far East was being liquidated and that we intended to rely solely on Japanese good faith. I asked the President whether the War Department could add that this statement also caused him great concern and did not correctly reflect his policies.

The President replied that we could say this and make it as strong as we could. He stated that this was not his policy and that he intended to use as many men as were necessary to assure the complete carrying out of the surrender and the adoption of the policies which we had already outlined to General MacArthur. He added that he intended to see that the Army authorities in the theater carried out these policies.

I reported this conversation to Mr. McCloy who will draft the cable along the lines indicated. We agreed that neither the War Department nor the State Department should make any comment on this reported statement of General MacArthur until we had had a reply to this cable. We also agreed that upon the receipt of such reply we would consider what statement the War Department should make since that seemed to be the appropriate source of the statement unless the President wished to make it himself.

DA

Dean Acheson

U:DA:ARK

MacArthur

Tokyo, September 17, 1945 - Text of Statement Issued Today
by General Douglas MacArthur

The smooth progress of the occupation of Japan enabled a drastic cut in the number of troops originally estimated for that purpose. The unknown quantity in the original situation was the debatable question whether a military government would have to be set up to run the country during the early occupation. This might well have involved the employment of several million troops.

The entire structure below the political plane, involving hundreds of thousands of people on professional and lower levels, would have had to be reconstituted and replaced. This would have involved a force running into millions of our men and would have taken many years of additional time and untold billions of additional dollars.

By utilizing the Japanese Government structure to the extent necessary to prevent complete social disintegration, insure internal distribution, maintain labor and prevent calamitous disease or wholesale starvation, the purposes of the surrender terms can be accomplished with only a small fraction of the men, time and money originally projected.

This situation involved a grave initial risk, but successful penetration and subsequent progress of the operation now assure success of the venture.

No greater gamble has been taken in history than the initial landings where our ground forces were outnumbered a thousand to one, but the stakes were worth it. As a consequence of the savings in men, the occupation forces originally believed essential are being drastically cut and the troops will be returned to the United States as rapidly as ships can be made available.

Within six months the occupational force, unless unforeseen factors arise, will probably number not more than 200,000 men, a size probably within the framework of our projected regular establishment and which will permit complete demobilization of our citizen Pacific forces which

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fought so long and so nobly through to victory. Once Japan is disarmed, this force will be sufficiently strong to ensure our will.

The questions involved in this matter are entirely independent of the future of the Japanese politico-governmental structure on a national and international plane. This problem is one the ultimate solution of which necessarily awaits completion of military phases of the surrender.

It is one which unquestionably will be determined upon the highest diplomatic level of United Nations and is one in which the answer cannot fail to be influenced by the incidence of events in the near and proximate future.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

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London

Dated September 17, 1945

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PRESS SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

9570 SEVENTEENTH NEWS CHRONICLE PUBLISHED RESULTS OF LATEST SURVEY BY BRITAIN PUBLIC OPINION COMMA AFFILIATE OF AMERICAN GALLUP POLL ORGANIZATION COMMA BASED ON QUESTION OF QUOTE DO YOU THINK THAT THE JAPANESE EMPEROR SHOULD OR SHOULDNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HIS THRONE QUERY UNQUOTE PERIOD IT IS STATED THAT SIXTYSEVEN PERCENT OF THOSE REPLYING ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE COMMA TWENTYTWO IN NEGATIVE COMMA AND THAT ELEVEN PERCENT HAD NO OPINION PARAGRAPH IN ACCOMPANYING EDITORIAL COMMA NEWS CHRONICLE HOLDS THAT VIEW EXPRESSED IN POLL IS PROBABLY SHARED QUOTE BY ALMOST ALL AUSTRALIANS AND BY A MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNQUOTE PERIOD ADDING THAT THERE IS NOW REASON TO SUSPECT GENERAL MACARTHUR OF NURSING ANY TENDER FEELINGS FOR JAPAN COMMA EDITORIAL SAYS IN HIS CONDUCT OF SURRENDER AND

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2-18-45
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SEP 21 1945
D/C/L
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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SEP 21 1945

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-2- #9570, seventeenth from London

OCCUPATION ARRANGEMENTS HE HAS MOVED WITH DELIBERATE CAUTION ON PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS BETTER NOT TO GET TOUGH UNTIL YOU ARE IN A POSITION TO ENFORCE YOUR WILL PERIOD NEWSPAPER IS GRATIFIED THAT QUOTE AS THE MOMENT OF COMPLETE JAPANESE IMPOTENCE APPROACHES COMMA THERE ARE WELCOME SIGNS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE VICTORS IS HARDENING UNQUOTE COMMA AND CITES ARRESTS OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS AND CENSORSHIP OF PRESS AND RADIO PERIOD EDITORIAL THEN GOES ON TO STATE COLON QUOTE WE CONFESS THAT WE READ WITH SOME SURPRISE THE STATEMENT OF GENERAL EICHELBERGER COMMA COMMANDER OF THE US EIGHTH ARMY COMMA THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE NECESSARY TO OCCUPY JAPAN FOR MORE THAN A YEAR PERIOD ASTERISKS IT IS TOO EARLY TO FORM ANY FINAL VIEW ABOUT JAPAN TREATMENT COMMA FOR EACH DAY BRINGS NEW DEVELOPMENTS PERIOD BUT AMONG THE ALLIED PEOPLES THERE IS CERTAINLY A GENERAL DESIRE THAT EVERY VESTIGE OF POWER SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONDUCTED JAPANESE POLICY BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR DASH AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO POSSIBILITY OF A SUBQUOTE COMEBACK END SUBQUOTE PERIOD WE SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TOO THAT JAPAN SHOULD AT LEAST BE SET ON THE ROAD OF FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE SO THAT TO HER OWN PEOPLE AND TO THE WORLD THERE SHOULD BE A VISIBLE AND REVOLUTIONARY BREACH WITH THE PAST PERIOD CAN ALL THIS BE DONE IN A BRIEF TWELVE MONTHS QUERY UNQUOTE

WINANT

JA/814P SEPTEMBER 17TH 1945

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

UNDER SECRETARY
SEP 18 1945
CENTRAL
FILES
DC/R
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DE/BC NARS, Date 10/29/74

18 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

The Chief of Staff directed that I forward
you the two attached messages.

H. M. PASCO
Colonel, GSC
Secretary, General Staff

This Document Must Be Returned To
40019 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-1845

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9-1845

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
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TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

URGENT
EYES ONLY

From: Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific,
Advance, Tokyo

To: War Department

Nr: CA 52048

18 September 1945

EYES ONLY for General Marshall from General
MacArthur. CA 52048. TOP SECRET.

Your WAR 65406 distresses me. There was not the faintest thought that my statement as to my personal estimate of the strength of the occupation forces in Japan would cause the slightest embarrassment. The strengths to be maintained in Europe and estimates for this theater have been carried freely in press reports. I was under the heaviest pressure from the press as they reported that President Truman in a late press interview referred them to me as to the time factors involved. In my statement I believed that I was acting in complete conformity with the War Departments announced policy of demobilizing just as rapidly as conditions permitted. I would appreciate it if you would explain my position to the White House and the State Department.

General Eichelberger's statement was made entirely on his own responsibility without previous consultation and is at variance with my own.

The reply to your WAR 57396 and WAR 64221 is being forwarded at once. It was drafted several days ago but has been delayed pending receipt from Manila of certain detailed computations that we were unable to make here.

ACTION: Gen Hull
INFO : C of S

End

CM-IN-14469

(18 sep 45)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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 OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
 (EYES ONLY)

EYES ONLY

Operations Division, WDGS
 Executive Office, 2904
 General Hull

17 September 1945

Commander in Chief
 Army Forces, Pacific, Advanced
 Tokyo, Japan

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Number: WAR 65406

EYES ONLY to General MacArthur from Marshall.

In the midst of a highly explosive Congressional situation which may jeopardize an orderly occupation and replacement policy appear press statements emanating from Japan which embarrass or prejudice War Department efforts.

The State Department and the White House are greatly concerned over the rapidly spreading effect of General Eichelberger's statement that occupation of Japan will be unnecessary after one year and also by the press reports this morning crediting to you the statement that occupation forces in Japan can be reduced to 200,000 within six months. They not only fear the adverse effect already evident on our efforts to maintain Selective Service to provide replacements but also an adverse effect on our political position in the Far East at this particular time. Leaders in Congress confirm these estimates.

Urgently needed is your estimate as to overall troop strength required in the Pacific on 1 July 1946. This was requested in WAR 57396 of 30 August and again in WAR 64221 of 14 September, replies to neither of which have as yet been received.

Please coordinate with War Department prior to release statements to press or visiting committees regarding strength of garrisons, rate of demobilization and matters referring to replacement needs, etc.

End

ORIGINATOR: General Hull

INFORMATION: C. of S.
 (Sep 45)

CM-OUT-65406

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(EYES ONLY)
 S E C R E T

EYES ONLY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: EE
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ES Secretary of State

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A-C PRAVDA September 17 carries half column TASS despatch

A-M
SPA from New York entitled "American press on policy towards

IS
SA Japan". Despatch states that American press continues to

SA/GN reach critically to American occupational policy in Japan

SA/M-2 and affirms that this policy is threat to peace in Asia and

inter-Allied relations. American press demands punishment of

leading Japanese industrialists and high placed officials as

war criminals. Voices are raised demanding that in addition

to Americans other Allied troops participate in occupation.


Remainder of despatch develops theme that prominent Japanese

industrialists are attempting to frighten Americans with

spectre of social disturbances and thereby obtain financial

assistance in reconstruction of Japanese industry.

Sent Dept 3299, repeated Chungking 162.



PLAIN
Moscow via War
Dated September 18, 1945
Rec'd 2:30 p.m.



~~EE~~
~~IA~~
~~DC~~

DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 25 1945
DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-1845

SEP 26 1945

DCR - EUR Unit
Anal
Rev
PLAIN

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 9-19-49

SEP 20 1949

MR. HICKERSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO : EUR - Mr. Hickerson

FROM : CA - Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT:

In accordance with the SWNCC recommendation as approved by the President, yesterday I handed a copy, as attached, of the statement to be made public by General MacArthur to a Secretary of the British Embassy and today I handed a copy to a Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and to a Secretary of the Chinese Embassy. I told them that the statement was being handed them for their information, that it would be released for publication by General MacArthur in a few days, and that in the meantime I would appreciate their treating it as confidential. The Chinese Embassy and Soviet Embassy Secretaries had no comment to make. * The British Embassy Secretary inquired with regard to the origin of the statement. I told him that it had originated with the American Government.

*Subsequently, the Soviet Embassy Secretary made the same inquiry as the British Embassy Secretary had made and was given the same answer.

CA:Vincent:ALM

copy to SWNCC. sec

J.C.V.

This Document Must Be Returned To
 DC/R/740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /9-19-49
 740.00119 Control (Japan)
 SECRET FILE
 FILED
 19-19-49
 SEP 20 1949

OFFICE
XXXXXXXX

49

TEXT OF A STATEMENT TO BE MADE PUBLIC
BY GENERAL MacARTHUR

1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force.

3. The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound in a contractual relationship with Japan as a result of that document. It will be respected and given effect because the Potsdam Declaration forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relation to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East.

740.00119 Central Japan | 9-1946

CA

SEP 13 1945

TOP SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Authority of the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers.

General MacArthur has sent the following message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "It would have a most beneficial and salutary effect if the instructions and powers of the Supreme Commander contained in your WX 60333 were published. Is there any objection?" A copy of the message in reference is attached hereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will transmit to General MacArthur a reply determined by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 12 approved publication of the message in reference on the understanding (1) that Presidential approval of their decision be obtained by the Acting Secretary of State and (2) that the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and China be informed of the contents of the message prior to its publication.

If you approve publication of the message, the Department of State will inform the respective Embassies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform General MacArthur that there is no objection to publication.

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

SWNCC 181/2
Appendix.

CA:JCVincent:ALM
9-13-45

A true copy of
the signed original.
als

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DC/R

TO : Mr. Dallas W. Dort, LA

DATE: September 20, 1945

FROM : Edwin M. Martin, A-C

SUBJECT: Handling of Japanese Supply Question

In conversation with Col. Grose on September 19, he suggested that the next step with respect to organization for handling Japanese supply problems might well be for the State Department to submit to Civil Affairs a proposal. Presumably this proposal would deal with the necessity for a co-ordinating committee which would represent War Food, WPB, FEA, or such other agencies as might be considered necessary; the proper place to establish such a committee, and its general terms of reference. He gave me the impression that they would welcome our initiative in this matter.

I hope that, as I understand has been the case with respect to Germany, this whole range of problems can be left largely in your hands. I shall be glad to be ^{of} any help I can, of course.

A-C:EMMartin:lmc

cc Mr. Walter B. Kahn, LA

WAR AREAS
ECONOMIC DIVISION

SEP 21 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R
Anal. <i>4</i>
Rev. _____
Cat. <i>1111</i>

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2045

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 9-2045
CS/H*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

STATE JA

INFO:

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A-R

NCB-1178-Z
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated September 22, 1945.

Rec'd 9:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

9838, September 22, 3 p.m.

After emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally and not (repeat not) under instructions, Sterndale Bennett told us this morning that he was becoming seriously concerned at the delay in setting up some sort of Allied control or advisory commission in Japan and the consequent unilateral issuance of directives to MacArthur and statements by him in name of Allied Powers but on which those powers had not been consulted. He gave as example a directive issued to MacArthur to make announcement on Sept 20 in Japan to effect that Emperor and Jap Govt were acting in subordinate capacity to Supreme Commander. According to Sterndale Bennett a copy of this directive was given to British Embassy in Washington on Sept 18 when copies were also given to Soviets and Chinese but none of the Govts concerned were given opportunity to comment or suggest changes. No exception was taken by Sterndale Bennett to contents of directive to MacArthur

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
SEP 24 1945
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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2245 Confidential File

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SEP 26 1945

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SECRET

-2-#9838, September 22, 3 p.m., from London

but he felt that we were "all in the same boat and have same objectives." He stated he had understood US policy would be that the conquering and occupation of Japan was at least in theory a joint affair and if so he hoped some machinery would be soon set up by which other Govts concerned could express their views on matters of vital mutual concern.

Sterndale Bennett referred to British proposal to set up five power control commission in Tokyo to advise MacArthur on other than military matters and said that FONOFF feels very strongly that such a body is necessary. It was pointed out that British proposal and the American proposal to set up a Far Eastern advisory commission in Washington were not mutually exclusive. British belief is that a large group in Washington as proposed by US would not be able to reach quick decisions on matters of urgency due to lack of sufficient knowledge of local conditions in Japan and that five power group sitting in Tokyo as suggested by British would be able to operate effectively on day to day and short term questions. Sterndale Bennett said it was because of strong British convictions on this point and the hope that an indication would soon be received from the

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-3-#9838, September 22, 3 p.m., from London.

from the Dept that some such machinery could be worked out that no official British reply had yet been made on American proposal for Far Eastern advisory commission. Sterndale Bennett said that as far as he could tell from indications he had received on American policy towards Japan the British Govt would be in substantial agreement with it. The role Japan will play in the future according to Sterndale Bennett will in large part be determined by what happens during next few months and he recomphasized the strong desire of FONOFF to cooperate with US in (1) making it impossible for Japan to take the road to aggression again and (2) building up conditions in which a new and peaceful Japan could grow.

WINANT

EP

SECRET

CIVIL CENSORSHIP DETACHMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
 UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
 USAFFE
 HEADQUARTERS
 (Station)

JP/TOK/PB/00103

Date: 21 Sept. 45

From: NIPPON TIMES

To:

Date of letter (or postmark if letter is undated) Communication:

19 Sept. 45

Number of inclosures:

None

Serial number of previous records:

None

Disposal of original letter:

- Passed.
- Deleted.
- Condemned.
- Photographed.
- Returned.
- Photostated.

(Check action taken)

Comment by:

L. I. McCloud

Date:

Type of communication: Press Copy COMMENT Language: English

Distribution GOVERNMENT AND PERSONALITIES: KAGAWA'S TASK IN RECONSTRUCTION

- G-2
- ASF
- CIS
- IDS
- MOS
- PRO

"With the formation of the Higashikuni Cabinet following the termination of the war, the activities of Toyohiko Kagawa, as "political adviser" to Prime Minister H.I.H. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, are attracting the keen attention of the people.

"For 35 years Mr. Kagawa has worked for the promotion of the welfare of the masses. He cares nothing for his official rank or title. What he is to work ardently for the good of a new Japan after the war.

"Three important tasks face Mr. Kagawa at present. The first is to undertake negotiations with the MacArthur Headquarters, the second, to establish an International Peace Society, and the third, to launch a movement for the resuscitation of morality.

"In his first attempt at diplomacy under the new conditions, Mr. Kagawa succeeded in obtaining the permission of the MacArthur Headquarters for the use of timber for the building of 300,000 houses for air raids victims.

"He is still making earnest efforts to secure the permission of the MacArthur Headquarters to import

Handwritten: *file*
 Stamp: *HE*

W. D. DIST. 18 Oct. 45

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CS/LE

W.D., A. G. O. Form No. 912a February 16, 1943

Examiner: VJJ

FROM INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, ASF
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-8228-1
CONFIDENTIAL

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) /9-2145

Handwritten: *740.00119 Control (Japan) 9-2145*

2,1000,000 koku of rice and medicines worth \$500,000,000.

"His honesty and enthusiasm undoubtedly stood Mr. Kagawa, who is neither a State Minister nor an Ambassador, in good stead, in his negotiations with the Headquarters of the Allied Forces.

"The person with whom I negotiated was Brigadier General T. F. Farrell, a staff officer of the MacArthur Headquarters, "declared Mr. Kagawa in an interview with a reporter of the Mainichi. He continued:

"It happens that the General is a friend of mine who 25 years ago wrote a biography about me. He is a person of strict morals and listens willingly to my earnest requests.

"I have seen the General in the capacity of Chairman of the Christian Commission for the Relief of Air Raid Victims. In Japan 77 cities have been burnt down. Six of the settlement that I run in Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe were burnt down. My hope is that houses for the air raid victims can be built before the winter comes. However, we can do nothing without the permission of the MacArthur Headquarters. From this point of view, I made direct negotiations with the Headquarters.

"Fortunately, the permission of the Headquarters has been obtained to use the timber originally assigned to military use and other timber, sufficient in all to build 300,000 houses, as well as to use the facilities of the Japan Shipbuilding and Wooden Aircraft companies. I intend to report the matter to the Welfare Minister immediately in order to go through the necessary procedure."

"Mr. Kagawa is now endeavoring to secure permission to import rice. If this is realized, it will prove to be a great blessing for the Japanese.

"Mr. Kagawa's second task is to organize an International Peace Society, of which Prime Minister H.I.H. Prince Higashikuni will be asked to become president. The society proposes to carry out four platforms:

"1. In obedience to the spirit of the Imperial Rescript proclaimed to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come, we resolve to contribute to world peace;

"2. We oppose aggressive war;

"3. We will contribute to the perfection of permanent world peace through the inception of a world wide collaboration system;

"4. We propose to promote mutual assistance among the peoples through religion, society, politics, economy, education, culture and other activities of men.

The Society aspires to encourage trade among the East Asiatic nations at least, based on mutual collaboration, and in the field of education, it proposes to strike out the word "hatred" from all school text books.

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Handwritten initials/signature

CONFIDENTIAL

"In contrast to the International Peace Society which is an external movement, the movement for the resuscitation of morality is an internal movement. In launching these big movements, Mr. Kagawa asks for no government subsidies."

CONFIDENTIAL

27 DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 24, 1945

To: U -- Mr. Acheson
From: FE-- Mr. Vincent
Subject: Far Eastern Advisory Commission



740.00119 Control (Japan) / 9-2245

London Embassy's no. 9838 of September 22 reports a personal conversation with the Chief of the British Foreign Office Division for Far Eastern Affairs, during which that Foreign Office official said that there were "strong British convictions" that a five-power Control Commission be set up in Tokyo and that therefore no official British reply has been made to the American proposal for a Far Eastern Commission.

Sir George Sansom, of the British Embassy, called on me this morning and in the course of the conversation I mentioned the matter to him. He said that he understood definitely that the British Foreign Office intended to discuss this whole matter with the Secretary and Mr. Dunn in London and that, therefore, there would be no need to give any particular attention to the personal conversation reported in 9838 unless of course we desired to do so.

FW 740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2245

J.C.V.

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Copy to EUR - Mr. Hickerson

FE:JCVincent:ead

OCT - 1 1945

FW 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 9-2245

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF DEFENSE MATERIALS

OK'd by Friedman 25/9/45.
He wrote Treasury letter.

Σ.

Treasury letter only nominated Angell
as financial adviser; said nothing about being
joint economic financial adviser or being on
staff of political adviser. Understand, however,
Treasury does not object to our letter.

E. M. M.

SEP 26 1945

In reply please refer to A-C

Dear Mr. McCloy:

The State Department is convinced of the importance of supporting its Acting Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan with a staff of competent economic and financial assistants. The State Department has reached agreement with the Treasury Department on the appointment of Mr. James W. Angell jointly by the two Departments as Economic and Financial Adviser to General MacArthur and head of this staff.

Before securing a final answer from Mr. Angell on his availability, I should like to know whether his appointment in this capacity will be satisfactory to the War Department.

Mr. Angell has been Professor of Economics at Columbia since 1931. In this capacity he has become a widely recognized authority in the field of economics, particularly international finance, on which he has written a number of books. During the war years he has held two responsible positions in the government, first as Director of Planning and Research for the Office of Civilian Requirements of the War Production Board, and subsequently as Assistant Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, a position he now holds.

It is my belief that he is well qualified to do the job that needs to be done in Japan. I hope you will agree with me.

Sincerely,

William L. Clayton
Assistant Secretary

TO:	DCE NE Unit
RE:	SCM
DATE:	
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The Honorable
John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D.C.

original
A-C

A-C:EMMartin:lmc 9-24-45

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 740.00119 Control (Japan) 9-26-45

signature
J.F.M.
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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 OCT 2 PM 2 15

RECORDS BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION

[TRANSLATION]

Office
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 4 - 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

TC No. 16893

The Chargé d'Affaires of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State of the USA and acknowledges the receipt of the Department of State's aide-mémoire of September 22, 1945 with enclosures.

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Washington

September 26, 1945.

(Initialed) NN

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2645

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Поверенный в Делах Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик свидетельствует свое почтение Исполняющему обя-
занности Государственного Секретаря США и подтверждает
получение меморандума Государственного Департамента от 22
сентября 1945 года с приложением.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2645

Посольство Союза Советских Социалистических Республик
Вашингтон

26 сентября 1945 г.

СССР

CS/VJ

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 9-2645
[Handwritten signature]



WAR DEPARTMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~OFS~~

DC/R

26 September 1945

Mr. Selden Chapin, Director
Office of Foreign Service
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.



Dear Mr. Chapin:

The occupation of Japan has proceeded to the point that the Theater Commander desires to add certain key civilian assistants to his military government staff. These civilians should be employed by you after approval by the Theater Commander and loaned to the War Department under the existing reimbursable detail agreement, as were those provided for service with the Group Control Council, Germany.

The Theater Commander has requested that civilian personnel with the following qualifications be procured:

An attorney, for service at policy making level, with broad experience in commercial and general business law in Japan representing Japanese as well as American firms and citizens in courts of Japan. Annual salary, \$8500.

Attorney for service at policy level with broad experience in the practice of law in Japan representing both Japanese and American banking institutions. He should be familiar with banking practices and law in Japan. Annual salary, \$8500.

An attorney for service at policy level with broad experience in the practice of law in the courts of Korea. He should be familiar with both banking and general commercial practices and laws in Korea. Annual salary, \$8500.

It is understood that in addition to the salary for each of the positions, there is paid a living allowance of \$2,520 for policy level and operating personnel. When quarters are provided by the Army, there is a deduction of 40% from the living allowance; when rations are provided, a deduction of 20%. When rations and quarters are provided by the Army, civilian personnel is required to pay the same nominal rates that are required of commissioned military personnel. These rates are in addition to the 40% and 20% deductions. However, after all deductions and charges have been made, the living allowance is more than

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/9-2645

740.00119 Control / 9-2645
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
FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS
ACK
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ample. Policy and operating personnel will be given an assimilated field grade officer rank. It is not, of course, possible to determine the exact duration of overseas service. Candidates should prepare to serve at least one year.

The War Department is most appreciative of your assistance in supplying qualified personnel for these assignments. Names of nominees and their qualifications will be supplied the Theater for approval and establishment of travel priorities.

Kind regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,



J. H. HILLDRING
Major General
Director, Civil Affairs Div.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FC-14

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

PLAIN

London


Dated September 26, 1945

Rec'd 12:15 a.m., 27th

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A-D PRESS SECSTATE WASHINGTON

A-B
A-R 10010 TWENTYSIXTH TIMES AND MANCHESTER GUARDIAN HAVE EDITORIALS
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IS ON POST WAR CONTROL OF JAPAN COMMA BOTH EXPRESSING APPROVAL OF
SA
SA/GN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL MACARTHUR PARAGRAPH
SA/M-2

TIMES ASSERTS THAT PUBLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN GENERAL
MACARTHUR HAS DISPELLED MANY UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT AIMS AND
METHODS OF ALLIED OCCUPATION WHICH WERE CAUSING CONCERN IN
UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE PERIOD IT DECLARES THAT NOTHING CAN
BE MORE CATEGORICAL THAN THIS DOCUMENT IN DETERMINATION IT
EXPRESSES TO USE EXISTING FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN AS A MERE
SINSTRUMENT FOR SECURING MORAL AS WELL AS MATERIAL DISARMAMENT
OF THE COUNTRY COMMA AND THAT IT IS DAILY MORE APPARENT THAT ORDERS
ISSUED BY MACARTHUR ARE STRIKING DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO EVERY
FORM OF NATIONAL ACTIVITY PERIOD EDITORIAL STATES COLON QUOTE IT
IS APPROPRIATE THAT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTING THE
POLICY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE HOMELANDS OF JAPAN SHOULD
BE VESTED IN THE UNITED STATES PERIOD IN SPITE OF THE CONTRIBUTION



740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2645

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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-2- #10010, Twentysixth, from London

TO FINAL VICTORY WHICH THE BRITISH COMMA AUSTRALIAN AND INDIAN
FORCEES WERE PROUD TO MAKE AND OF THE OPPORTUNE SOVIET INTERVENTION
COMMA THE MAIN BURDEN OF THE FIGHTING HAS BEEN BORNE BY THE ARMADA:
OF AMERICA PERIOD MOREOVER THE UNITED STATES COMMA UNLIKE HER
ALLIES COMMA CAN COMMAND THE SERVICES COMMA SO VALUABLE IN HER
DIFFICULT TASK COMMA OF THOUSANDS OF LOYAL CITIZENS WHO ARE AMER-
ICAN IN ALLEGIANCE BUT JAPANESE BY RACIAL INHERITANCE PERIOD
NEVERTHELESS IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT HER ALLIES SHOULD WATCH THE
COURSE OF EVENTS IN JAPAN WITH THE KEENEST INTEREST AND SHOULD
LOOK FOR REPRESENTATION ON THE SPOT PERIOD UNQUOTE TIMES SAYS
THAT FUTURE PEACE PLAINLY DEPENDS ON USE WHICH ALLIES NOW MAKE
OF THEIR VICTORY COMMA AND THAT THERE IS GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH
VIEW EXPRESSED IN AUSTRALIA THAT POLICY OF EMPLOYING JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT COMMA HOWEVER ADVANTAGEOUS IN SAVING LIVES AND FACIL-
ITATING JAPANESE DISARMAMENT COMMA HOLDS DANGERS WHICH CAN ONLY
BE AVOIDED BY CONSTANT VIGILANCE PERIOD THE REAL SAFEGUARD IS
EDUCATION OF JAPANESE PEOPLE IN ART OF LIVING AT PEACE WITH THEIR
NEIGHBORS PERIOD EDITORIAL CONCLUDES COLON QUOTE PROGRESS TOWARDS
THIS END IS THE CRITERION WHICH THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WILL APPLY IN THEIR ESTIMATE OF AMERICAN ACTION IN JAPAN SEMICOLON

PLAIN

PLAIN

-3- #10010, Twentysixth, from London
AND BOTH THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO GENERAL MACARTHUR AND THE
MANNER OF THEIR EXECUTION PROMISE THAT IT WILL BE SATISFIED UN-
QUOTE PARAGRAPH STRESSING DIFFICULTIES OF TASK CONFRONTING GENER-
AL MACARTHUR COMMA GUARDIAN SAYS THAT IN FIRST PLACE HE HAS TO
DISARM A LARGE AND MOSTLY UNDEFEATED JAPANESE ARMY COMMA WITH WHAT
IS STILL A VERY MODEST FORCE OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS PERIOD IN HIS
TASK OF CONTROLLING EMPEROR AND ENTIRE POPULATION OF JAPAN COMMA
HE IS BEING CONSTANTLY BOMBARDED BY INSTRUCTIONS FROM STATE DE-
PARTMENT QUOTE AND HECKLED AND NAGGED BY ANGRY AUSTRALIANS AND
AMERICANS WHO THINK THEY KNOW BETTER UNQUOTE PERIOD IN CIRCUM-
STANCES COMMA GUARDIAN FINDS IT QUOTE HARDLY SURPRISING THAT
GENERAL MACARTHUR SHOULD HAVE SAID AND DONE SOME PECULIAR THINGS
WHICH HE IS NOW DOING HIS BEST TO DENY AND UNDO UNQUOTE COMMA BUT
THAT ANY CRITICISM OF AMERICAN POLICY MUST MORE FAIRLY BE DIRECTED
AGAINST AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COMMA QUOTE WHICH HAS MADE IT CLEAR
TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT THIS IS FIRST AND
FOREMOST AN AMERICAN CONCERN UNQUOTE PERIOD GUARDIAN SAYS THAT
FORTUNATELY THE PRESIDENTS INITIAL DIRECTIVE IS NOW AVAILABLE
AND THAT IT IS ON THE WHOLE A WISE AND REASONABLE DOCUMENT PERIOD
AFTER QUOTING EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENTS INSTRUCTIONS COMMA EDITOR-
IAL SAYS COLON QUOTE AMERICAN POLICY MAY THEREFORE BE SUMMED UP
AS THIS COLON TO USE THE EXISTING JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND CON-
STITUTION FOR THE SAKE OF CONVENIENCE COMMA BUT TO HOPE AND PRAY
FOR A REVOLUTION WHICH WILL CHANGE THEM PERIOD THE CHIEF CRITI-
CISM THAT CAN BE MADE IS THAT IS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT A

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-4- #10010, Twentysixth, from London
REVOLUTION WILL TAKE PLACE PERIOD OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS WHICH
FORMED THE RULING OLIGARCHY IN JAPAN ONLY THE MILITARISTS HAVE SO
FAR RECEIVED A CRIPPLING BLOW PERIOD THE BIG INDUSTRIALISTS COMMA
THE LANDLORDS COMMA THE BUREAUCRACY WHICH CLINGS TO THE THRONE
ARE ALL ALMOST UNTOUCHED PERIOD UNLESS THE AMERICANS ADOPT A MORE
ACTIVE POLICY THAN AT PRESENT SEEMS LIKELY ONLY THE FORCE OF ECON-
OMIC DISTRESS IS LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED CHANGES PER-
IOD THIS HOWEVER MAY WELL HAPPEN PERIOD UNQUOTE EDITORIAL SAYS
THAT PEASANTS ARE PERHAPS THE MOST REVOLUTIONARY CLASS IN JAPAN
COMMA AND MOST APT TO BE HARD HIT BY FAMINE CONDITIONS AND RETURN
OF DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS PERIOD IT SAYS THAT AGRARIAN REFORM IS
PERHAPS THE FIRST ESSENTIAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECON-
OMIC HEALTH COMMA CONCLUDING COLON QUOTE IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS
FOR THE FARMERS WILL REDUCE THE INEXHAUSTIBLE FLOW OF CHEAP LABOR
FOR JAPANS INDUSTRY AS WELL AS OF DOCILE RECRUITS FOR JAPANS ARMY
PERIOD AN INCREASE IN THE PEASANTS PURCHASING POWER WOULD ALSO
EXPAND JAPANS HOME MARKET AND THEREFORE REDUCE THE PRESSURE TO
EXPORT DASH AND TO CONQUER PERIOD JUDICIOUS AMERICAN PRESSURE AT
THIS POINT MIGHT BRING ABOUT THE REVOLUTION WHICH ALONE CAN MAKE
JAPAN SUBQUOTE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY END SUBQUOTE UNQUOTE
WINANT.

PH/WF/1215A.

(SEPT. 27, 1945).

PLAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION:BC
INFO:

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Secretary of State

Washington

10050, Twenty-seventh

President's press conference remarks on control and occupation of Japan are well reported throughout London press today. No local comment has yet been added.

PLAIN

London

Dated September 27, 1945

Office of Far Eastern Affairs
OCT 3 - 1945
Department of State

Office of European Affairs
REC'D
OCT 1 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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WINANT

WMB

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RECORDS SECTION

7 40.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2745

VR

Assistant Secretary

Mr. Clayton

Date 10/22

To: A-C: Mr. Martin

From: ~~AWH~~

NOV 20 1945

For appropriate action.


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answer

Ed -

25

Specimen proposed reply for Clayton's signature



END OF JAPAN
SHOCK OF BAN ON ALL HEAVY INDUSTRIES
 From JOHN RIDLEY,
 Daily Telegraph Special Correspondent
 TOKYO, Tuesday.
 Gen. MacArthur's order banning all heavy industries in Japan came as a staggering blow to the people. For the first time they showed some reaction to the occupation, even though it was only verbal.
 "This is the end of Japan," a well-known Liberal business man in Tokyo said to me this morning. "This order is very harsh—it reduces Japan to the status of a mere agricultural nation with no means of raising the standards of living of the people."
 He went on to say that the closing of great industrial concerns meant ruin for hundreds of thousands of small shareholders. "The future of Japan is indeed black. How can we hope to solve the gigantic problem of unemployment?"
 All other Japanese I have talked to to-day said the same thing—"Japan is ruined for ever by this order." The order was published in full in the Tokyo papers this morning, but there was no editorial comment.

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Telephone:
Worthing 234

England.
12 BYRON ROAD,
WORTHING,
SUSSEX.

~~H-O~~
g

DIVISION OF PUBLIC LIAISON
The resident of the United
States of America.

Sept. 27. 1945

JK: RWB: 1L
11/15/45 file
Inat. to London

Dear Mr. President,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

①

The news in the enclosed newspaper paragraph came as a shock to many British people as well as to the Japanese. With the latter we need not sympathise, but I am sure you will with the former. I get — or ought to get, rather — nearly half of my very small income of about £500 a year from interest on Japanese Bonds, but I have not had a penny from that source for four years. If America is going to destroy Japanese industry it will destroy also the Japanese ability to pay their debts to British people.

The interest on Japanese Bonds is surely as much rightly due to the bondholders as war indemnities to Americans — may, I think the arrears, at least, have a prior claim. I have lost, owing to Japanese aggression, about £500, which is owing to me and which has been

unjustly withheld. And I read also that the whole of the Japanese gold and silver stocks is being seized by the American High Command, the amount being estimated at from £75,000,000 to £500,000,000. Considering that the entire interest yearly on the whole of the British loans to Japan, from 1899 to 1930, is only approximately £4,000,000 per annum, it does seem to me unjust that no mention has been made of British citizens rights to a very small portion of that. Indeed the smaller figure above-mentioned is almost exactly equal to the whole amount outstanding of the capital of these loans, one of which is due to be paid off in two years time.

But, of course, Mr. President, I am quite sure that America does not intend to do anything unjust to these citizens who were, and still are, America's allies and friends. The immense and far-reaching plans for the future of Japan have only been stated in general terms. Such things as the arrangements for the payment of interest on British loans to Japan must seem to you trivial and unimportant. But they are not so to me, a poor man, and thousands of others like me. I therefore ask you, Mr.

Telephone:
Worthing 234

12 BYRON ROAD,
WORTHING,
SUSSEX.

President, at least to relieve our anxiety in this matter by issuing a public statement that your Government will meet our just claims as soon as arrangements can be made to do so. I do not ask for details, but a general statement of this nature.

I see it also stated in the newspapers that Russia has asked for a very large loan from America. But Russia, previous to 1915, borrowed £160,000,000 from British people, and £400,000,000 from France, and in 1917 repudiated every penny. I certainly hope that your country will agree to the proposal, but only on condition that the loans made before 1915 are acknowledged.

For a country to say it cannot pay is one thing, but "will not pay" quite another. Russia said "I will not pay" in 1917, and there lies the sting. Inability is pardonable, dishonestly unpardonable.

I remain, Mr. President

Your obedient servant

A. G. Hills ✓

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NOV 20 1945

UNRESTRICTED

No. 6169

To the
Officer in Charge of the American Mission,
London.

The Secretary of State has received by reference from the White House the enclosed letter from Mr. A. E. Hills, Twelve Byron Road, Sussex, to which the Officer in Charge is requested to reply.

Mr. Hills may be informed that the news item to which he refers misrepresents Allied policy towards Japan which was concurred in by his Prime Minister together with the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the President of the United States at Potsdam in July 1945. In respect to heavy industry, that policy stated that "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war." That Allied policy governs the undertakings of the Supreme Commander as he puts into effect the Instrument of Surrender signed on September 2 by representatives of the government of Japan and the governments of the United Kingdom, China, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The United States will not, unilaterally, determine or carry out the execution of Allied reparations policy. Hence, any claim for reimbursement or compensation of losses which he has incurred as a consequence of the war against Japan should be addressed to his government which will participate, in due course, in inter-governmental discussions concerning the general reparations settlement.

Enclosure:

Letter from Mr. Hills, Great Britain, to the President dated September 27, 1945.

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A true copy of the signed original.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

September 27, 1945

PI - Mr. Lookhart

Mr. Acheson would appreciate having prepared for his signature a reply to the attached memorandum of September 27, from the Secretary of War concerning the recruitment of citizens of the Philippine Islands for service in the occupation of Japan.

F. S. W.
Frances E. Willis



UNDER SECRETARY
SEP 27 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

DIVISION OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS
copy in PL
1945 file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 27, 1945

DC/R
See page 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

On September 26, 1945, the Senate adopted the following amendment to H. R. 3951, the "Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act of 1945", which had previously passed the House of Representatives:

"The Secretary of War, with the approval of the Philippine Legislature, is hereby authorized to enlist in the Philippine Scouts, with pay and allowances authorized under existing law, 50,000 men for service in the occupation of Japan. Such enlistments shall be for 3 years and citizens of the Philippine Islands shall be eligible to volunteer for such service".

It is believed that, as a result of the foregoing and other amendments to H. R. 3951, the measure will go to a Conference between the two houses of Congress. Senator Hayden, who offered the foregoing amendment, anticipated that such a Conference would take place and that opportunity would be thus afforded to perfect and clarify the language of his amendment.

The War Department has indicated its concurrence in the principle of the use of Philippine citizens in our occupation force insofar as the military aspects of such use are concerned. It proposes, however, to suggest the following clarifications in text:

(1) To substitute, for the words "Philippine Legislature", the words "Philippine Government"; in order to obviate any possible future complications between the Philippine legislative and executive branches.

(2) To substitute, for the words "for service in the occupation of Japan", the words "for service in the Philippine Islands, in the occupation of lands now or formerly subject to Japan, and elsewhere in the Far East"; in order to avoid undue restriction in the use of the troops in question.

B.R.T.

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(3) To insert, after the words "such enlistments shall be for three years", the words "unless sooner terminated"; in order to avoid any implication that enlistees are entitled to serve out the full three year enlistment despite changing conditions.

There are other considerations which may warrant recommendations for future changes in the text. Some of these considerations are of a purely military nature and some involve national policy.

In examining these considerations, certain facts should be borne in mind:

(a) The Philippine Scouts are a component of the Regular Army.

(b) Philippine Scout officers must by law be appointed from among Philippine citizens, although United States Army officers may be detailed to command scout units.

(c) While under existing regulations the base pay of Philippine Scouts is less than that of other components of the Regular Army, the conditions of their service are likely to be more favorable than those of the Philippine Army. The base pay of the Philippine Scouts may be increased by War Department regulation to the same level as other components of the Regular Army.

(d) The President is authorized by law to reduce or disband the Philippine Scouts at any time.

(e) After July 4, 1946, the members of the Philippine Scouts, though serving in a component of our Regular Army, will be citizens of another sovereign nation, the Philippine Commonwealth.

As far as the military aspects are concerned, the War Department, while foreseeing difficulties in operating under the Hayden amendment, believes that none is insurmountable.

Apart from the military matters referred to above, the amendment appears to raise questions of national policy which are not within the province of the War Department:

(1) Should units composed wholly of nationals of another sovereign nation (which will presumably become the status of the Philippine Commonwealth after July 4, 1946) be included in the Armed Forces of the United States which are occupying Japanese territory? The answer to this question appears to involve our relations and engagements with our Allies.


(2) After the Philippine Commonwealth becomes a sovereign nation next July, will the members of the Philippine Scouts owe allegiance to that Commonwealth or to the United States in whose Army they and the units which they constitute will be serving? To illustrate the principle in question, a delicate international situation would arise if it were necessary, after next July, to court-martial and execute a Philippine Scout.

(3) What will be the effect upon the relations between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth, as a sovereign nation, of including in the Regular Army of the United States a force of 50,000 Philippine citizens, who are likely to be better trained and better equipped, and possibly better paid, than comparable elements of the Philippine Army?

It is believed that an expression of your views on these matters would assist the House and Senate Conferees in their deliberations and would aid in perfecting and clarifying the language of the amendment. The War Department would appreciate receiving a copy of such a communication from you.

The necessity for immediate action is obvious.

The Chairmen of the Committees on Military Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been advised of this reference to you.



Secretary of War

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My dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to your memoranda of September 27 and 28, 1945 concerning the Hayden Amendment to H.R. 3951, I enclose herewith a copy of the letter which I have sent today to the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate. A similar letter was sent to the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated October 1 to the Chairman on Military Affairs.

The Honorable

Robert P. Patterson,

Secretary of War

War Department.

A true copy of the signed original.

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B.R.T.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 19-27 (Japan) / CYLE
740.00119 Control (Japan) - 2745

OCT 1 - 1945

My dear Senator Thomas:

The Secretary of War has submitted to me a memorandum, a copy of which is attached, requesting that the Department of State express to you its views on the Hayden Amendment of H.R. 3951 and in particular with respect to certain questions concerning such amendment which the War Department believes are not within its province.

First, the Department of State concurs with the War Department in supporting the Hayden Amendment as modified by the three clarifying changes favored by the War Department as listed in the attached memorandum.

Second, with respect to the three specific questions raised by the War Department, this Department has the following comments:

(1) In the light of the special relationship between the Philippine Commonwealth and the United States, and in view of the requirement of the Hayden Amendment that the Philippine authorities express their approval of the proposal, there would not appear to be any policy considerations against the inclusion of units composed wholly of Philippine nationals in the armed forces of the United States after July 4, 1946.

(2) With respect to the question raised by the War Department as to whether members of the Philippine Scouts serving in the armed forces of the United States after the granting of independence to the Philippines would continue to owe allegiance to the United States, the Department of State believes that any possible difficulties in this connection can be avoided through special arrangements in agreement with appropriate Philippine authorities, including, if necessary, appropriate provision in the terms of enlistment.

The Honorable
Elbert D. Thomas,
Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs,
United States Senate.

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(3) As to the effect upon relations between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth of including in the Regular Army of the United States a force of 50,000 Philippine citizens who may be better trained and paid than comparable elements of the Philippine Army, the enlistment of Philippine Scouts for the purpose contemplated in the Hayden Amendment is to be carried out only with the approval of the Philippine authorities and, if they do approve of the proposal, questions of the nature raised by the War Department would appear to be academic.

A similar letter is being sent to Chairman May of the House Military Affairs Committee.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum from the Secretary of War, September 27, 1945.

A true copy of the signed original.
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Cleared with Lt: Bishop ✓
Efer OCT 1 1945

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OCT 1- 1945

My dear Mr. May:

The Secretary of War has submitted to me a memorandum, a copy of which is attached, requesting that the Department of State express to you its views on the Hayden Amendment of H.R. 3951 and in particular with respect to certain questions concerning such amendment which the War Department believes are not within its province.

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The Honorable
Andrew J. May,
Chairman, Military Affairs Committee,
House of Representatives.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 740.00119 Control 9-27-45
9-27-45
CS/LP [Signature]

(3) As to the effect upon relations between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth of including in the Regular Army of the United States a force of 50,000 Philippine citizens who may be better trained and paid than comparable elements of the Philippine Army, the enlistment of Philippine Scouts for the purpose contemplated in the Hayden Amendment is to be carried out only with the approval of the Philippine authorities and, if they do approve of the proposal, questions of the nature raised by the War Department would appear to be academic.

A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Thomas of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum from the Secretary of War, September 27, 1945.

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[Handwritten signature]

Cleared with Lt. Bishop
S. A.
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SECRET

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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E.O. 11652, sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority JCS Memo 14/14
By DR 183 NARS, Date 10/24/74

SWNC-3313
27 September 1945

19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Attention: Mr. T. C. Achilles.

Subject: Disposition of Canadian Army
Pacific Forces.

At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the enclosures are forwarded in order to apprise the State Department of the present situation as to Canadian participation in the occupation of Japan.

The letter in the enclosure to J.C.S. 1198/5 was forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission on 26 September 1945.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

[Handwritten Signature]

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

✓
✓
Enclosures:

- Cy. No. 68, JCS 1198/4.
- Cy. No. 60, JCS 1198/5.

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWNC-3313
27 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Attention: Mr. T. C. Achilles.

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For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Enclosures:

Cy. No. 68, JCS 1198/4.
Cy. No. 60, JCS 1198/5.

Copy to:

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SECRET

SECRETCOPY NO. 68J.C.S. 1198/44 September 1945Pages 31-32, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFDISPOSITION OF CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE
Reference: J.C.S. 1198 Series

Letter from the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission
(Circulated by the Secretaries for information)

File 1-4-18

31 August 1945

My dear Admiral Leahy,

In your letter dated 21st December, 1944 (J.C.S. 1198), concerning Canadian Army participation in the war against Japan, you advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposal that a Canadian Army force of one division with such ancillary troops as might be required should participate in the war against Japan under the higher command of the United States forces.

Accordingly, planning and executive action were undertaken immediately both by the War Department and the Department of National Defence. The force has now been assembled in Canada and in fact advanced cadres are undergoing instruction in the U.S.A. When it became evident that victory over Japan was imminent and after consultation with the War Department (Operations Division), movement of further Canadian troops was suspended until such time as the situation became clarified.

I have now been instructed to inform the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff that upon the execution of the terms of surrender by Japan it is proposed to disband the Canadian Army Pacific Force.

It is desired at this time on behalf of the Canadian Army to convey to the U.S. War Department the thanks and appreciation

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S E C R E T

of the Canadian Army for the cordial and ever ready cooperation which was received on every hand, and at every level.

We are at one with you in giving thanks that victory has been achieved but our thoughts are tinged with regret that circumstances have precluded us from serving side by side with the U.S. Army in fighting against our common enemy in the Pacific.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ H.F.G. Letson
Major General,
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff.

S E C R E TCOPY NO. 60J.C.S. 1198/519 September 1945Pages 33 - 34, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFDISPOSITION OF CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

Reference: J.C.S. 1198/4

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

While not absolutely required, the Joint Staff Planners consider that as a matter of courtesy it is desirable to reply to the letter from the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission contained in J.C.S. 1198/4. It is recommended that the enclosed letter be dispatched to General Letson.

It is apparent that the Canadians do not contemplate furnishing any occupation forces for Japan. The Joint Staff Planners consider that the determination as to whether the Canadians should be requested to assist in Japan must depend on firmer information concerning requirements for occupation forces than has yet been furnished by General MacArthur, and that any approach to the Canadians should initially be by the State Department rather than on a military level to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission. In order to apprise the State Department of the present situation as to Canadian participation in the occupation of Japan, it is recommended that this paper and J.C.S. 1198/4 be furnished to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

S E C R E TE N C L O S U R ELETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN JOINT STAFF MISSION

The United States Chiefs of Staff have received your letter of 31 August 1945 stating that on the execution of the terms of surrender by Japan it was proposed to disband the Canadian Army Pacific Force. It is presumed that any contribution which Canada may make to the Allied occupation forces in Japan will be taken up on a governmental level.

The United States Chiefs of Staff have informed the War Department of the appreciation expressed by you on behalf of the Canadian Army for assistance rendered in preparing the Canadian Army Pacific Force for the war against Japan. Members of the United States Army long have had great admiration for the fighting qualities of the Canadian Army and were only too glad to assist in the training of the Canadian Army Pacific Force.

During the war, the Canadian Joint Staff Mission has given valuable assistance to the United States Chiefs of Staff in solving problems of mutual interest to United States and Canadian armed forces. The United States Chiefs of Staff desire to take this opportunity to express their thanks and appreciation to the Mission and the Department of National Defense for their fine cooperation with the United States armed forces during the war against the Axis Powers.

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
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Government Agency.

Washington,

U.S. War Dept

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SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS,
United States Political Adviser,
TOKYO (JAPAN)

10

~~FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.~~

Please ascertain from General MacArthur if there is any objection to the request of Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America that four representatives of Protestant churches visit Japan for purpose of conferring with Japanese Christians. Please telegraph reply as soon as possible.

Atcheson (S.P.A.)
Acting

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS
OCT 9 1945
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UNRESTRICTED

No. 6390

Montevideo, September 28, 1945

Subject: Comment in El Pais on Acting Secretary Acheson's Statement on the Limits of Military Functions in Japan.

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DIVISION OF CONSULAR SERVICES
CENTRAL SERVICES

11 6 AM '45

BY AIR MAIL
LEAVING MONTEVIDEO

SEP 28 1945

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Acting Secretary ACHESON's statement of September 19 delineating military and civil functions in the implementation of United States policy in Japan elicited a commendatory editorial from El Pais which points to the incident as a healthy example of the practice of true constitutional democracy.

The editorial declares that "the incident is edifying, and increases the prestige of the North American republic and its institutions, as well as its people and its leaders who know how to respect, and force respect of, such institutions." As on previous occasions, El Pais contrasts the free exercise of democracy in the United States and in South America, and notes that military men like PERON, FARRELL, MORINIGO and VILLARROEL, have not only mixed in politics but occupy high government posts where they consider themselves indispensable. The editorial contends that democratic institutions in many South American countries will never be well established until the militarists become thoroughly imbued with their obligations to the country, constitution and laws, and hold themselves aloof from controversies of a purely political nature. El Pais quotes statements of Artigas and San Martin sustaining this point, and concludes with the observation that unfortunately the advice given by these heroes and repeated by the great modern democracies has not been well understood in several Latin American countries.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Edward J. Sparks
Edward J. Sparks
Counselor of Embassy

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(To Dept. in quintuplicate)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WAR DEPARTMENT

DIVISION OF PHILIPPINE
 WASHINGTON
 MILITARY AIRS
 OCT 11 1945
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY
 SEP 28 1945
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

421
DC/R

September 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Under date of September 27, 1945, I transmitted to you a memorandum with reference to various considerations arising out of the Senate - approved amendment proposed by Senator Hayden to H.R. 3951, the "Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act of 1945".

In that memorandum I set forth the text of the Hayden amendment and three clarifications in that text which the War Department was proposing to suggest.

On the same day, the Chief of Staff sent a radiogram to General of the Army MacArthur setting forth the Hayden amendment and the three proposed clarifying changes, together with a full statement of the various considerations involved. This radiogram requested General MacArthur's comments on the amendment and the proposed changes and an expression of his views on the general subject.

The War Department has today received General MacArthur's reply, a paraphrased copy of which is attached as Inclosure 1. For obvious reasons, I would appreciate that the contents of this reply be not made public.

In view of this reply, it is the present intention of the War Department to advise the appropriate members of the Congress that, from a military point of view, this Department concurs in the Hayden amendment as modified by the three clarifying changes referred to above.

RLP Patt

Secretary of War

1 Inclosure



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OCT 31 1945

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2845

740.00119 Control / 9-2845 (Japan)

Paraphrase of Radiogram Received by the Chief of Staff from General of the Army MacArthur, Commenting on Proposal to Employ Philippine Scouts in the Occupation of Japan.

General MacArthur's reply, dated 28 September 1945 and numbered CAX 52442, to the Chief of Staff's radiogram, dated 27 September and numbered WX 70311, is as follows:

- a. Concurs in the three changes which the War Department suggests should be made in the Hayden amendment for the purpose of clarification.
- b. Offers no other further suggestions for changes.
- c. Believes that Filipino officers for the force proposed by the Hayden amendment cannot, as a practical matter, be produced within any reasonable time, because the Philippine Officer Corps was virtually destroyed in the first Philippine Campaign.
- d. Recommends that, while new Philippine Scout officers are being developed, American officers be used in organizing and commanding the proposed force, augmented by such Filipino officers already trained by our Allied as may be available.
- e. States that the principal question involved is whether the United States intends to employ Philippine Scouts as a part of the United States Army after Philippine independence has been established.
- f. Recommends against the employment of Philippine Scouts in the United States Army after the Philippine independence has been established.
- g. Proposes that after Philippine independence has been established all Filipino soldiers become a part of the Philippine Army, and that suitable arrangements be concluded for the utilization of units of the Philippine Army in conjunction with United States Forces.
- h. Suggests, however, that a special arrangement might be made to cover the 50,000 Philippine Scouts enlisted under the Hayden amendment, whereby such Scouts would be excepted from any general rule that all Philippine soldiers become a part of the Philippine Army upon the establishment of Philippine independence.
- i. Suggests that such special arrangement for the continuance of Philippine Scouts in the United States Army after the establishment of Philippine independence be subjected to a specific time limit (no specific period of time is recommended).
- j. Recommends that the full concurrence of President Osmena (now en route to Washington) be obtained prior to final approval of the amendment.

Incl. I.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS
DIVISION

September 28, 1945.

TO: U
Mr. Acheson

FROM: PI
Mr. Lockhart.

DIVISION OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS
File
OCT 11 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY
SEP 28 1945
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Senator Hayden, who is the author of the amendment quoted in the underlying memorandum addressed to you by the Secretary of War, telephoned me this afternoon and said that he had been trying to reach you on the telephone in order to discuss the amendment. The Senator stated that the conferees have not yet been appointed, but that this would probably be done when the two Houses of Congress meet on Monday. He is anxious to know what the attitude of the Department of State is on the legislation and I told him that it was under consideration, but that you, so far, had not had an opportunity to go into the matter. He stated that the War Department had informed him of the reference of the matter to the Department of State.

Senator Hayden further stated that he hoped the Department might send to the Chairmen of the two Conference Committees by Monday afternoon some expression of view on the advisability of adopting the amendment. He seemed particularly concerned lest General MacArthur might recommend that the Philippine Army rather than the Philippine Scouts be used as a component part of the allied occupational forces in Japan. Senator Hayden said that if such a recommendation were to be made by General MacArthur, that he (Senator Hayden) would abandon the undertaking on behalf of the enlistment of Philippine Scouts.

I told Senator Hayden that I could not speak for you in this matter nor could I attempt to reflect the Department's attitude because the question had not yet been adequately explored. He seemed very anxious to speak with you on the telephone about it. You might wish to endeavor to reach him on the floor of the Senate where he said he would be this afternoon. In the meantime, I shall endeavor to prepare a letter to be dispatched to the Chairmen of the two Conference Committees unless you indicate action to the contrary.

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