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Government
and Politics

East Germany

August 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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East GERMANY

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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The German Democratic Republic is a stepchild of the Second World War, evolving over the past quarter of a century from the status of a Soviet-occupied area and scorned satellite to a second German state that commands the allegiance and support of a growing number of its own citizens and has gained increased recognition and prestige abroad. The revolution imposed by the Communists during their long period of control has restructured the society and abolished or brought under Communist control all traditional German institutions capable of commanding a separate loyalty from East Germans or linking them with their countrymen in the West. Using the Soviet Union as their model, East Germany's Communist leaders have established a political and social order which has as its primary goals the perpetuation of one-party rule by the Communists and the establishment of even closer links with the Soviet Union, the principal guarantor of the GDR's durability and stability.

The exercise of political power remains the exclusive prerogative of the Communists who exert and maintain control through the mechanism of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) which was created in 1946 by the forced marriage of once bitter adversaries—the Communists and the Social Democrats. As in the case of the Soviet Communist Party, political power is highly centralized within the top echelons of the ruling SED, while responsibility for implementing policy rests with the party apparatus and the various governmental ministries and agencies. A facade of

multipart democracy has been retained by allowing a number of non-Communist parties—usually headed by tractable officials—to remain in existence, but they provide no genuine opposition and are allowed to maintain separate organizations only because they provide a convenient channel for organizing segments of the population which would not join the SED.

At the time of its founding in 1949 the German Democratic Republic faced an uncertain future because of its public image as a creation of the Soviet Union which had plundered and ravaged large areas of East Germany. Much of this hatred and contempt was transferred to Walter Ulbricht¹ and other German Communist leaders who were regarded as Soviet stooges lacking both legitimacy and popular support. Aware of its lack of broad support among East Germans, the regime was also uneasy about the firmness of the Soviet commitment to support the development of a separate German state. There were suspicions that Moscow might be prepared to sell out East Germany in order to advance its own interests in Europe.

The onset of the cold war, the West German decision in 1952 to join the abortive European Defense Community, and Bonn's accession to NATO in 1954 hardened the division of Germany and strengthened the Soviet commitment to the development of a separate German state under Communist control. Moscow tried to shore up the East German regime by conferring further prerogatives of statehood in order to enable the rump state to compete more effectively

¹Ulbricht, titular head of state, died of heart failure on 1 August 1973.

with the Federal Republic. Membership in the Warsaw Pact followed shortly, as did the Soviet decision to grant "full sovereignty" to East Germany while retaining the right to maintain troops there.

The greater prosperity and stability of West Germany remained an obsessive attraction to the East Germans—particularly the trained and the educated—who continued to flee to the West in large numbers. By the early 1960's it had become apparent to the leadership that it could not consolidate control over the political and economic system as long as some of the nation's most valuable workers "voted with their feet" and moved west. The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 enabled the government to establish firm control over the society and proceed with overdue economic reforms, which within a decade provided the population with the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe. By the early 1970's East Germany had become the world's ninth largest industrial power—second to the Soviet Union in the eastern bloc—with a concomitant growth in prestige which gave added strength to its demands for recognition as a sovereign state and a voice in international councils.

Ironically, this period of growing accommodation at home and increasing acceptance abroad coincided with the political demise of the veteran Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, who had guided the destiny of East Germany for 25 years. Despite his reputation as a servant of Moscow, Ulbricht in his later years of rule had incurred Soviet displeasure by appearing to challenge the U.S.S.R.'s ideological supremacy and by creating obstacles to Moscow's strategy of detente with the West, particularly as it applied to West Germany.

Ulbricht's resignation as party leader in May 1971 and the transfer of power to Erich Honecker was accomplished smoothly, reflecting the government's stability and the party's success in tightening its control over practically all aspects of East German life. As the SED's new First Secretary, Honecker typifies the continuity and stability of a regime which has been in power for more than two decades, and which is increasingly confident about its popular support and its right to govern. A lifelong Communist and heir presumptive to Ulbricht for more than a decade, Honecker is a methodical and energetic manager of the party and the interlocking state organizations. He has brought to the top leadership post a more realistic view of economic planning, together with a recognition that domestic political stability requires the leadership to take steps to improve the morale of the people. Thus, the regime has assigned highest

priority to raising the "material and cultural living standards" of the East German population, although it has not neglected to stress ideological discipline and the SED's political control over the society.

After almost a quarter of a century of Communist rule even the most intransigent non-Communists in the society have accepted the reality of the existence of a separate East German state and come to terms with the regime and its demands. The resulting process of accommodation has led many East Germans to move from hostility to passive acceptance, and finally toward a degree of positive loyalty and a growing sense of a separate East German national identity. It is difficult to determine with any degree of precision how far this process has gone, but it appears that most East Germans now generally accept the GDR as a separate state for the foreseeable future, approve of some but not all aspects of its social and economic systems, and have developed a sense of distinctiveness from Germans in the Federal Republic.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

Since its founding under the aegis of Soviet occupation authorities in the early postwar years, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) has been the focal point of political and social power. Although the constitution does not define the role of the SED in the state apparatus, in practice all political power is wielded by the SED whose party hierarchy parallels the state organization at all levels. To insure that state organizations execute SED policy, the key posts in both party and government are filled by the most important and powerful party leaders. At the apex is Erich Honecker, both First Secretary of the SED and Chairman of the National Defense Council. Former party leader Walter Ulbricht retains titular leadership in the Council of State as its Chairman, and by this position has remained East Germany's head of state. Politburo member Willi Stoph is Chairman of the Council of Ministers and thus the head of government. SED control is insured down to the lowest governmental level as shown in Figures 1 and 2.

The first constitution of the German Democratic Republic, drafted in 1949 by a Soviet-sponsored People's Congress (a legislative body chosen from a Communist-approved slate by 66% of the electorate), formed the basis for the U.S.S.R.'s unilateral transformation of the Soviet Zone into the East German state on 7 October 1949. This document bore a superficial resemblance to the Weimar Constitution of 1919, but the East Germans strengthened the

powers of the central government while paying lip service to the *Laender* (states) as the foundations of the state. It listed certain "guaranteed rights" of citizens, but, as in other Communist constitutions, these rights were qualified and subject to laws or interpretations of laws put into effect from time to time. Certain duties of citizens were stressed. Men and women legally were equal. Although the constitution appeared to establish a multiparty system of popular representation and a parliamentary form of government featuring legislative supremacy, in practice the executive branch of the government dominated. The executive, which was in turn controlled by the SED through interlocking directorates, made all major decisions and suspended or withdrew democratic rights as desired by the party leaders.

At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1967, Ulbricht stated that the 1949 constitution no longer reflected the political and social changes that had occurred during the previous two decades. A constitutional drafting committee was established in December of that year and 2 months later a draft was produced and made public. In an unprecedented move, the draft constitution was submitted to a nationwide referendum on 6 April 1968, and in carefully controlled voting was approved by nearly 95% of those who voted. The relative haste with which the new constitution was promulgated seemed due to a desire to emphasize the sovereign nature of the German Democratic Republic by distinguishing it clearly from West Germany.

The new constitution was designed both to incorporate into a basic framework the various changes adopted piecemeal by the regime since 1949 as well as to justify the coercive measures employed by the state to channel and control expression. In addition to codifying the numerous legislative and social changes which had been instituted in East Germany, the present constitution places particular stress on the sovereign political character of the state, and constitutionally anchors the SED in its leadership role. All political power is nominally exercised by the workers and peasants, led by the SED-dominated National Front and its component parties and mass organizations.

A whole series of rights contained in the old constitution is retained in the new, including among others the right to inherit "personal property"; to inviolability of the home; "to social care in case of old age and invalidity"; and the right "to profess a religious creed and to carry out religious activities." However, other rights guaranteed in the old

constitution have been qualified. Thus, free speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble peacefully, and the right of association can only be exercised "in accordance with the spirit and aims of this constitution." Certain other rights have been defined more narrowly or simply dropped from the new constitution; thus, the individual is not entirely free in his choice of work, and there is no provision which allows workers to strike in order to seek redress of their grievances. In short, the 1968 constitution is more explicit in granting authority to the state and subordinating the rights of the individual to the needs of society.

I. Legislature

The legislature (*Volkskammer* or People's Chamber) is one of the elite institutions of the German Democratic Republic and is meant to mirror the social structure of the population, to emphasize the direction the regime wants its citizens to go, and to honor worthy contributors to the building of socialism. Unlike legislative bodies in the West, however, the People's Chamber has little actual power and functions as a rubberstamp, endorsing laws and decrees already formulated by the party.

East Germany's first constitution in 1949 established a bicameral federal legislature consisting of a People's Chamber and a chamber representing the *Laender*. The constitutional revision of 1968, however, replaced the two-chamber parliament with the unicameral People's Chamber consisting of 500 deputies elected for 4-year terms by citizens who have reached 18 years of age.

Candidates for the People's Chamber are proposed by election commissions organized by the SED-dominated National Front. The front is a loose federation of nine officially sponsored groups including five political parties (the SED and four collaborating parties: the Christian Democratic Union, the German Liberal Democratic Party, the German National Democratic Party, and the German Democratic Peasants Party) and four mass organizations (the Free German Trade Union Federation, the Free German Youth, the Democratic Women's League of Germany, and the German Cultural Association). Only these nine organizations have seats in the People's Chamber. In legislative elections the National Front apportions the seats among these groups, designates the candidates who must be approved by the SED, and then nominates them *en masse* and places their names on the ballot. Because the National Front is exclusively empowered by the regime to put forth candidates, there is only a single-




FIGURE 1. Party and government leadership (U/OU)

slate ballot. Prior to 1965, the voters could only approve or disapprove the entire slate. That year the ballot was expanded to include more candidates than seats available and the voter was permitted to select the "candidate of his choice" from a longer list of National Front-approved candidates. Furthermore, it was decreed in 1965 that a third of the membership of the People's Chamber must be replaced every 4 years. Despite the fact that East Berlin has not been formally incorporated into the German Democratic Republic, the city is represented in the People's Chamber by 66 deputies. Their special status is partially maintained, however, by the fact that they are elected by the East Berlin Assembly and not directly by the people.

The regime's control of the People's Chamber extends also to the legislative process, which similarly includes constitutional prerogatives that in practice are not exercised. According to the 1968 constitution, only the People's Chamber can adopt a constitution and laws, and nobody may restrict this right. It may

introduce legislation and pass on most legislative matters, including those introduced by itself, the executive branch, or local governments. It is further empowered to decide on the constitutionality of laws, to elect the members of the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the National Defense Council, and the Supreme Court, and to appoint the Prosecutor General. The People's Chamber approves the conclusion or cancellation of state agreements and determines the state of defense of the German Democratic Republic. In practice, however, the SED makes all such decisions which, through the system of interlocking directorates, are usually proposed to the People's Chamber by the Council of Ministers. Thus, the "initiatives" of the People's Chamber become mere ratifications, and the legislative body is used by the SED primarily as a forum to promulgate the party line.

In contrast to the marginal role assigned to the People's Chamber by the SED under Walter Ulbricht,




FIGURE 2. Party and government structure (U/OU)

there are signs that the Honecker regime may be prepared to encourage the legislative body to assume a more meaningful role in the governmental apparatus. In his presentation to the Eighth Party Congress in 1971 Honecker called for "improvement" in the work of the People's Assembly and an increase in its authority. The present body has since begun to meet more frequently than its predecessors, and in March 1972 the tradition of unanimity was broken for the first time when 12 representatives voted against a controversial abortion bill. The results of the People's Chamber election in November 1971 reflected the great sociological changes which have occurred in the

last decade. The older generation of functionaries, for the most part, were retired and their positions assumed by a new generation of party activists. Of the 500 deputies, 75% are under age 50. The representatives are also more highly educated; more than one-third have received a university education and 105 have attended specialized trade schools.

2. Executive

The executive branch consists of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, both of which are constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber. In practice, the executive is clearly dominant and is

itself controlled in all respects by the ruling party, the SED.

a. Council of State

The Council of State was established by constitutional amendment in 1960 to replace the office of the presidency after the death of Wilhelm Pieck. Its constitutional status was meant to add to the prestige of Walter Ulbricht who as "elected chairman" is the chief of state. It also provides sinecures for leading members of the collaborating parties. According to the constitution, the Council of State is elected by and responsible to the People's Chamber; it is composed of a chairman, six deputy chairmen, 17 members, and a secretary, all of whom serve 4-year terms. In addition to exercising ceremonial functions normally associated with the office of the president in a Communist country, the Council of State has specified executive duties and one significant legislative function. The Chairman of the Council of State proclaims the laws of the land, swears in members of the government, and represents the German Democratic Republic as head of state. The full council ratifies or abrogates treaties, appoints and recalls East German representatives abroad, receives foreign diplomats, calls elections to the People's Chamber, and convokes its first session after the elections. The constitution also empowers the council to frame basic decisions on problems of defense and security and to convoke meetings of the National Defense Council, two additional prerogatives normally associated with the executive branch of government. In its legislative capacity, the council since 1963 has acted for the People's Chamber between its plenary sessions, thus replacing three standing committees of the legislature which originally had been charged with carrying out these functions. The Council of State also has the constitutional power to issue decisions which have the effect of law and to issue binding interpretations of laws.

In November 1971 Walter Ulbricht was reelected Chairman of the Council of State despite widespread speculation that he might also lose this post because of his retirement as SED First Secretary 6 months earlier. Ulbricht's reelection was consistent with the theme of continuity in leadership and did not signify that he had retained a power base. In fact, the Council of State appears to have lost status despite the presence on the council of a growing number of high-ranking SED leaders, including Erich Honecker. In October 1972 a law was promulgated which granted the Council of Ministers substantial new governmental powers, largely at the expense of the Council of State.

b. Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers (cabinet) organizes, on behalf of the People's Chamber, the execution of the political, economic, cultural, social, and military tasks of the state. All members of the council serve for a period of 4 years. In early 1973 the council, in addition to Chairman (Premier) Willi Stoph, two first deputy chairmen, and 10 deputy chairmen, consisted of 28 ministers with portfolios and four heads of special agencies having ministerial rank, with the following areas of responsibility:²

Ministries:

Agriculture, Forestry, and Foodstuffs-Industry
 Bezirk Administered Industry and Food Industry
 Chemical Industry
 Coal and Energy
 Construction
 Cultural Affairs
 Education
 Electrical Engineering and Electronics
 Environmental Protection and Water Management
 Finance
 Foreign Affairs
 Foreign Economic Relations
 Glass and Ceramics
 Health

Agencies:

State Planning Commission
 Price Office
 State Bank
 Workers-Peasants Inspectorate
 Heavy Machine Construction and Installation
 Construction
 Interior
 Justice
 Light Industry
 Material Management
 National Defense
 Ore Mining, Metallurgy, and Potash
 Posts and Telecommunications
 Processing Machine Construction and Vehicle
 Construction
 Science and Technology
 State Security
 Trade and Supply
 Transport
 University and Technical School Matters

Formerly the chairman was chosen by the party having the greatest strength in the People's Chamber, but under the 1968 constitution the Council of State recommends a candidate for the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the nominee is then dutifully approved by the legislature.

²For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

This procedure was not followed in 1971 when Honecker, as SED party leader, nominated Willi Stoph for the post. The chairman is empowered to select his ministers, whose appointments in turn are passed on by the People's Chamber. The Council of Ministers is subordinate to both the People's Chamber and nominally to the Council of State, and carries out its activities within the framework of the decrees and decisions of the two superbodies. The Council of Ministers is empowered to adopt ordinances as necessary to accomplish its objectives and is theoretically responsible and accountable directly to the People's Chamber. The locus of power within the Council of Ministers resides in its Presidium, an inner cabinet composed in early 1973 of the chairman (Minister President) and 13 ministers, 10 of whom are deputy chairmen.

The regime has sought to solve its continuing economic problems partly by making a series of changes in the organization and personnel of the Council of Ministers. Since the New Economic System was formulated in 1963, these changes generally have reflected a desire to bring younger men trained in economics, technology, and management into government work in order to improve the efficiency of the bureaucracy. The introduction of the so-called technocrats into the governmental and party apparatus, however, has not diminished the party's control over economic decisionmaking. Most of the technocrats are themselves ideologically committed to communism and agree that the party must play the leading role in all spheres of life. In October 1972 the People's Chamber passed a law which increased the power of the council and redefined its relation to the other state organs. The primary intent of the law was to strengthen the central economic planning structures. It clarified individual ministerial responsibilities and provided for greater coordination between central organs and local agencies. In an effort to improve planning coordination between ministries, the law emphasized their collective responsibilities and accountability to parliament.

SED leaders, moreover, completely control the Council of Ministers. Willi Stoph is Minister President-Prime Minister; 12 of the 14 men who sit on the Presidium are SED members, of whom six including Stoph are also members or candidate members of the Politburo. Furthermore, each of the ministries and administrative units whose top officials comprise the Council of Ministers has a counterpart in the SED apparatus from whom he receives direction and guidance.

3. Judiciary

The imposition of a Communist regime in East Germany brought about sweeping changes in the legal system which had been inherited from the past. Like the other elements of government, the judiciary is completely dominated by the SED.

After a territorial reorganization in 1952, a series of laws restructured the judicial system and established the framework for court procedure. District and county courts were created to replace the old state (*Land*) courts, but these new courts and the local prosecutors' offices were subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, later designated as the central body for the administration of justice. The Supreme Court continued to function ostensibly as a separate branch of government, but it became for all practical purposes an instrument of the executive branch. Civil and criminal cases were treated within the same system, with direct appeals from lower to higher courts. Procedural law, changed to accord with the Soviet model, was designed to further the regime's objectives rather than to serve abstract concepts of justice.

In 1963 judicial reforms were introduced after 18 months of preparation and public "discussion." These changes revamped the judicial system, bringing it still more closely into line with that of the Soviet Union. The new legislation reduced considerably the authority of the Ministry of Justice, attacked intermittently since 1956 as being too Stalinist, by ending its control over the lower courts and prosecutors' offices. The Supreme Court was assigned general supervision over the administration of justice in the lower courts, and the Prosecutor General's office was given administrative control over the district and county prosecutors' offices. Party control remained intact, however, and both the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General, constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber under both the old and new constitutions, continued in practice to be "guided" by the SED leadership.

The regime also followed the Soviet model in introducing arbitration commissions in residential areas, collectivized farms, and private enterprises, and by extending the use of conflict commissions to settle disputes in factories. These commissions were formed to relieve the regular courts of minor civil and criminal cases by transferring them to nonprofessional units more responsive to pressures by local SED organizations. The 1963 changes also reflected the strong influence of Soviet judicial practice in the emphasis placed on the need to reeducate offenders.




FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU)

In January 1968 the People's Chamber adopted a new penal code to replace the outmoded code which had formed the basis of civil law in both Germanies since 1871. The new code, which was 5 years in the drafting, is a "socialist" model in that it places great emphasis on the political aspects of "socialist legality," i.e., assuring the submission of the individual to the state. The death penalty is prescribed as maximum punishment for 11 crimes, most of which relate to political offenses. Several of these are newly created in the code and include crimes against the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and war crimes. In contrast to the harsh sentences meted out for political offenses, the code prescribes more lenient treatment of persons convicted of various criminal and civil misdeeds. For example, the punishment for petty theft, rape, slander, homosexuality, and bigamy has been reduced or completely eliminated. As in the case of its educational reforms, the regime probably was eager to focus public attention on certain relatively progressive provisions of the new code as compared to West Germany's archaic 1871 code.

4. Local government

Theoretically, independent units of self-government are elected at the district, county, city, town, and precinct level. Under the constitution the local bodies are empowered to make decisions and organize the citizens to deal with the political, economic, social, and cultural issues which arise at the various levels of local government. In practice, however, each level of local government is closely supervised and controlled by the SED, almost to the same extent as the central governmental bodies. In 1952 the regime reorganized the subordinate units of government, replacing the five historic states (*Laender*) with 14 districts (*Bezirke*) whose boundaries are shown on Figure 3. These 14 districts are divided into 218 counties (*Kreise*), and 8,845 communities (*Gemeinden*). East Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, functions in practice—but not legally—as the 15th *Bezirk*.

At each level of local government, the elected assembly selects an executive council, but local autonomy is virtually nonexistent. The local assemblies and their councils actually serve to impose the SED leadership's will at various levels of local government. In 1963 further changes were made at the local level to provide still more control mechanisms for the party. In the heavily populated urban areas 750 new residential subdivisions, corresponding to precincts, were created, and committees were formed within these subdivisions to "help improve life and

eliminate shortcomings." Nominally controlled by the National Front, these committees actually work under the direction of closely knit party organizations guided by the central party organization in East Berlin.

C. Political dynamics (U/OU)

1. The SED and its development

The history of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) is for all practical purposes the history of the German Democratic Republic. The SED has created a governmental structure in which all elements of political power are monopolized by the party. Although this system is cloaked in the forms of parliamentary democracy, an interlocking network of party and government controls fixes power in the hands of the SED leadership, headed since May 1971 by Erich Honecker.

Walter Ulbricht and other German Communists who had been political exiles in the U.S.S.R. during the Hitler period, returned to Germany with Soviet troops in May 1945 to act as the political arm of the Soviet occupation forces. At the outset, Soviet occupation authorities disclaimed any intention of imposing Soviet-style communism, and the German Communists talked of favoring a parliamentary-democratic republic. In addition to the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), three political parties—the Christian Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party—were allowed to organize.

Behind this facade of multiparty democracy, the Soviet Military Administration manipulated or coerced all parties into following policies compatible with Soviet aims. In April 1946 the SED was created by a forced merger of the reestablished KPD, led by Wilhelm Pieck and Ulbricht, and the old Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Otto Grotewohl. Despite the initial enthusiasm of many Socialists for a unified party, the final merger was in large part the result of coercive acts by the Soviet Military Administration which was determined to develop East German political life according to the Soviet example. Grotewohl and Pieck were elected joint chairmen of the new party, and Ulbricht became the secretary-general. From the outset, elements which did not acquiesce in Communist leadership were deprived of the possibility of giving public expression to their views because of the Communist control of newspapers and other communications media. The SED, conforming to Stalinist policy, proceeded slowly in its attempt to "persuade" the people to choose

"socialism." Initially, the SED tried to gain support by stressing "democratic socialism" and German self-identity, i.e., the concept of a "German road to socialism." The continuing failure to gain widespread support from the people, however, together with the breakdown of the uneasy cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and its wartime allies, led Moscow and the SED to harden their attitude and to abandon the gradualist approach.

Until 1948 the SED was not a cadre party in the Leninist sense, but a Socialist mass party of 2 million members. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Comintern in 1948 provided the impetus for Ulbricht and the other East German Communist leaders to transform the SED into a tightly controlled and highly disciplined organization modeled after the Soviet Communist Party. Shortly after, Ulbricht declared the SED "a party of a new type"—in other words, a Leninist party—which was to be the "self-conscious and organized vanguard of the working class." This decision meant disavowal of the concept of a "German road to socialism," recognition of the leading role of the Soviet Communist Party, and certain important organizational changes. The top leadership was solidly packed with Ulbricht's adherents from the Moscow emigration and from local Communist circles. The party membership at all levels was drastically purged, with prominent Social Democrats and those with Western contacts the first to go. New party statutes were adopted which reflected the latest Soviet Communist Party practices, and new requirements for party membership, involving a period of candidacy and intensive indoctrination, were put into effect.

The years 1949-53 reflected the high point of East German "Stalinism." With the Ulbricht element firmly in control, the party committed itself to an economic program of accelerated communization and industrialization, and took the initial steps toward farm collectivization and emulation of the Soviet example as the only legitimate model for the party and the government. As popular resentment grew, Ulbricht again resorted to purges, culminating in the removal from office in May 1953 of the party's then second-ranking man, Franz Dohlem, for "political blindness." The purges, however, were not as brutal as those which occurred elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and this may help to explain the relative mildness of the post-Stalin reaction.

Events in the U.S.S.R. caused complications in East Germany. Stalin's death and evidence of confusion and competition among his successors were reflected in conflicting directives concerning Moscow's German

policy and East Germany's internal policy. Within the SED leadership, Minister for State Security Wilhelm Zaisser and party ideologist Rudolf Herrnstadt called for a change in the party line and for the removal of Ulbricht. Internal problems and Soviet pressure forced the regime to retreat from the tough line it had previously taken on such matters as workers' production quotas and the attitude toward the middle classes and the churches. The attempt by certain labor unions to resort to strikes as a means of improving their standard of living led to the uprising of 17 June 1953. Although the rioting had a profound psychological impact in East Germany, only about 5% of the industrial work force actually went on strike, and the resulting clashes resulted in only 21 fatalities.

SED officials reacted "in a confused and bewildered manner," as Ulbricht later confessed. Party organizations in major cities where SPD traditions were strong joined the rioters in demands for Ulbricht's ouster. Even after Soviet troops had restored order, the party remained badly shaken.

Ulbricht—with strong Soviet backing—lost little time in moving to reestablish his authority over the party and state. Zaisser and Herrnstadt were expelled from the leadership, and later from the party, on charges of forming a "party faction with defeatist aims." Other prominent SED figures were removed from their government positions, and some were tried and imprisoned for complicity in the uprising. Ulbricht also ousted "enemy elements" in the party, possibly as many as 20,000 functionaries and 50,000 rank-and-file party members were purged. These measures, backed by the show of Soviet force, were sufficient to prevent any serious challenge to Ulbricht's leadership for the next 3 years.

The so-called thaw in Soviet literary and cultural policies in 1953-56 did not induce the East German regime to make meaningful concessions to its own intellectual community, with the result that many East German writers and artists—including SED members—hoped that Ulbricht might be ousted because of his identification with the Stalinist policies condemned by Khrushchev at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress. Ulbricht managed to hold on to his position by maneuvering the SED Central Committee into a vote of confidence, while instituting a few limited measures to purge the regime of its Stalinist past. An investigation of past illegalities was launched, which resulted in amnesty for a large number of political prisoners. A special SED commission, established to review past purges, recommended the rehabilitation of Dohlem and other

individuals, and many of them were given fairly important state offices.

During the Polish and Hungarian crises in the autumn of 1956 East Germany remained relatively calm. The arrest and subsequent conviction and imprisonment for 10 years of Wolfgang Harich, a young professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt University in East Berlin and the most outspoken of the intellectual critics, served to discourage open rebellion. Less severe reprisals in the form of removal from jobs, demotions, and reprimands were meted out to other "deviationist" SED intellectuals. The fact that dissident individuals could still escape to the West was also a reason for the lack of widespread active resistance during this period.

The next challenge to Ulbricht's party leadership was far more serious, as it was led by Karl Schirdewan, Politburo member and heir presumptive to Ulbricht, and by Fred Oelsner, the SED's chief ideologist. Both men opposed Ulbricht's desire to increase the pace of "socialization," mainly on grounds of economic efficiency but apparently also because they thought that such changes would impede German reunification. Other high party officials backed the dissident leaders, as did Minister for State Security Ernst Wollweber.

The showdown came in February 1958 when Schirdewan, Oelsner, and Wollweber and their followers were purged. Schirdewan and Wollweber were accused of "factional activities," i.e., opposing Ulbricht. The following year, however, all except Wollweber issued public recantations of their earlier positions and pledged their loyalty to Ulbricht. This was to be the last of the sweeping purges of the Politburo, and for the next decade or so that body was to be a fairly reliable instrument of the party leadership.

Ulbricht plunged forward with a program of accelerated "socialization" and "decentralization" on the Soviet model, and economic expansion on the basis of a Seven Year Plan—all obediently rubberstamped by the Fifth Party Congress, held in July 1958. The harsh farm collectivization drive in early 1960, coincidental moves to subject remaining members of the middle class to more stringent controls, and, a year later, the hasty realignment of East German industry to make the country "invulnerable" to West German economic countermeasures, led to serious economic problems and mass flights to the West. Despite the promise of more moderate policies, only the harsh security measures associated with the building of the Berlin wall halted

the refugee exodus and prevented the probable collapse of the Ulbricht regime.

The Berlin wall, a conspicuous acknowledgement of the serious problems facing the regime, was considered by the East German leaders to be a necessary prerequisite for the economic recovery of East Germany and the strengthening of SED control. Despite the wave of indignation which the building of the wall evoked in the West, it enabled the regime to halt the refugee flow, restore discipline, and to turn its full attention to necessary changes in economic policy. In 1962 Ulbricht began to abandon the "ideological" approach to economics, dropping the Seven Year Plan and quietly substituting more realistic annual plans. At the same time he instituted governmental organizational and policy changes designed to provide a more rational approach to East Germany's basic economic problems. This emphasis on a more practical approach to economic problems was reflected at the Sixth Party Congress, held in January 1963, where younger, technically trained party functionaries were raised into higher leadership positions.

The party's preoccupation with economic problems was further indicated by the decision of the Party Congress, implemented in February 1963, to reorganize the party according to the "production principle" imitating changes previously initiated in the Soviet Communist Party by Khrushchev, the SED consolidated its control over the economy by creating separate party bureaus for the agricultural and industrial branches of the economy.

The changes were mirrored in a reorganization of the lower level SED organization. While leaving some measure of autonomy to the Associations of People-owned Industries (VVB's), the SED sought to insure its control over the economy at the lower levels by replacing the former district- and county-level executive bureaus by five-man secretariats. The new secretariats consisted of a first secretary and secretaries for agriculture, industry, agitation, and ideology. These structural changes were accompanied in many cases by personnel changes which enabled the SED to replace ineffective functionaries with younger and more technically competent men.

Despite Ulbricht's claim, the 1963 structural reorganization caused almost as many problems for the party as it solved. Although much time and effort were expended to implement the personnel changes, the SED later quietly followed the lead of Khrushchev's successor, who began in late 1964 to abandon the "production principle" and to reestablish the "territorial principle" as the governing concept in the party's organization. The SED, however,

continued to emphasize the necessity of solving economic problems, and gave lower priority to broader political and ideological issues. Several high-level party members later criticized this development, pointing out that ideological work had partially faded into the background because of the preoccupation with economic problems, and that party meetings had often taken on the nature of "production discussions."

The regime's overriding interest in economic theory and development fluctuated, as various officials expressed concern that the role of the party and indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism were being neglected. At the Seventh Congress of the SED in April 1967 Ulbricht expounded his concept of "the developed social system of socialism" which, as later amplified, implied that socialism as it existed in the German Democratic Republic was a distinct and independent social order and was not merely a stepping stone to communism. He portrayed the GDR as a model to be followed, thus deemphasizing the Soviet example and experience. Furthermore, Ulbricht began increasingly to stress national themes, and at times appeared to be devoting scant attention to the interests of international communism as defined by the Soviet Communist Party.

Ulbricht's fascination with science and abstract economic theory were not shared by all, however. In April 1969, with Czechoslovak developments still being sharply debated and ideological factionalism at an all-time high within the Communist world, Politburo member Honecker told the 10th plenum of the Central Committee that party discipline was as important as economic development. He castigated supporters of the "convergence theory" (i.e., that capitalism and communism were coming more and more to resemble each other), as well as reformers and revisionists, and hinted that his remarks were intended as much for domestic consumption as for known mavericks such as Czechoslovakia and Romania. Emphasis on pre-military training for youth through intensified programs sponsored by the Society for Sport and Technology (GST), the Free German Youth (FDJ), and Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, along with increased party indoctrination, coincided with the government's increasing concern over ideological deviation at home and abroad.

Leading party ideologist Kurt Hager supported Honecker by stressing the importance of planning and the party's role in directing ideology and cultural development. Hager justified the SED's domination of intellectual activity by terming the party the most important force behind social development.

For some time there had been rumors of impending changes in the top party leadership, but the rank and file were taken by surprise when Ulbricht stepped down in May 1971 as First Secretary in favor of Erich Honecker. While there was no doubt that age and ill health had begun to take its toll—Ulbricht was 77 at the time—these factors played only a small role in the ouster; he was removed apparently because of dissatisfaction with both his internal and foreign policies. Within the top SED leadership, there was concern that the change should come before the party's Eighth Congress which was scheduled for June. Months prior to the Congress, Ulbricht and other party leaders had set the agenda which included a major ideological speech by Ulbricht on his favorite theme—"the developed social system of socialism." By allowing Ulbricht to deliver a speech on this theme, the leadership would have enabled the aging leader's views to be cemented even more firmly in the East German ideological catechism, thereby contributing to the enhancement of Ulbricht's prestige and authority. Furthermore, it would have been difficult and perhaps embarrassing for the leadership to try to effect a change in ideological emphasis at the Congress or in the period immediately after. At the Central Committee plenum in May, a new agenda for the Congress was approved which replaced Ulbricht's speech with one by Honecker. In their addresses to the party Congress, Honecker and the other speakers concentrated on economic matters of concern to the regime and totally ignored Ulbricht's theses and concepts. The final blow was delivered a few months later by Kurt Hager, a leading ideologist, who explicitly rejected Ulbricht's theses without mentioning their author by name.

Soviet leaders also had cause to be dissatisfied with Ulbricht. His continued references to "national" themes were probably irksome, but more importantly his foreign policy stratagems were creating difficulties for Moscow which was pursuing its own foreign policy goals. The Soviet Union was anxious to improve relations with West Germany, and in August 1970 the two states had concluded a treaty renouncing the use of force. The West Germans, however, maintained that final ratification of the treaty would be withheld until there was an improvement regarding the status of West Berlin. Injection of the Berlin issue into the quest for detente was a challenge to Ulbricht who had sought by every means to weaken the Western position in the divided city and had refused to make any meaningful concessions. Honecker was also known for his hard line vis-a-vis the West Germans, but he did not possess the personal authority of Ulbricht, nor was

he inclined to stand up to Soviet pressure. Under Honecker, the East German leadership has been impelled to make significant changes in its policies in order to accommodate Soviet interests.

The SED under Honecker's leadership has continued to place highest priority on economic development, but it has approached this problem in a more practical manner by stressing results and deemphasizing the rigid economic formulas of the past. In contrast to the Ulbricht era, party work and ideology have received increased attention and more emphasis has been placed on the leading role of the SED. The importance and independence of the young technologically oriented intelligentsia has consequently been deemphasized.

2. SED organization and membership

The SED is organized according to the principle of "democratic centralism," under which actual control is exercised from the top despite the nominal elections held at all levels. The SED is defined by the 1963 statutes as the "conscious and organized vanguard . . . of the German working class."

According to the Central Committee report to the Eighth Party Congress held in June 1971, the SED had 1,909,859 members and candidate members, making one out of every six citizens above the age of 18 a member of the party. This is an increase of 140,938 or 8% since the previous Congress in 1967. Honecker reported that 36.6% of the members and candidates were workers, 5.9% collective farmers, and 17.1% members of the intelligentsia. The percentage of workers is considerably higher than reported at the Seventh Congress, but this probably reflects a juggling of numbers rather than a significant change in the social composition of the party. The report also claimed that 45% of the party members were under 40 years of age and 28.7% were women.

Following the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, the party cadre section began an intensive program designed to weed out members whose loyalty was questionable and those who evinced a lack of enthusiasm. The drive to tighten party ranks was extended in the fall of 1970 to a formal exchange of party cards, but the results were not particularly impressive since only 9,000 were denied new cards.

According to party statutes, the SED is democratically organized, with the Party Congress functioning as its highest organ. The Congress, which is supposed to meet every 5 years, elects the Central Committee and has a purely formal role in rubberstamping the decisions of the party leaders, i.e., the Central Committee Secretariat and the Politburo,


expressed through the Central Committee apparatus. The Central Committee meets about 4 times a year. In addition to its statutory authority to act between congresses as the highest party body and to lead "its entire activities," the Central Committee functions as a body which coordinates and implements Politburo decisions and passes them on to lower party units. The Central Committee also operates a number of schools and institutes which not only train future party leaders but also provide it with information and research on various problem areas. The most important of these is the Karl Marx Party College.

The actual center of authority within the party and the state is the Politburo, which is "elected" by the Central Committee and is nominally responsible to it (Figure 4). In practice, the Politburo is a small self-perpetuating body which formulates regime policy and implements it through a network of subordinate offices in the party. In 1972 there were 16 full members and seven candidate members. Politburo membership traditionally has been very stable; at the Eighth Congress, for example, no one was dropped. Erich Honecker has repeatedly emphasized the continuity and collectivity of the leadership, which suggests that party leaders may be uneasy about the reaction of the people to signs of open disagreement within the top leadership. For staff assistance, the Politburo utilizes permanent bodies (commissions and bureaus), usually headed by Politburo members or candidates, and several *ad hoc* commissions.

The Secretariat, second only to the Politburo in power and prestige, in 1972 was composed of a first secretary—Erich Honecker—and eight secretaries, each of whom is responsible for several of the operational departments (*Abteilungen*) and other institutions attached to the Central Committee. The Central Committee has at least 32 operational departments, each of which is responsible for a major field of activity, such as church affairs, transportation, agitation, and Communist activities in West Germany. Nearly every aspect of public activity and economic and social life comes within the purview of one or another of these departments.

Between the top leadership and the rank-and-file party members are several levels of progressively smaller versions of the central organization which implement the directives of the leadership at the district, county, city, urban residential, and basic party organization levels. In an effort to insure control over all facets of life, the basic party organizations are established, according to party statutes, in factories, collective farms, artisan production cooperatives, police units, state and economic administrations,

FIGURE 4. Central SED structure (U/OU)



scientific institutes, educational institutions, villages, and residential areas—in fact, any place where “at least three party members are available.”

Membership requirements for joining the party are carefully spelled out in the SED statutes. A candidate must be 18 years of age and file his application for admission with the appropriate basic party organization. Each candidate must be sponsored by two persons who have belonged to the SED for at least 2 years and have known the applicant for at least 1 year “in his vocational and social activities.” During the required 1-year candidacy period, the applicant must familiarize himself with the party program and

statutes, and must “prove his mettle in vocational and social activities.” During this period the party organization devotes constant attention to the candidate’s political and ideological development.

After the 1-year probationary period, the candidate must again petition the basic party organization for admission to full membership in the party. His application for full membership must again be sponsored by two party members. If the basic party organization decides that the candidate does not yet have all the necessary qualifications to be an SED member, it may prolong his candidacy period for another year. The decision of the basic party

organization finally to approve or disapprove the candidate's application or to prolong the candidacy period are confirmed by the next highest party organization.

In addition to its large party organization, the SED leadership has immediately under its control the Workers Militia (*Kampfgruppen*), a paramilitary adjunct estimated to number around 350,000 persons, armed and trained by the People's Police. The Workers Militia was formed in 1953 following the uprising in June, and its primary task is the protection of the state-owned enterprises against acts which would disrupt production or endanger public order. They are, therefore, particularly concerned with civil disturbances, and they cooperate with police units in the prevention and suppression of strikes, riots, and other disorders. In addition to being trained in the use of small arms and riot control, the Workers Militia participates in full field exercises employing machineguns, mortars, antitank guns, and armored scout cars. Training has become more rigorous since 1967, and during the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1968 some units reportedly were given orientation lectures because of the possibility that they might see action in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Party control of the Workers Militia remains in the hands of the SED security leaders from the highest levels in the Central Committee to local security secretaries and through them to the immediate level of commanders of the basic groups of 100 men. These basic groups are called *Hundertchaften*, a term used by ancient Germanic tribes as early as the first century to describe the hundred best warriors in a community. The Workers Militia is the largest organization in East Germany, with the exception of the regular military forces, to which weapons are made available. Although the capability of the Workers Militia has been questioned in the past, recent emphasis on training and indoctrination may have improved its effectiveness.

3. Party leadership

Until May 1971 Walter Ulbricht (Figure 5) occupied the summit of the SED organization and furnished the driving force for the party and for East Germany as a whole.

Born in Leipzig in 1893 of Socialist parents, Ulbricht joined the SPD in 1912 and helped found the German Communist Party after World War I. Ulbricht quickly demonstrated the qualities of thoroughness and persistence that have since led many biographers to describe him as the perfect bureaucrat.

He was self-assured, if somewhat unimaginative, but burdened with the pedantic mannerisms of an old-fashioned schoolteacher. Ulbricht was a hard worker, did not drink or smoke, and prided himself on physical fitness. As the SED First Secretary after 1953, he was directly responsible for adopting and overseeing the execution of regime policies.

On several occasions prior to 1961 Ulbricht's authority was challenged from within the party, and there were widespread public hopes that he might be purged in the wake of de-Stalinization moves in the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries. Ulbricht, however, was able on every occasion to counter all challenges and dash the hopes of the populace by convincing the Soviet leaders that his demotion or replacement would weaken the regime and raise a threat to continued Soviet control of East Germany. For almost a decade after the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961, Ulbricht's authority was virtually unchallenged and he proceeded with great vigor to consolidate Communist rule in East Germany. Although he slowed his pace somewhat, delegating more power to other members of the Politburo and attempting to assume the role of an elder statesman who was above day-to-day events, there was little doubt that Ulbricht remained in control of the SED and of East Germany.

Even while Ulbricht remained ensconced as party leader, a group of able younger men had begun the climb to top positions in the party. Despite their differing views on the problems facing the regime, this younger group had risen through the party ranks under Ulbricht's tutelage and they were all apparently convinced of the necessity of continued East German dependence on the Soviet Union. There were reports and speculation that SED leaders were divided, with the "hard" faction or "dogmatists" allegedly led by Erich Honecker (Figure 5), and the "soft" faction or "technocrats" led by Premier Willi Stoph (Figure 5). There was no firm evidence to substantiate such reports, however, particularly when the leadership demonstrated that it was capable of closing ranks and presenting a united front when other potentially divisive issues arose.

Since taking the reins of power, Honecker has proven to be a capable and acceptable successor to Ulbricht. Despite the latter's long years of dedicated service, there were apparently few tears shed at his demotion. Initial Western press speculation postulated that Honecker was too colorless and too specialized in cadre and security affairs to be able to successfully handle the complicated economic problems which had been the focus of criticism since the 14th plenum

in December 1970. It was predicted that a triumvirate, possibly consisting of Stoph, Honecker, and Guenter Mittag would be formed. Honecker has, however, established himself as *primus inter pares*.

Erich Honecker was born in 1912 in the Saar. At the age of 10 he was enrolled by his father in the Communist children's movement, and later transferred to the youth movement where he rose quickly to high-level positions. After spending 10 years (1935-45) in Nazi prisons, he returned to the Soviet occupation zone where he was given the very important job of organizing the Free German Youth (FDJ). Honecker's success in building the FDJ led to candidate membership in the Politburo in 1950. He was promoted to full membership in 1958 and became the secretary responsible for security and cadre affairs.

Long before the actual transfer of power, Honecker's position as Ulbricht's heir designate had been unquestioned. His experience and connections in the FDJ, the party bureaucracy, and the security apparatus assured him the support of these key elements. Even more important, however, Honecker was acceptable to Moscow because of his unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Communist Party, his seeming immunity to nationalist tendencies, and the likelihood that he would be prepared to subordinate SED interests to those of Moscow if a situation were to arise in which a choice had to be made.

The Honecker style of leadership combines a strict adherence to ideological principles with a willingness to find pragmatic solutions to difficult social and economic problems. Though his strength lies in organizational and cadre work, he opposes a heavyhanded bureaucratic approach to solving problems. At the Eighth Party Congress he criticized tendencies which had developed under Ulbricht including obstinacy, bureaucratism, paper-pushing, and the penchant for taking too optimistic a view of developments. Honecker is deeply devoted to the SED, but he wants it to be a party which does not rely on punitive administrative measures to command loyalty.

Several trends have become evident since Honecker took office. On the one hand there has been the attempt to strengthen political controls of the SED over East German society. This included giving increased weight to political attitudes over performance records, and assigning an increasingly important role to the cabinet-level Workers and Farmers Inspectorate (ABI) which has the responsibility to implement party resolutions affecting the economy and society. Simultaneously, the SED has also taken steps to raise the morale of the people by



Erich Honecker
First Secretary (1958)*



Walter Ulbricht



Werner Lambers
Agitation (1967)*



Guenter Mittag
Economy (1962)*



Alfred Neumann



Albert Norden
Propaganda (1955)*



Willi Stoph



Paul Vorner
Security (1958)*

FIGURE 5. Party Leaders (U/OU)



Hermann Axen
International Affairs (1965)*



Friedrich Ebert



Gerhard Grueneberg
Agriculture (1958)*



Kurt Hager
Culture, Science, and
Ideology (1954)*




Werner Krolikowski



Erich Mueckenberger



Horst Sindermann



Georg Ewald



Herbert Warnke



Walter Halbritter



Werner Jarowinsky
Foreign Trade and
Supply (1963)*



Guenther Kleiber



Erich Mielke



Margarete Mueller



Harry Tisch

*Area of responsibility and year of appointment in Secretariat

improving living standards and increasing outlays for social welfare.

4. Collaborating parties and organizations

In addition to the SED there are four other political parties, all of which are virtual adjuncts of the SED and are permitted to exist only because they lend democratic coloration to the regime. The collaborating parties, along with four of the more important mass organizations and the SED, are organized collectively as the National Front. The collaborating parties serve the SED chiefly by organizing those sectors of the population which the SED would have difficulty in reaching—the surviving remnants of the bourgeoisie and small farmers—and by providing channels through which the East German line can be propagated among West German parties representing similar interest groups. An indication of the extent to which the collaborating parties are captives of the SED is provided by their decision in the spring of 1972 to lead the drive to nationalize industries which remained in private hands. These parties also provide personnel for East German missions to foreign countries, especially nonaligned countries, where the presence of such "non-Communist" functionaries is intended to strengthen East Germany's claim to be a democratic republic. Leading officials of the collaborating parties are often assigned to head various friendship societies and are given representative positions in the government—especially in the Council of State—in an effort to stress the multiparty nature of the regime.

a. Non-Communist front parties

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), formed in 1945, originally represented the same Christian-oriented, middle class elements which organized the CDU in the Western occupation zones. The CDU soon ran into difficulty, however, because of its opposition to the SED and conflicts with the Soviet Military Administration, as a result of which prominent party leaders were forced to step down. The CDU had lost its independent character by 1948, and since then it has functioned as an auxiliary of the SED. At its sixth party congress, held in 1952, the CDU reorganized itself on the SED pattern, creating a political committee (corresponding to the SED's Central Committee) and a presidium (Politburo). Gerald Goetting, long the most powerful figure in the CDU, became the formal head of the party when he succeeded August Bach as chairman of the CDU after the latter's death in March 1966. Goetting had earlier

been rewarded for faithful service to the SED by being placed on the Council of State. Although the CDU is organized on a district and local level and publishes several newspapers, thereby giving the impression that it is a thriving organization, its membership has steadily dwindled from a high of approximately 217,000 in 1947 to less than 80,000 in 1968, at which level it appears to have stabilized.

The German Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) was formed in 1945 to represent middle class East Germans who had a "liberal creed and democratic political convictions." The party accepted the need to work with all anti-Fascist parties, but its espousal of private property and a free economy soon placed it in conflict with SED and Soviet authorities. In the face of constant pressure and harassment, the LDPD leadership slowly retreated from its original program and by 1952 it agreed to participate in "the building of socialism" in East Germany. In 1957 the LDPD accepted the leadership of the SED, thereby confirming its position as a mere adjunct of that party. The LDPD is led by Dr. Manfred Gerlach and is estimated to have a membership of about 75,000.

The German National Democratic Party (NDPD), headed by Dr. Heinrich Homann, was formed in May 1948 to extend the SED's influence over former low-level Nazis who had "broken with their past" and professional soldiers, to whom the party appealed by emphasizing the nationalistic aspects of East German policy. Like the other collaborating parties, the NDPD has attempted to contact similar elements in West Germany, apparently with only minor success. Unlike the other non-SED parties, however, the NDPD has increased in membership, growing from 17,000 members in 1949 to approximately 120,000 in early 1969, where it has stabilized.

The German Democratic Peasants Party (DBD) was created by the SED in 1948 to win over the farmers and farm workers to the party's brand of socialism. Once nominally representative of farmers with small holdings who had profited from the SED's early land reforms, the DBD surrendered all pretense to being independent when it supported the regime's decision to collectivize agriculture in 1960. The party is led by Ernst Goldenbaum and Paul Scholz and has approximately 80,000 members. Of the four collaborating parties, the DBD is perhaps the least influential.

b. Mass organizations

Like the four political parties, the so-called mass organizations have been established to appeal to genuine or alleged group interests, and they operate

under direct SED guidance. The four major organizations are the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB), the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD), and the German Cultural Association (DKB). From the regime's point of view, the organizations provide a convenient channel for transmitting party directives to the rank and file and mobilizing the people to achieve various objectives set by the regime. At the same time, because these mass organizations are represented in the national and local legislatures through the National Front single-list elections tickets, they afford a supplementary means of directing popular interest into regime-approved channels. From the viewpoint of the ordinary citizen, membership in the organizations is attractive only because certain privileges can be obtained. Many persons wishing to rise economically or politically find that participation in one or more of the organizations is a prerequisite.

The FDGB, organized in 1945 and affiliated since 1949 with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, is the organization which nominally represents all East German workers. In contrast to the role of trade union federations in the West, the FDGB does not represent the interests of the workers but instead functions as an agent of the regime, cooperating with management in the nationalized industries and with the state administrations in setting up and enforcing production quotas and in maintaining control over workers. The FDGB also administers the social insurance program and operates rest homes.

The federation and its member unions are organized on a territorial basis, with executive bodies at national, district, county, and local levels. The highest body of the FDGB is its congress, which meets every 4 years to elect a chairman (SED Politburo member Herbert Warnke in 1972) and a presidium to lead the organization. In 1972 the FDGB claimed 7.2 million members (or about 88% of the total work force), but many persons have joined the organization merely to avoid losing jobs, privileges, or certain benefits.

The FDJ and its junior affiliate, the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, which includes the Young Pioneers, were among the first organizations permitted by the Soviet authorities in 1945-46. Patterned after the Soviet youth organization, the FDJ exercises important functions in the educational and political indoctrination of East German children and youths. Its chief function is to prepare future cadres for the SED. The FDJ maintains an extensive program of activities and facilities, including sports events, premilitary training, trips and expeditions, parades

and rallies, recreational centers, and vacation camps. An affiliate of Communist-front World Federation of Democratic Youth, the FDJ accepts members 14 to 26 years of age; most of these members were previously enrolled in the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, which is open to children 6 to 14 years of age. The FDJ organization is patterned after that of the SED, with bodies at the local and district level receiving direction from the national leaders. A congress meets every 4 years to elect a central council, a bureau, and a secretariat to conduct FDJ affairs until the next congress. The FDJ claimed 1.7 million members in May 1972, while the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers had some 1.8 million.

Despite strenuous recruitment campaigns and the preference given to FDJ members for the most desirable jobs and for admission to the universities, the FDJ has not attracted East German youth to the extent desired by the SED. Only about 60% of the 14- to 26-year age group are members. Various concessions granted by the regime to youth and efforts to enliven the generally monotonous FDJ meetings and publications have not been productive.

The Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD) was founded in August 1948 with the goal of drawing women into more active participation in the economic life of the nation. Despite intensive membership campaigns, the majority of women have not joined its ranks. Total membership has remained constant at 1.3 million.

The German Cultural Association (DKB) was created in 1945 by the Soviet military authorities and was entrusted with the task of unifying all members of the intelligentsia. Since the early 1950's the creative artists, musicians and writers, have had their own autonomous organizations, but the association, with its 185,000 members, plays a peripheral role by sponsoring lectures, discussions, poetry readings, concerts, and exhibitions.

Other large organizations include the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (GDSF) and the German Gymnastics and Sports Association (DTSB). Each organization is patently designed to propagandize and control a specific cross section of the population. A more specialized role is played by the Society for Sport and Technology (GST), which was organized in 1952 under the Ministry for National Defense to provide guidance and facilities for premilitary training and sports activities which are useful in military service. The society offers marksmanship, driver training, telecommunications operation, parachuting, and other related activities.

The National Front, in addition to representing the parties and mass organizations, purports to represent the population as a whole and functions as the vehicle for presenting candidates for office at all levels of government. The National Front is organized on a residential basis; each apartment house or group of houses (in rural areas, even the smallest hamlet) elects a delegation to the National Front Committee for a specified locality or region. From these local committees a hierarchical structure ascends to the central controlling body called the National Committee of the National Front. The entire organization propagates the official line whenever the regime wishes to make the "popular will" apparent on questions of national significance—particularly in connection with elections.

D. National policies (U/OU)

In the early postwar years the Soviet occupation forces laid down the policy guidelines and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) acted, for the most part, as an executory agent. Soviet officials determined the breadth and scope of the reforms—social, educational, agricultural, and industrial—which overturned the existing system and provided the framework for the development of a new social and political structure. In their day-to-day decisions, however, the Soviet occupation authorities appeared to be pursuing contradictory policies, wavering between harsh exploitation of German resources through confiscation and reparations and attempts to set up a viable governmental structure. The resentment and alienation resulting from these policies came to be focused on the SED.

Disregarding popular opposition, the Soviet occupation authorities and East German leaders introduced sweeping reforms which paved the way for the development of a Communist society modeled after the Soviet Union. An indigenous elite gradually emerged and Soviet control became less direct. East German ideology still proclaims that the Soviet Union is the model for socialist development, and the SED leadership has shown itself sensitive to Soviet policy and practice. Both Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker have held the position that the GDR can find its place in the sun only by close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Today the leadership commands the loyalty of a large, dedicated bureaucracy and technical intelligentsia, which increasingly identify their own interests with those of the regime and recognize the stake they have in advancing the

legitimacy of the East German state by contributing to the successful implementation of government programs.

I. Domestic

The primary goals of the domestic policies pursued by the regime are to assure the perpetuation of SED control of the society and to continue the process of transforming East Germany into a viable state separate and distinct from the Federal Republic of Germany. Until recently, the major barriers to achievement of these goals have been the problem of legitimacy—the GDR was born of foreign occupation rather than domestic revolution—and the lingering desire of citizens of both Germanies for reunification of their divided nation. Prior to 1961 the East German citizenry had a choice as to whether they wished to be a part of the new society that the Communist regime was molding in the part of Germany under its control, or move to West Germany which had received general recognition as the only legitimate German state. The escape route through Berlin provided the means by which the East Germans were able to "vote with their feet," as a result of which a steady stream of the nation's most highly trained citizens—technicians and professional people, including engineers, scientists, and physicians—fled to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The readily available escape route allowed the remainder of the population to take a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the SED. In fact, the general state of relations between the regime and the people was measured by the flow of refugees to West Berlin. The construction of the wall on 13 August 1961 had the immediate effect of stopping the exodus of technically skilled manpower, but there were also longer range consequences. For the first time since the creation of the state, the regime had control over its own borders, a development that gave the entire party and governmental apparatus a measure of confidence that had previously been lacking. In addition, it was now clear to the people that they had no choice but to remain, and that in order to improve their own material well-being they would have to come to terms with the regime and its demands.

In its initial period of development the German Democratic Republic, like other Communist states, placed great emphasis on completing large show projects, particularly in heavy industry, with the result that consumer goods industries suffered and the creation of a broad economic infrastructure was neglected. While viewing economic growth as a goal in itself, the regime has also attached great importance

to economic achievement as a measurement of the state's ability to compete with West Germany and of the regime's legitimacy to rule. In 1963 the Ulbricht regime adopted a sweeping program of reforms, the goal of which was to encourage efficiency by giving greater play to such factors as profitability, realistic price-cost relationships, material incentives, and increased initiatives and responsibility at the managerial level.

Ulbricht, who was considered a hard-line dogmatist on many questions, was instrumental in bringing in young, technically trained experts to responsible party and governmental positions. Practical economic problems came to dominate party meetings and Ulbricht personally sponsored the development of theoretical economics and encouraged the development of a computer industry. In fact, Ulbricht's fall may be partially traced to his economic theories which tended to look to the 1980's rather than coming to grips with the immediate problems facing the regime. The Polish riots of December 1970 were seen by some East German leaders as an example of what could happen when concrete daily needs were ignored in favor of long term goals.

Since May 1971, when Honecker replaced Ulbricht, the SED has tried to strengthen domestic stability and improve the morale of the people by devoting more resources to the long-neglected consumer goods industries. In addition, Honecker announced at the fifth Central Committee plenum in April 1972 that the regime intended to expand the existing social welfare programs in order to provide additional care and services for the people.

It cannot be assumed that the promise of a greater volume of consumer goods and various services will automatically be translated into greater acceptance of the regime by the population. The comprehensive social welfare system, for example, reorganized and further developed by the regime, provides the people with a greater degree of security, particularly with respect to the health care field. These benefits have won the regime few converts, however, perhaps in large part because they are not innovations for Germans who have a long tradition of comprehensive social and health insurance programs that go back to the Bismarckian era in the late 19th century.

The SED leadership has at times been willing to attempt to win popular support by easing restrictions on travel and cultural activities. These concessions in the past have not always led to positive results from the regime's point of view, and such gestures as allowing greater freedom of expression to writers and artists, agreeing to pensioners' visits to West Germany,

negotiating the Berlin pass agreements, and encouraging contacts with the non-Communist world were regarded as counterproductive by the leadership. After a rash of youth riots in 1965, the SED leaders again tightened controls and were reluctant to experiment further with "liberalization."

As the Dubcek reforms swept neighboring Czechoslovakia in 1968, the East German regime placed even more emphasis on strengthening the SED's commitment to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The regime began to pay more attention to paramilitary training of students and intensified the indoctrination of youth groups in the party and mass organizations. During the first weeks following the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968, most military and paramilitary units in East Germany were either activated or placed on alert. Popular support for the East German role in the suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment was far from general, and the regime sought to neutralize pro-Dubcek sentiment at home by involving as many citizens as possible in military activity. There was evidence that antiregime sentiment was prevalent among intellectuals, and there were scattered reports of wavering among military personnel, government workers, and even party members. The dissent that did surface was not widespread or well organized, and the regime quickly and quietly suppressed the sporadic student demonstrations which occurred in a number of cities.

Soon after assuming power, the Honecker leadership took tentative steps to relax some of the more onerous restrictions on cultural expression. At the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 Honecker exhorted the artists' unions to conduct "frank, businesslike and creative discussions." Later that year at a Central Committee plenum, Honecker declared that there should be no taboos in art or literature either with regard to content or style, but he went on to warn against "feeding on the modernism of a world which is alien and even hostile to us." During 1972, the Honecker regime appeared to be in the process of determining the guidelines for its cultural policies, but it was far from certain that the first tentative steps taken by the regime represented a real change in policy rather than being merely tactical concessions.

The Honecker leadership, like its predecessor, attaches great importance to indoctrination of the population as a means of winning popular support and approval. The SED controls all media of mass communications, and party officials responsible for propaganda and ideology together with other top levels formulate the main lines of doctrinal policy.

These policies are reflected in all the relevant media and are given further dissemination by political, educational, social, recreational, and professional organizations.

Although the points of emphasis in the propaganda disseminated by the regime vary from day to day to reflect the current party line, the general thrust of East German propaganda has remained consistent throughout the years. The major themes relate to the achievements of the regime and Communist nations elsewhere in the struggle to assure peace, progress, and prosperity for all people.

The art of winning support through persuasion has taken on new importance under Honecker who has stated that "the art of leadership is the art of persuasion." The party has been prodded to get to know the workers and to speak their language. Several themes have been repeatedly emphasized, particularly the central role of the Five Year plans and the obligation of each citizen to participate in strengthening socialism. By attempting to show citizens that they have an opportunity for "true" participation in the governmental process, as opposed to the "sham" participation found in the West, the regime is waging a battle for the loyalty of East Germans. The old slogan, "*Plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit*" (plan with us, work with us, govern with us), expresses the Marxist-Leninist view that the dictatorship of the proletariat brings real democracy for the first time in human history to the great majority of the population.

The degree of success enjoyed by the regime in its drive to establish the legitimacy of the SED as the nation's leading force is difficult to determine. There undoubtedly is discontent and there are some who reject the concept of an East German state with the SED as its ruler, but these numbers are declining. Since the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 there has been a slow, rather subtle, process of enforced reconciliation between the population and the regime which seems fairly well advanced. As long as the regime is able to continue to register impressive gains in economic growth and in satisfying popular demands for goods and services, growing numbers of East Germans are likely to identify their own interests with those of the regime, thereby hastening the division of Germany and establishing the legitimacy of the GDR.

Although the regime proclaims the primary mission of its well-organized and well-equipped armed forces to be the defense of East German territory against foreign enemies, an equally important task is their supporting role in maintaining internal security and

order. The primary duty of the Frontier Command troops, for example, is to prevent escapes from East Germany into West Germany and West Berlin.

Civilian authority over the military, exercised by regime leaders, is virtually complete. There is no conflict between military and civilian leaders, and there is no indication that the East German military is prepared to assume a role that would challenge the primacy of the party's civilian leadership.

2. Foreign

The major foreign policy objective of East Germany is to secure international acceptance and formal recognition as a sovereign state. A corollary of this policy is the intensification of the drive—initiated under Ulbricht—for systematic differentiation (*Abgrenzung*) of the two Germanies on the basis of their social and political orders and their alleged contributions to peace and stability in Europe. The regime has established contacts and relations with a growing number of states since the fall of 1972. Evidence of increased acceptance and recognition abroad will strengthen the position of the East German leaders with their own people by dispelling the notion of the transitory nature of the GDR and placing the final seal on the existence of two separate German states (Figure 6).


East Germany's dependence on the Soviet Union as the guarantor of its continued existence as a national state and the integration of its armed forces into the Warsaw Pact combined command are effective deterrents to the formulation and implementation of a defense policy inimical to the interest of Moscow and the nations of Eastern Europe. In the event of war, strategy would be dictated by Soviet leaders, and the employment of the armed forces would be in accordance with Soviet plans.

a. Relations with the Soviet Union

East Germany's international relations continue to be circumscribed by the fact that it must frequently subordinate its own interests to those of the U.S.S.R. The East German-Soviet tie has gradually changed, however, from the vassal-master relationship of the Stalinist period to one in which East Germany has become more like a junior partner in a joint venture.

By the early sixties the East Germans had begun to assert their own interests more vigorously; they were gradually allowed to determine their own internal affairs and were given some latitude in managing relations with West Germany and the nonaligned nations. But Moscow has retained the decisive voice

FIGURE 6. New Foreign Ministry building, East Berlin (U/OU)



on issues affecting relations with the Western powers, particularly West Berlin, and has restrained the East Germans from undertaking actions which might directly challenge the position of the three Western Allies in the divided city. Continuing Soviet control is guaranteed by the 20 Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany.

Although Soviet and East German interests have generally coincided, there is evidence of some differences between the two regimes and a certain amount of friction in their relationship. The Soviet failure to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR in the early 1960's and Khrushchev's cautious flirtation with West Germany in 1964 particularly irked Ulbricht.

More serious problems arose after 1968 when Moscow's interest in pursuing detente with the West coincided with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Ulbricht felt that Brandt's eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*) neglected East German interests, and he attempted to halt or at least redirect Soviet and East European initiatives toward West Germany. Ulbricht continued to maintain that an improvement in relations between the two Germanies required the Bonn government to recognize the German Democratic Republic, even though it had been evident for some time that the Soviet position on this question had become more flexible. Ulbricht's unwillingness to enter into any agreement which might downgrade East German claims to the western half of the city also created

difficulties in Four-Power negotiations on a regulation of the status of Berlin. From the Soviet point of view, Ulbricht—in his prime, a master of maneuver for political gain—had become so inflexible that he could not adjust to the change in the international climate and the consequent shift in Soviet policy objectives.

Although Erich Honecker had a reputation as a hard-line dogmatist, he went a long way toward meeting Soviet demands. This was not accomplished without some Soviet prodding but, in general, Honecker has been prepared to acknowledge the regime's dependence on Moscow both politically and economically. Honecker has been responsive to Soviet interests in the area of foreign policy, as was evident in the spring of 1972 when he unilaterally took several steps which aided the passage by the West German *Bundestag* of the Soviet-Federal Republic treaty renouncing the use of force. The leadership has echoed nearly every nuance or shift in Soviet attitudes on a variety of issues, ranging from the need for a European Security Conference to the possibility of eventual agreement on troop reductions in Europe by the United States and the U.S.S.R. East Germany also continues to lend its wholehearted support to Moscow on such issues as Romanian nationalism, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The regime has also championed the Moscow line on issues concerning the so-called third world nations, including staunch support for the Arabs in their dispute with Israel.

b. Relations with other Eastern European countries

Recognized as a sovereign state by all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, East Germany strives to obtain from its "fraternal socialist" allies a binding commitment to support all East German political objectives. In particular, East Germany relies on the other Eastern European countries to support the regime's drive to gain membership in various international organizations and to encourage other nations to establish official relations. The Communist nations of Eastern Europe have been willing up to a point to support the GDR in attaining these objectives because they clearly regard the existence of a separate East German state to be essential to their own security arrangements. Relations with these countries were strained at times, however, because of such issues as West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, which the East German regime tried to block and which the other Communist nations regarded favorably. Another irritant has been the receptivity of these nations to Bonn's drive to expand trade relations with Eastern Europe, along with the success of the West Germans in negotiating agreements for exchanging trade missions with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. From the East German point of view, a particularly galling aspect of these agreements has been the implicit recognition by the Communist nations of Bonn's claim that West Berlin is a part of the Federal Republic.

Bonn was unable or unwilling to follow up its early successes immediately, but in early 1967 the new West German Government again sought improvements in West German relations with Eastern Europe. Its efforts met with some success when Romania established diplomatic relations with Bonn, and Prague and Budapest agreed to receive Bonn's emissaries. This led to feverish East German diplomatic efforts in early 1967 to convince the Warsaw Pact states that they should not improve their relations with the Federal Republic until Bonn gave up its claim to be the sole representative of Germany and recognized the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state.

This diplomatic activity was highlighted by a series of visits by Ulbricht to various Warsaw Pact states and the signing of mutual assistance treaties with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. From the East German viewpoint, these treaties provided reassurance that East German interests would not be completely ignored even if other Eastern European countries eventually established diplomatic relations with Bonn.

By mid-1968, relations between Pankow and other capitals in Eastern Europe had worsened. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was proving to be attractive to other bloc countries in addition to Romania, and the East German regime feared eventual isolation if West German initiatives succeeded. The prospect of a liberal, Western-oriented Czechoslovakia posed the most serious and immediate threat. As a result, the Ulbricht regime launched a vitriolic attack on the Dubcek leadership with the purpose of raising doubt about the ideological loyalties of the government in Prague and reversing the trend toward liberalization in Eastern Europe. East Germany's criticism of Dubcek was often more vehement than that of the Soviets, and on 20 August, when Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia, it was made to appear in East Germany that Ulbricht's policies had been vindicated.

During 1969-70 the Ulbricht regime pursued an active but defensive foreign policy in its attempt to coordinate and restrict East European approaches to Bonn. The East Germans succeeded in delaying moves toward detente between Bonn and the Communist world, but the regime suffered a sharp setback in August 1970 when the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression treaty with the Federal Republic. The agreement was a particularly bitter pill for the East German Government to swallow because it violated a key axiom of GDR policy—that the Communist nations would refrain from taking steps toward normalizing relations with West Germany as long as the Bonn government continued its policy of not recognizing East Germany. Gomulka had also dropped this as an issue in the talks between Bonn and Warsaw.

The more flexible policies of the Honecker leadership toward West Germany have eased tensions with East Germany's allies, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. Honecker visited his closest Communist neighbors in the fall of 1971, and at the fourth Central Committee plenum the following December he declared that a "new historical phase in the brotherly relations" was being introduced. One concrete result was the conclusion of special agreements in January 1972 allowing visa-free travel between these countries. The East German regime also remains a staunch supporter of economic and technological cooperation among the Communist nations through the Council on Economic Mutual Assistance which is headquartered in Moscow.

c. *Relations with West Germany*

In one sense, East Germany serves as a mere instrument of Soviet policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, the West Berlin authorities, and the Western Allies. The range of Soviet interests is so great and the issues are so sensitive that the Soviets have not permitted the East Germans to develop a truly independent policy toward the West. Their interests broadly coincide, however, and the U.S.S.R. recently has tended to allow the East Germans a longer tether on foreign policy issues than it did formerly.

The German Democratic Republic's claim to be a sovereign state dictated a basically hostile attitude toward West Germany. Nonetheless, the East Germans paid lip service to the idea of an East-West German confederation, which would include the "separate territory of West Berlin" as a first step toward reestablishing Germany unity. Ulbricht reaffirmed this position in his 1967 New Year's message, adding the caveat that unification is impossible until West Germany undergoes a "radical democratic revolution." Ulbricht also reiterated several of East Germany's longstanding demands in calling for agreements which would lead to confederation. The East Germans argued that the two German states should establish normal diplomatic relations; recognize existing national frontiers in Europe; renounce control of or participation in the control of nuclear weapons, and declare their readiness to participate in a nuclear-free zone in Europe; respect the independence of West Berlin; and establish a commission to examine how the Potsdam agreement had been implemented in East and West Germany.

Although they denounced the West German Government as being unrepresentative and revanchist, the East Germans constantly utilized various stratagems to induce Bonn to enter into talks at a level which could be used to bolster the GDR's claims to sovereignty. The West Germans refrained from official negotiations, limiting their contacts with the East Germans to technical discussions among representatives from such agencies as the Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade, which handles economic and traffic matters. Nevertheless, there were interministerial contacts on technical matters such as communications and transport. Both sides also found it advantageous to use private citizens, particularly church leaders, to conduct nonofficial negotiations which occasionally led to government-sanctioned agreements, as in the case of the prisoner exchange agreement in 1964. In 1966 the two Germanies appeared about to initiate a high-level speaker

exchange between the West German Social Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt, and leading members of the SED. The East Germans, however, became increasingly apprehensive about the course of the talks and backed out, allegedly over Bonn's reluctance to rescind a law under which East German leaders could be subject to arrest in West Germany. In the negotiations for the proposed speaker exchange, provision was made for temporary suspension of this law, but the East German regime was fearful of spontaneous popular demonstrations as well as longer range political effects if the popular Brandt and other well-known West German leaders appeared in East Germany. These fears were confirmed when Brandt and Stoph met in Erfurt in 1970, where Brandt received a tumultuous welcome.

In the closing months of the Ulbricht regime, the theme of unity of the German nation or the desirability of some form of German confederation began to receive less emphasis and was finally dropped entirely. It was replaced by a policy calling for a complete differentiation between the two states *Abgrenzung*—which has been given added emphasis by the Honecker regime. Under this policy, relations between the two Germanies are to be like those between any two sovereign and independent states. East German leaders loudly and unequivocally reject Chancellor Brandt's contention that the two Germanies represent two states within one nation and that a special relationship exists between them. Honecker and his ideologists instead insist that West Germany can no longer ignore the new socialist society which has been created in East Germany, since it represents an irreversible development in the history of the German people.

Despite the *Abgrenzung* campaign, Honecker has taken a number of steps to ease relations between East and West Germany. Under the umbrella of the Four-Power Berlin Agreement concluded in September 1971, the East and West Germans negotiated an agreement on transit traffic to West Berlin, in addition to two agreements on exchange of territory in Berlin and travel for West Berliners to East Berlin and to East Germany. In early 1972 the East German Government initiated a General Traffic Treaty with the Federal Republic and took several steps which made the passage of Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw easier.

On 15 June 1972, the East and West German representatives opened preliminary talks on the normalization of relations through conclusion of a treaty which would establish certain general principles governing relations, while leaving specific points to be

agreed on in subsequent negotiations. It became evident at a fairly early stage in the talks that basic disagreements had arisen because of Bonn's insistence that a measure of recognition be granted to the existence of "the German nation," and the desire of the West Germans for reaffirmation of Four-Power rights in Germany as a whole. The GDR categorically rejected "the German nation" concept and preferred to downplay Allied rights in all of Germany.

After much tough bargaining the two governments initiated a general political treaty in early November 1972 and signed it a month later. The treaty contained only an indirect reference to the "national question." It called for further agreements on cooperation in such fields as commerce, science and technology, transport, health, and sport. The two sides agreed on the inviolability of borders, to refrain from the use or threat of force, to respect each other's independence and autonomy, and to exchange permanent representatives.

d. Relations with Berlin

For almost two decades after the end of the Second World War the Berlin issue was the focus of controversy and tension in East-West relations. Despite the establishment in 1949 of the German Democratic Republic with its capital in East Berlin, the Soviet Union retained tight control over problems concerning Berlin because of its own awareness of the potential for conflict that existed in the tug of war over the rights of the occupying powers in the city. By the early sixties the Soviets began to allow the East German regime greater freedom of maneuver on some issues affecting Berlin, apparently in response to pressures by the Ulbricht regime. The regime hoped a more active Berlin policy would enable East Germany to carve out for itself a more important role in determining the future of both East and West Berlin. During most of the mid- and late-sixties the East Germans—undoubtedly at Soviet behest—were careful to avoid serious threats to Allied rights in West Berlin and concentrated instead on disrupting West German ties with the city. Following the student rioting in West Berlin in April 1968, which was triggered by the attempted assassination of firebrand leftist leader Rudi Dutschke, the East Germans arbitrarily barred travel through East Germany to members of West Germany's rightwing National Democratic Party, as well as to high-ranking Bonn officials. This was followed in the summer by the imposition of passport and visa requirements for West German travelers, and visa and personal identity card requirements for West Berliners visiting or transiting

East Germany. The Soviets supported East German actions of this kind as long as they did not run counter to Soviet policy and did not involve the risk of a confrontation with the Western Allies.

The Ulbricht regime apparently had considerable freedom of action in its dealings with the West Berlin city administration (*Senat*), particularly in negotiating the several pass agreements which were concluded from 1965 to 1966. In their relations with the West Berlin authorities, the East Germans were interested mainly in encouraging the *Senat* to recognize the GDR, at least on a *de facto* basis. Although differences occasionally developed between West Berlin and Bonn authorities over the proper response to harassment of access to the city, the East Germans generally failed in their efforts to create dissension between the city government and Bonn.

In June 1972 the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, and the U.S. Secretary of State successfully concluded nearly 2 years of negotiations by signing the Four-Power treaty on Berlin. In the agreement the Soviet Union formally agreed—for the first time since the partitioning of Germany—to share responsibility for the expeditious handling of traffic and communications into and out of West Berlin. In practical terms, the U.S.S.R.'s assumption of this responsibility was a blow to the East German regime which had been delegated control over the access routes by the Soviets in 1955. The Soviet Union's decision to negotiate the agreement underscored Moscow's interest in reaching detente with the West and in paving the way for the ratification by the *Bundestag* of the Soviet-West German treaty of August 1970 renouncing the use of force. The Western Allies had specified to the Soviet Union that ratification by the Bonn parliament was dependent upon an agreement on Berlin.

In the agreement the Soviet Union recognized the original rights of the three Western powers to maintain their presence in West Berlin, which it had often denied. Moscow also accepted a wide range of political, economic, and social ties between Bonn and West Berlin, thus retreating from its earlier position that West Berlin was an "independent political entity." In addition, the Federal Republic was authorized to represent West Berlin's interests abroad, except in those matters affecting the security or status of the city.

The successful conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty and the Four-Power treaty on Berlin opened the door to talks between East and West Germany which led to three agreements affecting West Berlin and its ties to the West. One agreement

eased the movement of people and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and two others between the GDR and the West Berlin city government liberalized the rules for travel by West Berliners between West Berlin and East Germany and prepared the way for the elimination of enclaves within Berlin itself through territorial exchanges.

On balance, the treaties and agreements of 1970-72 required decisive shifts in the regime's posture on the all-important question of its relations with the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Perhaps because of a pragmatic reassessment of East German interests, or because of Soviet pressure—or a combination of both—the Honecker regime was forced to retreat from a number of long-held positions, in particular that West Berlin was part of East Germany, and that East Germany controlled access routes to the city.

e. Relations with the non-Communist world

Since 1969 the GDR has made significant progress toward achieving international recognition and the prospects are good that in the next several years this pattern will continue. General recognition has long been the goal of the East Germans. They have wanted it both as a manifestation of the regime's legitimacy and as an entree to Western markets and technology. Because of its pivotal position in the East-West power struggle, however, East Germany accepted the need to subordinate its aspirations to those of the Soviet Union, and relations with the West were held in abeyance. It fell to Erich Honecker, as the Soviet interest in detente grew, to oversee a dramatic turnaround in Pankow's attitude toward the West.

The signing of the inter-German political treaty on 21 December 1972 opened the door to East Germany's acceptance in the West. Most Western powers, including France and the United Kingdom, have recognized Pankow, and the remainder are very likely to follow suit. East Germany has taken its seat in several international forums, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and can look forward to full U.N. membership by fall 1973.

As the GDR prepares for full diplomatic relations with the West, it must make a number of delicate measurements. The speed with which it moves will depend in part on the disposition of the regime's slender diplomatic resources. It must balance the benefits it finds in Western markets and in its new feeling of legitimacy against some real difficulties. It must take care not to get out in front of the Soviets, and above all it must weigh the impact of closer contact with the West on the East German people and

on its own ability to build a Socialist Germanic state that is the true equal of West Germany.

Some of the nation's most talented individuals are employed in the foreign service. Many of them are tireless in their efforts to enhance East Germany's position in the countries to which they are posted. In Burma, for example, the East German consulate negotiates government-to-government trade and aid agreements and cultural exchanges. East German consular officers have regular access to the Burmese Foreign Ministry and are allowed to disseminate information and propaganda on the same scale as an embassy.

For nearly two decades East Germany struggled to gain diplomatic recognition from non-Communist countries, and it finally achieved a breakthrough in May 1969 when Iraq agreed to exchange diplomatic missions. Recognition from several other Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries followed in quick succession. The most important of these was the United Arab Republic (Egypt), which recognized Pankow in July.

East Germany maintains a high level of official representation in Egypt, with an embassy in Cairo and a consulate in Alexandria. Communist support of the Arabs against Israel and the increased Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean probably contributed to the decision by Egypt to recognize East Germany. Furthermore, Bonn's reluctance to take retaliatory measures—other than to withdraw its ambassadors—when Cambodia and Southern Yemen had earlier recognized East Germany may have encouraged the Egyptians to act. Cairo was also well aware that the West German Government was divided at that time on the question of invoking the so-called Hallstein Doctrine under which Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with countries recognizing East Germany, and neither of the governing parties wished to make it an issue in an election year.

East Germany's successful wooing of Iraq came 4 years after the Arab nations had severed relations with West Germany over the latter's recognition of Israel in 1965. Although West Germany continued to conduct extensive economic relations with a number of Arab states, its ties with Iraq had not been significant. Indeed, Iraq had little to lose and, from an economic point of view, much to gain by yielding to the strong East German pressure for recognition. Syria and Sudan, which recognized the GDR in June 1969, were similar cases in point.

East Germany has also suffered some sharp setbacks in its drive to establish diplomatic relations with non-Communist countries. In 1971 the Central African

Republic suspended its relations with the GDR, and this was followed shortly by a Zambian request that the East Germans close their trade mission in Lusaka. Relations with the Sudan cooled, and the reestablishment of relations between Bonn and Cairo in 1972 was viewed critically by East German leaders. Many Asian and African states continued to turn a deaf ear to East German requests to upgrade relations.

In its initial forays into Western diplomacy, Pankow has tried to project the image of a responsible and constructive participant. The East German media have expressed satisfaction that East Germany is being accepted as an "equal and sovereign" state while voicing regret that acceptance had not come earlier. In their new chairs at international conferences, East German diplomats have generally concentrated on the issues at hand and have avoided polemics and chauvinistic challenges to their West German colleagues. While looking westward, the East German Government is by no means relinquishing its role as loyal supporter of bloc policies. Both as observers at the United Nations and in the preparatory Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, East German representatives have staunchly—if quietly—supported Soviet initiatives.

E. Threats to government stability (U/OU)

1. Discontent and dissidence

The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 not only halted the crippling exodus of trained manpower from the German Democratic Republic, but it also set in motion a slow and subtle process whereby the East Germans' previous hostility toward the regime changed first to passive acceptance and then in a growing number to positive loyalty and a sense of a separate East German national identity. Throughout the fifties, the will to resist by segments of the population had been undermined by the regime's coercive tactics, the threat of Soviet intervention to crush any uprising, the flight of potential resistance leaders to the West, and a sense of abandonment by the West which had remained aloof during the East Berlin riots in 1953 and the erection of the wall in 1961.

The passing of the years and the maturation of a generation born under Communist rule is a major factor in the accommodation of the population to the demands of the regime; more than 30% of all East Germans were born after the war and more than 50% have no active memory of any other system. This demographic trend is reinforced by ideological

indoctrination, increased economic security and well-being, and the considerable pride of the citizenry in the accomplishments wrought by their own labor in the absence of any substantial foreign assistance. As the regime has developed a greater sense of self-confidence, the controls based on force and intimidation which were instituted in the fifties have been replaced by more institutionalized restraints stressing persuasion and reward.

The long term process of accommodation and adaptation by the citizenry does not automatically exclude manifestations of dissatisfaction or low-key resistance to the regime and its policies. A major irritant in the past has been the regime's insistence on the mouthing of slogans and propaganda as evidence of loyalty. Even prior to Ulbricht's departure, however, the regime had begun to deemphasize these frequently superficial demonstrations of allegiance to the regime and to attach greater importance to professional competence.

The Berlin wall and the development of sophisticated devices to discourage escape across the border have reduced the refugee flow to a mere trickle, but occasionally individuals, and even families, are lucky or resourceful enough to carry out escape plans successfully. These deeply dissatisfied persons appear to be a distinct minority, however, and in all probability a growing number of East Germans would not be prepared to leave their present positions, homes, and the manner of life to which they have become accustomed for the uncertainty of beginning anew in West Germany. There also appears to be growing optimism over the prospects of improving life at home, and a determination among many to remain and strive for this goal.

A main source of discontent in the past was the failure of the regime's economic policies to effect a rapid improvement in living standards. These problems were heightened by Ulbricht's unrealistic economic plans and his concentration on the development and expansion of heavy industry to the detriment of the consumer goods sectors. Under Honecker the regime has tried to increase domestic political stability by taking steps to improve the morale of the people. A package of new social measures was introduced in 1972 which aimed at improving health and welfare facilities, and the regime has also promised a greater volume of goods and variety of sources over the next 5 years.

The government has moved to deal with longstanding complaints directed at the stringent controls over travel and the restrictive cultural policies. Although it is now relatively easy for East German

citizens to travel in Eastern Europe and millions have taken advantage of this opportunity, there is little likelihood that the tight controls on travel to the West will be relaxed in the near future. The regime has made tentative moves to allow writers and artists more freedom of expression, but there appears to have been no fundamental change in the policy of closely monitoring the activities and output of the cultural elite.

2. Affected groups

a. Industrial workers

Discontent among industrial workers, arising from specific economic grievances, is a source of deep concern to the East German leadership. The lesson learned in 1953, when an uprising was triggered by construction workers in East Berlin who resented an increase in work norms and who initiated a spontaneous strike, has not been forgotten. Under present circumstances, however, workers are unlikely to take to the streets, because there is no desire to risk sacrificing whatever has already been achieved and because of the certainty of reprisals. The regime has a pervasive and efficient security system which has usually been able to discern and deal with workers' grievances before they became widespread. In addition, the government has been known to grant limited concessions or has otherwise taken steps to eliminate sources of major grievances. In April 1966, for instance, the regime attempted to eliminate one chronic source of complaint by revising the workweek schedule so that all workers would have a 5-day workweek every other week, thereby reducing the average workweek from 48 to 45 hours. In September 1967 a general 5-day workweek was introduced and, after some initial difficulties stemming from complaints by shoppers who found that their favorite stores were closed on Saturday along with factories and other enterprises, seemed to be working reasonably well.

The decision of the regime to increase production of consumer goods and expand social benefits is intended to raise the living standards of industrial workers and to show that the leadership is concerned about their problems. Despite these measures, various complaints have cropped up periodically, including charges of inept management and unkept wage promises, rumors of price rises, and demands for more democratic procedures. The workers on occasion have tried to highlight their grievances by resorting to brief strikes, gathering petitions, engaging in slowdowns, and passively resisting exhortations for more production.

While not a threat to the regime in themselves, these grievances are taken seriously by the leadership. The Polish riots of December 1970 are a vivid reminder of what happens when the government and party lose touch with the workers.

b. Farm workers

The redistribution of land under the 1946 land reform resulted in some dilution of the traditionally conservative attitudes of the rural population, since many of the new farmers had either Social Democratic or Communist backgrounds. However, the collectivization campaign—culminating in the all-out drive of 1960—resulted in the flight to the West of thousands of farmers and farm workers, including many who had been in favor of the social and economic reforms instituted during the postwar period. Since 1963 the regime has been able to overcome resistance to collectivization to some extent by sharply raising farm incomes. This policy has improved labor productivity and reduced passive resistance, but it has not solved the problem of persuading youth to choose a career in agriculture.

c. Intellectuals

Intellectuals and persons in the professions express their disaffection in more subtle ways, although their opposition to the regime's determination to impose limits on the freedom of the individual is at least as strongly felt as that of the workers and farmers. Freedom to think, write, publish, and work without political interference has not fit in with SED attempts to restructure East German society along Communist lines. Many of East Germany's more prominent writers, artists, and professional men fled to West Germany, leaving few who might serve as rallying points in opposition to the regime. Many of the members of the intellectual community who have chosen to remain are committed Communists, though they may question specific policies of the regime. However, both groups of intellectuals—the Marxists as well as the more refractory non-Communists—have been reluctant to challenge the authorities head on. Rather than engaging in outright criticism or an exchange of polemics with the regime, many intellectuals employ satire and innuendo to express their dissatisfaction.

On the rare occasions when intellectuals have taken a firm stand against regime policies, retribution has been swift. Prof. Wolfgang Harich, a journalist and professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt University, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 1957 (only 7 were actually served) for writing

articles criticizing the regime at the time of the Polish and Hungarian revolts. Prof. Robert Havemann, another Humboldt faculty member, was dismissed from his post and dropped from the SED in 1964 for advocating freedom of inquiry. In 1966 Havemann further antagonized SED officials by advocating a democratic reorganization within the SED itself and by having his suggestions published in a leading West German weekly. Again the reaction was immediate; Havemann was dismissed from his job on the staff of the East German Academy of Sciences and expelled from the academy. The regime further forbade academy members from maintaining any contact whatever with the "dissident" professor. During the tense days just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Havemann was quoted in the West German press as advocating Dubcek-style reforms for East Germany. There was no evidence that Havemann was personally involved in the rash of pro-Czechoslovak demonstrations throughout East Germany that followed the occupation, but his two teenage sons were arrested for taking part in rallies.

The regime generally has sought to control its writers by using tactics less harsh than those employed against Harich and Havemann. These include financial inducements, petty harassments, chicanery, and the denial of a forum for dissenting views. Writers who have been particularly offensive from the regime's viewpoint—notably playwright Peter Hacks and balladeer Wolf Biermann—have been publicly censured. Others have been compelled to engage in self-criticism.

Under Honecker's leadership, the SED approach toward the intelligentsia has altered, reflecting in part personnel changes in the cultural sector of the SED Central Committee. The regime has clamped down on the nonideologically oriented technocrats who are now required to receive more intense political indoctrination. Those who refuse to cooperate are threatened with professional isolation and economic deprivation. The guidelines for the artistic intelligentsia have been relaxed somewhat to allow more room for creative expression. The works of some artists, authors, and film producers previously withheld from the public have appeared. At the fourth Central Committee plenum in September 1971, Honecker said that there should be no taboos in either style or content of artistic works, but there is no indication that the SED is prepared to loosen its grip on the cultural field. At a time when East Germans are being exposed to new ideas through travel abroad and through contacts with visiting foreigners, the regime is trying to make sure that it can rely on the intellectuals for support.

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d. Youth

In the eyes of the regime, the youth represent one of the most difficult and defiant elements in East German society. The party's intensive cradle-to-college indoctrination, while shaping some young people into obedient Communists, sparks rebelliousness in many others. Prior to erection of the Berlin wall in 1961, nearly 50% of the refugee flow to the West was comprised of young people in search of greater personal freedom and better jobs, and children accompanying parents.

In its efforts to control East German youth, the regime has alternated between a policy of cajoling and threatening, neither of which has produced entirely positive results. Dissatisfied with the results of its earlier policy of close regimentation, the regime relaxed its pressure in the early sixties and drafted a youth communique which allowed young people more time free of governmental and party supervision. This new policy, however, enabled young people to use their new-found leisure time to adopt fads and styles popular in Western Europe. Regime-sponsored activities were ignored, as youth sought to imitate the pop culture of the West, with its rock music and distinctive dress. Incidents of "antiregime" activity occurred sporadically throughout East Germany, and frequently party youth leaders even found it difficult to control meetings of the official youth organization, the Free German Youth.

The period of relaxation was quickly terminated after serious rioting broke out in Leipzig in October 1965 when police attempted to prevent students from singing songs proscribed by the regime. Following a crackdown on rowdiness, the regime introduced a new Family Code aimed at strengthening moral responsibility and reminding parents of their obligation to supervise the conduct of their children.

Now forced to stay in East Germany, young men and women and teenagers remain a source of great concern to the party leadership, because they are the most vociferous critics of the regime and of life in general within East Germany. "Hooligans" have disturbed the smooth operation of factories and farms. Teenage students have upset the educational machinery by asking searching political questions, by emulating their counterparts in Western Europe, and even, on occasion, by staging demonstrations against the regime's policies. Probably the most serious incidents of this type occurred in the weeks immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia when sporadic pro-Dubcek demonstrations took place in cities throughout East Germany. Although these demonstrations were easily contained by the regime,

they took on added significance because of the large number of student demonstrators whose parents were members of the party and government elite. The confidence of the regime in the effectiveness of its political indoctrination program was understandably shaken, and a number of high-ranking party and government officials whose children were involved were either fired or demoted. Despite vigorous efforts by the SED to instill political "reliability" in the ranks of the Young Pioneers and the Free German Youth, many of their members have retreated to a position of passive participation in the activities of these organizations, while a number of others have become sophisticated critics of the government and its policies.

The dissident movement among young East Germans was fragmented after the crisis in Czechoslovakia subsided and now consists of numerous small, normally passive, loosely organized and ideologically differentiated groups. They meet to discuss politics and to exchange dissident literature and only occasionally display their opposition to the regime overtly, since such actions often result in the arrest of the participants. The authorities monitor the dissidence closely and attempt to keep it under strict control, but they have not been able to eliminate it. The young dissidents oppose the regime on grounds that it is not representative of the population. They favor greater personal freedom and are particularly critical of the regime's restrictive cultural policies and of the inefficiency of its overcentralized bureaucracy.

e. The churches

The Evangelical and Roman Catholic churches have been the only nongovernmental institutions permitted by the regime to maintain independent contacts with West Germany. However, strict governmental control of the domestic and foreign activities of the churches, particularly contacts with West Germany, severely limits their effectiveness.

The contacts of the Evangelical Church with its sister church in the Federal Republic were further restricted in 1969 when a regime-sponsored plan was adopted providing for the formation of a separate East German church and the subsequent severing of organizational ties with the Evangelical Church in West Germany. All eight established territorial churches (*Landeskirchen*) of the Evangelical Church in East Germany yielded to pressure by the regime and agreed to establish a separate organization called the League of Evangelical Churches (BEK), but the constitution of the new organization continues to stress the all-German aspect of Protestantism in both East Germany and the Federal Republic. Despite regime

pressures, church leaders have refused to delete these references from the BEK's constitution.

The Roman Catholic Church, like the Evangelical Church, is a potential rallying point for opposition but church authorities have gone out of their way to avoid a confrontation with the regime in order to prevent additional restrictions and harassment. On what it considers vital issues, however, the Catholic Church has tended to be more outspoken than the Evangelical Church and more adamant in its stand. In order to protect its own members and clergy in East Germany, the Catholic Church generally avoids focusing international attention on the internal East German situation unless a specific issue is considered worth the risks involved.

Both the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches are extremely circumspect in voicing opinion on secular matters. Even during the tense period of the Czechoslovak crisis, the reaction of religious leaders was muted. By accepting restrictions on their traditional rights and freedoms in secular matters and by demonstrating their willingness to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" religious leaders hope to ensure the continued existence of the churches. Although some Protestant churchmen have lent their support to the regime, for the most part the churches have tried to resist Communist indoctrination of the faithful and other ideological pressures.

Despite the conciliatory gestures of the Evangelical and Catholic churches, the SED continues to regard organized religion as a competitor for the loyalties of the people and a potential source of dissidence which the state is compelled to neutralize, if not undermine and destroy, regardless of past agreements. Under Honecker there has been a renewed attempt to isolate believers from the rest of society and to diminish the role of the churches. Thus, in March 1971, the regime moved to restrict even further the activities of the clergy by requiring the churches to report all "nonreligious" functions to the police, a requirement that is being fought by the Evangelical and Catholic leaders. In addition, new requirements for admission to the universities discriminate against youths who are avowed Christians.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The primary mission of the police forces is to ferret out and control domestic opposition to the regime. Combating ordinary crime and protecting the rights and safety of the population are secondary functions

of the law enforcement system. A shift in emphasis is likely to occur, however, as the regime becomes more confident about its legitimacy and acceptance by a majority of the citizenry; in addition, as the economy becomes more consumer-oriented and the acquisition of goods and property becomes the objective of growing numbers of citizens, there is likely to be a rising incidence of crimes which Communist regimes have always insisted flourish only in capitalist societies, such as robbery, theft, and burglary. In late 1971 the attorney general claimed that crimes against property accounted for more than 50% of all criminal offenses.

All police and security organizations, as well as the courts, are under the direct control of the SED. The inner circle of SED leaders charged with formulating security and penal policy are members of the Central Committee Security Commission, headed by Paul Verner. Actual day-to-day policy and administrative decisions are worked out by the Central Committee Security Department.

On the governmental level, the Ministry of Interior is the organization primarily responsible for controlling the population and combating crime. The ministry has at its disposal, directly or through its 15 district headquarters, not only regular civil police but also the Alert Police, which are militarized security units trained for riot control, and personnel of the Civil Air Defense Command. It reportedly controls about 106,000 full-time armed police and security personnel. The higher echelons are composed for the most part of trusted SED members, and there is a significant number of SED members and sympathizers in the lower ranks.

Directly subordinate to the ministry is the Main Administration of German People's Police (HVDVP), which exercises day-to-day control over the major police functions and operations. The HVDVP has at its disposal several operational civil police organizations totaling some 89,000 personnel, including:

- Regular Police
- Water Police
- Traffic Police
- Factory Guards
- Prison Guards
- Criminal Police
- Transport Police

The HVDVP also exerts control, through district SED headquarters, over the approximately 11,000 heavily armed Alert Police. Several of the operational police organizations, notably the Criminal Police, coordinate their operations with the Ministry for State Security.

The Ministry of Interior also directs the Main Department for Passports and Registration, which acts as a central file for information on East German citizens. Through coordination between the record offices of the Ministries of Interior and State Security supplemented by local police files, a careful record is kept on nearly every aspect of the life of an individual citizen. In the case of SED members, this information is supplemented by local and SED Central Committee cadre records.

Various other organizations exercise supplemental police and internal security functions. These include the SED-controlled Workers Militia with 350,000 members available for duty during civil disturbances, and the army's Frontier Command, which has 49,500 men engaged in border control. (A full description of the duties of these forces is found in the discussion of their parent organizations.) The secret police organization, the State Security Service (SSD), which is subordinate to the Ministry for State Security, has responsibility for certain aspects of domestic security and counterintelligence (counterespionage and countersubversion). It includes a 3,500-man Security Guard Regiment. In all, the active members of both police and security forces (uniformed and plain-clothes) probably total about 500,000—or about 3% of the population. To supplement the large police and security forces, the regime has also attempted to organize an extensive network of informers, particularly in regions bordering on West Germany. Although some people, usually SED or FDJ members, willingly act as police informers, most recruits for this task must be coerced into service.

The police maintain a complex and extensive system of checks and controls over the population. In addition to the usual regulation of firearms and ammunition, fire and health hazards, and dangerous chemicals and drugs, the police have established controls over individuals, their associations, and their movements. Each citizen over 14 years of age, for instance, must carry a personal identity card (*Personalausweis*) which bears his picture; a copy of this picture is kept on record by the police. Every employed person is required to carry a work and insurance certificate which contains a complete record of his employment history. The police also maintain surveillance of population movements through a general registration system which requires every person to notify the police of any change of residence, including temporary visits exceeding 3 days. Both the population registers and the identity card system are administered by the regular police. Neither uses fingerprints for purposes of identification. To identify

suspected lawbreakers, however, the Criminal Police use the Bertillon system, which includes a 10-finger procedure of fingerprinting. They keep complete files on all suspects and convicts.

Travel both within and outside the country has increased, especially since the introduction of visa-free regulations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the increased travel of West Berliners to East Berlin and to the rest of East Germany. East German officials have expressed some concern over these increased flows, but there are no indications that security considerations would lead to curtailment of this travel. The government has, however, imposed currency restrictions for Polish citizens to prevent them from buying out East German consumer goods. The regime controls the travel of foreigners; special permission is required to enter certain areas, including the frontier zones and the uranium mining area in the Erzgebirge. Some administrative measures have been taken to curtail contacts with West Germans. Special passes are required to enter some factories. Police permission is also necessary for meetings and public collection of funds, and clubs and social organizations are required to have licenses issued by the police. Radio and TV receivers must be licensed by postal authorities.

Contacts with the West are closely regulated. Letters and printed material originating in West Germany or West Berlin, and to a lesser extent in other Western countries, are censored or excluded. The number, size, and content of parcels received by individuals are monitored and subject to control. The regime discourages viewing and listening to television and radio broadcasts from the Federal Republic and Western Europe, but controls have been largely ineffective. Attempts at jamming radiobroadcasts have generally been ineffective, except for the occasional difficulties created for broadcasts by the U.S. Government-managed *Radio in the American Sector* (RIAS) from West Berlin.

The police system, with the backing of the East German military forces, appears capable of dealing with any popular disturbance short of a spontaneous uprising of nationwide proportions. Buttressing the system of pervasive police controls is the legal system which is modeled closely after that of the Soviet Union, and functions as an instrument to perpetuate Communist rule. The maintenance of an impartial, comprehensive system of criminal and civil jurisprudence has been of less concern. Accordingly, the legal system reflects little either of the traditional German or the present-day West German system.

By Western standards, the penal code is harsh and arbitrary, clearly weighted in favor of the prosecution,

normally the state authority. The severe principles operative in the state's early years were summarized by the Minister of Justice:

The announcement of sentence is the goal of the criminal proceeding. It must in this connection be emphasized once again with all clarity that the task of defending our state against all threats and disturbances of our order continues to be the crucial task. Therefore, we must understand that we dare not show either softness or weakness in relation to the enemies of our order, and that hard sentences are also correct sentences.

By 1963, however, the regime shifted ground slightly in order to reflect changes which had been introduced in the Soviet Union the year before. A new decree stressed reliance on persuasion and education in judicial proceedings, and increased collective responsibility for apprehending, prosecuting, and reforming offenders. A new penal code was adopted in January 1968, and while considered a judicial model in Eastern Europe, it continues to emphasize the political aspects of justice in a Socialist state.

The new code is primarily designed to reinforce the unchallenged authority of the state and is tailored to meet the security needs of the regime. Under the code, many criminal offenses carry relatively light sentences as compared with penalties meted out by West German courts for similar crimes. On the other hand, crimes against the state, regardless of how trivial, are subject to harsh judicial decisions, some carrying the death sentence. Execution is by firing squad.

The Prison Administration, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior's HVDVP, controls several hundred prisons, ranging from county jails to large penitentiaries and labor camps. In addition, the Ministry for State Security controls two security prisons, at Bautzen and Waldheim, where major political prisoners are incarcerated. Nearly all prisons, as well as the labor camps, employ the inmates as laborers; in some cases the prisoners are used in outside work detachments as well as within the prison itself.

Information on the exact size of the prison population is not available, but it has been estimated that as many as 6,000 persons may be in custody for political offenses. Since 1964 East Germany has concluded several "ransom" agreements, whereby it has released approximately 3,600 political prisoners in return for payment by the Federal Republic of DM10,000 per prisoner. In October 1972 Honecker proclaimed a broad amnesty for several thousand persons convicted of minor crimes. This number included some West Germans. The amnesty was intended to demonstrate the internal stability of the GDR and to aid West German Chancellor Brandt's reelection campaign.

2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The regime still lacks the total support of East Germans, but the discontent which exists is mainly of the grumbling variety and is unlikely to lead to large-scale demonstrations or riots. This can be attributed not only to the well-disciplined police and intelligence forces, but also to policy decisions made by the top SED leadership aimed at preventing minor problems from developing into serious disputes. Public demonstrations of dissatisfaction are quickly and easily controlled by security personnel who have demonstrated their loyalty by carrying out even the most odious tasks, such as firing on citizens trying to escape over the Berlin wall.

The SED bureaucracy controls and aids the police forces in fulfilling their security functions. The party leadership in East Berlin is regularly informed about the state of public opinion and often quietly intervenes in situations which have the potential for leading to civil unrest if left unresolved. It is not unusual for SED leader Erich Honecker to concern himself with minor contentious problems.

The agreements reached by the two Germanies in mid-1972 to facilitate visits of West Germans to the GDR aroused fears of a large influx of West Germans, and certain categories of governmental officials were refused permission to receive Western relatives. There have been no indications, however, that the visits are creating security problems for the government.

In the event of civil disturbances which the East German security forces could not handle, the regime could count on the intervention of the 300,000 Soviet troops stationed in the country. If these troops were to be withdrawn at some future date, East Germany's own security forces would be prepared to assume full responsibility for internal security.

The internal security system has broken down only once and that occurred in 1953, the year of Stalin's death. At that time about 300,000 workers (5% of the work force) went on strike in protest against increased work norms. The demonstrations turned into full-fledged riots directed against the government and were finally brought under control by Soviet troops. The uprising did not provide a severe test for the security forces, however, because of the reluctance of the SED leadership and Soviet military commanders to order the use of extreme measures against the rioters. By underestimating the seriousness of the situation and failing to appreciate the depth and magnitude of the workers' disaffection, East German and Soviet authorities apparently avoided more

serious bloodshed. However, by the time order had been restored, 21 of the rioters had lost their lives.

Despite widespread discontent during the remainder of the decade, there was no repetition of the 1953 disorders. The building of the Berlin wall in 1961 made the job of the security forces easier by facilitating control of border traffic. There were small-scale student riots in the midsixties as well as open criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the security forces had no difficulty containing these overt expressions of dissatisfaction.

After almost a quarter of a century, most East Germans have come to terms with the Communist regime and accept the reality of Communist rule for the foreseeable future. The trend toward accommodation between the ruled and the rulers which has been on the ascendancy in recent years, has given the regime increased confidence in its legitimacy and strengthened the faction in the party which favors securing the cooperation of the people by tactics of persuasion and reward instead of relying on the discredited policies of coercion and arbitrary rule.

G. East Berlin (U/OU)

East Berlin, described by the Communists as "the democratic sector of Berlin," is the capital of East Germany. In practice, it is treated by the Communists as the 15th district (*Bezirk*) of East Germany, although it has not been formally incorporated into the German Democratic Republic. Because of the symbolic character and historical associations of Berlin, the East German regime has sought to develop its half into a more attractive city than other East German population centers (Figures 7 and 8). It still has not achieved the vast rebuilding and broadly based prosperity so evident in West Berlin.

The evolution of Communist control in the Soviet Sector of Berlin has followed a more complex course than that in East Germany because Berlin as a whole was originally governed separately under Four-Power authority and did not form part of the Soviet Occupation Zone under the basic quadripartite agreements. Before the establishment of a Four-Power *Kommandatura* in July 1945, the Soviet authorities already had licensed various political parties to operate throughout the city, at the same time installing Communists in key positions in Berlin's administrative system. But when the Soviet authorities moved to expand their control after the formation of the *Kommandatura*, the further development of citywide political activity virtually ceased. The attempt to merge the Communist Party of Germany



FIGURE 7. East Berlin panorama (top) and part of the restored Unter den Linden (bottom). The extensive reconstruction and facelift of recent years has been impressive and has greatly improved the outward appearance of the city. (U/OU)





FIGURE 8. The East German regime provides a relative abundance of consumer goods and food to the shops of East Berlin. Shown is a clothing shop on the Rathausstrasse (top) and a food market on Leninplatz (below). (U/OU)

(KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) failed outright in West Berlin; both organizations were eventually licensed by the *Kommandatura* to operate in all parts of the city, and the SPD continued as a separate organization in East Berlin until 1961. In East Germany the SPD disappeared as a separate entity in 1948.

With the breakdown of Four-Power collaboration in 1948, two separate political systems evolved. A mass meeting organized by the Communists on 30 November 1948 installed a new government in East Berlin. Since that time the Soviet Sector has in practice operated as an integral part of the East German political administrative system. The separate character of East Berlin was dramatized by the erection of the Berlin wall which enforced a drastic curtailment on the movement of people between the Soviet Sector and the three Allied sectors in West Berlin. Actual East German control over East Berlin was asserted even

more forcefully in August 1962 when an East German *Kommandatura* replaced the Soviet city command. In contravention of agreements that only military personnel of the Four Powers would be permitted in Berlin, substantial East German military forces now operate in the city. A few remnants of Four-Power status exist, however, notably the right of Western military patrols to visit East Berlin "without control" by East German authorities. These patrols, and all other foreign nationals, enter East Berlin only through Checkpoint Charlie, one of the several crossing points which exist between East and West Berlin (Figure 9). As a result of the agreement signed between the West Berlin *Senat* and the East German Government on 20 December 1971, the number of crossing points for West Berliners was increased to 15.

The government of East Berlin consists of a city council (*Magistrat*) of 18 members, headed by a Lord Mayor (*Oberbuergermeister*). Only two men have




FIGURE 9. Control points in East Berlin (U/OU)

held this post since 1948. Friedrich Ebert, a member of the SED Politburo and son of the first President of the Weimar Republic, served for 19 years, retiring in 1967 for reasons of health at the age of 73. He was replaced by Herbert Fechner, a candidate member of the SED Central Committee and a former Berlin borough mayor. The Lord Mayor and members of the *Magistrat* supervise a number of municipal offices (a planning commission, a press office, and departments of finance, church affairs, police, justice, statistics, and posts and telegraphs) which handle the affairs of the city but have no jurisdiction over ministries and agencies of the East German Government located in East Berlin. Former city institutions such as Humboldt University are also subordinated to central government control.

East Berlin's municipal assembly (*Volksvertretung*) of 180 members elects the municipal council and sends 66 members to the East German People's Chamber. The question of voting rights for these delegates has often been an issue in East-West relations (their West Berlin counterparts are not permitted to vote in the West German chambers) and the representatives were required to sit apart from the other delegates. By early 1972, however, the city's representatives appeared to have been quietly given full voting rights and were in no way singled out from the other delegates. The municipal assembly still reenacts legislation and decrees enacted by the central government, thereby underlining the separate character of the city. In the event that East Germany should take the long-deferred step of formally incorporating East Berlin

into the GDR, the city's representation presumably would be popularly elected, and the municipal assembly would cease its reenactment procedures.

East Berlin also has judicial and police organizations separate from those of East Germany, although in practice both function essentially as part of one overall system. The police presidium, operating as a district police headquarters, has eight local commands for East Berlin's eight boroughs (*Stadtbezirke*) as well as a separate fire department and water police. The court system, headed by a supreme court (*Kammergericht*) and city court (*Stadtgericht*), also includes eight borough courts (*Stadtbezirksgerichte*).

Each of the boroughs is organized along the same lines as the East Berlin city government and includes an assembly of 65 to 95 delegates and a council of 11 members. An exception to this pattern is Weststaaken, which for administrative purposes is part of Potsdam district. The irregular nature of the sector borders within the city, as well as West Berlin's boundaries with East Germany, have periodically led to difficulties for West Berliners living in isolated pockets surrounded by East German territory. In 1972 the West Berlin *Senat* and the East German Government moved to ease this problem by negotiating territorial exchanges. Additional agreements appear to be in the offing as both sides try to resolve some of the more difficult problems resulting from the division of the city.

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Chronology (u/ou)

1945

April

First group of German Communist emigres, headed by Walter Ulbricht, returns from Moscow to take charge of civil affairs under Soviet auspices.

May

German High Command signs unconditional surrender.

June

Allied Control Council composed of United Kingdom, France, United States, and U.S.S.R. takes over government of Germany.

July-August

Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.) Potsdam Conference confirms division of Germany into four zones of occupation, while Berlin is divided into sectors occupied by four Allied powers. Germany not to be partitioned but to be treated as single economic unit with certain central administrative departments following a common policy to be determined by Allied Control Council.

1946

April

Socialist Unity Party (SED) founded in Soviet Zone through forced merger of German Communist Party and Social Democratic Party.

October

Elections held for parliaments in five *Laender* created in Soviet Zone, and coalition governments (SED, CDU, LDPD) formed. Number of central administrative departments created, directly responsible to Soviet occupation authorities.

1947

January

U.S. and British zones fused into the Bisons to cope with economic problems worsened by Soviet lack of cooperation. (French zone joined in October 1948.)

December

SED convenes People's Congress in East Berlin; by apportionment of seats SED and front parties dominate.

1948

January

Power and composition of Economic Council of Bisons changed to create nucleus of a future German government.

March

Soviet representative walks out of Allied Control Council, thus ending last vestige of joint control.

April

Soviet authorities gradually extend restrictions on road and rail traffic to Berlin.

June

Soviet representative leaves Allied *Kommandatura*, executive body for Berlin. Total blockade imposed on 2.5 million inhabitants of West Berlin by Soviet and East German authorities, requiring airlift by U.S. and British to supply city.

Summer

U.S.S.R. begins to build up militarized police force in East Germany, in violation of Potsdam Agreement.

1949

May

Blockade of West Berlin ends. People's Congress adopts East German Constitution. Federal Republic comes into existence in West Germany with publication of its constitution.

September

East German regime joins Soviet-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

October

German Democratic Republic proclaimed and its government recognized by Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated governments; Soviet Military Administration dissolved and administrative functions transferred to East German regime; East German representation at quadripartite functions retained by Soviet Control Commission.

1950

July

East Germany and Poland sign treaty at Goerlitz recognizing Oder-Neisse line as their frontier.

October

General elections held in East Germany establishes primacy of SED. To enhance illusion of East German autonomy, Soviet Control Commission replaced by a Soviet High Commissioner with rank of ambassador.

1952

May

Police-guarded no man's land 3 miles wide created along entire western frontier excluding only Berlin.

July

East Germany administrative divisions reorganized; traditional *Laender* abolished; 14 districts (*Bezirke*), similar to Soviet *oblasts*, established. Collectivization of agriculture begins.

October

Judicial system revised in accordance with Soviet system.

1953**June**

Uprising in East Berlin over harsh labor policies spreads throughout East Germany; repressed by Soviet forces.

1954**January**

Reparations to Soviet Union cease; ownership of joint East German-Soviet companies, except for uranium complex in the Erzgebirge, returned to East Germans.

1955**January**

Soviet Union ends state of war with Germany.

May

East Germany joins Warsaw Pact as provisional member; receives full membership following year.

September

Soviet Union declares East German regime sovereign; East Germany given control over border security and communications between West Berlin and West Germany, with U.S.S.R. reserving jurisdiction only over movement of Allied personnel and freight.

December

West Germany formally implements policy of isolating East Germany diplomatically by proclaiming Hallstein Doctrine, i.e., West Germany will end diplomatic relations with any country except the U.S.S.R. establishing diplomatic ties with East Germany.

1956**January**

East Germany formally establishes armed forces.

1957**March**

U.S.S.R. and East Germany sign agreement on stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany.

October

Yugoslavia recognises East Germany; first nonbloc state to do so.

1958**February**

Purge begins of leading Communist functionaries who oppose pace of Ulbricht's economic policies; party and government reorganised.

November

East and West Germany formalise commercial relations by signing Intersessional Trade Agreement, which for years serves as principal official link between them.

1959**May-August**

Big Four foreign ministers meet at Geneva in futile attempt to work out formula for German unification; East and West represented as "advisers."

1960**April**

Government undertakes drive to complete agricultural collectivization.

September

Upon death of Wilhelm Pieck, office of president abolished; Council of State created as replacement with SED chief Ulbricht elected chairman.

1961**July-August**

East German refugees to West Berlin and West Germany reach highest number since 1953: 33,415 in July and 47,433 in August.

August

Escapes virtually stopped by erection of Berlin wall and by strengthening of defenses on East-West German demarcation line.

1962**January**

Universal military training law passed.

August

Would-be defector Peter Fechter shot and allowed to bleed to death at the Berlin wall in highly publicized instance of East German brutality.

1963**June**

Ulbricht proposes and later (February 1964) spells out New Economic System which places emphasis on such factors as profitability, realistic price-cost relationships, greater outlays for research, material incentives for workers, and increased managerial responsibility.

August

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by East Germany.

December

West Berlin and East German authorities conclude first Berlin Pass Agreement whereby West Berlin citizens visit relatives in East Berlin.

1964**June**

Soviet-East German Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed.

September

Premier Otto Grotewohl dies and is succeeded by Willi Stoph.

1965**April**

Soviet and East German military forces harass West German civilian and Allied military traffic to West Berlin in retaliation for West German *Bundestag* meeting in West Berlin.

September

Ulbricht leads high-level delegation to Moscow to receive support for GDR claims to international recognition of its sovereign status; marks beginning of more intensive Soviet-GDR bilateral relations.

October

Youth riots occur in Leipzig and other East German cities.

December

SED leaders criticize youth and cultural policies at 11th plenum of the SED Central Committee; subsequent return to hardline cultural policy produces many incidents between regime and intellectuals during 1966. Erich Apel, head of the State Planning Commission, commits suicide in spectacular act of protest against Soviet economic demands on East Germany.

1966**March**

In bid for international recognition, East Germany applies for U.N. membership through Polish offices.

1967**February**

Nationality Law enacted by People's Chamber establishes for first time concept of "citizens of GDR" as distinct from "German nationality." Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers discuss bilateral relations with West Germany; East Germans, Poles against; Czechs, Bulgarians, Hungarians favor.

March-September

GDR seeks to shore up opposition to Bonn; signs 20-year bilateral treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia (March), Hungary (May), and Bulgaria (September).

June

East Germany publicly sides with Arabs in Arab-Israeli war.

September

West German efforts to broaden and improve contact founders on East German precondition of recognition for GDR.

1968**April**

New constitution replacing outmoded 1949 document adopted in East Germany's first popular referendum.

March-June

East Germany bans travel to and from West Berlin by members of NPD, West Germany's ultrarightist party. In April, ban broadened to include senior officials of West German Government. In June, People's Chamber announces passport and visa requirements for all West Germans and West Berliners.

August

Occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, including East German troops, followed by crackdown at home on liberals sympathetic to Dubcek government.

1969**March**

West German presidential election held in West Berlin; arouses ire of East German and Soviet Governments but no incidents result.

April

Recognition of East Germany by Iraq, first non-Communist country to do so, opens door to recognition by number of other Afro-Asian states.

September

Advent of West German Government led by Social Democratic Party's Willy Brandt renews efforts to normalize relations with Soviet Union, GDR, and other Communist neighbors. Soviets reply positively to notes from Allied partners seeking cooperation in reducing Berlin tensions.

October

Delegations from 84 countries attend 20th anniversary celebrations in East Germany; divergences between East Germany and its allies over policy toward West Germany dominate speeches by most Eastern European leaders.

December

U.S.S.R. begins talks with West Germany on renunciation of threat or use of force in any conflict.

1970**March and May**

Prime Minister Stoph and West German Chancellor Brandt meet in Erfurt and Kassel but fail to agree on basis for improving relations.

March

First Four-Power talks in 11 years discuss Berlin problems.

August

Soviet Union and West Germany sign treaty renouncing use of force and accepting all postwar European boundaries. Four-Power rights in Berlin and Germany not affected. (West Germany signs same agreement with Poland in December.)

December

Ulbricht criticised for economic planning failures at 14th Central Committee plenum.

1971**May**

Erich Honecker replaces Ulbricht as SED First Secretary.

June

Honecker's opening speech at Eighth Party Congress ratifying his accession indicates he would settle for less than full diplomatic recognition by West Germany; wishes success to Four-Power negotiations on Berlin.

September

Four-Power Agreement on Berlin initialed (signed in June 1972). Berlin remains under quadripartite authority with reduced political ties to West Germany; Soviet Union guarantees unimpeded access to West Berlin through East Germany. East-West German negotiations begin on supplementary agreements.

October

Major ideological speech to social scientists explicitly rejects Ulbricht's favorite themes.

1972**April**

General Traffic Agreement reached with Bonn in April (signed in May); covers transport of goods, travel of West Germans to East Germany virtually unrestricted, only emergency travel allowed to East Germans.

Fifth Central Committee plenum adopts package of social legislation, granting additional benefits in pensions, rent and family assistance allotments.

June

Four-Power Agreement on Berlin is signed; discussions begin with Federal Republic on general treaty.

October

Government reorganization places greater power in hands of ministers at expense of advisory commissions, according to Honecker's dictates.

November

Agreement reached on general German treaty designed to end 25 years of cold war hostility; states pledge to refrain from use of force, respect common border, recognize sovereignty of each state in internal and external affairs; left open question of reunification.

East Germany becomes member of UNESCO and is granted observer status at U.N.

Regime hails reelection of Brandt coalition in West German parliamentary election, implicitly taking some credit for victory.

1973**January**

East and West Germany accorded equal representation at Helsinki preparatory talks for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

By end of January, 87 states had established diplomatic relations with East Germany, 34 since 7 December 1972.

SECRET

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
ABI.....	<i>Arbeiter und Bauern Inspektion</i>	Workers and Farmers Inspectorate
BEK.....	<i>Bund fuer Evangelische Kirchen</i>	League of Evangelical Churches
CDU.....	<i>Christlich-Demokratische Union</i>	Christian Democratic Union
DBD.....	<i>Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutsch-lands</i>	German Democratic Peasants Party
DDR.....	<i>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</i>	German Democratic Republic
DFD.....	<i>Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutsch-lands</i>	Democratic Women's League of Ger-many
DKB.....	<i>Deutscher Kulturbund</i>	German Cultural Association
DTSB.....	<i>Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund</i>	German Gymnastics and Sports Asso-ciation
FDGB.....	<i>Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund</i>	Free German Trade Union Federation
FDJ.....	<i>Freie Deutsche Jugend</i>	Free German Youth
GDSF.....	<i>Gesellschaft fuer Deutschesowjetische Freundschaft</i>	Society for German-Soviet Friendship
GST.....	<i>Gesellschaft fuer Sport und Technik</i>	Society for Sport and Technology
HVDVP.....	<i>Hauptverwaltung der Deutschen Volks-polizei</i>	Main Administration of German People's Police
KPD.....	<i>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands</i> ..	Communist Party of Germany
LDPD.....	<i>Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutsch-lands</i>	German Liberal Democratic Party
NDPD.....	<i>Notional-Demokratische Partei Deutsch-lands</i>	German National Democratic Party
RIAS.....	<i>Radio in the American Sector</i>
SED.....	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-lands</i>	Socialist Unity Party
SPD.....	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-lands</i>	Social Democratic Party
SSD.....	<i>Staatssicherheitsdienst</i>	State Security Service
VVB.....	<i>Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe</i>	Association of People-owned Enterprises
.....	<i>Bereitschaftspolizei</i>	Alert Police
.....	<i>Kriminalpolizei</i>	Criminal Police
.....	<i>Thaelmann-pioniere</i>	Thaelmann Pioneers
.....	<i>Kampfgruppen</i>	Workers Militia
.....	<i>Jungpioniere</i>	Young Pioneers

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.
Bautzen.....	51 11	14 26
Bonn, West Germany.....	50 44	7 06
East Berlin.....	52 30	13 33
Erfurt.....	50 59	11 02
Eragobirge (mts).....	50 30	13 10
Görlitz.....	51 10	15 00
Kassel, West Germany.....	51 19	9 30
Leipzig.....	51 18	12 20
Pankow (sec. of East Berlin).....	52 34	13 24
Potsdam.....	52 24	13 04
Saar, West Germany (region).....	49 15	7 00
Waldheim.....	52 35	13 03
West Berlin.....	52 30	13 20
Westtaaken.....	52 30	13 08

SECRET

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