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Saigon

7 Feb. 45

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XX BOMBER COMMAND



Tactical Mission Report

No. 34

DATE 7 FEBRUARY 1945

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES H. H. ARNOLD

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* By auth of *
* DEFCOM 20 A. F. *
* 1 Mar 45 *71* *
* Date Initials *
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 34

Mission No. 34

TARGET: NAVY YARD AND MILITARY HARBOR
Saigon, French Indo-China

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section
XX Bomber Command

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* DEPCOM 20 A.F. *
* 1 Mar 45 F.L.S. *
* Date Initials *
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C
APO 493

1 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 7 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING: Two Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 34 to participate in a daylight strike against military installations in the Saigon, Indo-China area. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Base</u> | <u>Commanding Officer</u> |
|--------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 444th | Dudhkundi | Colonel A. L. Harvey |
| 462nd | Piardoba | Colonel A. F. Kalberer |

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 34.

b. Targets Specified:

- (1) Primary Target: Navy Yard and Military Harbor, Saigon, Indo-China (AAF Target No. 85,2-88)
- (2) Secondary Target: Royal Ordnance Factory, Bangkok, Thailand
- (3) Last Resort Target: Martaban Marshalling Yards, Martaban, Burma.

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets Actually Attacked:

(1) Primary Target: The Navy Yard and Military harbor at Saigon is equipped with a 493-foot graving dock capable of handling medium-size vessels. Its facilities consist of machine, foundry, boiler, and carpenter shops, formerly employing approximately 3000 workmen.

(2) Last Resort Target: Ferries carrying goods and personnel ply between the jetties at Martaban and those at Moulmein, thus bridging the gap in the Burma - Thailand railroad caused by the Salween and Gyaing Rivers. There is a railroad terminal at both towns for the reception of rolling stock and there are also warehouses for storing supplies awaiting trans-shipment. The rail yards at Martaban are currently very active. Photo reconnaissance has shown an average of over 100 cars at any one time. Destruction of rolling stock and facilities at Martaban would complicate the Japanese problems of supply and of retreat from Burma.

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b. Details of Planning:

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) Mission Number 34 against Saigon was planned as a companion attack with Mission Number 35 against Rama VI Bridge at Bangkok. Both attacks were to be carried out the same day, each by 2 groups furnishing 32 planes per group.

(b) Because of the light defense in both areas, it was decided that bombing altitudes could be lowered to 18,000 and 20,000 feet.

(c) These missions, while of relatively small strategic value, provided targets for tactical missions that would be good experience for the newer crews of the Groups and at the same time afford a means of utilizing the available sorties to the best advantage possible.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load and Bombing Data:

(a) The field orders prescribed that aircraft of the 444th Group would load 500-pound M-76 Incendiary Bombs fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail and aircraft of the 468th Group 1000-pound general-purpose bombs fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail delay. The axis of attack was specified as 155 degrees magnetic. The 444th Group was to bomb at 20,000 feet and the 468th at 18,000 feet pressure altitude. Bombing was to be accomplished with 12-plane formations. Bombs were to be released electrically in minimum train on the range and deflection sighting of the lead bombardier of the formation. The aiming point was the center of the 493-foot graving dock.

(b) The bomb load on Missions Number 32 and 34 was largely determined by a prior plan in which three Groups were to be directed against the Saigon Naval Base and Arsenal and one Group against the Imperial Japanese Headquarters located in the Majestic Hotel. It was planned to attack the naval base with two Groups carrying 1000-pound general-purpose bombs fused .1 second nose and .025 tail, and the third Group carrying M-47 Incendiary Bombs fused instantaneous nose. The fourth Group attacking the Japanese Headquarters was to load 500-pound M-76 Incendiary Bombs, fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. Just prior to D-day, the Japanese Headquarters was scratched as a target for high-altitude attack, and the decision was made to dispatch two 2 Group attacks against the target instead of a 4-Group maximum-effort attack as originally planned. Inasmuch as planes of the 444th Group had already been loaded with M-76's, it was decided that the M-76 would be employed against the target instead of M-47's and the 468th would load 1000-pound general-purpose bombs. The limited availability of these bombs at the 468th base, occasioned by the fact that the Group loaded a greater number of bombs than had been anticipated, resulted in the employment of some 2000-pound bombs as a substitute for those specified in the field orders.

(c) Target analysis indicated that 1000-pound and 2000-pound bombs, fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail delay would be effective against the graving dock, the caisson at its entrance, a ship in the graving dock, or against numerous vital installations within the naval base and arsenal, such as the foundry and forge-installations, the boiler house, and the machine shops.

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(3) Other Provisions:

(a) The visual aiming point for the primary target was the center of the drydock.

(b) Time of arrival at the assembly point was set at 0206Z. Lead crews were to drop smoke grenades while circling the assembly point.

(c) Aircraft were to transmit convoy-sighting messages.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annex A):

a. Take-off:

(1) Take-off times were not specified. Instead, the arrival time over the assembly point was given as 070206Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished on D-day minus 1 as follows:

| <u>Group</u> | <u>A/C airborne</u> | <u>First A/C off</u> | <u>Last A/C off</u> |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 444th | 32 | 062030Z | 062133Z |
| 462nd | 35 | 062015Z | 062108Z |
| Total | 67 | 062015Z | 062133Z |

(3) Weather at take-off was clear with visibility 7 to 8 miles.

b. Route Out:

(1) The route out was from base to the assembly point (the northwest and southeast corners respectively of Grand Lake) to the initial point at Chhlong (12° 16' N - 105° 58' E) to the target at Saigon.

(2) Three aircraft deviated from the briefed route to the primary target, 2 bombing the last resort target and 1 returning with bombs.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 67 aircraft airborne, 33 bombed the primary target with a combined total of 175.39 tons of incendiary and demolition bombs. Three formations of 13, 14, and 17 planes each were over the target from 0334Z to 0405Z at altitudes ranging from 18,000 to 20,500 feet and on headings varying from 130 to 303 degrees. Eleven of these aircraft released their bombs prematurely, dropping on an accidental release within the formation.

(2) Weather conditions necessitated blind bombing as a result of overcast stratocumulus with some breaks, tops at 6000 feet.

d. Last Resort Target: This target was bombed visually by 2 aircraft which dropped 10.94 tons of incendiary and demolition bombs. The bombing was from 18,000 feet at 0013Z and 0051Z on headings of 58 degrees and 222 degrees respectively.

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e. Targets of Opportunity:

(1) The wharf and warehouse area at Phnom Penh was attacked visually by 19 out of 20 aircraft in two formations of the 462nd Group at 0347Z and 0354Z respectively. A total of 119.79 tons of demolition bombs was dropped from 18,000 feet on headings of 280 and 309 degrees.

(2) Since it was known that the primary target was a poor radar target, this group had been briefed on the importance of Phnom Penh. Both formations made two runs over Saigon and were unable either to bomb visually or to secure a satisfactory radar indication.

f. Route Back:

(1) Route back was from the primary target to Tavoy Point to base.

(2) On the return route, deviations were made by the 20 aircraft over Phnom Penh and by 3 aircraft which landed at alternate fields for refueling. One aircraft crashed at Dum Dum airfield on return (See paragraph 13 below).

(3) Weather on return was clear from Rangoon to the base area, where visibility was 5 to 15 miles.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft fire was reported on 4 runs over the primary target from 0300Z to 0400Z at altitudes varying from 18,000 feet to 20,500 feet through 9/10 to 10/10 undercast. Fire is believed to have been continuously pointed. Gun-laying radar was not used.

b. Meager and accurate to inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered at the Martaban - Moulmein area. Moderate and accurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was met at the Rangoon area by 1 aircraft, and by 2 aircraft near Sittang Bridge.

c. No anti-aircraft opposition was encountered at Phnom Penh.

d. No smokescreens, ground-to-air rockets, barrage balloons, or high altitude balloons were reported.

e. Based on RCM intercepts in conjunction with the fighter attacks between 0302Z and 0316Z, it is believed that the enemy had prior warning of the attack against Saigon.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

Enemy air opposition was very weak, no attacks at all having been made against 1 Group, while the other received only 9 attacks against 4 aircraft. The attacks were unusually timid, with only 1 enemy aircraft closing to less than 900 yards; only 2 of the encounters resulted in enemy gun-fire from which no damage was inflicted upon B-29's. One Tojo is claimed as damaged. The action occurred in the Saigon-Phnom Penh area before bombing. No coordinated attacks, aerial bombs, or rockets were reported.

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7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

- a. The weather was suitable for formation flying.
- b. The resultant easterly surface flow from a high pressure area to the west of the target caused overcast stratocumulus which had not burned off by target time. Bombing with the aid of radar was necessitated.
- c. Metro winds were generally rated as good.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex F):

- a. Bombs away messages and 400-mile position reports accounted for 100 per cent of the aircraft participating in this mission.
- b. No violations of cryptographic or transmission security were logged, and all aircraft complied with all provisions of the Command's Tactical Doctrine.
- c. Interference on frequency 8395 kilocycles was reported originating from 6 allied stations, 3 Japanese stations, and 2 unidentified voice stations. No positively established attempts at jamming or deception tactics on the part of the enemy were noted.
- d. Four radio homing beacons were used by 45 aircraft with extreme initial contact at 450 miles. Two requests for D/F aid were made with no unusual occurrences noted. Air-to-air homing signals were transmitted by 5 aircraft, upon which 27 aircraft homed for distances ranging from 15 to 80 miles.
- e. Twenty malfunctions of equipment were reported, of which 5 were repaired in flight.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

- a. Undercast conditions in the target area necessitated the use of the radar-bombsight procedure by all five formations. The target area showed up poorly as a radar target, and only two formations were able to drop on the briefed run. One formation dropped bombs on the second run. Two other formations made two runs over the target, were unable to drop either time, and therefore dropped on a target of opportunity visually. Radar was of primary importance in navigation because of the undercast weather en route.
- b. Scope photography of the route to target was good. Severe interference encountered by the lead radar operator on the bomb run made it necessary for the remaining sets in the formation to cease operation; therefore few pictures were obtained of the bomb run.
- c. Serviceability of the radar sets was above average for the mission. Ninety-four per cent of the sets were operative over the target.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

- a. Six RCM equipped aircraft participated, searching for early warning radar en route to and from the target and for radar fire-control equipment in the target area.
- b. It is thought that early warning to the enemy could have been provided by radar sites at Rangoon, Moulmein, or Cap St. Jacques, all of which were intercepted.
- c. No radar intercepts indicating gun-laying radar were received.

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11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

- a. The mission as regards gunnery is considered satisfactory.
- b. Malfunctions of machine guns and of turrets were respectively .001 and .006 per cent of the machine guns and turrets used on the mission.
- c. Rounds of ammunition used numbered 8455, of which 6370 were expended in test firing and 2085 in combat.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I): On this mission 6K-17, 11 K-18, 13 K-20, and 13 K-22 cameras were installed in aircraft airborne, a total of 43 cameras of all types. Of these, 8 were in aircraft failing to bomb any target. Of the remaining 35 cameras, 18 were used to photograph targets, with 43 usable negatives resulting.

13. LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M):

a. Known Battle Losses and Battle Damage: There were no battle losses or major battle damage from the mission. Minor damage from heavy antiaircraft was sustained by 5 aircraft. No aircraft were damaged by enemy aircraft.

b. Known Operational Losses and Damage: One aircraft crashed upon an attempted landing for fuel at an alternate field, all four engines reported to have cut out.

c. Missing Aircraft: None.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M):

a. Of the 67 aircraft airborne, 33 succeeded in bombing the primary target. Of the 34 which did not, only 4 failed to do so for mechanical reasons, of which 2 were power plant failures, 1 was a bomb bay door malfunction, and 1 was a propellor governor failure.

b. There were 68 malfunctions in flight, exclusive of malfunctions which prevented bombing of the primary target, as follows: power plant and accessory section - 7; oil system - 7; fuel system - 2; electrical system - 12; propellers and governors - 8; instruments - 24; miscellaneous - 8.


c. Overall averages of fuel consumption for the 3297 (air) mile flight were as follows: average - 6300 gallons; maximum - 6800 gallons; minimum - 5750 gallons. Statistics by groups were: 444th average - 6500 (maximum - 6800, minimum - 6150); 462nd average - 6060 (maximum - 6350, minimum - 5750).

15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L):

a. Saigon: No damage was sustained by the Naval Yard and Arsenal. Bombs from the first formation over the target fell 3000 feet southwest of the target, an excellent example of radar bombing against a poor radar target. Results, however, were unfortunate in that all bombs fell in a business/residential district where heavy damage was caused. The points of impact from the second and third formations have not been found.

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b. Phnom Penh: Both formations over this target reported a visual release though the visual run was only a few seconds in duration. The first formation dropped along the river front, destroying several hundred feet of jetties and damaging and destroying several business/residential buildings in the city proper. The point of impact of the bombs of the second formation has not been found.


R.M. RAMEY
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Commander

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By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path *
- IV - Bombing Data **
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report *

* Prepared by Staff Navigator

** Prepared by Staff Bombardier

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S E C R E T

I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

| Group | First A/C Off | Last A/C Off | Elapsed Time | No. of A/C Taking Off | Average Take-off Interval |
|----------|---------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 444th | 062030Z | 062133Z | 63 min. | 32 | 121 sec. |
| 462nd | 062015Z | 062100Z | 53 min. | 35 | 91 sec. |
| Over-all | 062015Z | 062133Z | 73 min. | 67 | --- |

Note: Take-offs were on D-day minus 1, Z time.

II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

A. Planned Routes

| | | |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Base | 444th Dudhkundi | 462nd Piardoba |
| Assembly Point | N.W. corner Grand Lake 13°15'N - 103°42'E | S.E. corner Grand Lake 12°37'N - 104°25'E |
| Initial Point | Ohlong - 12°16'N - 105°58'E | |
| Target | Navy Yard and Arsenal, Saigon | |
| Return Check Point | Tevey Point - 13°32'N - 98°08'E | |
| Base | Dudhkundi | Piardoba |

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. Aircraft Bombing Assigned Targets:

- a. Bombed secondary target - none.
- b. Bombed last resort target - 2 aircraft.

2. Aircraft Bombing Targets of Opportunity:

- a. Two formations totaling 20 planes of the 462nd Group, after being unable to make visual runs over the primary target or to successfully pick it up by radar proceeded to Phnom Penh upon which they had been briefed as a possible target of opportunity. Nineteen of these aircraft bombed Phnom Penh.

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3. Aircraft Jettisoning Bombs:

a. Eleven out of a formation of 17 aircraft of the 444th Group dropped their bombs 5 minutes prematurely during the bomb run over the primary target. See Section VII, Formations Flown, this annex.

b. A/C 456 (462nd), in a formation over Phnom Penh (see paragraph 2 a, above), did not release over the target because of a bomb bay door malfunction. Bombs were jettisoned.

4. Aircraft Returning Bombs:

a. A/C 393 (462nd) returned to base with bombs at 0219Z because of a blown exhaust stack on #2 engine.

5. Aircraft Landing at other than Home Base:

a. A/C 273 (444th) - Cox's Bazaar - refueling.

b. A/C 472 (444th) - Cox's Bazaar - refueling.


c. A/C 375 (444th) - Chittagong - refueling.


6. Other Deviations:

a. A/C 461 (462nd) crashed on landing at Dum Dum Airfield. See Annex J, aircraft Losses and Damage.

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CHANGING POSITION IN
THE BATTLEFIELD
IS A VITAL FLIGHT PATH
MISSION

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PRODUCED BY
10TH PHOTO TECH UNIT

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By *CD NAPA* Date *11/1/88*



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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

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Auth: CG XX BC
Initials: CAM
Date 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

Date Prepared: 11 February 1945

Field Order Number 34
Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45

1. Weather over the Primary Target was nine-tenth to ten-tenth under-cast and the three formations which bombed used radar-bombsight coordination procedure.

2. Two formations of the 462nd Group made two dry runs over the Primary Target but failed to bomb due to ineffectiveness of Radar to pick-up target area and consequently bombed a target of opportunity. Although eight-tenth to nine-tenths cloud cover existed, bombing was accomplished visually.

3. One formation of the 444th Group made one dry run over the target and failed to bomb because Radar Operator of Lead Aircraft could not pick up target. Lead was changed and bombs were dropped on second run.

4. One formation of the 444th Group changed Lead Airplanes between the I.P. and the target. Airplane which relinquished lead to deputy lead ship had an accidental release of three bombs some five minutes away from target. All aircraft in the seventeen ship formation did not get the order that lead ship was changed and eleven aircraft released all bombs on the aircraft which was originally the lead aircraft and had the accidental release.

5. Malfunctions reported:

444th Group

#411 - Three bombs released prematurely when the select-salvo handle was placed in the select position. No malfunction is indicated and a personnel error is charged against Bombardier.

462nd Group

#560 - One rear bomb door failed to latch when closed. Emergency wheel was used to latch door.
Cause: Unknown, equipment ground checked OK.

#456 - Rear bomb doors would not open fully and then would only close half way. Bombs were jettisoned with emergency release and doors retracted with emergency wheel.
Cause: Ground check proved that the door handle, if extended too far, cuts out the door motor.

#232 - Bomb doors would not open normally and pilot's emergency door release was used to open doors. When rack switches were turned on the bombs released. This malfunction is unexplained as racks ground check OK. Ground check proved that rear doors open at half the speed of the front doors and it is possible the Bombardier did not actuate the door switch long enough. No other malfunction could be ascertained on the door actuating mechanism.

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- #904 - Rear doors were opened normally but they immediately retracted. Doors were re-opened with pilot's switch. Cause: Unknown. Equipment ground checked OK.
- #386 - Bombsight failure. Cause: broken electrical lead.
- #230 - Intervalometer failed and Bombardier salvaged immediately. Ground check showed intervalometer inoperative.

V - BOMB LOADING *

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| Bomb load per A/C | 11th Sh | | 462nd | | | Total | | | | Avge Load in pounds per A/C | Avge Load in Short tons | Total Wt. in Short tons |
|-------------------|---------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | A/C | M-76 | A/C | M-141 | M-34 | A/C | M-76 | M-141 | M-34 | | | |
| 6 x M-34 | - | - | 15 | - | 90 | 15 | - | - | 90 | 12891 | 6.44 | 96.68 |
| 12 x M-141 | - | - | 19 | 228 | - | 19 | - | 228 | - | 12221 | 6.11 | 116.10 |
| 21 x M-76 | 11 | 231 | - | - | - | 11 | 231 | - | - | 10113 | 5.07 | 55.79 |
| 20 x M-76 | 20 | 400 | - | - | - | 20 | 400 | - | - | 9660 | 4.83 | 96.60 |
| 18 x M-76 | 1 | 18 | - | - | - | 1 | 18 | - | - | 8694 | 4.35 | 4.35 |
| 8 x M-141 | - | - | 1 | 8 | - | 1 | - | 8 | - | 8117 | 4.07 | 4.07 |
| Total | 32 | 649 | 35 | 236 | 90 | 67 | 649 | 236 | 90 | 11152 | 5.58 | 373.59 |

* Based on actual weight of bombs: M-76 Incendiary - 483.0 pounds; M-141 General Purpose - 1018.4 pounds; M-34 General Purpose - 2118.5 pounds.

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VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS *

Mission No. 34
 7 February 1945

| | 141st | | 1462nd | | | Total | | | Weight in pounds | Weight in short tons | |
|---|-------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------------------|----------------------|--------|
| | A/C | M-76 | A/C | M-141 | M-34 | A/C | M-76 | M-141 | | | M-34 |
| A/C bombing all targets and bombs dropped | 21 | 423 | 33 | 236 | 88 | 54 | 423 | 236 | 78 | 612234 | 306.12 |
| A/C over PT and bomb load carried | 31 | 629 | 33 | 224 | 84 | 62 | 629 | 224 | 84 | 712102 | 356.20 |
| A/C bombing PT and bombs dropped | 20 | 403 | 13 | 128 | 12 | 33 | 403 | 128 | 12 | 350786 | 175.39 |
| A/C bombing LRT and bombs dropped | 1 | 20 | 1 | 12 | - | 2 | 20 | 12 | - | 21381 | 10.94 |
| A/C bombing T/O and bombs dropped | - | - | 19 | 96 | 66 | 19 | - | 96 | 66 | 239567 | 119.79 |
| A/C jettisoning bombs | 11 | 226** | 1 | - | 6 | 12 | 226 | - | 6 | 122049 | 61.02 |
| A/C returning bombs | - | - | 1 | - | 6 | 1 | - | - | 6 | 12891 | 6.45 |
| Total A/C and bombs airborne | 32 | 649 | 35 | 236 | 90 | 67 | 649 | 236 | 90 | 747174 | 373.59 |

* Based on actual weight of bombs: M-76 Incendiary - 483.0 pounds; M-141 General Purpose - 1018.4 pounds; M-34 General Purpose - 2148.5 pounds.

** Eleven aircraft of a 17-plane formation over the primary target released their bombs early on bombs accidentally released by A/C 411. See Section VII, Formations Flown, this annex.

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

A. Formations Required

Bombing was to be accomplished by 12-plane formations in accordance with the formation composition set forth in the Command's Tactical Doctrine.

B. Formations Flown

The diagrams below are intended to indicate relative position only. "X" represents an aircraft of the 444th Group; "Y" represents an aircraft of the 462nd Group. All individual statistics are those of the formation leader.

1. Aircraft over FT - Saigon

First

Y 448
Y 299 Y 480
Y 711 Y 590 Y 521
Y 728 Y 800 Y 476 Y 873
Y 461 Y 463 Y 475

| | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------|
| No. A/C in formation | - 13 | Axis of attack | - 130°M |
| No. A/C releasing | - 13 | IAS | - 195 |
| Time of release | - 0334Z | Bomb load | - 128 x 1000# GP. 12 x 2000# GP. |
| Method | - Blind | Bombs dropped | - 128 x 1000# GP. 12 x 2000# GP. |
| Altitude (leader) | - 18,000' | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - 18,000 to 18,500' | | |

Second

X 538
X 559 X 580
X 524 X 378 X 507
X 202 X 277 X 537 X 884 X 268 X 584
X 873 X 485

| | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| No. A/C in formation | - 14 | Method | - Blind |
| No. A/C releasing | - 14 | Axis of attack | - 303°M |
| Time of release | - 0355Z | IAS | - 186 |
| Altitude (leader) | - 20,000' | Bomb load | - 284 x M-76 |
| Range of altitudes | 19,600 to 20,500' | Bombs dropped | - 284 x M-76 |

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Third

X 732
X 411 X 533
X 897* X 731* X 228
X 496* X 422 X 275* X 451* X 270*
X 861* X 446* X 899
X 472*
X 492* X 375*

No. A/C in formation - 17 Method - Blind
No. A/C releasing - 6 Axis of attack - 154°M
Time of release - 0405Z IAS - 189
Altitude (leader) - 20,000' Bomb load - 345 x M-76
Range of altitudes - 19,300 - 20,200' Bombs dropped - 119 x M-76

* These aircraft released their bombs 5 minutes early. This was occasioned by an accidental release of 3 bombs by A/C 411, which had been in lead position but had relinquished the lead during the bomb run to A/C 732 because of faulty radar. The formation was notified of the change of leaders, but not all aircraft received the message.

2. Aircraft over the Last Resort Target

First

Y 786
Time of release - 0013Z IAS - 195
Method - visual Bomb load - 12 x 1000# GP.
Altitude - 18,000' Bombs dropped - 12 x 1000# GP.
Axis of attack - 58°

Second

X 376
Time of release - 0051Z IAS - 190
Method - visual Bomb load - 20 x M-76 G
Altitude - 18,000' Bombs dropped - 20 x M-76
Axis of attack - 222°M

3. Aircraft over Target of Opportunity (Phnom Penh)

First

Y 560
Y 479 Y 531
Y 540 Y 230 Y 459
Y 450 Y 230 Y 838 Y 456*
No. A/C in formation - 10 Method - visual
No. A/C releasing - 9 Axis of attack - 280°M
Time of release - 0347Z IAS - 190
Altitude (leader) - 18,000' Bomb load - 96 x 1000# GP.
Range of altitudes - 18,000 to 18,500' Bombs dropped - 12 x 2000# GP.
6 x 2000# GP.

* A/C 456 jettisoned its bombs.

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Second

Y 503
Y 472 Y 454
Y 473 Y 232 Y 904
Y 502 Y 484 Y 386
Y 801

| | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|
| No. A/C in formation | - 10 | Method | - visual |
| No. A/C releasing | - 10 | Axis of attack | - 309° |
| Time of release | - 0354Z | IAS | - 198 |
| Altitude (leader) | - 18,000' | Bomb load | - 60 x 2000# GP. |
| Range of altitudes | - 18,000 to 19,150' | Bombs dropped | - 60 x 2000# GP. |

Note: The formations which bombed Phnom Penh had each made 2 runs over the primary target and were unable to bomb visually or to get a satisfactory radar indication. The crews had been briefed on Phnom Penh as a target of opportunity, and the formation leaders elected to bomb this target.

A-VII-3

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

SECRET
Auth: CG XX BC
Initials CM
Date: 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF
XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 12 February 1945

Field Order No. 34
Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45

1. This Mission was accomplished by the 444th and 462nd Groups without any notable navigation difficulties. Navigation Missions in this general area (of which this Mission is typical) are much easier to perform than were those out of China to Manchuria, Japan, and Formosa. The main reason for this is generally better weather conditions. Navigators who have not flown in China or over the Hump should be cautioned that Missions of this sort provide excellent opportunity for practicing the various techniques which are vital in successfully performing the type of Missions referred to above. All Navigators should continually develop confidence in their ability to navigate when there is no aid from terrain.

a. Average navigation times out and back and Group assembly times follow:

| | <u>NAV TIME OUT</u> | <u>NAV TIME BACK</u> | <u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u> |
|-------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 444th | 6h 53m | 7h 19m | 17m |
| 462nd | 6h 35m | 7h 28m | 12 1/2 m |

b. The following navigational aid work was reported:

| | <u>CEL LOG'S</u> | <u>CEL FIXES</u> | <u>RADIO FIXES</u> | <u>ODM'S</u> |
|-------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| 444th | 73 | 31 | 5 | 0 |
| 462nd | 56 | 12 | 22 | 0 |

c. Winds forecast was reported to be good. Computed winds follow:

| | <u>ONE HALF</u> | <u>TARGET AREA</u> | <u>ONE HALF BACK</u> |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 444th | 8000' 281° 16K | 20,000' 178° 16K | 15,000' 295° 18K |
| 462nd | 10,000' 270° 18K | 18,000' 185° 15K | 15,000' 280° 20K |

d. Very splendid navigation aid was received from the radar operators.

2. Comments by Groups:

a. 444th Group:

(1) Mountain in area of 16°00'N, 99°00'E have tops at ca. 8000'.

b. 462nd Group:

(1) Air strip noted at 12°56'N, 99°58'E.

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- (2) A railroad which is not charted was noted between Iursat 12°34'N, 103°50'E and Battambang 13°07'N, 103°12'N.
- (3) Noted again that the present antenna used for the radio compass is not satisfactory. This matter is being taken up with the communications people.

SECRET

- 2 -

S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

*Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Flak Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/05*

S E C R E T

* * * * *
* SECRET
* By Authority of CG
* XX Bomber Command
* 14/2/45
* Date Initials
* * * * *

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
APO 493

14 February 1945

P R E L I M I N A R Y R E P O R T

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 34, (DAYLIGHT), 7 FEBRUARY 1945

Primary Target - NAVAL YARD, SAIGON, F.I.C., Secondary Target -
ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, BANGKOK, and Target of Last Resort -
MARSHALLING YARD, MARTABAN, BURMA

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. SAIGON (10°46'N-106°45'E)

Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was reported for 4 of a total of 74 aircraft-runs over this area from 18,000 to 20,500 feet altitude from 0300Z to 0400Z through 9/10 to 10/10 undercast conditions. A total of 5 bursts were observed. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to fire encountered.

Table I; Heavy AA Fire Encountered.

| Formation | Total Aircraft | A/C Reporting | Time | Time Encountered | HAA Fire Encountered | Altitude in Feet | Undercast | No. of bursts | Heading |
|-----------|----------------|---------------|-------|------------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------|---------------|---------|
| 1* | 10 | 0 | 0300Z | ----- | -----None----- | 19,000 | 10/10 | 0 | 155° |
| 1* | 10 | 0 | 0320Z | ----- | -----None----- | 19,000 | 10/10 | 0 | 335° |
| 2* | 10 | 0 | 0318Z | ----- | -----None----- | 19,000 | 10/10 | 0 | 155° |
| 3 | 13 | 3 | 0334Z | 0333-37Z | Meager & inaccurate | 18-18500 | 10/10 | 4 | 130° |
| 4 | 14 | 1 | 0355Z | 0355Z | Meager & Inaccurate | 19600 to 20,500 | 9/10 | 1 | 303° |
| 5 | 17 | 0 | 0400Z | ----- | -----None----- | 19300 to 20,200 | 10/10 | 0 | 154° |

* Formations #1 and #2 made runs over SAIGON as indicated but did not bomb due to undercast conditions. Bombing was accomplished over PHNOM PENH.

Deviations of bursts varied from level to below, were generally behind, and to the left or right or in line with the aircraft. Fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed, with no enemy aircraft observed on the same course or altitude.

Meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire was also observed at 0355Z and consisted of 5 bursts very low and to the left of the aircraft.

Although heavy AA fire was conducted through a 9/10 to 10/10 undercast, gun-laying radar was not used. R.C.M. Observers monitoring the appropriate frequencies obtained no intercepts characteristic of gun-laying radar, nor was the fire of sufficient intensity or accuracy to indicate radar fire control methods. Although formations were in range of the known gun defense (8 HAA from cover to 8 Feb 45), the capabilities of this defense were not utilized to the fullest extent as evidenced by the reporting of a total of only 5 bursts.

B-I-1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

2. PHNOM PENH (11°35'N-104°55'E)

Although two formations of 10 aircraft each bombed this area at 0347Z and 0354Z from 18,000 to 19,150 feet altitude on headings of 230°M and 309°M through a 8/10 to 9/10 undercast, no antiaircraft opposition was encountered.

3. MARTABAN-MOULMEIN AREA (16°33'N-107°36'E)

Four aircraft of a known total of 7 passing within range of heavy AA defenses in this area encountered meager and accurate to inaccurate black and some white heavy antiaircraft fire. Table II shows known aircraft over the area in relation to heavy AA fire encountered.

One aircraft also encountered moderate and accurate (the aircraft was struck) automatic weapons fire at 0049Z while enroute to SAIGON at 8,000 feet under CAVU conditions. From 10 to 15 bursts were observed at one instant resulting in a total count of from 30 to 40 for the encounter. Deviations were level or below, abreast, and either in line or to the right.

Table II; Heavy AA Fire Encountered.

| Formation | No. of Aircraft | Bomb Release Time | Time Encountered | Heavy AA Fire Encountered | Altitude in Feet | Undercast | No. of bursts | Heading |
|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------|------------------|-----------|---------------|---------|
| 1* | 1 | ----- | 2331Z | Moderate-Accurate | 8,000 | CAVU | 30 | ----- |
| 2* | 1 | ----- | 2332Z | Moderate - Accurate | 8,000 | CAVU | 20 | ----- |
| 3* | 1 | ----- | 0012Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 8,000 | 3/10 | 4 | ----- |
| 4 | 1 | 0013Z | ----- | -----None----- | 18,000 | CAVU | -- | 58°M |
| 5* | 1 | ----- | 0032Z | Moderate - Accurate | 8,000 | CAVU | 35 | ----- |
| 6* | 1 | ----- | 0049Z | None (AW only)----- | 8,000 | CAVU | -- | ----- |
| 7 | 1 | 0051Z | ----- | -----None----- | 18,000 | CAVU | -- | 222°M |

* These aircraft encountered fire from this area while enroute to SAIGON as a result of straying to the south of the briefed flight path.

The number of heavy AA bursts observed at any one instant varied from 4 to 7 with the total for the encounters varying from 4 to 35. Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used, and no enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude.

The following table (III) lists reports of intensity, accuracy and deviations for the heavy antiaircraft fire encountered. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below.

Table III; Intensity, Accuracy, and Deviations

| Reports of Accuracy | | Reports of Intensity | |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Struck | 1 (25 percent) | Intense. | 0 (0 percent) |
| Rocked | 0 (0 percent) | Moderate | 3 (75 percent) |
| Within 150' | 2 (50 percent) | Meager | 1 (25 percent) |
| Outside 150' | 1 (25 percent) | | |

| Reports of Deviations | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Above | 4 (40 percent) | Ahead. | 4 (50 percent) | Left. | 2 (33 percent) |
| Level | 3 (30 percent) | Abreast | 1 (12 percent) | In Line | 3 (50 percent) |
| Below | 3 (30 percent) | Behind | 3 (38 percent) | Right | 1 (17 percent) |

S E C R E T

4. RANGOON (16°47'N-96°10'E)

Three aircraft, while enroute to SAIGON and off the briefed flight line, encountered or observed attempts at opposition from the RANGOON Area from 6,000 feet altitude with 3/10 undercast conditions.

Table IV: Opposition, RANGOON Area.

| Formation | No. of A/C | Time Encountered | Fire Encountered |
|-----------|------------|------------------|---|
| 1 | 1 | 2342Z | HAA - Moderate and Accurate, total of 15-20 bursts 1/4 at one time. |
| 2 | 2 | 0000Z | HAA and AW ground flashes observed with both aircraft beyond maximum range. Number of bursts and deviations not reported. |

Formation #1, at 2342Z, encountered black bursts within 150' with deviations of above, level, and below; ahead or behind; and to the left or right. Barrage type fire was reported and no enemy aircraft on the same course and altitude were seen.

5. Unidentified Naval Vessel at 16°50'N-96°50'E

Meager and inaccurate black antiaircraft fire (undetermined caliber) was encountered by one aircraft at 0002Z while enroute to SAIGON through a 10/10 undercast at 7,700 feet. Bursts were below and to the left with 5 occurring at one instant resulting in a total of 25 for the encounter.

6. SITTANG BRIDGE (17°25'N-96°53'E)

Two aircraft encountered moderate and accurate to inaccurate black automatic weapons fire at 2320Z and 0020Z at 6,500 feet altitude under CAWU conditions. One aircraft was struck. Bursts at one instant varied from 1 to 5 with a total of from 6 to 35 observed for the two encounters. Deviations were above, level, and below; and to the left or in line.

This opposition was also observed by 12 aircraft then in the vicinity, which reported two guns on each side of the river in a wooded area.

7. SATTABIB (12°40'N-100°51'E)

One aircraft observed (from a distance of 10 miles) 2 black bursts of heavy antiaircraft fire from 12,000 feet altitude that appeared to originate from this area. No other aircraft were observed in the vicinity at the time.

8. HNINPALE (17°10'N-97°15'E)

Two aircraft at approximately 2330Z (just at dawn) from 7,000 feet altitude observed a total of 35 to 40 black heavy antiaircraft bursts (occurring one at a time) and originating from this area. Gun flashes were observed from 5 guns on the east bank of the river near the bridge and fire was reported as directed against 5 other B-29's approximately 12 miles distant.

Believed to be the 12 aircraft referred to above, 12 planes observed fire originating from the bridge at TAUNGZUN (17°12'N-97°09'E) in this area. Caliber of fire was not determined but it was reported that fire came from "3 guns 40mm or heavier". As it is known that HNINPALE is defended by 4 heavy guns (WIS EAC Section V, #24, Cover to 1 Feb), the origin of this inaccurate fire is listed under HNINPALE rather than TAUNGZUN.

B-I-3

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S E C R E T

B. SMOKESCREENS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

None reported.

C. DAMAGE FROM ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Five aircraft were damaged by anti-aircraft fire while enroute to the target areas. The exact locations and conditions under which damage was inflicted to two aircraft could not be determined as shown below.

Table V: Damage from Anti-aircraft Fire.

| Aircraft Number | Group | Location | Under-cast | Caliber | Time | Altitude in feet | Extent |
|-----------------|-------|----------------|------------|---------|-------|------------------|--------|
| 897 | 444th | Sittang Bridge | CAVU | AW | 0020Z | 6,500 | Minor |
| 268 | 444th | Moulmein | CAVU | HAA | 0032Z | 8,000 | Minor |
| 446 | 444th | Moulmein | CAVU | AW | 0019Z | 8,000 | Minor |
| 448 | 462nd | ----- | ---- | ---- | ----- | ----- | Minor |
| 454 | 462nd | ----- | ---- | ---- | ----- | ----- | Minor |

D. WARNING NETS

It is believed that the enemy had prior warning of the attack directed against SAIGON because of early warning radar activity as determined by R.C.M. intercepts in conjunction with 3 enemy fighter attacks occurring between 0302Z and 0316Z made by approximately 5 fighter aircraft.

Frank L. Scott, Jr.
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

B-I-4

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Operational Intelligence Unit *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 34

TARGET: Saigon, French Indo-China.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 7 February 1945.

1. GENERAL

Enemy air opposition was practically non-existent. One Group experienced no attacks (although enemy aircraft were sighted). The other Group reported nine attacks against four B-29's in the area of the primary target. Enemy pilots opened fire in only two of the nine encounters, however, (both at ranges of about 1000 yards), and the others were listed as attacks only because the B-29's fired in each case. Fire from the bombers was effective defensively, because in only one instance did an enemy aircraft approach closer than 900 yards. The enemy inflicted no damage on the B-29's, and preliminary claims list but one enemy aircraft, a TOJO, as damaged.

The attacks occurred in the SAIGON to PHNOM-PENH area between 0255Z and 0352Z, and all at about 18,000 feet altitude. All of the action took place before bombing as the two formations attacked made two runs on the primary target and did not bomb as proper radar scope images were not picked up; the formations then proceeded to PHNOM-PENH where bombs were dropped at 0347Z and 0354Z.

Four attacks were made by OSCAR, three by TOJO and two by ZEKE. Probably no more than five enemy aircraft were involved in the action.

The number of attacks was so small that directions and levels of approach follow no particular pattern. No coordinated attacks, aerial bombs or rockets were observed. The enemy usually terminated the attacks with dives for fast breakaway.

The highlight of the aerial opposition encountered was the extreme reluctance of Jap pilots to press their attacks.

Details of combat are shown in Table No. 1, and enemy aircraft sightings in Table No. 2.

C-I-1

S E C R E T

Table No. 1 - Details of Attacks

| <u>A/C No.</u> | <u>Type E/A</u> | <u>Direction of Approach</u> | <u>Level of Approach</u> | <u>E/A Opened Fire (yds)</u> | <u>E/A Closed To (yards)</u> | <u>B-29 Opened Fire (yds)</u> | <u>E/A Claims</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| 456 | TOJO | 6 | level | 1000 | 900 | 1000 | no |
| 456 | TOJO | 3 | level | 1000 | 900 | 1500 | no |
| 456 | OSCAR | 2 | level | no | 1900 | 1500 | no |
| 456 | OSCAR | 2 | low | no | 1000 | 1500 | no |
| 456 | OSCAR | 5 | high | no | 1200 | 1500 | no |
| 479 | ZEKE | 6 | level | no | 900 | 900 | no |
| 484 | ZEKE | 11 | low | no | 300 | 300 | no |
| 801 | OSCAR | 11 | low | no | 1000 | 1100 | no |
| 801 | TCJC | 9 | low | no | 1000 | 1200 | damaged |

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S E C R E T

Table No. 2 - Enemy Aircraft Sightings

| <u>A/C No.</u> | <u>No. E/A</u> | <u>Type E/A</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Altitude</u> | <u>Distance</u> |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 378 | 3 | S/E | ---- | RANGOON | ----- | ----- |
| 202 | 3 | Unidentified | ---- | BANGKOK | ----- | 10 miles |
| 884 | 2 | Float Planes | ---- | SATTAPHIB | (moored) | ----- |
| 537 | 1 | S/E | ---- | ST. JACQUES | (low) | ----- |
| 227 | 1 | S/E | ---- | MARTABAN | ----- | ----- |
| 375 | 3 | TONY | ---- | GRANDE LAKE | ----- | 2000 |
| 375 | 3 | Unidentified | ---- | 11°32'N - 104°50'E | (on A/F) | ----- |
| 590 | 1 | RUFÉ | 0332Z | SAIGON | 18,000 | 3000 |
| 838 | 3 | OSCAR | 0325Z | SAIGON | 18,000 | 4000 |
| 838 | 1 | TOJO | 0325Z | SAIGON | 18,000 | 3000 |
| 484 | 2 | ZEKE | ---- | SAIGON | 19,000 | ----- |
| 479 | 6 | ZEKE | ---- | SAIGON | 14,000 | 1000 |
| 456 | 2 | OSCAR | ---- | SAIGON | 18,000 | ----- |
| 450 | 8 | S/E | ---- | SAIGON | 18,000 | 4000 |
| 502 | 1 | T/E | ---- | SAIGON | 18,000 | ----- |
| 502 | 2 | S/E | ---- | SAIGON | 18,000 | ----- |

C-I-3

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I- Weather Information
- II- Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III- Synoptic Map

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* * * * *
*   Prepared by:   *
*   Weather Section *
*   XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

| | As Forecast | As Encountered |
|------------------|---|--|
| Base at Take-off | Clear. Visibility 6 to 8 miles. Light NW surface winds. | <u>FIARDOBA</u> : Clear. Visibility 7 miles. Wind WNW 5 mph. <u>DUDHKUNDI</u> : Clear. Visibility 8 miles. Wind west 4 mph. |
| Route Out | Clear to 94°E. remaining route 4/10 cirrus, base 28,000'; 5/10 stratocumulus base 2000' and tops 6000' | <u>BASE TO BURMA COAST (94°E)</u> : Clear. Visibility 15 miles. <u>BURMA COAST TO A.P. (104°E)</u> : Scattered stratus in valleys with tops below 1000'. 3/10 altostratus and altocumulus at 10,000'. Visibility 15 miles. <u>A.P. TO TARGET</u> : Scattered low stratocumulus with tops at 5000' increased to 7/10 at I.P. and to overcast with breaks at target. There were also a few swelling cumulus with tops to 10,000'. 3/10 cirrus above 20,000'. |
| Target Area | <u>SAIGON</u> : 4/10 cirrus base 28,000'. 8/10 stratocumulus base 2000' and tops 6000' at 2330Z becoming 5/10 stratocumulus same height by 0430Z and 4/10 small cumulus base and tops same by 0730Z. 3/10 altostratus with bases 12,000' and tops 14,000'. Sea level pressure 29.86 inches. Mean bombing temperature: 9° C. <u>BANGKOK</u> : 3/10 cirrus 28,000'; 3/10 stratocumulus base 1500' and tops 2500' in forenoon becoming 3/10 small cumulus with tops to 5000' in afternoon. Sea level pressure: 29.88. Mean bombing temperature: 9° C. | <u>SAIGON</u> : Overcast stratocumulus with breaks tops at 6000'. 1/10 cirrus at 25,000'. Visibility 20 miles. <u>PHNOM PENH</u> : 6/10 stracumulus tops 6-700'. Visibility unlimited. |
| Route Back | Similar to route out except for scattered small cumulus tops 6000' over water areas southern part of trip. | The low stratocumulus remained broken till the point 13°N and 99°E was reached. The tops were 6000' with a few buildups to 15,000'. From there to Rangoon (16,30°N and 96°E.) the cloudiness gradually dissipated. From Rangoon to the base area it was clear. |
| Base on Return | Clear. Visibility 8 miles. Light NW surface wind. | <u>DUDHKUNDI</u> : Clear. Visibility 20 miles. Wind SW 5 mph. <u>FIARDOBA</u> : Clear. Visibility 15 miles. Wind SW 8 mph. |

D-I-1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

| Altitude | Base To 91.5 Deg | 91.5 To 96.5 Deg | 96.5 To 100 Deg | 100 Deg To Target |
|----------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1,000' | 290/12K | 30/10K | 70/08K | 20/08K |
| 5,000' | 290/18K | 260/15K | 180/10K | 90/10K |
| 10,000' | 290/30K | 270/20K | 260/15K | 180/12K |
| 15,000' | 280/32K | 260/22K | 250/18K | 190/14K |
| 20,000' | 280/35K | 260/25K | 240/20K | 200/15K |
| 25,000' | 270/40K | 260/30K | 250/25K | 220/20K |

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

| Altitude | 90 Deg | 95 Deg | 98 Deg | 100 Deg | 106 Deg | Target |
|----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 3,000' | 240/15 | | | | | |
| 8,000' | | | 280/15K | | | |
| 10,000' | | 280/15K | | 265/15K | | |
| 15,000' | | | 290/18K | | | |
| 16,000' | | 265/18K | 230/10K | | | |
| 18,000' | | | | | 195/15K | 195/15K |
| 21,000' | | | | | | 180/15K |

C. Temperatures Aloft

As Forecast

| Altitude | Base | 93 Deg | 97 Deg | Target |
|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Surface | 19 Deg C. | 21 Deg C | 26 Deg C. | 25 Deg C. |
| 5,000' | 11 | 16 | 19 | 23 |
| 10,000' | 7 | 8 | 10 | 10 |
| 15,000' | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 20,000' | -10 | -10 | -9 | -6 |
| 25,000' | -19 | -18 | -18 | -16 |

As Encountered


| Altitude | 90 Deg | 95 Deg | 98 Deg | 100 Deg | A.P. | Target |
|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|------------|
| 3,000' | 18 Deg C. | | | | | |
| 8,000' | | | 15 Deg C. | | | |
| 10,000' | | 10 Deg C. | | 11 Deg C. | | |
| 16,000' | | 3 Deg C. | | 3 Deg C | 0 Deg C. | |
| 18,000' | | | | | | -2 Deg C. |
| 21,000' | | | | | | -11 Deg C. |

D-I-2

S E C R E T


SECRET
 XX BOMBER COMMAND
 WEATHER AS FORECAST

MISSION NO. 34




WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE OUT

MISSION NO. 34




WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE BACK

MISSION NO. 34




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SECRET

10TH PHOTO TECH UNITS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 7600 63*
By *CD* NAPA Date *11/1/88*



S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Communications Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) of (E)
NIP 740120
By *CD/mt* NARS, Date OCT 21 1975

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

SECRET

: : : : : : : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG, XX BC :
: Initials: *RIT* :
: Date: 13 Feb 45 :
: : : : : : : : : :

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date prepared: 10 February 1945 Field Order No.: 34
Date of Mission: 7 February 1945.

PART I

1. Mission number thirty-four (34) was accomplished by the 444th and 462nd Groups only. Based upon the greatest number of such messages which could be received (i.e., one per aircraft), the following percentage figures indicate the number of aircraft accounted for by Bombs Away and 400 mile from base Position Report messages:

a. Bombs Away:

| | <u>444th Gp</u> | <u>462nd Gp</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| No of a/c from which msgs could be expected: | 32 | 33 | 65 |
| No of msgs received: | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| No of a/c accounted for by msgs: | 32 | 33 | 65 |
| Percentage of aircraft accounted for by msgs: | 100% | 100% | 100% |

b. 400 Mile from Base Position Report:

| | | | |
|--|------|------|------|
| No of a/c from which msgs could be expected: | 32 | 35 | 67 |
| No of msgs received: | 20 | 35 | 55 |
| No of a/c accounted for by msgs: | 32 | 35 | 67 |
| Percentage of aircraft accounted for by msgs: | 100% | 100% | 100% |

-1-

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c. Attack, convoy sighting and abort messages handled:

| | <u>444th Gp</u> | <u>462nd Gp</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Abort Messages: | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Attack Messages: | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Convoy Sighting Messages | 4 | 2 | 6 |

PART II

2. No distress traffic was logged during this mission.

PART III

3. No violations of cryptographic or transmission security were logged, and all aircraft complied with all provisions of the Tactical Doctrine.

PART IV

4. Aircraft were airborne from approximately 0030 GMT to 1130 GMT, and during that period static activity as logged by both ground-station and aircraft was negligible. The 444th Group reported a decided fading of the eight megacycle frequency assigned that Group (8495 kilocycles) between the hours of 0300 GMT to 0500 GMT. Aircraft transmissions especially were affected, and considerable difficulty was experienced in the reception of bombs away messages.

5. The 444th Group also reported interference by station XUR on the Group's assigned two megacycle frequency between 0300 GMT to 0500 GMT. Interference experienced by the 462nd Group on the newly assigned frequency of 8395 kcs was the worst experienced by any organization to date, operators logging a total of six (6) interfering stations of apparent Allied origin, three Japanese stations, as well as two unidentified voice stations. In addition, the primary air-to-air command frequency of the 468th Group, separated by only five kilocycles from 8395 kcs, interfered each time aircraft of the 468th Group engaged in talk between aircraft. Theatre Headquarters was informed of this situation and has assigned four frequencies for the 462nd Group to monitor. The clearest channel will be assigned to the 462nd Group to replace 8395 kcs.

6. There were no positively established attempts at jamming or deception tactics on the part of the enemy noted.

PART V

7. Statistical data on radio aids to navigation is as follows:

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a. Radio Beacons:

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Power</u> | <u>No of a/c Reporting</u> | <u>Average Initial Contact</u> | <u>Extreme Initial Contact</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Chittagong | 1200W | 4 | 100 | 125 |
| Dudhkundi | 25 W | 9 | 118 | 120 |
| Khargpur | 1200W | 6 | 259 | 500 |
| Piardooba | 2000W | 26 | 337 | 450 |

- b. Radio ranges were reported as not being used during this mission.
- c. Two requests for D/F aid were made. No unusual occurrences were noted.
- d. Air-to-air homing results were as follows:

(1) 444th Group:

A/C 4580 transmitted homing signals from 0208 GMT to 0230 GMT. Twelve aircraft homed on these signals from an average distance of 45 miles while achieving rendezvous.

A/C 411 transmitted homing signals from 0224 GMT to 0305 GMT. Five aircraft homed on these signals from an average distance of 25 miles while achieving rendezvous.

- (2) 468th Group reported three aircraft transmitting homing signals. A total of fourteen aircraft homed on these transmissions from distances varying from 15 to 80 miles to achieve rendezvous.

PART VI

8. Following malfunctions were reported:

a. 444th Group:

- (1) A/C 559 could not tune command transmitters while in flight as transmitters refused to load properly. Cause undetermined. Not repaired in flight.
- (2) A/C 3446 had fixed liaison antenna break in flight. Trailing wire antenna would not extend, but this condition was remedied when antenna could be worked upon after depressurization, and the trailing antenna was thereafter used successfully.

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- (3) A/C 5268 and 378 had compass sense antenna break in flight. Remedied by jumpering compass antenna binding post to command antenna and mast type sense antenna respectively.
- (4) A/C 273 and 524 had compass antenna break. Not remedied in flight.
- (5) A/C 732 had voltage regulator short out. Repaired in flight.
- (6) A/C 375 had dynamotor of SCR-522 set catch fire thru overheating. Not repairable in flight.
- (7) A/C 273 was bothered by electrical interference in the BC-348 liaison receiver which could not be located in flight.
- (8) A/C 451 has remote cable from Compass Control Box to Compass break; not repairable in flight.
- (9) A/C 202 had faulty compass indicator, needle rotating in one direction only; cause undetermined, not repairable in flight.
- (10) A/C 861 experienced feed-thru of SCR-522 transmissions at the radio operator's position, blocking liaison reception, while SCR SCR-522 was in use; cause undetermined.

b. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 4456 had faulty microphone switch in tail-gunner's position; not repairable in flight.
- (2) A/C 473 had radio compass antenna break-off, not remedied in flight.
- (3) A/C 5230 experienced trouble in command set in that receiver component BC-345D shorted out the audio output of other receiver components. Condition remedied when BC-345D was removed from mounting. Cause undetermined. Aircraft also had forward mast supporting compass sense antenna carry away, taking antenna with it. Remedied by jumpering compass antenna binding post to command set fixed antenna.
- (4) A/C 459 had forward mast supporting compass sense antenna carry away, taking antenna with it. Not remedied in flight. Aircraft then had liaison antenna carry away, which in turn entangled itself with trailing wire antenna. Trailing wire antenna was jettisoned while over water.

SECRET

- (5) A/C 299, 448 and 472 had the lead-in from the compass antenna break-off. Not remedied in flight.
- (6) A/C 476 and 801 had the compass antenna break in flight. Not remedied.

PART VII

9. 444th Group used the SCR-522 VHF set for command purposes during this mission. Twenty-seven (27) pilots reported satisfactory results, and five (5) reported unsatisfactory results, which included:

- a. When flying in tight formation, aircraft directly under the calling aircraft could not receive transmissions. This is a rather common occurrence with this type of equipment and can be remedied by either the calling or called aircraft shifting position slightly, so a more favorable angle of propagation is encountered.
- b. VHF transmissions interfering with other interphone positions. Local maintenance should satisfactorily clear up this trouble.

S E C R E T

ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - Radar Information*

Section A - Navigation and Bombing
Section B - Scope Photography
Section C - Serviceability

II - Radar Tables*

Table A - Bombing Data
Table B - Photographic Results
Table C - Serviceability
Table D - Malfunctions

III - Radar Photograph Analysis Charts**

* Prepared by Radar Section,
XX Bomber Command

** Prepared by Target Intelligence Unit,
XX Bomber Command

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

.....
:SECRET
:Auth: CG XX
:Initials QMA
:Date 12 Feb 45
:.....

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 12 February 45 Field Orders No. 34
Date of Mission 17 February 45

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. Mission was conducted by two groups divided into five formations. Radar-bombsight procedure was resorted to, because of a solid undercast. The primary target, city of Saigon, proved to be a difficult radar target as was borne out by scope photographs of the area.

2. Two formations dropped bombs on the briefed run. Post-strike photographs show that the bombs from one formation landed in the city proper, which was the radar aiming point. The other formation dropped their bombs short of the target.

3. One formation bombed the primary target on the second run. Due to an error, 11 planes jettisoned their bombs during the two runs. This is further explained in the bombardier's report.

4. After two unsuccessful attempts to bomb the primary target blind, two formations decided to bomb Phnom Penh, a target of opportunity. A radar approach was made on the city, but shortly before bombs away, the bombardier was able to take over and the releases were visual.

5. Radar was of considerable assistance in navigation, particularly in identifying important check points such as Tonle Lak and the I.P.

6. The average mapping range for 61 planes was 46 miles. Navigational ranges were approximately the same as on previous missions.

B - Scope Photography

1. Scope photography was good enroute to target, and many good pictures of check points were obtained. Due to bad interference, most sets were ordered to switch to "stand by" on the bomb run. Therefore, only nine sets of pictures traced the bomb run, or 47 per cent of the sets received. Nineteen sets of pictures of 25 cameras installed are useable.

C - Serviceability

1. Serviceability of sets has maintained the good performance noted since Mission 28. Credit must be given to improved and more effective maintenance, both ground and air. In 61 of the 65 A/C reporting bombing (94%), the APQ-13 was operative over the target.

2. Four complete failures occurred on the mission. Two were due to malfunctions in the synchronizer and two were caused by modulator failure. Two inverters were changed in flight. Three sets overheated, causing the range to become shortened. As noted above, severe interference was encountered on the bomb run.

3. There were no failures in the auxiliary equipment.

- 1 -
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II - Radar Tables

A - Bombing

Total A/C Bombing - - - - - 65 (a)
 Total A/C Bombing Saigon (P.T.), Blind - - - - 33
 Total A/C Bombing Martaban (L.R.T.), Visually - 2
 Total A/C Bombing Phnom Penh (T.), Visually - 19

(a) - 11 A/C from 444th Bomb Group jettisoned their bombs on accidental release by lead plane.

B - Photographic Results

| DATA | 444th Gp | | 462nd Gp | | Total | |
|---|----------|-----------|----------|-----|-------|-----|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| No. Cameras Installed | 9 | | 16 | | 25 | |
| K-35 Cameras | 3 | | 4 | | 7 | |
| K-24 | 6 | | 12 | | 18 | |
| No. Cameras in Abort, Early Return & Missing Aircraft * | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| No. Cameras Completing Mission * | 9 | 100 | 15 | 94 | 24 | 96 |
| No. Cameras in Camera & Radar Malfunction Aircraft # | 1 | (b) 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Sets Pictures Returned # | 8 | 89 | 11 | 73 | 19 | 76 |
| No. Negatives Returned | 322 | | 353 | | 675 | |
| Sets Pictures Useable ** | 8 | 100 | 11 | 100 | 19 | 100 |
| Sets Pictures Tracing Bomb Run** | 4-a | 50 | 5 | 42 | 9 | 47 |

* Percentage based on cameras installed.

Percentage based on cameras completing mission.

** Percentage based on sets of pictures returned.

a - Camera malfunctioned just before bomb run.

b - No report of pictures from 3 aircraft.

C - Serviceability

| DATA | 444th Gp | | 462nd Gp | | Total | |
|---------------------------------------|----------|-----|----------|-----|-------|-----|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| A/C Airborne | 32 | | 35 | | 67 | |
| A/C Reporting | 32 | | 34 | | 66 | |
| APQ-13 Operative Just After Take-Off* | 32 | 100 | 34 | 100 | 66 | 100 |
| A/C Bombing | 32 | | 33 | | 65 | |
| A/C Reporting Bombing # | 32 | 100 | 33 | 97 | 65 | 98 |
| APQ-13 Operative Over Target # | 30 | 94 | 31 | 94 | 61 | 94 |
| APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures | | | | | | |
| Completely Inoperative # | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| Partially Inoperative # | 7 | 21 | 4 | 12 | 11 | 17 |
| Total Failures # | 9 | 27 | 6 | 18 | 15 | 23 |
| APQ-13 Repaired in Flight | 3 | | 0 | | 3 | |
| SCR-695 Failures | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | |

* Percentage based on aircraft reporting.

Percentage based on aircraft reporting bombing.

S E C R E T

D - Malfunctions


| DATA | 444th Gp | 462nd Gp | Total |
|---|----------|----------|--------|
| <u>Malfunctions Between Take-Off and Tgt</u> | | | |
| Completely Inoperative: | | | |
| Synchronizer Failures | 11 | 00 | 1 |
| Transformer in Mod. Burned Out | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Partially Inoperative: | | | |
| Low Range | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| A.F.C. Out | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Set Overheated | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Spoking | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Azimuth Stabilization Out | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Total Complete Failures | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total Partial Failures | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| Total Malfunctions Between Take-Off and Target | 6 | 5 | 11 |
| <u>Malfunctions Between Tgt & Landing</u> | | | |
| Completely Inoperative: | | | |
| Short in Synchronizer, No Sweep Modulator Out | 1 0 | 0 1 | 1 1 |
| Partially Inoperative: | | | |
| Azimuth Stabilization Out | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Set Overheated, Blurred Returns | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total Complete Failures | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total Partial Failures | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Total Malfunctions Between Target and Landing | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| <u>Malfunctions Repaired in Flight</u> | | | |
| Bad Inverters Changed | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Corrected Poor Inverter Regulation | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| <u>Summary, APQ-13 Malfunctions</u> | | | |
| Completely Inoperative | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Partially Inoperative | 7 | 4 | 11 |
| Repaired in Flight | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Total Malfunctions | 12 | 6 | 18 |
| <u>Malfunctions of Auxilliary Equipment</u> | | | |
| SCR-695 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

A/C 230 7/2/45

ALL ALTITUDES 18,000' - ALL SWEEPS 20 MILES
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.


SECRET

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
SAIGON-FRENCH INDO-CHINA
MISSION NO. 34




72

HEADING 281° MAG.




71

HEADING 283° MAG.





69

HEADING 283° MAG.



68

HEADING 283° MAG.



462ND BOMBARDMENT GROUP

PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION


SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*


SECRET

R 82.2 SHEET H

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
SAIGON-FRENCH INDO-CHINA
MISSION NO. 34




52




HEADING 114° MAG.

56



HEADING 296° MAG.

57




HEADING 296° MAG.

68



MAG.

67



HEADING 283° MAG.

RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND

SECRET

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Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

A/G 899 7/FEB/45
 A/C 448 7/FEB/45
 ALTITUDE, 8,000' EXCEPT 8,9,10 WHICH ARE UNKNOWN


SECRET
 RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
 SAIGON-FRENCH INDO-CHINA
 MISSION NO. 34

AIRCRAFT 899




HEADING 155° MAG.

20 MILE SWEEP




HEADING 186° MAG.

25 MILE SWEEP



HEADING 290° MAG.

40 MILE SWEEP



PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION
 SECRET

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 Authority *760063*
 By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

SECRET
RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
SAIGON-FRENCH INDO-CHINA
MISSION NO. 34

R-85.2 SHEET 1



AIRCRAFT 448


8



HEADING 133° MAG.

20 MILE SWEEP


9



HEADING 154° MAG.

20 MILE SWEEP

10



HEADING 181° MAG.

20 MILE SWEEP

REPRODUCED BY 948 TH ENGR. AVN. TOPO. CO

RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION-XX BOMBER COMMAND
SECRET

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 Authority *760063*
 By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* RCM Section *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/08*

S E C R E T

SECRET
Auth: Dep Com 20 AF
Initials: mc
Date: 15 Feb. 1945

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C
APO 493

15 February 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 34, Saigon,
7 February 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

Six RCM search aircraft, each equipped with a Bottom Mount D/F Antenna, participated in this mission. The RCM Observers searched for Early Warning Radar enroute to and from the target and for Radar Fire Control Equipment while in the target area.

B. Results

It is possible that the enemy had prior warning of our attack due to the fighters encountered in the target area. The Rangoon, Moulmein or Cap St. Jacques Early Warning radar sites could have provided this warning.

1. Radar Sites D/F'ed.

A. Rangoon Radar: 80/496/38. Two good sets of cuts were obtained on this radar site with the intersection of cuts at approximately $96^{\circ}1'E$ $16^{\circ}37'N$ and $96^{\circ}03'E$ $16^{\circ}37'N$ respectively. This radar site comes on abruptly and has never been known to sweep. Enroute to the target, several operators flew near the Rangoon site, however no intercept was made. Two operators reported the first intercept of this station while in the Moulmein area.

B. Moulmein Radar: 99/770/36. Four good cuts locate this radar site South of Moulmein at approximately $97^{\circ}40'E$ $16^{\circ}17'N$. The 202 Mc. station previously reported to be located in the Moulmein Area was checked for but the only intercept was the harmonic of the 99 Mc. Radar site which came in strong at 200 Mc. It is interesting to note that the characteristics of the previously reported 202/725/41 radar site compare favorably as a harmonic with the 99/770/36 radar site.

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C. Cap St. Jacques - Saigon: 69.2/490/26.
Fair cuts locate this radar site on Cap St. Jacques at approximately 106°51'E 10°23'N. Signal strength was extremely strong in the target area.

D. Possible shipborne Mk 1 Model 3: 154/500/6.
Two cuts locate this radar site in the sea at approximately 108°40'E 10°30'N. Radar was reported as tracking while the aircraft were in the target area.

Exhibits showing the "Track and D/F Cuts" for radar sites D/F'ed lettered A, B and C will be included in the Monthly Enemy Radar Report.

2. Radar Intercepts.

E. The following Mk 1 Model 3 intercepts were reported as strong and tracking in the target area.

149.5/490/10
152.5/490/
154/490/
140/500/28

F. 194/955/7: Signal fairly strong. Tracking and then searching. Intercepted from 98°08'E 13°35'N to 97°00'E 14°30'N. The characteristics and rough D/F cuts suggest that this may be the Mergui Radar.

G. 92/490/5: Signal was very weak though apparently tracking -- only on momentarily. Intercepted at 103°25'E 11°47'N near Kas Kan.

H. 195/1170/9: A very weak intercept resembling the Great Coco Radar site - made at approximately 96°30'E 17°20'N.

I. The 69 Mc. Radar site located near Rangoon was not intercepted.

Letters on the enclosure, "RCM Search Aircraft Track and D/F Cuts", correspond to the letters listed under Para. 1, Radar Sites D/F'ed and Para. 2, Radar Intercepts.

C. Radar Fire Control Equipment

1. Meager and inaccurate flak was encountered from an unidentified naval vessel at 96°50'E 16°50'N. A check on Radar Fire Control Frequencies was made and no radar intercepts were encountered.

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

2. Mcager, accurate to inaccurate flak was encountered in the Moulmein Area. The 99 Mc. Mk 1 Model 1 Moulmein Radar site was logged strong and tracking. The characteristics indicate that this radar is not capable of furnishing accurate anti-aircraft data.

3. Intercepts made in the target area did not have the characteristics of radar fire control equipment.

D. Enemy Countermeasures

1. One aircraft out of fifteen reported bagpipe jamming at 2960 Kc. (Channel used 2995 Kc). Signal strength of the jamming was S-5 from 2145Z to 0030Z, at which time use of this frequency ceased.

2. One aircraft reported CW jamming on the 8 Mc. band, only when our ground station transmitted; signal strength S-5.

Comments: There is no conclusive evidence that jamming or interference encountered on this mission was intentional.

E. Equipment

1. AN/APA-11 Pulse Analyzers with adequate ventilation operated in a satisfactory manner.

2. TU-58 tuning unit jammed and did not permit further tuning, either automatic or manual.

3. TN-17 tuning unit jammed when the cam and linkage system on the rotor shaft of the oscillator butterfly got out of adjustment.

4. One horizontal dipole on the AN/APA-24 D/F antenna snapped off.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

Leo I. Herman

LEO I. HERMAN
Colonel, Air Corps
Actg. Adjutant General

1 Incl:
RCM Search Aircraft Track and D/F Chart.

-3-

S E C R E T

SECRET



21.36

SECRET

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Authority *AW 760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/08*

28

10th PHOTO TECH UNIT
REPRODUCED BY

SECRET

S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Staff Gunnery Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 10 February 1945

Field Order Number 34
Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45.

1. On the mission directed by Field Order #34, fighter opposition was very weak. Japanese pilots were not aggressive, being reluctant to press home their attacks.
2. The mission is considered as satisfactory in regards to gunnery.
3. The following statistical data is submitted:

| | <u>444th</u> | <u>462nd</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| Ammunition used test firing | 3305 | 3075 |
| Ammunition used in combat | 60 | 2025 |
| Malfunctions of CFC system | 0 | 2 |
| Total turrets on mission | 155 | 170 |
| Malfunction of cal. 50 MGS | 0 | 1 |
| Total MGS on mission | 372 | 408 |
| Total airplanes (included in report) | 31 | 34 |
| Total percent malfunctions CFC Nil Cal. 50 MGS Nil | | |

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

| | 444th | | | K-17 | 462nd | | | K-17 | Total | | |
|------------------------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 | | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 | | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 |
| No. cameras airborne | 7 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 4-a | 6 | 11 | 13 | 13 |
| No. in A/C failing to bomb any tgt | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| No. in A/C bombing targets | 5 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| No. photographing targets | 3 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 6 |
| Failure to photograph - mechanical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Failure to photograph - other | 2-b | 3-c | 4-d | 1-e | 0 | 7-c | 0 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 4 |
| No. usable negatives | 11 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 36 |

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- a. 1 - K-22, 40"; 3 - K-22, 24".
- b. Started camera early (1 A/C); weather (1 A/C),
- c. No reasons specified, presumably weather.
- d. Weather (2 A/C); cameras not used, reason not specified but presumably weather (2 A/C).
- e. Cameras aboard A/C 461, crashed on return.

Note: Only 1 camera equipment malfunction was reported - the failure of an intervalometer counter which did not prevent photography

S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

S E C R E T

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By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

I - AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

1. Known Battle Losses:

None.

2. Known Operational Losses:

A/C 461 (462nd): This aircraft crashed on landing at Dum Dum airfield, Calcutta, upon return from the primary target. Reports indicate that the aircraft was low on gasoline and the pilot decided to land and refuel. All four engines are reported to have cut out on the approach and the aircraft was not down until the last one-third of the runway was reached. The aircraft went off the end of the runway and was completely demolished. Three crew members were killed, 3 were injured, and 5 were able to get out of the airplane safely.

3. Missing Aircraft:

None.

B. Aircraft Damage

For details by aircraft of battle and operational damage, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data*

* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

1. A/C Airborne 67
2. Less A/C failing to bomb the primary target - mechanical 4
 - a. Bombed last resort target (2):
 - (1) A/C 376 (444th) - #2 turbo malfunction
 - (2) A/C 786 (462nd) - #1 propellor governor failure
 - b. Jettisoned bombs (1):
 - (1) A/C 456 (462nd) - bomb bay door malfunction.
 - c. Bombs brought back (1):
 - (1) A/C 393 (462nd) - blown exhaust stack, #2 engine
3. Less A/C failing to bomb the primary target - other reasons 30
 - a. Weather (19):
 - (1) Nineteen aircraft of the 462nd Group bombed a target of opportunity (Phnom Penh) because of inability to make a visual run or to secure a satisfactory radar indication. (A/C 560, 503, 230, 232, 386, 450, 454, 459, 472, 473, 479, 484, 502, 506, 531, 540, 801, 838, and 904.) See also Section VII of Annex A, Execution of the Mission, and Annex F, Radar Information.
 - b. Personnel error (11):
 - (1) Eleven aircraft of the 444th Group released all bombs prematurely when A/C 411 through personnel error released 3 bombs 5 minutes before the formation leader. Aircraft releasing early were A/C 496, 731, 273, 472, 375, 861, 270, 446, 451, 492, and 897. See also Section VII of Annex A, Execution of the Mission
4. A/C bombing primary target 33

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Auth: CG XX LG

Initials: 18/11

Date: 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date Prepared: 10 February 1945

Field Order #34

Date of Mission: 7 Feb 1945

1. A summary of the performance of the aircraft participating in this mission is contained in the attached table.

2. The wide variation in bomb loads is accountable to two main factors: The 444th Group bombed from the higher altitude which necessitated the installation of one bomb bay tank to provide a safe reserve. The 462nd Group bombed from the lower altitude and as a result the extra tank was not necessary. This Group also reduced the ammunition load on each aircraft which resulted in an increase in bomb load without increasing the starting gross weight.

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- 1 -

SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE
F.O. No. 34.

| Group | | Overall | 462 | | |
|------------------|------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|
| | | | 444th | Primary | Opportunity |
| Target | | Primary | Primary | Primary | Opportunity |
| *No. of A/C | | 42 42 | 29 | 13 | 19 |
| Total Time | | 14:22 | 14:27 | 14:11 | 14:16 |
| Time to target | | 6:53 | 7:00 | 6:37 | 7:18 |
| Fuel Carried | Ave | 7010 | 7130 | 6730 | 6700 |
| | Max | 7300 | 7300 | 7100 | 6700 |
| | Min | 6700 | 7050 | 6700 | 6700 |
| Fuel Burned | Ave | 6360 | 6500 | 6060 | 6185 |
| | Max | 6800 | 6800 | 6350 | 6480 |
| | Min | 5750 | 6150 | 5750 | 5825 |
| Burnable Reserve | Ave | 640 | 630 | 670 | 515 |
| | Max | 950 | 900 | 950 | 875 |
| | Min | 350 | 350 | 400 | 220 |
| ** Air Miles | | 3297 | 3312 | 3265 | 3541 |
| Ground Miles | | 3113 | 3110 | 3095 | 3192 |
| ** Gal/Air Mile | | 1.92 | 1.96 | 1.85 | 1.75 |
| *** Bombing Alt | | 19200 | 19800 | 18000 | 18000 |
| Starting Weight | Ave | 134780 | 135080 | 134100 | 134000 |
| | Max | 135645 | 135645 | 135082 | 134842 |
| | Min | 133117 | 134426 | 133117 | 133292 |
| Weight of Bombs | Ave | 10550 | 9850 | 12000 | 12625 |
| | Max | 12900 | 10185 | 12900 | 12900 |
| | Min | 8740 | 8740 | 12240 | 12240 |
| No. of Bombs | M-76 | 14.0 | 20.3 | 0 | 0 |
| | M-44 | 2.7 | 0 | 8.9 | 5.0 |
| | M-34 | 0.4 | 0 | 1.4 | 3.5 |

- * Aircraft that bombed the target specified and returned to their own bases for which logs were available.
 ** Accuracy is questionable due to difficulty in determination.
 *** Pressure Altitude.

S E C R E T

ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

```
* * * * *
*   Prepared by:   *
*                 *
*   Target Intelligence Unit *
*                 *
*   XX Bomber Command *
*                 *
* * * * *
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I - TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

A. SAIGON

1. The Saigon Naval Yard and Arsenal was attacked by 3 formations, all of which released their bombs blind due to a solid undercast. Formation components were as follows:

| <u>Formation order</u> | <u>Group</u> | <u>No. of A/C</u> | <u>Bombs carried</u> |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 462nd | 13 | Mixture of 1000# and 2000# G.P. |
| 2 | 444th | 14 | M-76 IB |
| 3 | 444th | 17 | M-76 IB |

2. No damage was sustained by the Naval Yard and Arsenal. Bombs from the 1st formation fell approximately 3000' SW of the target, an excellent example of radar bombing against a poor radar target. However, results were unfortunate in that all bombs fell in a business/residential district where heavy damage was caused.

3. The points of impact of bombs from the 2nd and 3rd formations have not been found.

B. PHNOM PENH

1. Phnom Penh was attacked by 2 formations as a target of opportunity. These 2 formations were over the FT at Saigon but were unable to satisfactorily identify the target by radar and they elected to proceed to Phnom Penh where the weather was known to be somewhat better. Formation components were as follows:

| <u>Formation order</u> | <u>Group</u> | <u>No. of A/C</u> | <u>Bombs carried</u> |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 462nd | 10 | Mixture of 1000# and 2000# G.P. |
| 2 | 462nd | 10 | 2000# G.P. |

2. Both formations reported a visual release though the visual run was only of a few seconds duration. The 1st formation dropped along the river front destroying several hundred feet of jetties and damaging and destroying several business/residential buildings in the city proper.

3. The point of impact of the bombs of the 2nd formation has not been found.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Statistical Control Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Four
 7 February 1945

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Table I and II - Aircraft Participating *

| Group | Mission No. | Field Order No. | ** A/C Taking Off | Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target | | | | | | | Time Of First Takeoff | Time*** Of Latest Return | Average Time of Flight *** | |
|-------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|--|---------|--------|-------|------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | Total No. | Percent | Reason | | | | | | | A/C Bombing Primary | Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary |
| | | | | | | Mech. | Pers. | Wea. | Not in Form. | Misc. | | | | |
| 444th | 34 | 34 | 32 | 12 | 37.5% | 1 | 11 | | | | 2030Z | 1145Z | 14:33 | 13:37 |
| 462nd | 34 | 34 | 35 | 22 | 62.9% | 3 | | 19 | | | 2015Z | 1122Z | 14:13 | 13:34 |
| TOTAL | 34 | 34 | 67 | 34 | 50.7% | 4 | 11 | 19 | | | 2015Z | 1145Z | 14:25 | 13:35 |

- * Mission was run from Rear Area Bases: Tables I and II consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.
- ** Field Order #34 required each group to furnish 32 aircraft on mission.
- *** Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

NOTE: 19 aircraft of 462nd Group made two runs over the primary target. Because the target was 10/10 undercast and the formation leaders were not confident that they could hit the primary target by using the assigned radar checkpoints, the decision was made to bomb another target. FOR FURTHER DETAILS SEE RADAR REPORT.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
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Table III - Bombing Runs

| Group | No. of A/C Bombing | Target Bombed | Time of Release | | Altitude of Release | | Visual Bomb | Radar Bomb | Blind Bomb | On The Leader | | | A/C Dropping On | |
|-------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|---------------------|--------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------|-------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Earliest | Latest | Highest | Lowest | A/C Sight- ing For | A/C Sight- ing For | A/C Sight- ing For | Visual | Radar | Blind | AFCE | Manual |
| | | | | | | | R&D Range | R&D Range | R&D Range | | | | | |
| 444th | 20 | Saigon | 0355Z | 0405Z | 20500 | 19300 | | | 2 | | | 18 | 2 | 18 |
| | 1 | Martaban | 0051Z | 0051Z | 18000 | 18000 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | |
| 462nd | 13 | Saigon | 0334Z | 0334Z | 18500 | 18000 | | | 1 | | | 12 | 1 | 12 |
| | 1 | Martaban | 0013Z | 0013Z | 18000 | 18000 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | |
| | 19 | Phnom-Penh | 0347Z | 0354Z | 19150 | 18000 | 2 | | | 17 | | | 2 | 17 |
| TOTAL | 33 | Saigon | 0334Z | 0405Z | 20500 | 18000 | | | 3 | | | 30 | 3 | 30 |
| | 2 | Martaban | 0013Z | 0051Z | 18000 | 18000 | 2 | | | | | | 2 | |
| | 19 | Phnom-Penh | 0347Z | 0354Z | 19150 | 18000 | 2 | | | 17 | | | 2 | 17 |

Primary Target - Saigon
 Secondary Target - Bangkok
 Last Resort Target - Martaban
 Target of Opportunity - Phnom-Penh

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
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Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

| Group | * Type of Bombs | Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A. | | | On Targets | | | | Bomb Disposal | | | |
|-------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------|--------------------|--------------|--------|----------|------------|---------------|------------|----------|---------|
| | | Fusing | | Average No. Loaded | Total Loaded | Saigon | Martaban | Phnom-Penh | Oppor-tunity | Jettisoned | Returned | Unknown |
| | | Nose | Tail | | | | | | | | | |
| 444th | 500# M-76 | Inst | N.D. | 20.3 | 649 | 403 | 20 | | | 226 | | |
| 462nd | 1000# M-44 | .1 | .025 | 6.7 | 236 | 128 | 12 | 96 | | | | |
| | 2000# M-34 | .1 | .025 | 2.6 | 90 | 12 | | 66 | | 6 | 6 | |
| TOTAL | 500# M-76 | Inst | N.D. | 9.7 | 649 | 403 | 20 | | | 226 | | |
| | 1000# M-44 | .1 | .025 | 3.5 | 236 | 128 | 12 | 96 | | | | |
| | 2000# M-34 | .1 | .025 | 1.3 | 90 | 12 | | 66 | | 6 | 6 | |

- * 500# Bomb Incendiary - FT-1 M-76 - Actual weight 483 pounds.
- 1000# G.P. AN-M 44 - Actual weight 1018.4 pounds.
- 2000# G.P. AN-M 34 - Actual weight 2148.5 pounds.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Four
7 February 1945

Table V - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Serial Number</u> | <u>Combat</u> | <u>Operational</u> | <u>Explanation</u> |
|--------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|---|
| 462nd | 24461 | | X | Lost all four engines due to fuel shortage on approach to land at Dum Dum. Crashed. |
| TOTAL | | | 1 | |

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

NEGATIVE REPORT

Minor Damage

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Serial Number</u> | <u>E/A</u> | <u>A/A</u> | <u>Own Guns</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>Explanation</u> |
|--------------|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|---|
| 444th | 24897 | | X | | | Right aileron trim tab. |
| | 65268 | | X | | | Right elevator. |
| | 63446 | | X | | | Outboard right wing panel and #2 nacelle. |
| | | | 3 | | | |
| 462nd | 63448 | | X | | | Two holes in fuselage of aircraft. |
| | 63454 | | X | | | Hole through elevator. |
| | | | 2 | | | |
| TOTAL | | | 5 | | | |

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
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Table VI - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

| DIRECTION | ALTITUDE | | | | | | TOTAL | |
|-----------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | HIGH | | LOW | | LEVEL | | 444th | 462nd |
| | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | | |
| 0800 | | | | | | | | |
| 0900 | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| 1000 | | | | | | | | |
| 1100 | | | | 2 | | | | 2 |
| 1200 | | | | | | | | |
| 0100 | | | | | | | | |
| 0200 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 |
| 0300 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0400 | | | | | | | | |
| 0500 | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| 0600 | | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| 0700 | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 1 | | 4 | | 4 | | 9 |

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Table VII - Personnel Losses

| Position | Killed | | Missing | | Seriously Wounded | | Slightly Wounded | | Total Casualties | | Total Participating | |
|------------|--------|-------|---------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd | 444th | 462nd |
| Pilot | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Co-Pilot | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Navigator | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Bombardier | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Flt. Engr. | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Radar | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 32 | 35 |
| Radio | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| CFC Spec | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| Right Gnr. | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| Left Gnr. | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| Tail Gnr. | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| R C M | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Others | | | | | | | | | | | 11 | 2 |
| TOTAL | | 3 | | | | 3 | | | | 6 | 363 | 387 |

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 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
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Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

| Group | Ammunition Expended Per Plane In Combat Firing | | | | | Total Expended | Claims Against Enemy Aircraft | | | Per 1000 Founds Expended in Combat | | |
|-------|--|-------------|------------|------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|---------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| | Upper Front | Lower Front | Upper Rear | Lower Rear | 50 Cal. Tail | | Destroyed | Probably Destroyed | Damaged | Destroyed | Probably Destroyed | Damaged |
| 444th | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - |
| 462nd | 5 | 3 | 9 | 15 | 14 | 1625 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | - | .62 |
| TOTAL | 2 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 1685 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | - | .59 |

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Four
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Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

| Group | Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff | Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff | * Average Gallons Consumed on Mission | | * Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission | |
|-------|--|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| | | | Per Aircraft Bombing Primary | Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary | Per Aircraft Bombing Primary | Per A/C Not Bombing Primary |
| 444th | 135115 | 7123 | 6512 | 6076 | 611 | 1055 |
| 462nd | 134007 | 6711 | 6042 | 5934 | 691 | 766 |
| TOTAL | 134536 | 6908 | 6336 | 5975 | 641 | 850 |

* Excludes A/C which did not return directly to home fields.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Four
7 February 1945

Table X - Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target

| A/C Serial Number | Specific Mechanical Malfunction | Other Reasons | Local Action To Prevent Recurrence |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|
| <u>444th Gp.</u> | | | |
| 24897 | | A/C 411 dropped 3 bombs prematurely, and A/C thought he was dropping on the leader. Bombs dropped 5 minutes before true release on leader. Considered personnel error. | |
| 63496 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 24731 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 65273 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 24472 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 63375 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 24861 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 65270 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 63446 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 63451 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 24492 | | Same as A/C 24897 | |
| 63376 | #2 turbo malfunction caused by loose intake pipe and excessive oil in turbo governor. | | Replaced pipe and governor. U.R. #45-78 submitted. |
| <u>462nd Gp.</u> | | | |
| 24786 | #1 prop governor failure. Resister clip broken. | | Replaced prop governor and electric head. U.R. #45-94 submitted. |
| 63393 | Blow exhaust stack #2 engine. | | Replaced stack. U.R. #45-92 submitted. |

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TABLE X - cont'd

| <u>A/C</u> <u>Serial</u> <u>Number</u> | <u>Specific</u> <u>Mechanical</u> <u>Malfunction</u> | <u>Other</u> <u>Reasons</u> | <u>Local Action</u> <u>To Prevent</u> <u>Recurrence</u> |
|--|--|---|--|
| <u>462nd Gp. - cont'd</u> | | | |
| 24456 | Rear bomb bay door wouldn't open fully, and would close only half-way. This occurred on 1st run over target and A/C could not stay in formation. Retracting screw trouble. Material failure of part. | | Replaced screw. No other action required U.R. not submitted as this system is no longer in production. |
| 63560 | | Formations led by A/C 560 and 503 made two runs over primary, 10/10 undercast and could not locate target by radar. | |
| 65230 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63502 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63450 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63459 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63479 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 24506 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63531 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63540 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 24838 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63503 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 65232 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 24904 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63386 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63454 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63472 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 63473 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 24484 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |
| 24801 | | Same as A/C 63560 | |

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Four
7 February 1945

Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

| | | 444th | 462nd | Total |
|----------------------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|
| POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT. | Exhaust System | | 1 | 1 |
| | Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System | 1 | | 1 |
| | <hr/> | | | |
| PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS | Governor | | 1 | 1 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| ELECTRICAL SYSTEM | Bomb Bay Door | | 1 | 1 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 1 | 3 | 4 |

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

| | | 444th | 462nd | Total |
|----------------------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|
| POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT. | Engine Running Rough | 1 | | 1 |
| | Engine Running Hot | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| | Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System | | 1 | 1 |
| | Intercooler and/or Control System | 1 | | 1 |
| | Excessive Fuel Consumption | | 1 | 1 |
| | <hr/> | | | |
| OIL SYSTEM | Oil Leaks | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| | Oil Temperature Regulator | | 1 | 1 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| FUEL SYSTEM | Fuel Transfer System | | 1 | 1 |
| | Mixture Control | | 1 | 1 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| ELECTRICAL SYSTEM | Generators | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| | Voltage Regulator | 2 | | 2 |
| | Landing Lights | 1 | | 1 |
| | Bomb Bay Doors | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS | Governor | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| | Governor Oil Leak | 1 | | 1 |
| | Prop Switch | | 1 | 1 |

- 1 -

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Commanding General:

2-20-41 HC SR
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TABLE XI - Engineering Malfunctions

| Part II - cont'd | | 444th | 462nd | Total |
|------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| INSTRUMENTS | Carb. Air Temp. Gage | 2 | | 2 |
| | Cylinder Head Temp. Gage | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| | Nose Oil Press. Gage | | 1 | 1 |
| | Rear Oil Press. Gage | | 1 | 1 |
| | Fuel Press. Gage | 1 | | 1 |
| | Tachometer | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| | Flux Gate Compass | | 1 | 1 |
| | Radio Compass | 1 | | 1 |
| | Flap Indicator | | 1 | 1 |
| | Flight Indicator | 2 | | 2 |
| | AFCE | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Driftmeter Gyro | | 1 | 1 |
| MISCELLANEOUS | Pressurization | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | Hydraulic System | 1 | | 1 |
| | Oxygen System | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| | Vacuum System | 1 | | 1 |
| TOTAL | | 37 | 31 | 68 |

NOTE PERTAINING TO BOTH PART I AND PART II:

Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering malfunction, all malfunctions have been listed.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Four
7 February 1945

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Table XII - Utilization of Useful Load
(Based on A/C Bombing F.T.)

| Group | No. of Ground Miles | Number of A/C Considered | Type of A/C | Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff For Mission | Average Weight of A/C | Average Useful Load | Average Number of Bombs Loaded | * Average Weight of Bombs Loaded | Average Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal | Average Miscellaneous Weight |
|-------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| 444th | 3110 | 20 | Center Wing Tanks | 135069 | 75577 | 59492 | 500#/M76-20.3 | 9805 | 42735 | 6952 |
| 462nd | 3095 | 13 | Center Wing Tanks | 134113 | 75109 | 59004 | 1000#/M44-9.8 2000#/M34-.9 | 12020 | 36692 | 10292 |
| TOTAL | 3113 | 33 | Center Wing Tanks | 134692 | 75393 | 59299 | 500#/M76-12.3 1000#/M44-3.9 2000#/M34-.4 | 10677 | 40354 | 8268 |

* 500# Bomb Incendiary - FT-1 M76 = Actual weight 483 pounds.
1000# G.F. - AM-M 44 = Actual weight 1018.4 pounds.
2000# G.F. - AM-M 34 = Actual weight 2148.5 pounds.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

DISTRIBUTION - MISSION NO. 34

7 February 1945

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7 Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group
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9 - 38 Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Attention AC/AS
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39 Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence
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

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ADJUTANT GENERAL

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