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
The Battle of Monocacy.

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Monocacy
July 9th 1864.

"These Men died to save
the National Capitol,
and they did save it."

Copyright, 1898, by Edward V. Soldsborough.)



EARLY'S GREAT RAID

He Advances Through Maryland,

BATTLE OF MONOCACY,

The Union Forces Under Gen. Lew Wallace
Stubbornly Contest the Field Against
Overpowering Numbers.

WALLACE RETREATS,

Narrow Escape from Capture of Gen. E. B. Tyler
and his Staff and Orderlies.


By E. Y. Goldsborough, First Lieutenant and Aid-de-Camp,
Past Department Commander, Department of
Maryland, G. A. R., Frederick, Md.

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companies of the 1st Potomac Home Brigade, about 200 strong, under Capt. Brown.

See report of Gen. Wallace, War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 37, Part 1, page 193.

On Thursday, July 7, Lieut. Col. Clendennin, with the 8th Ill. Cav., and Lieut. Leary, with a section of Alexander's Battery, had a skirmish with the rebels on Catoclin Mountain and in Middletown Valley, and in the afternoon the 3d Md. P. H. B., the 8th Ill Cav., and three guns of Alexander's battery and Capt. Lieb's mounted infantry had a fight with a strong column of the rebel advance force about one mile west of Frederick City, between the Harper's Ferry and Hagerstown turnpike roads, near Prospect Hill. (See position on map of July 7.)

Rebellion Record, Series 1, Volume 37, Part 11, Page 100, July 7th, 3:40 P. M. A large force of Veterans has arrived by water and will be sent immediately. As Sigel's force remains on Maryland Heights, you are doubtless aware of the great importance of preserving Monocacy bridge. If it be damaged or destroyed, great delay will result in getting forward re-enforcements to General Sigel. I trust you will be able to maintain your position and protect fully this most important structure. At 4:55 Gen. Wallace replied: My troops are engaging the enemy to west and in the skirts of Frederick. Warm cannonading going on. I will hold the bridge at all hazards. Send on troops as rapidly as possible.

J. W. Garrett telegraphs Mr. Stanton that our agent at Monocacy states: Some difficulty exists on account of the delicacy of Generals Wallace and Tyler in commanding the troops west of the Monocacy, in view of their departmental limits.

July 7th, 9:00 P. M.—E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War, to J. W. Garrett, Esq: Gen. Wallace has been directed to operate without reference to departmental lines. Pages 108, 109 and 110.

Page 101, July 7th, 8:55 P. M.—J. W. Garrett to


Hon. E. M. Stanton: Gen. Wallace telegraphs that after a battle of four hours the enemy has been finally repulsed from Frederick.

After a sharp engagement of about four hours, during which the rebels threw a number of shells into Frederick City, our battery dismounted one of the rebel guns and silenced their artillery, and they were driven back to the mountain by a charge by the 3d Md. P. H. B., under Col. Gilpin. Our loss during the day was two men killed, one officer and 17 men wounded; whilst the rebels reported loss was 140 killed and wounded. Thursday night Col. Gilpin's regiment, Col. Clendennin, with the 8th Ill., Capt. Leib's mounted infantry, and Alexander's battery, resting on their arms, remained in the western suburbs of Frederick City, near the ground where they had fought during the afternoon.

Rebellion Record, Series 1, Vol. 37, Part 11, page 117.—Lieut. Shearer of Gen. Bradley T. Johnson's Staff, captured with two private soldiers, says that the design is not upon Pennsylvania, but upon Washington City. That the advance into Pennsylvania is a blind and a diversion to distract attention from the main object, and supply the exhausted stock of animals.

Page 131.—Gen. Couch reports enemy about 30,000, said to be 125 pieces of artillery, five brigades of cavalry, McCausland's, Jones', Jackson's, Imboden's and Ransom's. The first composed of four regiments 2800 strong. Three infantry divisions, Early's, (commanding his old one,) Breckinridge's and Rhodes'; Breckinridge's about 15,000. Having had no report from Col. Gilpin as to the result of his engagement with the enemy, or of his plans for further operations, Gen. Tyler directed Lieut. Goldsborough about midnight, Thursday night, to ride into Frederick, find Col. Gilpin, get all the information that he had of the strength of the force that he had fought with, the direction they were moving, &c. Lieut. Goldsborough went

to Frederick, found the 3d Md. Regt., and Alexander's Battery, one section, resting on their arms on the hill, west Patrick street, at the Junction of the Harpers Ferry and Hagerstown Turnpikes, and Col. Gilpin asleep in the House of Mr. Frederick Lambert, nearby, obtained a report from him and returned with it at once to Gen. Tyler at Monocacy Junction. Upon receipt of the report from



Stone Bridge Crossing Monocacy on Baltimore Turnpike.


Col. Gilpin it was deemed best to send reinforcements to him, and early the next morning (Friday, July 8th,) the 144th and 149th Ohio regiments, part of the force that had been collected at the Monocacy Junction, Col. Brown commanding; and later, Col. Henry with part of the 1st Brigade, 3d Div., 6th Corps, marched from the Junction along the east bank of the Monocacy, across the Stone Bridge and by way of the Baltimore Turnpike into Frederick City, under command of Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler, to support the 3d Md. P. H. B., three guns of Alexander's Battery, the 8th Ill. Cav., under Lieut. Col. Clendennin, and the mounted infantry under Capt. Lieb.

July 7th.—Gen. Ricketts' division of the 6th Corps commenced arriving at Baltimore at 6:30 P. M.; orders were issued at once to proceed to Monocacy without delay.

The result of the engagement of Thursday afternoon, (July 7th,) and the information obtained by the scouts and skirmishers confirmed the rumors that the object of the raid was to plunder the rich vallies of Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, and then move in force on Washington City and perhaps Baltimore, both of which they knew were in a defenseless condition. It therefore became necessary for Gen. Wallace to make the best disposition that he could of his small force to delay the invaders and thus give time for, at least a partial defence of the National Capital. He knew that it would be idle to attempt to defend Frederick City against such overpowering numbers. The high bank of Monocacy River on the east side, extending for about three miles from south of Monocacy Junction, north of the Baltimore Turnpike, offered a peculiarly advantageous position for defense, covering the great highways, the Georgetown Turnpike to Washington, the Baltimore Turnpike to Baltimore and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. There it was decided to throw up fortifications and give battle,

to develop their strength and delay them as long as we could.

Our cavalry skirmished with the rebel cavalry during the day (Friday, July 8th,) along Catoctin Mountain, near Rocky Springs School House, and the artillery stationed near the city limits on the north side of the road had a spirited fight with a



Showing Federal and Rebel Lines of Battle July 8th, 1864.

rebel battery on Hagan's Hill, about a mile west of the city, on the south side of the Hagerstown road, (see map for positions of July 8th,) killing a number of their men and horses, with a loss on our side of one officer and one man killed and seven men wounded.

As the day advanced we found that we were opposing an army entirely too strong to be checked by our small command, and it was determined to abandon Frederick City, as it appeared that the enemy's object was to move around us to the south and get possession of the Washington Turnpike.

Rebellion Record, Series 1, Volume 37, Part 11, page 127, July 8th, 8:00 P. M.—Wallace determines to withdraw immediately from Frederick and cover Washington if necessary.

Page 128.—Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Ricketts to report to Gen. Wallace, and assist him in retarding the enemy's movements towards Washington and Baltimore.

Toward evening all our quartermaster and commissary stores were sent away, and at night the troops were quietly withdrawn from Frederick City, and marched by the same route over which we had come in the morning, back to Monocacy Junction, where it was determined we would make a stand the next day. After we withdrew the rebels came in and took possession of Frederick City.

That Friday evening the Third Division of the 6th Corps, Army of the Potomac, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts commanding, reached Monocacy Junction, having been sent up from the Army of the Potomac, comprising the following commands:

First Brigade.—Col. W. S. Truex, commanding, 1,750 men; 106th N. Y., Col. Paine; 151st N. Y., Col. Emerson; 14th N. J., Lieut. Col. Hall; 10th Vt., Col. Henry; 87th Pa., Lieut. Col. Stahle.

Second Brigade.—1,600 men, Col. McClennan, commanding—138th Pa.; 9th N. Y., Col. Seward; 126th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Ebright; 110th Ohio, Lieut.

Col. Binkley, and a detachment of the 122d Ohio, Second Lieut. Gibson; total, 3,350 men; increasing our numbers to about 5,850 infantry, Alexander's Maryland Battery of six three-inch rifle guns, and a 24 pound brass Howitzer, that was placed near the blockhouse on the east bank of the Monocacy.

The residue of the Third Division of the Sixth Corps, it was reported, would arrive the next day. It came up to Monrovia, but did not take part in the battle.

Page 138.—Statement of fight on Friday, July 8th, and evacuation of Frederick that night.

On Saturday morning, July 9th, we found that the enemy had followed us closely, and picket-firing began soon after daylight.

From their friends in Frederick (the rebel sympathizers) they had obtained information of our movements and strength, and with their vastly superior numbers, estimated at about 30,000 men, they doubtless thought it would be an easy task to annihilate us whenever they concluded to do so. Our line, somewhat in the form of a semi-circle, extended from Baker's farm, on the Georgetown Turnpike, to the Monocacy Junction; thence along the east bank of the Monocacy River to the Stone Bridge on the Baltimore Turnpike, and to Hughes' Ford beyond, a distance of about six miles in all, with a picket line on the west side of the river, holding the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at the Y formed by the main line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and the branch road from Frederick City; to protect the turnpike bridge and the (iron) railroad bridge, that the rebels might not use them to cross a force over to break our center, and also a picket line on the Baltimore Turnpike, on the west side of Monocacy, guarding the Stone Bridge, to prevent them from getting in on our right flank. Our position on the left from Baker's farm to Monocacy Junction extended along the crest of a range of hills overlooking the valleys beyond; and yet, with our

small numbers and a necessarily weak and long-drawn-out line, to cover a front of about two miles, with probably 3,500 men; the Georgetown or Washington Turnpike, the road that the enemy would use on their way to the Capital, was so well guarded that it was not 'till late in the afternoon that we were compelled to abandon it.

Although there had been skirmish-firing earlier, the fight really began about 9:00 o'clock on our center, and the rebels were detained, securing the \$200,000 which they had levied upon the City of Frederick, with the threat that the city would be sacked and burned unless it was paid, so that their main body did not reach the battlefield until afternoon.

In the morning a column of infantry marched down the Georgetown Turnpike from Frederick City, followed by artillery. They threw out skirmishers and began firing.

About 8:00 o'clock in the morning a rifle gun posted on a hillock between two trees, a little west of the Frederick branch of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, on what was then known as the Cronise farm, opened fire upon our Headquarters near the railroad bridge, the first shot mortally wounding two men of the 151st N. Y. In this first firing several men of the 87th Pa. Regt. were severely wounded, whilst the regiment laid in the yard in front of Mr. Gambrill's house, and one or two killed near Gambrill's mill. Their range was so accurate that we were soon compelled to change Headquarters to a position near the blockhouse on the north side of the railroad, and to move some troops that were near the old warehouse on the south side of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad nearer to our Headquarters, that they might have the protection of the hill formed by the east bank of the Monocacy, which at that point rises to quite a height above the river.

At the Stone Bridge, on the Baltimore Turnpike,

Col. Brown, commanding the 144th and 149th Ohio, deployed a skirmish line along the crest of the ridge on the west side of the Monocacy at daybreak, and having placed a strong guard at Crum's Ford, about a mile above the railroad bridge, made such other dispositions of his forces as seemed necessary to enable him to hold his position. At about 6:00 A. M., a force of the enemy having marched from Frederick, by the Baltimore Turnpike, threw out a skirmish line and opened fire on our men. Later in the morning, about 10:00 A. M., a force of rebel cavalry attempted to cross at Crum's Ford and turn our left; but Col. Brown sent Co. E, of the 149th Ohio, and a company of the mounted infantry under Capt. Leib, to reinforce the infantry guard under Capt. McGinnis, holding the ford, and the enemy were driven back and prevented from crossing the river, and withdrew.

About 500 yards west of the ridge on which our skirmish line deployed, is another parallel ridge with a little valley between, extending north of the turnpike and breaking off into a wider range of lowland to the Monocacy River at our extreme right. On this ridge, on the north side of the turnpike, stood a dwelling-house, (Simpson's log house) in which a force of rebel sharpshooters was located, where they had excellent protection, and from which, through holes pierced in the chinking between the logs, their guns commanded a complete range of the ridge behind which our skirmish line was deployed. So accurate was their fire that it was dangerous for our men to even show their heads above the hilltop.

About noon, having massed a heavy force of infantry on the left of our skirmish line defending the Stone Bridge, they deployed and advanced upon us. The superiority of their numbers enabled them to force back our left and secure an enfilading fire upon our line. To regain the position we had lost, Co. B, 149th Ohio, was ordered to charge

the enemy with fixed bayonets, which they did, but were repulsed. Cos. B, I and G of the 144th Ohio were sent to reinforce Co. B, and the rebels were routed.

There seemed to be no point where an attack could be made that was not taken advantage of by the rebels, and defended with equal promptness by the union forces. As soon as the artillery opened on our Headquarters, near the railroad bridge, a body of rebel sharpshooters who had taken possession of Best's barn, on the west side of the Georgetown Turnpike, began to pick off our skirmishers defending the railroad, from the railroad station to the turnpike at the Y.

Three guns of Alexander's battery and a brass cannon were at once placed in position on the hill on the east bank of the Monocacy, near the blockhouse. A well-directed shell set fire to Best's barn and scattered the rebel sharpshooters, giving some relief to the detachment of the 10th Vt., and 1st Md. P. H. B., along the railroad, and turning the fight on our center for the rest of the day mostly into an artillery duel.

About 10:30 A. M., the first line of battle appeared and Gen. Ricketts was compelled to change front to the left, his right now resting on the river bank near the wooden bridge. Whilst making this change his command was under an enfilading fire from the batteries posted on Best's farm across the river. About the same time a body of rebel cavalry (McCausland's,) dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, advanced upon our left along the Georgetown Turnpike, evidently expecting that ours were new troops, but they soon discovered their mistake and were driven back in confusion and with heavy loss, by the veterans of the old Sixth Corps.

About noon an attack was made upon the detachment of the 10th Vt., two companies of the 1st Md. P. H. B., and one company of the 9th N. Y. H. A., who were guarding the blockhouse and the

railroad at the Y on the west side of the Monocacy.

The fighting was very severe, and our men, with heavy loss, stubbornly held their ground until afternoon, when they were ordered to fall back to the rifle pits on the east side of the Monocacy. They burned the blockhouse to prevent the rebels using it, and the wooden bridge over the Monocacy, and then retired across the river and occupied the rifle pits, successfully guarding the railroad bridge until our troops (the main body) retreated. About the same time the main portion of their army, about 20,000 strong, having left Frederick City, marched out the Georgetown Turnpike, thence by the Sand Hole Road, now known as the Buckeystown Turnpike, to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, near Shoaf's Creek, and moving south of the Monocacy Junction, and west of the Georgetown Turnpike, crossed the river, which was then very low, at an old ford about a mile below the wooden bridge, where, near Mr. John T. Worthington's house, under the cover of a heavy woods and behind the hill, they formed their line of battle opposite our extreme left.

The left of our line, commanded by Gen. Ricketts, was composed of a part of the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac, viz: First Brigade.—Col. W. S. Truex, commanding—106th N. Y., Capt. Paine; 151st N. Y., Col. Emerson; 14th N. J., Lieut. Col. Hall; 10th Vt., Col. Henry; 87th Pa., Lieut. Col. James A. Stable. Second Brigade.—Col. Matthew R. McClennan, commanding—9th N. Y. H. A., Col. W. H. Seward, Jr.; 110th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Binkley; 122d Ohio, (detachment,) Lieut. Charles J. Gibson; 120th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Ebright; 138th Pa., Maj. Lewis K. May. Three guns of Alexander's Baltimore battery, supported on the left by a part of the 8th Ill. Cav., commanded by Lieut. Col. Clendennin.

The right, commanded by Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler, consisted of the First Separate Brigade, Eighth Corps; 3d Md. P. H. B., Col. Charles Gilpin; three companies of the 1st Md. P. H. B., under Capt.

Bamford; 11th Md., (100 days,) Col. Landstreet; three guns of Alexander's Baltimore Battery, and a 24 pound Howitzer, extended along the east side of the Monocacy River, guarding the railroad bridge



and the fords on the river to the Stone Bridge on the Baltimore Turnpike, which was held by the 144th and 149th Ohio (100 days men,) under Col. Brown, whilst Hughes' Ford, about a half-mile north of the Stone Bridge, forming our extreme right, was guarded by a few cavalrymen.


The rebel forces that made the invasion into Maryland were composed of Ewell's old Corps (entire,) consisting of three divisions, commanded respectively by Gens. Rodes, Gordon and Ransom, and of Breckinridge's Corps, with a large body of cavalry and a force of artillery, all under command of Gen. Jubal A. Early, and divided as follows:

Ewell's Old Corps (infantry)	-	12,000
Breckinridge's Corps (infantry)		10,000
Artillery	- - - - -	1,000
Cavalry	- - - - -	<u>7,000</u>
Total	- - - - -	30,000

Gen. McCausland commanded a brigade of cavalry, and Gen. Bradley T. Johnson had command of Jones' Brigade, of the Valley cavalry. Gen. Gordon, commanding a division, was under Breckinridge, who commanded his own and Gordon's Divisions. See Rebellion Record, Series 1, Volume 37, Part 1, page 350.

Until about 10:30 A. M., the fighting on our center and left was mostly skirmishing and experimental cannonading, which very effectually developed the superiority, both in the number and caliber, of the enemy's guns. We had six 3-inch rifle cannons to their 16 or 18 Napoleons. The rebel cavalry and artillery had pushed rapidly toward our left, crossed the river and charged upon Gen. Ricketts Third Division, Sixth Corps, with a recklessness that indicated their belief that they were fighting raw troops. Gen. Ricketts changed front to the left, so that his right rested on the bank of the river, repulsed the enemy, and then charged and drove them back.

During this time our line was subjected to a continuously heavy enfilading fire from two or more rebel batteries on the west side of the Monocacy River. By 1:00 o'clock P. M., it became evident from the great superiority of their numbers and the greater length of their lines, that we must put all our available force before them on the left. Accordingly, the blockhouse on the west side of the Monocacy, and the wooden bridge were burned,



and the force that had been on guard there was withdrawn to the east side of the river to guard the railroad bridge, whilst such as could be spared were sent to strengthen Gen. Ricketts' line of battle. Two more of the guns of Alexander's battery

were also sent to Gen. Ricketts. About 2:00 o'clock P. M., Gen. Gordon crossed about a mile below the Monocacy Junction, formed their second line and advanced on our left. We now had all our forces in one line, with no reserves except the 11th Md., which was with Gen. Tyler at the iron bridge, expecting at any moment to be sent to assist Col. Brown at the Stone Bridge. The rebel skirmishers fell back, and, with a yell, their line charged upon our left. Our boys, cool and calm, held their fire 'till the enemy were within close range; they then poured into them terrible and well-directed volleys, followed by a charge that routed them and sent them back past Worthington's house with broken ranks and heavy loss.

Mortified at this unexpected repulse, and terrified by the reception that had been given them by the Sixth Corps, they declared that they would not advance again. The officers, brandishing their swords, cursed and swore at their men and ordered them into line. Our troops occupied the position they had gained for about an hour, when orders were given to advance the line, which was done under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery, the latter coming obliquely from the front and rear, and an enfilading fire directly from the right from the batteries on the west side of the river.

It was impossible to hold this position under such a fire, and our line fell back and formed along a cut in the Washington Turnpike, still exposed to the fire of the artillery.

Rebellion Record, Series 1, Volume 37, Part 1, page 196.—Gen Wallace says: Finally by burning the wooden bridge and block house at its further end, thus releasing the force left to defend them, I put into the engagement every available man except Tyler's Reserves.

This charge developed their strength. Heavy skirmish firing continued until 3:30 P. M., when they emerged from behind a woods, where they

had formed, with a strong skirmish line and two lines of battle, one behind the other, each of which overlapped ours, both on our right and left flanks, and outnumbering us at least three to one. With a yell they came charging down the hill. The 6th Corps stood its ground manfully, repulsed their skirmish line and held their third line of battle in check 'till our ammunition gave out and the enemy had turned our right flank, when, seeing the imminent danger of our forces being annihilated by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the order was given to fall back, and our troops withdrew under a terrific fire of infantry and artillery.

The residue of the 3d division of the 6th Corps remained at Monrovia, on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and did not take part in the battle.

When the infantry line fell back Col. Clendennin, with a part of the 8th Ill. Cav., that had supported our left flank, retired toward Urbana, closely pursued by McCausland's Cavalry Brigade, and after some severe fighting fell back to Monrovia. Overpowered by an enemy apparently four to one, our troops slowly retreated past Gambrill's Mill, along the east bank of the Monocacy to Bartonsville, thence to New Market and Monrovia, thence by the Baltimore Turnpike to Ellicott's Mills and to Baltimore City.

When the battle was over, and we had begun to retreat, it was all-important that we hold the Stone Bridge. Gen. Wallace ordered Col. Brown to hold the Stone Bridge over the Monocacy, on the Baltimore Turnpike, to the last extremity, and when he was pressed so hard that nothing more could be done to command his men to disperse and to take care of themselves. Col. Brown made such disposition of the forces under his command as he thought would enable him to hold out as long as possible. He contracted his skirmish line, thus strengthening his center, and covered all the commanding points that he could. Orders were given to the

cavalry to take such position as would protect the left flank, on the east side of the river. Gen. Tyler had started with his reserves (the 11th Md.) to Col. Brown's assistance, but on receipt of the order of Gen. Wallace to hold the bridge, Gen. Tyler, with Capt. Webb and Lieut. Goldsborough, of his staff, galloped to the bridge and took command in person. When the head of the retreating column reached the pike, Gen. Wallace rode up to the bridge and ordered that it be held at all hazards by the force then there, until the enemy should be found in its rear, at least until the last regiment had cleared the County road by which the retreat was being effected. This order Gen. Tyler obeyed.

At about 6:00 P. M., when our retreating column was well on the way to New Market, a heavy attack was made along Col. Brown's entire front at the Stone Bridge. Gen. Tyler sent Lieut. Goldsborough, of his staff, with an order to Col. Landstreet, commanding the 11th Md., to move his regiment from the position in which they were in the meadow below Bartonsville, and to move down the pike towards New Market to join our columns. Lieut. Goldsborough gave the order to Col. Landstreet, saw the regiment start down the pike, rode back and reported to Gen. Tyler, who was then on the hill, on the east bank of the river, overlooking the bridge. All our troops, except those holding the Stone Bridge, had now left, and, satisfied that Col. Brown's forces could not withstand the attack of the enemy's greater force, Gen. Tyler ordered that he withdraw his men from the west to the east side of the river. The men had begun to cross the bridge when an Orderly rode up, saluted Gen. Tyler, and said: "General, the rebels have turned our left, and are in our rear near Bartonsville."

Owing to the length of his lines and the knowledge that the enemy were in their rear attempting to cut off their retreat by taking possession of the bridge from the east side, the command was with-

drawn in confusion. Col. Brown attempted to rally his men, when the enemy brought up his artillery and threw several shells, one of which struck the bridge while the men were crossing it. The Colonel succeeded in rallying some of his men in the orchard, on the hill overlooking the bridge, and they fired several rounds into the enemy, who were advancing from the west, and also those in the wheatfield and woods on the south. The enemy's skirmishers on the east side of the river now opened fire on our flanks. This fire was returned by the men in the orchard, and the advance checked. By this time our men learned that the main body of our army had moved away an hour and a half or two hours before, and that they were surrounded. Many of them broke and threw away their guns to prevent the enemy from getting them, and attempted to save themselves. The Colonel succeeded in bringing off about 300 of his command, with which he joined the main body at New Market. As soon as he had learned from the Orderly that the enemy was in our rear, Gen. Tyler, with his staff and several Orderlies, rode off toward Bartonsville to see if the report was correct. When we reached the top of the hill, at the entrance to the road leading to N. O. Cline's house, we saw a body of rebel cavalry in the orchard at Bartonsville. They at once opened fire and charged upon us. Realizing that it would be impossible for us to get past the force of the enemy that was attacking us, to join our main column that was retreating down the turnpike, we took the road leading past Cline's house, past the mill, and on to Hughes' Ford, so closely pursued that there was no chance of escape, except to continue on the road on the east bank of the river to the old Liberty road, which leads to Baltimore. Riding along we saw by the clouds of dust along the Woodsboro Road, that squads of cavalry were moving in the direction that we were, but we hoped to get ahead of them. We reached

the Liberty Road, turned east in the direction of Baltimore, and rode into the village of Mount Pleasant, where, to our surprise, we came upon a squad of rebel cavalry plundering a store. Our little party then consisted of Gen. Tyler, Capt. Webb, and Lieut. Goldsborough, of the staff, and two or three Orderlies. Seeing that we were Federal soldiers they fired upon us, and either wounded or captured our Orderlies. We at once put spurs to our horses and dashed down the road for about a mile, when, discovering that they were pursuing, and as our horses were well worn out, would soon overtake us, we turned from the road into the woods, where Capt. Webb's horse fell and threw the Captain under him.

The General and I dismounted, got the horse up, and helped the Captain on his feet. We then abandoned our horses, turned them into the road and took to the bushes. Supposing that we were still on the horses, they followed them down the road and captured them. In the meantime we came across a colored man, named Ridgely, who piloted us to a safe hiding place in a dense thicket. That night we helped Capt. Webb, who was now quite lame from his accident, to the house of Mr. Ephriam Creager, a Unionist, living near by, who cared for him 'till our escape. We returned to our hiding place, where we remained until the following Monday evening, July 11th, when a squad of our cavalry that had driven the rear of the rebel column out of Frederick City, rescued us and brought us to Frederick City, whence with an escort of cavalry, we proceeded by way of the Baltimore Turnpike, and rejoined our command at the Relay House, on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, near Baltimore.

When the infantry retreated toward the Baltimore Turnpike, Lieut. Col. Clendennin, with about 80 men of the 8th Ill. Cav., on Ricketts' extreme left, was cut off from the main body and retired toward Urbana, skirmishing with McCausland's

Cavalry Brigade, which pressed them closely by and made several charges. On one of these, at Urbana, the 17th Va. Cav. charged desperately, but were repulsed with the loss of their colors (captured by Col. Clendennin himself,) their Major, color-bearer and several men killed and a number wounded. Deploying his 80 men as skirmishers and making a show of having received reinforcements, the enemy dismounted a regiment to fight him on foot and sent their horses to the rear. Col. Clendennin immediately called back his skirmishers over a hill and fell back to Monrovia. There was heavy skirmishing along the Georgetown or Washington Turnpike in front of Gen. Tyler's line during the day until about the time the retreat began.

At the angle where the branch of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from Frederick City connects with the main road, passing under the bridge over the turnpike and forming the Y, our loss was severe. But the heaviest fighting was in a hollow, between the hills not far from Gambrill's Mill. Through the hollow runs a little stream, and so great was the number of dead and wounded along its banks, that the water for about 100 yards was red with blood. Our troops retreated quietly, and the enemy did not seem anxious to renew the fight or attempt to capture them, as they might have done with their much larger numbers. We did not lose any of our battle flags, nor did they capture any of our artillery, as the entire battery and even the 24 pound Howitzer, and a mountain Howitzer that had been used to defend the railroad bridge at Monocacy, were brought safely off the field and taken to Baltimore. After the battle ended and our troops had moved off in the direction of Baltimore, squads of rebel soldiers traversed the country in every direction, taking horses, forage and whatever they wanted, as there was nothing to stop them, and it was not until Sunday morning, after burying their dead and damaging the iron railroad bridge at the

Monocacy, that Gen. Early resumed his march toward Washington.

The wounded were brought to the United States General Hospital at Frederick City and cared for.

COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION FORCES
IN THE BATTLE OF MONOCACY.

Command.	Kill'd		Wnd.		Cap'd or Mis'g		Aggregate
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Eight Corps, First Separate Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler.							
1st Md. P. H. B., (five companies,) Cap. Chas. J. Brown.....	..	1	1	12	..	5	19
3rd Md. P. H. B., Col. Charles Gilpin.....	..	2	..	7	..	4	13
11th Md., Col. Wm. T. Landstreet.....	2	2
144th Ohio (3 Co's,))	..	1	1	10	2	35	49
149th Ohio (7 Co's,))	..	4	..	25	5	64	98
Col. A. L. Brown, Baltimore Battery, Capt. F. W. Alexander.....	4	4
Total First Separate Brigade.....	..	8	2	60	7	108	185
Cavalry.							
Lieut. Col. David R. Clendennin.							
8th Ill., Lieut. Col. David							

TABLE CONTINUED.

R. Clendennin.....	1	5	2	19	27
159th Ohio (ditch mounted Inf.,) Cap. E. H. Leib, and Cap. H. S. Allen..	..	1	8	9
Detachment of mixed cav- alry, Maj. Wells.....
Loudoun (Va.) Rangers..
Total cavalry.....	1	6	2	19	..	8	36
6th Corps, 3d Div., Gen. J. B. Ricketts. Staff..	..	1	1
6th Corps 3d Div., 1st Brig. Col. W. S. Truex, Staff	1	1
14th N. J., Lieut. Col. C. K. Hall.....	2	22	8	79	..	29	140
106th N. Y., Capt. E. M. Paine.....	2	14	3	70	..	44	133
151st N. Y., Col. Wm. Emerson.....	..	24	1	44	..	32	101
87th Pa., Lieut. Col. Jas. A. Stahle.....	3	9	2	28	1	31	74
10th Vt., Col. Wm. W. Henry.....	..	5	1	19	..	31	56
Total 1st Brigade.....	7	74	16	240	1	167	506
Second Brigade.							
Col. M. R. McClennan.							
9th N. Y. H. A., Col. W. H. Seward, Jr.....	1	12	5	84	..	99	201
110th Ohio, Lieut. Col. O. H. Binkley.....	1	3	5	77	2	50	138
122d Ohio (detachment, Lieut. C. J. Gibson....	..	4	1	9	..	46	60
126th Ohio, Lieut. Col. A. W. Ebright.....	..	6	3	40	..	51	100
138th Pa., Maj. L. A May	1	38	1	28	68
Total 2d Brigade.....	2	25	15	248	3	274	567
Total 3d Division.....	9	99	32	488	4	441	1,073
Grand Total.....	10	113	36	567	11	557	1,294

The 6th Maryland, 67th Pennsylvania and part of the 122nd Ohio did not reach the battle field.

Killed 123, wounded 605, total killed and wounded 726, captured 668; total killed, wounded and captured 1,294.

The following is a list of the Union officers killed or mortally wounded: Capt. John V. Morris, 8th Ill. Cav.; Lieut. Charles S. Gilbert, 8th Ill. Cav.; Capt. Henry J. Conine, 14th N. J.; Capt. Henry W. Stults, 14th N. J.; Capt. James W. Conover, 14th N. J.; Lieut. James H. Ellis, 9th H. A.; Capt. Alfred J. Hooker, 106th N. Y.; Capt. Martin J. Camberlin, 106th N. Y.; Lieut. John Kingston, 106th N. Y.; Capt. William A. Hathaway, 110th Ohio; Lieut. Geo. O. McMillen, 110th Ohio; Lieut. Jefferson O. McMillen, 122d Ohio; Lieut. Anthony M. Martin, 87th Pa.; Lieut. Charles F. Haack, 87th Pa.; Lieut. Daniel D. Dieterich, 87th Pa.; Lieut. John F. Spangler, 87th Pa.

On the Confederate side, Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon, in his report of the battle, says: "I regret to state that my loss was heavy in both officers and men, amounting in the aggregate, as shown by tabular report of brigade commanders, to be 698." The estimate of the Confederate killed and wounded, as made from information on the Union side, amounted to about 275 killed and 435 wounded and left in hospital and private houses at Frederick City, making 710 killed and wounded, among whom Col. J. H. Lamar and Lieut.-Col. Van Valkenburg, of the 61st Ga., were killed, and Lieut.-Col. Hodges, 9th La., Hay's Brigade, was severely wounded and left in the hospital in Frederick City.

Federal killed 123, wounded 603, total	-	726.
Rebel killed 275, wounded 435,	"	- 710.
		<hr/>
		1,436

Total killed, on both sides,	-	398
" wounded, on both sides,	-	1,038
" killed and wounded,	-	<hr/>
		1,436

I do not propose to criticise the conduct of, or charge with inefficiency, any officer on the Confederate side, but it seems to me that opportunities of securing for the Southern Confederacy the most important results sought to be accomplished by their invasion into Maryland were entirely overlooked or by the battle of Monocacy prevented. For instance, in the engagement on the afternoon of July 7th, south-west of Frederick City, our line extended only from the Harper's Ferry road near Prospect Hill to the Hagerstown road, thus leaving open the road leading past Prospect Hill on the south into the Harper's Ferry road beyond the left of our line; and beyond our right, the roads running from the Hagerstown turnpike, by way of Shookstown, into the Almshouse road to Frederick City. Neither of these roads could be closed by us with our small force, and had the enemy, whilst engaging us in front with infantry and artillery, sent a body of cavalry by way of the road passing south of Prospect Hill, they could have pushed across the fields to the south side of Frederick City, near Mt. Olivet Cemetery, almost unobserved, whilst another column, moving via the Shookstown and Almshouse roads, could have entered the city on the northwest, passed down Market street, and forming a junction with the column entering by the south, could have attacked us in the rear.

Thus surrounded and cut off from reinforcements from Monocacy Junction, our whole force might have been either captured or destroyed by an attack by superior numbers both in front and rear. Then by a prompt movement to Monocacy Junction they could have defeated Gen. Tyler with his little reserve command of less, at that time, than 1,500 men. Having done this they could have plundered the city and country, and pushing on with little or no opposition have taken Washington City beyond doubt. But, again, instead of stopping in Hagerstown a day and in Frederick City

part of a day for plunder, if they had passed on and attacked us on Thursday or Friday at Monocacy, they could then have defeated us much more easily than they did; because we were not so well prepared to meet them or reinforced as we were on Saturday. They could then have reached Washington City by Saturday morning or evening, and have captured it, as it was not now properly prepared for defense till troops from the Army of the Potomac arrived on the Sunday evening or Monday morning. Had they not been delayed and badly cut up at Monocacy, and have hurried on to Washington even on Saturday afternoon, instead of remaining at Monocacy Junction and roaming over the country for plunder after the fight until Sunday, and taken the Capital, a large part of the Army of the Potomac would most likely have been called back for its recapture and defense, the Treasury with all its stored-up wealth would have been in their possession, and its money would have lifted the Confederacy out of much of its poverty and distress, whilst the announcement in Europe that they had possession of the National Capital would have secured recognition for the Southern Confederacy in England, and perhaps other countries, thus giving it a place among the nations of the world and aid that might at least have prolonged the war and greatly increased its cost both in money and human life.

It is acknowledged by those who were in it on both sides to have been one of the hardest fought and most sanguinary battles of the war, considering the numbers engaged and the short time it lasted, and for the momentous results secured by it, one of the most important.

In the light of these facts, and what might have followed from a different handling of the rebel forces before and during the fight, I have always felt that the importance of the Battle of Monocacy has never been properly recognized, nor just credit given to those engaged in it on the Union side, for

the skill and bravery with which it was fought, especially when the great disparity in numbers is taken into account.

The Government at Washington was apprised that the object of Early's raid was to attack and capture Washington City, and had the force at Monocacy been double what it was, say 12,000 or 14,000 men, instead of about 6,000, I believe that the raid would not only have failed, as it did, on account of the Battle of Monocacy, to take the Capital, but that Early's army would have been so cut up and crippled that but a small part would have gotten back to the Confederacy.

I have been told that after the Battle of Monocacy, a prominent officer who had been in most of the important battles of the war, said that the character of wounds of the men left upon the battle field of Monocacy, were as horrible as any he had seen on any other battle field, and that he noticed a fact that was of rare occurrence, that a very large number were shot in the forehead, showing that they must have been shot as they arose from behind a breast-work, and at short range from the enemy.

This short, but as General Gordon calls it, terrible engagement, proved the error of the belief so common at the beginning of the war, that one southern man was equal to three on the other side, or that bravery was the result of locality, birth or sectional pride. But that deeds of heroism and bravery were numerous alike on both sides, and that in this battle, as in every other of the Civil War, the Union soldier and the Confederate, each found in the ranks of his opponents, foemen worthy of his steel, and on both sides the finest soldiers in the world.

Whoever visited that bloody field at the close of the battle, cannot but admit, that whatever has been said unfairly and unjustly about the retreat of those who escaped the terrors of the fight, the

ghastly sights presented by the dead and wounded fully attest their heroism and patriotic devotion to duty, and the fearful struggle and terrible storm of suffering and death through which that noble little band of brave men passed, in their efforts to save the National Capital.

As an Aid-de-Camp on the staff of General Tyler, and having actively participated in all the arrangements for, as well as, in the Battle, I had the most favorable opportunities for knowing what transpired. I have therefore with confidence referred to the records of the War Department for corroboration of what I have stated. My object in writing this history has been to preserve a fair and accurate account of this battle, the importance and extent of which seem to have been so imperfectly understood; and to secure for those engaged in it the credit they so nobly won, but which has been so unjustly withheld from them. I feel sure that no one will charge that my desire to secure for myself some share of this honor is without a reasonable ground, for I then and there did my duty as it came to me, without any compensation other than that reward which every man feels in the faithful discharge of an honorable service.

[FINIS.]



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