

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

### TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF THE  
MESSAGE:

Collect

## Department of State

PLAIN

Charge Department: **XX**

Washington

Charge to

AMLEGATION,

BERN.

2377

TWENTY-THIRD

Request Swiss Govt reimburse ~~XXXXXX~~ 19,120.16

Swiss francs URTEL 3499 July 11 .

*Request to Japanese Govt for reimbursement for certain expenditures incurred in transport of relief supplies.*

*[Signature]*  
Acting

Anal.	for
Rev.	
Cat.	FLA
Dist.	

DCR - CP-C Unit

SENT

CODE ROOM  
RELEASE DESK

1945 JUL 23 PM 7 33

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

JUL 23 1945 P.M.

711.94114 Supplies/7-1145

*[Signature]* BWP:ABC *[Signature]* Correll:EHJ

7-11-45

BF

JA

A-H

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1145

CS/D  
7-11-45  
711.94114 Supplies

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
War Problems  
SPECIAL DIVISION

July 11, 1945

~~BE~~

~~JA~~

A-H

*relief supplies  
10-1845*

The attached draft telegram authorizes a further payment ~~to the Japanese Govern- ment~~ (see Department's telegram no. 2150 of June 26, 1945 to Bern, attached) in partial reimbursement of expenses said to have been incurred in transporting Allied relief supplies picked up at Nakhodka last fall by a Japanese vessel to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. The Department in its telegram to Bern no. 3582 of October 20, 1944 agreed to pay such charges.

*File 711.9414 Supplies / 6-1845*

DCR - GP C Unit

Anal. *Frank*

Rev. \_\_\_\_\_

Dst. \_\_\_\_\_

Int. \_\_\_\_\_

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~



*am* *ACL*  
SWP:ABCORRELL:EM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

MFD-1072

PLAIN

Bern

Dated July 11, 1945

Rec'd 11:08 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

US URGENT

3499, Eleventh

AMINTERESTS JAPAN

Your 3582, October 20.

Foreign Office note July 9 quotes following telegram July 4 from Gorge:

"Japanese Foreign Office requests American Government reimburse following costs (one) cost distribution relief Peking by Catholic Church 2750 yen and by Swiss Representative 2200 yen (two) cost loading relief AWA MARU Kobe 13,797 yen 33 sen total 18,747 yen 33 sen or Swiss francs 19,120.16".

HARRISON

MJK

DCR - GP-C Unit  
Dorothea M. Laurias

JUL 24 1945

FTL 721145


711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1145 11.94114 Supplies

ack 7-11  
6:42 PM '45  
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Projects  
SPECIAL DIVISION

November 19, 1945



A-R - Colonel Burgess:

It is true that with the advent of V-J Day we ceased complying with Japanese requests for reimbursement for expenditures claimed in connection with the distribution of relief supplies. However, it has not yet been settled as a matter of policy whether the remaining expenditures claimed by the Japanese will be considered in connection with reparations or whether we will consider it desirable to honor our obligation by further cash payments. Meanwhile the Department is out of pocket approximately \$142,576 for payments made to the Japanese prior to V-J Day, which, in accordance with a prior arrangement with the Red Cross, the latter was prepared to advance. Accordingly, regardless of what subsequent action may be taken in this case, the Department should seek to recover from the Red Cross the amount already advanced from official funds.

711-9414 Kuppinger 7-1145

Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr.

SPD:EDKuppinger:EHJ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

A-R

November 19, 1945

SPD - Mr. Clattenburg

Regardless of delay involved by non-despatch, hasn't the procedure outlined in the attached letter changed with the advent of V-J Day?

Should not this be clarified?

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Burgess

Attachment:  
Ltr. to Richard Allen

*3M 740. 94114 Burgess/7-1145*

*ma 3*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Projects  
SPECIAL/DIVISION

The underlying letter is a duplicate of one drafted on July 24, of which no trace can be found in the Department. It has been established, however, that the first letter did not leave the Department.



SPD:EDKuppinger:EHJ

NOV 23 1945

In Reply Refer to  
SPD

My dear Mr. Allen:

There are enclosed two copies each of telegrams dated June 5, June 18, and July 11 from the American Legation at Bern quoting the texts of communications in regard to expenses said to have been incurred by the Japanese authorities in connection with the distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody of the Allied relief supplies picked up at Nakhodka last fall by a Japanese vessel.

Upon receipt of these telegrams the Department instructed the American Legation at Bern to transfer the amounts requested to the Swiss Government for payment to the Japanese Government. In accordance with the arrangements made with Mr. John Cotton last fall, it is my understanding that the American Red Cross will wish to reimburse the Department for these payments which thus far have totaled 611,389.79 Swiss francs, the approximate dollar equivalent being \$142,576.10.

It is my further understanding that, after arriving at the proper pro rata amounts applicable in respect of the delivery of relief supplies to various categories and nationalities, the Red Cross will bill the Department for the amount due in respect of American civilian internees who received a share of this distribution.

As it is assumed further statements of expense in this regard will be received from the Japanese Government, the Department will communicate with you again on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

Donald S. Russell  
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable  
Richard F. Allen,  
American Red Cross,  
Washington, D. C.

- Enclosures: 740.94114 Supplies 6-545
1. No. 3055 from Bern, June 5, 1945.
  2. 3219 from Bern, June 18.
  3. 3499 from Bern, July 11. 7-1145

NOV 8 1945 P.M.  
NOV 15 345 P.M.

SPD:EDKuppinger:EJH

11-1-45

BF  
(Mr. Thompson)

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1145

711.94114 Supplies/7-1145  
CS/LE

NOV 2 2 15:35

A true copy of the original was sent.

WM  
JA  
JPF

Riley supplies &  
bl taken by Dr.  
Junod & Miss  
Stracher &  
Manchessa &  
ouward for  
POWs.



JUL 14 1945

In reply refer to  
SWP

RESTRICTED

My dear Captain Pence:

*re 711 94114 Supplies / 7-11-45*

I enclose for your official use a copy of telegram  
no. 2521 of July 11, 1945 from the American Embassy at  
Moscow regarding Dr. Junod and Miss Straehler and arrange-  
ments made for the transshipment of some 15 tons of  
relief supplies.

Sincerely yours,

*Bo*  
Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr.  
Assistant Chief  
Special War Problems Division

Anal.	<i>DR</i>
Rev.	<i>AB</i>
Cat.	<i>re</i>
Dist.	


Enclosure:

No. 2521 from Moscow,  
July 11, 1945.

Captain H. L. Pence,  
Relief to Prisoners of War,  
American Red Cross,  
Washington, D. C.

*CEH/D*  
JUL 13 1945 P.M.

*abc*  
SWP:ABC Correll:EHH 7-12-45




711.94114 SUPPLIES /  
7-1145

711.94114 Supplies  
OS/D 7-1145

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JULY 13, 1945  
No. 549



CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN THE MORNING NEWSPAPERS OF SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1945, WHICH DO NOT APPEAR ON THE STREETS BEFORE 8:00 P.M., E.W.T., FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1945. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

The Government of the United States has now completed its investigation of the circumstances surrounding the sinking by an American submarine of the Japanese vessel, Awa Maru, while returning, under safe conduct, from a voyage to Hongkong, Singapore, et cetera, to carry supplies for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody.

The investigation discloses that the Awa Maru was substantially complying with all conditions of the safe conduct agreement. In the circumstances the burden of making positive identification was placed upon the United States submarine. The investigation reveals that the United States was responsible for the sinking of the Awa Maru. The Government of the United States has acknowledged responsibility to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government in a telegram dated June 29, 1945, and suggested that, in view of the complex nature of the question of indemnity demanded by the Japanese, this matter be deferred until the end of the war.

- - -

On April 11, 1945, the Department of State announced in Press Release No. 331 that it had been informed by the Navy Department that the Japanese vessel, Awa Maru, traveling under Allied safe conduct had been sunk by submarine action.

On May 29, 1945, in Press Release No. 463 the Department released the text of a Japanese protest dated April 26th as well as the text of this Government's reply dated May 18th. In this reply, this Government notified the Japanese Government that an investigation was then in progress to assemble all the relevant information on the sinking and notified the Japanese Government that the United States Government could not accept, prior to the judicial determination of the question of responsibility, the charge of the Japanese Government that responsibility for the disaster lay with the United States Government.

Out: [Handwritten signature]

JUL 20 1945

On [Stamp]

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1345

711.94114 Supplies/7-1345

- 2 -

On May 16, 1945, (received May 30th), the Japanese Government formally demanded that the United States Government apologize to the Japanese Government for the sinking; punish those responsible; and indemnify the Japanese Government for the loss incurred.

The text of the Japanese statement dated May 16, 1945, transmitted through the Swiss Government, is as follows:

"With reference to the protest which the Japanese Government lodged with the United States Government through the Swiss Government under the date of the 26th of April against attacking and sinking of the AWA MARU, the Japanese Government while reserving all rights not hereby exercised to take any necessary action to cope with this violation of a solemn undertaking, make the following demands and request the United States Government to inform the Japanese Government without delay whether they are prepared promptly to comply with the same. Namely (one) that the United States Government apologize to the Japanese Government; (two) that the United States Government punish persons responsible and inform the Japanese Government thereof; (three) that the United States Government pay indemnities for the loss of lives of the crew and the passengers for the injury done to the survivors and for the loss of the vessel and of the goods which were on board.

"The Japanese Government by their note of 12th April addressed to Swiss Minister in Tokyo requested the United States Government to inform them fully of the circumstances in which the AWA MARU was attacked and sunk and to take adequate measures for the repatriation of the survivors at the earliest possible date. The Japanese Government request an early reply."

The text of this Government's communication of June 29 follows:

"The Japanese Government's further communication dated May 16 concerning the sinking of the Awa Maru has been received by the United States Government, which makes the following responses to the points raised therein:

"(1) The United States Government, in its communications forwarded through the Swiss Government dated April 10 and May 18, 1945, has already officially expressed its deep regret that this incident has occurred and that there was such a heavy loss of life in connection therewith.

"The official investigation into this disaster has now been concluded. It has been established that at the time the ship was sunk she was proceeding at night in a fog. There is, however, evidence that she was showing the prescribed lights. It appears that the ship was about eight miles off the course previously announced and was about 32 miles ahead of her predicted position. However, the difference between the ship's predicted position and the scene of the disaster is not considered unreasonable. The Commanding Officer of the submarine did not see the Awa Maru prior to or after she had been torpedoed, the attack having been made by means other than visual, which fact of itself disproves the charge that the attack was

willful

-3-

willful and deliberate. However, since it appears that the Awa Maru was complying substantially with the conditions of the safe conduct agreement, the burden of establishing identity was that of the commander of the American submarine and in view of his failure to do so, the United States Government acknowledges responsibility for the sinking of the vessel.

"(2) Disciplinary action is being taken with respect to the commander of the American submarine concerned.

"(3) Because of the complex nature of the question of indemnity, this aspect of the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily during the period of hostilities. It is suggested, therefore, that the matter of indemnity be deferred until the termination of hostilities. The Japanese Government may be assured that the United States Government will be prepared at that time to discuss all phases of the question of indemnity and will approach the question with an attitude of complete fairness and without regard to the political situation then existing.

"The survivor of the sinking, who is now being cared for by American authorities, will be repatriated to Japan as soon as arrangements are perfected for further exchanges of nationals between Japan and the Allies."

In taking this action the United States Government not only took into consideration the facts as determined by the investigation but was also guided by the very real necessity of doing everything in its power to insure that future shipments of food, clothing, and medical supplies to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody would be facilitated by the Japanese Government.

Ever since the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, the Government of the United States with the other interested governments has made every effort to maintain a flow of essential relief supplies to Allied individuals in Japanese custody to supplement the inadequate supplies being furnished them. During 1942 and 1943 in connection with the exchange operations some relief supplies were sent in.

In 1944, there were no exchanges. However, the United States Government, deeply conscious of its responsibility to these unfortunate individuals, actively continued negotiations through the Swiss Government with a view to working out mutually satisfactory arrangements for the delivery by the Japanese of further relief supplies. These negotiations finally resulted in an arrangement whereby through the cooperation of the Soviet authorities, such supplies were picked up at Nakhodka by a Japanese vessel. This vessel traveled under safe conduct granted by this Government on behalf of itself and the other Allied governments. A portion of the shipment was distributed to American and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan. Subsequently the Japanese asked for and received safe conduct for two vessels, one to proceed to Shanghai to carry a portion of the remainder

of the

- 4 -

of the supplies for prisoners of war in that area and the other to proceed to the southern areas (Hong Kong, Singapore, et cetera) for a similar purpose. The vessel despatched to Shanghai completed its voyage. The other vessel, the Awa Maru, after carrying supplies for distribution to the southern areas, was sunk on its return trip to Japan.

The United States Government in accepting the responsibility for the sinking of the Awa Maru hopes that the Japanese Government will be willing to accept further shipments of relief supplies for distribution to Allied nationals detained by the Japanese.

\* \* \*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

68

Bern

Dated July 13, 1945

Rec'd 10:47 p.m.

NC-119

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Secretary of State

Washington

3553, July 13, 3 p.m.

JAPAN AMERICAN INTERESTS

Legation's A821 June 21 and previous

Foreign Office note July 11 gives following sub-

stance interview July 3 Gorge and Suzuki. Gorge drew attention grave uneasiness food problem POWS and civilian internees result existing food shortage.

Gorge recalled question regarding civilian internees capable settlement by further repatriation. However situation POWS doubtless worsen unless supplies received via Siberia. Gorge insisted that in authorizing transport by AWA MARU food, medicines, other articles lacking POWS Japanese government had not (repeat not) shown generosity but merely taken measure permitting it to substitute this measure for its obligations toward POWS whose minimum well-being properly assurable by Japanese.

Gorge had impression Suzuki recognized justice these statements

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION JUL 14 1945 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS JUL 20 1945 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1345

711.94114 Supplies/7-1345

Form with fields for ANAL, REV, and a signature line with the name 'L. J. Garrison' written vertically.

X

~~-2-~~ #3553, July 13, 3 p.m., from Bern 69

statements but latter nevertheless recalled difficulties raised by numerous Japanese circles as result employment AWA MARU this purpose. These circles believed Japan itself should assume all responsibility maintenance POWS its proper means. Following torpedoing AWA MARU Suzuki anticipated stronger opposition and Gorge unable envision presently sending another vessel Nakhodka.

Suzuki failed comment regarding manner remedy situation. Gorge believes despite efforts Japanese Government increase production potatoes, grave food shortage may be anticipated and internees and POWS will suffer as all Japanese population.

HARRISON

WMB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

*Handwritten signatures and initials: COT, [unclear], [unclear], [unclear]*

EMD-477

PLAIN

Bern

Dated July 14, 1945

Rec'd 9:19 p.m.

*DCR*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3567, Fourteenth

AMINTERESTS JAPAN

Your 2188, June 29

*Announce*  
SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION  
JUL 16 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Supplies / 5-3045*

FONOFF note July 12 states Jap Leg Bern acknowledged receipt July 6 American response.

HARRISON

JT

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1445

*DR - SP-C Unit*  
*Dorothea M. Laurion*  
Anal. ....  
Rev. *MB* .....  
Cat. ....  
Dist. ....

JUL 20 1945

FILED

X

*711.94114 Supplies / 7-1445*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

DE3-496

PLAIN

Bern

Dated July 14, 1945

Rec'd 9:55 p.m.

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION  
JUL 16 1945  
Crisp  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington

3568, Fourteenth

AMINTERESTS FAR EAST

Your 2063, June 16 and Legation's 3475, July

by SV  
war - { Bryan Sweet  
          { Keeble  
Red Cross - 2  
Hans - 2  
Justice - Kelly

JUL 17 1945  
9:56  
9.

711.94114 Supplies  
17-945

FONOFF note July 12 gives following information from Swiss Consulate Bangkok:

Contact between Consulate and POW camps Thailand not (repeat not) yet established, Consul not (repeat not) in position presently provide information desired. He can, nevertheless, state to present no (repeat no) parcels distributed by Jap authorities POW and civilian internee camps.

Consulate continuing efforts establish contact but anticipates delay.

HARRISON

JT

DCR - GP-C Unit  
Anal. *[Signature]*  
Rev. *[Signature]*  
Cat. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dist. \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 20 1945

RECEIVED

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1445

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

EIM-743  
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Moscow via Army

Dated July 16, 1945

Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

~~576-448P~~  
~~FP~~

DOR

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION  
JUL 16 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2584, July 16, 8 p.m.

Clubb has informed us the 15 tons POW supplies will be shipped in baggage car on train leaving Vladivostok July 14 and is expected to arrive Otpor by time Junod's arrival there which is scheduled for July 21. I feel that Clubb has done good job in getting this shipment off and cleared in short time allowed.

(Copy in dossier)

KENNAN

DU

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL  
File  
JUL 19 1945  
M.V.O.  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To: Dorothea M. Laurion  
By: [Signature]

RECORDS BRANCH  
JUL 16 1945  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
X

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1645/11.94114 Supplies/7-1645



SECRET

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



19 July 1945

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
JUL 20 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Selection of Replacement for Japanese Ship AWA MARU.

Reference: SWNCC 140/2.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the letter of 23 June 1945 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, in which it was requested that a suitable ship be selected to be offered to the Japanese Government in replacement of the AWA MARU and a description of the selected ship be furnished the Department of State.

It is recommended that, if a vessel be offered the Japanese Government in replacement of the AWA MARU, it be a troopship of the U.S. Maritime Commission category designated as C4SB2 type (Marine class). There are presently available eight vessels in this category and their characteristics compare with those of the AWA MARU as follows:

	C4SB2	AWA MARU
Gross tonnage	11,758	11,249
Draft	22 ft.	30 ft.
Deadweight tonnage	5,379	---
Speed	17 knots	16 knots
Length	520 ft.	508 ft.
Beam	72 ft.	41 ft. (?)
Approximate passenger capacity	2,500	---
Radius in miles	14,000	---
Year built	1944	About 1940

These vessels are now owned by the War Shipping Administration. A request for transfer of one of these vessels to the Japanese Government should be directed

711.94114 SUPPLIES  
/7-1645  
711.94114 Supplies

AUG 3-1945

Confidential File

AR 894.85

2394

SECRET

DCR - GP-C Unit

Anal. *Dorothea M. Lear*

Rev. \_\_\_\_\_

Col. *J m w*


Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

to the War Shipping Administration with a proviso that the final selection of the vessel be made from the C4SB2 type by the War and Navy Departments at the time of transfer.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concurs in the above views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

  
JOHN D. HICKERSON  
Acting Chairman

- 2 -

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

~~SECRET~~

DOR

AB-859

PLAIN

Born

Dated July 16, 1945

Rec'd 8:35 p.m.


Secretary of State  
Washington

3586, Sixteenth

AMINTERESTS FAR EAST

Legs 3475, July 9

*711.94114 Supplies/7-945*



711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1645

FONOFF note July 13 states Suzuki confirms to Gorge information according which parcels unloaded Saigon and all distributed POWS. Suzuki added POW bureau obtained usual receipts which would not fail deliver when received to Intercross delegation.

HARRISON

MMI

RECORDS SEARCH

*Dorothea M. Laurion*

Rev. *AB*

Dist. ....

JUL 20 1945

FILED

*711.94114 Supplies/7-1645*

X

*Cleared for publication in AKC Bulletin*

THE SINKING OF THE AWA MARU

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION  
JUL 19 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The United States government has accepted full responsibility for the sinking, last April, of the Japanese ship Awa Maru, which was returning to Japan under an Allied safe conduct after delivering relief supplies for American and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. These were the supplies, shipped from the United States, which had been picked up by the Japanese last November at a Soviet Pacific port.

In a telegram sent, on June 29, through the Protecting Power (Switzerland), to the Japanese government, the State Department disclosed that disciplinary action was being taken against the Navy commander responsible for the sinking.

An investigation had ~~disclosed~~ <sup>revealed</sup> that the Awa Maru, which was returning from Hong Kong and Singapore, was "substantially complying with all the conditions of the safe conduct."

In announcing that disciplinary action was being taken, and promising an indemnity after the war, the State Department said that the United States was

*Italic*

guided by the very real necessity of doing everything in its power to insure that future shipments of food, clothing, and medical supplies to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody would be facilitated by the Japanese government.

The State Department also expressed the hope that the Japanese government would be willing to accept future shipments of relief supplies for distribution to American and other Allied nationals detained by Japan.

*Descriptive entry*

REV. *Therese M. Laurion*  
*aut*

JUL 19 1945

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1645  
REC'D

*711.94114 Supplies*  
*7-1645*  
*Red*

Prairieton Ind.  
July, 16, 1945.

Acting Sec. of State  
Joseph Green  
RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
JUL 20 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Luk 7 76  
EX: 217

Dear sir, 1945 JUL 19 PM 2 07

Our only son, 1st Lt. George W. Smith, O-374301, a Liberator bomber pilot has been missing in action since Dec. 21, 1943, when his plane went down in the ocean in the Eastern Marshal Islands. Five of the ten men crew were seen in life rafts. If any survived, undoubtedly they are being held prisoners by the Japanese in those by-passed Marshal Islands (Jaluit, Wotji, Maloelap, and Mille)

RECORDS BRANCH  
Recently we read of the condition of the Japanese which our navy permitted the Japs to evacuate from the enemy held Wake Is. and we realize all the more the starving condition of our own American boys on those enemy held by-passed islands.

Isn't there some way that the richest and most powerful country in the world can get food and medicine into the hands of these heroic American boys before it is entirely too late? Can't ships with Red Cross markings with Red Cross supplies go? Or can't supplies be parachuted to them? Surely there is some way - we know they are in desperate need. We can not fail them - they gave of their utmost to their country. No doubt but there's plenty of American boys waiting there for the help from their country.

As a mother, I plead and urge you to do every thing possible about it. It means so much. My thoughts are always with them. May God direct and guide your undertakings.

Gratefully, Mrs. George W. Smith

711.94114 SUPPL  
711.94114 SUPPL

111 31700

In reply refer to  
SWP 711.94114 Supplies/7-1645

My dear Mrs. Smith:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 16, 1945 suggesting that steps be taken to deliver relief supplies to American airmen who may be held as prisoners on by-passed Pacific islands still occupied by the Japanese.

The enclosed information sheet and press release contain information with respect to the varied and continuous efforts made by this Department and other interested agencies, as well as the American Red Cross, to dispatch relief supplies to the Far East for American and other Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians to supplement the inadequate diet furnished them by the detaining Power. These efforts are not being relaxed and all feasible means are being explored with a view to ameliorating the condition of these unfortunate persons. However, the assent and cooperation of the Japanese authorities are essential in order to put such plans into operation. Thus far it has been possible to secure Japanese assent only with respect to the operations mentioned in the enclosures to this letter, namely two shipments of supplies by vessels engaged in the exchanges of civilian personnel between the United States and Japan in 1942 and 1943 and the shipment of relief supplies to a Soviet port where they were picked up by a Japanese ship in the fall of 1944 and subsequently distributed by other Japanese ships, one of which was the Awa Maru.

The foregoing has reference particularly to those areas where American and other Allied prisoners of war are known to be held. It is unfortunately the case that

the

DCR - GP-C Unit	
Anat.	Mrs. George W. Smith,
Reva.	Prairieton, Indiana.
Cat.	
Dist.	

SWP 711.94114 Supplies/7-1645



-2-

the Japanese authorities have not notified this Government in respect of all areas where it is thought American prisoners may be held. That applies particularly to the islands mentioned in your letter. In the circumstances there are no means for ascertaining on which islands American prisoners may be held and until such time as that information may become available and the Japanese agree to the distribution of relief supplies by International Red Cross representatives or other neutrals, the probabilities would be that if supplies were dropped indiscriminately on the by-passed islands, the Japanese themselves would benefit and we would have no assurance that Americans who might be held on such islands would receive any of the supplies.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:


Eldred D. Kuppinger  
Assistant Chief  
Special War Problems Division

Enclosures:

1. Information sheet.
2. Press release,  
July 13, 1945.

OR  
JUL 30 1945

*[Handwritten initials]*  
SWP:EDKuppinger:EHJ n 7-26-45  
*[Handwritten initials]*



*SWP*  
*DCR*

*JUL 20 1945*

In reply refer to  
SWP

My dear Mr. Morrow:

I refer to previous correspondence regarding Dr. Junod and Miss Straehler and enclose a paraphrase of telegram no. 2584 of July 16, 1945 from the American Embassy at Moscow regarding relief supplies being shipped to them from Vladivostok.

Sincerely yours,

Eldred D. Kuppinger  
Assistant Chief  
Special War Problems Division

Enclosure:

No. 2584 from Moscow,  
July 16, 1945.

*711.94114 Supplies/7-16-45*

DCR - GP-C Unit	
Anal.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Col.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dist.	

Mr. Graham Morrow,  
Canadian Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.

*JUL 20 1945 P.M.*

*[Signature]*

SWP:ABC Correll:EHJ 7-19-45

A true copy of the signed original.

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1645  
*711.94114 Supplies/7-1645*

July 20, 1945

In reply refer to  
SWP

My dear Mr. Ranken:

I refer to previous correspondence regarding Dr. Junod and Miss Straehler and enclose a paraphrase of telegram no. 2584 of July 16, 1945 from the American Embassy at Moscow regarding relief supplies being shipped to them from Vladivostok.

Sincerely yours,

Eldred D. Kuppinger  
Assistant Chief  
Special War Problems Division

Enclosure:

No. 2584 from Moscow,  
July 16, 1945.

Mr. G. R. Ranken,  
British Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.

SWP:ABC Correll:EHJ 7-19-45

*711.94114 Supplies/7-1645*

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Anal.	<i>[Signature]</i>
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*JUL 20 1945 P.M.*

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1645

*711.94114 Supplies/7-1645*

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

**DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION**

PEM-1229

PLAIN

Bern

Dated July 17, 1945

Rec'd 9:25 p.m.

*DC/R*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3599, Seventeenth

AMERICAN INTERESTS JAPAN AWA MARU YOUR 2188 JUNE 29  
FONOFF note July 16 states Swiss Legation Tokyo  
communication July 10 response American Government to  
Jap FONOFF.

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
JUL 18 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Supplies  
75-7095*

711.94114 SUPPLIES / 7-1745

HARRISON

CSB

DCR - GP-C Unit	
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Rev.	<i>113</i>
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Dist.	

RECORDS BRANCH  
DC/R

JUL 18 1945

CENTRAL SERVICES  
DIVISION OF  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

JUL 20 1945

FILED

*X*

~~STOP~~

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
JUL 19 1945  
DEPT TO DCR FOR DEPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**BRITISH EMBASSY** DCR  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**  
[ZONE 8]

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
JUL 20 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File

OR  
RECORDS  
DC/R  
BRANCH

July 18, 1945.

1945 JUL 20 AM 9 35

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

3/67/45

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1845711.94114 Supplies

My dear Mr. Clattenburg,

I am sending you herewith the full text of the Swiss note (together with its reference) an excerpt of which I handed to you about a week ago, regarding Minister Suzuki's comments to the Swiss representative in Tokyo regarding the effect of the sinking of the "Awa Maru" on the prospects of further exchanges of United States and British nationals with Japan.

Yours sincerely,

*G. R. Ranken*

G. R. Ranken.

Anal. *Dorothea M. Laurion*  
Mr. A. E. Clattenburg, Jr.,  
Special War Problems Division,  
Cat. Department of State,  
Dist. Washington, D. C.

SEP 8 1947

FILED

OS  
17  
1945

B. 24.GBr(15) 6 A/1.- CA/Ro.

Faisant suite à sa note B.24.GBr (15)6 A/1 CA/Ro (52236) du 20 Octobre 1944 concernant l'échange anglo-japonais, le Département Politique fédéral, Division des Intérêts étrangers, a l'honneur de faire savoir à la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique que M. Gorgé, Ministre de Suisse à Tokio, a eu récemment l'occasion de d'entretenir de la question des échanges anglo-japonais et américano-japonais avec le Secrétaire du Service des Intérêts étrangers du Ministère japonais des Affaires étrangères, et au cours de cette entrevue, il a insisté pour que le Japon lui donne une réponse en cette matière.

M. Gorgé souligne qu'il ne lui a pas été possible, au cours de cet échange de vues, d'obtenir de déclaration positive, mais que son interlocuteur lui a confirmé une fois de plus que les Autorités nippones compétentes ne négligeront pas le problème et il a même ajouté qu'on pouvait espérer qu'une décision interviendra bientôt sur la base d'une des propositions américaines envisageant d'utiliser un bateau neutre qui serait repris d'un port déterminé par un équipage japonais. Le fonctionnaire japonais ajouta qu'on avait longuement envisagé la possibilité d'utiliser un bateau de faible tonnage qui se serait rendu à Goa, mais que ce plan avait finalement dû être abandonné parce que le bateau n'était plus disponible.

Enfin, l'interlocuteur de M. Gorgé déclara que les Autorités japonaises examinaient en particulier la possibilité de réaliser un deuxième échange britannique qui devrait précéder un nouvel échange américain, car jusqu'ici un seul échange a pu être effectué entre l'Empire britannique et le Japon. M. Gorgé télégraphie que son entretien a été difficile, car le fonctionnaire japonais avançait continuellement le prétexte que les Autorités militaires étaient seules compétentes.

Le Département saisit cette occasion de renouveler à la Légation de Sa Majesté les assurances de sa haute considération.

A la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique  
Berne, le 26 mars 1945.

C  
O  
P  
Y

B.24.GBr(15)6 A/1 - CA/Me

17770

Comme suite à sa note B.24.GBr (15)6 A/1 CA/Ro (12248) du 26 mars 1945, le Département Politique fédéral, Division des Intérêts étrangers, a l'honneur de faire savoir à la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique que M. Gorgé, Ministre de Suisse à Tokio, a repris récemment avec le Ministre Suzuki, directeur de la Section des Intérêts étrangers au Ministère japonais des Affaires étrangères, la question d'une nouvelle évacuation de ressortissants britanniques et américains.

Au cours de cet entretien, M. Suzuki a laissé entendre qu'il avait espéré trouver une solution pratique pour un second échange entre l'Empire britannique et le Japon et, plus tard, pour un troisième échange entre les Etats-Unis et le Japon, mais que tous les projets de réalisation de ces échanges avaient été remis en question à la suite du torpillage du navire AWA MARU.

Berne, le 5 mai 1945.

A la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique  
B E R N E.

~~HP~~ ~~BP~~ ~~AD~~ DC/R

UNRESTRICTED

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 12140

Via Airmail Pouch

AMERICAN LEGATION

Bern, July 19, 1945.

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 AUG 4 AM 8 10

Subject: American Interests - Manchuria  
Transmission "Far East Memo  
No. 19 USA".

CC/R  
RECORDS BRANCH

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS  
DIVISION  
AUG 6 - 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The American Minister at Bern has the honor to enclose, for the Department's information and records, a copy of "Far East Memo No. 19 USA" prepared on July 16, 1945, by the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva. This transmits letters of appreciation sent by American and British prisoners of war detained at the Hoten prisoner of war camp to the camp commandant regarding the distribution of Red Cross food parcels.

The Legation received two copies of the attached memorandum under cover of a letter dated July 16, 1945, from the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva.

Enclosure:

Copy of "Far East Memo No. 19  
USA " - with original of despatch  
only.

File No. 814.2  
TJH/mak  
In quintuplicate to Department

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-1945

FILED

AUG 14 1945

CS/D

711.94114

DCR - GP-C Unit  
Anal. *[Signature]*  
Rev. *[Signature]*  
Cat. *[Signature]*  
Dist. *[Signature]*

*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*



Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1210  
dated July 19/45 from the American  
Delegation, Bern.

Hôtel Beau-Séjour  
Geneva

16th July 1945.

Subject: Relief distribution at Hoten POW Camp - Letters  
of appreciation.

Our Delegation in Tokyo transmitted us the  
texts of the following letters, addressed to the camp comman-  
dant and communicated to our Delegation by the Japanese PIWAR :

1. First-lieutenant William D. THOMPSON, American - Date 18.8.1944

"The distribution is fair, honest, impartial and equal to  
all War Prisoners here. An accurate record is kept of the  
receipt and issue of all articles, both by the Japanese  
Officer in charge and by the Prisoners Officer in charge.  
The Japanese Officer in charge gives full consideration  
to requests pertaining to issue of these articles."

2. Major S.H. HANKINS, American - Date 16.8.1944

"The distribution of American Red Cross food parcels under  
the direction of Lieutenant Murata has been satisfactory.  
The present system which require that each man receive  
exactly the same as the other man is a good method and as  
much as the opening and sorting of contents is done by  
the Prisoners of War everyone is entirely satisfied. We  
are permitted to keep an accurate record of this dis-  
tribution. I wish to also acknowledge receipt of informa-  
tion of the arrival of American Red Cross insulin sent  
from this camp to Zentsuji POW Camp early in July at the  
request of the International Red Cross Committee Represen-  
tative in Japan."

3. Major Robert PEATY, British - Date 18.8.1944

"The distribution of Red Cross parcels is being carried out  
to the general satisfaction of the entire camp and all  
Prisoners of War recognize that the methods employed are  
impartial and designed to insure that every man received  
exactly the same as his comrades."

4. Lieutenant Aim GREIG, British -

"I have attended the opening of Red Cross packages in this  
camp from the beginning to this date and I am well satis-  
fied with the manner in which the Japanese Staff are dis-  
tributing the foodstuffs. This method assures an absolutely  
impartial distribution and by the adoption of a system of  
daily issues insures that the foodstuffs are consumed at  
one so that the greatest possible benefit shall accrue to  
the individuals over a period. Every opportunity is accorded  
to Prisoners of War Officers of checking the quantities as  
the packages are opened and of keeping track of distributio

- 2 -

## 5. FW FELLZER, US Navy -

" In my opinion the present method of distribution in the best arrived at under existing circumstances. Were the packages distributed intact many difficulties would arise. Daily issues does much towards taking the monotony out of our daily lives like having a birthday every day. The impartial and fair view taken by the camp staff under whose personal supervision the articles are distributed meets with my approval. It insures every item being delivered to the men in equal shares."

## 6. H.R. ROSS, American -

" I wish to express my satisfaction and pleasure concerning the fair and equal distribution of American Red Cross food-stuffs being issued to men of this camp also highly commend special attention given to hospital patients in being given special foods and liberal access to library books."

For the International Red Cross  
Committee

H. Wasmer  
Manager of the Relief Division.

*Emergency management  
office for  
from*

PD TO WA AND OWI

*Press Release*

P22135 SAIGON IN ENGLISH AT 6:00 AM SATURDAY 7/21 TO AMERICAN FORCES

IN THE PHILIPPINES

MICHAEL TREVOR, COMMENTARY

(TEXT EXCERPT) THEY, THE UNITED STATES, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS  
IS THE BEST OF ALL THE CIVILIZED NATIONS IN THE WORLD. JAPAN ALSO ACCORD  
ING TO THESE AMERICANS, IS A BARBAROUS NATION. THEN WHY SHOULD THE  
AMERICANS OR THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVILIZED NATIONS

ATTACK HOSPITAL SHIPS AND INDULGE IN INDISCRIMINATE BOMBING ATTACKS ON

CIVILIANS ...? ON THE OTHER HAND WHY IS THE SO-CALLED BARBAROUS

NATION, JAPAN, NOT ATTACKING HOSPITAL SHIPS OR NON-MILITARY

This Document  
Must Be Returned  
RM/R  
Central  
711.94114-SUPPLIES/7-2145  
CS/PG

DC/R
ATTACK
Re: CIVILIANS
On: JAPAN

*711.94114*

TARGETS? MAYBE THE BOOT IS ON THE WRONG FOOT.

THERE IS ALSO A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT WHICH BELIEVES THAT VIOLENCE SHOULD BE MET WITH VIOLENCE. CONTRARY TO ALL EXPECTATIONS, JAPAN HAS NOT ADOPTED THIS PRINCIPLE, THOUGH SHE HAS EVERY RIGHT TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HAVE ATTACKED AND SUNK JAPANESE HOSPITAL SHIPS THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT RETALIATED LIKEWISE. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS ARE BOMBING JAPAN'S HOME MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND ... RIGHT AND LEFT, JAPANESE HAVE REFRAINED FROM FOLLOWING SUIT.

THEN HERE IS THE GLARING EXAMPLE IN THE "AWA MARU" CASE ITSELF. WITH THE SINKING OF THE SHIP THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES HAD THE RIGHT TO REFUSE THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMFORT GIFTS AMONG THE AMERICAN INTERNEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR UNTIL THE UNITED STATES HAD COME OUT OPENLY WITH AN ADMISSION. BUT DID THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DO THIS?

*Applied 7-21-45*

WHILE I AM ON THIS SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THE SO-CALLED AMERICAN STRATEGICAL BOMBING OF JAPAN. IN AN AERIAL ATTACK A BOMB (LEAVING?) ON FOR ITS TARGET MAY SHIFT AND HIT A NON-MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CONTRARY TO THE INTENTION OF THE RAIDER. THIS HAPPENS QUITE OFTEN. BUT THIS EXCUSE CANNOT ANY MORE BE USED BY THE AMERICANS WHO ARE TODAY INTENTIONALLY AIMING AT THE OUTSIDE ... OF CIVILIANS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS.

FOR INSTANCE, THE AMERICAN TWENTIETH AIR FORCE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT TWO-THIRDS OF THE CITY OF GIFU IN JAPAN HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ASHES BY B-TWENTY-NINES. GIFU ... (AS PHOOEY-FOO?) IS A BARBARIAN WORD. THE CITY OF GIFU IS NOTED FOR ITS ... PAINTING AND ITS (ACTING?). IT IS A SMALL-SIZED CITY AND A COMMERCIAL CITY. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION IN THE AMERICAN ATTACK UNLESS THE AMERICAN RAIDERS WENT ON THIS ASSAULT OF KILLING, MAIMING AND RENDERING HOMELESS THE CIVILIANS OF JAPAN.

AND YET THE DIABOLITICAL TREACHERY METED OUT TO THE HARMLESS CITY OF GIFU DOES NOT STAND ALONE IN ITS ... AND DESTRUCTION AGAINST THE AMERICAN INDISCRIMINATE FIRE-BOMB ATTACKS. AN AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM GUAM ON JULY THE TENTH PROUDLY ADMITTED THAT THE B-TWENTY-NINE ATTACKS ON JAPAN PROPER HAD PRACTICALLY LAID TWENTY CITIES IN ASHES, AND THE TOTAL AREA BURNED OUT IN THIS ATTACK WAS ESTIMATED AT THIRTEEN HUNDRED

ON JAPAN PROPER HAD PRACTICALLY LAID TWENTY CITIES IN ASHES, AND THE TOTAL AREA BURNED OUT IN THIS ATTACK WAS ESTIMATED AT THIRTEEN HUNDRED SQUARE MILES, WHERE THE POPULATION INVOLVED WAS GIVEN AS SEVENTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND. THESE FIGURES HAVE BEEN GROSSLY EXAGGERATED, OF COURSE, BUT THIS PROVES THAT THE OBJECT BEHIND THE AMERICANS' SO-CALLED STRATEGICAL BOMBING IS THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIANS WITH NO DISTINCTION TO RACE, SEX, OR AGE.

THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO POINT OUT AGAIN THAT IN THE FACE OF THESE INHUMAN ATTACKS THE JAPANESE NATION HAS CARRIED ITSELF MAGNIFICENTLY. IF THESE BARBAROUS ATTACKS HAVE DONE ANYTHING TO ALTER THE FEELINGS OF THE JAPANESE NATION, THEY HAVE ONLY INCREASED THEIR ANGER, HEIGHTENED THEIR MORALE, AND FANNED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE THEIR REVENGE ON THE . . . .

BUT WHY DON'T THE AMERICANS CONDUCT THEIR FIGHTING . . . ? WHY DON'T THE AMERICANS LIMIT THEIR ATTACKS TO COMBATANTS AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS? IF THEY CANNOT FIGHT DECENTLY, THEY WOULDN'T YOU SAY THAT THE GUARANTEE OF SECURITY WHICH THE AMERICANS DISPLAYED IN THE CASE OF THE "AWA MARU" WAS NOT WORTH THE PAPER IT WAS WRITTEN ON? (VVS)

WHILE I AM ON THIS SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THE SO-CALLED AMERICAN STRATEGICAL BOMBING OF JAPAN. IN AN AERIAL ATTACK A BOMB (LEAVING?) ON FOR ITS TARGET MAY SHIFT AND HIT A NON-MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CONTRARY TO THE INTENTION OF THE RAIDER. THIS HAPPENS QUITE OFTEN. BUT THIS EXCUSE CANNOT ANY MORE BE USED BY THE AMERICANS WHO ARE TODAY INTENTIONALLY AIMING AT THE OUTSIDE ... OF CIVILIANS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS.

FOR INSTANCE, THE AMERICAN TWENTIETH AIR FORCE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT TWO-THIRDS OF THE CITY OF GIFU IN JAPAN HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ASHES BY B-TWENTY-NINES. GIFU ... (AS PHOOEY-FOO?) IS A BARBARIAN WORD. THE CITY OF GIFU IS NOTED FOR ITS ... PAINTING AND ITS (ACTING?). IT IS A SMALL-SIZED CITY AND A COMMERCIAL CITY. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION IN THE AMERICAN ATTACK UNLESS THE AMERICAN RAIDERS WENT ON THIS ASSAULT OF KILLING, MAIMING AND RENDERING HOMELESS THE CIVILIANS OF JAPAN.

AND YET THE DIABOLITICAL TREACHERY METED OUT TO THE HARMLESS CITY OF GIFU DOES NOT STAND ALONE IN ITS ... AND DESTRUCTION AGAINST THE AMERICAN INDISCRIMINATE FIRE-BOMB ATTACKS. AN AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM GUAM ON JULY THE TENTH PROUDLY ADMITTED THAT THE B-TWENTY-NINE ATTACKS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

War Problems  
SPECIAL DIVISION

July 25, 1945

FE - Mr. Ballantine:

My dear Mr. Ballantine:

Mr. Kuppinger of my Division reports a recent conversation he had with Mr. Bagge, formerly Swedish Minister to Tokyo. His memorandum on the subject I am attaching for your information with the suggestion that Mr. Grew may possibly be interested in it as well. Attention is particularly invited to the last paragraph of the memorandum.


Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JUL 26 1945  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

E. A. P.  
AUG 24 1945

SWP:EAPlitt:OBO



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WAR PROBLEMS  
SPECIAL/DIVISION



memo KFE  
7-25-45  
EAP  
etc

DCR

July 24, 1945

CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER BAGGE

On the afternoon of June 14 Mr. Bagge, formerly Swedish Minister to Tokyo, called on me at the Red Cross office in Paris. He had returned from Japan last winter after having served for many years in that country.

He emphasized the increasing food shortages in Japan and the resultant need for relief shipments for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. He then mentioned the unfortunate Awa Maru incident and suggested the urgent necessity for overcoming the impasse which had arisen as a result of that incident. In a rather indirect way he seemed to suggest that our only hope, in his opinion, was to capitulate completely to the Japanese demands. I commented that I thought we were going as far as American public opinion would stand in acknowledging full responsibility, expressing our sincere regrets, and giving assurances of our intention to settle in a just manner the question of indemnity at the termination of hostilities.

He then expressed his preoccupation at the possibility of Japanese savagery being vented upon prisoners as the tide of war went increasingly against the Japanese. In that connection he brought up the Emperor question and expressed the view that any discussion of that question, particularly from the point of view of deposing the Emperor and any statements, cartoons, etc., which tend to belittle the Emperor, were extremely dangerous from the viewpoint of possible repercussions involving the lives of our prisoners.

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-2445 OS/EG

711.94114 Supplies/7-2445



WPK

SWP:EDKuppinger:EHJ

arc

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
MEX. MAILING  
JUL 30 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 26, 1945

*Informed 8/11 - Zacharias - He will get in touch with OWI*

*memo to Mr. Platt 5/6/45*

*WPK*

*file*

The Honorable  
Archibald MacLeish  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Archie:

Reference is made to the attached file on a proposed broadcast concerning the Awa Maru. We have gone over this matter very carefully and have concluded that it would be unwise to make such a broadcast at this time for the following reasons:

1. While the broadcast does represent a refutation of the Japanese official allegations that American conduct with respect to the Awa Maru was "inhuman", most of the tone of the broadcast, unlike the general tone of the Zacharias' scripts, is that of two countries at peace with each other, viz: "It is the desire of the United States that Japan accept this proposal as one prompted by the same humanitarian instincts as those which prompted our sending relief to your stricken earthquake victims some 25 years ago and which, for reasons of international amity and respect, later caused us to provide a cruiser to return to Japan the ashes of your Ambassador Hiroshi Saito." "If the Japanese Government fails to do everything in its power to insure the safety and well-being of American prisoners and refuses fully to cooperate with the American authorities in their efforts to send relief supplies to the prisoners, the resentment of the American people arising from the Japanese Government's attitude will be bound adversely to affect relations between the two countries for many years to come."

2. In view of the recently announced intention by the Japanese Government to permit visits of the International Red Cross to Japanese prison camps it is felt that the implied threat that "Time is running short" would be misconstrued, and, regarded as a threat, would not serve to improve the position of American prisoners of war.

3. The Japanese propaganda campaign with respect to the Awa Maru, like its other campaigns, does not arise from a general feeling of indignity suffered, but is motivated by a desire to make as much propaganda value as

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-2645

CS/LE

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

*711.94114 Supplies/7-2645*



SECRET

DCR - GP-C USE  
Dist. *Sub*  
by *AB*  
Date *BF*  
JUL 31 1945

-2-

SECRET

possible from an American mistake. Already the Japanese have indicated official dissatisfaction with the steps taken by the Navy to punish the C.O. of the American submarine, and there is no reason to believe that they will cease to distort American purposes in this matter to their own people despite the good-will evidenced in the proposed broadcast. It is possible, for example, that the Japanese would publicly refuse the offer and demand punishment and reparations.

4. It is understood that joint security has placed a ban on discussion over the radio of the transport of Japanese forces back to Japan from isolated garrisons. Accordingly, much of the point of the broadcast would be lost if these portions were deleted.

5. It is felt that an offer of this kind should be kept secret and be conveyed solely through diplomatic channels as there is danger of repercussions both in the United States, where it will eventually become known, and in Japan.

Cordially yours,

*T. L. Barnard*

T. L. Barnard  
Acting Director, Overseas Branch

Attachment: as stated.

SECRET

This is Captain Zacharias of the United States Navy speaking to you from Washington, D. C.

Two recent incidents of the Pacific war show that even the most complex problems can be solved satisfactorily if both sides agree to adopt an attitude of reason and fairness.

A few months ago two Japanese ships were granted safe conduct to carry relief cargoes for Allied prisoners to Shanghai and to the southern areas of China, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. The first vessel completed her voyage. However, the second vessel, the Awa Maru, which had delivered her cargo to Hong Kong, and the south, was sunk unintentionally by an American submarine while returning to Japan.

At the time of her sinking the Awa Maru was proceeding at night in a fog. She was about 8 miles off the course previously agreed to and about 32 miles ahead of her predicted position. The American submarine contacted her by means other than visual and was, therefore, unable to determine the character of the ship. The torpedoing of the Awa Maru was regrettable. The United States Government has expressed its regret in clear and unequivocal language. The United States Government does not make a practice of violating agreements and at no time will it condone such violation. At times, however, and despite all precautions, mistakes do occur. Due to the complexities of war they occur with all belligerents. Mistakes of a similar nature are not entirely unknown in times of peace. The sinking of the Awa Maru was not willful and it was not deliberate. You

-2-

have my personal and official assurance of this fact.

I am in a position today to announce that the American Government has decided to take still another step in order to remove all grounds for complaint and recrimination. In addition to its assurances that it will, at the proper time, make a fair settlement of the case, the American Government is prepared immediately to put at the disposal of Japan a ship with characteristics equal to the Awa Maru. This<sup>ship</sup>/is not to be considered an indemnity, but a replacement. It is offered to you in order that your original plans to use the Awa Maru for relief purposes will not be interrupted. This proposal now being presented officially to your Government is unprecedented in time of war. It is the desire of the United States that Japan accept this proposal as one prompted by the same humanitarian instincts as those which prompted our sending relief to your stricken earthquake victims some 25 years ago and which, for reasons of international amity and respect, later caused us to provide a cruiser to return to Japan the ashes of your Ambassador Hiroshi Saito.

There are many other and similar evidences of American respect for international law and customs, and perhaps we should review one because it is of recent occurrence.

As you know, the American island of Wake was taken by the Japanese early in the war. Later, in the course of the American advance from Pearl Harbor across the Pacific to Okinawa and Iwo, Wake was by-passed and neutralized through blockade, thus sharing the fate of many other Japanese outposts in the Pacific.

-3-

As a consequence of America's absolute command of the sea, the Japanese Navy was no longer capable of supplying the Wake garrison. Famine became rampant, mortality rose alarmingly, and virtually the entire garrison fell sick.

The Japanese Government was therefore confronted with the alternative of letting the Wake garrison perish through the effects of America's invisible weapon, naval blockade; or to save the lives of those sick soldiers who could no longer make a contribution to the Japanese war effort. The Japanese Government acknowledged the obvious fact that it has obligations toward its subjects and in particular towards Japanese soldiers who have done their utmost in fighting for their country. The Japanese Government realized that it could serve no useful purpose to waste lives of those who in the not too distant future, will be able to make valuable contributions to Japan's peace-time reconstruction. Therefore, the Japanese Government decided to avail itself of the provisions of the Hague Convention and dispatched a hospital ship to evacuate approximately 1,000 Japanese soldiers from Wake to Japan. This was both a reasonable and humanitarian decision. The hospital ship was stopped twice by American warships but upon establishing her identity she was permitted to proceed unmolested, and in accordance with the stipulations of the Hague Convention, was to proceed unmolested. Thus, through observance of International Law, respect for international conventions, and through ~~the~~ cooperation, the lives of a thousand Japanese subjects were preserved.

-4-

The tiny island of Wake typifies the condition of countless other Japanese garrisons dispersed throughout the Pacific. Like the garrison of Wake, these other garrisons are blockaded and are starving. Tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers are confronted with a death which will not in the least change the outcome of the present war. They will die without even seeing action. Yet, two things should be obvious to every Japanese who thinks about the future. First, Japan is unable to evacuate all these countless soldiers in hospital ships. Second, the Japanese Government has the same moral obligation to the numerous blockaded garrisons in the Pacific which it assumed with respect to the Wake garrison. The Japanese Government does not have the right to condemn these soldiers to a purposeless death through famine. Today, they may still grope for a solution of this pressing problem. Yet the leaders to whom the salvation of Japan is now entrusted should realize, and realize before it is too late, that inspired statesmanship can overcome even the greatest difficulties

The Japanese Government must understand the depth of the concern felt by the American people for the welfare of American nationals held by the Japanese. If the Japanese Government fails to do everything in its power to insure the safety and well-being of American prisoners and refuses fully to cooperate with the American authorities in their efforts to send relief supplies to the prisoners, the resentment of the American people arising from the Japanese Government's attitude will be bound

-5-

adversely to affect relations between the two countries for many years to come. The American people have not been satisfied that the Japanese Government has conscientiously fulfilled the obligations toward prisoners which it assumed by its declaration to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Time is running short. The Japanese Government has a last opportunity to improve its record in this respect and I suggest that from the point of view of Japan's long-range self-interest, the Japanese authorities should now take active steps to improve this situation. The American and other Allied Governments are ready to send the supplies necessary to maintain in good health their nationals in Japanese custody and to provide the shipping necessary to repatriate those eligible for repatriation. Japan's active cooperation is required, however, in order that these measures may be carried out. These questions could be resolved without difficulty or delay if Japan were to suggest for its part the means by which the desired measures might be put into effect. The American and other Allied Governments will react promptly and favorably to any practicable Japanese proposals of this nature whether involving movement by sea, overland by rail, or by air. In this connection I draw attention particularly to the 2000 tons of relief food and medical supplies now awaiting onward shipment at Nakhodka. Would it not now be the course of wisdom for Japan to take into account world public opinion and realize that in Japan's own self-interest a new attitude should be adopted immediately as regards treatment, safety measures, relief shipments, and repatriation of Allied nationals held by Japan?



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 8/6/45

TO : Mr. Russell

FROM : SWP - SA Peirce

SUBJECT: OWI reply re Awa MARU broadcast  
draft. Letter attached.

Mr. MacLeish may wish to see  
Kupfinger's memo re. the "Gaetaria"  
script which Mr. MacLeish gave  
me the day you and I were in  
his office.

Attention is invited to Kupfinger  
memo. last P with which I gave

Peirce

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC LIAISON

AUG - 8 1945

OFFICE OF CHIEF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

War Problems  
SPECIAL DIVISION

*WPK*  
*file*

Memorandum

August 6, 1945

Mr. Plitt:

*71194114 Supplies*  
*7-26-45*  
*(encl)*

Reference attached letter from OWI dated July 26.

During my absence Capt. Pence (ARC) suggested the desirability of including in the Zacharias broadcast series a statement supplementing our repeated efforts through official channels to induce the Japanese to cooperate with us in arranging shipments of relief supplies for Allied nationals in Japanese custody. On my return I found a note on my desk from Mr. Clattenburg suggesting that I get in touch with Capt. Pence and Capt. Zacharias in this regard, which I did on or about July 16. Capt. Zacharias called at the office immediately and I supplied him with some background material. Several days later he left with me a rough draft of a script he had prepared and invited our comments and suggestions. In consultation with Capt. Pence I prepared a redraft to which JA agreed with certain suggested changes.

I then left the draft with Mr. Blake (SA/M) for clearance with Mr. MacLeish and Mr. Grew.

I understand that Mr. MacLeish sent the draft to OWI. OWI's letter of July 26 presumably is in reply to that reference. On August 1 I informed Capt. Zacharias that OWI had seen the draft and had suggested that the broadcast not be made. He said that he would take the matter up with OWI. I have not heard from him since.

In the circumstances no reply to OWI's letter would seem to be required unless the Department desires to press the matter in the face of OWI objections.

FW 711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-2645

*ARC*  
*WPK*  
*SEP 28 1945*

SWP:EDKuppinger:amg

*arc*

SEP 28 1945

RECORDED

*71194114 Supplies/7*

War Problems  
/Memorandum

August 6, 1945

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
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SWP:EDKuppinger:amg

# CONFIDENTIAL

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
Room 178, State Department Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

27 July 1945



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Introduction of relief supplies for Allied nationals into Japan and Japanese-held territory.

Reference: SWNCC 164.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the dispatch of the telegram proposed by the Acting Secretary of State in his letter of 2 July 1945, concerning introduction of relief supplies for Allied nationals into Japan and Japanese-held territory, subject to the following comments:

It is not possible to predict in advance how much time will be required to put the proposed plan in operation after receipt by this government of Japanese approval there-to. It is accordingly recommended that the last paragraph of the proposed telegram be revised so as to remove the two weeks time limit and to state instead only that this government will implement this plan as rapidly as is operationally feasible.


It is likewise believed that there is no necessity for agreeing not to use the relief planes in any military operations whatsoever against Japan at any time, and it is suggested that the pertinent paragraph in the draft telegram be revised to read as follows:

"2) To devote such aircraft as are used in the delivery of supplies for prisoners of war and civilian internees exclusively to the transportation of the supplies while under safe conduct for this purpose."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, simultaneously with the forwarding of this proposal to the Japanese Government, the Department of State might well inform the Soviet Government thereof, and request the employment of Soviet pilots for these relief flights, and, if necessary, of Soviet bases as well, in the event the Japanese Government refuses

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## CONFIDENTIAL



711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-2745

111.94114 Supplies/7-2745  
CS/LEC Confidential File

**CONFIDENTIAL**

to permit American pilots to fly over Japanese territory, while otherwise approving delivery by air of relief supplies. In this case, of course, United States planes and supplies would be used.


It is further believed that the Japanese Government should not be authorized to make 20 per cent, or any other amount, of the relief supplies available to Japanese nationals. It is contrary to the policy of the armed forces to furnish aid or comfort to the enemy, and it is not believed that such an offer would materially increase the likelihood of Japanese acceptance. In any event, as you will doubtless agree, only a small percentage of the relief supplies delivered will probably reach the American nationals for whom they are intended.

With respect to the practicality of using short wave radio communication in the implementation of this plan, this will depend on the operational situation in the Far East at the time of such use. It is felt, however, that this fact should not deter this government from proposing that this channel of communication be used by the Japanese in the event of acceptance of the proposed plan.

In view of the fact that previous efforts by this government to deliver relief supplies to American nationals in Japanese custody were coordinated with the British Government, it is assumed that the Department of State will keep the British informed of this latest proposal as well.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the above views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

  
JOHN D. HICKERSON  
Acting Chairman

- 2 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Confidential File

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7/30

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

Mr MacLeish gave me this &  
said it was the best reply to  
Graham's broadcast (proposal) what  
Mr. MacLeish said he needed  
his offer for Sat. do you  
know anything about it?

Please see me

Ⓟ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

MEC-574  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Stockholm  
Dated July 27, 1945  
Rec'd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS DIVISION  
JUL 30 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2621, July 27, 8 p.m.

During visit Pate Amcross further exploratory talks were held with Salen regarding possibility obtaining Swedish vessel for Pacific relief operations. Pate will inform Department of possibilities on return Washington August. Legation's 1647, May 3.

711.94114 Supplies / 5.345  
SAP

Bagge, former Swedish Minister Tokyo, participated these discussions. He first stated that doubtful whether Japs would permit relief shipments unless fully satisfied with United States reply regarding AWA MARU incident. Later in private conversation with officer of Legation he said he had received information from Tokyo Japs were not satisfied with United States reply on grounds (one) Japs specifically desired know details of disciplinary action taken against submarine commander and (two) they desired indemnity be offered immediately rather than at close of war. Bagge urged questions of prestige be waived by United States and every possible effort be

*Mr. Bagge expressed Sunday visits to me in Paris.*

made effect

DCR - <sup>GRC</sup>EUR Unit  
Anal  
Rev  
Dist

SECRET

Handwritten initials and a large '9' in a circle.

711.94114 SUPPLIES/7-2745

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

SECRET

-2-#2621, July 27, 8 p.m., from Stockholm

made effect relief shipments to United States and Allied prisoners in Jap hands. He said only few tons relief supplies were on hand in Japan on June 15.

Bagge also expressed view Japs would probably be more receptive to proposal made thru Intercross than to formal proposal thru Swiss.

JOHNSON

WMB

SECRET

*why?*