

Doc. No. 1266

Berlin, 28 July 1937

Pol. VIII 814

Diplogerme Tokio
No. 148

Telegram in Ciphers

To telegrams No. 182 and 193

Japanese attempts to base measures in China as fight against Communism on the Anti-Comintern Agreement are devious. As already stated in telegram 140 the agreement has not the objective of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states. Rather, Japan's measures may be considered by us as being contrary to the Anti-Comintern Agreement because they obstruct the consolidation of China thus promoting the spread of Communism in China and, in the end, driving the Chinese into the arms of Russia. (To this I note confidentially that in a conversation with Ambassador Trautmann Chiang Kai-shek replied to a question in that regard that one has to count with the possibility of an intervention of Russia into a possible war at a later time. He, Chiang Kai-shek, has made no agreements with the Russians up to now, but the situation is changed.) The Japanese have therefore no reason to expect us to favor their undertaking, rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called "creation of a clear strategic situation" does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible conflict with Russia. It will be necessary to consider the consequences of an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan for years to come, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would therefore have to carry on a two-front war in the case in question; this would be the case even if the maximum program of the Japanese military, separation of the Five Provinces, were carried out.

Recently the Japanese have been carrying on radio propoganda in Gerran language directed towards Germany, which continuously is attempting to represent the war against China as a fight against Communism and to force upon us /the necessity of/ taking side at least morally. This propoganda is unwelcome to us.

The Reichsminister informed the Japanese Ambassador before upon his remonstrances that delivery of armaments to China in any amount worth mentioning have not been taking place either now nor earlier. The Japanese cannot reprimand us for the fact that the Chinese bought arms from us in a limited amount. The deal developed on a purely economic basis. We have shown our new arms most willingly to the Japanese and have given the Japanese commissions far-reaching insight. It is not our fault that the Japanese have up to now failed to make any orders, a fact which we can only regret. The German deliveries of armaments to China cannot be made the object of German-Japanese negotiations. Since a situation has now arisen which approximates a state of war further deliveries of war material to China will cease because of our attitude.

Withdrawal of our military advisors in China would at the present moment mean that we are taking sides against Nanking and is therefore out of question. A withdrawal of the advisors could possibly also lead to the vacated positions being occupied by Russians; this is a consequence which is also undesirable for the Japanese. The Japanese Military Attache has up to now only stated in the war ministry his wish that the advisors may not participate in active combat actions. Advisors have always had a corresponding instruction which recently has been expressly restated. Mushakoji, who was informed of this, acknowledged this measure with thanks.

A remark of the Adjutant to the War Minister that the policy of cooperation of the Japanese Army is endangered by our attitude in the question of the advisors since the already existing opposition of single groups of Japanese officers is threatening to spread to the masses, finds no understanding here.

I have just informed Ambassador Mushakoji in accordance with the above statements in a cordial manner and I request of you to regulate your statements correspondingly and to advise the Japanese emphatically to apply moderation.

/s/ Weizsacker

Berlin, 28 July 1937

The Japanese Ambassador visited me today in order to hand me the attached report about the situation which by the way and as far as I know has already appeared in press reports.

The Ambassador then inquired about our conversations with London and Washington regarding the East Asiatic conflict. I outlined to the Ambassador once more our attitude in general terms. Mushakoji was satisfied with this. However, later he continued /to state/ that Japan misses complete German understanding for the anti-Communist achievement which the Japanese action against China constitutes. He tried stubbornly to prove that Japan is doing anti-Communist work in China also for our benefit. I replied to him in accordance with the tenor of the wire to Tokyo of today's date. When Mushakoji described the lack of understanding for the anti-Communist feats of his government which he encounters in Germany as a danger for the continued true existence of the German-Japanese agreement of Autumn 1936, I told him he should not exaggerate. The German-Japanese relationship of amity is quite beyond discussion. However, we can not deduce from our contractual relationship an obligation to approve or assist morally a Japanese action which might easily lead to the opposite of the aim which both of us desire, namely, to a fostering of Communism in China and to driving the Chinese into the arms of the Russians. Mushakoji then talked about the idea to call the secret German-Japanese special committee which up to now has not come into existence, before which committee he could then explain the anti-Communist tendencies which prompted Japan to her present action in China. (Mushakoji mentioned that Herr von Ribbentrop and the Reichsminister are informed about the organization of that Commission.)

Mushakoji received my confidential information that our instructors in China have orders not to interfere in the Japanese-Chinese conflict with thanks. Mushakoji then mentioned briefly the question of transportation of war

material. I declared that a justified claim of Japan for the cancellation of eventual delivery of arms from Germany to China does not exist. However, we did not go deeply into the topic.

In conclusion, Mushakoji used again some partly plaintive and partly threatening phrases about the failure of his mission in Berlin. I laughed him off with this.

(signed) Weizsacker

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DANLY

One copy of this
translation handed
to ~~Document~~
~~Investigation~~
Action

June 7, 1942.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1266

11 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat: Telegram from E. von Weiszacker (Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs) apparently to German Ambassador in Tokyo.

Date: 28 July 37 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: China Incident (Marco Polo Bridge); Aggressive warfare in China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This telegram, sent shortly after the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident, reflects the German attitude towards the Japanese action in China.

Germany views unfavorably Japan's attempt to enlist German support by withdrawal of military advisors from China and ending arms exports to China--which are brought forward with the reason that Japan's actions in China constitute a fight against communism. Germany's attitude is that the Anti-Comintern Pact does not provide for fight against communism in the territory of a third state.

Significant is the wording of the following part of the telegram: "The Japanese have, therefore, no reason to expect us to favor their enterprise; rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called creation of a clear strategic situation does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible dispute with Russia. It will be necessary to take the consequences of

an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan into consideration for years to come, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would, therefore, have to carry on a two-front war in the case in question; this would be the case even if the maximal program of the Japanese military, separation of the five provinces, were carried out." (p.1)

As to the exports of armaments to China, Weiszacher mentions that the German Foreign Minister stated to the Japanese Ambassador that such exports will now cease, "since a situation has arisen which approximates a state of war." (p. 2)

The purpose of the telegram is to inform the German Ambassador of this attitude, so that he may be guided in his utterances in this matter. It closes with the request to "advise the Japanese forcefully to apply moderation."

Attached is an office memorandum about a conversation of Weiszacker with Japanese Ambassador MUSHAKOJI on the same day (28 July 37). The tenor of the conversation is identical with the telegram. Speaking about the German-Japanese friendship, Weiszacker stated: "We cannot deduce from our contract relationship an obligation to approve or assist morally a Japanese action, which might easily lead to the opposite of the aim which both of us desire, namely to foster communism in China and to drive the Chinese into the arms of the Russians."

MUSHAKOJI then suggested to call together the secret special German-Japanese committee which had not yet begun to function, mentioning the fact that the organization of said committee is known to von Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Minister. /A.N.: von Meurath)

1266-1
C. 486F

ベルリン

一九三七年七月廿八日

POL VII 八一四

ドイツ東京外交第一四八號、數字暗號電報

第一八二號及ビ第一九三號電信ニ應ヘテ、

防共協定ニ差ヅク對共產主義抗爭ノ下ニ支那ニ於テ
日本ガ試ミントセシ手段ハ正當ヲ違シタルモノデア
ル。電信第一四〇號ニ於テ既ニ述ベシ如ク協定ハ第
三國領内ニ於テ延激主義ト取アラ目的トセズ。ムシ
ロ日本ノ手段ハ悉々ヨリ視レバ反コミンテルン協定
ニ反スルモノト考ヘラレル、何故ナラバ其レ等ハ中
國ノ統一ヲ妨害シカクシテ中國ニ於イテ共產主義ノ
普及ヲ促進スル事ニナリ、遂ニハ支那民族ヲロシヤ
ノ手ニ進ヒ込ム事ニナルカラデアル。(此ノ事ニ關
シ、余ハ、トラウトマン大使トノ會談ニ於テ蔣介石
ハ其ノ機ナ意味ノ質問ニ對シ歐爭ガ將來生ジル機ナ
場合ハロシヤガ後程干涉スルデアラウ事ヲ豫想セネ
バナラヌト答ヘタ事ヲコ、ニ内密ニ記シテ置ク。蔣
介石ハ今マテノ所、ロシヤト何等協定ヲ結ブニ到ツ
テ居ナイガ事情ハ今ヤ變化シテ居ル、其故、日本人
ハ我々が彼等ノ企圖ヲ好意的ニ見ルデアラウト豫期
スル何等ノ理由ヲ持タナイ。ムシロ我々ハ彼等ガ支
那テ動亂ヲ起サヌ事ヲ期待スルモノデアル。我々ハ

所謂「現狀ナル戰略的状況ノ創設」ト言フ事ハ日本ノ將來發展セラレル對露紛争ニ於ケル日本ノ實益ヲ輕クスルモノデハナイト言フ意見ヲ保持スルモノデアル。

日本ガ北支ニ勢力ヲ得レバ待ル程、將來長年月ニ亘リ支那人ノ日本ニ對スル怨々嫉シイ情態ノ結果ヲ考度スル必可ガアル。故ニ、斯ル場合ニ於テハ日本ハ兩面作戦ヲ遂行セネバナラヌ。日本軍部ノ最高計畫、即チ五省分隊ノ計畫ガ実行セラレタ場合ト雖モコノ様ナ事ニ立チヨルデアラウ。

最近日本ハドイツニ向ケテドイツ語ノラヂオ宣傳ヲ行ツテネルガ、ソレハ常ニ中國ニ對スル紛争ハ共產主義ニ對スル戰デアルコトヲ表現セント欲シ我々ニ少クトモ精神的ニテモ協力ノ必要ヲ強要セムトシテ居ルノデアアル。我々ニハ、此ノ宣傳ハ好マシカラザルモノデアアル。

ドイツ國政府ハ前ニ日本大使ノ抗議ニ對シ取り擧ゲテ云フ程ノ兵器ヲ移在モ又以前モ中國ニ渡シタ事ハナイト告ゲテキル。限ラレタ量ノ兵器ヲ中國ガ我々カラ買ヒ受ケタト言フ事ニ對シ日本ハ我々ヲ非難スル事ハ出來ナイ。駁引ハ純然タル經濟的基礎ノ上行ハレタノデアツタ。我々ハ日本人ニ進ンテ我々ノ

新シイ兵器ヲ見セタノデアリ、日本人委員ニ遠大ナ
洞察ヲ爲サシメタノデアル。今マテ日本ガ全然註文
ヲシテカツタ事ハ我々ニ責任ガアルノテハナクテ、
此ノ事ヲ我々ハナゲカハシク忌フノデアル。
ドイツノ對中國兵器供給ハ日獨交渉ノ基礎トハナリ
得ナイ。然シ今ヤ戰爭狀態ニ近似スル狀態ガ招來シ
タ爲、我々ノ中立的態度ニ由リ今後對中國軍需資材
ノ供給ハ打チ切ル事トスル。
中國ニ於ケル我ガ軍需顧問ノ引上げハ現在テハ我々
ガ南京政府ニ敵對スル事ヲ意味スル故ニ全然問題ニ
ナラナイ。顧問引上げハ悉ラクロシヤ人ニヨル空席
補充ト言フ事ニ到ラシメルデアラウ、之又日本ニ好
マシカラザル結果デアラウ。日本大使館附陸軍武官
ハ今マテノ所、顧問等ハ現實ニ、歐戰行爲ニ參加セ
ザル様、陸軍省ニ於テ彼ノ希望ヲ述べタニ違ギナイ。
顧問等ハ之ニ符合スル訓令ヲ常ニ受ケテ居タガ、之
ハ最近ハ特ニ繰リ返シ強調セラレタ。此ノ事ヲ通告
セラレタル武者小路ハ此ノ方法ヲ認メ感謝シテ居ル。
現在既ニ存在セル日本將校ノ單獨的ナ敵對行爲ガ今ヤ
集團化セントシテ居ル爲ニ、顧問ニ囑スル我々ノ態
度ニヨツテ日本軍ノ協力政策ハ危クナツテ居ルト言
フ陸軍大臣副官ノ言辭ヲ我々ハ認メル事ハ出來ナイ。
余ハ以上ノ聲明ノ趣旨ニ從ヒ、武者小路大使ニ懇篤

1266-4

ナ態度ヲ遺憾シタ所デアルカラ、貴國ノ態度ヲ右ニ
調節シ、日本側ニ對シ冷靜ナ態度ヲ取ル様ニク忠告
サレン事ヲ希望スル。

ワイスザツケル署名

ベルリン、一九三七年七月二十八日

余ノ知ツテ居ル限りテハ既に新聞ニ報道サレテ居ル
事柄ニ關スル附屬狀況等皆ヲ余ニ手交セムガ爲、
日本國大使ハ本日、余ヲ訪問シタ。
ソレカラ、大使ハ東亞ノ紛争ニ關スル「ロンドン」
及ビ「ワシントン」トノ余ノ會見ニ付キ尋ネタ。
余ハ大使ニモウ一度、我々ノ態度ヲ一般的言葉ヲ概
略的ニ語ツタ。武者小路ハコレヲ満足シタ。然シ後
ニ、彼ハ日本ノ對中國行動ニ存在スル所ノ反共產主
義ノ業績ニ付キ獨逸ガ完全ナル理係ヲ缺クト言フ事
ヲ緩ケテ述べタ。日本ハ我々ノ利益ノ爲ニモ中國ニ
於テ反共產運動ヲ行ツテ居ルノダト言フ事ヲ執拗ニ
證明セムトシタ。余ハ今日ノ日附テ發セン東京宛電
信ノ趣意ニ從ヒ彼ニ應答シタ。武者小路ガドイツニ
於テ体験シタ日本政府ノ反共產主義ノ功績ニ對スル
ドイツノ理係ノ不足ガ一九三六年秋ノ日獨協定ノ眞
ノ存續ニ對スル脅威デアルト述べタ時、余ハ彼ニ語
張セザル様申シタ。日獨關係ノ親睦ハ斷ズルヲ要シ
ナイ。然シ我々ノ契約關係ノ中ニハ、中國ニ於ケル
共產主義ヲ助成シ、中國民衆ヲロシヤノ手中ニ追ヒ
込ムガ如キ、我々相互ノ希望スル所トハ反對ノ結果
ニ導キ及イ日本ノ行動ヲ容認シ又ハ道義的ニ援助スル義
務ヲ見出シ得カイ。ソレカラ武者小路ハ今マテノ所、生

1266-6

レテ居ナイ日獨特別委員會ヲ召集スルト言フ考ヘヲ
語ツタ、ソシテソノ委員會ニ於テ、日本ヲシテ中國
ニ對スル現在ノ行動ヲ或ラシメタ反共産主義傾向ヲ
説明セムト言フノデアツタ。(武者小路ハ此ノ委員
會設立ニ關シテハリットンベントロツプ氏並ニドイ
ツ國政府ハ既に通告ヲ受ケテ居ル事ヲ語ツタ)
武者小路ハ在支獨逸軍事情報ハ日又抗爭ニ干涉スベ
カラザル旨、訓令サレテ居ルトノ我々ノ親善ヲ感服
シテ受諾シタ。次ニ武者小路ハ軍需資材ノ輸送問題
ニ付キ簡單ニ言及シタ。ドイツガ將來中國ニ對シ武
器ヲ供給スルトシテモ之ガ取消ヲスル正當ナ要求ヲ
日本ハ有セズト余ハ言明シタ。然シ、我々ハソノ問
題ニ付キ余リ深ク討議シナカッタ。
最後ニ武者小路ハ兵ビベルリンニ於ケル彼ノ使命ノ
失敗ニ付キ半バ惹シゲテ、半バ脅迫的言辭ヲ用ヒタ。
私ハ其レニ付テ彼ヲ嘲笑シタ。

ワイスザツケル署名

證 明 書

余 E・E・ダンリイハ茲ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス

記

一 余ハ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部ニ於ケル文書課長ニシテ、且ツ本職ノ任トシテ右檢察部ノ入手ニ係ル接收敵國文書類ノ原文又ハ寫シヲ所持、保管、管理ニ當ルモノナルコト

二 添附ノ文書ハ米國國務省文書中ノ「マイクロフィルム」ノ寫トシテ米國陸軍省ヨリ余ニ手交セラレタルモノニシテ右ハ在歐洲米國陸軍ノ接收セル獨逸文書ニ付作成セラレタルモノナルコト且ツ右文書ハ手交セラレテ以來引續キ余ノ保管下ニアルモノナルコト

E・E・ダンリイ
E. E. Danley

Item No.	Sack No.	S. A. No.	Pro No.
1266			239

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Date 3 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat: Telegram from E. von Weizsacker (Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to apparently to German Ambassador in Tokyo

Date: 28 July 1937 Original () Copy () Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
 Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____:
Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:
War Dept
 PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:
China Incident (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident
Aggressive Warfare in China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This telegram, sent shortly after the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident, reflects the German attitude towards the Japanese action in China. Germany views unfavorably Japan's attempt to enlist German support - by withdrawal of military advisors from China and ending arms exports to China - which are brought forward with the reason that Japan's actions in China constitutes a fight against Communism. Germany's attitude is that the Anti-Comintern Pact does not provide for fight against Communism in the territory of a third state.

Analyst Wheeler

Doc. No. ovs

Significant is the wording of the following part of the telegram:

"The Japanese have, ^{therefore} ~~no~~ reason to expect ~~from~~ ^{us} to favor their enterprise; rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called 'creation of a clear strategic situation' does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible dispute with Russia. It will be necessary to take into ~~co~~ the consequences of an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan ~~for years to~~ into consideration for years to come, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would, ~~also~~ therefore, ^{have to carry on a two front war} in the case in question; this would be the case even if the Maximal program of the Japanese military, separation of the five provinces, were carried out." (p. 1)

As to the exports of armaments to China, ~~he~~ Weizacker ^{mentions} ~~states~~ that the German Foreign Minister ~~has~~ stated to the Japanese Ambassador that such exports will not cease, "since a situation has arisen which approximates a state of war". (p. 2)

The purpose of the telegram is to inform the German Ambassador of his attitude, so that he may be guided in his utterances in this matter. It closes with the request to "advise ^{the Japanese} ~~freely~~ ^{freely} to apply moderation".

Attached is an office memorandum about a ^{of Weizacker} ~~conversation~~ ^{with} Japanese Ambassador ~~Hirata~~ MUSHAKOSI on the same day (28 July 1937)

The tenor of the conversation is identical with the telegram. Speaking about the German-Japanese friendship, Weizacker stated: "We cannot deduce from our contract relationship an obligation to approve ^{or assist morally} a Japanese action, which might easily

lead to the opposite of the aim which both of us desire, namely to foster communism in China and to drive the Chinese into the arms of the Russians!

MUSHAKOJI then suggested to call together the secret special ^{German-Japanese} Committee which had not yet begun to function, mentioning the fact that the organization of said committee is known to von Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Minister. (analyst's note: von Neuwirth)

1266

#1266

Three Way Check

~~Telegram No. 148 and Office Memorandum~~

Berlin, 28 July 1937

Pol. VIII 814

Diplogerma Tokio
No. 148

Ciphers
Telegram in figures.

To telegrams No. 182 and 193

Japanese attempts to base measures in China as fight against Communism on the Anti-Comintern Agreement are devious. As already stated in telegram 140 the agreement has not the objective of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states. Rather, Japan's measures may be considered by us as being contrary to the Anti-Comintern Agreement because they obstruct the consolidation of China thus ~~favoring~~ ^{facilitating} the spread of Communism in China and, in the end, driving the Chinese into the arms of Russia. (To this I note confidentially that in a conversation with Ambassador Trautmann Chiang Kai-shek replied to a question in that regard that one has to count with the possibility of an intervention of Russia at a later time. He, Chiang Kai-shek, has made no agreements with the Russians up to now, but the situation is changed.) The Japanese have therefore no reason to expect us to favor their enterprise; rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called "creation of a clear strategic situation" does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible dispute with Russia. It will be necessary to take the consequences of an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan for years to come ~~in consideration~~, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would therefore have to carry on a two-front war in the case in question; this would be the case even if the maximum program of the Japanese military, separation of the Five Provinces, were carried out.

a possible
+ mid war

+ undertaking

+ conflict
+ consider

Recently the Japanese have been carrying on radio propaganda in the German language directed toward Germany, which continuously is attempting to picture the war against China as a fight against Communism and to force upon us /the necessity of/ taking sides at least morally. This propaganda is undesirable as far as we are concerned.

+ represent

unwelcome to us

The Reichsminister informed the Japanese Ambassador before upon his remonstrances that delivery of armaments to China in any amount worth mentioning have not been taking place either now nor earlier. The Japanese cannot reprimand us for the fact that the Chinese bought arms from us in a limited amount. The deal developed on a purely economic basis. We have shown our new arms most willingly to the Japanese and have given *our fault* the Japanese commissions far-reaching insight. It is not ~~any concern of~~ ~~ours~~ that the Japanese have up to now failed to make any orders, a fact



Three Way Check

which we can only regret. - The German deliveries of armaments to China cannot be made the object of German-Japanese negotiations. Since a situation has now arisen which approximates a state of war further deliveries of war material to China will cease because of our ~~attitude~~ *neutral* attitude.

Withdrawal of our military advisors in China would at the present moment mean that we are taking sides against Nanking and is therefore out of question. A withdrawal of the advisors could possibly also lead to ~~it that~~ vacated positions ^{may} be occupied by Russia; this is a consequence which is also undesirable for the Japanese. The Japanese Military Attache has up to now only stated his wish that the advisors may not participate in combat actions. Advisors have always had a corresponding instruction which recently has been expressly restated. Mushakoji, who was informed of this, acknowledged this measure with thanks.

A remark of the Adjutant to the War Minister that the policy of cooperation of the Japanese Army is endangered by our attitude in the question of the advisors since the opposition of single groups of Japanese officers is threatening to spread to the masses, finds no understanding here.

I have just informed Ambassador Mushakoji in accordance with the above statements in a cordial manner and I request of you to regulate your statements correspondingly and to advise the Japanese emphatically to apply moderation.

/s/ Weissacker

(Doc. No. 1266)

in the war
Ministry
+ active

already
existing

Three Way Check

Berlin, 28 July 1937

The Japanese Ambassador visited me today in order to hand me the attached report about the situation which by the way and as far as I know has already appeared in press reports.

The Ambassador then inquired about our conversations with London and Washington regarding the East Asiatic conflict. I outlined to the Ambassador once more our attitude in general terms. Mushakoji was satisfied with this. However, later he continued /to state/ that Japan misses complete ^{German} understanding for the anti-Communist achievement which the Japanese action against China constitutes. He tried stubbornly to prove that Japan is doing anti-Communist work in China also for our benefit. I replied to him in accordance with the tenor of the wire to Tokyo of today's date. When Mushakoji described the lack of understanding for the anti-Communist feats of his government which he encounters in Germany as a danger for the continued true existence of the German-Japanese agreement of autumn 1936, I told him he should not exaggerate. The German-Japanese relationship of amity is quite ~~not~~ of discussion. However, we can not deduce from our contractual relationship an obligation to approve or assist morally a Japanese action which might easily lead to the opposite of the aim which both of us desire, namely, to a fostering of Communism in China and to driving the Chinese into the arms of the Russians. Mushakoji then talked about the idea to call the secret German-Japanese special committee which up to now has not come into existence, before which committee he could then explain the anti-Communist tendencies which prompted Japan to her present action in China. (Mushakoji mentioned that Herr von Ribbentrop and the Reichsminister are informed about the organization of that Commission.)

+ beyond

Mushakoji received my confidential information that our instructors in China have orders not to interfere in the Japanese-Chinese conflict with thanks. Mushakoji then mentioned briefly the question of transportation of war material. I declared that a justified claim of Japan for the cancellation of eventual delivery of arms from Germany to China does not exist. However, we did not go deeply into the topic.

In conclusion, Mushakoji used again some partly ^{plaintive} ~~elegiac~~ and partly threatening phrases about the failure of his mission in Berlin. I laughed him off with this.

(signed) Weissacker

TRANSLATION

Berlin, 28 July 1937

Pol. VIII 814

Diplogerma Tokio
No. 148

Telegram in figures.

To telegrams No. 182 and 193.

Japanese attempts to base measures in China as fight against Communism on the anti-Comintern Agreement are devious. As already stated in telegram 140 the agreement has not the objective of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states. Rather, Japan's measures may be considered by us as being contrary to the anti-Comintern Agreement because they obstruct the consolidation of China thus fostering the spread of Communism in China and, in the end, driving the Chinese into the arms of Russia. (To this I note confidentially that in a conversation with Ambassador Trautmann Chiang Kai-shek replied to a question in that regard that one has to count with the possibility of an intervention of Russia at a later time. He, Chiang Kai-shek, has made no agreements with the Russians up to now, but the situation is changed.) The Japanese have therefore no reason to expect us to favor ~~their~~ their enterprise; rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called "creation of a clear strategic situation" does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible dispute with Russia. It will be necessary to take the consequences of an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan for years to come into consideration, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would therefore have to carry on a two-front war in the case in question; this would be the case even if the maximum program of the Japanese military, separation of the Five Provinces, were carried out.

Recently the Japanese have been carrying on radio propaganda in the German language directed toward Germany, which continuously is attempting to picture the war against China as a fight against Communism and to force upon us/the necessity of/ taking sides at least morally. This propaganda is undesirable as far as we are concerned.

The Reichsminister informed the Japanese Ambassador before upon his remonstrances that delivery of armaments to China in any amount worth mentioning have not been taking place either now nor earlier. The Japanese cannot reprimand us for the fact that the Chinese bought arms from us in a limited amount. The deal developed on a purely economic basis. We have shown our new arms most willingly to the Japanese and have given the Japanese commissions far-reaching insight. It is not any concern of ours

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(signed) Weizsaecker

that the Japanese have up to now failed to make any orders, a fact which we can only regret. - The German deliveries of armaments to China cannot be made the object of German-Japanese negotiations. Since a situation has now arisen which approximates a state of war further deliveries of war material to China will cease because of our mutual attitude.

Withdrawal of our military advisers in China would at the present moment mean that we are taking sides against Nanking and is therefore out of question. A withdrawal of the advisers could possibly also lead to ~~it~~ that vacated positions may be occupied by Russia; this is a consequence which is also undesirable for the Japanese. The Japanese Military Attache has up to now only stated his wish that the advisers may not participate in combat actions. Advisers have always had a corresponding instruction which recently has been expressly restated. Mushakoji, who was informed of this, acknowledged this measure with thanks.

already existing
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I have just informed Ambassador MUSHAKOJI in accordance with the above statements in a cordial manner and I request of you to regulate your statements correspondingly and to advise the Japanese emphatically to apply moderation.

(signed) Weizsaecker

Production of Documents

G. Osmund Hyde

Roy Morgan
Chief, Investigative Div.

7 June 1946

Will you please obtain telegram No. 140, which is referred to in the second sentence of the translation of Document No. 1266, a copy of which translation I have heretofore delivered to you.

G. OSMUND HYDE

*Attached papers belong in Document
1266.*

Telegram No. 140 can not be obtained

TRANSLATION

Berlin, 28 July 1937

Pol. VIII 814

Diplomerna Tokio
No. 148

Telegram in figures.

To telegrams No. 182 and 193.

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(signed) Weissacker

I

CHECK SHEET

DATE ISSUED: 20-6-46

TITLE OR DOCUMENT NO.: 11

REQUESTED BY: Tararoko

WORK DESIRED:

- ✓ (1) July 4, 1941: Secret code from Tokyo about Japan's entry into war with Russia
- ✓ (2) Nov. 17, 1941 - Telegram from Berlin signed by Armandoff
- ✓ (3) January 29, 1942 - Secret code from Tokyo - statements by Tojo and Tojo outlining Japanese war policy

REMARKS:

*transmission completed
6/27/46*

Ch - Tamaya 5/7.

*Returned to Maj. Clarke
6/7/46*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

JUL 24 1946

24 July , 1946

Straw

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 1266 for Tavener.

Arrange for translation as follows:

Three way check:----~~(G-E)~~ (G-E; G-J)

(Compare each type with ~~the original copy~~ copy)

*To Mr Tavener
K/S*

K. Steiner

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT NUMBER 1367

TITLE: Diary of instruction department for Total War

Institute.

SOURCE: Cabinet Secretariat

MICROFILMING

Document 1367 Source: Cabinet Secretariat

has been microfilmed on 19²⁰ Oct. 1948 for

permanent historical record.

(None) (Part) of this document had been extracted for court use.

F. MATTISON
Files Unit
Document Division

UNCLASSIFIED

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

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