

INTERP. OF TOGO, SHIGEN & R1
19 May 46 (030-1300 + 1415-1530)

DOC 4118

(11)

(16)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

Shigenori TOGO

Date and Time: 19 March 1946, 1030-1300 and 1415-1530 hours

Place : Togo Residence, Tokyo

Present : Shigenori TOGO
Fumihiko Togo, son of Shigenori TOGO
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Japanese national, Interpreter
Mr. Roy L. Morgan, Interrogator
Miss Mildred Rich, Stenographer

Questions by Mr. Morgan

Q. In connection with the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941, I presume you are familiar with what took place.

A. I do.

Q. I understand that there were two propositions made at the Imperial Conference known as "Proposition A" and "Proposition B". (These propositions read in English translation by Mr. Morgan and then translated into Japanese by Mr. Shimanouchi.) I have just read to you "Proposition A" and "Proposition B" which were submitted at the November 5, 1941, Imperial Conference. As read by me, do you consider that they are substantially correct.

A. In connection with the negotiations between the United States and Japan, these propositions were considered on the following basis: If "Proposition A" is accepted by the United States, it would be all well and good; however, if "Proposition A" should be rejected by the United States, Japan would offer "Proposition B". It was on such a basis that these propositions were approved at the Imperial Conference. Regarding the conditions of these propositions, it seems that one item is lacking in "Proposition B", and that is that if this proposition is agreeable to the United States, Japan would immediately withdraw her forces from southern French Indo-China.

Q. You mean by that statement that a portion of "Proposition B" as read by me is missing.

A. The point I refer to, that is immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces from southern French Indo-China, and that point was added because it appeared to be missing. It would be a repetition, but that point was decided upon at the Imperial Conference. Of course, there were other points and other understandings at the conference which have no direct bearing with the negotiations of the United States.

Shigenori TOGO

19 March 1946

- Q. "Proposition B" did not take into consideration the evacuation of troops from north French Indo-China.
- A. This proposition was considered primarily as a modus vivendi and the principal point was the revival of the status existing prior to the freezing of assets and it was in that connection that the immediate withdrawal of southern French Indo-China was considered. As to withdrawal of troops from north French Indo-China, that was pending general settlement of the issues and restoration of general peace in the Pacific. If it would be convenient to you, it might perhaps be a help if I explain the manner in which these matters were considered before they were finally decided upon. It might take a little time, but it may alleviate the necessity of further questions if this explanation is made.
- Q. In making such an explanation I would desire that you begin with the background and explain in detail as to the method of presenting "Proposition A" and "B" to the United States.
- A. First of all, as I have pointed out previously, the KONOYE Cabinet fell because of disunity within the Cabinet which developed from questions relative to China, chiefly the army's strong stand regarding the stationing of troops in China. At the time TOJO persuaded me to enter his cabinet, he stated that as chief of the Cabinet he was in a position to continue to take a strong stand. To this I strongly objected as it would be inimicable to any effort to seek a settlement with the United States, and after some argument TOJO finally agreed with my opinion that all questions may be reconsidered from a rational point of view and to make efforts to reach a successful settlement with the United States. The propositions referred to arose out of this understanding with TOJO.

At the liaison conferences, which were held from the time of the KONOYE Cabinet to consider basic policy on all matters, questions relative to Japan and the United States were reconsidered and studied from all possible aspects practically every day beginning, as I recall, about October 23.

The first problem was to what extent would it be possible to relax the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on September 6, the details of which you probably know, and which were decided by the preceding cabinet, and on the basis of Japanese concessions, to what extent the United States might or might not on their part make concessions. And thus the first question was a reconsideration of the September 6 decisions to that end of seeking a solution to the Japanese-American questions. Before entering concrete discussions, I recall General SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff, saying that the decisions of the Imperial Conference of September 6, which as you no doubt are aware, decided that if there were no changes by the middle of October war preparations will

19 March 1946

A. (cont'd)

be completed, that it was the understanding that the primary emphasis during the month of September was placed upon diplomatic negotiations, but in the month of October the chief emphasis must be placed upon operational or military aspects of the matter because otherwise opportunity would be lost. I strongly objected and I insisted that the decision in the liaison conference must be hastened as much as possible. I strongly objected to SUGIYAMA and refused to accept his views, and I felt myself not bound by such understandings, since such matters were not transferred to me when I took over the post of Foreign Minister, and because I became Foreign Minister on the understanding and the assurance that all matters were to be rationally reconsidered.

Another point which I recall is the statement of the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, TSUKADA, which was to the effect that the Japanese-American negotiations were futile, offered no possibility of settlement, and that Japan had already been challenged to an economic war by such acts as the freezing of assets and that the United States, Britain and others were preparing to encircle Japan; and that, therefore, Japan must immediately undertake actions of self defense.

Thus, the discussions entered into consideration of the question of relaxing the conditions as decided on September 6. As you know, the principal and outstanding questions relative to Japanese-American relations, questions which came up recurrently in the negotiations, were the question of stationing troops in China, the question of non-discriminatory trade with China, and the question of the Tripartite Pact. Upon assuming my office I studied and reviewed the course of Japanese-American relations on the basis of papers and documents in an effort to find some means to seek a solution. I also used as reference data the ideas held by my predecessors, TOYODA, those which were presented in his written views on how it would be possible to reach a settlement between Japan and the United States, which is before the collapse of the KONOYE Cabinet, at which time, as you recall in KONOYE's memoirs, TOJO said that there was no chance of settlement. I also considered as reference data the views of the American Embassy, and on the basis of these materials, I made strenuous efforts to find a way in seeking solutions to the difficulty.

To explain more fully, TOYODA's views were related to the point of not increasing Japanese troops in Indo-China, and to the acceptance of the principle of withdrawing troops from China, that is, placing a time limit on the withdrawal of troops in China. To these views the army objected. And now I, as Foreign Minister, was in the position of finding that I was saying that if these conditions were conducive to a settlement I was in the position to insist upon it. Furthermore, he is in the position - - - On the basis of the report from Ambassador

19 March 1946

A. (cont'd)

NOMURA from Washington in the first part of October that he had practically obtained the understanding of the United States government relative to the Tripartite Pact in accordance with the proposals made by Japan previously. And that was the understanding since the latter part of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. As I have stated before, it was not until the early part of November that I discovered that no such understanding existed. This was exceedingly unfortunate. Generally speaking, "Proposition A" and "B" are based upon my personal ideas. I went much further than TOYODA in the question of placing a time limit on the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo-China by including in "Proposition B", by proposing the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China pending agreement, whereas TOYODA proposed not to increase Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Furthermore, being of the understanding that understanding existed between the two countries on the Tripartite Pact, according to NOMURA's report, I felt that this point would be acceptable to the United States that Japan would interpret the treaty independently. In order to have this proposition accepted, I made very strenuous efforts at the liaison conference.

As I have related before, the majority of the members opposed the idea of withdrawal of Japanese troops from China as a principle. Everybody except myself at first objected. I insisted that there was no such thing as withdrawal of troops in principle and that with the improvement in the Japanese position the same results could be obtained without the stationing of Japanese troops, and after great effort I won the members over to my views. The army, which at first was reluctant to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China, finally agreed with me when I stated that if the situation existing prior to the freezing of assets was to be restored, then accordingly Japan must withdraw her troops from that area. And it was after much effort and persuasion that the army ultimately agreed that they agreed to my contentions.

As regards the Tripartite Pact, the idea was that since, according to NOMURA's report, understanding existed it was considered all right to present the Japanese proposal on that point to the United States.

On an occasion outside of the liaison conferences I recall a talk with TOJO in which I stated that if the United States accepted the proposals in general, but had objections to some points contained in the proposals, Japan should be prepared to make concessions. On this matter I secured TOJO's understanding that Japan may be prepared for such a situation. These propositions were prepared by me in the hope that they would lead the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and on the basis of

Shigenori TOGO

19 March 1946

A. (cont'd)

all the reference data that I had on hand I made extreme efforts to over ride the opposition within the army and to convince them in agreeing to my views. Even afterwards no efforts were spared to endeavor to seek a settlement and later even to - - - Aside from that I made other efforts calculated to avoid war. Among them was my effort in opposing those military elements which insisted upon the cessation of the negotiations and another was the consideration of drawing up of proposals which I hoped would prove to be successful in avoiding war. These efforts, I am sure, should be sufficient to testify to my positive efforts in trying to find a peaceful settlement.

I have just given you the general outline of the background leading to "Proposition A" and "B". If you desire further explanations of my efforts to avert war, I shall be happy to make them if that would be of any help in enlarging upon your understanding of the situation at that time.

- Q. With reference to these two propositions, may I ask how they were presented.
- A. On the basis of "Proposition A" we had negotiations conducted with the Washington government between NOMURA and HULL around the 7th or 8th of November. With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, HULL showed no big interest and rather did not appreciate the great efforts Japan had made on that point. Regarding the non-discriminatory treatment of trade with China, HULL at first insisted that the Japanese proposal should be as it was, but immediately thereafter revised his attitude and I do not recall the condition, as reported by NOMURA.

HULL made a counter proposal which implied something like a joint control of the economic affairs of China by a group of powers. And regarding the Tripartite Pact, HULL insisted on making it a dead letter, which made it clear that there was no understanding on that matter previously as had been understood and on other matters HULL took a rather cold attitude.

The negotiations on the basis of "Proposition A" were continued one or two more times, but when there was no prospect of settlement on the basis of "Proposition A", "Proposition B" was presented, and that was, as I recall, around the 20th of November.

As Ambassador KURUSU had been sent to Washington meanwhile and began to participate in the negotiations with the White House and the State Department from around the 17th or 18th of November, KURUSU was also a participant in the negotiations which were carried on on the basis of "Proposition B", which was offered by Japan as a modus vivendi. At that time it appeared that the United States was trying to render easier the

19 March 1946

A. (cont'd)

settlement of the China Incident, and also it appears that our proposals were also referred by the United States government to Great Britain, China, the Netherlands and Australia, etc. in Washington. But as it turned out, the United States flatly rejected Japan's proposal, saying that a modus vivendi was useless without an agreement on fundamental issues. At that time HULL handed over to our ambassadors the note of November 26 compelling complete surrender on the part of Japan.

That is the general manner in which the "Proposition A" and "B" were presented.

Q. Did KURUSU leave Japan for the United States on November 7.

A. I think it was the 5th. He left early on the morning of November 5. It was on that day that the Imperial Conference was held, but KURUSU knew of both propositions "A" and "B" before he left.

Q. You mentioned something about the army making preparations for war in October, or indicated that they were making military preparations. I presume this was the general attitude of the army with regard to the United States as evident by the statement of TSUKADA himself when he stated that negotiations apparently were useless.

A. As you know, the decisions of September 6 included the question of completing war preparations. I am not in the position to make any interpretations of the decisions, not being in the Cabinet then. What I meant by the statement of SUGIYAMA that he said consideration must be made from the standpoint of military operations. But I should like to have it made clear that that was another thing in connection with the decision for war. In other words, a decision of war was a separate thing. And as to TSUKADA's statement, I must say that they were his personal views, though it may be they reflected some elements within the army; but they were not the official views of the liaison conference or the army inasmuch as it was the decision of the liaison conference to continue negotiations. SUGIYAMA and TSUKADA finally agreed to the decision to continue negotiations.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of any conclusion reached by TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO and the other members of the TOJO clique to start war around October 10 or 15 prior to the fall of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet.

A. I know of no such decision, but from what I have learned since about the third year of the war from Prince KONOYE, and from his so-called memoirs since the termination of the war, TOJO was very anxious to arrive at an early decision on the basis of the September 6 decisions with the prospect that the negotiations were useless. From what I recall of the conversation with KONOYE, MUTO, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, had said to KONOYE that if the Prime Minister opposed war, the Prime Minister could be changed any time, but if the navy objected to

A. (cont'd)

war, then there could be no war, since the navy is saying that it leaves everything up to the decision of the Prime Minister, you can not get anywhere. So the question is to get the navy to decide. So it is necessary to make clear the navy's views. Of course, it is not impossible to try to understand TOJO's fear from what KONOYE said, but insofar as I am personally concerned, from my personal contacts with TOJO he agreed with me on the continuance of negotiations with the United States and even more had asked me to make every effort to reach a successful settlement. Although I do not know whether he showed the same attitude to the other people with whom he was in contact, but as far as I am concerned, he has not revealed to me, nor has he ever shown any signs or evidence that he had asked me to continue negotiations although he had decided on war.

- Q. From your present knowledge after a review of all the facts, it appears that there is only one conclusion to be drawn, that is that TOJO undoubtedly made up his mind for war while he was telling you that negotiations should continue.
- A. That I do not know. The negotiations being with a foreign country the matter can not be considered simply. The ideas and attitudes of individuals were manifested in how the negotiations should be carried on. There was a split among those who favored the relaxation of conditions reaching a settlement and those who regarded a successful settlement beneficial but who did not favor making any concessions. The difference between these opposing views makes a very great difference in the negotiations themselves; so if it is from this standpoint that TOJO wanted to reach a settlement but with great reluctance on the relaxing of conditions, then there would be no objections to saying that there was a wide split between him and me.
- Q. I wish to ask simply this. That from past events, which you can now review more clearly, is not there a strong presumption that TOJO had probably made up his mind to wage war against the United States with the idea that negotiations with the United States would not be successful.
- A. It can not be said whether he had any decisions of his own in favor of war in every case, because if the United States were to make concessions then there would be means to a settlement and no necessity for war. It can not be said that TOJO wanted war in spite of settlement. As a matter of fact, there was a prospect of agreement on the question of the Tripartite Pact, as well as the question of trade in China, and the only outstanding issue was the question of withdrawing troops from China, which was the general opinion of all members of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. When TOJO offered me the office he said that now that he is to become Prime Minister he can continue to take the strong stand as he did as war minister in the previous cabinet. But because I opposed him he relaxed his stand and agreed to the continuance of negotiations by concurring to my views.

Shigenori TOGO

19 March 1946

- Q. Do you recall the conversation with General OTT around November 25, 1941, at which time you stated that the Japanese government was working ^{on} a reply to the United States proposals, and that Japan was not afraid of a termination of these negotiations, and that she hoped that if the occasion should arise Germany and Italy will stand by her side.
- A. I do not recall any meeting on the 25th, nor of my making any such statement. But the contents of your question do not accord with the facts insofar as preparation of Japan's reply was concerned. That did not come until after the receipt of HULL's note on the 26th. And furthermore, when the question of possible aid from the outside was studied by the liaison conference from every aspect, the question came up as to how much assistance could be expected from Germany and Italy, and, as I have stated before, it was my view that because Germany was engaged in a war with Russia, and because of the distance and because of my estimation of German power, Japan could not expect any great help from Germany. And I led the liaison conference toward my view.
- Q. Did you have conversations with General OTT subsequent to the receipt of the HULL note to the effect that Japan is not afraid of termination of negotiations with the United States.
- A. Yes, I recall having seen OTT. And on that occasion I recall my telling him that Japan could not accept the United States' note. I did not say anything of the nature mentioned in the question. I do not recall ever using the expression that "Japan did not fear the United States," although it may not be unusual to make such remarks in diplomatic talks.
- Q. What did you say at the time of your conversation with OTT regarding what was expected of Germany.
- A. Although I have to brush up on my memory, I recall that the main point of interest so far as I was concerned was what the attitude of Germany would be in case the negotiations failed. As I recall, OTT said, as his personal opinion, that Germany would stand on the side of Japan, and assist Japan.
- A. (continuation after recess)
Going back to the question relative to November 25, when you said that I met General OTT, I recollect in my memory during the recess, and I have recalled the following: On November 25 the feeling was rather strong that the Japanese modus vivendi would be acceptable to the United States, that even the formula for a treaty had been drafted and had been telegraphed to Washington on that very day. The feeling that such a feeling was entertained by those outsiders who visited the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and such observations were also being made in London as well as elsewhere. Such being the expectation, the army went so far as to make an exorbitant request with respect to the supply of gasoline, which was taken up in point two of "Proposition B",

19 March 1946

A. (cont'd)

and the matter was brought to the Foreign Office. When I was informed of this army request for such a heavy order for gasoline, I told my subordinate officer that such a demand could not be accepted because it would sabotage the efforts toward arriving at a successful conclusion of the negotiations, and that if any request is made it should be within reasonable limits, that is, that a figure averaging Japan's gasoline needs over a period of years should be requested and not such an exorbitant quantity. In order to make the negotiations a success, the Japanese must approach the matter with more sincerity, and furthermore it would be in violation of the spirit of the decision of the Imperial Conference which was to seek a successful settlement; and I had that request rejected and turned back to the military.

This should explain the fact that there was no idea on that day of any failure of the negotiations, and although it may not be a very precise picture, it would explain the general situation. As far as the army was concerned, it may be considered in the light of your observation, attempt at sabotage of the negotiations on the part of the army. But the Foreign Office can not see clearly to what extent this represented the army's views, what latitude of the army's views, or at how high a level. That matter was to have been brought to the Foreign Office by the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, General MUTO. At that time one of the most urgent and important considerations was that of petroleum. What to do with the petroleum question in case the negotiations ended in failure, and what to do with the question in case the negotiations succeeded.]

It was my contention that Japan should exercise patience and forbearance even in case the negotiations resulted in failure and watch development in the international situation on the basis of the supply of synthetic oil. This question was studied by the liaison conference, at which time, SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, said that reliance could not be placed on synthetic oil because the Japanese supply of coal was insufficient for the purpose and that if used it would be at the sacrifice of other important industries, and being a technical question in which the view of the Planning Board was authoritative, my stand to exercise patience was not accepted.

KAYA, Finance Minister, was also one of those who strongly contended that some way be found in solving the petroleum problem. The views being that of the Planning Bureau which had weight on this technical issue prevailed.

Upon my reading of KONOYE's so-called memoirs somewhere in November of last year, KONOYE says that SUZUKI had said that there was a way of meeting Japan's petroleum requirements through synthetic oil, but that

A. (cont'd)

view of SUZUKI, as reported by KONOYE, contradicts with what I recall to be SUZUKI's stand when this petroleum matter was brought up before the liaison conference somewhere about the end of October, 1941. I do not know the reasons for this contradiction, but if your presumption that war had already been decided upon by TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, etc. were a fact, then this situation involving the petroleum issue may be considered as having some bearing

Q. In regard to the question of gasoline, what was the demand in quantity that MUTO requested that you should make of the United States.

A. I do not recall the exact figures, but I do recall that the quantity was much greater than the ordinary imports.

Q. What would be the reason that the military should desire such large quantities of gasoline.

A. The military, as a matter of course, desired being well supplied and stocked insofar as preparations were concerned; and, therefore, submitted such an exorbitant request. If this question were viewed from the American point of view, it was even publicly stated by President ROOSEVELT and Assistant Secretary of State BERLE that if oil imports into Japan were stopped, it would lead to war. And the American stand on the matter was that by limiting oil supplies to Japan, Japanese strength would be weakened. Therefore, the making of such a demand upon the United States would naturally be rejected and make virtually impossible the arriving at a successful settlement. That is the main and crucial point of the question.

Q. Let us presume that negotiations proved successful and to the satisfaction of Japan, what purpose would the army have for such large quantities of oil.

A. It might be said that it was instinctively habitual among military men to be well stocked and prepared in order to strengthen its position, regardless of whether or not the negotiations were successful. The psychology is similar to rich people wanting to become richer.

Q. From your observations, don't you think that it appears that the army knew that such a demand would be rejected causing a complete collapse of negotiations.

A. I rejected this army request because it had the danger of bring about a failure of the negotiations, and, of course, it would be childish to think that such a proposal would be made without considering its results; but whether the army made such a proposal with conscious intention, I do not know.

Q. Did TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and the others connected with TOJO, reveal at any time other than this that they wished to sabotage successful negotiations between the United States and Japan.

19 March 1946

- A. The actual situation was that whenever any question arose and views were expressed by the army, it has been very difficult to know or to confirm to what extent it represented the army. That was one of the principal difficulties of the Foreign Office, to confirm whether, for instance, the request brought by MUTO on the gasoline question represented what latitude or level of the army. I cannot now recall any other instances of which to speak; but in order to understand the truth of the situation, it would be necessary for you to know that the line of demarcation should not be drawn between those who favored settlement, or, as you say, favored war; but between those who favored settlement with concessions and those who favored concessions without making concessions except with extreme reluctance. With that understanding a proper understanding of this situation it would be difficult to appraise the situation as well as the views of the different personalities, whether they were not very much disposed to a successful settlement or not.
- Q. Do you recall around December 2 or 3, 1941, of relaying instructions to SHIRATORI to have a conference with MUSSOLINI telling him about the deadend in Japanese-American relations and invoking the Tripartite Pact to the extent that Italy should declare war on the United States immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.
- A. Upon receipt of the HULL note of November 26, which gave Japan the alternative of total surrender or war, the feeling became solidified in Japan that war would be unavoidable, although there still remained the wish that by some miracle a war could be averted in the last minute by asking reconsideration on the part of the United States. Then came the Imperial Conference of December 1 - - - A few days later, toward the end of November, Ambassador OSHIMA in Berlin reported his conversations with HITLER and von RIBBENTROP, principally with HITLER, who repeatedly said that he had reports that indicated that there were no prospects of a settlement between Japan and the United States and expressed his views that this would be not only to the common interests of Japan and Germany but also to the interests of Japan for Japan to engage in war with the United States. Then on December 1 came the Imperial Conference where the decision for war was made. At that time, since war was regarded as unavoidable, cables were dispatched to Germany to enter into negotiations with the German government to conclude a military alliance stipulating the signatories not to conclude a separate peace, and also stipulating on a joint declaration of war, and the same was sent to Rome. Incidentally, as the negotiations were primarily conducted in Berlin, this was in accordance with the general line decided upon at the Imperial Conference on December 1 as a step to be taken in case the Japanese-American negotiations collapsed and this general line was decided upon the general understanding of the members of the liaison conference.

Shigenori TOGO

19 March 1946

- Q. On what date were these cables sent.
- A. I recall the dates as being approximately the days you mentioned, December 2 or 3.
- Q. I presume that both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were advised to request both Germany and Italy to invoke the provisions of the Tripartite Pact in connection with declaring war against the United States.
- A. I do not recall that such was mentioned in the telegrams.

Certificate of Stenographer:

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Mildred Rich

Certificate of Interrogator:

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 19 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

Roy L. Morgan

TOJO, Shigenori

Extract from Interrogation of TOJO, Shigenori - 19 March 1946.

Page 6

- Q. Do you have any knowledge of any conclusion reached by TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO and the other members of the TOJO clique to start war around October 10 or 15 prior to the fall of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet.
- A. I know of no such decision, but from what I have learned since about the third year of the war from Prince KONOYE, and from his so-called memoirs since the termination of the war, TOJO was very anxious to arrive at an early decision on the basis of the September 6 decisions with the prospect that the negotiations were useless. From what I recall of the conversation with KONOYE, MUTO, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, had said to KONOYE that if the Prime Minister opposed war, the Prime Minister could be changed at any time, but if the navy objected to war, then there could be no war, since the navy is saying that it leaves everything up to the decision of the Prime Minister, you can not get anywhere. So the question is to get the navy to decide. So it is necessary to make clear the navy's views.

* * *

Page 8

- Q. What did you say at the time of your conversation with OTT regarding what was expected of Germany.
- A. Although I have to brush up on my memory, I recall that the main point of interest so far as I was concerned was what the attitude of Germany would be in case the negotiations failed. As I recall, OTT said, as his personal opinion, that Germany would stand on the side of Japan and assist Japan.
- A. (continuation after recess)
Going back to the question relative to November 25, when you said that I met General OTT, I recollect in my memory during the recess, and I have recalled the following: On November 25 the feeling was rather strong that the Japanese modus vivendi would be acceptable to the United States, that even the formula for a treaty had been drafted and had been telegraphed to Washington on that very day. The feeling that such a feeling was entertained by those outsiders who visited the Japanese Embassy in Washington,

Page
9

and such observations were also being made in London as well as elsewhere. Such being the expectation, the army went so far as to make an exorbitant request with respect to the supply of gasoline, which was taken up in point two of "Proposition B", and the matter was brought to the Foreign Office. When I was informed of this army request for such a heavy order for gasoline, I told my subordinate officer that such a demand could not be accepted because it would sabotage the efforts toward arriving at a successful conclusion of the negotiations, and that if any request is made it should be within reasonable limits, that is, that a figure averaging Japan's gasoline needs over a period of years should be requested and not such an exorbitant quantity. In order to make the negotiations a success, the Japanese must approach the matter with more sincerity, and furthermore it would be in violation of the spirit of the decision of the Imperial Conference which was to seek a successful settlement; and I had that request rejected and turned back to the military.

This should explain the fact that there was no idea on that day of any failure of the negotiations, and although it may not be a very precise picture, it would explain the general situation. As far as the army was concerned, it may be considered in the light of your observation, attempt at sabotage of the negotiations on the part of the army. But the Foreign Office can not see clearly to what extent this represented the army's views, what latitude of the army's views, or at how high a level. That matter was to have been brought to the Foreign Office by the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, General MUTO. At that time one of the most urgent and important considerations was that of petroleum. What to do with the petroleum question in case the negotiations ended in failure, and what to do with the question in case the negotiations succeeded.

* * *

Page 10

- Q. In regard to the question of gasoline, what was the demand in quantity that MUTO requested that you should make of the United States.
- A. I do not recall the exact figures, but I do recall that the quantity was much greater than the ordinary imports.

- Q. What would be the reason that the military should desire such large quantities of gasoline.
- A. The military as a matter of course, desired being well supplied and stocked insofar as preparations were concerned; and, therefore, submitted such an exorbitant request. If this question were viewed from the American point of view, it was even publicly stated by President ROOSEVELT and Assistant Secretary of State BERLE that if oil imports into Japan were stopped, it would lead to war. And the American stand on the matter was that by limiting oil supplies to Japan, Japanese strength would be weakened. Therefore, the making of such a demand upon the United States would naturally be rejected and make virtually impossible the arriving at a successful settlement. That is the main and crucial point of the question.

* * *

- Q. Did TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and the others connected with TOJO, reveal at any time other than this that they wished to sabotage successful negotiations between the United States and Japan.

Page 11

- A. The actual situation was that whenever any question arose and views were expressed by the army, it has been very difficult to know or to confirm to what extent it represented the army. That was one of the principal difficulties of the Foreign Office, to confirm whether, for instance, the request brought by MUTO on the gasoline question represented what latitude or level of the army.

* * *