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
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序言

關於我國國際關係的種種事實，美國人民從來沒有像今天這樣提出如此之多的問題的。單就國務院而言，書面的詢問就源源不絕地湧來，數量與日俱增，最近每月平均達五千份以上。

美國的外交政策，是不能根據任何一個單獨的官方文件加以斷定，或予以正式的合法的表現。它不能接受這樣的看待，因為它必須保持其伸縮性，而要在隨時間而變動的各種環境之下，不斷適應。

我國的外交政策是用各種不同的方式表現出來的。國會的立法程序，對於我國外交政策的發展，極關重要，此點可於一九三五年與一九三七年通過中立法案，一九三九年廢棄中立法案，以及國會規定以財政援助給予經濟上艱難諸國見之。

總統在憲法上的地位，使他在決定外交政策路綫方面具有廣大的主動權。他可以談判條約，而在參院參酌意見之下，可以加以批准。他可以規定重要的原則，猶如門羅總統的決定門羅主義，以及卜克與T·羅斯福兩總統把這種主義加以發揮一樣。

在總統規定的方針之內，國務卿擬就外交政策，猶如海氏國務卿宣佈中國門戶開放的原則，以及史汀生國務卿宣佈不承認領土侵略的已成事實的原則。

對於外交政策的形成及其執行，輿論的作用亦頗重要。馬歇爾國務卿在一九四七年七月一日曾經說：「在一個民主國家中，任何一種政策，無論是外交的或者內政的，假如得不到大眾的支持，就極少有發揮效能的機會。」由於我國的國際關係對於我國人民的生活日益重要，輿論對於決定國際政策方面所起的作用，勢將隨之增加。

大多數的外交政策是逐漸形成的。它們極少從任何一個個人的頭腦中生產出來，一下子就達到羽毛豐滿的階段，至於牽涉國家重大利益的政策，尤其如此。種種的決定，必須在衝突的辦法和衝突的意見之中，終告獲致。我國政府的參加第一次世界大戰，也是在經過許多曲折之後，最後使得政府內外的美國人的意見，得到一個結晶。

指導我國外交政策的原則和目標，往往隨時由我們的總統和國務卿加以說明。這些原則和目標中最基本的，就是對於國家安全，經濟利益和維護和平的種種考慮。此外，還有若干更精細的長期目標，作為日常處理外交政策的準則。一九四五年十月廿七日，杜魯門總統提出了這些目標中的若干種，他說這些目標是美國要設法在戰後世界中實現的。它們所關切的，就是完成公正和平，恢復世界的經濟健康，促進保障個人基本自由的民主政治，以及建立維護和平的機構和制度。

要實現這些目標中的若干種，並非美國所能單獨決定。截止目前，為使我們能够希望立即完全實現它們而謀取其他國家必要合作的嘗試，亦未成功。然而，美國在世界政治中佔有如此重要的地位，使它一定要採取主動，而作與其他國家協力解決這些問題的嘗試。因為這些問題假使不獲解決，可能引起禍殃。

下面的文字，目的不在檢討我國外交政策的全部領域，亦不是就它的任何一部份作詳盡的研究。它們的目的，是在就今日美國面臨的重大外交政策問題以及解決這些問題時所牽涉的若干困難，勾出一個輪廓。可是我們希望這一段比較上是簡單的討論，對於美國公民更進一步瞭解我國與其他國家間所發生的問題，能有所助益。

一、締造和平與佔領工作

盟邦各大國和義大利，羅馬尼亞，匈牙利，保加利亞和芬蘭（註一）所簽訂的和約，終於在一九四七年九月十五日發生效力，但是這不過是第二次世界大戰後走向完全和平解決的漫長路途上的一個小站。在放射最後一個子彈兩年多之後，世界上的大多數國家依然和德國與日本處於技術上的戰爭狀態，而奧地利和朝鮮雖為被解放國家，却仍在軍事佔領之下，在國際間並無條約上的地位。美國的一個基本目標，就是要加緊成立條約以求必要的解決，因此把佔領軍隊撤退，並使世界全體國家儘速恢復到和平時代的基礎。

和平解決的原則，甚至若干明白的和平目標，早在戰爭初期即已規定。羅斯福總統的四大自由（一九四一年一月），大西洋憲章（一九四一年八月）和聯合國宣言（一九四二年一月）給予戰後的世界一種希望，在這個世界中，將有一個根據經濟政治合作的國際機構，所有各國人民均能享有言論與信仰，以及免於缺乏和恐慌的基本自由。戰時在莫斯科（一九四三年

十月—十一月），開羅和德黑蘭（一九四三年十一月），雅爾達（一九四五年二月）和柏林（一九四五年七月—八月）舉行的著名會議中，盟邦各大國對於勝利與和平的目標，獲致更多和更精細的協議。奧地利和朝鮮應成爲自由獨立；德國和日本應被剝奪其未來的作戰力量，須以實物充作賠償，並須失却若干領土；法西斯主義，納粹主義和黷武主義應予清算；被解放各國和歐洲軸心附庸國的人民，在實施緊急救濟措置以及根據自由選舉來建立民主政府方面，應該予以協助。

協議的範圍雖極廣泛，但在德國和日本投降之後，有關這兩個主要侵略國的締造和平，顯然是一樁冗長和艱難的工作。按照次序，初步的努力是集中於獲致對義大利以及歐洲四個前軸心附庸國的和平解決。經過了兩年的積極談判，包括美國，聯合王國和蘇聯的一次外長會議，美，英，蘇，法的四次外長會議和巴黎舉行的長達兩個月的和平大會，這五個和約最後是完成了。猶如前國務卿貝爾納斯論及這幾個和約草案時所說的，它們「並不是人類智力所能設計的最好的東西。但是它們是人類智力使四個主要盟邦能够互相同意的最好的東西」。

在談判和實施對義，羅，匈，保，芬的和約時，盟邦之中對於賠償，疆界爭執，經濟機會平等以及對「民主」權利和辦法的解釋，曾發生重大的不協調。在獲致和約的協議時雖作種種必要的妥協，但是若干棘手問題，像義國殖民地的最後處置辦法以及爲「特里埃斯特自由區」設立一個可以行得通的政府問題，依然未獲解決。

自從一九四六年初期起，美國一直重視開始草擬由奧國，德國，日本和朝鮮所形成的國際問題的解決辦法之重要性。在這種解決辦法獲致之前，美國軍隊繼續留駐在這四個國家中，籍以執行我們更進一步促進民主發展，經濟穩定和建立和平狀態的政策。

德國

防止德國任何可能的重起侵略的安全保證，首見於該國的立即解除武裝，此點，係由杜魯門總統，艾德禮首相和史達林大元帥於一九四五年七月和八月在柏林會議中簽訂的波茨坦議定書中所規定。這個協定核准每一佔領國家在各自的佔領區中有拆卸德國軍事設施和軍火工廠的權利。

但是美國覺得單是解除武裝還不足够，並認爲美國以及歐洲的安全需要由四個主要戰勝國（美，英，蘇，法）來共同保

證和實施德國的長期非軍事化。在一九四六年間，國務卿貝爾納斯首先建議簽訂一個四強條約，爲期廿五年，期滿後假如其他盟邦希望延長，可予繼續。這種建議未爲蘇聯所接受，雖然英法政府是表示贊同的。

我國對德政策的基本原則，就是反對納粹主義和黷武主義。紐倫堡審判高級納粹官吏，消滅納粹組織和法律，在美軍佔領區內培養有力的消滅納粹運動，讓德國人自己去進行，以謀將前納粹黨中凡『超過名義上參加納粹活動』的全部黨員逐出一切公私職位，凡此種種，都以實施此一原則爲目標。此外，復遵照波茨坦協定採取種種措施，以謀消弭『經濟力量的過份集中』，猶如企業集團和其他獨佔性辦法所表現的。

基本的民主自由，在美軍佔領區中是最充份的給予德國人民的，祇要能保證我國駐軍的安全和符合佔領的目標就好了。此外，在美軍佔領區中的四個行政區(Länder)中的每一區中，都有一個負責的德國行政機構，它的發展情形，給予德國人在民主自治的方法方面一種實際的教育，並且鼓勵了他們對當地有關公衆利益的事務作健全的參預。教科書和教師都經過了嚴格的審查，籍使納粹或黷武主義思想完全逐出教育制度。

美國政府明瞭一個和平民主德國的發展，需要經濟復元和安定。照一九四七年七月給予德境美國軍政府首長的最高政策指令中的說話，我們的目標是在『鼓勵德國人民重建自給自足的國家，使其致力於和平的目的，融合於歐洲的經濟體系之中』。

按照波茨坦議定書第十四款，美國一向主張德國在四強管治之下應『作爲一個單獨的經濟單位』。由於法國和蘇聯政府不願採取必要的步驟來達成此點，國務卿貝爾納斯在一九四六年這一次外長會議中曾經宣佈說：他的政府不能允許這種勢將導入經濟混亂的現行局勢繼續下去，並且說美軍佔領區將與願意參加的其他佔領區作經濟上的合併。這個建議到目前還是對所有的其他佔領區開放的，但是截止現在，還祇有英方表示接受。規定英美佔領區經濟合併的正式協定，係於一九四六年十二月加以公佈，其目的，乃係在三年之內使這兩個區域達到自給自足。

由於德國經濟統一的目標在莫斯科外長會議（一九四七年三月—四月）中又未能實現，那麼假如英法佔領區要達到自給自足的程度，就必須修改先前准許該兩區維持的工業水準，這一點是非常顯明的了。先前規定的德國工業水準計劃（一九

四六年），是根據德國將被作爲一個經濟整體的理論的。鑒於早日實現此項目標的希望渺茫，英美佔領區的經濟復蘇，就需要提高適用於這兩個貧乏區域內的工業水準，英美佔領區的一個新工業水準計劃，是在一九四七年八月宣佈的。按照這個計劃規定的範圍，英美佔領區的工業復蘇，目的不僅在解除英美納稅人爲維持這兩個佔領區而負起的重大財政負擔，並且要在德國人民中造成發展民主政治更有利的條件，以及經由德國所能提供的貢獻促進歐洲的經濟復蘇。

截止目前，爲謀決定解決德國問題的基礎而舉行的種種討論，業已顯示蘇聯不但反對美國所建議的解除德國軍備和使德國非軍事化的四強條約，並且反對美國根據波茨坦議定書所定的佔領政策的其他重要方面。蘇聯政府已經明白表示贊成德國成立一個集中形式的政府，雖然波茨坦協定明白規定「德國的行政機構，應以分散中央政治機構和發展地方責任爲目的的。」蘇聯對於我們堅決想達到四強合作把德國「當作一個單獨的經濟單位」管治的努力，始終反對。蘇聯堅持假如把德國當作一個經濟整體看待，那麼德國的全部工業，應該爲賠償而生產，不應爲償付必要的輸入品而生產輸出品。這個建議是被認爲違背波茨坦賠償協定的，假如真正執行起來，等於英美兩國來付出賠償，因爲英美必須無限期繼續把食物和其他必需品供給它們的佔領區了。

蘇聯政府在它的佔領區中已經片面實施具有遠大影響的措施，足以影響德國經濟，政治和社會生活的基本形式，蘇聯政府這樣做，完全不能實施波茨坦協定中准許政治活動，言論和集會自由的規定。這種局勢的持續，祇會引導到德國分裂的路上去，假如這樣，美國勢將面臨一種工作，就是至少要協助西部德國沿民主途徑發展，並參與歐洲的經濟復元。

日 本

美國的對日政策是和對德政策遵循着實質上相同的路綫。但是對於日本，由於麥克阿瑟將軍担任盟國駐日最高總司令實行統一指揮的原故，進步比較更快。靠了日本各種武裝部隊的消滅，陸軍和海軍設備的奪獲，以及一切極端國家主義和贖主義社團的解散，立即解除日本武裝的目的已經達到了。此在德國，美國曾建議一項長期安全公約，保證德國侵略者的繼續解除武裝。雖然這一個條約的草案已於一九四六年初提交中國，蘇聯和聯合王國考慮，但至今在這方面並未採取確定的行動。

遠東國際軍事法庭已使日本的重要的戰犯和鼓動侵略者受到應得的審判。爲了消滅日本國內的全能主義和專制主義，業已採取強有力的步驟。日皇已公開否認皇室的神聖，因此推翻了國家「神道」的基本原則。一種新的自由的憲法已被採納，保證了民權的自由並且大大地減低了日皇的絕對權力。一九四七年四月根據這個憲法舉行全國第一次普選時，麥克阿瑟會發表演說稱，此項結果，證實了一種信念，就是日本人民不會担当不起他們的新責任，並且說日本所挑選的中庸路線，「對於任何一種極端頗能站於中間地位，而來保證自由的確保和個人尊嚴的增長」。

爲少數財富世家控制的大工業集團的權力，業已破裂。教育制度，則正根據美國於一九四六年春季派往日本的教育代表團所提供的意見以及遠東委員會其在政策上所作的決定，加以自由化和現代化。日本經濟的和平發展已予以鼓勵，它的國外貿易的復蘇，則由於一九四六年十月盟邦對日貿易局的成立而獲得了刺激。

盟邦主要國家在雅爾達會同意蘇聯恢復獲得庫頁島南部，包括其鄰近島嶼在內，千島列島則應移交予蘇聯。其後復就會遭日本侵略各國應獲得緊急實物賠償一節，獲致一項協議，但是解決對日問題的其他基本項目，則猶待決定。

一九四七年七月，美國向參加遠東委員會的其他十國建議，認爲在可能範圍內應儘速召開會議討論對日和約，並提議該項會議中的決定，應由三分之二多數表決。除蘇聯外，參加該委員會的各國政府迅即對召開十一國會議表示贊同，雖然美國所假定的日期一般都認爲不大方便。蘇聯反對此項建議，並堅持初步會議應限由美，英，蘇，中參加。

奧地利

在一九四三年十月—十一月舉行的莫斯科會議中，英，美，蘇宣佈一個「自由獨立」的奧地利的目標。一九四五年春季納粹崩潰之後，立即採取迅速行動去達成這一目標，並獲得法國和其聯合國國家的支持。雖然該國被分爲四個佔領區，但證明可能在一九四五年年底之前成立一個根據自由選舉的奧地利代表政府。遵照維也納盟國管制委員會的意願，新政府迅即實施改革教育和清算納粹的綱領。至一九四六年六月，奧國政府的穩定和合作態度，已使盟管會可以大事放鬆先前對奧國立法機關的嚴格管制。

一九四六年九月，美國和奧地利恢復了正常的外交關係，並且敦促迅速簽訂對奧條約，因此可以正式承認奧國在國際間

的地位，而可使盟國軍隊加速自奧地利領土撤退。這種政策固爲聯合王國和法國所支持，但是蘇聯提出了若干反對，至今互相可以同意的解決辦法還沒有獲得。蘇聯支持南斯拉夫對南卡林西亞和斯蒂里亞的一小部份的領土要求。蘇聯並堅持一點，說是根據波茨坦協定，蘇聯應獲得奧國東部的全部『德國』資產，不管其中許多資產是由納粹份子強佔去的，而根據其他三個佔領國的意見，應該歸還原主的事實。在談判條約時，蘇聯一直拒絕美國，聯合王國和法國的建議，根據這種建議，德國資產之移充賠償者，應遵照奧國法律的各方面來辦理。此在美國政府，則曾公開表示願意進行談判，甚至可以放棄它對奧境德資產應得的一份，以謀作爲這一問題的總解決之一部份。

此項問題在一九四七年三月—四月在莫斯科舉行的外長會議中加以詳細檢討之後，馬歇爾國務卿表示如果接受蘇聯的立場，將使奧國以獨立和自給自足國家的地位謀取生存的機會甚爲渺茫，並表示美國『不能參與內含如此許多顯著的不公平的條約』，這種條約將造『如此孱弱和無助的一個奧國，而將成爲將來重大危險的一個根源。』繼而就在維也納成立了一個四強委員會，以謀更進一步研究此一問題。一九四七年八月，美國代表奉召返國，有所商討。他在離開維也納的時候發表了一個聲明，指出美國對於下列諸點，深表關切：（一）『蘇聯奪取應歸委員會討論範圍之內的財產這種片面行動』，（二）蘇聯代表團一般的不合作，此點可由該代表團『對其他代表團向委員會所提的事實資料表示冷淡』見之，（三）蘇聯堅持向奧國人和其他人索取賠償，此點可由蘇聯『所要求的資產，在數量上和形式上並不是真正爲德國所有』見之。美國希望這種談判所造成的成功結果，可以使佔領軍隊從奧國領土撤退成爲可能。

美國對奧地利成立了一個救濟計劃，規定從一九四七年六月到九月底，以價值約爲四千三百萬美元的急需供應品，裝赴奧國，並考慮再裝運更多的物資去減輕奧國人民的痛苦。

朝鮮

羅斯福總統，邱吉爾首相和蔣介石委員長於一九四三年十一月在開羅舉行會議時，表示決心，認爲『朝鮮應遵照適當步驟成爲自由獨立』。這一保證在一九四五年的波茨坦宣言中予以重申，其後在蘇聯參加對日戰爭的時候，它也加以簽署。但是朝鮮的政治本質，自被日本人從一九一〇年加以兼併以來，已告模糊。因此在一九四五年八月日本抵抗崩潰的時候，美國

軍隊佔領了朝鮮的南部，蘇聯軍隊開進了朝鮮的北部。這種局勢到今日依然保持。

一九四五年十二月舉行的莫斯科會議，建議爲朝鮮成立一個美蘇聯合委員會，籍以和朝鮮領袖磋商成立朝鮮臨時政府的辦法，並草擬四強託管朝鮮爲時不得超過五年的建議。朝鮮實際所發生的情形，馬歇爾國務卿於一九四七年九月十七日向聯合國全體大會簡潔地說明了出來：

大約兩年來，美國政府設法經由聯合委員會和其他辦法，與蘇聯獲致協議，以謀獲得實施莫斯科協定的方法，因而形成朝鮮的獨立。美國代表會堅持解決朝鮮問題的任何辦法，不得在任何方面侵犯意見自由的基本民主權利。這一點依然是我國政府的立場。今日朝鮮的獨立較兩年前並無進步。朝鮮依然在北緯三十八度被劃分，蘇軍駐於北部工業區，美軍駐於南部農業區。兩佔領區問題極少或者幾乎沒有交換物資和服務。朝鮮的經濟因此殘廢了。

朝鮮人民並不是從前的敵人，而在從日本四十年壓迫中解放出來的人民，但是至今依然沒有自由。這種局勢不能任其無限制繼續。爲謀獲致進展起見，美國政府最近提出若干建議，以求達成莫斯科協定的目的，並請參與此項協定各國參加討論這些建議。中國和聯合國同意此項步驟。蘇聯政府並不同意。更有進者，參加聯合委員會的美蘇代表團甚至不能就它們考慮的進展程度共同擬就一個聯合報告。顯然的，再作經由美蘇兩國談判以求解決朝鮮問題的嘗試，僅足以稽延獨立統一朝鮮的建立而已。

在馬歇爾國務卿宣佈美國政府擬將朝鮮問題提交聯合國的意向之後，朝鮮美蘇聯合委員會的蘇方首席代表在一九四七年九月廿六日聲稱『可能給予朝鮮人自己來組織一個政府的機會，不必盟國的協助和參預，美蘇軍隊可自朝鮮撤退』。

美國於一九四七年十月十七日公佈的向聯合國提出的建議，說明美國政府不能承認僅僅撤軍就可作爲朝鮮問題的適當解決。美國的建議主張下列數點：（一）佔領國家應在各自的佔領區中舉行選舉，不得遲於一九四八年三月三十一日，由聯合國監察；（二）經由此項選舉而成立的朝鮮政府應該組織其自己的安全部隊，並籌備美蘇軍隊的『早日完全撤退』；（三）聯合國爲盡其對該項問題的責任起見，應成立聯合國朝鮮臨時委員會。

因此美國已經把馬歇爾國務卿的願望提供了具體的表示，就是說在促進『朝鮮人民對獨立的迫切合理要求方面』，不得再有所遷延了。

（註一）美國並未和芬蘭宣戰，所以並不簽字於對該國的和約。

二、聯合國

對聯合國的支持，乃是美國維護和平和國際安全政策的基石。聯合國是在贏取戰爭過程中所採步驟的直接結果。

早在一九四一年八月的大西洋憲章中，美國就表示決心，要締造一種可以給予世界所有民族普遍安全的和平。在大國的幾次戰時會議中，像一九四三年十月的莫斯科會議等，我們首先發動，盟邦也一致主張儘早建立『一個普遍的國際機構……籍以維護和平與安全』。一九四四年，我國政府邀請英國，蘇聯和中國在華盛頓舉行鄧巴頓橡樹會商。在這幾次會議中，四強草擬了一套建議，提出了一個永久性國際機構的雛型。這形成了聯合國憲章的基礎，後者係由五十國代表在一九四五年四月—六月的舊金山會議中擬定的。

憲章將維護國際和平與安全的首要責任，託付與安理會，它並且承認大國在安理會的地位，應大致與它們爲防止或消除和平威脅和侵略行動而負起實施政治，經濟或軍事措施的責任相符合。所以在組成安理會的十一國中，五個理事國——包括美國在內——應有永久席位。在『實際』而非『程序』的事務提交安理會時，必須有七票贊成的大多數，所有常任理事國不投反對票，始能通過。根據一項非正式協議，一個常任理事國可以放棄投票，而這種棄權不作爲使用否決權論。常任理事國全體一致的規定之唯一正式例外，就是在此等常任理事國之一也是某項爭執的一方，而安理會又須遵照憲章第六章覓致和平解決的時候。在這種情形之下，這一個常任理事國必須不予投票，以免對一樁直接有關的事務發生表決的作用。在日常的或者程序的事務方面，安理會按照另一種票決制度，祇要任何七個理事國的大多數，就可以發生決定的作用了。

美國對於使得安理會成爲聯合國更有效的一種工具方面，極表關切，爲達到這一目的，我們的代表會標榜若干原則：

(一) 對向安理會提出的事務有關的每一國家，都有充份和公開陳述意見的權利。所以，縱使是不屬於聯合國的國家，當它們被牽涉到考慮中的案件時，也被邀參加安理會的辯論。

(二) 安理會應充份理解有關某項爭端的一切事實，所以在必要時應該進行調查和探詢。此種情形的一個顯著例子，就是巴爾幹委員會，後者奉命調查希臘對南斯拉夫，保加利亞和阿爾巴尼亞的控訴。在該委會進行實地考察的全部過程中，美

國代表會盡力之所及，保證對該案的事實作澈底的調查。

(三) 安理會對於解決爭端的責任，超過有關各方本身的利益，因為一樁案子一旦在安理會提出之後，如不獲安理會的准許，就是直接有關的國家也不能把它撤回。此點在處理伊朗案件時已予以釋明，當時貝爾納斯國務卿會肯定安理會有繼續處理此項爭端的權利，雖然蘇聯和伊朗雙方都表示願意將該案從安理會的議程上撤回了。

美國贊成此一原則，就是安理會遵照憲章第七章的規定對威脅和平，破壞和平及侵略行動可以採取實際行動之前，五個常任理事國應該意見協調。同時，這一點也含蓄著一種責任，就是對於重大的問題必須竭盡一切力量以謀獲得一致同意。縱使一個常任理事國可以使用否決權來阻止一個對它本身安全利益不符的行動，這種否決權還是以少用為宜，並且不應該和維護和平與國際安全的基本責任相背反。猶如國務卿最近所說的（一九四七年九月十七日），『約束是權力和特權的一個必要伴侶』，『假如有人堅持特權到破壞集體意志的程度，聯合國將萬難容忍』。

為使否決權的使用不應該使安理會的活動麻痺起見，我們會設法增加不必由五常任理事國一致同意而能解決的事務之數目。第一，對於被認為是程序的問題，應該提取一種寬大的解釋。第二，就是關於實際問題，一個常任理事國的棄權不能被認為否決權而把安理會的決議推翻。第三，第二十七款規定爭端的有關方面對牽涉和平解決的事情必須不參與投票的一部份，應該解釋為任何國家對它自己的案子不能參與裁判。最後，鑒於否決權的過份使用已阻止安理會履行其真正的任務，我們已經宣佈在有關申請加入聯合國以及憲章第五章關於處理和平解決爭端所引起的各種事務，願意接受取消大國必須一致的規定。

假如聯合國要行使它維護和平的權力，安理會必須獲得必要的武裝力量 and 辦法來維護國際的安全。軍事參謀委員會是負責草擬該方面的計劃的，當該委會舉行討論的時候，美國會根據憲章力促立即草就協議，籍以保證安理會一旦遭遇破壞和平或侵略事件發生時，可以有充份的武裝力量。

全體大會是討論憲章範圍以內任何問題的場所，考慮並提出建議，以謀促進國際間在政治，經濟，社會方面合作。雖然憲章第二十一款禁止全體大會對正由安理會積極考慮中的任何爭端或局勢提出建議，但是美國政府覺得這一項規定目的並不

在剝奪大會考慮重要政治問題的權利。在過去一年中，大會曾經檢討過如此重要的政治問題像有關西班牙弗朗哥政權以及巴勒斯坦的將來等問題，並且我們支持大會爲對此一爆炸性的問題謀取公正解決而所作的努力。最近，美國並已要求大會討論在去年發生的對希臘完整的威脅以及早日建立朝鮮獨立的問題。

由於美國愈來愈重視全體大會，認爲它是把世界的道德和政治力量加到國際不協調之上的一個場所，我國政府已敦促大會成立一個負責和平與安全的臨時委員會。雖然這個團體不致和安理會的功能相衝突，但是它可以考慮損害國際友好關係的局勢和爭端。這個『小型大會』可以：（一）考慮有關和平與安全的問題並向全體大會報告。（二）對值得不斷注意的建議隨時留意。（三）對國際合作作長距離的研究。這樣一個委員會可以『增強和平解決問題的機構，並將解決這種問題的責任廣泛地置於聯合國所有會員國的身上。』（註一）

作爲全體大會促進聯合國經濟，社會和人造目標的機構的經濟社會理事會，着手進行各種不同的活動，猶如起草國際人權法案，管制國際間麻醉品的流通，協助歐洲的經濟復興以及許多其他重要計劃。在這些工作的每一種中，美國總是遵照憲章的目的，參與建立『穩定和幸福的條件，後者對於國際的和平友好關係是必要的』。同樣的，我們正經由託管理事會的努力，協助世界非自治土地的發展，並且遵照我們對非獨立民族的政策，我們在託管理事會的工作方面，也已負起領導的任務。（註二）

爲培植聯合國的經濟，社會和人造原則起見，美國會支持過特種機構的許多計劃，聯合國善後救濟總署送往會遭戰爭破壞各國的救濟品中，有百分之七十三是從我國獲得的。爲協助難民起見，國際難民機構現已形成，曾獲得美國的充份合作。爲保證長期通貨穩定和經濟復興起見，國際貨幣基金和國際銀行會把我國的美金存款提取甚多。此外，謀改善工作條件的國際勞工機構，謀增進食物供應的食物農業機構，謀培植更健全的生活條件的世界衛生機構，謀促進相互諒解的聯合國教育科學文化機構，都會獲得我國政府衷心的支持。

聯合國並不是一個超人的機構，不能立即在全世界建立和平與繁榮。聯合國所能成就的，在我國出席安理會代表H·魯森于一九四七年六月廿一日所作的一個聲明中說得很清楚，他堅稱『聯合國給我們早期澄清和戰的一個機會，要在尙能謀

致和平的時候形成抵抗陣綫，而不是一定要在牽入生死之戰的時候才予以形成。『我們知道聯合國必須由每一國家解決其自身問題的熱誠努力以及所有政府均有和平解決爭端的誠心意願來加以補充。可是聯合國靠了把法治的利益和約束擴大到所有民族的過程，能够切實地幫助解決現行問題以及阻止將來的嚴重衝突。』

(註一) 摘自馬歇爾國務卿于一九四七年九月十七日向聯合國全體大會發表的演說。

(註二) 參看美國對非獨立地區的政策。

三、支持自由國家

大部份由於他們自己形成一個獨立國家的根源和環境，美國人民從他們的歷史開始時起，對於努力奮鬥以謀達到，恢復，或維持他們自由和獨立的其他國家和人民，一向是同情的。一九四四年六月，赫爾國務卿就我國的政策說：『一百五十年來我們一直向地球上的所有國家，地球上的所有民族，倡導自由，並且我們的確這樣做了。我們曾經鼓勵所有國家崇尚自由並享受自由：這是我們始終一貫的記錄，一種爲每一個人爭取自由的記錄，在所有的時間和所有的地方，始終鼓勵他們。』

一七九六年一月，華盛頓在述及他自己維護自由的事業時說：『當我在任何國家中看到一個被壓迫的國家揚起自由的旗幟時，我的懇切回憶，我的同情心理和我誠懇願望會不自主地激動起來。』這種感覺，在其後的一個半世紀中時常由重要的美國政治家加以表示，現在在一九四一年八月的大西洋憲章中得到了宣露。這一憲章中聲明從軸心侵略國手中獲得解放的國家，應該讓它們的獨立恢復。一九四五年十月，杜魯門總統以一種政策的形式表達了這種感情，當時他指出按照美國的觀點，『所有準備自治的民族都應准許他們選擇他們自己的政府形式，』並且說『這在歐洲，在亞洲，在非洲以及西半球都是準確的。』

關於新世界，一九四七年六月馬歇爾國務卿總結一世紀餘來的發展說：『美國的傳統政策，就是西半球國家維護它們的獨立。』首先，我們的支持見諸於承認新國家的獨立。其後，當若干歐洲企圖擊破這些新成立而猶孱弱的國家或者想在新世界建立殖民地而把它們用作侵略行動的跳板時，當這種危險似乎顯現時，美國就宣佈了門羅主義，其主要目的乃在防止這種

禍害。

關於遠東，我們在十九世紀之末二十世紀之初宣布了我們支持中國的獨立和領土完整以及門戶開放或貿易權利平等。我們曾經屢次重申支持中國的獨立，包括我們在第二次世界大戰期間就和平目標所作的聲明在內。在一九四三年十二月的開羅宣言中，羅斯福總統，邱吉爾首相和蔣介石委員長同意『將日本從中國人手中竊取去的一切土地，像滿洲，台灣和澎湖羣島，都應歸還中華民國共和國。』他們同時同意在一九一〇年被日本兼併的朝鮮，『應成爲自由獨立』。美國是始終支持恢復朝鮮獨立的。美國准許菲律賓獨立，乃是在遠東實施自決原則的一個確鑿例證。

鑒于美國在爭取反抗軸心侵略國的戰爭中所佔重要地位，我們的國家對於一切歐洲國家之自由與獨立被用武力剝奪的，主張予以恢復。一九四五年二月，當戰爭接近結束時，羅斯福總統，邱吉爾首相和史達林大元帥在克里米亞半島的雅爾達舉行會議，發表聯合宣言，聲稱『三國政府將聯合協助歐洲任何被解放國家或前軸心附庸國的人民，而在這些國家中的情形，根據它們的判斷，需要……形成可以廣泛代表人民中一切民主份子的臨時政府，並保證儘早根據人民的意志經由自由選舉建立政府；並……在有此需要的地方，竭力便利這種選舉的舉行。』

美國不但維持並且支持這種見解，就是自由政府如無自由選舉不能存在，並且維持與支持另一種見解，就是唯有在新聞，言論，宗教，結社和集會的民主自由，以及免于威嚇，武力壓迫，和隨意逮捕的自由實際上存在的情形之下，政府才能保持自由。

美國起先認爲雅爾達協定是一種神聖的具有約束性的國際協定。波蘭，羅馬尼亞，保加利亞和南斯拉夫的現政府都提供了舉行自由選舉的保證，但是不幸的是這幾個政府違背了它們的保證。在匈牙利，于一九四五年十一月舉行自由選舉而推選出來的一個民主政府，于一九四七年六月被共產黨少數黨所推翻了。在這些國家中，基本自由都遭受了嚴重的損害。波蘭，羅馬尼亞，保加利亞和匈牙利是被蘇聯軍隊所解放的。在解放之前或稍後，在這些國家中所形成的政府，一開頭就是由蘇聯控制的，自從雅爾達協定以及其後的幾種協定簽字之後，美國曾經屢次對此等新政府未能恪守諾言提出抗議。

根據和約的規定，佔領軍隊應於和約生效之日起九十日內——一九四七年九月十六日——撤退，但是蘇聯軍隊爲了維持對奧

境蘇佔區的交通綫起見，可能留駐在羅馬尼亞和匈牙利。

美國幫助獨立國家維護獨立的決心，亦見諸於過去數年中我們給予近東國家的道德支持，如敘利亞，黎巴嫩，伊朗和土耳其所獲得的。

當蘇聯主張能按照蘇聯政府先前所作的保證於一九四六年一月自伊朗撤退軍隊時，美國會力促蘇聯恪守協定。蘇聯軍隊於一九四六年五月離開伊朗。美國在聯合國會議中支持伊朗的立場。

類似性質的道德支持也由美國給予土耳其。根據一九三六年簽訂的國際協定，土耳其負責守衛海峽——黑海與地中海之間的紐帶。一九四六年夏季，蘇聯要求土耳其允許一項協定，規定兩國聯合負責守衛此一重要水道。土耳其力言接受此項建議勢將動搖其獨立。美國立即通知蘇聯和土耳其，認為海峽問題必須由國際協定予以解決，而在此種協定簽訂之前，海峽地位不應有所變更。

美國自身的利益與在世界各地保存自由政府一點，休戚相關。美國與全世界的自由和平與安全，具有重大關係。第二次世界大戰的開始，是以攻擊自由獨立人民為信號的。靠毀滅基本民主自由而奪取政權的少數份子所控制的極權政府，對於將世界導入混亂應負責任。

第二次世界大戰的痛苦經驗，加強了我們的決心，凡有國家它們的獨立為侵略的壓力和威脅所危害時，就應該給予援助。從一九四七年五月以來，希臘和土耳其就在得到這種援助。一九四七年三月，杜魯門總統告國會稱：『我相信美國的政策必須是支持自由人民去抵抗武裝少數份子或外來壓力所企圖造成的征服行動。經由直接或間接侵略而加於自由人民頭上的極權政權，動搖國際和平的基礎，因此也動搖美國的安全。』

美國也深知在貧困和艱苦盛行，政治穩定朝不保夕以及經濟情形日趨恐化的地方，自由政府和民主制度是不能繁榮的。所以美國政府建議以經濟援助給予願意自助的國家。經濟福利與自由制度的保持之間的密切關係，會由馬歇爾國務卿於一九四七年八月十五日加以慎重說明；他說：『美國人需要一個繁榮的世界……美國人需要一個自由的世界。我們希望每一國的人民能夠自由選擇他們所歡喜的政府形式和經濟組織。我們知道饑餓和不安全是自由民主最惡劣的敵人。……戰爭是由窮苦

和壓迫培養成功的。唯有在比較上自由和繁榮的世界中，和平的保持始屬可能。」

四、歐洲的復興

由於六年的戰爭，歐洲的經濟感受着麻痺的影響。經濟的失常比起先所理解的更爲嚴重，歐洲的復興將是一椿冗長和艱難的工作。再者，除非會遭戰爭破壞各國恢復經濟健康，世界的和平和美國外交政策的其他目標可能受到嚴重的威脅。不但是個經濟上健全的世界大致是一個和平的世界，同時一個相當可以的生活標準，也是民主制度的生存或生長的最低的條件，而保護和培養這種制度，就是我們的政策。

一九四七年六月九日，杜魯門總統在加拿大議會發表演說謂：

每一個地方的自由人都知道美國的目的是在恢復世界的健康，並且重建一種環境，俾使地球上的普通人民能在這種環境之下，靠了他們自己的努力而獲救。

我們想要擴大我們的力量，提供我們的物資，靠了幫助能够並且願意爲此一目的提供最大貢獻的人，來促進世界的復興。

我們協助歐洲復興的努力，甚至在戰爭尚在進行的時候已經開始。我們的成立聯合國善後救濟總署（聯總）方面會起領導的作用，這一機構的目的，是在把救濟物品立即供給會遭戰爭破壞的國家。爲協助長期經濟復興起見，我們支持了這一類機構像糧食農業機構，國際復興開發銀行和國際貨幣基金，每一個機構都是戰後復興和擴大世界經濟計劃的一部份。

當戰爭結束的時候，長期計劃必須由具體的和立刻的援助加以補充。我們貸與英國三十三億七千五百萬美元，國會又授權進出口銀行出借二十八億美元以供建設之用，其中大部份是借給歐洲國家的。一九四七年中，我們撥款四億美元援助希臘和土耳其，並撥三億三千二百萬美元作爲救濟，其中大部份是給予歐洲國家的。自從戰爭結束以來，截止一九四七年七月一日，我們貸出的或贈與歐洲各國的總額，包括剩餘資產的信用貸款以及其他形式的援助，幾達一百七十億美元的價值。

此外，我們還率先替歐洲解決燃料和運輸上的難題，推動並且積極參加歐洲煤斤機構和中歐內陸運輸機構。我們積極推動在聯合國之下設立歐洲經濟委員會，作爲調整這些和其他努力的一種方法。美國一方面堅持維持適當的保證以防德國再起

侵略的危險，但同時又承認德國對歐洲復興計劃成功的極大重要性。馬歇爾國務卿于一九四七年的莫斯科外長會議中會就美國的政策說：『美國反對使德國在歐洲中部繼續成爲擁擠的貧民窟或者經濟的破落戶這種政策……我們要德國利用它熟練的人力，能量和工業力量的資源，來重建歐洲繁榮所繫的貿易網……』

以此爲止，我們的援助已經得到了好結果。美國在過去兩年中對於直接援助所作的貢獻，對於減輕饑餓和極端艱苦頗有成就。我們的援助在若干歐洲國家中已經造成工業生產的恢復。這種改進，對於避免極權主義政府的擴大極有關係，後者是要利用經濟上的惡化作爲奪取政權的手段的。

可是歐洲的復興，離完成的階段尙遠。猶如在國家和個別工業中一樣，復興是不平衡的，而從整個歐洲講，今日還遠不能在世界中自有辦法。歐洲大陸現在還不能夠生產足夠的東西來滿足它自己的需要，和供給若干輸出品，因而可以採購若干免不了的輸入品。所以歐洲復興戰爭的勝利，猶在未定之天。由于這次戰爭假如失敗歐洲將成爲極權政府繁殖的場所之故，所以它的結果如何更見得重要。

一九四七年六月五日，馬歇爾國務卿號召對於歐洲復興整個問題，作一種新的嘗試。

第一，國務卿力促我們將來的復興援助應該配合在一個完整計劃之中，藉使歐洲國家自給自足。他力言我們的援助不僅應該是無窮盡的一連串臨時措置，以應付不斷加緊出現的危機。『這個政府在將來可能給予的援助應該是一種醫療而不僅是一種緩和劑。』爲保證美國援助的最高效能，國務卿說明每一個歐洲國家應該按照它的能力作充份的貢獻。所以美國的援助不但要看歐洲國家的自助，並且要看歐洲各國本身之間的互相幫助。

第二，馬歇爾國務卿力主草擬歐洲復興計劃的主動權，應該完全放在歐洲人手中。他說美國不能獨斷復興的形式作爲供給援助的代價。一俟歐洲國家擬定計劃之後，我們政府將予以詳細的研究，藉以決定美國在幫助歐洲復興方面究竟能做些什麼。

第三，國務卿說明美國歡迎所有歐洲國家參加此項計劃。但是他又說，『凡是希望想用增加人類痛苦的辦法來在政治上或其他方面牟利的政府，政黨或團體，將遭美國的反對。』（註一）

最後，我們主要的目的，就是希望歐洲國家能够擬就一種計劃，這一計劃要不但能够造成經濟復興，還要能够使歐洲的經濟自給自足。猶如副國務卿艾克遜于一九四七年五月八日所說的，「……在各國能够自己立定脚跟而成爲自給自足之前，世界上就不能有政治或經濟的安全，我們任何人都得不到持久的和平或繁榮。」

對於馬歇爾的建議發生了迅速的反應。英法兩國外長採取主動，邀請蘇外長莫洛托夫於六月二十七日舉行初步會議。幾位外長會商了一個星期。之後，蘇聯政府就宣佈不願參加此項計劃，其理由是它將干涉參加各國的內政主權。英法兩國政府不願蘇聯的反對，邀請歐洲所有國家參加歐洲復興會議。十六國接受了。蘇聯和其他東歐國家拒絕出席。

十六國在會商二個多月之後，於九月二十二日宣佈了它們關於歐洲復興計劃的初步報告。歐洲國家準備做三件事：一、竭盡一切力量增加它們的國家生產；二、竭盡所能防止通貨膨脹並建立國內的財政穩定；三、相互合作，以謀歐洲內部的貨物自由移動，並增加亟需物資的生產。歐洲國家估計它們將需要二百二十億美元，俾在未來四年中以美元償付食物，燃料，原料和重要設備的輸入。預料此項資金中的一部份可由國際銀行或私人投資來負擔，但是歐洲國家估計它們所需要而無法從這幾方面獲得的最低缺額，將爲一百九十億美元。這一數額需要用來向美國和其他需要美元償付國家，購買供應品。

當十六國正在歐洲會商的時候，由政府專家和民間要人所組織的委員會，則在就美國援助歐洲的能力作詳細的研究。這種研究的目的，是在決定美國究能用多少力量去援助歐洲而又不致危害它自己的經濟。

各種的因素已經會同證明一點，就是在未來數月中，歐洲復興計劃必須由立即的緊急援助加以補充。一九四六—四七年冬季的嚴寒以及今夏破壞農作物的旱災，已經加深了歐洲經濟的惡化，尤其是在食物方面。整個的計劃需要長期的研究，因此將它匆促地付諸實施，顯屬不智。最後，在一九四五年和一九四六年所供給的借款和贈與，到一九四七年秋間已因供給歐洲各國物資而幾告用罄了。結果，馬歇爾國務卿最近宣佈了某種形式的臨時援助之需要，藉以應付不可忍受的饑餓與寒冷的威脅，以待援助歐洲復興的長期計劃充份發揮效力。

當國務卿向美國人民說明他們對世界復興所作的慷慨貢獻能得到什麼回報時，他也總結了一下我們的復興計劃之未來路線。「他們堅決要求他們所貢獻出來的無論什麼東西，都應該有效地用於原來規定的目的；它不能用於謀取自私的經濟或

政治利益；它應該確定地用於協助經濟復元；最後，它應該致力於一個偉大的目的，那就是要在有關各國的人民之中重建希望 and 信心，相信將在將來，世界是可以有和平與安全的』（註二）

（註一）馬歇爾國務卿于一九四七年六月五月在哈佛大學發表的演說。

（註二）馬歇爾國務卿于一九四七年七月一日在全國婦女新聞俱樂部發表的演說。

五、國際經濟政策

過去數十年中的種種事情，已愈益證明我們自己國內的繁榮，是與全世界的繁榮相聯繫的。我們不能把國內和國外的事務分開。假如我們要一個繁榮的美國，我們必須要有一個繁榮的世界；而在阻礙貨物在國與國之間暢流的歧視辦法與過份的關稅壁壘依然存在之時，健全的世界經濟就永不能成爲現實。

貿易政策

一九三〇年代的經濟恐慌和第二次世界大戰的日益迫近，引起了一個複雜的貿易壁壘的迷宮。例如，限額制度任意地限制了進出於一國的貨物數量，外匯管制同樣也限制了進出於一國的金錢。特惠關稅造成歧視，將從若干特惠國家輸入的貨物課稅較低。官樣文章阻撓進口或出口的整個程序達如此的程度，致使貿易上的一切生機被窒息了。在某種時候，一個政府可以付出出口補貼，迫使若干種貨物在國際市場上傾銷。由于政治的動機有時會影響商業上的打算之故，國有工業往往有任意干涉貿易的傾向。私人的獨佔組織和企業集團可以人爲地提高價格而任意劃分世界市場。由于政府與政府間商品協定的運用失當，生產國可以剝削消費國。經由純粹的內政政策，若干政府也可以予國際貿易以不利的影響。例如，一國可以根據短促的眼光來設法減少外國貨的消費，藉以解決暫時過剩的一些貨物。增高關稅壁壘的政策，總是會引起其他國家的報復措置的。

美國反對這些中傷國際貿易正常發展的勢力，發動了一個幾方面的攻擊。我們最明顯的一種努力，就是成立國際貿易機構。它提出了消滅或減低政府與政府間阻撓世界貿易的關稅壁壘。有幾條規則是頗爲重要的，它們限制或者禁止使用限額制

度及其他方法來束縛進口或出口貨物的數量。國際貿易機構的憲章並規定舉行談判，以謀減低過高的關稅壁壘，以及最後取消特惠關稅制度。它並將保證商品協定祇能用於合法的目的——就是有條理地處理世界過剩物品——而不能用以剝削消費國。憲章中並有若干規則，其目的，乃在約束私人獨佔組織和企業集團特定的商業行爲。它並保證較落後國家的經濟發展，並且保障經濟恐慌不致從一國擴展到另一國。

美國並正使用其他方法來便利國際間貨物的移動。友好條約，商業條約和航海條約，一向是我國和其他國家經濟關係的傳統基礎，它們應該保障美國商人與其他國家從事國外貿易的商人，享有同樣的權利。美國最近曾和二十個以上國家討論商約，作爲保證國際經濟關係一個穩定和公正基礎的計劃之重要一部份。

互惠貿易協定乃是對貿易壁壘的直接攻擊。根據現行貿易協定的立法觀念，我們和某一指定國家談判，以謀一方面我們減低對從該國輸入的貨物的課稅，而另一方面該國也減低對由我們供給的貨物的課稅。我們的貿易協定的立法，規定當我們減低從某一國輸入的某項貨物的課稅時，我們也就自動地對一切其他國家提供同樣的減低了的稅率，祇要這些國家對美國的貿易是不予歧視的。最近，我們會與十八個不同國家進行貿易協定的談判。

金融政策

猶如我們的貿易政策旨在克服防礙國際間貨物流通的障礙一樣，我們的金融政策的目的，要在解放國際間金錢與使用的目的之後，才能獲得。美國在原則上反對外匯管制，因爲它們妨礙商業交易的自由活動，促進國與國間不健全的兩邊辦法，並且在許多情形之下鼓勵歧視和腐敗的行爲。

但是我們承認假如有些國家外匯極端缺乏，而它們的貿易又是和外匯管制相配合的，那麼這些國家的確不能一朝一夕就把外匯管制取消。我們也承認假如管制取消得太快了，結果可能使匯率發生激烈的波動。

避免通貨價值發生這種波動，是我們金融政策的第二目標。假如要使國際貿易繁榮，通貨價值必須長時期保持穩定。把通貨和外匯的關係弄得絕對固定和呆板倒是不必要甚或不可取的，但是進口商和出口商應該要能夠對於通貨的價值發生信心，並依此而擬就他們的計劃。

要使穩定得合理的外匯匯率和外匯交易合理的自由要能交相爲用，那麼唯有在根本健全的世界經濟系統之內，才能做得到。這是我們的金融目標祇能逐步予以完成的理由。在走向世界金融穩定方面去的一個重要步驟，就是國際貨幣基金的創設。該基金的主要目的，就是幫助各國在平衡支付方面克服暫時的困難。希望單靠這個基金來恢復這個會遭戰爭破壞的世界之金融穩定，是不合理的。唯有世界各國恢復了它們的生產能力，國內的金融有了秩序並且恢復了正常貿易關係的時候，美國所期望的國際金融穩定才能充份實現。我們協助歐洲會遭戰爭破壞各國經濟復興的計劃，應該大有助於加速達成此等目標。

假如國際貿易要對一般的經濟繁榮有所貢獻，那麼首先應該經由貸款予會遭戰爭破壞和經濟落後各國的方式來使國際貿易復活。美國政府相信私人資本應該是國際投資最後的來源，但不靖的環境妨礙私人資本負起這個任務。在過去兩年中，美國政府經由進出口銀行貸款和直接貸款的方式，成爲資金的主要供給者，對英貸款就是一例。但是我們也想經由國際復興開發銀行來獲得一個國際的解決。國際銀行的目的，是在促進世界上會遭戰爭破壞和經濟落後各國的重建和發展。該銀行將担保以私人借款貸與其他國家，或者在私人資本無法獲致的時候，則將出借它自己的資金或者爲此目的而特別籌劃的資金。我國在該銀行業務方面所起的作用，是極重要的，因私人借款和大部份特別籌劃的資金，在該銀行最初幾年執行業務時，必須來自美國，因爲其他國家目前並沒有辦法。

運輸和交通政策

不僅是減低妨礙國際貿易流通的壁壘是重要的，同樣重要的是要有充份的工具來運輸貨物與人員以及溝通思想。我們對運輸和交通的政策，是和我們的貿易政策一樣，根據同樣廣泛的原則的。我們主張減少人爲的約束，並促進平衡的發展。但是在國際民用航空，航業和電信交通方面，具有若干特殊因素，有時候使我們在把統整政策應用到這幾方面去的時候，必須有所修正。民用航空是一個比較新的和未發展的領域。雖然一方面我們正設法經由國際民航機構獲致一個多邊解決辦法，但是我們還是經由兩邊航空協決，按照一個較緩而更確實的基礎來開闢世界的航線來得好。

在國際航業方面，我們的政策就不乏前例可尋。我們所簽訂的友好條約，商務條約和航務條約，早已確定了航運自由的主義，這是我們政策的核心。鑒於一個良好的商船隊對於一國的國防和商務是如此重要，我們一定要保持它，並且政府必須

以援助給予航業和造船工業，藉以克服美國較高的工資和其他費用。

最後，電信交通在技術上的特點，使它需要特殊的政策。對於無線電的政策自然要受波長爲數有限的約束，後者必須分配給所有國家使用的。假如要避免空中電波的混亂，國際間極高度的合作是極重要的，因爲唯有如此，才能使波長平均地分配給各使用者。

雖然經濟的政策和計劃明白地有好幾個，猶如我們已經看到的，但是每一個對於另一個都是不可少的，而它們全體對於達成國家和世界繁榮這個最後目的，也都是不可少的。我們的貿易政策旨在打破國與國間，由政府與政府以及由私人造成的妨礙貨物流通的壁壘。我們的金融和貨幣政策旨在保證金錢和貸款的效用，藉以便利國際貿易的暢流。此外，我們的政策還要促進運輸和交通的良好發展，並且保障它們的平等使用。

美國不能避免領導的任務。『我們是經濟世界中的巨人。不管我們喜歡不喜歡，將來經濟關係形式的形成，有賴於我們。』（註一）

（註一）杜魯門總統于一九四七年三月六日向德克薩斯州威科城貝勒大學發表的演說。

六、非獨立地區

若干地區的居民還沒有享有自治。這些地區應該成爲一種國際責任的原則，在第一次世界大戰時期的美國政策中，已經開始形成，而在第二次世界大戰期間更形具體化。一九一八年，威爾遜總統力言人民和地區不應該『從一國的主權變賣給另一國的主張，猶如棋賽中的兵卒一樣……牽入這次戰爭的每一種領土的解決辦法，必須根據有關民衆的利益而決定』。

這一個原則，表現於第一次世界大戰和平解決時所規定的委任統治條款中。今日，這一原則在國際間是包含在「託管」這個觀念中。

第一次世界大戰後，勝利國家將亞洲，非洲和太平洋區若干非獨立地區置於它們的國家管理之下，由國際加以監督。這些地區，是由於戰爭的結果而到它們手裏去的。凡是分配到這種土地作爲『委任統治地區』的國家，在行政方面應對國際聯

盟負責。若干委任統治地已經成爲獨立國家，例如伊拉克，敘利亞和黎巴嫩。

在第二次世界大戰衝突停止之後，勝利國家面臨有關非獨立地區內及其人民的三大問題。第一：國際聯盟既已不再存在，那麼委任統治地應該怎樣？第二：以前由義大利和日本統治的非獨立地區，現在應該讓誰來管理？第三：以前從沒有置於國際監督之下的非獨立地區，現在不應規定它們自動地歸入託管制度之內？

我國相信這些尚未達到自治的人民，應由已達到自治的人民予以協助，並且他們應該獲得參加行政工作的更多機會，直到他們可以按照每一地區的特殊環境而自由選擇他們自己的命運。由美國發動而於一九四一年八月十四日公佈的大西洋憲章，聲明英美政府尊重所有民族選擇其政府形式的權利。

這種觀點反映於聯合國憲章中，其中包括有關非自治地區的四個基本原則。負責這些土地的國家，第一，『應該承認這些地區的居民的利益，是最重要的』，並以一種神聖託付的形式，接受儘量促進這些人民幸福的責任。第二，它們應該公正對待這些居民，並且培養他們政治，經濟，社會和文化的進步。第三，它們應該同意協助民主政治制度的發展。最後，它們每年應該向聯合國提出報告，說明它們在負責管治地區的活動。

憲章並規定三種非獨立地區應置於『託管』之下，換言之，就是把保育的責任賦予『負責行政的當局』。這三種非獨立地區就是：（一）國聯前委任統治地；（二）戰敗國如義大利與日本所割讓出來的土地；（三）聯合國會員國自願置於聯合國保管下的地區。

在憲章中所提起的所有前委任統治地，均已遵照聯合國全體大會和安理會所核准的協定，置於託管之下，除了（一）巴勒斯坦，其地位尚待決定；（二）外約旦，已由它的委任統治國（聯合王國）使它成立爲獨立國；（三）西南非洲，關於它，聯合國全體大會已通過由美國和其他國家所提的決議案，拒絕南非所提將其合併的建議，並邀請南非政府提出託管協定；（四）那魯羣島，關於它，澳洲已向聯合國第二屆全體大會提出託管協定。

應歸託管的第二類土地，包括非洲前義國殖民地以及前爲日本所有或委治的島嶼。按照對義和約，該國前殖民地的地位，應於一九四八年九月十五日前，由美國，聯合國，蘇聯和法國決定，或者四國同意的話，可由聯合國全體大會決定。關

於日本島嶼，杜魯門總統曾於一九四六年十一月六日宣佈說：『美國準備將日本委任統治島嶼以及由於第二次世界大戰之結果而負責管理的任何日本島嶼，置於託管之下，由美國担任行政當局。』這些島嶼是由美軍在戰時佔領的。

美國政府認為它爲負起太平洋區安全，防禦和維護和平的責任，需要在管理前日本委治島嶼的時候，把它們作爲『軍略區』看待，換言之，行政當局可以爲了安全的理由，封閉若干特殊地區，不得視察及提出報告。美國所提的託管協定，包括將此等島嶼作爲軍略區看待一點在內，已於一九四七年四月二日由聯合國安理會遵照憲章加以核准，並於一九四七年七月十七日由國會加以批准，現已在實行之中。美國已按照憲章，負起在可能範圍內促進當地居民的發展，以達自治或獨立。

不在聯合國託管之下的非自治地區，分佈在每一海洋之中和每一大陸之上：大西洋中丹麥所有的格林蘭；太平洋中智利的殖民地伊斯特島；印度洋中法國的馬達加斯加島；北冰洋和南冰洋的極區；北美洲的阿拉斯加，南美洲的荷屬基阿那，非洲的比屬剛果；以及其他約計八十個地方，總人口共達二億七千萬人以上。

我們對所有這些地區的政策，是根據上面所說的原則的。美國對它屬地的態度表現得最清楚的行動，就是自願准許菲律賓獨立，以及國會最近通過法案，准許拍托里科人民選舉他們自己的行政長官。

但是其他國家管理的非自治地區，我們也表示關切。非洲大陸，大部份都是非獨立地區，但具有軍略重要性，而且生產重要的天然產物。此等地區中的一部份，經過我們投了贊成票之後，已經置於聯合國託管之下。關於其餘的，美國希望達到聯合國憲章中關於非自治地區所規定的目的，那就是說，促進此等人民的經濟，社會和文化進步。

印度已經達到獨立，緬甸和錫蘭已經走上自治之路，美國對於此項措置表示滿意。對於越南和法國的衝突以及印尼和荷蘭的衝突，美國贊成當地領袖和歐洲有關國家舉行直接談判，以謀達到和平解決。

對於印荷爭端，美國建議成立一個三國委員會，代表『安理會進行斡旋』，謀使爭端獲得和平解決，此點已由聯合國安理會加以核准。美國在被任命爲該委會的委員之後，在解決印尼問題方面，已發生積極作用。

美國參加了一九四七年舉行的南太平洋會議，該項會議的召集，旨在考慮居住於南太平洋非獨立地區的二百萬人民在經濟與社會方面的進步。這次會議結果成立了一個南太平洋委員會，由在該區領有非獨立地區的六國組成，就是美國，兩國大

陸國（法國和荷蘭），不列顛聯邦的三員（澳洲，紐西蘭和聯合王國）。猶如美國代表所指出的，這一次會議，是「該區行政管理國家第一次集合在一起，交換共同的經驗，並且擬具未來合作的基礎」。新委員會除其他工作外，將鼓勵和便利關於技術，經濟和社會問題領域內的研究，並提供辦法，以謀發展和調整有關當地居民幸福的服務。會議並促請委員會儘早考慮若干特殊的經濟社會計劃。

關於南北美洲的非獨立地區，美國於一九四〇年重申其見解，即反對「西半球任何地區由一個非美洲國家轉讓給另一非美洲國家的任何企圖」。一九四二年，美國會同英國，成立加勒比安委員會，自從一九四六年以來，法國和荷蘭亦已參加，其目的，乃在加強加勒比安區各會員國及其領土之間的經濟合作，以謀提高該區人民的社會，文化和經濟水準。

非獨立民族的地位問題，現已被認為世界上一大重要問題。『世界大國政府所面臨的問題，少有像有關非獨立人民問題那樣重要和令人無所適從的。我國政府恪守民主原則，就是非獨立民族的地位，應由他們自己來決定』。

（註一）一九四六年一月十四日杜魯門總統致國會咨文。

七、軍備和原子能

在傳統上，美國一向是贊成限制和裁減軍備的。但是它並不想重演第一次世界大戰與第二次世界大戰之間我國所實行的片面裁減軍備的悲劇性政策。由於國際安全的政治經濟條件不存在，和平國家的解除武裝僅足以鼓勵好戰國家去征服它們的鄰國。從這幾年的經驗中，我們可以得到若干結論：第一，沒有一個負責的愛好和平國家可以裁減軍備，除非它的政治安全獲得了保障。第二，限制和裁軍必須在獲得保障之後始能實現，那就是要保護恪守信條的國家，防止可能成爲侵略者的國家違約和逃避責任。第三，美國的片面裁軍不但將危害我們自己的安全，並將危害世界的和平。

因此，美國的政策是在經由聯合國，協力造成最大可能的限制與裁減軍備，以符維護國際和平與安全的目的。

關於管制戰爭武器方面，美國關心三個主要問題。第一，由於假如軸心及其附庸國力足以威脅聯合國，國際安全就不能存在之故，我國政府希望靠簽訂條約與永久防止侵略再起的其他措置來永遠毀滅軸心的戰爭機構。第二，鑒於原子能的破

壞力量，我們竭力主張首先應對此種力量達成國際管制並防止其濫用。第三，我們希望給予安理會足夠的武力，以便維護國際和平。一俟普遍安全的條件成爲更確立之後，我們相信對於普通或者『習用』的軍備實行疊進式的限制和裁減，就可以着手了。

將前敵國立卽加以非軍事化一點，業已完成。在對義、保、匈、羅、芬的和約中，對於可以容許它們保持的軍隊和軍備，曾加以嚴格的限制。美國並建議由四大國聯合簽訂長期條約，以保證德國和日本的非軍事化。

自從一九四五年以來，美國一直在力促對原子能作有效的國際管制。該年秋季，總統從英國，蘇聯和加拿大獲得了初步協議，就是原子能是應置於國際管制之下的。當聯合國全體大會於一九四六年一月在倫敦舉行第一屆會議時，我們在大會中獲得支持，決定成立原子能委員會，以謀擬就管制計劃。

一九四六年六月原子能委員會舉行第一次會議時，美國代表提出建議，主張發展一種管制原子能的完全計劃。這些建議集中於三個密切相關的目標，每一個都被認爲對於滿意的原子能管制是必要的。第一，我們敦促聯合國成立一個國際原子能發展機構，可以管制『對世界安全可能蘊藏危險的一切原子能活動』，並有權力去檢查和核准其他一切原子能活動。此外，該機構應該培養原子能的有益使用。第二，我們的政府建議該機構應有充份量來防止原子能的非法使用。由於該機構靠了它的研究人員將成爲原子能方面的世界領袖之故，它應該最適合於偵察原子能的不適當使用。總之，我們相信聯合國的每一個會員國應該完全保證違背不得使用原子能於破壞目的的協定者，決不致不受責罰。最後，我國政府表示願意在有效國際管制的因素已逐一確立而達到一個適當階段的時候，放棄它所存的原子彈，並且透露它的科學秘密。

美國代表在原子能委員會和安理會考慮原子能問題的整個時期中，一直堅持此等原則。此外，我們復堅持除非各國能對付原子能武器的可怕挑戰，要建立對其他戰爭武器的完全限制，希望是極渺茫的。最後，我們的代表還力請原子能委員會繼續考慮原子能管制，希望最後能擬就一項章約提交安理會。

原子能委員會中的大極多數委員都支持由美國委員巴魯樞於一九四六年六月十二日提出的基本原則，僅僅稍爲作了一些修正。可是蘇聯却認爲在確保恪守規章各國不致遭遇其他國家違約的意外之前，原子武器應立即加以毀滅。蘇聯的主張，在

委員會中爲十票對二票所否決，其理由是這樣的辦法對於國際管制原子能問題不能提供適當有效的解決。委員會中大多數委員贊成該委會於一九四六年十二月三十一日向安理會提出的第一次報告，而蘇聯和波蘭則拒絕贊同該項文件中所包含的一般原則。

一九四七年中，蘇聯不斷批評美國的建議，並拒絕承認大多數國家對於此項問題的看法。另一方面，蘇聯的反建議對於主要問題如保證國際管制和檢查以及防止原子武器成爲國家軍備等方面，未能提供滿意的保證。由於對此等問題不能獲致一致的協議，原子能委員會就無法完成它草擬國際管制計劃的責任。

美國對於原子能管制的重視，大大地影響了它對限制和裁減普通武器的政策，因爲普通武器通常是被認爲不能實行集體破壞的。我們相信『首要的事情應該先考慮』，並認爲原子能應在『習用武器』之前先予限制。鑒於政治穩定是軍備限制的基礎，我國所以時常表明見解，認爲軍備限制與國際安全的逐步進展相配合。我國政府不願意放棄它的習用武器，假如此一行動將使世界侵略重起的話。更有進者，美國堅主保持充份的兵力，來維護個別或者集體自衛的固有權利，猶如憲章第五十款所承認的。

鑒於美國在聯合國方面所負的重要責任，它必須有它的軍事能力。參議員奧斯汀曾說明這種義務的精神（一九四七年四月二十五日），他說：『我們必須保持我們的軍事力量，不是爲了要達到限制的目的，而是要負起我們的義務，藉以支持聯合國之下的集體安全』。我們感覺根據憲章第一百〇六條，有協助維護和平與安全的責任，作爲一種過渡的辦法，以待在充份的兵力派給安理會之後，可以讓它負起此項責任。此外，我們還有使安理會獲得此項軍隊與便利的長期責任，俾使聯合國在必要時可以採取軍事行動。

在此等指導原則的範圍之內，我們支持安理會於一九四七年二月設立的習用武器委員會的工作。我們的代表根據一種觀點，就是限制軍備本身並不是一種目的，軍備的裁減，必須與下列諸點相配合：（一）國際安全的進展，包括順利簽訂對德和對日和約在內；（二）原子能的國際管制；（三）安理會應有適當的武裝力量這個要求。

八、泛美制度

大自然把西半球劃成一個特殊的地理區域。在這個廣大地上，對於自由的共同忠誠以及歷史性的恐懼國外政治原則與制度的侵入，已經促進一羣國家的生長。在這一羣國家中，美國由於它的面積和豐富資源，不得不担當起大部份的領導任務。

在拉丁美洲爭取獨立期間，美國的態度是一種同情的態度，此點可於我們很早就承認這些新國家見之。我們理解拉丁美洲從歐洲的控制中獲得自由，是符合我們本身的安全要求的。此種觀念於一八二三年由門羅總統在一種政策或主義中加以說明。在其後的半世紀中，我們對該地區的官方利益，與歐洲干涉新結構成一種威脅或事實的時代，大致相似。但是，由於十九世紀末葉，美國的工業運動以及商業關係之隨之增加，兩個美洲的關係應該更其密切是免不掉的。

十九世紀末葉，美國開始日益表現一種傾向，就是要和它的南方鄰國起先是在商業方面其後在政治方面實行積極的合作。在一八八九年到一九三三年之間，官方代表出席了六次美洲各國的國際大會和至少五十六次特別會議。這些會議對於建立和平機構，擴充兩個美洲之間的貿易以及若干特殊次要問題的解決，有所貢獻；但是這些會議，大部份都避免牽涉重要政治問題，並且是在一種呆板的友好空氣，有時甚至在冷淡之中進行的。

跟了泛美團結精神的生長以及美國逐漸放棄（一九二二—一九三三年）對加勒比安區的干涉政策，善鄰政策變成了我們和拉丁美洲關係的基礎。在珍珠港事件前，美國的參加三次重要泛美會議（蒙德維多，一九三三年；布伊諾艾里斯，一九三六年；里瑪，一九三八年），使它得有機會去具體實施它新宣佈的政策。在這幾次會議中，美國和其他美洲國家互相同意反對干涉，並且採取協商的方法來解決共同問題和應付共同危險。

牽入第二次世界大戰的結果，使西半球合作的價值成爲更其明顯。善鄰的精神變成更顯著了。每一個拉丁美洲國家對一個或一個以上的軸心國家宣戰，其後復簽字於聯合國憲章。建築和使用海空根據地的權利，很寬大地給予我們。租借援助和進出口銀行放款，對西半球的防衛以及美洲各地經濟穩定的維持，頗有貢獻。美洲共和國的三次外長會議（巴拿馬，一九三九年；哈巴那，一九四〇年；里亞熱內盧，一九四二年），在反抗軸心侵略的鬥爭中，更鞏固了西半球的團結。

今日美國對待拉丁美洲的政策，是爲善鄰精神所指導，並在「泛美制度」的形式之內加以確定。逐漸地，幾乎不能察覺地，這個制度由西半球各國的日常關係鍛鍊成功。從組織的立場講，這個制度代表着錯綜複雜的許多辦事處，機關，局，委員會，法庭，龐雜的一羣臨時的和永久的機關，而以泛美聯合會在許多方面作爲一個調整一切的秘書處。將這些機關合併於一個緊湊的制度之中，乃是下一次在巴哥泰舉行的美洲各國國際會議的主要工作。

在發展泛美制度的過程中，美洲各國已決定服從多少已經明白規定的若干基本原則：

- 一、美洲國家的政治獨立，並反對非美洲國家企圖干涉西半球事務。
- 二、共和政府形式作爲共同的政治理想。
- 三、美洲各國在國際法律之前以及在會議中取得決議時，地位平等。
- 四、承認美洲主權國家的領土完整，反對征服，並且不承認以武力造成領土的變更。
- 五、和平解決美洲內部的爭端。
- 六、尊重並恪守自由決定的條約和其他義務。
- 七、協力促進共同的政治，經濟，社會和文化利益。
- 八、美洲任何一國不得干涉另一國的事務。
- 九、以協商方式解決共同問題並維持共同防禦。
- 十、大陸團結一致，以保護美洲各國的獨立，和平與安全。

這些原則，曾經在許多條約，決議和宣言中提出並加以重申，深深地生根於泛美的思想和行動中。它們的力量，乃是存在於這一事實中，就是它們代表西半球各國半世紀多來爲應付共同危險和解決共同問題所作自覺的合作的努力。在若干方面，它們爲世界上最老的區域制度形成一種不成文憲章。

雖然美國完全支持這種區域制度，但是它並不希望削弱拉丁美洲鄰邦與非美洲國家之間的友好關係。我們認爲像泛美制度一類的區域制度，既以尊重別國的權利與利益而與世界制度相配合爲目的，在世界和平的機構中可以成爲堅強的柱石，並

認為現代世界中各國的獨立是互相依靠的，所以區域的獨立主義和國家的孤立主義一樣危險。

聯合國憲章規定凡與聯合國目的和原則相符的區域組織，在和平解決爭端方面應有一種任務，並且預料安理會將授權區域組織在若干特殊事件中負責採取實際行動。憲章並規定這種辦法，就是假如在聯合國一個會員國遭遇到武裝攻擊時，並不妨礙個別與集體自衛的固有權利，以待安理會採取必要措施來維護國際和平與安全。美國相信一個更堅強的泛美制度意即是一個更堅強的世界制度。

在第二次世界大戰中，美洲各共和國在墨西哥城開會來決定反抗軸心侵略國的共同主張，並且努力於鞏固在戰爭壓力中形成的團結。以此爲目的，討論戰爭與和平問題的泛美會議（墨西哥城一九四五年二月二十一日—三月八日）通過了兩項影響遠大的決議。在此次會議中產生的却普爾丹貝克法案（決議第八項），規定假使任何一國美洲國家的領土，主權或者政治獨立遭遇到威脅或者攻擊時，應協商應付辦法，並建議簽訂一項條約，確定共同防衛的程序，俾使在協商時所獲得的決議成爲有效。

維護大陸和平與安全的泛美會議（里亞熱內盧一九四七年八月十五日—九月二日）的召集，目的在「完成却普爾丹貝克的諾言以及聯合國憲章的認可」。按照一九四七年九月二日在里亞熱內盧簽訂的泛美互助條約，十九個共和國同意「任何一國向一個美洲國家實施武裝攻擊時，應被認爲向全體美洲國家實施武裝攻擊」，每一個國家必須出力協助，以應付此項攻擊。假如這種攻擊發生時，每一國家爲恪守其責任起見，應決定立即行動。這種立即的互相防衛行動應繼以迅速的協商，藉以更具體地確定集體計劃。可能的集體程序，包括召回外交使節到集體使用武裝力量。協商的決議由三分之二多數票決定，對於批准條約國家具有約束力量，「除了在一個國家沒有同意的時候，不能要它使用武裝力量這一例外」。

馬歇爾國務卿說：「這個條約的目的，是在保證西半球的和平與安全，其中確切規定假如有外來的侵略或者西半球內部發生了侵略，應該採取的協調行動」。

一九四五年在墨西哥城通過的第十八款，建議「泛美制度的改組，鞏固與增強」，並且責成泛美聯合會準備憲章草案，俾於一九四八年在哥倫比亞的巴哥泰舉行美洲國家國際會議的時候，提出考慮。泛美聯合會的管理局現在已經擬就一個「泛

美制度條約計劃』，先行送交各會員國研究。巴哥泰會議的主要工作，就是使泛美制度成爲一個整體，因此可以更有效地應付與和平安全有關的迫切問題。

九、結論

前面一些並不詳盡的檢討，指出了美國國際利益的世界範圍。這些利益以及處理這些利益的政策，表明了美國今日在世界政治中的特殊地位。造成我們地位的增長的根本因素是：（一）交通和運輸的革命，這使世界所有地區互相發生密切與迅速的接觸；（二）現代戰爭在性質上的深刻改變，使它造成空前程度的集體破壞；（三）由於戰爭的結果，世界大部份地區正常經濟生活破裂以及遭遇政治崩潰的威脅，尤其在歐洲和亞洲；（四）世界『均勢』的歷史性轉變，若干以前的大國消失了，美國則在世界事務中提高到出衆的領導地位。所有這些發展會同把極大的力量與責任賦予美國。

在過去幾年中，我國政府和美國人民曾設法恢復第二次世界大戰後的和平，其條件是：（一）消除法西斯主義，納粹主義和贖武主義的危險；（二）培植民主主義精神，以謀給予個人權利以基本的保障；（三）協助會遭戰爭破壞各國恢復經濟健康與安定，（四）奠定組織與維持世界未來和平與經濟幸福的基礎。

一九四五年，當敵人放下武器無條件投降的時候，實現此等希望的展望似乎相當光明。在最近幾個月中，這種希望變成暗淡。一九四七年九月十七日，馬歇爾國務卿向聯合國全體大會說：

我們今日面臨的局勢，可以概括地這樣說，就是自從戰爭結束了二年多來，和平與勝利的果實還沒有到我們掌握之中。人們懇切地望着將來，懷疑是否一個新的和更可怕的衝突將把他們捲進去。我們還沒有能够確立對德和對日和平的基礎，我們也沒有使奧地利恢復成爲一個獨立國，復興工作到處落後；生命的基本需要缺乏；在許多廣大地區需要援助迫不及待，因戰爭而脫節的複雜經濟機構還沒有恢復過來，我們所發現的不是和平，自由與經濟安全，而是威脅，壓迫與極度的缺乏。

在我們不能掌握『和平與勝利果實』的後面，就是大國之間在追求和平與安全所必要的目標方面，未能合作。在該方面很重要的一點，就是蘇聯的態度，後者的特點，就是對於實施在戰時會議——像在莫斯科，雅爾達和波茨坦舉行的——中就許多

問題獲致的協議，不肯協調。

蘇聯猶如美國，也是接受關於德國非軍事化，政治重建和經濟統一的義務的。蘇聯未能實施許多義務，而最關心於從德國提取最大數額的賠償，以及保證新的德國政權應該是對蘇聯『友好的』。美國所最關心的，乃是一種經濟復元工作，因此可以使德國自給自足而又不致妨礙安全的要求，並且要根據德國人本身的自由政治行動而達到民主政治的重建。

美國希望德國在國家之中佔有一個地位，給予它在廣大的歐洲復興計劃中實行合作的自由，而不願意它在經濟上和政治上和任何一個集團聯繫。大國之間對於此一問題的僵局，結果至少暫時使德國陷於分裂狀態。

奧國的局勢多少和德國的局勢相似。美國主張奧地利成爲一個在經濟上和政治上獨立的國家，而蘇聯則堅持將奧國境內的所謂德國資產，估爲已有，而其苛求程度，在美國看來，足以嚴重損害該國的獨立。這個問題乃是就對奧條約獲致協議以及正式承認奧國爲獨立自主國家的主要障礙。

猶如以前所指出的，對於原子能這個重要問題，未能獲致協議。截止目前，蘇聯不願意按照似乎是聯合國原子能委員會大多數國家認爲真正防止另一次戰爭的危險（包括原子武器在內）所必要的路綫合作。美國政府在它的建議中支持該會中大多數的意見，主張：（一）成立國際原子機構，對於原子能的發展和使用，具有充份權力，（二）建立執行制度，俾使破壞建議中的原子能條約者，沒有一個能够用任何合法手段逃避他行動的後果，包括否決權在內，（三）當安全的條件逐步實現時，逐漸將原子武器從國家軍備中消滅。

蘇聯主張（一）限制國際機構的權限，否認它有管制對安全具有危險性的一切原子能活動的權利，（二）拒絕由該會大多數國家認爲對於國際管制係屬必要的明確制度，（三）拒絕對違約和根據條約實施處罰時放棄否決權，（四）堅持原子武器必須在發展有效國際管制制度之前，先予破壞。

一九四七年九月十七日，馬歇爾國務卿向聯合國全體大會致詞，指出一項事實，就是原子能委員會的大多數國家『已經設計了一種管制制度，這個勇敢和大胆的制度，在我們看來，對於防止原子戰爭是必要的。少數國家顯然不願意用現實態度面對此等事實』。

大國之間合作的破裂，對於作爲維護和平的重要機構的聯合國安理的效能，已經予以威脅。這一點，在蘇聯使用否決權方面，特別表現得清楚，原來蘇聯對於普通的程序問題，也使用過否決權。美國對於在安理會中濫用否決權一節，表示關切，並且根據四強於一九四五年七月七日在舊金山發表的聲明，提出建議，主張限制其使用，因爲當時的聲明中曾經說過常任理事國不能故意使用它們的否決權『來阻撓安理會的行動』。

美國已經說明當今世界政治經濟組織不斷衰落之際，它不能坐視。經驗已經顯示饑餓和經濟艱苦培養政治上的不安，並且使人類容易成爲極端思想和政治專制的獵獲物。當國內的經濟艱苦和政治不安因隣近國家發動神經戰爭以謀鼓勵內部的搗亂活動和建立政治獨裁而更趨嚴重時，局勢也就愈益惡化。

爲求實現和平，必須對付造成世界不安的原因。美國政府已經說過它將竭盡所能，『協助正常經濟健康的恢復』（註一）因爲美國深知，猶如參議員范登堡所說的（一九四七年六月十三日），美國『不能在一個支離破碎的世界中繁榮』。

（註一）馬歇爾國務卿於一九四七年六月五日在哈佛大學發表的演說



Aspects of Current
American
Foreign Policy

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
Introduction	1
1. Peacemaking and Occupation	5
2. The United Nations	19
3. Support of Free Nations	27
4. European Recovery	33
5. International Economic Policy	39
6. Dependent Areas	47
7. Armaments and Atomic Energy	53
8. The Inter-American System	59
9. Conclusion	65

INTRODUCTION

NEVER BEFORE HAVE the American people asked so many questions about the facts of our international life. Into the Department of State alone flows a stream of written inquiries in this field, increasing in volume and averaging recently more than 5,000 per month.

The foreign policy of the United States cannot be codified or given formal legal expression in any single official document. It does not lend itself to such treatment, for it must remain flexible and capable of adjustment to the changing circumstances of the times.

Our foreign policy is expressed in a variety of ways. Congressional legislation is very important in developing it, as illustrated by the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937, and their repeal in 1939, and by Congressional provision for financial aid to countries in economic distress.

The President's constitutional position gives him a large range of initiative in determining the course of foreign policy. He may negotiate treaties and, with the advice of the Senate, ratify them. He may lay down important principles, as was done by President Monroe in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, and by Presidents Polk and Theodore Roosevelt in elaborating it.

Within lines laid down by the President, the Secretary of State makes foreign policy, as was done by Secretary Hay, in enunciating the principle of the Open Door in China, and by Secretary Stimson in proclaiming the principle of non-recognition of the fruits of territorial aggression.

The role of public opinion is also important in the formation of foreign policy, as well as in carrying it out.

A M E R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

"In a democracy", said Secretary Marshall on July 1, 1947, "no policy, whether foreign or domestic, has the slightest chance of being effective unless it enjoys popular support." With the growing importance of our international relationships in the lives of our people, the impact of public opinion on policy determination in this field tends correspondingly to increase.

Most foreign policies take shape gradually. They rarely spring full-fledged from the mind of any individual, particularly if grave national interests are involved. Decisions must be reached in the midst of conflicting alternatives and conflicting opinions. Our Government entered World War I only after a long series of events which led ultimately to the crystallization of American opinion inside and outside the Government.

The principles and objectives which govern our foreign policy have been stated from time to time, generally by our Presidents and Secretaries of State. Fundamental among these are considerations of national security, economic welfare, and the maintenance of peace. In addition, there are more specific long-term objectives which serve as guideposts in the conduct of policy from day to day. President Truman, on October 27, 1945, set forth certain of these objectives which, he said, the United States would seek to realize in the postwar world. They were concerned with the consummation of a just peace, the restoration of economic health to the world, the promotion of democracy with its basic individual freedoms, and the building of institutions for the maintenance of peace.

The realization of certain of these objectives has not lain exclusively within the determination of the United States, nor has it been possible thus far to secure the necessary cooperation from other powers to enable us to hope to realize all of them immediately. Nevertheless,

INTRODUCTION

the United States occupies such a position of responsibility in world politics that it finds itself called upon to take the initiative in attempting, along with other powers, to find solutions for those problems which, if not solved, could lead to catastrophe.

The following pages do not purport to examine the entire field of our foreign policy, nor any part of it in exhaustive detail. They outline a number of the major foreign-policy problems confronting the United States today, and some of the difficulties involved in their solution. It is hoped, however, that this relatively brief discussion will help American citizens to understand better certain of the issues and problems in our relations with other nations.

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I. PEACEMAKING AND OCCUPATION

THE PEACE TREATIES which finally came into force on September 15, 1947, between the major Allied powers on the one hand and Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland on the other¹ mark only a way-station on the long road toward a complete peace settlement after World War II. More than two years after the last shot was fired, most of the world is still in a technical state of war with Germany and Japan, while Austria and Korea, although liberated countries, remain under military occupation and lack treaty status in the family of nations. A basic aim of the United States is to press for the necessary treaty settlements which will permit the withdrawal of occupation troops and enable all nations of the world to return as soon as possible to a peacetime basis.

The principles of the peace settlement, and even some of the specific peace aims, were laid down early in the war. President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms (January 1941), the Atlantic Charter (August 1941), and the Declaration by United Nations (January 1942) gave promise of a postwar world in which there would be an international organization, based on economic and political cooperation and the enjoyment by all peoples of the elementary freedoms of speech and religion, and relief from want and fear. At the famous wartime conferences held at Moscow (October-November 1943), Cairo and Teheran (November 1943), Yalta (February 1945), and

¹The United States was not at war with Finland and consequently did not sign the treaty with that country.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Berlin (July-August 1945) the major Allies agreed upon additional and more specific goals for victory and peace. Austria and Korea were to become free and independent; Germany and Japan were to be deprived of future war-making power and required to pay reparations in kind and to lose certain territory; Fascism, Nazism, and militarism were to be wiped out; the peoples of the liberated and Axis satellite countries in Europe were to be assisted in carrying out emergency relief measures and establishing democratic governments based on free elections.

Despite these wide areas of agreement, it was obvious after the surrender of Germany and Japan that peace-making concerning these two major aggressors would be a long and difficult process. Accordingly, the initial effort was directed at obtaining peace settlements with Italy and the four former Axis satellites in Europe. After two years of intensive negotiation, including one meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, four sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers (the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R., and France) and a two months' general Peace Conference at Paris, these five treaties were finally completed. As former Secretary of State Byrnes said of the drafts, they "are not the best which human wit could devise. But they are the best which human wit could get the four principal Allies to agree upon."

In negotiating and applying these treaties with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, there were major disagreements among the Allies on reparations, disputed boundaries, equality of economic opportunity, and the interpretation of "democratic" rights and processes. Despite the compromises necessary to achieve agreement on the treaties, certain thorny problems remain unsolved, such as the ultimate disposition of the Italian

colonies and the establishment of a workable government for the "Free Territory of Trieste".

Ever since the early part of 1946 the United States has stressed the importance of beginning the task of drafting settlements for the international problems represented by Austria, Germany, Japan, and Korea. Until such settlements can be made, American forces of occupation continue to be stationed in these four countries in order to carry out our policy of furthering democratic development, economic stability, and the establishment of a status of peace.

GERMANY

Security from any possible renewal of aggression by Germany was insured in the short run by the immediate disarmament of that country, as provided in the Potsdam protocol, which was signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin at their conference in Berlin during July and August 1945. This agreement authorized the dismantling by each occupying power of German military installations and war-production factories within its zone of occupation.

The United States, however, felt that disarmament was not sufficient in itself and that American, as well as European, security required that the long-term demilitarization of Germany be guaranteed and enforced by the four major victors (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France). In 1946 Secretary of State Byrnes first proposed such a four-power pact to run for 25 years, subject to renewal if desired by the other Allied powers. The offer was not accepted by the Soviet Union, although it was favorably received by the British and French Governments.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Fundamental to our policy in Germany has been the drive against Nazism and militarism. This has been carried out through the trials at Nürnberg of high Nazi officials, the abolition of Nazi organizations and laws, and the fostering in the United States zone of a rigorous denazification program, carried out by the Germans themselves and designed to remove from important public or private positions all members of the former Nazi party who were "more than nominal participants in its activities". Measures have also been taken in accordance with the Potsdam agreement to eliminate the "excessive concentration of economic power" as exemplified by cartels and other monopolistic arrangements.

The basic democratic freedoms have been granted to the Germans in the American zone to the fullest extent consistent with the security of our forces and the objectives of the occupation. Furthermore, the development of a responsible German administration in each of the four states (*Länder*) of the American zone has afforded the Germans practical education in the methods of democratic self-government and has encouraged wholesome local participation in matters of civic interest. Textbooks and teachers are thoroughly screened in order to exclude Nazi or militaristic ideologies from the educational system.

The United States Government realizes that the development of a peaceful and democratic Germany requires economic rehabilitation and stability. In the words of the high policy directive issued in July 1947 to the head of the United States military government in Germany, our aim is to "encourage the German people to rebuild a self-supporting state devoted to peaceful purposes, integrated into the economy of Europe."

In accordance with article 14 of the Potsdam protocol, the United States has striven to attain four-power

PEACEMAKING AND OCCUPATION

administration of Germany "as a single economic unit". When the French and Soviet Governments proved unwilling to take the steps necessary to accomplish this, Secretary of State Byrnes announced at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in July 1946 that his Government could not permit the continuation of the existing situation, which was leading toward economic chaos, and that the American zone would merge economically with any zone or zones willing to join. This offer, which is still open to all other zones, has been accepted thus far only by the British. A formal agreement providing for the economic fusion of the two zones was announced in December 1946 with the object of making the bizonal area self-supporting within three years.

When the objective of economic unity for Germany again failed to materialize at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow (March-April 1947), it was apparent that a revision would have to be made in the level of industry to be permitted in the bizonal area, if that area were to become self-supporting. The previous level-of-industry plan for Germany (1946) was based on the theory that Germany would be treated as an economic entity. Since there was no early prospect of achieving that objective, the revival of the economy in the bizonal area required an upward adjustment in the industries permitted to operate in that deficit area. A new level-of-industry plan for the U.S.-U.K. zones was announced in August 1947. The revival of industries in the two zones, within the scope of that plan, is designed not only to free the American and British taxpayers of the heavy financial burden of supporting the zones but also to provide more favorable conditions for the development of democracy among the German population and to promote the economic revival of Europe through the contributions which Germany should be able to make.

A M E R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

Discussions held thus far on the basis of a settlement concerning Germany have revealed that the Soviet Union appears to oppose not only the four-power disarmament and demilitarization pact which the United States proposed but also other important aspects of American occupation policy which are based on the Potsdam protocol. The Soviet Government has made it plain that it favors a highly centralized form of government for Germany, although the Potsdam agreement specifies that the "administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility". It has opposed our persistent efforts to attain quadripartite cooperation in administering Germany "as a single economic unit." It has insisted that if Germany were to be treated as an economic entity all German industries would have to produce for reparations rather than for exports to pay for necessary imports. This proposal, which is considered contrary to the Potsdam reparations agreement, would actually result in the United States and Great Britain paying for such reparations, in as much as they would have to continue indefinitely to provide food and other essentials for their zones.

The Soviet Government has carried out unilaterally in its zone measures of far-reaching importance affecting the basic structure of German economic, political, and social life. In doing so, it has failed fully to implement the provisions of the Potsdam agreement permitting freedom of political activity, speech, and assembly. Continuation of this situation could only lead to a divided Germany, in which case the United States would be confronted with the task of assisting Western Germany, at least, in developing along democratic lines and in taking part in the economic rehabilitation of Europe.

JAPAN

American policy toward Japan has followed essentially the same lines as that toward Germany. In the case of Japan, however, progress has been more rapid as a result of the unified command under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who occupies the position of Supreme Commander in Japan for all the Allied Powers. Immediate Japanese disarmament was achieved by the abolition of all Japanese armed services, the seizure of military and naval equipment, and the dissolution of all ultra-nationalistic and militaristic societies. As in the case of Germany, the United States then proposed a long-term security pact, guaranteeing the continued disarmament of the late aggressor. Although such a draft treaty was presented early in 1946 for the consideration of China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, no definitive action has yet been taken in this matter.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East has brought to justice the leading Japanese war criminals and perpetrators of aggression. Vigorous steps have been taken to eliminate totalitarianism and absolutism in Japan. The Emperor has publicly denied the divinity of the ruling house and has thus refuted the basic principle of state Shinto. A new and liberal constitution has been adopted, guaranteeing civil liberties and greatly reducing the absolute power of the Emperor. Speaking of the first nationwide elections held under this constitution in April 1947, General MacArthur stated that the results justified the faith that the Japanese people would not fail in their new obligations and that the moderate course chosen by the Japanese was "sufficiently centered from either extreme to ensure the preservation of freedom and enhancement of individual dignity."

The power of the great industrial combines, controlled by a few wealthy families, has been broken, and the educational system is being liberalized and modernized in accordance with the recommendations of the Education Mission which the United States sent to Japan in the spring of 1946 and the subsequent policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission. The peaceful development of the Japanese economy has been encouraged and the revival of its foreign trade has been stimulated by the formation of an Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan in October 1946.

The major Allies agreed at Yalta that the Soviet Union should recover southern Sakhalin, including adjacent islands, and that the Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. An agreement was later reached regarding emergency reparations in kind to countries victims of Japanese aggression, but other basic terms of the settlement with Japan are yet to be made.

In July 1947 the United States proposed to the other 10 states represented on the Far Eastern Commission that it would be desirable to hold a conference as soon as practicable to discuss a peace treaty for Japan. It was suggested that the decisions of the proposed conference should be made by a two-thirds majority. All governments represented on the Commission, with the exception of that of the Soviet Union, promptly expressed their approval of the proposed eleven-power conference, although the tentative date suggested by the United States for such a conference was found to be generally inconvenient. The Soviet Union opposed the proposal and insisted that the preliminary conference should be limited to the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.

AUSTRIA

A "free and independent" Austria was proclaimed as a goal of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference of October-November 1943. With the Nazi collapse in the spring of 1945 speedy action was taken to achieve this goal, which was supported by France and the other United Nations. Although the country was divided into four zones of occupation, it proved possible before the end of 1945 to establish a representative Austrian government based on free elections. In accordance with the desires of the Allied Council at Vienna the new government promptly instituted programs of educational reform and denazification. By June 1946 the stability and cooperativeness of the Austrian government were sufficiently assured to permit the Allied Council to relax very considerably its previously rigid control over Austrian legislation.

The United States resumed normal diplomatic relations with Austria in September 1946 and has consistently urged the prompt conclusion of a general treaty with Austria which would formally recognize Austria's position in the community of nations and would permit the speedy withdrawal of Allied troops from Austrian territory. While this policy is supported by the United Kingdom and France, the Soviet Union has raised certain objections for which mutually agreeable solutions have not as yet been found. The Soviet Union has supported the claims of Yugoslavia to southern Carinthia and a small portion of Styria. The Soviet Union also insists that it is entitled by the Potsdam agreement to all "German" assets within eastern Austria, irrespective of the fact that many of those assets were acquired by the Nazis through duress and, in the opinion of the other three occupying powers, should be restored to their original

owners. In the treaty negotiations the Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France by which German assets transferred as reparations would be subject in all respects to Austrian law. For its part, the United States Government has publicly expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations looking toward the renunciation to its share in German assets in Austria as part of a general settlement of this question.

After this problem had been thoroughly explored at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March-April 1947, Secretary Marshall indicated that the acceptance of the Soviet position would render dubious Austria's chances of surviving as an independent, self-supporting state and expressed the opinion that the United States "could not commit itself to a treaty which involved such manifest injustices" and which would create "an Austria so weak and helpless as to be the source of great danger in the future". A Four Power Commission was then set up in Vienna to study the matter further. In August 1947 the American representative was recalled to the United States for consultation. Upon his departure from Vienna he issued a statement indicating that the United States Government was deeply concerned over: (1) the "Soviet unilateral action in seizing properties falling within categories agreed upon for discussion within the Commission"; (2) the general failure of the Soviet Delegation to collaborate, as evidenced by its "indifference toward the factual material presented to the Commission by other delegations"; and (3) the Soviet insistence on reparations from Austrians and others as shown by the Soviet "demand for assets in amounts and in forms other than those validly held by Germany". It is the hope of the United States Government that the successful out-

come of these negotiations will make possible the removal of occupation troops from Austrian territory.

The United States has instituted a relief program for Austria which provided for the shipment of approximately \$43,000,000 in urgently needed supplies during the period from June through September 1947 and contemplates further shipments to relieve the distress of the Austrian people.

KOREA

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, meeting at Cairo in November 1943, indicated their determination that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent". This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union when it entered the war against Japan. Korean political identity, however, had been obliterated by the Japanese ever since the annexation of 1910. Accordingly, with the collapse of Japanese resistance in August 1945 American troops occupied the southern part of Korea and Soviet forces moved into the northern part. This situation remains in effect today.

The Moscow Conference of December 1945 proposed the establishment of an American-Soviet Joint Commission for Korea in order to consult with Korean leaders for the purpose of establishing a provisional Korean government and to work out proposals for a four-power trusteeship for Korea for a period not to exceed five years. What has actually happened in Korea was succinctly explained by Secretary Marshall to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 17, 1947:

For about two years the United States Government has been trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Government, through

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

the Joint Commission and otherwise, on methods of implementing the Moscow agreement and thus bringing about the independence of Korea. The United States representatives have insisted that any settlement of the Korean problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom of opinion. That is still the position of my Government. Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel with Soviet forces in the industrial north and United States forces in the agricultural south. There is little or no exchange of goods or services between the two zones. Korea's economy is thus crippled.

The Korean people, not former enemies, but a people liberated from 40 years of Japanese oppression, are still not free. This situation must not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In an effort to make progress the United States Government recently made certain proposals designed to achieve the purposes of the Moscow agreement and requested the powers adhering to that agreement to join in discussion of these proposals. China and the United Kingdom agreed to this procedure. The Soviet Government did not. Furthermore, the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Joint Commission have not even been able to agree on a joint report on the status of their deliberations. It appears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea.

Following Secretary Marshall's announcement of the American Government's intention to submit the Korean problem to the United Nations, the Chief Soviet Delegate on the Joint Commission in Korea stated on September 26, 1947, that "it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea".

The United States proposal to the United Nations, which was made public on October 17, 1947, indicated that this Government did not consider mere troop withdrawal as an adequate solution of the Korean problem. The American proposal recommended: (1) that the occupying

PEACEMAKING AND OCCUPATION

powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under United Nations' observation; (2) that the Korean government thus established constitute its own security forces and arrange for "the early and complete withdrawal" of American and Soviet troops; and (3) that the United Nations discharge its responsibilities in the problem through the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

Thus the United States has given concrete expression to Secretary Marshall's desire that there should be no additional delay in furthering "the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence".

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2. THE UNITED NATIONS

SUPPORT OF THE United Nations is the keystone of American policy for the maintenance of peace and international security. The United Nations is a direct outcome of steps taken in the course of winning the war.

As early as the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, the United States expressed its determination to work for a peace which would provide general security for all peoples of the world. During the wartime conferences of the major powers, such as the Moscow Conference of October 1943, we took the lead in pledging ourselves, along with our Allies, to establish "at the earliest practicable date a general international organization . . . for the maintenance of peace and security". In 1944 our Government was host to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations in Washington, D.C. In these meetings the four powers drafted a series of proposals setting forth the framework of a permanent international organization. This formed the basis of the United Nations Charter, which representatives of 50 nations prepared at the San Francisco Conference in April-June 1945.

The Charter confers "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" on the Security Council. It also recognizes that the position of the major powers in the Council should roughly correspond to their responsibilities in carrying out political, economic, or military measures to prevent or bring to an end threats to peace or acts of aggression. Thus, of the 11 nations making up the Council, 5 members—among

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

them the United States—hold permanent seats. In “substantive”, as opposed to “procedural”, matters that come before the Council, there must be a majority of 7 affirmative votes, with no permanent member voting negatively. By informal agreement a permanent member may abstain from voting without having such abstention counted as a veto. The only formal exception to the rule of unanimity occurs when one of these permanent members is a party to a dispute for which a pacific settlement is being sought under the terms of chapter VI of the Charter. In this case, the permanent member must refrain from voting in order to avoid casting a ballot in a matter with which it is directly concerned. In routine or procedural matters, however, the Council functions under a different voting system, in which a majority of any 7 members is controlling.

The United States has been vitally concerned with making the Security Council a more effective instrument of the United Nations, and to that end our representatives have upheld a number of principles:

1. Every state concerned with a matter before the Council has a right to be heard fully and publicly. Thus, even countries which do not belong to the United Nations have been invited to participate in the debates of the Council, when they were involved in the case under consideration.

2. The Council should have full access to the facts of a dispute and should therefore conduct an investigation or inquiry whenever necessary. A notable example of this was the Balkan Commission, which was instructed to investigate the Greek charges against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Throughout the on-the-spot inquiry conducted by this Commission the American representatives did everything in their power to assure a thorough investigation of the facts of the case.

3. The responsibility of the Security Council to settle a dispute goes beyond the interests of the parties themselves, for once a case is before the Council not even the states directly concerned may withdraw it without this body's approval. This view was enunciated during the Iranian case, when Secretary of State Byrnes affirmed the right of the Council to continue to deal with the dispute, even though both the U.S.S.R. and Iran expressed their willingness to withdraw the case from the Council's agenda.

The United States endorses the principle that the five permanent members shall be in agreement before the Security Council may take enforcement action regarding threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression as defined in chapter VII of the Charter. At the same time, this requirement carries with it the obligation to make every effort to reach unanimous accord on important problems. Even though a negative vote by a permanent member can prevent an action that is inconsistent with its vital security interests, such a veto should be used sparingly and not in contradiction with the fundamental obligation to maintain peace and international security. As the Secretary of State recently declared (September 17, 1947), "...restraint is an essential companion of power and privilege", and "The United Nations will never endure if there is insistence on privilege to the point of frustration of the collective will."

In order that the exercise of the veto should not paralyze the activities of the Council we have sought to increase the number of matters which may be settled without the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members. In the first place, a liberal interpretation should be placed upon what is considered to be a procedural question. Secondly, even on substantive questions, abstention on the part of a permanent member should not be regarded

as a veto which would defeat the Council's decision. Thirdly, that part of article 27 which states that parties to a dispute must refrain from voting in matters involving peaceful settlement should be so construed as to prevent any nation from acting as a judge in its own cause. Finally, in recognition of the fact that an excessive use of the veto has prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its true function, we have announced our willingness to accept the elimination of the unanimity requirement with respect to applications for membership and matters arising under chapter VI, which deals with peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Security Council must be provided with the necessary armed forces and facilities to maintain international security if the United Nations is to exercise its authority to maintain peace. During the discussions of the Military Staff Committee, which was entrusted with working out plans for this purpose, the United States has urged, in accordance with the Charter, the immediate preparation of agreements which will insure adequate armed forces to the Council in case of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

The General Assembly, which serves as a forum for the discussion of any question within the scope of the Charter, considers and makes recommendations to promote international cooperation in political, economic, and social fields. Although article 12 of the Charter forbids the General Assembly to make recommendations on any dispute or situation under active consideration by the Security Council, the United States Government has felt that this provision was not intended to deprive the Assembly of its right to consider important political problems. During the past year the Assembly has undertaken to review such significant political questions as those relating to the Franco regime in Spain and the

THE UNITED NATIONS

future of Palestine. In the latter case we approved the appointment of an investigatory commission to survey the situation in Palestine, and we have supported the efforts of the Assembly to reach a fair settlement of this explosive issue. Recently, the United States has also requested the Assembly to discuss the threats to the integrity of Greece that have arisen during the past year, as well as the question of the early establishment of the independence of Korea.

Since the United States is looking more and more to the General Assembly as the forum in which the moral and political forces of the world must be brought to bear upon international disagreements, our Government has urged that the Assembly create an interim committee on peace and security. Although this group would not impinge upon the functions of the Security Council, it would consider situations and disputes impairing friendly international relations. This "Little Assembly" would: (1) consider problems of peace and security and report to the General Assembly; (2) keep watch on those recommendations which call for continuing attention; and (3) conduct long-range studies on international cooperation. Such a committee would "strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and place the responsibility for such settlement broadly upon all the Members of the United Nations."¹

The Economic and Social Council, as the organ of the General Assembly to promote economic, social, and humanitarian objectives of the United Nations, has undertaken such diverse activities as drafting an International Bill of Human Rights, controlling the international flow of narcotics, aiding in the economic reconstruction of Europe, and a large number of other important projects. In each of these the United States has taken part in ac-

¹From address by Secretary Marshall, delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Sept. 17, 1947.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

cordance with the aim of the Charter to create the "conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations". In a similar fashion, we are aiding in the development of the non-self-governing territories of the world through the efforts of the Trusteeship Council, and in accordance with our policies toward dependent peoples we have also taken a leading part in the work of this Council.²

In fostering the economic, social, and humanitarian principles of the United Nations, the United States has sponsored many projects on the part of the Specialized Agencies. In bringing relief to the war-torn countries, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration obtained approximately 73 percent of its support from this country. In seeking to aid refugees, the International Refugee Organization, now taking shape, has received the full cooperation of the United States. In providing for long-range currency stabilization and economic reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund and International Bank have drawn heavily on the dollar deposits of this country. Furthermore, the International Labor Organization, in improving working conditions, the Food and Agriculture Organization, in increasing food supplies, the World Health Organization, in fostering healthier living conditions, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in aiding mutual understanding, have all received the wholehearted support of our Government.

The United Nations is not a super-state which can immediately establish peace and prosperity throughout the world. What the United Nations can accomplish is indicated by the statement of Herschel V. Johnson, our Representative on the Security Council, when, on June 21,

²See discussion of the policy of the United States toward dependent areas, p. 47.

THE UNITED NATIONS

1947, he affirmed that "The United Nations gives an opportunity of clarifying the issues of war and peace in the early stages and forming that front of resistance when it can count for peace rather than when it must be thrown into a war of survival". We know that the United Nations must be supplemented by the earnest efforts of each country to solve its own problems and the sincere willingness of all governments to settle their disputes peaceably. Nevertheless, by extending the benefits and restraints of the rule of law to all peoples, the United Nations can aid materially in resolving current problems and in preventing serious conflicts in the future.

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3. SUPPORT OF FREE NATIONS

OWING LARGELY to the circumstances of their own origin as an independent nation, the people of the United States, from the beginning of their history, have sympathized with other nations and peoples struggling to attain, regain, or maintain their freedom and independence. In June 1944, Secretary of State Hull said of our policy: "We have for 150 years preached liberty to all the nations of the earth, to all the peoples of the earth, and we have practiced it. We have encouraged all nations to aspire to liberty, and to enjoy it. . . . That has been our consistent record, a record of championship of liberty for everybody, encouraging them at all times and in all places".

George Washington, referring in January 1796 to his own career in defense of freedom, said: "My anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes are irresistibly excited, whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banner of freedom". This sentiment, frequently expressed by leading American statesmen, throughout the succeeding century and a half, found expression in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, which proclaimed that the countries to be liberated from the Axis aggressors should have their independence restored to them. The sentiment was expressed as a policy by President Truman, in October 1945, when he pointed out that in the American view "all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government", and added, "That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere".

As regards the New World, Secretary of State Marshall, in June 1947, summarized the developments of more than a century by saying, "It is the traditional policy of the United States to aid the nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain their independence". Our support consisted at first in recognizing the independence of the new countries. Later, when there seemed to be a danger that some European countries might seek either to crush the new and still weak countries or to establish colonies in the New World which they might use as a springboard for aggressive action, the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, with the primary purpose of preventing such disasters.

Respecting the Far East, we announced at the turn of the century our support of the independence and territorial integrity of China as well as of the Open Door or equality of trading rights. We have repeatedly reaffirmed this support of China's independence, including our statements of peace aims during World War II. In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek agreed that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". They agreed at the same time that Korea, which was annexed by Japan in 1910, "shall become free and independent". The United States has since consistently supported the restoration of Korea's independence.¹ The granting of independence to the Philippines by the United States was a striking illustration of the application in the Far East of the principle of self-determination.

In view of the important role of the United States in winning the war against the Axis aggressors, this Nation

¹For further details on our Korean policy, see p. 15.

SUPPORT OF FREE NATIONS

was interested in restoring freedom and independence to all the European countries that were deprived of them by force. When the war was drawing to a close in February 1945, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, meeting at Yalta in the Crimea, issued a joint declaration stating that "the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require....to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; andto facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections".

The United States has not only maintained and supported the view that free governments cannot exist without free elections but also that governments can remain free only if there remain in effect the democratic freedoms of the press, speech, religion, association, and assembly, and freedom from intimidation, use of force, and unwarranted arrests.

The United States has regarded the Yalta agreement from the first as a solemn, binding international agreement. Pledges to hold free elections were given by the present Governments of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, but unfortunately those Governments have violated their pledges. In Hungary, a democratic government chosen in a free election in November 1945 was overthrown in June 1947 by a Communist minority. The fundamental freedoms are seriously impaired in all those countries. Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were liberated by Soviet troops, and the governments formed in those countries before or shortly after liberation have been dominated by the Soviet Union since their inception.

Since the conclusion of the Yalta agreement, and others that followed it, the United States has repeatedly protested the failure of these new governments to live up to their promises.

In accordance with the provisions of the peace treaties, occupation forces are to be withdrawn within 90 days from the effective date of the treaties—September 16, 1947—but Soviet forces may remain in Rumania and Hungary for the purpose of maintaining lines of communication with the Soviet zone in Austria. •

American determination to help independent countries to maintain their independence is also illustrated by the moral support which this country has given in the past several years to certain Near Eastern countries, namely, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey.

When the Soviet Union failed to withdraw its troops from Iran in January 1946, in accordance with a pledge made previously by the Soviet Government, the United States urged that the Soviet Union honor its agreement. Soviet troops left Iran in May 1946. The United States supported the case of Iran before the United Nations.

Moral support of a similar character was given by the United States to Turkey. According to an international agreement concluded in 1936, Turkey is responsible for the defense of the Straits, the link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In the summer of 1946, the Soviet Union requested Turkey's consent to an agreement whereby both powers would become jointly responsible for the guardianship of this vital waterway. Turkey contended that acceptance of the proposal would undermine its independence. The United States promptly advised the Soviet Union and Turkey that the matter of the Straits must be settled by an international agreement but that until such an agreement was concluded there should be no change in the status of the Straits.

SUPPORT OF FREE NATIONS

American self-interest is intimately involved in the preservation of free governments everywhere. America has a vital stake in freedom, peace, and security throughout the world. Attacks on free and independent peoples signalled the start of World War II. Totalitarian governments, dominated by small minorities which had seized power by extinguishing fundamental democratic rights, were responsible for plunging the world into chaos.

The bitter experience of World War II reinforced our resolve to extend assistance to countries whose independence is endangered through pressure and threats of aggression. Greece and Turkey have been receiving such aid since May 1947. President Truman told Congress in March 1947: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . . totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States".

The United States is also keenly aware that free governments and democratic institutions cannot thrive where poverty and distress are rampant and that political stability becomes precarious where economic conditions deteriorate. The American Government has therefore proposed to extend economic aid to the nations that are willing to help themselves. The close connection between economic welfare and the preservation of free institutions was emphasized by Secretary Marshall on August 15, 1947, when he stated: "Americans want a prosperous world. . . . Americans want a free world. We want the people of every nation to be free to choose the form of government and economic organization which they desire. We know that hunger and insecurity are the worst enemies

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

of freedom and democracy.... Wars are bred by poverty and oppression. Continued peace is possible only in a relatively free and prosperous world”.

4. EUROPEAN RECOVERY

THE ECONOMY OF Europe is suffering from the paralyzing effects of six years of war. The economic dislocations were more severe than was at first realized, and European economic recovery will be a long and difficult task. Furthermore, unless the war-devastated nations regain economic health, the peace of the world and the other goals of American foreign policy may be seriously threatened. Not only is an economically healthy world likely to be a peaceful world but tolerable standards of living are the minimum essential for the survival or growth of those democratic institutions which it is our policy to protect and foster.

Speaking before the Canadian Parliament on June 9, 1947, President Truman said:

Free men everywhere know that the purpose of the United States is to restore the world to health and to re-establish conditions in which the common people of the earth can work out their salvation by their own efforts.

We intend to expend our energies and invest our substance in promoting world recovery by assisting those who are able and willing to make their maximum contribution to the same cause.

Our efforts to facilitate Europe's recovery began even while the war was in progress. We played a leading role in establishing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which was designed to supply the immediate relief needs of the war-devastated countries. To facilitate long-range economic recovery, we sponsored such agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International

Monetary Fund, each of which was part of the program to revive and expand the world's economy after the war.

When hostilities ended, the long-term program had to be supplemented with concrete and immediate provisions for aid. We loaned \$3,375,000,000 to Great Britain, and Congress authorized the Export-Import Bank to lend \$2,800,000,000 for reconstruction purposes, the greater part of which was loaned to European countries. In 1947 we appropriated \$400,000,000 for aid to Greece and Turkey and \$332,000,000 for relief, most of which is for European countries. Including surplus-property credits and other forms of assistance, we had loaned or granted by July 1, 1947, nearly eleven billion dollars' worth of aid to European countries since the fighting ended.

In addition, we have led the attack on Europe's fuel and transportation bottlenecks by promoting and actively participating in the European Coal Organization and the European Central Inland Transport Organization. We were active in promoting the establishment under the United Nations of the Economic Commission for Europe as a means for coordinating these and other efforts. The United States has also recognized the great importance of Germany to the success of any program for European recovery, while insisting on the maintenance of adequate guarantees against the danger of a resurgence of German aggression. Secretary Marshall stated the American policy during the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in 1947: "The United States is opposed to policies which will continue Germany as a congested slum or an economic poorhouse in the center of Europe. . . . we want Germany to use its resources of skilled manpower, energy, and industrial capacity to rebuild the network of trade on which European prosperity depends"

EUROPEAN RECOVERY

Our aid thus far has had good results. American contributions to direct relief over the past two years have done much to alleviate hunger and extreme hardship. Our aid has brought about recovery in industrial production in certain European countries. This improvement has done much to stave off the spread of totalitarian governments, which use economic deterioration as a means of gaining power.

Europe's recovery, however, is far from complete. As among nations and individual industries, recovery has been very unequal, and Europe as a whole is today far from able to pay its own way in the world. The European continent is not now able to produce enough to satisfy its own needs and to provide the exports with which it must purchase certain vitally needed imports. Thus, victory in the battle for European recovery still hangs in the balance, and the outcome is made all the more critical by the fact that, if the battle is lost, a breeding ground will exist for the growth of totalitarian governments.

On June 5, 1947, Secretary Marshall called for a fresh approach to the whole problem of European recovery.

First, the Secretary urged that our future reconstruction aid be fitted into a well-integrated plan which would make the European nations self-supporting. He emphasized that our aid should be more than an endless series of stop-gap measures designed to deal with increasingly frequent crises. "Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative."¹ In order that United States aid be assured of maximum effectiveness, the Secretary made it clear that each European nation should expect to contribute fully in accordance with its ability. The assistance of the United States, therefore, would be

¹Remarks at Harvard University, June 5, 1947.

contingent not only upon self-help but also upon mutual help among the states of Europe.

Secondly, Secretary Marshall maintained that the initiative for drawing up the plan for European recovery should be left entirely to the Europeans. He asserted that the United States did not intend to dictate the pattern of recovery as a price for providing aid. Once the European nations evolved a plan, our Government would give it thorough study in order to determine what the United States could do to aid in European recovery.

Thirdly, the Secretary made it clear that the United States would welcome the participation of all European countries in the program. He added, however, that "governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States."¹

Finally, our primary purpose was to see that the European nations should work out a program which would not only bring about economic recovery but would also make the European economy self-supporting. As the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, said on May 8, 1947, ". . . until the various countries of the world get on their feet and become self-supporting there can be no political or economic stability in the world and no lasting peace or prosperity for any of us".

There was a prompt response to Secretary Marshall's proposal. The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France took the initiative and invited the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, to a preliminary meeting on June 27. The Foreign Ministers conferred for a week. At the end of this time the Soviet Government announced that it was unwilling to participate in the plan on the ground that it would interfere with the internal sover-

¹Remarks at Harvard University, June 5, 1947.

EUROPEAN RECOVERY

eighty of the participating countries. Despite the Soviet Union's opposition, the British and French Governments invited all the nations of Europe to attend a conference for European recovery. Sixteen nations accepted. The Soviet Union and other countries of eastern Europe refused to attend.

After conferring for over two months, the 16 nations announced on September 22 their initial report on a European recovery program. The European nations undertook to do three things, (1) to make every effort to increase their national production; (2) to do everything possible to combat inflation and to create internal financial stability; and (3) to cooperate with each other in efforts to free the movement of goods within Europe and to increase the output of vitally needed resources. The European nations estimated that they would require \$22,000,000,000 to finance dollar imports of food, fuel, raw materials, and capital equipment during the next four years. It was expected that part of these funds could be financed by the International Bank and by private investment, but the European countries calculated that their minimum deficit for needs which could not be financed from these sources would be \$19,000,000,000. This amount was needed to purchase supplies from the United States and from other countries which would require payment in dollars.

While the 16 nations have been conferring in Europe, committees of government experts and leading private citizens have made detailed studies of America's capacity to aid Europe. The aim of these studies is to determine how much the United States can safely contribute to European recovery without endangering its own economy.

Various factors have combined to make it increasingly apparent that the European Recovery Program would have to be supplemented by immediate emergency aid

during the coming months. The intense cold of the winter of 1946-47 and the crop-killing droughts of the past summer have accelerated the economic deterioration of Europe, particularly in regard to food. The need for long study of the over-all program has made it appear unwise to set the program in operation too hastily. Finally, the loans and grants supplied during 1945 and 1946 were nearly depleted during the autumn of 1947 as a source of supply for the European nations. Consequently, Secretary Marshall recently announced the need for some form of interim assistance to meet the threat of intolerable hunger and cold until the long-range plans for European recovery can become fully effective.

The future course of our reconstruction program was summarized by the Secretary as he outlined what the American people expected in return for their generous contribution to world recovery. "They emphatically demand that whatever they contribute shall be effectively used for the purpose for which it was intended; that it should not be expended to serve selfish economic or political interests; and that it should be employed specifically to assist in economic rehabilitation; finally, that it should serve a great purpose in restoring hope and confidence among the people concerned that the world will know peace and security in the future."¹

¹Remarks before the Women's National Press Club, July 1, 1947.

5. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

EVENTS DURING THE past few decades have shown increasingly how our own domestic prosperity is tied in with the prosperity of the whole world. We cannot separate our domestic and our foreign affairs. If we want a prosperous America, we must have a prosperous world; and a sound world economy can never become a reality so long as there are discriminations and excessive barriers which can block the flow of goods among nations.

TRADE POLICY

The depression of the 1930's and the impact of World War II gave rise to a complex maze of trade barriers. Quotas, for example, arbitrarily limit the amount of goods which can enter or leave a country, and exchange controls similarly limit the amount of money which can enter or leave a country. Preferential tariffs discriminate by imposing lower duties on imports from certain favored countries. Red tape can so encumber the entire process of importing or exporting that it stifles all incentive to trade. Export subsidies are sometimes paid by a government to force certain goods on the international market. State-owned industries, because political motivations sometimes color ordinary business considerations, tend to interfere arbitrarily with trade. Private monopolies and cartels may hold up prices artificially and divide the markets of the world arbitrarily. Through the misuse of inter-governmental commodity agreements, producer nations can exploit consumer nations. Through purely do-

mestic policies, governments may also adversely affect international trade. For example, a country may make short-sighted efforts to compensate for a temporary surplus of goods by cutting down the consumption of foreign goods. A policy of increasing barriers tends always to lead to retaliatory measures by other countries.

Against all these forces which militate against the normal development of international trade, the United States has directed a many-pronged attack. Our most comprehensive effort has been the International Trade Organization. The ITO provides the means for eliminating or reducing the governmental barriers to world trade. Of major importance are the rules which limit or prohibit the use of quotas and other devices to restrict the volume of goods which can be imported or exported. The charter of the ITO also provides for negotiations leading to the reduction of excessively high tariffs and for the eventual elimination of preferential tariff systems. The ITO will also insure that commodity agreements are used only for their legitimate purpose—the orderly disposal of world surpluses—and not for the exploitation of consumer nations. The charter of the ITO contains provisions which are aimed at curbing the restrictive business practices of private monopolies and cartels. It also provides for the economic development of less-advanced nations and contains safeguards to prevent depressions from spreading from one country to another.

The United States is also making use of other methods for facilitating the international movement of goods. Treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, which have been the traditional basis of our economic relations with other countries, seek to guarantee American businessmen the same rights enjoyed by other businessmen engaged in foreign trade. The United States Government has recently been discussing com-

mercial treaties with over twenty nations as an important part of the program to provide a stable, nondiscriminatory basis for international economic relations.

Reciprocal trade agreements constitute a direct attack on trade barriers. Under existing trade-agreement legislation, we negotiate with a particular country for the purpose of reducing our tariffs on certain goods that we get from it, and that country, in return, reduces the tariff on goods which we supply to it. Our trade-agreement legislation provides that, when we reduce our tariff on a given product from one country, we automatically offer that same reduced rate to all other countries which do not discriminate against the trade of the United States. We have recently been carrying on trade-agreement negotiations with 18 different countries.

FINANCIAL POLICY

Just as our trade policy seeks to overcome the obstacles which impede the flow of goods among nations, our financial policy aims at liberating the flow of money and capital among nations. Financial and exchange controls can be as effective as tariffs and quotas in stifling both trade and investment. Hence, we cannot hope for beneficial results from our trade policy unless we back it up with the right kind of financial policy.

Our financial policy deals with the problem of payment for goods and services moving between countries. Broadly speaking, we seek two fundamental objectives: freedom and stability. By freedom is meant the ability of an importer to go to a bank or other foreign-exchange dealer and to obtain without difficulty the foreign currency necessary to pay for imported goods. Such freedom is in sharp contrast with the rigid systems of exchange control prevalent in many countries today, under

which foreign money is obtainable only in amounts and for purposes approved by a governmental authority. The United States opposes exchange controls in principle because they interfere with the free operation of business transactions, promote unsound bilateral arrangements between countries, and in many cases encourage discrimination and corrupt practices.

We have recognized,⁹ however, that countries cannot do away with exchange controls overnight if they are extremely short of foreign currency and if their trade is geared to a system of exchange controls. We also recognize that, if controls are eliminated too suddenly, the result might be violent fluctuations in exchange rates.

The avoidance of such fluctuations in the value of currencies is the second objective of our financial policy. If international trade is to flourish, the values of currencies must remain stable over long periods of time. It is not necessary or even desirable that these relationships be absolutely fixed and rigid, but importers and exporters should be able to have confidence in the value of currencies and to make their plans accordingly.

The combination of reasonably stable exchange rates and reasonable freedom of exchange transactions can be accomplished only within the framework of a fundamentally sound and healthy world economy. That is why the achievement of our financial objectives will come about only gradually. An important step in the direction of world financial stability was the creation of the International Monetary Fund. The chief purpose of the Fund is to assist countries to overcome temporary difficulties in their balances of payments. It is unreasonable to expect that the Fund by itself can restore financial stability to a War-disrupted World. International financial stability along the lines desired by the United States will

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

be fully realized only when the nations of the world have restored their productive capacity, placed their internal finances in order, and resumed normal trade relations. Our program for the economic reconstruction of the war-torn countries of Europe should do much to hasten the accomplishment of these objectives.

International trade, if it is to contribute to general economic prosperity, will first need to be revived through loans to the war-devastated and economically backward countries. The United States Government believes private capital to be the best ultimate source for international investment, but troubled conditions prevent private sources from assuming this role. During the past two years, the United States Government has itself been the principal supplier of funds through loans by the Export-Import Bank and through direct loans, such as that to Great Britain. But we have also sought an international solution through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The International Bank seeks to promote the rebuilding and development of the war-damaged and economically backward countries of the world. The Bank will guarantee private loans to other countries, or, when private capital is not available, will lend its own funds or funds specially raised for the purpose. Our role in the Bank's operations is vital, for both the private loans and the greater part of the funds specially raised must come from the United States during the early years of the Bank's operations, since the other countries do not have the resources at present.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

It is not only important to reduce the barriers which obstruct the flow of international trade; it is equally important to have adequate means for transporting goods

and persons and for communicating ideas. Our policy toward transportation and communications is based upon the same broad principles as our trade policy. We seek to reduce artificial restraints and to promote a balanced expansion. There are, however, special factors in international civil aviation, shipping, and telecommunications which sometimes make it necessary for us to modify our over-all policy as it applies to these fields. Civil aviation is a relatively new and undeveloped field. Although we are, on the one hand, seeking a multilateral solution through the International Civil Aviation Organization, we have found it desirable to open up the world's air routes on a slow but sure basis through bilateral aviation agreements.

There is no lack of precedent for our policy in the field of international shipping. Our treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation have long since established the doctrine of freedom of navigation which is the core of our policy. However, to maintain an adequate merchant marine, which is so essential to the national defense and to the commerce of this country, it is necessary for the Government to give assistance to the shipping and shipbuilding industries to aid in overcoming higher American labor and other costs.

Finally, the technical peculiarities of telecommunications require special policies in that field. Policy toward radio is naturally affected by the limited availability of frequencies, which must be assigned to many users in all countries. If chaos of the air waves is to be avoided, an exceptionally high degree of international cooperation is vital to secure an equitable distribution of frequencies among users.

Although, as we have seen, there are several distinct economic policies and programs, each is indispensable to the other, and all are indispensable to the ultimate

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

goal of national and world-wide prosperity. Our trade policy seeks to break down governmental, intergovernmental, and private barriers to the flow of goods among nations. Our financial and monetary policy seeks to insure adequate money and loans to facilitate the flow of international trade. Furthermore, our policy seeks to promote the adequate development of transportation and communication facilities and to insure their equitable use.

The United States cannot avoid the role of leadership. "We are the giant of the economic world. Whether we like it or not, the future pattern of economic relations depends upon us."¹

¹Address by President Truman at Baylor University, Waco, Tex., on Mar. 6, 1947.

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6. DEPENDENT AREAS

THE PRINCIPLE that certain territories whose inhabitants do not enjoy self-government should become an international responsibility began to take shape in American policy during World War I and crystallized further during World War II. President Wilson, in 1918, urged that peoples and provinces should not be "bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game . . . but every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned."

This principle found expression in the provisions for mandates in the World War I peace settlements. Today it is expressed broadly by international arrangements embodying the idea of "trusteeship."

After World War I, the victorious powers placed under national administration with international supervision some of the dependent areas in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific which had come into their possession as a result of the war. The powers to whom these territories were allocated as "mandates" were accountable to the League of Nations for their administration. Several of the mandated territories have since become independent countries, as, for example, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

After hostilities ceased in World War II, three major problems faced the victor nations in connection with dependent areas and their populations. First: What should become of mandated territories, since the League of Nations no longer existed? Secondly: Who should

administer the dependent areas which had been under Italian and Japanese rule? Thirdly: Should provision be made for dependent territories which had never been placed under international supervision to be brought voluntarily within the trusteeship system?

This country believes that peoples who have not yet attained to self-government should be assisted by those who have, and they should be granted an increasing measure of participation in government until they are prepared freely to choose their destiny in accordance with the particular circumstances of each territory. The Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, initiated by the United States, declares that the American and British Governments "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

These views are reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, which incorporates four basic principles regarding non-self-governing territories. The nations assuming responsibility for such territories, first of all, "recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the people placed in their care. Secondly, they obligate themselves to treat the inhabitants justly and to foster their political, economic, social, and cultural progress. Thirdly, they agree to help in the development of democratic political institutions. Finally, they are to submit to the United Nations annually accounts of, or reports on, their activities in the territories in their charge.

The Charter provides further that three types of dependent areas are eligible to be placed under "trusteeship," that is, assigned for caretaking purposes to "administering authorities." These three types are: (1)

DEPENDENT AREAS

former mandates of the League of Nations; (2) territories ceded by the defeated powers, such as Italy and Japan; and (3) areas which members of the United Nations may voluntarily place under the care of the United Nations.

All the former mandated territories referred to in the Charter have now been placed under trusteeship, in accordance with agreements approved by the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council, except (1) Transjordan, which has been set up by the mandatory power (the United Kingdom) as an independent state; (2) South-West Africa, as to which the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a resolution proposed by the United States and other countries rejecting the Union of South Africa's proposal to annex it and inviting that Government to submit a trusteeship agreement; and (3) Nauru, for which Australia has submitted a trusteeship agreement to the second session of the General Assembly.

The second category of territories eligible for trusteeship includes the former Italian colonies in Africa and the islands formerly held by Japan as possessions or as mandates. Under the treaty of peace with Italy, the status of the country's former colonies will be determined, prior to September 15, 1948, by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France, or, if they cannot agree, by the General Assembly of the United Nations. As to the Japanese islands, President Truman announced on November 6, 1946, that "The United States is prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese Islands for which it assumes responsibilities as a result of the second World War." These islands were occupied by American forces during the war.

The American Government feels that its responsibilities for security, defense, and the preservation of peace in the Pacific require that the former Japanese mandated islands shall be administered as a "strategic area," that is, one in which the administering authority may for security reasons close certain specified areas, among other things, to inspection and report. The trusteeship agreement submitted by the United States covering the administration of these islands as a strategic area was approved on April 2, 1947, by the Security Council of the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, and, upon approval by Congress on July 18, 1947, is now in operation. The United States has taken up its obligation under the Charter to promote the development of the inhabitants, so far as practicable, toward self-government or independence.

Non-self-governing areas which are not under United Nations trusteeship are located in every ocean and on every continent: Greenland, the Danish possession in the Atlantic; Easter Island, a Chilean colony in the Pacific; the French island of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean; the polar regions in the Arctic and the Antarctic; Alaska in North America; Netherlands Guiana in South America; Belgian Congo in Africa; and some eighty others, comprising a total population of over 270,000,000 people.

Our policy toward all these regions is based upon the principles outlined above. Illustrative of the attitude of the United States toward its own possessions are its action in voluntarily granting independence to the Philippines and the recent act of Congress under which the people of Puerto Rico are permitted to elect their own governor.

But we are also concerned with non-self-governing areas under the jurisdiction of other countries. De-

DEPENDENT AREAS

pendent areas in Africa, which comprise the greater part of that continent, possess strategic importance and are also sources of important natural products. Some of these areas have been placed, with our Government's concurring vote, under United Nations trusteeship. For the rest, the United States seeks to achieve the purposes set forth in the section of the United Nations Charter on non-self-governing territories, namely, the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural advancement of the populations.

The United States has expressed its satisfaction with the recent arrangements by which India has attained independence and Burma and Ceylon have been set upon the road toward self-government. In the conflicts between elements in Indochina and France, and Indonesia and the Netherlands, it has favored direct negotiations between the local leaders and the European powers concerned with a view to reaching an amicable settlement.

In the Indonesian dispute the United States proposed, and the Security Council of the United Nations approved, the formation of a three-nation committee to extend "the Council's good offices" for peaceful settlement of the controversy. After being appointed to membership on this committee, the United States has played an active role in seeking to resolve the Indonesian problem.

The United States participated in the South Seas Conference of 1947, convened to consider the economic and social advancement of the 2,000,000 people living in the dependent islands of the South Pacific. The South Commission, which was established as a result of this conference, represents the six powers having dependent territories in this area: the United States, two continental powers (France and the Netherlands), and three members of the British Commonwealth (Australia,

New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). As pointed out by the American delegate, this conference was "the first time the administrators of the area have met together with a view to sharing their common experiences and working out the basis for future cooperation." The new Commission, among other things, will encourage and facilitate research in the technical, economic, and social fields, and recommend measures for the development and coordination of services affecting the welfare of the inhabitants. The conference called upon the Commission to give early consideration to a list of specific economic and social projects.

As regards dependent areas in the Americas, the United States in 1940 renewed its earlier expressed disapproval of "any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." In 1942 this country joined with Great Britain in the establishment of a Caribbean Commission, in which, since 1946, France and the Netherlands have also participated, to strengthen social and economic cooperation between the member countries and their territories in the Caribbean area, with a view to raising the social, cultural, and economic level of the peoples in the area.

The status of dependent peoples is now recognized as a world problem of primary importance. "The major governments of the world face few problems as important and as perplexing as those relating to dependent peoples. This Government is committed to the democratic principle that it is for the dependent peoples themselves to decide what their status shall be."¹

¹President Truman's message to Congress, Jan. 14, 1946.

7. ARMAMENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY

THE UNITED STATES has traditionally favored the regulation and reduction of armaments. It does not intend, however, to repeat the tragic policy of unilateral and unregulated disarmament followed by this country in the years between World War I and World War II. Because political and economic conditions of international security were absent, disarmament by peaceful nations merely encouraged warlike powers to undertake the conquest of their neighbors. From the experience of those years certain conclusions have been drawn: First, no responsible, peace-loving nation can afford to reduce its armaments unless its political security is adequately assured. Secondly, the regulation and reduction of armaments must be accompanied by safeguards, to protect complying states against violations and evasions on the part of potential aggressors. Finally, unilateral disarmament by the United States would be a menace not only to our own security but to the peace of the world.

Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States to aid in bringing about, through the United Nations, the greatest possible regulation and reduction of armaments consistent with the maintenance of international peace and security.

In seeking to control the weapons of warfare, the United States has been concerned with three main problems. First, since international security could not possibly exist if the Axis nations and their satellites were in a position to threaten the United Nations, our Government seeks the permanent destruction of the Axis

war machine by the conclusion of treaties and the undertaking of other measures which will permanently prevent a renewal of aggression. Secondly, in view of the destructive power of atomic energy we have vigorously maintained that immediate priority should be given to achieving international control of this force and establishing safeguards against its misuse. Thirdly, we wish to give to the Security Council control over sufficient armed forces and facilities to maintain international peace. As these conditions of general security become more firmly established, we believe that the progressive regulation and reduction of ordinary or "conventional" armaments should be undertaken.

The immediate demilitarization of the ex-enemy states has been accomplished. In the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland, rigid limitations have been placed upon permissible armies and armaments. The United States has also proposed that the four major powers join in long-term treaties to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany and Japan.

Since 1945 the United States has pressed for an effective international control of atomic energy. In the autumn of that year the President obtained preliminary agreement from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Canada that atomic energy should be put under international control. When the General Assembly of the United Nations met for its first session at London in January 1946, we supported the creation by the Assembly of an Atomic Energy Commission to work out a control plan.

At the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, the United States representative presented proposals for the development of a complete program for the control of this force. These proposals centered on three closely related objectives, each of which is considered

ARMAMENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY

essential to the satisfactory control of atomic energy. We urged, first, that the United Nations create an International Atomic Development Authority, which would have managerial control or ownership of "all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security" and would have the power to inspect and license all other atomic activities. The Authority, moreover, would foster the beneficial use of atomic energy. Our Government proposed, secondly, that the Authority should have sufficient power to forestall the illegal use of atomic energy. Since through its research staff this agency would "be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge" it would be best qualified to detect misuse of atomic force. Above all, we believe that every member of the United Nations should have complete assurance that violation of the agreement not to use atomic energy for destructive purposes would not go unpunished. Finally, our Government stated its willingness to dispose of its stock of bombs and reveal its scientific information at an appropriate stage as the elements of effective international control are progressively established.

The representatives of the United States have maintained these principles throughout the deliberations of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council. We have insisted, moreover, that unless the nations can meet the fearful challenge of atomic warfare there is little likelihood of establishing full control over other weapons of war. Consequently, our representatives have pressed for continued consideration of the control of atomic energy by the Commission, with the ultimate hope of preparing a draft treaty for submission to the Security Council.

The overwhelming majority of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission has supported, with only slight modification, the basic principles recommended by

the United States and set forth on June 12, 1946, by Mr. Bernard Baruch, the American member. The Soviet Union, however, has argued that atomic weapons should be destroyed at once, in advance of the establishment of adequate safeguards to protect complying states from the hazards of violations. The Soviet doctrine was rejected by a vote of ten to two in the Commission, on the grounds that such an approach would be an inadequate and ineffective solution to the problem of international control of atomic energy. While a majority of the Commission approved the Commission's first report to the Security Council, transmitted on December 31, 1946, the U.S.S.R. and Poland refused to approve the general principles which this document embodied.

During 1947 the Soviet Union persistently criticized the American proposals and refused to admit the nature of the problem as understood by the majority. On the other hand, the Soviet counter-proposals have not provided satisfactory solutions to the key problems of safeguards, including international control and inspection, and the circumstances in which atomic weapons would be eliminated from national armaments. In the absence of unanimous agreement on these problems, the Atomic Energy Commission may find itself unable to fulfil its responsibility for drafting plans for international control.

The importance which the United States attaches to the control of atomic energy greatly influences its policy toward the regulation and reduction of those weapons which ordinarily are regarded as incapable of mass destruction. We believe that "first things come first" and that atomic energy should be regulated before "conventional armaments." In recognizing that political stability is basic to arms limitation, this country has frequently affirmed its view that such regulation must be synchroniz-

ARMAMENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY

ed with the progressive evolution of international security. Our Government does not wish to scrap its conventional armaments if such action will contribute to a resurgence of aggression in the world. Moreover, it is the firm intention of the United States to keep sufficient forces at its command to maintain the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as recognized by article 51 of the Charter.

The United States must also maintain its military capabilities in view of its important responsibilities as a member of the United Nations. The spirit of this commitment was indicated by Senator Austin (April 25, 1947), when he said: "We must maintain our military establishment, not for purposes of domination, but in order to be able to back up our commitments in support of collective security under the United Nations." As an interim measure, we feel an obligation under article 106 to assist in maintaining peace and security until sufficient forces are earmarked for the use of the Security Council to enable it to assume this responsibility. In addition, we have the long-term duty of making available to the Council those armed forces and facilities which will enable the United Nations to take military action if it becomes necessary.

Within the framework of these guiding principles, we have supported the work of the Commission on Conventional Armaments which the Security Council established in February 1947. Our representatives on the Commission are guided by the view that regulation of armaments is not an end in itself but that the reduction of armaments must be synchronized with: (1) the evolution of international security, including the successful conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan; (2)

the international control of atomic energy; and (3) the requirement that adequate armed forces be made available to the Security Council.

8. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

NATURE HAS MARKED the Western Hemisphere as a distinct geographic region. Within this vast area, a common devotion to freedom and a historic apprehension of the encroachment of alien political principles and instructions have furthered the growth of a community of nations. Within this community, the United States, because of its size and wealth of resources, inevitably finds itself exercising a large measure of leadership.

During the Latin American struggle for independence the attitude of the United States was one of sympathy, as reflected by our early recognition of the new states. There was a realization that the freedom of Latin America from European control was in the interests of our own security. This view was stated in the form of a policy, or doctrine, by President Monroe in 1823. For more than a half century thereafter, our official interest in that area was limited largely to those periods when European intervention in the New World was either a threat or an actuality. However, with the mid-century industrialization movement in the United States and the resulting increase in commercial relations, it was inevitable that the two Americas should be brought closer together.

Late in the nineteenth century, the United States began to show an increased inclination toward active cooperation with its neighbors to the south, first in commercial, then in political matters. Between 1889 and 1933 official delegates attended six general International Conferences of American States and at least fifty-six special meetings. These conferences made some contribu-

tion to the creation of peace machinery, the expansion of inter-American trade, and the solution of specific minor problems; but for the most part they avoided important political questions and were conducted in an atmosphere of formal amity, sometimes even coolness.

With the growth of the spirit of Pan American unity and the gradual abandonment (1923-1933) by the United States of the policy of preventive intervention in the Caribbean area, the policy of the Good Neighbor became the basis of our relations with Latin America. Participation in three major inter-American conferences before Pearl Harbor (Montevideo, 1933; Buenos Aires, 1936; Lima, 1938) furnished opportunities for the United States to give concrete application to its newly announced policy. In these conferences the United States and the other American republics committed themselves against intervention and adopted consultation as a means of solving common problems and meeting common dangers.

Involvement in World War II made clearer the growing realization of the value of hemisphere cooperation. The neighborhood spirit became even more evident. Every Latin American nation declared war on one or more of the Axis powers and later signed the Charter of the United Nations. The right to construct and operate naval and air bases was freely granted to us. Lend-lease aid and Export-Import Bank credits contributed to hemisphere defense and the maintenance of stable economies throughout the Americas. Three Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics (Panama, 1939; Havana, 1940; Rio de Janeiro, 1942) further consolidated hemisphere unity in the struggle against Axis aggression.

Today United States policy in dealing with Latin America is guided by the spirit of the Good Neighbor and is formulated within the framework of the "inter-Ameri-

can system." Gradually and almost imperceptibly this system has been forged out of the day-to-day relations between the nations of the Western Hemisphere. From an organizational standpoint, the system presents a complex maze of offices, institutes, bureaus, commissions, committees, boards, and tribunals—a heterogeneous group of temporary and permanent agencies, with the Pan American Union serving in many ways as a coordinating secretariat. The integration of these agencies into a compact system is to be the principal task of the forthcoming International Conference of American States at Bogotá.

In the process of developing the inter-American system, the nations of the Americas have committed themselves to a body of fundamental principles, more or less clearly defined:

1. Political independence of the American states, and opposition to non-American attempts to interfere in hemisphere affairs.
2. Republican form of government as a common political ideal.
3. Equality of American states before international law and in the making of decisions in conferences.
4. Recognition of the territorial integrity of sovereign American states, condemnation of conquests, and nonrecognition of territorial changes made by force.
5. Pacific settlement of inter-American disputes.
6. Respect for and faithful observance of treaties and other commitments, freely made.
7. Cooperation in the advancement of common political, economic, social, and cultural interests.
8. Nonintervention of one American state in the affairs of another.
9. Consultation looking toward the solution of common problems and the maintenance of common defense.
10. Continental solidarity in protection of the independence, peace, and security of the American states.

These principles—set forth and reaffirmed in numerous treaties, conventions, resolutions, and declarations—are deeply rooted in inter-American opinion and

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

practice. Their strength rests in the fact that they represent more than a half century of conscious, cooperative efforts on the part of Western Hemisphere nations to meet common dangers and to solve common problems. They constitute in some respects an unwritten charter for the oldest regional system in the world.

Although the United States is fully committed to the support of this regional system, it has no desire to weaken the bonds of friendship between its Latin American neighbors and non-American nations. It is our view that regional arrangements, such as the inter-American system, which respect the rights and interests of other states and fit into a world system, may become strong pillars in the structure of world peace, and that the interdependence of the modern world makes regional isolationism as dangerous as national isolationism.

The Charter of the United Nations provides that regional organizations which are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations shall have a role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and it envisages the authorization by the Security Council of regional arrangements to undertake enforcement measures in specific cases. The Charter also provides that nothing in it shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. The United States is convinced that a stronger inter-American system will mean a stronger world system.

In the midst of World War II, the American republics met at Mexico City to make common cause against the Axis aggressors and to dedicate themselves to the perpetuation of the solidarity achieved under pressure of

war. Toward these ends, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Mexico City, February 21-March 8, 1945) approved two far-reaching resolutions. The Act of Chapultepec (resolution VIII), growing out of the conference, provided for consultation regarding measures to be taken in case of any threat to or attack upon the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of any American state, and recommended the conclusion of a treaty establishing common defense procedure for making effective the decisions reached in consultation.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security (Rio de Janeiro, August 15-September 2, 1947) met "to fulfill the promise of Chapultepec and the sanction of the United Nations Charter." Under the inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, nineteen republics agreed "that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States," and each undertook to assist in meeting the attack. In event of such an attack, each state shall decide upon the immediate action which may be required of it in support of this obligation. This immediate mutual-defense action is to be followed by prompt consultation to determine more definitely upon collective plans. Possible collective procedures range from the recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions to the collective use of armed force. Consultative decisions are to be made by two-thirds vote and are binding on all ratifying states, "except that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

"The purpose of the treaty," said Secretary Marshall, "is to provide for the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. It lays down in precise terms the agreed

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

action to be taken in case of aggression from without or of aggression within the Hemisphere.”

Article IX approved at Mexico City in 1945 proposed the “Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System” and charged the Pan American Union with the task of preparing a draft charter for the consideration of the International Conference of American States at Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union has now drafted and submitted to the member states for prior study a “Project of Organic Pact of the Inter-American System.” The principal task of the Bogotá conference will be to integrate the inter-American system so that it may more effectively cope with the pressing problems of peace and security.

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9. CONCLUSION

THE FOREGOING SURVEY, by no means exhaustive, suggests the world-wide extent of American international interests. These interests and the policies for dealing with them are the expression of the extraordinary position of the United States in world politics today. Underlying factors which have brought about this growth in our position are: (1) the revolution in communication and transportation, which has brought all areas of the world into close and rapid touch with each other; (2) the profound change in the character of modern war, with its capacity to spread mass destruction on an unprecedented scale; (3) the breakdown of normal economic life and the threatened political collapse in large areas of the world, particularly in Europe and Asia, as a result of the war; and (4) the historic shifting of the "balance of power" of the world, marked by the eclipse of some former great powers and the rise of the United States into a position of outstanding leadership in world affairs. All these developments have combined to impose on the United States a remarkable degree of power and responsibility.

During the past several years our Government and the American people have sought to bring about a restoration of peace after World War II, under conditions that would: (1) remove the danger of Fascism, Nazism, and militarism; (2) cultivate the spirit of democracy, with its fundamental guarantees of individual rights; (3) assist in restoring the war-devastated nations to economic health and stability; and (4) lay the foundations for the

organization and maintenance of the future peace and economic welfare of the world.

In 1945, when the enemy states laid down their arms and surrendered unconditionally, the prospects for the realization of these hopes seemed sufficiently bright. In recent months they have dimmed. Secretary Marshall stated to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 17, 1947:

The situation we face today may be summarized by the statement that more than two years after the end of the war the fruits of peace and victory are still beyond our grasp. Men look anxiously toward the future, wondering whether a new and more terrible conflict will engulf them. We have not yet succeeded in establishing a basis for peace with Germany and Japan, nor have we restored Austria as an independent state. Reconstruction lags everywhere; the basic requirements of life are scarce; there is desperate need throughout great areas. The complex economic machinery which was thrown out of joint by the war has not yet been put back into running order. In place of peace, liberty, and economic security, we find menace, repression, and dire want.

Behind our inability to grasp the "fruits of peace and victory" is the failure of collaboration among the Great Powers in the pursuit of the objectives essential to peace and security. Important in this connection has been the attitude of the Soviet Union, which has been characterized by intransigence in implementing agreements reached on a broad range of subjects at wartime conferences, such as those at Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam.

The Soviet Union, along with the United States, is party to commitments with reference to the demilitarization, political reconstruction, and economic unification of Germany. The U.S.S.R. has failed to implement many of these commitments, however, and has been mainly concerned with extracting maximum reparations from Germany and insuring that a new German political regime shall be "friendly" to the Soviet Union. The United

CONCLUSION

States has been concerned chiefly with such economic rehabilitation as may render Germany self-sustaining without jeopardizing security requirements, and with democratic reconstruction on the basis of free political action by the Germans themselves.

The United States desires that Germany shall occupy a position among the powers which would give her freedom to cooperate in a broad program of European economic reconstruction rather than to be linked economically and politically with any orbit. The impasse between the Great Powers in this matter has resulted temporarily, at least, in the virtual partition of Germany.

The situation in Austria is somewhat similar to that in Germany. The United States favors an Austrian state both economically and politically independent, while the Soviet Union insists upon the appropriation of alleged German assets in Austria to an extent that, in United States opinion, seriously endangers such independence. This issue has been the chief obstacle to agreement on a treaty with Austria and formal confirmation of its status as an independent and sovereign state.

As previously noted, agreement has failed on the vital problem of atomic energy. The U.S.S.R. has thus far been unwilling to cooperate along lines that appear to the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations to be essential to any real safeguard against the danger of another war involving the use of atomic weapons. The United States Government supports the overwhelming majority of that Commission in its proposals for: (1) the creation of an international atomic authority with full powers over the development and use of atomic energy; (2) the establishment of an enforcement system in which no violator of the proposed atomic-energy treaty will be able to escape the consequence of his

action by any legal means, including the veto; and (3) the gradual elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments as conditions of security are progressively achieved.

The Soviet Union (1) would limit the jurisdiction of the international authority by denying it any right of managerial control or ownership over atomic-energy activities that are dangerous to security; (2) rejects the necessary comprehensive system of international inspection proposed by the majority of the Commission; (3) refuses to abandon the veto on questions of violation and enforcement under the terms of the treaty; and (4) insists that atomic weapons must be destroyed prior to the development of an effective international system of control which would protect complying states from the hazards of violations and evasions.

Secretary Marshall, in his address to the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, took note of the fact that the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission "has devised a system of control which, while it is bold and daring, is, in our view, essential for security against atomic warfare. The minority has evidently been unwilling to face these same facts realistically."

The breakdown of cooperation among the ~~Great~~ Powers has threatened the effectiveness of the Security Council of the United Nations as an organ for the maintenance of peace. This has been manifested particularly by the use of the veto by the U.S.S.R., even in what are ordinarily regarded as procedural matters. The United States has become concerned over what it regards as the abuse of the veto in the Security Council and has made proposals to limit its exercise in line with the statement of the Four Powers at San Francisco on June 7, 1945,

C O N C L U S I O N

to the effect that the permanent members would not use their "veto" power "wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

The United States has made it clear that it does not desire to stand by while the political and economic fabric of the world progressively decays. Experience has demonstrated that hunger and economic distress breed political unrest and make men an easy prey to extremist ideologies and political tyranny. The situation is made worse when internal economic distress and political unrest are aggravated by a war of nerves from neighboring states seeking to encourage internal subversive movements and threatening to establish political dictatorships.

To achieve peace it will be necessary to deal with the causes of unrest in the world. The American Government has said that it will do what it can "to assist in the return of normal economic health,"¹ realizing that, as Senator Vandenberg said (June 13, 1947), the United States "cannot prosper in a broken world."

¹Remarks by Secretary Marshall at Harvard University, June 5, 1947.



Aspects of Current
American
Foreign Policy



United States Information Service, Shanghai, 1948

