

Filed Rome X-2 Pts 4
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Appendix "A" to Fifth Army G-2 Report No. 581

10th FLOTILLA MAS

A. The 10th Flotilla MAS has a history which dates back to the last war. During the earlier years of the present war it played a prominent part as the formation controlling the attacks made by midget assault craft, human torpedoes and limpeteers of the Italian Navy against Allied shipping in harbors throughout the Mediterranean area. Since the Italian Armistice, the Flotilla, under its able and energetic commander, Prince BORGHESE, has expanded in scope and importance to a point where, in addition to controlling practically the entire remnants of the Italian Navy still in action against the Allies, it disposes of considerable land forces. Members of the Flotilla have also played a prominent part in sabotage activities directed against Allied forces in Italy. Furthermore, the Flotilla now represents an important factor in any political survey of Fascist Republican Italy.

On the proclamation of the Armistice on 8 September 1943 10th Flotilla MAS, in common with most other Italian units, was dissolved by the Germans and its personnel sent on indefinite leave. Before this process of dissolution had been completed, however, Prince BORGHESE approached the German authorities and reached an agreement with them that the Flotilla should continue to exist as an independent Italian formation, officered by Italians, fighting the Allies under the Italian flag. He stipulated that the Flotilla should be free from internal interference by the Germans, and that none of its units or personnel should be sent to Germany for training. Granted these conditions, he declared himself willing to 'fight on to redeem Italian honor.'

Measures were at once initiated to re-form the Flotilla. It was reorganized on a somewhat wider basis than before. BORGHESE is an ambitious and able officer, and he seems to have been determined to unite under his own command the majority of the surviving units of the Italian Navy. In addition, the SAN MARCO Regt of marine infantry was re-formed and came under his command, thus constituting the "Land Forces" section of the new Flotilla.

In October Prince BORGHESE had an interview with Admiral DOEMITZ in BERLIN. Agreement was reached that the major part of the naval section should come under command of the German Navy for operational purposes, while the sabotage personnel would operate under the general direction of Abteilung II of the Abwehr. Details of the agreement are not known, nor are the proportions of control vested in the respective Italian and German authorities quite clear.

By November 1943 the process of reforming the Flotilla was well under way. Personnel for the various naval units had all begun to assemble and train. The SAN MARCO Regt had begun a process of rapid expansion. By the beginning of the New Year the BARBARIGO and LUPO Bns were practically formed, and the first months of 1944 saw seven or eight additional battalions in process of formation. This expansion continued rapidly during 1944.

B. THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE FLOTILLA.

1. Headquarters Group.

The CO is Prince BORGHESE himself. The Chief of Staff has been variously reported as Commander AGOSTINI and Lieutenant Commander SCARELLI, both officers clearly occupying important posts in the Hq of the Flotilla. Other personalities mentioned as holding prominent positions are Commander (?) TORTORA and Capt RICCIO.

2. Naval Section.

The CO of this section is Commander ARILLO. It has been variously reported by ITs as the "Sezione Navale," "X MARE," and 2° Raggruppamento da Combattimento, X Flottiglia MAS." It is believed that the

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latter is the correct designation. Included in ARILLO's command are the midget assault craft, the limpeteers (these may now form an independent unit directly under BORGHESE) and the human torpedoes, as well as MTBs.

3. Land Forces Section (Marine Infantry)

This section of the Flotilla was until recently commanded by Commander CARILLO (or CORALLO). When he was killed in December 1944 while fighting against the Partisans, his post was, it is believed, taken over by Commander BEDESCHI.

The Land Forces section is a formation of approximately divisional size. It represents an expansion of the SAN MARCO Regt. The formation has been variously reported by PWs as "Decima Divisione" (i.e. 10th Div); "Decima (BORGHESE) Divisione"; "Divisione BORGHESE"; "Decima Divisione MAS"; and "1° Raggruppamento da Combattimento."

From further interrogation it seems clear that all the various names given above do in fact refer to the same formation, and from a consensus of opinion among reliable PWs it seems that the correct title of the formation is either "1° Raggruppamento da Combattimento" or "X Divisione" (10th Div). The latter is inscribed on the "shield" worn by some members of the Land Forces section of the Flotilla on their left arm, but it appears that either is in fact valid.

As at present constituted, 10th Div comprises one mobile infantry battalion (FULMINE); five infantry battalions (LUFO, BARBARIGO, SAN GIUSTO, SAGITTARIO SCIRE); one parachute infantry battalion (FOLGORE or FOLGORE 'I'); two artillery battalions (SAN GIORGIO and COLLEONI); one assault engineer battalion (LUCIA TARIGO - formerly VALANGA); and one engineer battalion (FRECCIA); - i.e. a total of 11 battalions. There are in addition five battalions of which PWs report, but whose existence should be regarded as doubtful until confirmed. There is also the VEGA Bn, which is probably a headquarters controlling swimmer saboteurs; the VEGA and FOLGORE Bns (see above) are an expansion of the original NF Bn.

The FULMINE Mobile Bn of 300 Bersaglieri is reported reforming in the VENETO after suffering heavy losses in an anti-Partisan action in January 1945.

The LUFO Inf Bn, which formed part of the old SAN MARCO Marine Regt, held a sector on the SENIO under command of 362d Inf Div during February, and has now been withdrawn to rest and reform, reportedly at VICENZA.

The BARBARIGO Inf Bn fought at the ANZIO beachhead where it suffered heavy losses. It was engaged in mopping up operations in Piedmont in July 1944 and again in Lombardy in December 1944 and has recently lost a prisoner who claims that it is under command of 4th Front Div south of IMOLA. It is said to consist of four companies each about 100 strong.

The SAN GIUSTO Inf Bn was formed in TRIESTE in December 1944 from local personnel and was reported to be almost complete at VENICE at the end of February this year.

The SAGITTARIO Inf Bn was formed in PIEDMONT in December 1944 and was reported to be leaving for the front in February 1945. The battalion strength is thought to be about 300.

The SCIRE Inf Bn appears to be still in the process of forming. It is allegedly intended to be 500 strong.

The FOLGORE Front Inf Bn was formed from the disbanded FOLGORE Group in October 1944. It comprises three companies of parachute infantry, each company having one infantry, one MG and one AT platoon, and its total strength is estimated at 800. Engaged in anti-Partisan operations until recently it has likewise been reported ready to move to the front.

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The SAN GIORGIO Arty Bn is credited with a number of 88 mm guns but its armament is more likely to be on the lines of that of the COLLEONI Bn. It, too, is reported as a candidate for the front.

The COLLEONI Arty Bn was reported by a recent PW to be in the area LUGO, and its armament is said to include 45 mm and 81 mm mortars and 75 mm infantry guns.

Of the VILANCA or LUCA TARISO Bn little is known. It appears to have some kind of an assault engineer role, and some of its personnel attended a demolition course at IESOLO in May 1944. Its strength is reported to be 600.

The FRECCIA Eng Bn about 300 strong was last reported near CONEGLIANO.

Other battalions which PWs and refugees claim to have heard of include SERENISSIMA and 10th RISOLUTI Bns, but their existence lacks confirmation. The NI battalion now in the line on the SENIO east of LUGO is presumably analogous with either the VEGA or FOLGORE Bns referred to above.

Up to the present no headquarters of regimental size have been identified. The battalions have been used in widely separated areas in an autonomous role.

The land section of 10th Flotilla M.S comes under the orders of the High Command of the German Army (OKH) and, more directly, of the C - in C SW. It seems to enjoy a greater measure of independence than that allowed to any other Republican units at present serving with the Germans.

The battalions are armed with Italian weapons, and unlike the Fascist Republican divisions, they do not have permanent German liaison staffs attached.

If the statement of recent PWs be accepted, BORGHESE has now under his command upwards of 50,000 to 60,000 men.

(Source: Eighth Army Intelligence Summary No. 896)

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11th May, 1944

United States

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Foreign British

cc. St. What (2 copies) ✓

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Sent 27/5/44

BB008

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Source: OUR FRIENDS

10th MAS FLOTILLA

I have extracted the following points from the report on the interrogation of prisoners captured from MAS 504 of the 10th MAS Flotilla. This boat was sunk when making a torpedo attack on ANZIO. The remainder of the report is of purely naval interest.

MAS 504 was based on LA SPEZIA and formed part of the 10th MAS Flotilla under the nominal command of Capitano di Fregata (Commander) Junio Valerio BERGHESE, who is already very well-known for his activities in connexion with Assault Craft. The operational command of the MAS has now devolved upon Capitano di Corvetta (Lt. Cdr.) Raffaello ALLEGRI, a former submariner and 2nd-in-Command at one time to ENZO GROSSI.

The boat was manned by a crew of 14 Italian ratings and two officers. Two Italian-speaking German ratings were borne for W/T and V/S communications. The Commanding Officer was 47-year-old Merchant Service skipper with experience of MAS in this and the last war.

This MAS left LA SPEZIA on the evening of 23rd March and proceeded under cover of darkness to PORTO SANTO STEFANO. Her Captain was new to her and the crew, as he had taken the place of her proper Commanding Officer (AMENDOLIA) who had gone sick, at short notice. It was the First Lieutenant's first patrol. One of the POWs, GARACCIONE, was himself a MAS C.O., but had asked to serve under FRESCHI the C.O. of 504 for this patrol.

From various statements made it would appear that the Flotilla does not consist of more than 11 boats in 3 squadrons, about four of which are occasionally operational at the same time.

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Frank Britton

The following officers of the Flotilla are still serving in it under the Germans: BORGHESE-ALLEGRI-MAZZANTI-ARILLO-CCINATO-UNGARELLI-SCANDAMAGLIA-BARDELLI-DI AFFRATE-RICCI-BIFFICANDI; while the following "underwater" specialists are also with the Flotilla in one capacity or other: BELLONI (stone-deaf and 64 years old) COLOMBINO -BALOCCO- COLONTO.

FRESCHI maintained that DI AFFRATE, CARRACIONE (P/W) and himself were the three best MAS C.O.s left in the Flotilla. With the loss of 504, only DI AFFRATE now remains.

There are apparently about 200 officers still with the Flotilla, and the crews are mostly untrained.

P/W FRESCHI summed up the situation of the remnants of the 10th MAS Flotilla at LA SPEZIA in the words, "We have no food, no clothing, no supplies and no confidence". Everything is in short supply and is doled out in niggardly quantities by the Germans.

FRESCHI himself appears to have remained with the Flotilla owing to motives of misguided patriotism and personal dissatisfaction.

After serving for some months in the BLACK SEA under MAGADINO, where he won the Iron Cross, he returned to ITALY but was given no leave and posted instead immediately to MESSINA in command of a MAS. The boat was attacked by 2 Spitfires on 2nd August 1943, and he himself was wounded. The MAS returned to MESSINA and he went to hospital at AQUILEIA. On recovering from his wounds, he went home to ROME on leave and returned to LA SPEZIA on 3rd September. It was while on his way from LA SPEZIA to the MAS base at ANCONA with a convoy of lorries carrying dismantled MAS that he learned of the signing of the armistice. He could get no definite instructions from anyone in ANCONA, so went by road to ROME where he saw Admiral FERRERI and wrote a report. He returned to LA SPEZIA via ANCONA and reported to BORGHESE, who gave him a command.

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When asked, he said he had no scruples about throwing in his lot with the Germans, since he felt the King had let his country down, and his conscience would not let him fight the Germans after being Allies with them for so long. He added that, if released, he would go straight back to serve in MAS again.

P/W's comments showed clearly how great an impression had been made on Italians in the North of ITALY by the statement published in the Allied Press concerning the proposed division of the Italian Fleet. Even the sight of Italian warships flying their own flag in NAPLES harbour and the statement on oath of an Italian Naval Officer well-known to him, hardly appeared to convince him, and he said that this move had done much to solidify anti-Allied feeling in Northern ITALY.

The case of P/W GARRACIONE, however, was slightly different, in that he had been given the choice of serving with the Italian Republican Navy or going to a concentration camp in GERMANY.

This P/W was very much more cheerful and light-hearted than FRESCHI, whose recital was frequently punctuated by floods of weeping.

There appears to be a good deal of internecine squabbling among the more senior Naval Officers in Northern ITALY: GROSSI for example appears to be out of favour with BORGHESE. The morale of the majority of officers is definitely low as they know they are fighting for a lost cause. As FRESCHI put it, "Ninety per cent of them had no choice, the remaining 10 per cent are hotheads ("esaltati")".

According to FRESCHI, MUSSOLINI still exists as a "force" but he is never seen and his influence on affairs of State is taken for granted."

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2
A.P.O. #464, U. S. Army

11 July 1944
ARF/af

Subject: 'X' Flotilla MAS.

11 pp

2 docs

To: See Distribution.

The attached AFHQ documents on the 'X' Flotilla MAS are forwarded for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Arthur R. Blom
ARTHUR R. BLOM,
Major, Infantry,
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

- A.C. of S., G-2, II Corps,
- A.C. of S., G-2, IV Corps,
- SM, Corps Expeditionary Francois,
- CIC Detachment, Fifth Army,
- RIP, Fifth Army,
- Naval Liaison Officer, Fifth Army.

- 1) Agents note
- 2) File

S.J.S.

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Answer # 1

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Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

By: *hmc* Date: *5/1/15*

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: *2005*

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Intelligence Relations



La Spezia, il 25 Ottobre 1943.

10^a FLOTTIGLIA M. A. S.

Indirizzo telegrafico DECIMA FLOTMAS

Al Ecc. Alceo Ercolani
- Capo della Provincia di

Protoc. N. 108

Allegati

GROSSETO

ARGOMENTO Ringraziamento.

Il Tenente di Vascello PALADINI Luigi - delegato da questo Comando per il ritiro di benzina costà depositata, necessaria per l'impiego operativo bellico di questa Flottiglia, mi ha comunicato di aver avuto da V.Ecc. il più ampio ed efficace appoggio per l'espletamento della missione affidatagli.

Tengo ad esprimervi il mio vivo ringraziamento - felice di constatare che - nel nuovo clima - la collaborazione delle Autorità civili con gli Enti militari operativi sia reale, fattiva e spicciativa.

VIVA L'ITALIA ! -

IL COMANDANTE
Capitano di Fregata
(J. Valerio BORGHESE)

J. Borghese

(3)

ENCL: 1

XAR2-5044

13 Jul 44

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GRUPO 1

N.º de protocolo

Fecha del hecho N.º

del

de 1944

Urgencia:

Requis per oficial inferior un solo documento

AAI B-357,502/13 12 Oct. 1944

B-379,502/13 25 Jun. 1944

AAI 1055/4(G-1)(4) 89

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH ARMY
APO 484

12th
18 July 1944

SUBJECT: 10th Flotilla Mas.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

A document recovered from the confidential files of the Capo della Provincia of Grosseto, Alceo Ercolani, reveals that the Commanding Officer of the 10th Flotilla Mas at La Spezia, on 25 October 1943 was Capitano di Fregata J. Valerio BORGHESE. (CDR.)

The document in question is a letter of thanks to Ercolani for kindness shown to a certain Tenente di Vascello Luigi PALADINI. It is noted that AAI 1458/4/GSI(b), dated 31 May 1944, Subject: Enemy Agents, contains the name PALADINI with a description, 'Sailor; had been in the Aegean Islands; height, 1.66 m.; thin, dark complexion, small head, plump face, cleanshaven, frizzy chestnut hair, dark eyes; Approximate age 22.'

POB: 2122
CIT: Italy
LINKED WITH ITALIAN NAVAL
ASSAULT & SABOTAGE ACTIVITY
ALBA H. WARREN, Jr.
Special Agent, CIC

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LA SPEZIA UN.
ITALIAN
NAVAL
ASSAULT
SABOTAGE
GROUP.
(ENCL'S
SET FOR
INFO ON
GROUP
A 43
LETTE
BY
SIB)

APPROVED:

STEPHEN J. SPINGARN,
Major, M. I.
Chief, CIC, 5th Army

DIST: (3) 6-2, 5th Army
(1) CIC, AFHQ
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2 ENCL'S

XAR2-5044
13 Jul 44

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TOWN	UNIT	LOCATION	Nature of Buildings	PERSONALITIES	REMARKS
LA SPEZIA (continued)	8. M/S group	Huggiano. See App. B. and Town Plan of La Spezia 1/10,000	Seaplane hangar	See App. D	15 M/S boats
	9. "Maiali" detachment				Torpedo stores for "Maiali"
6. VAREZZE	M/S boat unit	Shipyards at Bagnetto di VAREZZE	Unknown	Unknown	12 M/S ready for service
7. MILAN	X M/S Propaganda Office	15 Via Carlo Alberto	Unknown	<u>Lt. TULVI</u>	
8. VIGEVANO	1. Gamma Detachment	Unknown	G.I.L. Building Dopolavoro of MARZOTTO L'INTEGRO	Ten. di Vasc. WOLK C.O. " FERRARO 2 i/o S/Ten. di Vasc. OELLI inst Trainees 2/Lt. BELICERIE " VENTURINI " PARIGI " PAVONE Sgt. PACIOLLA Ord Seaman RUSCA	Preliminary Gamma training. 30 - 35 Italian trainees housed in G.I.L. Building; 30 - 37 German trainees housed in the Dopolavoro building of MARZOTTO L'INTEGRO.
	2. "Maiali" detachment	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Believed to be a "Maiali" training school.

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TOWN	UNIT	LOCATION	Nature of Buildings	PERSONALITIES	REMARKS
4. MASSA-CARRARA Area	Reparto Superficie?	Bocche di Magra	See 11 shipyards and repair dock.	Unknown	
5. LA SPEZIA	1. Cotrau Group	Castagna Bay. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia.	Unknown	See App. D	Training in the use of mahogany explosive boats, 1942.
	2. Messi d'Assalto Group	Varignano. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia, 1/10,000	Unknown	"	Preliminary training for the Messi d'Assalto group.
	3. "Mialli" detachment?	do.	Unknown	"	"Mialli" training school.
	4. Torpedo store and workshop possibly for X Flot. MAS	Baia d'Assalto. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia 1/10,000	Workshop and store along the waterfront	"	
	5. X Flot. MAS H.Q.	Molo Mirabello. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia, 1/10,000	Unknown	"	Main base
	6. Punteria di Mare	San Bartolomeo. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia 1/10,000	Souola di Marina in former C.R.M.I. barracks.	"	Approximately 800 men
	7. Sommozzatori Group	Muggiano. See App. B and Town Plan of La Spezia 1/10,000	Seaplane hangar	"	Sommozzatori training school.

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FLORIDA MAP: INTERNAL LOCATIONS -

MAP "ITALY AND THE BALKANS" 1/2,000,000 - See Appendix "A"

TOWN	UNIT	LOCATION	Nature of Buildings	PERSONALITIES	REMARKS
1. LEGHORN	1. Reparto Subacquea	San Leopoldo	Unknown	Unknown	Scuola di Livorno comprising the Scuola di Sannozatori and the Scuola di Gamma, in 1942.
	2. Reparto Lavori	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	
	3. B.D.S. or "Miali" group (human torpedo)	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	
2. VIAREGGIO	1. B.D.S. or "Miali" detachment	Balpedio Rocca	Unknown	Unknown	B.D.S. = Bocche del Serchio River
	2. Reparto Subacquea group	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Center for all (?) preliminary training of Reparto Subacquea
3. FLORENCE	I Flot. MAS (San Marco Regt.?) Recruiting Office	Unknown	Unknown	Col. CERRINA-FERRONE C.O. San Marco Regt.	

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By Authy
25 June
Initials:

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B-389.502/2/3.

25 June, 1944.

SUBJECT: X Flotilla MAS.

TO : Distribution below.

1. Attached for your information is a table, "X Flotilla MAS: Known Locations".

2. The X Flotilla MAS is a Republican Fascist naval assault and sabotage group, reformed early in 1944. Its principal sections are the "Reparto Superficie" (torpedo assault craft) and the "Reparto Submarino" (swimmer-saboteurs and "human" torpedo units). The X Flotilla MAS has attached to it an Army section, the San Marco Regiment (parachutists, saboteurs, and infantry). Fuller details of the organization are contained in our B-389.502/3 dated 20 March 1944.

3. The current table summarizes the information known about depots, etc. of the X Flotilla MAS sections and personnel. It is hoped that it will be of use in the operations now in progress.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON
Colonel, G. S.
G-2(CI) Section.

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C. S. O. (I) Med., AFHQ.
D. S. H.

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
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APPENDIX C

IE SOLO MARINA



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
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APPENDIX B

LA SPEZIA

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I FLOTILLA MAS: KNOWN LOCATIONS -

MAP "ITALY AND THE BALKANS" 1/2,000,000 - See Appendix "A"

TOWN	UNIT	LOCATION	Nature of Buildings	PERSONALITIES	REMARKS
1. LEGHORN	1. Reparto Subacquea	San Leopoldo	Unknown	Unknown	Scuola di Livorno comprising the Scuola di Sperimentatori and the Scuola di Gamma, in 1942.
	2. Reparto Lavori	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	
	3. B.D.S. or "Miali" group (human torpedo)	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	
2. VIAREGGIO	1. B.D.S. or "Miali" detachment	Palipodio Rocca	Unknown	Unknown	B.D.S. = Bocche del Serchio River
	2. Reparto Subacquea group	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Center for all (?) preliminary training of Reparto Subacquea
3. FLORENCE	I Flot. MAS (San Marco Regt.?) Recruiting Office	Unknown	Unknown	Col. CERRINA-FERRONE C.O. San Marco Regt.	

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TOWN	UNIT	LOCATION	Nature of Buildings	PERSONNELITIES	REMARKS
9. DESOLO MARINA	1. San Marco Coys.	Near VENICE. See App. C	T.B. Hospital for quarters	See App. E	200 men
	2. Nuotatori-Paracadutisti Group (swimmer-parachutists)		Hotel 500 yards from T.B. Hospital used for quarters	Capt. BUTTALONE C.O? Lt. NUTI 2 i/o? Sailor BACCINI ? Sgt. FRASSONI ? Sec App. E	
	3. San Marco Coys. and N.P. Group		Large building 30 yds from the shore.	Lt. REI Lt. SCALO Lt. GHIASSI Lt. TRICSI Sgt. PIAZZA ? Sgt. SIDARI ? Sgt. MARINELLI ? ALMEOSICOTTICCI ?	Training center for both San Marco Coys. and N.P. Group
	4. N.P. Group		VILLA BELLA		Former quarters of N.P. Group
10. DESENZANO	Comm. Unit	Lago di Garda	Unknown	Unknown	Gamma training
11. GARGANO	X Flot. M.S. Reception Center	1 km. S.W. of GARGANO which is on Lago di Garda	Barracks	Unknown	For incoming volunteers; houses 500 men
12. SESTO CALENDE	"Barchini" group (Midget Torpedo Boats)	Lago Maggiore	Unknown	Unknown	Training school for midget torpedo boats (MTBs); 5 - 6 units formed of 90 Italian trainees.

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APPENDIX "D"

LA SPEZIA

PERSONNELITIES:

Cdr. BORGHESI	C.O. X Flot. MAS
? Capt. ARELLO	C.O. Mezzi d'Assalto
? Capt. BELLONI	C.O. B.D.S. or "Maiali"
Console FULINI	Ma Morti - Conturia
? Capt. ALLEGRI	C.O. Reparto Superficie
? Capt. BEMIGNATI	C.O. 2nd. Squadr. Reparto Superficie
Capt. BENEDECHI	C.O. San Marco at La Spezia
Lt. MOSCATELLI	C.O. Samozzatori
? Cdr. FRESCHI	MAS 504
? Cdr. PUCCI	MAS 505
? Lt. SARTI	MAS 505
? Lt. SORCINELLI	MAS 505
? Cdr. LONGHETTI-CATTAN	
? Major MISCISTRELLI	(Armi Navali)
? Lt. Cdr. MASCAPO	
? Lt. SCARDINELLA	
? Lt. BERTOZZI	
? S/T FRACASSINI	
? S/T SPINOLA	
? Sgto. BENDANI	
? Sgto. MUOIO	
? Sailor LUSCIETTO	

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APPENDIX "E" - Additional Personalities -

The following personnel, formerly at CAPERM, may now have returned to ESCOLO MARINA: -

AMATINO, Cap. Mag.
ARVICIONI, Ardito
BILDUCCI
~~BRUNO, Ardito~~
BARONI, Cap. Mag.
BATTIZATTI, Sgto.
BENEDUK, Sgto.
BERTUCCI
~~BERTUCCI, Sgto.~~
CASSONE, Sgto.
CECCACI, Ten.
CINCIO, Ardito
CINOTTI, Cap. Mag.
~~COSSIGNATI, Sgto.~~
DEI CAPO, Sgto.
DOMILLI, Sgto. Mag.
FOLLADORE, Sgto.
GARU
L.C. GRIMA, Cap. Mag.
PERRI
RIGALI, S/Ten.
RINI
ROSSI, Cap. Mag.
SANTERINI, S/Ten.
SPADOLANGA, Sgto.
~~SPADOLANGA, Sgto.~~

The following personnel formerly at CAPERM may now be at ESCOLO MARINA: -

BILDINI, Sailor
CUGLI, Sgto
GATTO, Sailor
PERRI, Secondo Capo (Same as PERRI?)
QUIRICONI, Cap. Mag.
ZAPPI, Lt.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(C) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

SECRET

2-24-1517
canceled
15 December 1944

MEMORANDUM #53

To: SAINT Rome
From: SAINT Caserta
Subject: BORGHESE

DEC 17 1944	
TARGETS	READ
CARDED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OK FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>
ACTION	C + F

The following is from DH001's letter of 24 November (X-1117) to Saint Caserta:

1. With reference to a report from CB015 dated 19 October 1944 on above subject, we had previously received the information in paragraph 1a from Algiers - our accession #VX002-8.22a.
2. We believe that the information in paragraph 2a, b&c all applies to one person. The following is a summary of all information we have on the subject.
3. (Prince) Junio Valerio BORGHESE - Hauptmann BORCHARDT. Born about 1906 - Rome. Son of Prince Livio BORGHESE - cousin of the ex-governor of Rome. Wife - Doria WASSILIEVNA (Russia), last reported to be living in Florence with an unidentified sister of Prince BORGHESE.
4. Attended the Royal Italian Naval Academy - LIVORNO? Rank of Capitano di Corvetta or Fregata. Commanding officer of the 10th Mas Flotilla and the San Marco Battalion. Has close relations with Kdo. 212 in which he holds the rank of Hauptmann.
5. It has been rumored that he was wounded in a Partisan attack and also that he was arrested by the Germans in June for treachery. One report states that it was rumored amongst his men that he was anti-Fascist, but this is not borne out by any other reports. His last headquarters were reported to be at Valdagno near Vicenza.
6. Our description fits your a, with these additions: Robust figure, large nose, smooth grey hair, blue eyes.

32

ROME X-2 Pts 103
FOLDER # 1517

SECRET

XABZ-9543
15 Dec 44

Capitano di Fregata Junio Valerio BORGHESE

SALTY
Folds

7 JAN; 45 Rome
dit
pub? at-Italy

C.F.

Commander of
attached to
Flotilla MAS

BORGHESE was born in 1906, his father was Livio dei Principe BORGHESE and his mother Valeria KEUN, of Turkish origin.

He entered the "R. Accademia Navale" of Livorno in 1922, and graduated in 1928 with the grade of "Guardiamarina" after having repeated the first year.

In 1929 he went on a cruise to South America in the "TRENTO". From 1929 to 1931 he was on Torpedo ships in the North Adriatic. After having completed the advanced courses in Livorno at the R. Accademia Navale, he graduated with the grade of S. Tenente di Vascello and started a course for "Palombari a Grande Profondità" after which he embarked on the "TITANO" in 1933 and was assigned to the "Scuola Palombari di Grande Profondità".

In the summer of 1933 he went on a sailing cruise to North America.

Upon his return he was promoted to "Tenente di Vascello" after having been transferred to the TITANO at La Spezia where he continued his studies of the "Palombari G.P." and was later transferred to the submarine TRICHECO based at Massaua where he remained during the whole of the Ethiopian Campaign.

He married a young woman of Russian origin called Doria OLSOUFIEFF, sister of Tenente di Vascello Alessio OLSOUFIEFF who was killed in combat in the Sicilian Canal during the present war.

Upon his return to Italy he was given command of the submarine IRIDE with which he participated in the Spanish war from Sept. 1937 to Feb. 1938.

He was awarded the "Medaglia di Bronzo al Valore Militare" with the following motivations:

"As Submarine Commander he completed numerous war missions on the Spanish coast operating against the Red warships, and against the contraband activities, showing an excellent offensive spirit and solid professional qualities. He resolutely attacked a destroyer by night with the submarine IRIDE, remaining on the surface and succeeding various times in eluding enemy units who tried repeatedly to damage the submarine with depth charges".

From 1938 to 1940 he was successively in command of the submarines ZAFFIRO, AETISTA, NEREDDE, PISANI and DIASPRO.

(4)

He was promoted to Capitano di Corvetta and was in command of the submarine SCIRE, initiating the first attempts at transporting and launching "Mezzo d'Assalto" by submarine.

In October 1941 he undertook his first war mission, which consisted of carrying three "Mezzi Speciali" to within two miles of Gibraltar. This attempt failed due to the irregular functioning of the machines. Only Lt. V. BIRINDELLI succeeded in penetrating the Port of Gibraltar, but the charge exploded 30 metres from the British Battleship.

In January 1941 he was awarded the "Medaglia d'Oro al Valore Militare".

In the summer of 1941, he assumed command of the Xth Flottiglia MAS and from then on he directed and coordinated the activities of the "Mezzi d'Assalto".

In December 1941 he succeeded in bringing the "Mezzi Speciali" in front of the Base at Alexandria which operated with great success in the harbor sinking and damaging two British Battleships. For this he was awarded the "Ordine Militare di Savoia" in March 1942 with the following motivations:

"Commander of the submarines assigned to the Xth Flottiglia MAS for operations with "Mezzi d'Assalto", after having completed three audacious and difficult missions. He studied and prepared a fourth mission with the view of forcing another enemy base with perfect technique and sagacity. Confronting the risks of enemy defense and vigilance with cold determination, he drew his submarine near to the well fortified port in order to put the "Mezzi d'Assalto" in the best position for the forcing of the enemy base. He then launched the "Mezzi d'Assalto" in an action which was crowned with brilliant success causing heavy damage to the two enemy Battleships."

He was also promoted to Capitano di Fregata for distinction in combat, and was awarded the Iron Cross 11 Class by the German Command.

In September 1943 he assumed a republican attitude and from the 14th of September 1944 was suspended from the Italian Navy for an indefinite period, awaiting penal proceedings.

(4)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Supplementary Interrogation Report of Federico PISCIA, Our JRX-321		2. RI FILE NO.		WASH REG INT 160		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
		JRX-321a			22 Dec 44	
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		
				8. DATE OF INFO.		
				9. EVALUATION		
		10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
14.						
<p>The report delves almost completely on the organization of the Xth Flotilla MAS?</p> <p>Para 46. The Fascist Government, according to BUTAZONI [Ten. di Vascello Nino, C.O. of NP (Nuotatori-Paracadutisti) Company7, was resigning in a few days and a military government was to take charge. In this new government, BORGHESE would play an important part. One of the main tasks of this new government was to organize an army.</p> <p align="center"><u>Appendix A</u> of the report lists:</p> <p align="center">BORGHESE, Prince Junio Valerio, as C.O. Xth Flotilla MAS</p>						
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT						
<p>EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)</p> <p>(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p>						
<p>Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005</p>						
15.						
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.					C	

58
Handwritten: 40, 1602, Cairo
Capitano di Fregata Junio Valerio BORGHESE

Nato il 1906 da Livio dei Principi BORGHESE e Valeria KEUN di nazionalità turca.

Entrato nella R.Accademia Navale di Livorno nel 1922 ne usciva col grado di Guardiamarina nel 1928 dopo aver ripetuto il primo anno di corsi.

Imbarcato sulla R.Nave TRENTO eseguiva una crociera nel Sud America nel 1929.

Dal 1929 al 1931 sulle siluranti in Alto Adriatico.

Dopo il corso superiore frequentato a Livorno presso la R.Accademia Navale col grado di S.Tenente di Vascello iniziava un corso per palombari a grande profondità e veniva successivamente imbarcato nel 1933 sulla Nave TITANO assegnata alla scuola palombari di grande profondità.

Nell'estate del 1933 sulla R.Nave COLOMBO eseguiva una crociera a vela nel Nord America.

Al rientro promosso Tenente di Vascello dopo un imbarco sul TITANO a La Spezia dove continuava le esperienze dei palombari G.P. veniva assegnato sul sommergibile TRICHECO di base a Massaua dove rimase per tutto il periodo della campagna etiopica.

Sposato con la Signorina di origine russa Doria OLSOUFIEFF sorella del Tenente di Vascello Alessio OLSOUFIEFF morto in combattimento nel Canale di Sicilia durante l'attuale guerra.

Al rientro in Italia assumeva il Comando del sommergibile IRIDI col quale partecipava alla guerra di Spagna dal Settembre 1937 al Febbraio 1938.

Gli veniva conferita la medaglia di bronzo al V.M. con la seguente motivazione:

"Comandante di sommergibile ha compiuto numerose missioni di guerra sulle coste spagnole operando contro le navi da guerra rosse e contro il traffico di contrabbando, dimostrando elevato spirito offensivo e solide qualità professionali. - Con 1

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

308

Rome 2-2

pts. 103

Doc. 1602

2ARI-4580

7 Jan 45

smg. IRIDE attaccava risolutamente di notte stando in superficie un C.T. e riusciva successivamente con calma e abilità ad eludere la ricerca e l'offesa di varie unità avversarie che cercavano ripetutamente di colpire il sommergibile con bombe di profondità."

Dal 1938 al 1940 ebbe successivamente i Comandi dei smgg. ZAFFIRO, AMETISTA, NEREIDE, PISANI e DIASPRO.

Promosso Capitano di Corvetta fu Comandante del smg. SCIRE' che iniziò le prime esperienze per il trasporto ed il lancio dei mezzi d'assalto con un sommergibile.

Nell'Ottobre 1941 egli compì la sua prima impresa di guerra portando 3 mezzi speciali a 2 miglia da Gibilterra. - Dato il funzionamento irregolare degli apparecchi l'impresa fallì. - Solo il T.V. BIRINDELLI riuscì a penetrare nel porto di Gibilterra ma la carica scoppiò a 30 metri da una corazzata inglese.

Per tale impresa gli fu conferita nel Gennaio 1941 la medaglia d'oro al V.M.

Nell'estate 1941, assunse il Comando della X^a Flottiglia MAS e da allora coordinò e diresse le imprese dei mezzi d'assalto.

Nel Dicembre 1941 portò dinnanzi alla base di Alessandria i mezzi speciali che operarono con successo nel porto affondando o danneggiando due corazzate inglesi: gli fu pertanto concesso nel Marzo 1942 l'Ordine Militare di Savoia con la seguente motivazione:

"Comandante di sommergibile assegnato alla X^a Flottiglia MAS per operazioni con mezzi d'assalto, dopo aver compiuto con successo tre audaci e difficili imprese, studiava e preparava con tecnica perfetta e sagacia una quarta operazione per il forzamento di altra base nemica. - Con il suo sommergibile si avvicinava al munitissimo porto affrontando con fredda determinazione i rischi frapposti dalle difese e dalla vigilanza del nemico per mettere i mezzi d'assalto nelle condizioni migliori per il forzamento della base nemica. - Lanciava quindi i mezzi d'assalto nell'azione che era coronata da brillante successo avendo portato al grave danneggiamento di due corazzate nemiche."

3

Veniva inoltre promosso Capitano di Fregata per merito di guerra e dal Comando tedesco gli veniva conferita la Croce di Ferro di II^a Classe.

Nel Settembre 1943 assumeva un atteggiamento repubblicano e a decorrere dal 14 Settembre 1944 è stato dalla Marina Italiana sospeso dall'impiego a tempo indeterminato, in attesa di procedimento penale.

Roma, 7 Gennaio 1945

(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handwritten initials/signature

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2
A.P.O. #464, U. S. Army

ARB/sm
C1-334B

2 June 1945

SUBJECT: Preliminary Interrogation of Prince Valerio BORGHESE.

TO: Chief, 305th CIC Detachment, Fifth Army, APO 464, US Army.

1. Herewith for information one copy of SCI Unit Z Report, file reference JZX-1369, in respect to subject.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Handwritten signature
ARTHUR R. BLOM,
Lt. Col., Inf.,
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246
By: WAC Date: 5/1/15

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION

Changed to Secret

BY AUTHORITY

Name []

Office WE74

Date 27 May 63

~~RECLASSIFIED~~

RI/AN

RI/MIS

RI/Files

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE 2 June 45

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
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 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

(3)

(31)

ENCL-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handwritten notes:
to - XAR 2-5032
28 May 45

SECRET
ROME

TOP SECRET
1960
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

77-1569
28 May 1945

SUBJECT: Preliminary Interrogation of (Prince) Valerio BORGHESE *CIT Italy*

TO: AC of S, G-2, CI, AFHQ

*SUBT. AS C-IN-C. OF ITALIAN
SABOTAGE ORG. WITH GERMAN
I.S. LINKS.*

*RID/MIS
4 copies pp 2-4
also*

A. Circumstances Leading to Interrogation:

1. Subject was brought from Milan to Rome after having been contacted by two agents of this Unit prior to the Allied offensive. He was removed from Milan to avoid an impossible situation with Partisans and taken to Rome for detailed interrogation. Subject is being held at the disposition of CSDIC and this Unit.

B. Relationship between 10th MAS and GIS:

2. Until the fall of 1943, Subject's unit was completely at the disposition of the German Intelligence Service. The first elements of the 10th MAS to enter the German Service did so in January 1944, joining the organization of Thur VON HOHENSTEIN. From reports and personal observation, Subject came to the conclusion that this system worked to the complete disadvantage of the Italians in his unit inasmuch as the Germans had no regard for the personal safety of the men, did not train them properly for their missions, and Subject himself received no reports of the results.

ENCL'S RELATE TO SEARCH (NEGATIVE RESULTS) FOR ORGANIZATION'S STAY BEHIND O.P. PLANS DOCUMENT.

C. Protest to General HARSTER:

3. In August 1944 Subject talked the situation over with General HARSTER and, as a result, an agreement was made whereby no 10th MAS personnel could be employed by the Germans without Subject's authorization. Requests were to come through HARSTER and, for the most part, Subject recalls that they were made directly through his liaison officer, KOEHLER. During the following months, Subject's estimation of the treatment received by his men from the Germans continued to decline, particularly after he had inspected, sometime during September or October, the CYPRESSE Organization maintained by Major BEGUS at CAMPALTO. Following this inspection, Subject went to HARSTER and stated that he would give no additional men to the Germans but would work alone along the espionage and sabotage lines already laid out by the GIS. HARSTER stated that he would talk over the proposal with his subordinates, HUEGEL and BEGUS. Subject never again discussed this aspect of the situation with HARSTER and, in the period that followed, operated on an independent basis with monthly reports of his activity being supplied to HARSTER.

*Roul
X-2
P 54
Fldr
DB 18*

XARZ - 5032

(31) TWO ENCL'S

28 May 45

~~TOP SECRET~~

Following his talk with HARSTER sometime during October, Subject established the so-called VEGA Battalion under the command of Tenente di Vascello ROSSI. The purpose behind the formation of the new battalion was to place all personnel heretofore concerned with espionage or sabotage under the direction of a single unit. In line with this purpose, the NP Units, which up to this time had been in the German Service, were transferred to the VEGA Battalion. BUTAZZONI himself was removed from all contact with sabotage or espionage activities and his men converted to straight infantry use. The work of the VEGA Battalion was conceived as:

- a. Gathering intelligence information in AOT.
- b. The commission of acts of sabotage in AOT.
- c. The preparation of post-occupation espionage and sabotage in the main Northern Italian centers.

RIG/MIS
add at end of R and pages 2-4

5. ROSSI was in complete charge of this activity and kept Subject informed through regular reports of the progress along the three lines indicated.

CITED IN PRELIM. INTERDGC OF C-IN-C OF THE ITALIAN SABOTAGE GROUPS, PRINCE VALERIO BORGHESE.

E. Preparation of 10th MAS Pin Groups:

6. With regard to the preparation of post-occupational groups in Northern Italian cities, Subject states that the activity of the VEGA Battalion proceeded simultaneously with similar activity carried out by the GIS, by the Republican Fascist Intelligence Service under PAVOLINI and probably also by the MGIR. All of these, according to Subject, were working separately. During November and December, ROSSI presented a program for the establishment of five 10th MAS groups of post-occupational agents, namely, in MILAN, TURIN, GENOA, BOLOGNA and VENICE. The Venice group was to have its headquarters in the city but to work throughout the whole Veneto area. Each group was to be composed of six or more men and, in all, according to Subject, the number of VEGA Battalion personnel who volunteered for the work was between 60 and 70. Each group was to be provided with a portable W/T set, arms and explosives. In each city various forms of commercial cover were to be used. The objectives of the group, according to Subject, were strictly military; that is, the groups were to operate during the course of military operations. ROSSI, he states, was the only one who knew all the details of the plan. During the course of the winter he came to MILAN every week or two to explain the progress achieved, to get additional funds, etc. The details ROSSI presented in the form of regular reports which, according to Subject, are in the archives of the 10th MAS at his headquarters in the Castello di Lonato at LONATO. Others who knew to a greater or lesser extent of the program were UKA and (2nd Lt.) Ottavio MORBELLI. The latter was head of Subject's secretariat and therefore received all of the reports and was responsible for their safekeeping and filing.

ATT = Italy

C-IN-C OF ITALIAN NAVAL ASSAULT & SABOTAGE GROUPS (10TH FLOTILLA MAS), WWII.

(B)
(5)

~~SECRET~~

Planning and Last News of the Groups

7. The components of the respective post-occupational groups were placed during February and March. According to the plan, the groups were to keep in "T" communication with Subject, whose base was to be located first at Milan and then at some undetermined point either in the mountains or the German "reduit". Subject stresses that the entire program was based upon the assumption that the Allied occupation of Northern Italy would be gradual, and therefore that there would be ample opportunity to provide for the withdrawal to other headquarters as the Allied armies approached. Subject states that as far as he knows, the groups received no orders with regard to the eventuality of an armistice. He considers that this was a fundamental error on his part but believes that none of the group would work following the cessation of military hostilities. Subject saw ROSSI for the last time at the end of March or the 1st of April, but only for a brief moment. He was told that LOCASCIO (identical with the LOCASCIO mentioned in the interrogation of LOCATELLI) had been captured by partisans. Following this, Subject had no further reports. He did not see ROSSI again, and therefore does not know what decisions were taken with regard to the operation of the groups, but again states with certainty that, as the purposes were strictly military and devoid of any post-defeat aspects, none of the groups would continue operations.

G. Pin Group Personalities Concerned

8. Inasmuch as ROSSI was in complete charge of all of the activities of the VEGA Battalion in general and of the pin group in particular, Subject states that he himself recalls only a few of the people concerned in the post-occupational program. He has heard the name of Rino GRASSO, UXA, Subject states, as Commandant of the 10th MAS, was au courant of all operational activities; the VEGA Battalion as a component of his command therefore came under his observation. According to Subject, however, UXA was completely out of the planning and execution of the post-occupational groups.

9. (Signora) Fede Arnaud/POCEK, head of the 10th MAS Women's Auxiliary, Subject states, had absolutely nothing to do with the post-occupational program.

10. (Lieut.) Giuseppe GOZZI, in his capacity as 10th MAS paymaster, would probably know more of the details, next to ROSSI, than any other person concerned. Subject recalls that large sums of money were given to GOZZI for the use of the groups, and both GOZZI and ROSSI were made personally responsible by Subject for the expenditure of all funds. Subject recalls that (Lieut.) Giovanni DELSAMPERLO was one of the members of the post-occupational team. He recalls also that (Lieut.) Elio CUCCHIARI, an expert saboteur with several missions to AOT to his credit, was another pin group member.

*See F. Italy
CIT: Italy*

*(GERMAN-I-S-LINKED
ASSAULT & SABOTAGE
ORG, ITALY, WWII)*

*AS PAYMASTER OF ITALIAN NAVY
ASSAULT & SABOTAGE GROUPS*

*(10TH FLD
LA MAS)*

*WWII
SUBT*

*KNEW
STAY BE
HIND
PLANS.*

*CIT-ITALY
IN AN ITALIAN SABOTAGE-UNIT WITH PROBABLE
KNOWLEDGE OF STAY BEHIND ACTIVITIES PLANS,
POSTWAR*

31

11. Aside from 1945, however, Subject states that none of the other VECA members concerned are recalled by him, nor does he recall any details of the commercial cover established in each city. He states that following the placing of the post-occupational groups those who remained of the VECA Battalion, numbering about 140, were re-assigned to other units and the VECA Battalion itself was dissolved in March 1945.

H. Interrogator's Comments:

12. Subject has given every indication of complete willingness to cooperate, and great care and insistence has been placed during the course of interrogation upon the precise objectives of the 10th MAS post-occupational network. Nothing has been adduced which would indicate that the groups, as far as Subject is concerned, were designed for a post-defeat mission. From a general standpoint, this program would seem hardly likely to be undertaken by Subject in view of the fact that he had so completely compromised himself in the service of the Germans and the German Intelligence System, and therefore knew that all members of his Units would be removed from circulation either by Allied or Italian agencies.

*CIT-Italy
KEY OFFICER IN SABOTAGE-GR
POST-DEFEAT PLANS, ITALY, '45,
Wtto)*

I. Recommendation:

13. Subject states that Mario ROSSI, on Subject's order, if necessary, could effectively apprehend all members of the network and uncover their arms and explosives cache. Further recommendation in this regard will be rendered following receipt of preliminary interrogation of Mario ROSSI.

(as of MAY 45)

Interrogation conducted and report written by Raymond G. Rocca of this Unit.

James Angleton
JAMES ANGLETON
1st Lieut., Inf.
C.O., SCI/2 Units

Distribution:

- G-2 (Ib) 15th Army Group (2)
- AC of S, G-2, CI, 5th Army (5)
- IV Corps, G-2, CI (5)
- SCI/2/Genoa
- SCI/2/Milan

(4)

(31)

SECRET

Fifth Army

S. T. S.

Date 12 JUN 1945

EST/wh
12 June 1945

*+MAS Background
Ship Canal*

SUBJECT: Search for 10th MAS Files and Documents in Castello di Lenate at LENATE (K2458), Province of Brescia.

TO : A. C. of S., G-2 (GI), Fifth Army, APO 484, U. S. Army.

1. Reference is made to SUI Unit 2, Rome, letter of 28 May 1945, file reference JER-1889 to A. C. of S., G-2 (GI), AFSA, Subject: "Preliminary Interrogation of Prince Valerio BORGHESE", forwarded to this office by letter A. C. of S., G-2, 5th Army, dated 2 June 1945, same Subject. Paragraph 2 of the SUI Unit 2 letter stated that archives of the 10th MAS were in the Castello di Lenate at LENATE (K2458), Province of Brescia.

2. On 9 June 1945 Special Agent Gordon Mason of this office went to LENATE to find out if the 10th MAS archives were still in the Castello di Lenate. It was learned that the 251st Italian Division (Italian APO 107) had established its headquarters in the building which is being used as the office of the division staff. Special Agent Mason questioned Carabinieri ANARO Pasquale of the 251st Division who had made the original inspection tour preparatory to occupation by his unit. ANARO claimed that on 15 May 1945 when he inspected the building no documents remained. He admitted, however, that there had been a quantity of waste paper left on the floor of some of the rooms, but the caretaker of the estate reported that this had been removed by an unidentified waste paper gatherer.

STEPHEN J. SPINGARN
Lt. Col., MI
Chief, CID, 5th Army

*Dist: (3) 6-2, 5th Army
(1) CIC, PBS
(1) " 88th Div
(1) " II Corps
(1) " IV "
(1) SCI, Unit 2, Rome*

(3)

(31)

SECRET

ENCL-1

*KARZ-5032
28 May 45*

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
File title: TENTH FLOTILLA MAS (X-MAS) 26-31		2. RI FILE NO. ROME X2	PTS 4	
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. Doc. 26, Folder 18, Box 3	4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JRX-367A, 3 March 1945
 Subject: Supplementary Interrogation Report of Gino PERELLI-CIPPO, Captured Abwehr I-LUFT KDO 190 Agent - in re: The Xth Flotilla MAS

Section D. Organization of the Xth MAS:

Para. 12. The organization of the Xth MAS (also known as the Republican Fascist Navy - sic) is commanded by Valerio BORGHESE, who is subordinate only to the Minister of the Navy, Admiral SPARZANI.

Para. 13. Prince BORGHESE, who is in command of all operations of the Xth MAS, has his headquarters at Lonato (Prov. Brescia) together with the Ministry of the Navy. He also has a headquarters (Comando Tappa) in Piazzale Fiume, Milan, through which he keeps in contact with the commanders of the various branches of the organization.

Appendix "A" - Personalities

3. BORGHESE, Valerio: Capitano di Fregata; c-in-c of Xth MAS and Chief of Staff; about 45 years old; 1.73 m; robust build; long, gray hair, gray eyes.

* * *

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

JRX-367B
 21 March 1945

A. Organization of Xth MAS

2. Prince Valerio BORGHESE, Commander-in-Chief of the Xth Flotilla MAS, directs all operations (comandante operativo) of all branches of the organization.

3. BORGHESE's headquarters are located at Lonato (Brescia), together with his General Staff, and he is subordinate only to the Minister of the Navy, Admiral SPARZANI.

(CONTINUES)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	➔	C	2	
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DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL 105-246

By: MAC Date: 6/16

* * *

CIC 305th Detachment
Bologna Section
2 June 1945

Subject: 10th Flottiglia MAS

2. The Xth Flottiglia MAS was re-organized by the Republican Fascists after 8 September 1943 under the command of Prince Valerio BORGHESE. In the spring of 1944, Prince BORGHESE is believed to have broken with the Republican Fascist Minister of Interior because of the unconventional methods adopted by the Republican Fascists. Somewhat later, Prince BORGHESE is reported to have fallen off with the Secretary of the Fascist Party, PAVOLINI, because of certain acts committed by the Brigata Nera, and Prince BORGHESE is said to have finally severed relationship with MUSSOLINI himself. Just prior to the allied occupation of North Italy, Prince BORGHESE is believed to have reorganized the Xth Flottiglia MAS to form the nuclei of this new political movement.

* * *

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Italy: Misc. Info on Internal Situation		2. RI FILE NO.	43	7	12	80
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
		PIM-1687			8 Feb 1950	
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
				10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. Report reflecting Source's reflections of his state of mind at the present time.

Portion on Borghese:

Prince Junio Valerio BORGHESE is in Buenos Aires at this time. From there he sent his wife (living in Florence with her children) a long letter in which he told her that he had had separate offers by members of the Italian Monarchist Party and of the neo-Fascist Movement (MSI) who want him to head their party, making promises of position and honors if they are successful.

BORGHESE intends to refuse both offers, being fed up as he is with his political experiences. He intends, instead, to take over a job as technical director of an Argentine shipbuilding complex whose guest he is at the present time.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT					DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Former Italian Officers Engaged in Journalistic Activity					2. RI FILE NO.	43	7	19	223
					3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
					PIR 12449			15 Nov 51	
5. ANALYST					7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION
6. DATE PROCESSED					C		A		
10. DISSEMINATED IN					11. DATE				
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION									
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE					13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.				
PERTINENT INFORMATION									
14.									
<p>DOI: September, 1951.</p> <p>Among those listed was:</p> <p><u>Commander Junio Valerio BORGHESE, La Rivolta Ideale</u></p>									
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT									
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)					Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency				
(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/>					Date: <i>2005</i>				
(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>									
(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>									
15.									
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.							C		A

8546a

SECRET CONTROL

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Check on Report received from

1. The following report dated February 1952 has been received through

"A confidential informant reports that Valerio Borghese, a few weeks ago, met secretly in Paris with American emissaries, not identified, but probably elements of the American intelligence service, for the purpose of examining the Italian situation from the political and defense point of view against Communism under the aspect of active participation of the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). No information is available on the results of the meeting."

2. The report cited in the previous paragraph has been disseminated by the Italian CE to various CE centers for investigation and attempted confirmation.

3. Any information to deny or confirm this report is requested.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Deputy Chief, WE

WE/FI/3
EM/bh 1 October 1952

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - addressee
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2 - WE/3
1 - SPS
1 - CFI

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Date: 2005

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(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET CONTROL

43-6-4-3308

Subject: **Alleged Meeting Between
Valerio BORGHESE and American
Emissaries in Paris**

Report No: **WIR-1108**

Date of Information: **1 February 1952**

Place Acquired: **Italy, Rome** *C*

Date Acquired: **5 February 1952**

Evaluation: **B-6**

Date of Report: **21 March 1952**

Source:

*DPOB 6 June 1906, Rome, Italy
at Italy*

1. *reportedly* A confidential informant reports that *(PRINCE) JUNIO* Valerio BORGHESE, a few weeks ago, met secretly in Paris with American emissaries, not identified, but probably elements of the American intelligence service, for the purpose of examining the Italian situation from the political and defense point of view against Communism under the aspect of active participation of the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). No information is available on the results of the meeting.
2. The report cited in the previous paragraph has been disseminated by the Italian CE to various CE centers for investigation and attempted confirmation.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: *2005*

Files:
MSI
Files

cc to Paris

Files: **SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION**

INDEX

Classification
- H

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FEB 1948

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43-6-1-308

8746

MSI
Paul
Fitz

SEGRETO



Stato Maggiore della Difesa
SERVIZIO INFORMAZIONI DELLE FORZE ARMATE
Ufficio "D"

Delemo

D/85772/3 Roma, 1 febbraio 1952
AL CENTRO C.S. DI: ROMA

OGGETTO: - Colloquio fra Valerio BORGHESE ed
 ambasciatori americani a Parigi.-

7

Il presente rapporto è confidenziale in quanto contiene informazioni relative a colloquio avuto il giorno 30 gennaio 1952 dal punto di vista personale del Colonnello Carboni con l'ambasciatore americano a Parigi, Valerio BORGHESE, al fine di verificare la possibilità di svolgere attività di spionaggio a favore delle Forze Armate Italiane.

Le informazioni riportate nel presente rapporto sono di natura esclusivamente informativa e non devono essere divulgate al di fuori del personale incaricato della loro raccolta e trasmissione.

Il presente rapporto è stato redatto in base ai risultati delle attività di spionaggio svolte al fine di verificare la possibilità di svolgere attività di spionaggio a favore delle Forze Armate Italiane.

IL COLONNELLO CAPO UFFICIO
G. Carboni

modesta presenza
1952
si è verificato
gli ambasciatori di Parigi
risultando
ONAR

WIR-1108
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~~43-6-14-3308~~
[]

VIA: Air Pouch # 569
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. STTA-23

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE

DATE: 25 August 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, JBS

SUBJECT: GENERAL -
SPECIFIC- CIC Reports on MSI Activities

1. Attached hereto, for your information, are the following CIC reports

<u>Attachment #</u>	<u>Report N#</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1	S-504-1486	MSI Activities in Trieste
2	S-504-1487	" " " "
3	S-504-1491	" " " "
4	S-504-1508	" " " "

2. The Station did not retain copies of these reports.

- []

Att: As stated.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

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PL105-246

By: WAZ Date: 5/1/15

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HEADQUARTERS
 17TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
 TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS
 APO 209 U S ARMY

4 August 1952
 Report No. S-504-1508

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: MSI Activities

1. The following information was submitted by FB 6108 on 2 August 1952:

2. Paolo BERTI, Franco PETRONIO, and Iole PETRONIA, Trieste delegates to the III National Congress of the MSI held at Aquila, ITALY, returned to Trieste highly elated over the success of the Congress. They related about the incident between the Secretary of the Bologna Federation of the MSI, NANNI, and the Director of the "Meridiano", Dr. Franco SERVELLO, which was given so much publicity in the papers and on the radio. According to the three delegates mentioned above, NANNI and SERVELLO exchanged blows for personal differences and not for political differences. At the Congress, there were no attempts at Fascist demonstrations. Youth members of the Rome MSI kept complete order during the Congress. The most violent incident was provoked by Professor MASSI, extremist from Milan, with his inopportune words "we men of the north" in debating with Filippo ANFUSO, from SICILY. This created quite a disturbance between delegates from northern and southern ITALY. Professor DE MARSANICH presented a brilliant speech which lasted for two and one-half hours. The speech concentrated on the strong pro-Atlantic Pact sentiments of DE MARSANICH and of the Congress.

3. DE MARSANICH received the highest number of votes for the newly elected MSI Central Committee composed of seventy-five members. Carlo COLOGNATI, of Trieste, was the seventh highest in votes received and Ida DE VECCHI, of Trieste, was the eighth highest. Gamma DE GALO and Riccardo GEFTER-WONDRICH, of Trieste, were not re-elected.

4. According to source, the London Times wrote very favorably on the Congress, pointing out the political maturity demonstrated by the participants and predicting that many malcontents of other parties would join the MSI.

5. On 30 July, Dr. Renzo LODOLI, correspondent for the "Secolo d'Italia" (Prince BORGHESE's newspaper) visited MSI headquarters and

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200 4 to STTA-28

VIA: Air Pouch # 569
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DISPATCH NO. STTA-23

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE

DATE: 25 August 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, *JBS*

SUBJECT: GENERAL -
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2	S-504-1487	" " " "
3	S-504-1491	" " " "
4	S-504-1508	" " " "

2. The Station did not retain copies of these reports.

Att: As stated.

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HEADQUARTERS
17TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS
APO 209 U S ARMY

4 August 1952
Report No. S-504-1508

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ADD 4 to STT A-23

VIA: Air Pouch No. 204
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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE
FROM : Chief of Mission, [] *YBB*
DATE: 3 July 1955
SUBJECT: GENERAL - INTEL
SPECIFIC - CIC Reports on Political Activities in Trieste

1. Attached hereto are the following CIC reports relative to miscellaneous political activities in Trieste:

- S-505-1624
- S-505-1649
- S-500-1650

2. The [] Mission has not retained copies of these reports.

Attachment: As stated.

Distribution:

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By: [Signature] Date: 7/15

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
HEADQUARTERS
17th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS
APO 209 U S ARMY

7 November 1952
Report No. S-505-1624

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Possible Public Demonstration by Demo-Christian Party

1. The following information was submitted by a Confidential Source of this office on 6 November 1952.
2. Elements within the Demo-Christian Party of Trieste are agitating and preparing for a political strike in the near future in protest of Prince BORGHESE's participation in the Lega Nazionale ceremonies held in Trieste on 3 November 1952. The PSVG and the PRI are reported to be in agreement to hold the strike which will probably be in the form of a public manifestation or demonstration. The Demo-Christian Party has sent a note of protest to the Roma government and has asked the government to intervene by separating the MSI from the Lega Nazionale. A sub-source, in the Demo-Christian Party, stated that if the Roma government complies with the request, then plans for the political strike will be called off.
3. Source also reported that the Trieste MSI is aware of the plans of the Demo-Christian Party and is preparing to retaliate if a political strike is called. Members of the viale XI Settembre group have been alerted by the MSI and will be called upon to stage a public demonstration if the Demo-Christian Party decides to hold their public demonstration.


PETER N. DERZIS
Lt Col Arty
Commanding

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SECURITY INFORMATION

48

From: Italy, Rome Report No: OIR-633 Local File No: 16 Jan. 1953

No. of Pages: _____ No. of Enclosures: _____

Report Made By: [] Approved By: [] [] []

Distribution:
By copy to: Washington (3) Orally to: [] []
Neo-Fascists Files (1)

Source Cryptonym: [] [] (B-doc.) References: _____

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Attached, forwarded untranslated, report on neo-Fascist activity and the statute of the recently constituted "Association of Veterans of the Ith Flottiglia MAS".
2. No copies are retained.
Date of Info: current
Date Received: 20 Dec. 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005

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43-7-12-375

C O P I A

ASSOCIAZIONE RECLUSI "X" / FLOTTIGLIA MAS

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STATUTO

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 1) Ufficiali, sottufficiali, graduati e soldati già militanti nell'X Flottiglia MAS della marina della R.S.I. si uniscono in associazione volontaria e apolitica, avente la denominazione: X FLOTTIGLIA MAS - Associazione degli appartenenti alla X Flottiglia MAS.
- 2) Possono appartenere all'Associazione:
 - a) tutti coloro che hanno prestato onorevolmente servizio nella X Flottiglia MAS della R.S.I.;
 - b) i familiari dei Caduti della X Flottiglia MAS.
- 3) Appartengono idealmente alla Associazione tutti i Caduti della X Flottiglia MAS il cui nome verrà iscritto in un albo che ne perpetuerà la memoria.
- 4) L'associazione si propone i seguenti scopi:
 - a) escludere tassativamente ogni fine di lucro;
 - b) conservare e onorare la memoria dei Caduti della X Flottiglia MAS; ricercarne le spoglie disperse e assicurarne una degna sepoltura;
 - c) rinsaldare i vincoli di amicizia e di cameratismo sorti in guerra e promuovere la solidarietà fra gli appartenenti alla X Flottiglia MAS. Organizzare l'assistenza a favore degli appartenenti alla X Flottiglia MAS detenuti per fatti di guerra, dei familiari dei Caduti, dei mutilati ed invalidi per cause di servizio durante l'appartenza alla X Flottiglia MAS;
 - d) Raccogliere e riordinare materiale documentario concernente la storia della X Flottiglia MAS.
- 5) La durata della Associazione va dalla data del presente atto costitutivo al 31 dicembre 2000 (duemila) ed è prorogabile.
- 6) La sede della Associazione è in Roma.
- 7) L'associazione si articola in sezioni che possono essere costituite in tutte le località ove risiedono almeno cinque iscritti previa autorizzazione dell'assemblea dell'associazione, la quale stabilirà con deliberazione di massima le norme di funzionamento delle sezioni.

49-7-12-37

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(2)

- 8) Il patrimonio dell'Associazione è formato dalle quote associative e dalle contribuzioni dei soci e non soci.
- 9) I soci si distinguono in soci d'onore e soci ordinari.
Sono soci d'onore i famigliari dei Caduti, i mutilati, i feriti, i decorati al valore per fatti di guerra avvenuti durante l'appartenenza alla X^a Battaglia MAS.
Sono soci ordinari tutti coloro che non appartengono alle categorie precedenti.
- 10) Gli organi dell'Associazione sono:
 - a) il Presidente
 - b) il Consiglio direttivo
 - c) l'assemblea generale.
- 11) L'assemblea generale è composta da tutti i soci sia d'onore che ordinari con parità di voto.

L'assemblea elegge il consiglio direttivo, delibera sul bilancio e sulla relazione annuale del Consiglio direttivo, sulla ammissione di nuovi soci e su tutti gli altri argomenti attinenti alla normale attività della Associazione.

L'assemblea generale è regolarmente costituita qualunque sia il numero dei presenti e le sue deliberazioni sono valide con la maggioranza semplice;
- 12) per deliberare su modifiche dello statuto sociale è necessaria la presenza di tre quarti dei soci in prima convocazione e almeno di un quarto in seconda convocazione, che può essere fissata a distanza di due ore dalla prima. Le deliberazioni per tali oggetti devono essere adottate a maggioranza di due terzi dei presenti.
- 13) Su richiesta motivata di almeno un decimo dei soci il Consiglio direttivo è tenuto a convocare l'assemblea.

La convocazione dell'assemblea è fatta a mezzo lettere ai soci che dovrà contenere l'indicazione della data, dell'ora, del luogo e degli argomenti da trattare.

Sono ammesse le deleghe, purchè risultino per iscritto, e in numero non superiore agli iscritti della sezione.
- 14) Il consiglio direttivo è composto da ventuno (21) membri, di cui almeno tre residenti nella città sede della Associazione.

Promuove e dirige nell'ambito dello statuto l'attività dell'Associazione.

(2)

Ne amministra il patrimonio, fissa le quote contributive e le altre contribuzioni dei soci.

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Elegge fra i suoi membri il Tesoriere ed il Segretario dell'associazione.

Convoca almeno una volta l'anno l'assemblea ordinaria dei soci alla quale presenta una relazione sulla attività svolta e il bilancio. Dura in carico un anno e può delegare in tutto o in parte i propri poteri a un numero più ristretto di consiglieri costituito in Comitato esecutivo.

- 15) Il presidente dell'Associazione ha la rappresentanza legale. Egli ispira e vigila l'azione del Consiglio Direttivo affinché sia costantemente mantenuta in aderenza agli scopi dell'associazione ed ha il potere di sospendere l'attività, e di scioglierlo, nominando una commissione esecutiva di tre membri che resta in carica coi poteri del Consiglio fino alla convocazione della assemblea da disporsi entro due mesi dalla sospensione o scioglimento del consiglio.
Nomina una o più commissioni che decidono su ogni questione disciplinare e su altre materie di interesse sociale. - Presiede l'assemblea generale.
- 16) Il servizio di esazione e di cassa è affidato al Consigliere Tesoriere.
- 17) Il Consiglio direttivo delibera gli investimenti delle somme.
- 18) In caso di necessità l'assemblea secondo le norme di legge statuirà la liquidazione e la erogazione del residuo attivo netto.

P r o m o t o r i :

- F.to Junco-Valerio Borghese
- " Luigi Paladini
- " Rodolfo Soarelli
- " Spano Mario
- " Elie Turanti
- " Palomba Enrico
- " Bedendo Emilio
- " Jacobacci Augusto
- " Sala Franco
- " Rossetto Mario
- " Tului Luciano
- " D'Onofrio Vincenzo
- " Trettenne Domenico
- " Cardia Pietro

- F.to Cencetti Giulio
- " Belardinelli Francesco
- " Orrù Giuseppe
- " Cera Luciano
- " Satta Giovanni
- " La Serra Raffaele
- " Gattoni Alberto
- " Pompei Pompeo
- " Alfieri Cesare
- " Bendandi Leopoldo
- " Gallitto Bortolo
- " Leo Michele
- " Marchesi Alberto
- " (Dr. Guglielmo Vesoi, Notaio)

43-7-12-375

Registrato a Roma Ufficio Atti Pubblici in data 27.6.952 N.2673 Vol.74.

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0179.633

BORGHESE, Prince Junio Valerio
② Hauptmann BORCHARDT

Italian

ITALY

During World War II commanded the 10th Flotilla M.A.S. Was expert on sabotage. Graduated from the Royal Naval Academy at Leghorn in 1928. His career seems to have been largely in submarines and deep-sea diving. In 1940 he was made Capitano di Corvetta and placed in command of the submarine SCIRE. In 1941 he assumed command of the 10th Flottiglia MAS and was soon after awarded two medals and promoted to Capitano de Fregata. In 1943 he was suspended from the Italian Navy.

OIR-5067
18 Sept 53

Article "Bombard ZARA" appearing in Secolo d'Italia (MSI newspaper) on 7 July 53 allegedly passed by BORGHESE to an editor of the newspaper. BORGHESE has reorganized certain elements of the former "I Office" of the Xth MAS and has recovered documents previously hidden for safekeeping. BORGHESE is closely tied to Senator Francesco TURCHI. Subj also maneuvers certain financial backers of the Secolo among whom TORLONIA and the COLONNAS. It appears that the document was in possession of members of the dissolved "I Office" of the Xth MAS.

*Facsimile of card
Filed in WE/4/CE*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

SECRET

United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

DFB 56942

September 23, 1955

38

GABRIELE (NHN) MORELLO

Mrs. RUTH PERRY, Assistant to the librarian, HOOVER Institute and Library, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, on September 9, 1955, stated there has not been in the past five years a librarian or employee of the library at HOOVER Institute who has the last name MORELLO. RUTH PERRY recalled that in about 1952 or 1953 there was an employee of HOOVER Institute whose name was GABRIELE MORELLO. She stated he had been employed doing research on some phase of Communist activity in Italy. She had no information regarding MORELLO other than that he was a scholar who utilized the facilities of the library in his research.

A confidential source, who is a prominent scholar employed in an administrative and research capacity at HOOVER Institute and Library, and who has furnished reliable information in the past, on September 13, 1955, furnished the following:

GABRIELE MORELLO, an Italian National, who was a graduate student at Stanford University, was employed from July 15, 1952 to November 15, 1952 as a research assistant under WITOLD SWORAKOWSKI at the HOOVER Institute and Library. This source stated the research was conducted as a part of a study of the Communist underground in Italy during World War II. This source is very well acquainted with Communist Party history and tactics and ideology and has spoken and written against Communism frequently in the past. The source stated that MORELLO gave no indication of sympathy with Communism and in fact his remarks on the subject indicated definite anti-Communist feelings.

(This source) stated that it was easy to understand, however, how MORELLO might have been reported as a Communist suspect. This source stated that MORELLO was extremely anti-fascist but was certain that his anti-fascism had never lead him into Communist sympathies. According to the source MORELLO had an LL.B. University of Rome. He had come to Stanford University to obtain a M.A. in economics after having taught in the University in Italy. He was in the United States on a student visa and was recommended to SWORAKOWSKI by another Italian

4

FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

By: _____ Date: _____

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-16-05 BY 33542 REN/KM
bin

student. He obtained his M. A. Degree from Stanford in about 1953 and was called back to Italy to perform his one year of military service, but after his return to Italy was rejected by the military service for physical reasons. As of July, 1950, MORELLO was employed at IFFOA (source thought this was an institution of learning) and his address was Piazza Marena 19, Palermo, Italy as of that time. Source also stated that ELENA MARIA DELLA NEVE SOFONIE was a student at Stanford University in 1952 and was an acquaintance of MORELLO's. Source noted that MORELLO was friendly with BORGHESE, but treated her in a rather condescending manner. Source stated that BORGHESE was the wealthy daughter of the leader of the Neo-Fascist Party in Italy and was a princess. Source stated she very consciously played the role of princess while at Stanford and was entertained frequently by the wealthy people of Palo Alto, Atherton, and Menlo Park, California. MORELLO was opposed to her father's politics and contemptuous of her pretensions to royalty. He, however, was courteous to her.

The source stated that while BORGHESE was at Stanford her father was released from prison where he had served five years as a war criminal. ELENA BORGHESE at the time stated that her father was "a fool - fascism is discredited - Italians are ready for new political ideas." Source stated that as of 1952 BORGHESE was not sympathetic to Communism, but thought that possibly in her search for new political ideas she might subsequently have embraced Communism. Source was certain that as of that time MORELLO was not a Communist. Source knew of no individual named MORELLI, who was a student at Stanford University or connected with the MOORE Library.

Records (of the Registrar) at Stanford University, reflect that ELENA BORGHESE was born in Rome, Italy, July 28, 1932. She matriculated at Stanford, September 29, 1952, majoring in International Relations and received an A.B., June 19, 1953. Her father was listed as JUNIO V. BORGHESE, Via Lovania 11, Rome, Italy. Miss BORGHESE presented credentials from the University of Rome.

Records (of the Registrar) at Stanford University, reflect GABRIELE MORELLO was born in Palermo, Italy, March 18, 1928. His address in Palo Alto was 637 Alvarado Road, Stanford University. He graduated from Collegio Gonzago, Palermo, Italy in 1945. He received a law degree from University of Palermo in 1949. He was thereafter employed as Assistant Professor at the University of Palermo until September, 1951 when he came to the United States.

In 1950, he spent one year on a scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford, England. In 1951, he received a scholarship to Stanford from the American Committee for Cultural Exchange and thereafter

(4)

came to the United States to study at Stanford. He received a A.M. in Economics on June 11, 1953 and thereafter his credits were mailed to him June 23, 1953 in Italy.

The above source furnished the following physical description:

Age:	Appears 21
Height:	5' 9"
Weight:	140-145 pounds
Build:	Thin, wiry
Hair:	Blond
Eyes:	Unknown, probably blue
Complexion:	Fair
Teeth:	Good
Appearance:	Good
Nationality:	Italian
Marital Status:	Single
Speech:	Speaks perfect English, slight - accent, speaks Italian
Occupation:	Lawyer

Two confidential sources familiar with Communist Party activity in the Palo Alto area and at Stanford University, stated on September 4, 1955 and September 6, 1955, that neither W.F. LLO nor BORCHERS is familiar to them.

(4)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
List of Dangerous MSI Leaders		2. RI FILE NO.	43	7	42	407
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
		OIR 21719			15 Nov 56	
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
			E	3		
		10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE			

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

Listed among 44 MSI members whom Source considers the most dangerous, was:

BORGHESE, Junio Valerio, son of Livio, Vice President (sic) of the National Federation of Veterans of the Republic. Resides Rome, Via Lovanio 11.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	➔	E	3
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT WHO'S WHO IN ITALY Intercontinental Book & Publishing Co. Milan - 1958		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 	8. DATE OF INFO. 	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 	6. DATE PROCESSED 	10. DISSEMINATED IN 	11. DATE 	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BORGHESE Junio Valerio, Prince. Farmer, Gold Medal Military Valor.
 Born Rome on 6 June 1906; son of Livio, Diplomat and of Valeria Keun. Ancestry: Paolo V Borghese, Pope (1605-1621); Scipione Borghese, Cardinal (1600); Scipione Borghese (Peking-Paris raid, 1907). Married Countess Daria Vassilieva Olsoufieff in 1931.

Career: Navy Officer from 1928 to 1945, reached the rank of Commander for war merit, winning also a Gold Medal for Military Valor. Honorary President of MSI- neo-Fascist Party - (1952-54); as of publication of this edition, he was President of the Federazione Nazionale Combattenti of the Socialist Italian Republic (Veterans of the Republic of Salo'). Publications: Decima Flottiglia MAS (1950), published in Chicago in 1954 under the title Sea Devils. Awards: formerly Cavaliere O.M.S. Hobbies: naval books and prints. Sports: sailing, diving. Address: Rome, Via Lovanio 11.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔	⌊ ⌋
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
CHI E'? Biographic Dictionary of Italiens of Today - 1961		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BORGHESE Junio Valerio, b. Rome on 6 June 1909 of Livio and Valeria Keun. Rome, Via Lovanio 11.

Naval Officer, he distinguished himself in World War II as submarine commander and subsequently of naval assault units which he led frequently against British bases in the Mediterranean, earning him a Gold Medal for Military Valor. After 8 September 1943 [Badoglio surrender] he joined the Italian Social Republic (Salò). From 1952 until 1954 he was honorary president of the MSI. At time of publication (1961) was President of the Veterans of the Italian Social Republic. Author of Decima Flottiglia MAS (1950).

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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 Date: 2005

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		C	J	
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PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST					<i>NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.</i>				
TO : RID/201 Section					DATE 29 May 1983		1. ACTION		
FROM : [] []					ROOM NO. 45263		PHONE 3359		
CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.		2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST		3. RESTRICTED			4. PERMANENT CHARGE		
YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>			YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
5. 201 NO. 0		IDN NO.			6. SOURCE DOCUMENT			DATE	
7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)					8. SEX		9. PHOTO		
NAME VARIANT (Last) (First) (Middle)					M <input type="checkbox"/> F <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
10. TYPE NAME									
11. DATE OF BIRTH									
12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH		13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH			14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION		CODE		15. CITIZENSHIP
ITAL		Rome			ITAL		443		Italian
16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY					17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY				
63 64 65		66 67 68 69 70 71			72 73 74 75		76 77 78 79 80		
18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)							19. ORG/GROUP CODE		
20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)							21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION		
Member, Gold Medal V.M.; Naval Officer - Comm. the Italian naval assault troops during World War II.									
22. ACTION DESK				23. CODE		24. SECONDARY DESK		25. CODE	
ITAL				043					
26. CRYPTONYM					27. PSEUDONYM				
28. COMMENTS									
Present Address: 211 Via Lovanio, Rome, Italy									
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT									
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)					Classified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005				
(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/>									
(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>									
(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>									
29. SIGNATURE [] []					30. IDN- [] []				

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

TO	PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
Chief of Station, []		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM Chief, WE		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

SUBJECT
(Prince) Junio Valerio BORGHESE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[] has requested that [] be asked for traces on Subject, dating from his stay in Buenos Aires in 1950, if possible.

Distribution:
3 - COS/ []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE TYPED 5 June 63	DATE DISPATCHED 7 JUN 63
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRW-21313	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ◆ C []	

10 July 1963

In recent years Prince Valerio Borghese has led a politically insignificant life.

He was released from the Rome prison in February 1949, at which time he had served three of the 12 years to which he had been sentenced for collaboration. The balance of the sentence was commuted.

He immediately was approached by supporters of neo-fascism [which in the meantime had successfully created the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI; Italian Social Movement)], and these men offered him a good position in the new Party. Borghese refused the offer, however, since he realized that the MSI only intended to exploit his name for electoral purposes and that it would have been impossible for him to make even slight inroads on the solid positions of Michelini (Arturo) and the other members of this group.

Borghese did join the MSI, however, and in January 1952, following the National Congress held in Aquila, he was named Honorary President of the Party, a position of no concrete significance, however.

During this period he also had to resolve some rather difficult economic problems which stemmed from his brushes with the law.

Although he was numbered among the most illustrious members of the Roman nobility, that group had shunned and abandoned him out of cowardice. When the agrarian reform laws were being considered by the Government, however, the titled landowners, headed by Prince Torlonia, recontacted Broghese because they believed it possible to ally him with their interests and because of the political role they thought he might have been able to assume.

Borghese, disgusted by this opportunism, did not accept their proposals and, in fact, has never re-established his former relationship with the Roman nobility, but has adopted instead a kind of splendid isolation.

During the first years of this period, he preferred to dedicate himself to the writing of his memoirs. He published two books, "X Mas" and "Mezzi d'Assalto", and collaborated as military columnist with the Neapolitan monarchist daily "Il Roma".

He also passionately dedicated himself to the creation of the "Organization of Former X Has Members" with the aid of the periodical "Il Meridiano d'Italia".

In 1951 rumors circulated concerning his contacts with Americans (Ambassador Dunn, the mayor of New York and his wife, etc.) as well as with Peron.

In 1952 he was given the responsibility for relations between the MSI and the Monarchists (Achille Lauro).

In 1953 he went to England -- in order, it was said, to request financial aid for the MSI from the Mosley group. He then took part in the MSI electoral campaign with a busy round of electoral rallies.

In 1954 he went to Argentina and stayed there more than a month. It is said that at that time he succeeded in procuring, through Commandant Grossi and other members of the fascist hierarchy in Argentina, substantial financial aid for the MSI.

In 1956 he was elected President of the National Federation of Republican Combatants. He left that organization at the time of its Congress in Florence in April 1959.

Borghese, who had the support of the MSI members, was placed in a minority position with regard to the group headed by Farina-Barbasino, another X Mas officer. The latter group supported the political independence of the Federation, which had to limit itself to aiding its members, leaving to them the liberty to decide on their political attitude.

Various attempts to unify the opposing groups followed this schism, but it was not possible to reach an agreement, and in August 1962 the Borghese faction formed the National Combatants Union of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI; Italian Social Republic). Headquarters of the Union are at Via Cimarra 57; it is currently headed by Bruno Gemelli, holder of the Medaglia d'Oro, and has as members several significant veterans of the RSI.

There is no indication that Borghese has substantive duties in the Union or that he takes an active part in the demonstrations called by the group.

At the time of the elections on 28 April 1963 an agreement between the two groups, announced by the "Secolo d'Italia", was attempted, but in reality the agreement remained only on paper. The Federation and the Union continue to oppose each other, but neither has any further political influence, not even within the MSI.

In January 1963 Borghese joined a politico-cultural association which originated in Naples, the "Centro di Via Medina" (the street in which many Neapolitan monarchists fell in 1946), the purpose of which was to aid the parties of the extreme right in the elections. The "Centro" has never accomplished anything.

As can be seen, the political activity of Borghese has had little success and has waned with the passing years. The fact of the matter is that he has neither the capacity nor the feeling for political balance. The memory of his past as an ardent soldier is not enough to enable him to succeed in a world which is too difficult for his mentality.

Today he continues his contacts with the neo-fascist world, but his reputation as a man of weight are clearly on the decline.

Furthermore since he is too labelled by his past, he cannot move to another political area other than that of neo-fascism.

He declares himself ready to move if the circumstances require it and if the country has need of it, but this is a rather rhetoric attitude and is linked to the historic role in which he is confined.

In recent years the financial condition of the family (which began to deteriorate in 1890) has improved somewhat. Among other things, he has inherited from an aunt, the Princess of Orleans, money and an agricultural holding of about 100 hectares in the Comune of Artena (Latina). He is seriously and passionately dedicated to agriculture and to study. He lives a retired life.

Last February his wife Daria, nee Olsonieff, was killed in an automobile accident near Artena. Borghese felt this loss keenly, even though his relationship with her was often turbulent in recent years.

In fact, he had an affair with the wife of fnu Tarquini, the daughter of the former Fascist party leader Antonello Carpino. She was younger than he; he lost his head and spent much money on her. (Opponents in the MSI circulated the defamatory rumor that, with her, he had wasted part of the money he obtained in Argentina for the MSI.)

As is known, Borghese has four children. The oldest, Elena, is 31 and the youngest, Andrea, is 21 years old.

He has the Medaglio d'Oro for Military Valor and collects the allowances that go with it.

In December 1958 his civil rights were restored.

In the past year his name was taken from the list of the Casellario Politico Centrale (political records center) where he was listed as a dangerous fascist. This was done in consideration of his good conduct and of his moderate political activities.

[]

Fels
[]

Il principe Valerio Borghese ha condotto negli ultimi anni una vita insignificante dal punto di vista politico.

Fu dimesso dal carcere di Roma nel febbraio del 1949. Dei 12 anni a cui era stato condannato per collaborazione ne aveva a quel momento espiati 3. Il resto gli venne condonato.

Immediatamente, fu avvicinato da esponenti del neofascismo che nel frattempo avevano creato con successo il M.S.I., i quali gli offrirono una buona posizione nel nuovo partito. Ma Borghese, capito che s'intendeva solo sfruttare il suo nome a fini elettorali e resosi conto che sarebbe rimasto in secondo piano per la impossibilità di scalfire le solide posizioni di Michellini e dei suoi, rifiutò di impegnarsi.

Accettò, però, di iscriversi al partito e, nel gennaio del 1952, a termine del Congresso Nazionale di Aquila fu nominato Presidente Onorario del M.S.I., carica senza alcun significato concreto.

In quell'epoca ebbe anche a risolvere non facili questioni economiche, conseguenti alle disavventure giudiziarie.

La nobiltà romana, che pur avendolo fra i suoi esponenti più illustri lo aveva isolato ed abbandonato per viltà, si riaccostò a lui quando, essendo in programma del governo le leggi di riforma agraria, i nobili latifondisti, capeggiati dal principe Torlonia, si riavvicinarono a lui ritenendo di poterlo agganciare ai loro interessi ed in considerazione del ruolo che avrebbe potuto assumere in sede politica.

Ma egli, disgustato da questo opportunismo, non aderì alle proposte ed, in fondo, con la nobiltà romana non ha mai più ripreso i rapporti di un tempo, rinchiudendosi in una specie di splendido isolamento.

Preferì, in quei primi anni dedicarsi alla redazione delle proprie memorie, pubblicando due libri, "X Mas" e "Mezzi d'assalto" e collaborando come critico militare al quotidiano monarchico napoletano "Il Roma".

Si dedicò pure, ed appassionatamente alla creazione della "Organizzazione degli ex appartenenti alla X Mas" con l'appoggio del periodico "Il Meridiano d'Italia".

Nel '51 corsero voci su suoi contatti con americani (l'ambasciatore Dunn, il sindaco di New York e la moglie ecc.) oltre che con Peron.

Nel '52 fu incaricato dei rapporti fra il MSI ed i monarchici (Lauro).

Nel '53 si recò in Inghilterra - si dice per cercare presso Mosley finanziamenti per il MSI - e prese poi parte alla campagna elettorale del MSI con un attivo ciclo di comizi.

Nel '54 si recò in Argentina, restandovi oltre un mese. Si disse, in quella occasione, che era riuscito a procurare, tramite il comandante Grossi ed altri gerarchi fascisti riparati in quella nazione, cospicui finanziamenti per il MSI.

Nel '56 venne eletto Presidente della Federazione Nazionale Combattenti Repubblicani, dalla quale si distaccò in occasione del congresso, tenutosi a Firenze il 26.4.1959.

Nella circostanza, il Borghese, che sosteneva l'appoggio degli iscritti al MSI, fu posto in minoranza dalla corrente Farina-Barbasino (altro ufficiale della X Mas), i quali propugnavano, invece, l'indipendenza politica della Federazione, la quale doveva limitarsi a svolgere funzioni assistenziali in favore degli iscritti, lasciando a questi la libertà di decidere circa il loro atteggiamento politico.

Alla scissione che ne seguì, si susseguirono vari tentativi tendenti a riunificare i gruppi opposti, ma non essendo stato possibile raggiungere un accordo, nell'agosto 1962, la frazione Borghese ha costituito l'Unione Nazionale Combattenti della ^{Repubblica Sociale Italiana} R.S.I., con sede in Via Cimarra 57, attualmente presieduta dalla medaglia d'Oro Gemelli Bruno, con l'adesione di alcuni rappresentativi personaggi del combattentismo della R.S.I. -

Non risulta che il principe vi rivesta cariche direttive, nè che prenda parte attiva alle manifestazioni indette dall'Unione.

Al momento delle elezioni del 28 aprile si è tentato un accordo fra i due organismi, di cui il SECOLO D'ITALIA diede l'annuncio. Ma in realtà l'accordo è rimasto sulla carta. La Federazione e l'Unione continuano ad osteggiarsi vicendevolmente, ma entrambe non hanno più alcun peso politico, neanche nell'ambito del MSI.

Nel gennaio del '63, Borghese diede la propria adesione ad una associazione politico-culturale, sorta a Napoli con il nome di "Centro di Via Medina" (la strada in cui caddero molti monarchici napoletani nel 1946) e con la finalità di appoggiare i partiti di e-

strema destra nelle elezioni. Il "Centro" non ha mai svolto attività concreta ed efficace.

Come si vede, l'attività politica del Borghese si è svolta con scarsi successi e con tono decrescente con l'andare degli anni. Il fatto è che egli non ha nè capacità nè senso di equilibrio politico. Il ricordo del suo passato di combattente ardimentoso non è stato sufficiente a dargli una possibilità di successo in un mondo troppo difficile per la sua mentalità.

Oggi, egli continua ad avere contatti con il mondo neo-fascista ma in esso le sue quotazioni come uomo di punta sono in netto ribasso.

Nè egli, troppo etichettato dal suo passato, potrebbe avere la possibilità di muoversi in altra area politica che non sia quella del neo-fascismo.

Egli si dichiara pronto ad agire se le circostanze lo richiederanno e la patria ne avrà bisogno ma si tratta di un atteggiamento piuttosto retorico e legato al ruolo storico cui il personaggio è obbligato.

In questi ultimi anni le sue condizioni economiche (da notare che l'effettiva decadenza finanziaria della casata iniziò nel 1890) sono assai migliorate avendo, fra l'altro, ereditato da una zia, principessa Orleans, denaro ed un'azienda agricola di circa 100 ettari nel Comune di Artena (Latina). Si dedica con serietà e passione all'agricoltura ed allo studio. Conduce vita ritirata.

Nello scorso febbraio, gli morì in un incidente automobilistico nei pressi d'Artena, la moglie Olsonieff Daria, e ne ha risentito duramente la perdita, malgrado che con essa i rapporti fossero stati spesso turbati

negli ultimi anni.

Infatti, il Borghese aveva intrapreso una relazione con la moglie dell'avv. Tarquini, figlia dell'ex gerarca Antonello Carpino, più giovane di lui per la quale perse la testa e fece molte spese (avversari nel MSI misero in giro la voce diffamatoria che egli aveva dilapidato con l'amica parte del denaro avuto in Argentina per il MSI).

Com'è noto, il Borghese ha 4 figli: la maggiore, Elena, ha oggi 31 anni ed il minore, Andrea, ne ha 21.

E' medaglia d'oro al Valor Militare e percepisce i relativi assegni.

Nel dicembre del 1958 fu riabilitato dalla detta condanna penale.

Nello scorso anno è stato radiato dal Casellario Politico Centrale, cui era iscritto come fascista pericoloso, in considerazione della sua buona condotta e della scarsa moderata attività politica svolta.

Lì, 1° luglio 1963

PRIORITY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, EUR		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, []	<i>amb</i>	MICROFILM
SUBJECT Alleged Coup Plans of Valerio Junio Borghese		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		
<p>REFERENCES: A. []-4290 B. OIRA-53013</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>ORLANDINI</i></p> <p>Attached hereto is the tape transcription of the conversation that took place between Hugh Fenwick and "Remo" on 5 August 1970. The attached is being sent without comment at this time in order to get it on its way as soon as possible. A copy has been made available to []</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[]</p> <p>1 Attachment: Tape Transcription</p> <p>Distribution: 3-C/EUR, w/att</p>		
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT		Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005
<i>aut</i>	EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>	
GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION		
CS COPY		
CROSS REFERENCE TO []-D43-9-54	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRA-53014	DATE AUG 7 1970 6 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER []

PRIORITY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, EUR	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, [] [] []	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Alleged Role in Coup Plans of Valerio Junio Borghese	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[] [] 4290

Attached for your information is a copy of a memo provided to

[] [] by the Station on 6 August 1970.

[] [] []

1 Attachment:
Memo as outlined above.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRA - 53013	DATE AUG 7 1970 6 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [] []

SUBJECT: Alleged Role in Coup Plans of Valerio Junio Borghese

1. On 4 March 1969 an Italian Naval Intelligence Officer, who is in contact with one of my officers, told him the following:

He spoke of recent preliminary meetings of a number of personal influential friends of his who had discussed a coup. This officer stated that these unidentified friends were well established in both the Italian Government and private industry but had no formal organization and were bound by long standing personal friendships. The Italian officer asked the writer if a CIA rep would sit down and at least listen to the group and their proposed solution to Italian problems. He said that the group wanted a reliable reading on the position the U.S. Government would take in the event of a coup; i.e., would we oppose it and stick with the Center-Left Government. The American officer told his Italian colleague that CIA could not speak for the U.S. Government nor could CIA endorse such vague embryonic plans or ideas. The Italian refused to budge on revealing identities and replied negatively to the query whether Rodolfo Pacciardi and remnants of the Nuova Repubblica were involved.

2. On 4 April 1969 the Italian officer again raised the same subject stating that he would be meeting his coup plotting comrades anew and still needed some indication of U.S. Government reaction. He said that he and his friends were too practical to expect U.S. Government support and all they wanted to hear was that the U.S. Government would be neutral in the event of a coup. The Italian officer was told that CIA could not be responsive until we had some specific details on who were involved and what was planned. At this point the Italian stated that the primary personality involved was Valerio Junio Borghese. (The Italian to whom we were talking is a colleague of Borghese's from WW II and served with him in the ex-Flotila Mas at La Spezia.)

3. On 25 May 1969 we learned from the above noted Italian intelligence officer that Borghese already had a contact with an unidentified U.S. intelligence official in Naples. Borghese, in talking to the Italian Naval Intelligence officer, alleged that he had friends in influential places in Washington, including the State Department. The Italian Naval Intelligence Officer went on to say that Borghese's movement had the respect and support of a wide range of Government officials and even politicians that begin with the right wing of the PSI and extend to the left wing of the MSI. The same source stated that when a coup did take place, it would be a combination of military men and the economic leadership of the country.

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h/watt. OIRA 53013

4. In addition to the above, our files indicate that the Italian Ministry of Interior had a report in September 1969 of meetings taking place between Valerio Borghese, President of the Fronte Nazionale, and several Genovese industrialists: Alberto Calami, Sabastiano Calami, Giacomo Cambiaso, and Giacomo Berrino.

5. Our files also contain a record of conversation between Charles Stout, Second Secretary of the American Embassy and Prince Valerio Borghese on 26 January 1970. It is clear from the miscellaneous papers in our files that Borghese and his activities have been under some surveillance by Italian security officials for many years.

SECRET

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VTE: 8 AUGUST 1970

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
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Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2003

RYBAT
 REF: 4309 (IN 138538) ET AL

1. PRELIMINARY ORAL TRACES BORGHESE AND FRONTE NAZIONALE FROM ^{DOD} LNSLED NEGATIVE. WE FOLLOWING UP WITH FORMAL WRITTEN REQUEST TRACES, SINCE HQS FILES CONTAIN RECORD OF FIFTH ARMY INTERROGATION BORGHESE IN 1945.

2. HQS FILES INDICATE BORGHESE ACTIVE IN FORMATION "NATIONAL FRONT" IN EARLY 1950'S, WITH PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATION BY VARIOUS MONARCHIST, EX-FASCIST AND OTHER RIGHTIST INDIVIDUALS.

3. HQS TRACES ON ORLANDINI INCLUDE FOLLOWING:
 A. ACCORDING TO ARMY PSYWAR BRANCH UNIT 12 REPORT, 13 JANUARY 1944, ON CONDITIONS IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ITALY, LISTED UNDER CATEGORY OF "COLLABORATIONISTS IN LA SPEZZIA" WAS A CERTAIN REMO ORLANDINI, WHO WAS DESCRIBED AS OFFICER OF BLACK BRIGADE AND AS HAVING

8 Aug 70
-CONTINUED-

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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TO: FRITZIE HAUGLAND:BLW

SECRET/RYBAT

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ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO _____ BRANCH FILE RID

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TAKEN PART IN ALL MOPPING UP OPERATIONS AND AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR VARIOUS KILLINGS.

B. ACCORDING TO OSS INDEX CARD, FNU ORLANDINI WAS MEMBER OF SQUAD IN PARMA BLACK BRIGADE. BORN CIRCA 1905, HE WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING 1.65 METERS TALL, WEIGHING 60 KILOS, WITH SMOOTH BLACK HAIR, SMALL BLUE ALMOND-SHAPED EYES, PALE COMPLEXION, THIN BUILD.

C. COPY OF REPORT PROVIDING ITALIAN PARTISAN ORDER BATTLE AS OF 15 APRIL 1945 LISTED A REMO ORLANDINI ALIAS "AMIS" AS ITALIAN PARTISAN MEMBER OF 145TH BRIGATA GARIBALDI IN REGGIO ZONE.

4. FILE:

END OF MESSAGE

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17 AUG 1970

TO : Commanding General
 U.S. Army Intelligence Command
 Director of Investigations, ICDI-SO-O
 Fort Holsbird, Maryland

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 Junio Valerio BORGHESE
 Fronte Nazionale

We request that you provide us with any information your files contain on the following:

a. Prince Junio Valerio BORGHESE, born in Rome, Italy on 6 June 1906. Information in our files indicates he was a naval officer during World War II, commanding Italian naval assault and sabotage units against British bases in the Mediterranean. Our files contain a copy of a preliminary interrogation of BORGHESE, dated 2 June 1945, conducted under the auspices of the Fifth Army Headquarters in Rome, that furnished details of the naval unit under his command, known as the 10th MAS. Our files further reflect that BORGHESE became engaged in neo-Fascist activities after World War II, and that he was active in the formation of an organization made up of Monarchists, ex-Fascists, and other extreme-right individuals known as the "Fronte Nazionale."

b. "Fronte Nazionale" (National Front). Our files contain a few references to the formation of a new political movement in Italy in the early 1950's with the purpose of unifying Fascist, Monarchist, and other rightist forces. Valerio BORGHESE is mentioned as an individual who will head the National Front. Other information indicates that the Fronte Nazionale was formed in 1968, with Valerio BORGHESE as its leader.

CSCI-316/02471-70

E/I/R: ekb x5559 10 August 1970

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17 Aug 70

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TO Chief, EUR		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Chief of Station, [] only			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT Prince Junio Valerio BORGHESE and the National Front			MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: [] <u>4526</u>			
<p>Per reference, attached is a copy of the memo of conversation between Charles R. Stout and Prince Valerio Borghese which took place on 26 January 1970 at the Embassy. Also attached is a copy of the document provided to Stout by Borghese which, in turn, is a copy of the same document which was given to General Walters by persons unknown.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[]</p>			
<p>2 Attachments: As outlined above.</p> <p>Distribution: 3-C/EUR, w/atts</p>			
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	OIRA-53054	31 August 1970	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQ5 FILE NUMBER	
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FROM	Chief of Station, [] <i>only TP</i>	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Prince Junio Valerio BORGHESE and the National Front	

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2 Attachments:
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	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
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Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL 105-240
By: WAC Date: 5/11/16

#1 att to OIRA-53054

*the appropriate
person
B10*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

2P

American Embassy
Rome, Italy
January 26, 1970

SUBJECT: The National Front and the Italian Political Situation
PARTICIPANTS: Prince J. Valerio Borghese
Oddone Colonna - Italian Representative for Northrop
Charles R. Stout^{CS} - Second Secretary of Embassy
COPIES TO: Ambassador POLIT
Minister POL (4)
Department - EUR/AIS

(Note: Political/Military Counselor Gordon had been asked by Mr. Colonna who in the Embassy might see Borghese, and Mr. Gordon gave him my name.)

Borghese said that he had not been in touch with anyone in the Embassy for many years. He was not sure what our sources of information are and suspected that we might not be completely aware of the desperate state of Italian opinion, or of the work of his movement, the National Front (Fronte Nazionale). He continued that the public is utterly fed up with the government and party system, which is corrupt, inefficient and self-serving. They do not care about Lenin or Duce, or any other politician. Furthermore, the country is very rapidly sliding toward Communist control. The PCI now influences public policy to a considerable degree; in a short time it will be in absolute control. Few public figures seem to worry about this, but the thinking public does. He came to the Embassy because the U.S. is the world's leader and because it has considerable influence in Italy. He cited President Kennedy's alleged decisive support for introducing the center-left in Italy.

Borghese continued that the Front is not a party. He refuses to have anything to do with them. The Front aims at getting together people who are worried about what the postwar era has brought to Italy -- businessmen, professional men, intellectuals, and petty bourgeoisie. There are hundreds of small, local organizations in the country that have a similar viewpoint; the Front tries to bring them together. Its

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long range aim is to catalyze public opinion and eventually supplant the parties and the present system of government. It has already set up a "shadow" government, with "prefects" in each province and a central staff of experts in many fields.

I said that I could sympathize with many of his criticisms of the Italian system, but is it realistic to think that a group outside the system could overthrow it as simply as he had explained? Borghese insisted that it was a matter of getting public opinion on the side of justice -- or rather, the opinion of people who can lead, since the people as such follow the decisive leader.

In reply to a question, Borghese said that the Front is conservative in the sense of wanting to preserve public order, respect for the law, and Italy's position in NATO. But it favors a social policy that is much more realistic and progressive than that of any Italian party. The Front has no membership formality, and thus no estimate on how many people adhere to it.

I asked Borghese whether he was still active in the MSI. He said no, that he had consented to become the MSI's honorary president in the early 1950's under particular circumstances. When the circumstances no longer applied, he resigned a couple of years later. The MSI is no better than any other party.

I said that we were always interested in receiving various political views and would be glad to see him in the future if he had something to add. Borghese gave me a copy of a memorandum that had been given to a member of President Nixon's entourage in Rome last February.

Biographic Note: Borghese was famous during the war as the regular Navy officer in command of torpedo boats that performed daring actions against the British. He stayed with the Republic of Salo and was condemned after the war to a number of years of prison because of action taken against the partisans. His English is fairly good, but he preferred to speak Italian.

The Front has received occasional newspaper coverage but nothing of importance.

ATT 2 to OIRA-53054

NOTE: This memorandum is more indicative of the Front's opinions than Borghese briefer presentation. The first, internal part exaggerates but makes a discussable interpretation. The foreign affairs section is unacceptable irredentist. The last section presents the case for the future -- in nationalistic terms.

Not neo-Fascist, but perhaps Falangist.

crs

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I - THE INTERNAL TANGLE

1. Acquiescence and complaisance

Italian politicians are trying to reassure the public opinion on the positive aspect of the internal political situation, and on the country's future; but among large sections of the Italian people there is a diffuse apprehension about the undeniable fact, that the Communist Party and other left-wing parties are getting the upper hand, owing to the acquiescence and even to the complaisance of certain governmental circles. It is feared that sooner or later the Italian government will be compelled by the rules of democracy to admit into its own structure some elements of the Communist Party, with consequences that can easily be imagined.

2. Limits of DC anti-communist action

The Christian Democratic Party stepped out on the political scene as the strongest party in Italy, since the very beginnings of the new Italian Republic (1947). During a first period up to 1960, the Christian Democrats, having acquired a relative majority in the government, made some serious efforts in order to stand up to Communism, as well as to other leftist forces; so that the late Premier De Gasperi boasted of having built a "dam" to stem the red flood. Since then, about ten years have elapsed, but instead of a dam against Communism, the DC is now reduced to merely attempting "to throw a gang-board towards Socialism", as the newly appointed Secretary of the DC, Mr. Piccoli, picturesquely declared in a recent speech.

In fact, the Christian Democrats were not, and still less are now, in a condition ^{to} erect any barrier between themselves and the Communists, nor to sustain at length a fight against them. Both the Christian Democrats and their adversaries were partners in the "Resistance" against the Germans and the Fascists during the Second World War. They carried out joint actions, and in many cases shared heavy responsibilities and were implicated in certain irksome episodes, over which Art. 16 of the Peace Treaty held a safe shield, and time drew an opportune sheet. From this point of view, leaders like De Gasperi, Togliatti, Saragat, Pacciardi, Longo, Nenni and Reale are considered on equal foot. The Italian Constitution bears the signature of a Communist Keeper of the Seal, Mr Terracini.

From such old alliances the DC inherited a general leftist trend destined to a steady growth. Another heritage of the said alliance is the impossibility of cooperating sincerely and effectively with any political group not welcome to the Leftists, and labelled by them as "conservative", "reactionary", "capitalistic-minded", "fascist" and so on: like the Liberals, the Monarchists, the Movimento Sociale Italiano, and many others. Alliances with the Republican (a kind of Radicals) and with the Socialists are permissible, always because of their leftist characterization and of the above-mentioned joint fight in the "Resistance" period; but the Liberals, who should be included in the "Resistance" junta, are out of the game, for they are relentlessly accused by the Communists, of being puppets of the capitalists, representing "the forces of the Reaction, constantly laying in ambush". The position of the Italian liberals ^{loosely compared with that of the American conservatives, and has nothing to do with American liberals,} but the term "conservative" has acquired a disparaging meaning in the political current in Italy, while the notions of "progress and of "democracy" are automatically associated with leftist thoughts and methods.

might be

3. Failure of the center-left system

It was therefore unavoidable that in due time the DC opposition against Socialism should cease at all; and as consequence, a coalition government has been formed, in which power was shared by the DC, the Socialists and the Republicans. This coalition, called "center-left government" (governo di centro sinistra) was recommended and encouraged by the late President John F. Kennedy, and has been ruling Italy since many years.

According to the strategy laid down by Mr Fanfani and Mr Moro, inventors of the center left formula, the DC should have incapsulated the Socialists in the governmental tissue, thus leaving the Communists alone and destitute. After many vicissitudes, this very complicated operation resulted in the incapsulation of the DC, and in the stengthening of the hands the Communist Party. This is due to the fact, that Socialists accepted govermental positions, but not the relevant responsibilities, carrying on their opposition exactly as before, and curbing the government to their own wished. For the last ten years, the leftis parties succeeded in imposing on the Italian people a lot of red colored laws, intended to effect a steady and capillary intrusion of the State into every economic activity of some importance, and into all social structures, according to well-known socialistic shemes, and by means of the "nationalization" method. If this process woudn't come to a stop, Italy will torn into a true socialist State, within a very short time, and in a historical period in which all socialistic State of the world are getting fed up with socialism.

But there are even greater dangers. If, in order to maintain its grip on the government, the DC is compelled to make further

and further concessions to its socialist partners, these or their turn feel obliged to make concessions to the Communists with whom they have so many principles and methods in common. It is to be always born in mind, that Communism is the logical and ultimate consequence of Socialism. The Socialists may depart from the Communists for a while, they may even quarrel with them, owing to tactical reasons, but they will never really fight against Communism, for the strategic end of both of them is the same: the destruction of the "bourgeois" civilization. This is a fact that the Christian Democrats and many other groups in Italy are not able to grasp.

4. Communist successes and tactics

The DC, hampered by a heritage of complicity with the Leftists, indulging in too many acknowledgements of their good social reasons, trapped in the snare destined to the Socialists, plighted by factionalism and by sniping from the two coalition partners, goes on compromising, in the hope that time will change things for the better.

But many Italians feel that time will change things-for the worse. Truly anti-communists parties and forces, and patriotic movements have been branded as anti-democratic thugs and confined in a political and moral ghetto. The DC is reduced to impotence. Among the extant parties, not a single one is left to stand up against Communism.

If the Communists have not yet seized power, this is due in the first place to the recent crises and uncertainties inside the government of the Soviet Union, and secondly to the hope, or better to the certainty, on the side of the Communists, to be able to take over gradually, and by legal means, according to a method already indicated by Togliatti; and there is every sign

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that they are perfectly right.

At the time of Togliatti, his plan could have seemed preposterous, but to-day it is not. In the present situation, the Italian Communists are no longer tackling the question of their strength, but only that ^{of} calculating exactly the moment in which the weakness of the adversary will be at its lowest ebb.

Besides, the Communists know quite well that whoever ^{starts} upon the road of the Left, must go along the whole route, down to the communistic maw. They consider the Italian Republicans, Socialists and other Leftists (left-wing Christian Democrats included) as nothing else but a bunch of "useful idiots", destined to prepare the way for Soviet power. The Socialists may laugh at the Christian Democrats trapped in their own trap; but the Communists are waiting for the moment in which the whole lot of their adversaries will fall into the pit they are digging with their own hands.

The Communists are displaying rational tactics in dealing with their opponents. On the one side, they insist on the "democratic" character of their principles and method (indeed they claim to be ^{the} only democratic movement in history), and on their own particularly keen respect for the Constitution, donning a garb of respectability which has been hastily acknowledged by their effete adversaires. On the other side, they have systematically denounced the misdeeds and failure of the center-left government, and the inadequacy of the present political and social system. They refuse to recognize any social progress bourgeois in Italy, and in the whole Western civilization, they show no faith in a free world. They haven't given up a single item of the Marxist doctrine, and go on presenting a completely obsolete picture of modern society and economy, and waging "class-warfare". They are directing a heavy fire against bourgeois

family, bourgeois society, bourgeois State, bourgeois culture. They keep on fighting on the field of the syndicates. Strikes and street fights are rampant in Italy. In the last general strike, about ten million workers walked off their job. The account of the working-hours lost in strikes during the last 20 years is appalling. The damage inflicted to the Nation's economy is a sad counterpart to the so-called "Italian miracle". Many of the strikes have been called by the Communists only to put their organizations to a practical test, and to keep them in a good form. The Communists want to be sure that in case of a war not approved by them, the whole Nation will be reduced to a State of complete paralysis, within a few hours.

The Communists are now proceeding from the speech delivered by the Secretary of the PCI in the XII Party Congress, Mr Longo, the Italian Communists are now asking "radical changes" in the government policy, and "structural transformations which may consent new developments in democracy"; they are claiming for "new majorities" in the public administration, they want Italy to get out of the NATO at once, They speak and take up a position of neutrality, in the name of the Italian people to declare that Italy will never fight against the Soviet Union .

On the other side, in the same speech Longo let understand that as regards relations with the Soviet Union, the PCI should follow an independent line. This is a very shrewd move. The Communists are aware that subservience to the Soviet Union is not a popular dish in Italy. If they will succeed in demonstrating that they are not disposed to sell off Italy to Russian domination, they will win half the battle; and the other half will be won when everybody in Italy will be convinced that an Italian-made communistic regime would be something entirely "different", certainly quite civil and tolerant, in comparison with those of Eastern Europe.

7

5. Naivety, tolerance, weakness.

To this extremely dangerous illusion, the present Government is validly contributing with a continuous display of esteem and confidence towards Communist good intentions and "respectability". Two Italian under-Secretarys, belonging to the Italian Socialist Party and to the Republican Party, personally presented their greetings and good wishes to the above-mentioned Congress of the PCI. As a reward, a passage of the Socialist exponent's speeche was greeted by laughters and hisses.

A similar naivety is evident in Vatican policy. Both ⁱⁿ the Theological and in the political field, the Vatican State, utterly anxious to show a "progressive" spirit, has taken up a position of extreme tolerance, which has precedent in the long history of the Church. Communist atheism, though clearly stated and never given up, seem to be of ~~of~~ no consequence in the eyes of a "modern" Church. The excommunication of the Marxists, proclaimed by the preceeding Pontiffs, has fallen into complete oblivion. Social concerns are overweighting religious dogmas. Bishops and Cardinals are permeated with socialist ideas. Humble Priests dare ^{to} display socialistic and communistic versions of the Holy Scriptures, representing Jesus Christ as a social reformer, a defendant of the poor against a capitalistic society. The Church appears to be quite unwilling to stamp out such flares of heterodoxy, nor seems to have the nerve of punishing the priests who in steadily increasing numbers are defying its authority and even setting up fanciful rituals of their own made.

Anarchist movements have arisen in Italy, especially among students. These show now particular differences in comparison

with other movements of the kind all over the world, organized and sponsored by well-located and well-respected centers. In Italy, like in many other countries, the man in the street is wondering why those centers are not swiftly dealt with according to the Penal Code.

To sum up, an excess of tolerance and extreme feebleness towards anarchism and communism are in the eyes of the Italian people the most disturbing features of the Italian State and of the Catholic Church.

6. No way out but Communism?

Much of these evils are attributed to factionalism. There are a dozen political parties in Italy to-day; and almost every party is split into many currents and under-currents, ^{After the last elections, the need for satisfying the appetite of all these factions} has brought to the appointment of 56 Under-Secretaries, as painful appendixes of 18 Ministers. Conflicts of every kind among all persons and groups involved in this entangled system are spreading chaos in the public administration. Not even the simplest problem can be tackled without paying a heavy price to factional or personal demands.

A return to a more sober political dosage is no longer possible, and even if it could be, the degenerative process would start all over again very soon. Any proposal to resort to a two-parties system would be rejected with sanctimonious indignation as an "Anglo-Saxon" system by those very individuals who every day proclaim that patriotism is a surpassed value.

An almost incredible aspect of the abnormal situation in Italy is offered by the fact that, according to the Italian Penal Code, all organizations and all propaganda intended to establish by violence a dictatorship of a social class upon another, or to abolish a social class (see Marxism), as well as

organizations and propaganda intended to destroy the institutions established in the Constitution (see Anarchism) are strictly prohibited, and severe penalties are laid down for their repression. The relevant clauses (Art. 270 to 274) are quite detailed and leave no doubt on the matter: communism and anarchism are out of the law. How on earth the Communist Party ^{may} flourish in Italy, and the anarchists may call international congresses on the national territory, nobody knows.

Occasional reproaches have been made to Italy, as well as to other European countries, for having allowed socialism and communism to take root on their soil. To such reproaches many Italian citizens answer, that there was no socialism and no communism in Italy before the last phases of the Second World War, when bands of leftist partisans were organized and recklessly backed by the Allies; and that the Allied Military Government in Italy allowed leftist politicians a freedom of action and an authority they never had before. Some of these politicians were coming directly from the Soviet Union. In a word, the truth is, they say, that communism was introduced into Italy by the Anglo-Americans, and the Italian people cannot be blamed for the fatal consequences of this error. Even later, instead of doing something concrete to help Italy, the US administrations following to Mr Truman, and especially President John F. Kennedy's administration, did their utmost to sponsor Socialism, and therefore Communism, in Italy.

II - THE INTERNATIONAL RIDDLE

1. Three steps in the dark

No less apprehension is felt as regards the international situation and the Italian foreign policy. The last provisions taken by the Italian government do not appear to be very coherent with loyalty to the Atlantic Pact and to the principles on which the Western world is based. Since the appointment of the well-known Socialist leader Pietro Kenni as head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, three very important and very alarming steps have been taken, in the course of a few weeks:

- firstly, three PCI senatores have been sent for the first time to the 18 member Italian delegation of the European Parliament, in addition to three other Socialists already appointed;

- secondly, the Italian government has signed the anti-H Treaty, and is now preparing to ratify it, without any previous consultation in Parliament, or any sounding whatever of the public opinion, and in spite of the previous decision to keep the whole matter in suspense until the situation in Czechoslovakia had taken a more reassuring turn. No real guarantee for Italy's atomic industry has been ensured before signing the Treaty, and the system of controls envisaged by the document would put that industry at the mercy of the Soviet Union;

- Thirdly, the Italian government is now planning to recognize Communist China. In the opinion of many Italians, as well as of many Americans, this move is regarded as entirely premature and ~~and~~ imprudent.

2. Mutilated Italy.

by Italian

The second step taken ^{by Italian} Minister for Foreign Affairs is judged all the more condemnable, as the situation at the Eastern borders is still quite unsatisfactory and conceals many dangers. The so-called settlement of the Italo-Yugoslav borders, after the Second World War, imposed by the victors, is still considered in Italy as an ~~act~~ of gross injustice. Large tracts of land on the Adriatic Sea have been given up to Yugoslavia. Three hundred thousand Italians have been compelled to escape to peninsular Italy.

Of course, there is no longer a question ascertaining how many Italians are in those lands now, after so many conflicts, massacres, options, displacements, denationalization provisions. The fact is, that everything of value in Istria and Dalmatia, from the humblest homes to the most important buildings, is of Venetian origin, and has remained Venetian for centuries, up to modern times. Venice took up the ancient Roman heritage and on that basis developed a modern civilization, still admired by the whole world.

By the loss of Istria and Dalmatia, the Italian geopolitical structure has been gravely mutilated. Germany has suffered a more conspicuous partition; but Eastern Germany has remained German, while Eastern Italy (Istria and Dalmatia) have been merged into Yugoslavia, and submerged by Slavs(1)

Even apart from all that, there is the question of the "B-Zone", an Istrian territory assigned to Yugoslavia as a temporary trusteeship, and in which Yugoslav ^{fact that their government, cowed} ~~fact that their government, cowed~~ by the Socialists, does not find the courage of appealing to UNO or to other relevant international organizations in order to get back a territory unduly occupied by the Yugoslavs; and that Ita-

lian politicians too often indulge in flirting with Yugoslavia, just because it is a socialist country .

The Yugoslavs are now hovering over Trieste and over the whole North-Eastern Italy. All the boundaries between these two Nations have been traced so as to allow Yugoslav armies to crash through Italian defence down to Venice and Milan in no time. In this area there are many NATO basis, but the Italians are not sure whether they will keep their ground.

There is also the ominous presence of an up-to-date military apparatus set up with Chinese material in Albania, 70 km off the Eastern Italian shores. Albanian missiles can destroy any town in Italy. Perhaps there is some possibility of a counter-action; but the Italian people ignores it.

3. Italy, NATO and UNO

The British Minister for Defence wrote recently that the whole Soviet Union fleet in the Mediterranean could be destroyed by the Italian navy; but the Italian man in the street is inclined to consider this as a gag. Everybody knows the clauses of the Peace Treaty, by which Italy's armed forces are still kept in a condition of inferiority after almost thirty years. The Italian people is wondering what on earth NATO authorities are expecting from a country, which has been mutilated, reduced to a military nonentity, and consigned to the Communists; and seeing the Leftists allowed to have a free hand not only in Italy but in many other European countries and not even a serious propaganda action carried on by the relevant American organizations. The same citizens are also wondering whether it is not the case of believing to those who assert that USA are by now resigned to let Yalta criteria and systems be forced on Europe down to their extreme consequences. Somebody even thinks that the USA and the Soviet Union are planning a new and definite partition of the world, in which Italy, and indeed all the other European

countries, ~~and not even a serious propaganda action carried on~~ by the relevant American organizations, the same citizen are also wondering whether it is not the case of believing to those who assert that the USA are by now resigned to let Yalta criteria and systems be forced on Europe down to their extreme consequences. Somebody even thinks that the USA and the Soviet Union are ~~playing a new and definite partition of the world, in which Italy, and indeed all the other European countries,~~ should have no claim and no hope for political and economic independence. Many recognize that this is perhaps an exaggerated thesis; but doubts and fears arise again when people see so few facts in contrary to the supposition, and so many facts in favor of it.

The thought of a Unite Europe is no longer a source of hope. The massive entry of Communist and Socialist exponents into the political and economic structures of the building still under construction is not at all reassuring. There is a strong suspect, based also on UKO experiences, that the Reds want to partake to the said organizations only with a view to sabotage them.

Moreover, it is feared that the communist presence in the EEC and ECM will certainly facilitate the realization of the plans for an international labor union, auspicated by some French and Italian leftist federations of trade unions. Such plans are disturbing enough in themselves, but should they result to be connected with those cherished by some labour exponents in the United States, the effect on the Italian public opinion would be very depressing.

4. The only solution left.

In conclusion, people in Italy are getting deadly tired under the pressure of a heavy political situation, and begin to see no way out of the present tangle, unless the whole system is changed by some drastic means; which may imply, according to the various points of view, a revolution, a civil war, a Communist coup de main in Parliament, or a military coup d'état.

According to some observers, however, there is still a solution left: a concentration of nationalist forces, not bound to any party (comparable to those that organized the historical one million people demonstration in Paris streets, some time ago), resolved to fight communism sternly and efficiently, and to establish a new and more rational political system, in which the political representatives by profession should be substituted by representatives of the professions, freely elected and free from party pressures.

But this could be realized only on condition of putting a stop to the condemnation of nationalism and patriotism, and to the exaltation of compromise and tolerance towards the Leftists, presently celebrated in force of a perverted conception of true democracy and true freedom.

Nationalism and patriotism have proved to be ^{the} only real moral resources to which a free people can resort against international Marxism and materialism, as appears from so many instances all over the world. Hence the need for a reappraisal of nationalism and patriotism particularly in Italy, a country where Leftist of every kind are allowed to scoff at those values, and schoolboys are taught that patriotic feelings lead down to war-mongery and that war-heroes are just degenerated sadists. In facts, the Reds know quite

well how great a danger Nationalism is for themselves, for it means unit, spiritualism, and a will to fight.

On the other side, modern Italian Nationalism does not appear to be a danger for a free world: it has already accepted the perspective of being integrated in an international system, provided that each Nation's moral and material rights be seriously guaranteed.

The dilemma now before the U.S. government is the following: either to abstain from every intervention, and leave Italy to slide inexorably into the Red Area; or to come to the rescue before it is too late, and sponsor the said concentration of Nationalist Forces, in a very efficient way.

Note 1). Napoleon consigned Venice with Istria and Dalmatia to Austria, with a despotic tract of pen. Venice was recovered by Italy after a short war with Austria in the last century; but in the First World War, Italy lost 650.000 men to snatch back from Austria also Istria and Dalmatia, just to see Dalmatia given over her allies, in spite of all treaties, to a brand-new "Yugoslavia"; and after the Second World War the same sort was suffered by Istria.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	PROCESSING ACTION	
		XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, EUR			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, []			MICROFILM
SUBJECT [] [] Evaluation on Junio Valerio BORGHESE			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: [] 4533

1. As stated in para 3e of Reference, [] will undertake as soon as possible to put together a study on the Italian extreme right, including Junio Valerio BORGHESE leader of the Fronte Nazionale (FN). cit: ITALY A ITALY

2. [] volunteered, however, to provide immediately a brief appreciation of BORGHESE which he had available; the evaluation was prepared within the context of an evaluation which [] had been asked to prepare on charges leveled in a new-left-inspired book which had attacked various aspects of the Italian establishment and, inter alia, had attempted to show BORGHESE and the FN as a rallying point for a number of rightist elements. The translated portion of the [] evaluation concerning BORGHESE is extracted and attached.

Attachment: H/W
a/s para 2 above

Classified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Distribution:
3 - C/EUR/w/att

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CROSS REFERENCE TO D 43-9-54	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRA-53055	DATE 1 September 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER [] []

SECRET RYBAT

H/W Attachment to OIRA-53055, 1 Sept 70

IP

Junio Valerio B o r g h e s e, president of the "Fronte Nazionale" (Front), is presented* as the leading personality of the Italian extreme right and as the man who appears "to hold in his hand the strands of the complex web that ties the various points of strength and action of the right."

Borghese is a member of the cadet branch, a very poor one, of the Roman princely Borghese family. In 1958 he was made president of the MSI by that party's national leaders who hoped to use his prestige and personality to attract votes to the party. While a fine soldier, Borghese proved to be a poor politician, and little by little was put aside and eventually out of the MSI. After a rather long period of political inactivity, in 1968 he founded the Front with the purpose of banding together the political groups of the right and the veterans and military personnel voluntary associations. In spite of his many efforts, the success of this venture was very modest, mainly because of lack of funds, but also as a result of the contrasts existing within the extreme right groupuscules.

To attempt to vitalize the Front, between 1968 and the spring of 1969 Borghese held meetings of supporters in many Italian cities; but these meetings were nothing but reunions of old war buddies. There were rumors about contacts with industrialists, but if anything came from such contacts in the way of financial subsidies, these must have been very small.

An objective evaluation of Borghese's political activity and of the strength of his organization reveals the utter lack of effective political weight on the part of Borghese, even among the forces of the political extreme right.

It is exaggerated to present Borghese as the key man and the rallying personality for the forces of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary right in Italy.

* (IN THE BOOK UNDER REVIEW)

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SEP 11 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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SECRET RYBAT

H/W ATT. 1 to OIRA-53055

[]



~~SECRET~~
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS
 U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
 FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

ICDSO-R

SEP 01 1970

SUBJECT: Junio Valerio BORGHESE
 Fronte Nazionale (S)

Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 ATTN: Deputy Director for Plans
 Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Reference your letter, CSI-3161, 02471-70 Subject as above, dated 17 August 1970.
2. (S) Review of files at this Headquarters fail to indicate any information identifiable with above subjects.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

IRWIN R. GAY
 LTC, MI
 Acting Assistant Adjutant General

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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By: MRC Date: 5/1/15



SECRET
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 HEADQUARTERS
 U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
 FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

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 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
 PL105-246

By: MAC Date: 5/11/15

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, EUR		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, []			MICROFILM
SUBJECT Transmittal of Copies of Colonel Clavio's Memos			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REFERENCES: A. OIRT-14377 B. OIRT-14376			
<p>Forwarded as attachments to this dispatch are eighteen (18) additional memos from Colonel Clavio. The source is []</p> <p>[]</p> <p>18 Attachments: UNDER SEPARATE COVER Memos as outlined above.</p> <p>Distribution: 3-C/EUR, w/atts</p> <p>DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING IN []</p> <p>CS COPY FILED IN <u>43-9-54</u></p> <p>FOR COORDINATION WITH <u>US Army</u></p> <p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT</p> <p>EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION</p> <p>Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: <u>2005</u></p> <p>DECLASSIFIED Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act PL105-246 By: <u>hmac</u> Date: <u>3/1/5</u></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO []	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRT-14381	DATE <u>OCT 9 1970</u> 8 October 1970	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQ5 FILE NUMBER <u>43-9-54</u>	

Attachment to OIRT-14381,

15 Oct 1970

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The Ambassador

1 September 1970

Army Attache *for*

Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source.

Source volunteered information on the situation involving the FM. He stated that his evaluation of the organization differed from that of Chief SID. Source said the organization is effective, well organized, and national in character. However, it does not possess at present the capability to take any major action. He believes it is an important organization which must not be underestimated, and feels that their activities must be watched closely. He indicated this is being done not only here in Rome but all over the country on a daily basis. Although the FM does not now possess the capability, they may very well develop this capability in the near future, even within six or nine months or a year. This is why they must be watched.

Chief SID, on the other hand, considers the organization to be ineffective and does not feel they are too important. Source indicates, however, that on several occasions Chief SID has been worried by the organization.

Source revealed that General MARCHESI had been in touch with him and discussed paratroopers and Carabinieri. Source assured MARCHESI that paratroopers supported the Center and did not support extremists.

General FORLENZA, Commander of Carabinieri, allegedly fell while at home and injured his elbow, and he will be away from duty for a while.

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SECRET INFORM

3 September 1970

The Ambassador

Army Attache

Appointment of Chief, SIB

Rice

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source.

That source at 12:50 PM as he was returning to his office. He confided to me that the prospects looked good now for the appointment of General MICHELI as Chief, SIB. He was very agitated about the attempt that was being made to block the appointment.

He stated that the real candidate is Major General Carlo BAMBASINI, former Military Aide to the President, now commanding the Personnel Division. BAMBASINI had expressed his desires for the job to SARAGAT. The President, through his Chief of Office DEVALLO, has been pushing for BAMBASINI's nomination. The proposed nomination of PUGNA is merely a decoy. The plan is to either appoint PUGNA to be Chief, SIB for an interim period or appoint no one officially as Chief, but merely leave the job open. PUGNA would remain as Acting Chief until such time that General BAMBASINI could become available to fill the position.

Source indicated that Admiral NINNI was doing everything possible to prevent the appointment of MICHELI.

Source says the main reason that opposition to General MICHELI has arisen is because he is a friend of the United States and NATO. According to source there is British influence behind the move. There also appears to be French interest in this case. However, the French are only looking for the belittlement of Italy.

A decision is expected at any moment, and certainly within the next couple of days.

The following information was obtained from the Israeli Military Attache at 1530 today.

Source said that in the last two or three days he has heard from a very reliable source that General MICHELI, who was the favorite contender for the job of Chief, SIB, was out of the running. General PUGNA supposedly

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would get the appointment. When I asked the reason for this sudden switch he replied that rumors had been circulated that in some way General NICOLE had been involved in the Forward Task Deal concluded in January with Germany. He did not indicate that General NICOLE had received any monetary payoff for his assistance, but that perhaps the payoff was in the form of something personal.

Source admitted that General NICOLE was a very conscientious worker, that he was very qualified in his job, and that he was probably the most qualified candidate for the job of Chief, S&D. However, there are some people who fear what he might do if he gets the job.

At this point our conversation ended, and we will resume discussion in the next few days.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT - SECRET

Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 10 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was provided by a reliable military source.

This morning at 0900 I met with source.

Source stated that he thought the political situation was a little bit better now because COLOMBO might be able to solve some of the economic problems and get the country's production going again. However, he did not discount the possibility that a crisis could occur in the near future. He said there are too many people who for their own reasons want the Government to fall or who will put pressure on the Government which may result in a crisis. He indicated he was giving his support to the COLOMBO Government and hoped that it would bring about a situation that would be better for Italy. He mentioned as a reason for favoring the Government the fact that the Minister of Defense was a staunch anti-Communist and source preferred to have him in charge.

Source stated that he spoke to General CHILLEMI, Chief of Cabinet for the Minister of Defense yesterday about the appointment of Chief, SID. General CHILLEMI allegedly assured source that the situation looked very favorable for the appointment of General NUCOLI as Chief, SID and that the action would be taken during the next week. General CHILLEMI also said that although the Minister originally was not inclined to appoint General NUCOLI to the job, that he had now apparently decided to support him. Source said that the Minister will have obtained the prior consent of President SARAGAT and the President of the Council before announcing his final decision. Source reiterated his former position that he must have someone in the job whom he can trust, and if his recommendation for the appointment is not approved that he will leave his position.

He then went on to tell me that the job should be occupied at this time by an Army man because the Army has maintained an aloof position, whereas there is a possibility that the Air Force and Navy may be involved to some degree with the head of the Fronte Nazionale. He called BORGHESE, the head of the Fronte, a Fascist. Source said it would be a disaster if the Fronte were assisted in any way by the other two services in any attempt against the Government because they

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would surely fail. This would then have a very bad effect on the democratic forces and would give a tremendous advantage to the Communists. Source said the Army is everywhere in Italy and is the force to maintain order if required. Of course, he said, having an organization like the Fronte Nazionale is not a bad thing. However, every effort must be made to control that force and let it be employed only at the proper time and when circumstances so dictated.

Source told me that Italian military units had been moved to Sicily in late July as a contingency measure for possible action should the Libyans have killed any Italians. He mentioned paratroopers and also the movement of the San Marco Marine battalion from Taranto to Augusta in Sicily. He indicated that final withdrawal of remaining units had begun on 6 September. When I congratulated source on the ability of the Italian Armed Forces to maintain an operation of this type secret, he replied that this fact should be a demonstration to us that members of the Italian Armed Forces are loyal and are against Communism. He further stated that if there had been anyone with Leftist leanings among the large number of military people engaged in the operation, that there certainly would have been a security leak.

Comment: Source appeared very nervous, perhaps because of his concern over the delay in the appointment of Chief, SID.

Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

FROM : Army Attache *Jr*

SUBJECT: Italian Right Wing Groups

DATE: 11 September 1970

The following information was obtained from two reliable military sources on 31 August. This information passed verbally to Ambassador afternoon 31 Aug.

Today I discussed with source political orientation of the Armed Forces and activities of several Right-wing groups. According to source most officers of the rank of Major and higher are oriented toward the Italian Social Movement (MSI). The younger officers naturally do not have the same degree of political orientation toward the MSI because most of them do not remember very well the years of the Fascist regime. The MSI praises military officers. Source emphasized that the MSI was very anti-Communist and very pro-U.S. and pro-NATO. Its leader ALMERANTE is respected by many politicians of other parties as a person who does not seek to change the Government by undemocratic means.

Source stated that the MSI has a youth group called Avanguardia Nazionale with a strength of about 80,000. Its leader is a man called ANDERSON, a Regional Counselor of Rome, friendly to Americans and a friend of On. P. TURCHI. According to recent reports, this youth group is said to have broken away from the MSI. (I did not pursue this subject further at this time because I was anxious to obtain information on other Right-wing groups.)

Source then discussed an organization known as Ordine Nuovo (New Order) led by PINO RAUFI, an editor of Il Tempo. This organization is much more to the Right than the MSI and has a membership of about 10,000 throughout Italy. RAUFI maintains liaison with the political Right of Germany, Spain, Belgium, Greece, and some other countries. Just recently RAUFI organized a trip for 30 Italian students to go to Greece, among other things to meet with Greek Government figures.

Source then began to cover the Fronte Nazionale (FN) headed by Prince Valerio BORGHESE. According to source the organization came into being in January 1969 when the events of the previous several years seemed to some people to warrant formation of an extreme Right-wing group. A manifesto was issued in March 1969, a copy of which is attached. When this organization was formed other Right-wing paramilitary groups joined. It

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- 2 -

is estimated that there are at least 5,000 hard-core activists throughout Italy. In July of this year, BORGHESE allegedly contacted all heads of Right-wing organizations to constitute a united front against Communism. However, the reaction to this attempt is considered poor. The reason given is that Right-wing groups fear that BORGHESE is ruining the Right-wing movement because of his extremist ideas and his insistence that the Government must be changed by extra-legal means. Some groups are also reluctant to follow his leadership because BORGHESE reportedly is sick with arteriosclerosis, and Italians consider that anyone who has this disease becomes progressively demented. Another reason given for the lack of cohesion among the Right-wing groups is that BORGHESE has contacts with and is influenced by the British Intelligence Service.

It is no secret that BORGHESE and members of his movement have sought Italian Armed Forces help but they have achieved poor results. Perhaps they have obtained some results in the Navy because of BORGHESE's naval background and the many friends he has in the Navy.

One of the veterans' organizations that reportedly is allied with BORGHESE is called the Organizzazione Combattentismo Attivo, a clandestine group of 2-3,000 retired personnel headed by a retired Air Force Brigadier General named MASTROGOSTINO. The group is centered in Bologna. There may be elements of the active forces connected with this group, but if so they are few. According to source the Fronte Nazionale supposedly receives financial assistance from many industrialists and businessmen. He mentioned COSTA, ex-President of Confindustria; FASSIO, a ship owner; MONFI, an oil man; and a DI FAINA.

Source says that the leaders of the FI have been out of Rome during the month of August, but he could give no reason why this was so. Source did state that there were some summer training camps being conducted at Bardonecchio during the month of August. The groups training allegedly belong to the Fronte Nazionale. I tried to obtain information about FI leaders in addition to BORGHESE, but I could get no names. However, source did tell me that the Number Two man in the organization was an Italian military intelligence agent in Switzerland during World War II, working with the Germans against the Russians and the British. He allegedly was caught and some time after the end of the war was repatriated to Italy. Source refused to reveal identity.

Source emphasized at the end of our discussion that ALMIRANTE, head of the MSI, was not in agreement with the policies and ideas of BORGHESE.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET INFORMATION

Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 11 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache *jc*

SUBJECT: Fronte Nazionale

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 3 September. Verbally reported to Ambassador on 3 September.

Source stated that the Fronte Nazionale is really an apolitical organization. It seeks to eliminate the present political system by any means necessary and seeks to establish a presidential republic. According to members of the Fronte Nazionale, they enjoy a wide following among ranking members of the Armed Forces and have the support of numerous business and industrial leaders. They also claim support for their movement by members of the DC and other political parties. In addition, they claim to have support of the Carabinieri and police. Source states that these claims are exaggerated. He admits that there may be some individuals who are allied with the organization but that very few Armed Forces personnel are probably involved.

According to source, leaders of the FN now consider that having Valerio BORGHESE as their leader presents an incongruous picture to Italians because BORGHESE is a Black Shirt. He is not apolitical but rather supports Fascist ideals and is intent on making a takeover try because he knows it is the only way for him to gain power. Therefore, source says that they are looking for a new leader. Allegedly, even BORGHESE recognizes the problem that is posed for the organization to expand so long as he is its head. BORGHESE is said to be in agreement with the idea of finding a new leader. Source speculated that BORGHESE would not necessarily step down from leadership but perhaps would remain as a co-leader of the group. The group feels that the only way it can attract a broad base of public opinion is to change the image projected to the public. They want to become respectable and accepted.

Source refused to give me any information on the Number Two man in the FN or about any other of its leaders. He alleges that this type of information is kept very restricted. I then reminded source of his recent statements to me that one of the faults of the organization was the fact that its members talked too much. Source replied that although this was true that this would not apply to discussion of its leaders.

Source restated the position of General MARCHESI and the Armed Forces, i.e., that the Armed Forces are in the Center and they will remain unaligned with any group because they feel that the moment they do, their freedom of action will be gone. The Armed Forces must remain in a strong position to take action when it becomes necessary.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 14 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache *J*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on the afternoon of 12 September.

Source was in a very confident mood, possibly ^{DIRECTORATE} reflecting his expectation of being appointed Chief SID. Source said that no one really knows what position FORLANI will take at the National Council of the DC on 20 September. Previous reports that many followers of FANFANI were moving over to join FORLANI do not seem to be true. It seems that the FANFANI followers are remaining with FANFANI. The position that FORLANI takes will be very important for the future of the DC. Source reiterated that this meeting would be very critical.

In discussing senior Italian military leaders source said that the selection of the ROSELLI LORENZINI as Chief of Staff Navy was very good. He is a strong individual with a good character, is staunchly anti-Communist, and greatly favors the ideas of General MARCHESI. As for General PANALI, Chief of Staff Air Force, source said that he wants to become the Chief of Staff Defense when MARCHESI leaves. Source alleges that he is a near Fascist, but that in his career he has had PSI support for his advancement. Source did not give PANALI much of a chance to become Chief of Staff Defense because he said it would be an Army General.

General FORLENZA, Commanding General of Carabinieri, will still be absent from duty because of his recent fall for possibly another three weeks.

The following information was obtained from same source on the evening of 12 September.

We discussed the relationship between PICCOLI and RUMOR. According to source, there is no rift between RUMOR and PICCOLI. He bases his opinion on the fact that PICCOLI told source this during the last few days. Naturally there have been problems. After all, RUMOR resigned because he was allied with PICCOLI and because of the tacit understanding with

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SARAGAT and FAFFANI. However, when SARAGAT and FAFFANI deserted PICCOLI and RUMOR, RUMOR then turned to PICCOLI for an explanation. RUMOR is allegedly very bitter about the recent political events, because in spite of his resignation to get a political clarification, nothing has really changed. Both PICCOLI and RUMOR know why the situation evolved as it did. Source maintained that the PICCOLI-RUMOR-TAVIANI grouping is still workable.

Contact between RUMOR and PICCOLI is being maintained by BISSEGLIA, a young man in RUMOR's entourage. Source alleges he does not trust BISSEGLIA because what he says and what he does are two different things.

The FASISTI are spreading rumors saying that PICCOLI is a Right Winger. They claim that PICCOLI is rigid on the political front, but does not favor social reforms. Source says that in fact PICCOLI supports COLOMBO and that there is a good chance the COLOMBO Government may last until elections.

COLOMBO allegedly has turned to General MARCHESI for support. According to source there is an agreement among politicians that MARCHESI will remain as Chief of Staff Defense until after the elections are completed in 1971.

During a ceremony held this morning at CESANO source says that General GIRAUDDO, Secretary General Defense, told source he wants to become Chief of Staff Defense after General MARCHESI leaves. Source replied that we must wait and see how the situation develops, but that now everyone must support General MARCHESI.

ANDREOTTI is still very bitter with PICCOLI and other members of the DC and the PSU because of their contribution to his failure. Everyone is now saying that ANDREOTTI claims to have only two enemies: The PSU and PICCOLI.

According to source, many people say that General FODDA and Lt Colonel IUCCI and others in SID campaigned very actively for ANDREOTTI during his attempt to form a Government. Source states that IUCCI claims to be a relative of ANDREOTTI. IGENIO CAO is a very conscientious man. He has many contacts within the PSU, especially with CARICLIA and FERPI. He is also a good friend of RUMOR. He is a trusted individual in the trade unions and he has numerous ties with the Vatican. He has a good picture of what is happening on the current political scene.

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Source's biggest preoccupation during the whole discussion was with the possibility that something unfortunate would happen at the DC National Council meeting. He said if the DC fragments, all will be lost --- even Italy could be lost.

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Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 14 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache *Jr*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 11 September.

The DC National Council meeting will be held in Rome on 20 September. Many believe that FANFANI will attempt to form the "new majority" recently talked about, which would include ANDREOTTI, LORO, the BASISTI, DONAT CATLIN, and others. According to source if the declaration (document) issued by the Council is not suitable the PSU may leave the Government. At this moment it is very difficult to predict what the outcome of this meeting may be, but source believes it represents a critical point in the current political situation. If the COLANGELO Government can hurdle the meeting it may last until January.

The appointment of Chief SID will be made between 20-22 September. Source now feels fairly certain he will get job. He indicates that the appointment will be cleared by TANASSI, with SARAGAT and with the Council before being announced.

The situation in Trento is not very good. Recently a Right Wing group, the AVANGUARDIA NAZIONALE (estimated strength 70,000) had requested permission to hold a national convention in Trento, but was turned down by the authorities because of previous clashes between extreme Left organization members and extreme Rightists. The Left Wing organization, LOTTA CONTINUA, has applied for permission to conduct a national assembly in Trento. The authorities have not yet acted on the request. In the meantime the Right Wing group is protesting the denial of authority to conduct their meeting. PICCOLI is very concerned about the situation and is in touch with Minister of Interior RESTIVO. Source reminded me that Trento was the place where Italian Fascism began.

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Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 19 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following reports were received from a reliable military source on 8 September 1970.

Conversations with Friends in Touch with CD Circles (The Party Secretary and the Party Headquarters)

1. Relations between FANFANI and FORLANI

Apparently these are very cordial but in reality something has changed between the two men in the recent period. The following are the causes:

- A. FORLANI's continued intolerance in putting up with the suffocating and overbearing ways of FANFANI who rightly or wrongly considers himself the guiding beacon of Italian political life;
- B. Almost all FANFANIANI with the exception of BOSCO and GIOIA, who are the only true faithful followers of the President, have drawn closer to FORLANI and this has given FORLANI the courage to "finally think about fighting the feared professor, at least once in a while";
- C. The dictatorial and independent ways of the professor who has always placed everybody before fait-accompli.

2. The La Base faction:

- A. MARCORA and DE MITA are definitely with FORLANI;
- B. GALLONI and CRANELLI are definitely with ANDREOTTI.

3. Even though constructive (positive) news items have been circulated regarding the foreign trips of President FANFANI, it is well known in circles close to the President that:

- A. The meeting with President MENON had been requested by FANFANI not NIXON.

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- B. The meetings in the USSR were prepared to lay the foundation for a more fruitful discussion with the PCI. Nonetheless it is said that these contacts are being conducted in the U.S. by FAINFANI's confidence man BERNABEI and in the USSR directly by FAINFANI, probably via the Soviet Embassy in Rome.

A Conversation with Friends who Have Connections in Social Democratic Party Circles

1. President FAINFANI

An intense maneuver behind closed doors is underway within the Christian Democratic Party and has as its purpose the creation of a new majority centered around President FAINFANI. This majority has been defined as left leaning and has the following aims:

A. A discussion with the PCI (sic, probably should be PSI) to lay the basis in the country for a strengthening of the PSI at the expense of the PCI and with the resulting weakening of the PCI;

B. The formation of a DC/PSI government with the exclusion or, at least with minimal participation limited to a few people, of the other parties of the center-left (PSU and PRI).

To reach this objective which has as its ultimate aim the election of FAINFANI as President of the Republic, COLOMBO would be supported in his current governmental activities until the elections. An agreement between MARCINI and COLOMBO on this matter is already in existence under the watchful eye of FAINFANI. In the new majority would be ANDREOTTI, COLOMBO, MORO, left-wings of the DC, FORLANI. An as yet undefined maneuver to thwart MORO's initiatives which aim at being considered the champion of the Catholic left (is also part of this plan).

2. The Church

The fundamental problem is the divorce question. On this issue it seems that prominent Catholic personalities are negotiating with wavering senators to attract their votes and cause the, at least temporary, failure of the passage of the bill. An agreement between the DC and

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the PSU could also be worked out, but it is said that the necessary premises i.e., a compact and responsible DC, do not exist for the PSU. It is known for certain that the PSU is not especially interested in the divorce question. It is not excluded that the Church could agree with the PSI on acceptable conditions for the solution of the divorce problem, making concessions in other fields. It is known that the Church has attempted to make agreements with the "lay parties" without results. The Church is looking for a person who is qualified to stop developments in a situation which is certainly not favorable to the Church. The Church in fact is losing prestige in many factions of the DC party and in the ACLI. The Church regards COLOMBO with much confidence and hope. It also favors PICCOLI "to balance the influence of FARFANI"; it attempts to convince ANDREOTTI to really support COLOMBO.

3. The following are political problems which could lead to a government crisis:

- A. Divorce;
- B. Housing construction measures (changes in law 167);
- C. The financial situation which is regarded as particularly serious in view of heavy debts of the government controlled corporations and of the social assistance institutes;
- D. Union agitation of a selective nature to complete labor contracts in various categories.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : THE AMBASSADOR

DATE: 15 September 1970

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE *Jr*SUBJECT: FRONTE NAZIONALE

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 6 September:

Between the 15th and 30th of August, there have been persistent reports from usually well-informed quarters regarding pressured imminent initiatives of a subversive character inspired by the movement of Valerio Borghese. There has also been talk about collusion with the movement on the part of military elements. Even though these reports have been unbelievable and later clearly demonstrated to be unfounded, the fact is that it points up the preoccupation of many people with the current situation.

It is certain that the reports which claim collusion with military officials have been disseminated by ranking members of the Fronte Nazionale hoping thereby to acquire more prestige in the circles of the right.

On the other hand, the extreme left has readily amplified these rumors of collusion with the military to re-emphasize their long held views about the danger faced by the extreme right and to justify their claim of the acceptance of the right by military officials.

Some people say that the whole exercise was designed by Borghese to attract away from the MSI the youth groups.

After the incidents at Trento, various right wing youth groups have accused the leaders of the MSI of being too tepid in their reaction. Valerio Borghese is now attempting to profit from the current discontent and thus attract these youth elements to his organization.

Allegedly, Borghese has at his disposal a great amount of financial backing and claims to have some military officials. However, after the death of Admiral Michelagnoli, many military members of his group disassociated themselves. The MSI is no longer in a position to act with restraint but must undertake conspicuous acts or run the risk of losing a good part of its base, especially the activists. (The Fronte Nazionale has recently been responsible for the appearance of the following wall posters: "The MSI surrenders; the Fascists do not surrender.") The MSI now finds itself in the unenviable position of demonstrating its capacity for reaction should there be repetition of the episodes that took place in Trento and Genoa. It should not take aggressive action.

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that may be generated by Borghese, who they feel wants to undermine and replace the MSI. The danger of events of this type is evident, especially in relation to the exploitation that could be made by the subversive forces of the extreme left.

They can be stopped only if responsible officials and organizations demonstrate with deeds that they are determined to avoid a repetition of inopportune episodes like those of Trento by elements of the extreme left.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE AMBASSADOR

DATE: 17 September 1970

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE

SUBJECT: Italian Military Changes in Command

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 13 September 1970:

LT GEN Cirino Rubino, CG of 3rd Army (Designate), died on 13 September after suffering a heart attack last week. The following generals are being considered to replace him:

- LT GEN Alessi, now stationed in Brussels
- LT GEN San Giorgio, now CG of the T₀scio-Emiliana Military Regional Command in Florence
- LT GEN Galateri, now CG V Corps and presently slated for reassignment to the School of Higher Military Studies in Rome at end of October
- LT GEN Pistotti, now commanding Sicilian Military Regional Command

The following information was obtained from the same source on 15 September:

With regard to the reassignment for the position of Commanding General, 3rd Army, source said that the job had been down-graded in importance and that many generals had no desire for it. According to source, the Army may soon implement a plan re-designating the 3rd Army Headquarters a Corps Headquarters with provision for re-designating to an Army Headquarters in case of hostilities.

We then discussed the appointment of a new Commanding General of the Carabinieri. Source said that the Carabinieri would give anything to have General Forlenza, the present Commanding General, extended, because under him they can do as they please. Source also related the following story to illustrate a point about General Scotto-Lavina, who is one of the candidates for the job:

Several weeks ago, LT GEN Scotto-Lavina, Commander of the Rome Military Regional Command, made an unannounced inspection visit to a unit in the field. The unit was commanded by a Colonel Ottaviani, former Military Attache to Cairo who returned about a year ago. Reportedly, this individual had not been feeling well since his return and was extremely high-strung. According to sources present at the time of the inspection, General Scotto-Lavina was very critical of the unit and refused to give any consideration to the Commander's explanation for

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the situation. Colonel Chiaviani tried to commit suicide by slashing his wrists and taking an overdose of barbiturates. He was discovered and received medical assistance in time to save him. On the day this happened, I was with a senior military official who received a telephone call advising him of the attempted suicide.

Source says that General Scotto-Lavinia has a reputation for being good officer and commander, but a person who has no sensitivity for the feelings of others; and that he lacks ordinary consideration for others.

As a result of this incident, the Carabinieri have let it be known that they do not want Scotto-Lavinia as their commander. Source indicates that the Carabinieri favor having a weak personality to command them at this time. This would give them a freer hold over their own affairs. Source then asked me if I had ever heard of a General Mino, for some time in NATO commands, whose name has popped up as a possible nominee. Source described General Mino as a bachelor sometimes involved in sexual aberrations. Source stated that rumors had it that Carabinieri might favor someone like him because they could manipulate and control him. (Note: On 14 September I was requested by a senior military officer to provide a General Mino with the address of a clinic in Houston, Texas, where he could get a "super" EKG and EES. General Mino is said to be going to the U. S. on a tour in October. Bachelors in Italy are often justly or unjustly accused of having homosexual tendencies. Source admitted there was no real evidence against General Mino.)

Source stated that the Italian Army is going to station a battalion of troops in the Bari area. No reason was given for this move.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TO : THE AMBASSADOR

DATE: 18 September 1970

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE *jc*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 14 September. The original source is a civilian with extensive contacts in the PSU, trade unions, and the Church.

According to information obtained from PSU circles:

1) The Fanfani group now follows the political line of Forlani-Morlino. In Basisti circles, the division of the two groups continues to be accentuated:

- the first fully lined up with the Forlani line made up of Donata, Marcora, Misasi, and recently Cossiga;

- the second called the "waiting group", with sympathies distinctly for the DC Left (Donat-Cattin) made up of Galloni and Granelli.

2) Forlani-Morlino are supposed to be at the Center of a new DC majority:

- to which there would gravitate the Dorotei, exclusive of Moro, who desires to maintain a personal position without any outside obligations; and the Basisti of the first group; and perhaps even those of the second group, Colombo, maybe Andreotti, and all the Fanfaniani. (Source says it is unlikely that both Colombo and Andreotti could be together in this grouping.)

- The position of the Dorotei and Scalfaro is uncertain.

- The new Majority probably will seek to leave someone to the Left (Donat-Cattin) and someone to the Right, thus constituting a real force in the Center. (Source indicates that the Piccoli-Rumor-Taviani group may be the ones left to the Right.)

- However, it is very probable that for now the situation will continue to remain fluid. The problem of the constitution of the new majority is closely tied to the problem of the stability of the government. Once the attempt is made to define the new majority, if the move is not handled equitably, it could lead to unpredictable situations.

3) Divorce - This is a great political problem that now is generating heated discussion and controversy.

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- The Church (according to unimpeachable sources) now accepts the principle of divorce, but on condition that the proposed law be amended in the areas held to be essential for Christian ends. In particular, the Church does not accept:

a) The principle that either the husband or wife, abandoning the other for five years, acquires the right to divorce, even if the other spouse opposes the action, in which case there would be nothing but a legalization of the "repudiation";

b) The inexistence of precise regulations spelled out in the law concerning the wardship and protection of the children and non-offending spouse.

- As a result, should the divorce law be passed by force in its present form as originally conceived, there would be created a grave schism between the Church and the laity, with a consequent great loss to the Christian Democrats (as a party), who would be forced to fight a political battle, evidently not desired by them.

- We must add to this the maneuver of the Communists. There have been signs, in fact, that the Communists' demonstrating an understanding of the Church's position on the question of resolving the problem of divorce would like to acquire benefits today denied to them in the Christian world--benefits which could have unforeseeable results and certainly positive ones for them in gaining political ends.

- Consequently, in an effort to prevent such an eventuality, there are those close to the Secretariat of the PSU who think that it will be necessary for Social Democrats, also in accord with a part of the PSI, to present amendments to the projected divorce law so as to make these acceptable to the Church. (In some cases, defined even in lay circles as monstrous.)

4) In PSI circles, the political line of Mancini-Viglianesi is prevailing. This line seeks to reduce tensions in the political and trade union camps and is trying to definitely disassociate itself from the line of the PCI.

5) The Mancini-Colombo accord, which has replaced the Rumor-DeMartino accord, has given and continues to give force to the Government, especially because in the trade union camp, all of the UIL (PSI, PSU, PRI) is adopting a political-economic line closer to the Government and detaching itself from the positions of the CGIL.

- Besides, in the PSU camp, Tanassi and Preti are acquiring force gradually so that the actions of the Government will prevail over those actions which are purely party polemics. There are indications that the PSI and PSU are adopting nearly similar positions in actions concerning the Government, while the argumentative and trade union Left of the DC gradually moves closer to actions more in accord with the Communist line.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TO : THE AMBASSADOR

DATE: 18 September 1970

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE *JAC*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 17 September.

Source stated that in a meeting held on Tuesday evening, 15 September, Dr. Ravenna of UIL said that they are not in accord with Mancini's recent efforts to reduce tensions. The PSI must now assure positions against the Colombo Government.

Source has been told by Piccoli that the DC National Council meeting on 23 September will not take up the question of a political clarification within the DC and the formation of the new majority. Allegedly, Forlani feels it better to keep this meeting low key and avoid action that could cause a definite crisis at this time. Instead, Forlani intends for these matters to be decided in October when another council meeting will be held.

Fanfani is still a question mark. Word going around now is that Fanfani did not assume any important international obligations while in Moscow. He only attempted to obtain Moscow's help in influencing local Italian Communists not to impede Fanfani's campaign for the Presidency.

Source says there is a feeling of gloom and pessimism among Democratic politicians with the present political situation in general. These people feel no real progress has been made despite the change in government. They are especially critical of the agnostic policy followed by the Vatican with the Communists. Many politicians maintain no real progress will be made against communism until the Church changes its stand.

Source left Rome at noon today and will return on Monday.

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- Therefore, one has the sensation that the situation is evolving toward a reinforcement of the Center-Left formula, a reinforcement which could be followed by even more stability should the Government succeed in a timely resolution of the divorce problem.

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Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

DATE: 23 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache *je.*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 23 September.

Source reports that at last night's DC National Council meeting, ANDREOTTI tried to generate an action to constitute a new majority without COLCIBO, FORLANI, and the RUMOR-PICCOLI group. FORLANI had announced only two agenda items: the first a review of the recent crisis and the program of the present COLOMBO Government and discussion and approval of a statute governing the youth group of the DC. This latter proposal is designed to make young people more politically conscious and to get more participation by them in political affairs. Source stated that ANDREOTTI and GALLONI presented a request to add their item to the agenda, but their request was denied.

Source again broached the subject of President Nixon's visit and said that General MARCHESI and other military leaders hoped that the President would be told the whole truth about the political situation, i.e., how really serious it is. They feel the President must take advantage of this opportunity and speak most energetically with President SARAGAT and the Pope about the necessity of adopting a strong attitude against Communism in Italy and to have the courage to speak out against it. They want the President to have faith in Italy's Armed Forces and in their desire to maintain Italy free and democratic. Source said this is a good time for the U.S. to invest heavily in newspaper and other media to assist in the battle against the Left. The Soviets spare nothing in their support of Leftist activities in Italy.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : THE AMBASSADOR

DATE: 23 September 1970

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE *for*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source 22 September:

Source stated that he had discussed coming visit of President Nixon with General Marchesi and that they wished the following message passed in some way to the President during his visit: "Although the political situation is very confused and is becoming increasingly more difficult, there are still some Democratic politicians who are seeking to maintain a stable Democratic government. Rest assured that the Armed Forces are here without political attachments and with no designs to obtain political power. The Armed Forces are strongly democratic and are on guard against surprise." Source stated that General Marchesi may have some other message to pass on by the end of ~~next~~ *the* week.

Source also told me of his discussion with General Marchesi in regard to activities of the extreme left and right-wing groups. They wish to confirm they do not want to encourage either side, but the military find it convenient that the forces on the right are there. The Armed Forces remain in the middle and will be closely observing the actions of all groups. Source then reminded me of the order recently dispatched to all military commanders advising them to prevent all groups, regardless of color (red or black), from attempts at ideological penetration and political activism in military organizations. Source gave me copy of this document on 15 September. Source stated he would have more information for me on this subject at a later date.

Source said that just a few hours ago he had heard that Almirante had been in contact with Valerio Borghese trying to reach an agreement on the United Youth Front. There are no details available at this moment, but we will be kept informed. About a month ago, Almirante was reported to be very concerned about the efforts of the Fronte Nazionale to attract the youth group from the MSI. This group, called "Avanguardia Nazionale", reportedly has about 50,000 members. The propaganda to lure away the youth group dealt with the mild manner of the MSI in dealing with current problems.

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Memorandum

TO : Counselor for Political Affairs

DATE: 29 September 1970

FROM : Army Attache *jc*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source:

Source states that Vatican has been trying to induce PICCOLI to make a statement on divorce to the effect that the Vatican was ready to accept the divorce law with amendments of the DC. PICCOLI reportedly is giving the matter very careful consideration because he feels that it would be a very dangerous thing for him to make this pronouncement. He is fearful that he may cause a party crisis and he especially wishes to avoid this because of his previous involvement with the RUMOR Government crisis. Source stated that FANFANI wants to complete action on the divorce bill by 6 October and that FANFANI will not make any statement which supports the Vatican's position because this will certainly alienate the Communists. Source commented that he and other military leaders hope that PICCOLI does not accede to the Vatican's request. They prefer him to sit this one out because they fear that PICCOLI may be further isolated in the DC if he openly supports the Vatican.

BOSCO has been speaking to many people, claiming that he is speaking for FANFANI and saying that the time has come to form the new majority within the DC under the leadership of FANFANI. The objective would be to resolve outstanding problems as quickly as possible and to accomplish this by working with the Left (PSI and PCI). Source believes that FANFANI could get his way because the DC politicians are tired. If this plan succeeds, PICCOLI and his friends would find themselves isolated. No one can predict what effect this maneuver by FANFANI will have on the COLOMBO Government which at the present time seems to be developing a broader base of support because most elements and industrialists favor a stable Government. However, this FANFANI attempt would be a further slide towards the Republica Conciliare, which eventually would see the Communists in Government.

At the Council of Ministers meeting today Defense Minister TANASSI reportedly will seek COLOMBO's approval for the nomination of a new Chief SID. The announcement will probably be made tomorrow or Thursday but there is no indication yet of the identity of the individual.

There have been an increasing number of statements by General FADIALI, Chief of Staff Air Force, letting it be known that he wants to become Chief of Staff Defense. Source would not speculate as to reasons for this.

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Source states that Almirante recently told Colombo that in case of chaos he and the MSI will fight outside the law if necessary. Almirante allegedly made these same remarks in a speech to a large youth convention over this past weekend.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum***SECRET****NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

TO : THE AMBASSADOR

FROM : THE ARMY ATTACHE *JSC*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source. It represents the current thinking of source and some members of the DC and PSU. The document in Italian was prepared by this group after a series of meetings held 30 September - 1 October:

After all, the most important problem in the present Italian political situation is that of the Democratic Christian (DC) Party. Recently, the party has not maintained a compact, precise anti-communist line, but through the tactics of a number of its exponents, it has dealt with the Socialists on the left and with serious collusions with parties of the extreme left.

There had been a great hope recently that the DC would take action to halt its slide to the left. However, preoccupation with internal order in the DC and the ambition to achieve the Presidency of the Republic have caused FANFANI to turn to the left, which even with his skill at maneuvering is extremely grave. The declarations of BOSCO in Naples on 27 September are very clear; and because they were expressed by the most qualified and leading right-winger of the FANFANI group, this constitutes a confirmation of the reports circulating for some time that FANFANI was moving to the left to attempt to gain control of the DC with the help of its left wing. To this, we add the hybrid situation of ANDREOTTI who, from a position on the extreme right, seeks—with the help of the DC Parliamentary group—to be the leader of an accord, more or less conciliatory, with the extreme left.

The Rumor-Piccoli group and the COLOMBO group on the other side, considering the inheritors of the DOROTEI after the break-up, are the only solid points holding the line against the progressive slide to the left of the DC. They represent, together with the TAVIANI and SCALFARO groups, that third of the DC not yet contaminated with the "opening to the left." Very important in this contingency is the position of Catholic Action, which is very close to the political line of COLOMBO, who is revealing himself at this time much more active and solid than his predecessors.

(on 3 Oct)

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Therefore, we can conclude that for the moment in the DC, the tactical line of the left prevails over that of the right. This greatly weakens the position of the DC in its confrontations with the Socialists of the PSI and with the communists.

As for the PSI, the political line of MANCINI is essentially directed at acquiring the maximum power through accords with both DC party members and communists, seeking at the same time to exclude in every way possible the rival Social Democrats and Republicans.

In this situation, the positions of the PSU and PRI are very weak because they are being progressively shunted aside by the convergence of the DC and PSI, with the powerful outside support of the PCI.

In conclusion, the tactics of the communists to advance progressively toward participation in power (rule) is about to be successful if the anti-communist forces fail to interpose and demonstrate much greater strength in front of the attacks against the civil and productive life of the country, attacks which generate a growing lack of faith in all strata of the population. Above all else, the position of the Church as the inspirer and guide for the members of the DC will be one of the most determining factors.

Unfortunately, at this time we cannot envision the formation of an anti-communist majority (front) even if favorable to social reforms sponsored by the DC, and even if the actions of FANFANI make it seem to the contrary. The failure to dissolve the Houses has denied the majority of the country from electing a Parliament responsive to its real will. Therefore, it will be very difficult to reverse this negative attitude and trend, especially because there are symptoms of resignation and adaptation even among those politicians who should have the courage and the possibility of acting to the contrary.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Memorandum

TO : The Ambassador

FROM : Army Attache *Joc.*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

DATE: 5 October 1970

The following information was obtained from a reliable military source on 2 October.

The information reflects the analysis of the political situation by source and certain members of the DC and PSU. Meetings were held by this group on 30 September and 1 October.

Recently the tactics of the Communists and their allies have changed completely. Until 1968 they generally maintained what might be categorized as constitutional opposition. The only exceptions were the insurrections of 1948 projected by the attempt on TOGLIATTI, and the 1960 episodes against TAMBRONI and the MSI Congress in Genoa.

After the "French May" of 1968 a new tactic was initiated in the international Communist camp. This new system has made the greatest progress and achieved the most success in Italy.

On the one hand, there is a permanent insurrection against all the authority of the state and against all the national production activities, accompanied by intensive action designed to weaken and undermine the values of our civilization.

On the other hand the PCI, while supporting the movements that spread the insurrection in the name of democracy and liberty, takes advantage of a rigid and legal line designed to place the organs of the state in crisis.

Moreover, the PCI profits from the disruptive activities of allied groups in other parties and organizations (PSI-DC-CISL-UIL-ACLI and various cultural and technical groups). These forces comprise about 35% of the electorate and in Parliament could in certain cases muster a little over 50% of the vote. To confront these forces we have an anti-Communist political conglomerate that is divided and suffering a rapid and serious decline in power.

In particular:

the groups of the Right from the MSI to the PLI cannot play a meaningful counterweight role;

the DC, which has in the past blocked the march of Communism in cooperation with the Church, actually is the prey of a pseudoleftist crisis,



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- 2 -

with internal battles that impede every function of its policy of Government and which could lead to disintegration of the party;

the PSI, which should have isolated the Communists, is with the Center Left on a path very close to Frontism.

Consequently, even though two-thirds of the electorate is anti-Communist, because of the politics played by the parties and Parliamentary groups, we are in an extremely weak condition to confront the twin Communist tactics which paralyze the state through their continuous guerrilla warfare of union and political agitations.

In such a political situation we have a Government that is based on a majority with the Socialists playing a decisive role, and is powerless to contain the attacks of the Communists and their allies.

As for the economy, the situation until now has not assumed grave aspects. However, a serious economic crisis could develop at any time because of the continuing internal sabotage articulated by unions, activists, and strikes in industry, and the mismanagement of activities of the State and Parastate. Such a crisis would give a new impulse to the disruptive activities of the Communist front, even if some believe, using the 1964 situation as an example, that a negative economic situation (an economic crisis) might calm people's passions.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

Memorandum

TO : Counselor for Political Affairs

FROM : Army Attache *Jr*

SUBJECT: Current Italian Political Situation

DATE: 6 October 1970

The following information was obtained from a reliable source with intimate contacts in the PSU and from a reliable military source on 6 October.


The civilian source says that according to members of the PICCOLI group that FANFANI continues his behind-the-scenes maneuvers to isolate PICCOLI and organize a majority within the DC oriented toward the Left. They also maintain that just recently BISSAGLIA has been inducing RUMOR to move away from the PICCOLI and TAVIANI groups and join forces with FANFANI. The reasons given for BISSAGLIA's actions are that he is still very angry with PICCOLI because he feels that PICCOLI's influence with RUMOR brought about RUMOR's resignation on 6 July. It is said that BISSAGLIA was working very diligently to obtain a ministerial appointment in the RUMOR Government and that this finished his chances. BISSAGLIA is also regarded as an opportunist and it is felt that he has considerable influence with RUMOR. Source stated that some people were discussing the possibility that PICCOLI should force the issue in the DC party even though this might lead to a breaking up of the party, which in turn would cause another Government crisis.

The military source said that it would be foolish at this time for PICCOLI to undertake such an action because PICCOLI has a very large following among rank and file voters throughout Italy. The military source maintained that it would be better for PICCOLI to stay in the DC because in the long run he would be more effective. Both sources said they would discuss this matter personally with PICCOLI to find out what his feelings were on this problem.

CS COPY

43-9-54

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, EUR		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief of Station, [] <i>QEW</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT FRONTE NAZIONALE		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: OIRA-53217			
<p>Attached for your information is an article on the Fronte Nazionale and Valerio BORGHESE taken from "La Stampa" of 9 December 1970.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[]</p>			
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT			
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) <input type="checkbox"/> (A) Privacy <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (C) Methods/Sources <input type="checkbox"/> (D) Foreign Relations		Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: <i>2005</i>	
Attachment: As stated, h/w			
Distribution: 3 - EUR, w/att			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRT-14702	DATE DEC 10 1970 9 December 1970	
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 43-9-54	



volta è stato anche a Reg- il suo fronte, in realtà, e sino a sfiorare il tavolo:
~~Fronte~~ ~~qualche cosa~~ ~~gli elementi~~

LA STAMPA


Anno 104 Numero 267 - Mercoledì 9 Dicembre 1970

3

CHE COSA FA L'ESTREMA DESTRA ITALIANA

Deliri del principe nero

Valerio Borghese, ex comandante della « X Mas », è fermo al 1943 - Con i mille del suo « Fronte nazionale » vuol creare uno Stato-ombra; si tiene pronto a raccogliere il potere, scoppiasse la guerra o la rivoluzione, e a ricostruire la repubblica di Salò
 Si sente un De Gaulle italiano e di sinistra - Opera « nel mistero », ma riconosce d'aver guidato la rivolta di Reggio




« Io ce l'ho — intervieni l'ex segretario del Fronte, Carlo Benito Guadagni, già marò della X Mas, oggi impresario edile — quell'uomo non potrebbe essere che Borghese ». Il principe si passa una mano sul volto e sospira: « Sì, forse io sono adeguato. Sì, io sono uomo capace di suscitare un corteo di un milione di uomini. Sono conosciuto, ho un seguito. Ma sono anche troppo anziano. E poi sono contrario all'idea che un

passibile queste parole putrefatte e mi fissa con gli occhi un po' sbarrati. Chiedo: ma quanto tempo ci vorrà perché subentriate allo Stato attuale? « Non molto tempo, credo, anche se è difficile dirlo. Dipende dal grado di preparazione del Fronte, dagli errori del governo, dallo stato dell'ordine pubblico: un autunno caldo, per esempio, è una situazione rivoluzionaria e potrebbe essere un'occasione perché qualcosa succeda.

nel Fronte sono rimasti soprattutto reduci di Salò, spesso gente con denari e disposta a spenderli per rendere più eccitante il riposo del guerriero sconfitto.

E' pericoloso, il Fronte? No e sì. No, perché pare non abbia la carica aggressiva degli squadristi del msi o di altri gruppetti neri che vedremo. Sì, se qualcuno pensa di utilizzarlo, se gli fa credito politico e finanziario; se, in una società « saranata » come la nostra



de un gruppo di uomini che sollevi questa bandiera». Il Fronte? « Il Fronte sta preparando una struttura nazionale per sfruttare questo corteo di un milione di uomini ».

"Darci da fare"

A fondare questa « libera associazione » è stato lui, nel settembre 1968. « Molti mi sollecitavano: comandante, muoviamoci, bisogna darci da fare ». Così qualcuno ha stilato gli « orientamenti programmatici » del Fronte. Mi offrono in lettura un opuscolo. E' la pattumiera delle pseudo-idee del neofascismo: abolire tutti i partiti (compreso il msi), rimettere in vita le corporazioni, lo Stato forte come acropoli della civiltà italiana, « no » al sistema, « sì » all'ordine, al potere, alla disciplina.

Da quel settembre s'è fatto un gran parlare di Borghese, anche se nessuno l'ha mai avvicinato: il « principe nero » che tiene le fila della sovversione di destra, l'uomo della Cia, lo spettrale istigatore degli attentati di Milano, il finanziatore segreto del msi... « Balle: ho dato quattro querele ». Ma qual è la verità sul Fronte? Borghese e Guadagni nicchiano. Sì, il principe ha girato l'Italia, « non abbastanza farei bene ad anda-

guerra. Con una guerra molte cose potrebbero modificarsi... ».

Una guerra? Comandante, lei è pazzo, moriremmo tutti sotto le atomiche... Borghese mi scruta con la sufficienza del professionista: « Spero che non venga, ma se una guerra scoppia, non è detto che sia atomica: potrebbe essere ad armi convenzionali. In quel caso, quale classe dirigente sarebbe capace di reggere il timone di questa difficilissima Italia? ».

E invece di una guerra, un colpo di Stato, magari con un governo di « tecnici », non le farebbe comodo? « Se fosse a breve termine e inteso a ristabilire l'ordine o per impedire l'avvento dei comunisti, lo riterrei positivo. Ma in linea politica, no: un governo tecnico si presenterebbe come un governo conservatore, e noi invece siamo dei progressisti. Se non credessi né alla destra né alla sinistra, né al centro, potrei essere tranquillamente classificato di sinistra. Siamo perfino per la socializzazione! ».

I quadri e i soldi


Borghese parla, parla, parla, fissando il vuoto dinanzi a sé e alzando il pugno a scatti, mentre un'aria di fol-

tuazioni esplosive e di drogare, com'è avvenuto in Calabria. E Borghese? E' un furbo pieno di rancori che cerca la rivincita? O è un visionario che insegue il proprio fantasma giovanile, quello di un'altra grande « Decima » qualunque e autoritaria? Glielo chiedo, ma lui continua a parlare sorridendo, poi mi offre di aderire al Fronte: « Venga con noi. Si sentirà libero ».

Col manganello

Penso con paura alla « libertà » di Borghese, la stessa per la quale a Cuneo e in altre città si scatenano i manganelli neri con le scritte « X Mas » impugnati dai « ragazzi » del suo nemico-amico Almirante. Ma il comandante e il Guadagni continuano cordiali e tranquilli. Guadagni parla di De Gaulle, dice che fra De Gaulle e Borghese in pratica non c'è alcuna differenza, ritorna sull'idea fissa del nuovo Stato. Chi sarà il capo di questo Stato nuovo? E Guadagni, calmo: « Ma il comandante Borghese, naturalmente ».

Mi volto verso Borghese. Ascolta in silenzio, poi sospira lento: « No, non vorrei rivestire nessun incarico. Se dovessi accettare, lo farei sotto forma di un dovere impostomi da me stes-



Roma. Il principe Valerio Borghese sotto il labaro della «Decima». (Foto Team)

al nostro inviato speciale)

Roma, dicembre.

«Sì, ci sono dei deputati dei senatori che siedono Parlamento sotto altre etichette, ma che in realtà appartengono al mio Fronte nazionale». Comandante Borghese, lei sta dicendo... «E' così! E, del resto, che ci vede di strano? Sono venuti da me dei parlamentari a dirmi che idee del Fronte gli piace-

vano e mi hanno chiesto se, dovevano dimettersi. Io gli ho domandato: nel momento in cui vi chiederò di strappare la tessera del vostro partito e di dichiarare che aderite al Fronte, lo farete? Se mi dite di sì, benissimo: restate pure al vostro posto, voi sarete le nostre quinte colonne...».

Sono tante o poche le vostre quinte colonne in Parlamento? «Non glielo dico». E ci sono altre persone note che aderiscono al Fronte? «Sì, ma non faccio nomi». In quali campi operano? «Nell'amministrazione dello Stato, nelle università, sono dirigenti industriali, operai, sindacalisti...». Sindacalisti della Cisl? «No». Ci sono anche dei militari con voi? «Poiché le nostre idee viaggiano, esse trovano udienza anche nelle forze armate». Davvero non vuol fare neanche un nome? «No».

periosa, mentre il pugno sovente si serra duro e il braccio si leva di scatto, nel gesto meccanico di chi, per troppo tempo, ha arringato gente in divisa.

Tetri cimeli

Siamo nell'ufficio personale di Borghese, una stanza piena di giornali e di carte. In un armadio, i documenti per la storia della «Decima» repubblicana. Al muro, il gagliardetto azzurro del reparto col teschio dalla rosa in bocca, lo scudetto dei mezzi d'assalto e stampe di Malta. C'è anche uno dei manifesti del Fronte: un bambino piange, mentre su di lui si protende una mano artigliata, su ogni artiglio una scritta: «Droga, omosessualità, prostituzione...». Il titolo dice: «Italia drogata e democratica».

Inutile sprecare parole sulle idee di Borghese: quel

volta è stato anche a Reggio Calabria, dove il Fronte «ha aperto gli occhi ai reggini», guidandoli nella rivolta contro partiti e sindacati, «una guida morale, perché noi abbiamo fatto da pompieri e, quando abbiamo detto di finirla, la rivolta s'è fermata di colpo».

Quanti siete nel Fronte? «Si può dire centinaia di migliaia» annuncia Guadagni. Borghese lo corregge con fastidio: «Diciamo varie migliaia». Ma che cosa fate? «Almirante commette un grosso errore quando ci giudica un movimento sentimentale. In realtà, noi stiamo creando un centro di potere su scala nazionale, e abbiamo abolito tutte quelle manifestazioni retoriche che non ci portano diritti allo scopo. Per questo lavoriamo, ci sono nostri tecnici e studiosi che si stanno preparando e aggiornando».


E' un po' vago, comandante... Borghese sogghigna: «L'esperienza militare mi ha dimostrato che è una grossa forza circondarsi di un certo mistero». Poi mi acccontenta: «Il Fronte ha un'organizzazione su scala provinciale: c'è un comitato basato sulle categorie e un delegato nel capoluogo di provincia, al quale mandiamo ordini da Roma. Per noi, il delegato ha la funzione

il suo fronte, in realtà, e un'altra cosa. Gli aderenti non sono più di un migliaio, dispersi in una ventina di province, i centri più attivi a Reggio Calabria, Genova, Perugia, Firenze, Palermo. Dopo il fallito accordo con «Ordine nuovo» (Borghese avrebbe messo il nome e i soldi, i neo nazisti i quadri),

sino a sfiorare il tavolo: «Sto pensando...». Che cosa? C'è una pausa lunga, poi Borghese esclama: «Ecco, vorrei solo avere un buchetto sull'Altare della Patria...»:

Giampaolo Pansa

(Il primo articolo dell'inchiesta sull'estrema destra è apparso il 6 dicembre).




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12 ESTRAZIONE DEL NUMERI VINCENTI
7 DICEMBRE 1970



Junio Valerio Borghese alza le spalle e mi fissa. Ho già visto quegli occhi. Erano quelli di un uomo col basco, le mostrine chiare con l'ancora, il gladio e l'alloro, la «P. 38» alla cintola in una curiosa fondina fatta di tre cinghie incrociate. L'anno era il '44, io stavo in terza elementare, lui comandava per il fascismo più ribaldo la «X Mas». Ricordo un'estate di spari e di polvere, e poi un autunno pieno di pioggia, le valli del Piemonte rastrellate, partigiani impiccati con al collo un cartello che diceva: «E' passata la Decima».

Adesso Borghese ha un pullover coi bottoni e 64 anni sulla schiena un po' curva. «Professione? Agricoltore» dice. Un mestiere, sostiene, che gli rende poco, le sue terre di Artena «costituiscono un debito colossale: io sono senz'altro un uomo povero», che ha la pensione di capitano di fregata (148 mila lire il mese) e di medaglia d'Oro (altre 83 mila il mese). Mi detta le cifre con voce im-

peggio, il principe si tiene immerso nel caos. «Un caos — giura — che avevo previsto fin dall'8 settembre, quando ho fatto una scelta di cui vado fiero. Quel giorno ho pianto, e poi non ho pianto più». E mi presenta a ciglia asciutte un quadro farneticante della realtà italiana, coi sovietici pronti a sbarcare sulle coste delle regioni «rosse», a Rimini o fra Viareggio e Massa. Chiedo: ma lei ne è davvero convinto? Mi fulmina duro: «Perché no?».

Al centro di queste allucinazioni un gran vuoto: «Manca l'idea di Patria, che è stata abolita — spiega Borghese —. Parlo di quell'idea che dopo il maggio francese ha consentito a Parigi una sfilata di un milione di persone sui Campi Elisi». Riuscirebbe una sfilata così a Roma? «Penso di sì. Ma l'appello dovrebbe lanciarlo una persona non compromessa con la politica». Chi potrebbe essere costui? Il comandante si fa pensieroso: «Non ho in mente un uomo...».

stiamo preparando un centro di potere che possa un giorno prendere il posto delle strutture attuali». Interviene Guadagni: «Qualcuno ha chiamato tutto questo uno Stato-ombra». Borghese allarga le braccia: «Be', potrà chiamarsi Stato quando avrà raggiunto la necessaria solidità».

Magari la guerra

E in che modo lo Stato-ombra creato dal Fronte sostituirà quello attuale? «Lo Stato di oggi è talmente marcio che forse non servirà nemmeno dargli un colpo. L'attuale classe governante sta anelando qualcuno che si presenti e dica: signori, andate a casa». Cioè, si arrenderà? «Si è già arresa: tutti sanno che esegue rigidamente gli ordini del pci». Ma se è così, non avete paura che siano i comunisti a bloccarvi? «Allora si arriverà ad una decisione del popolo italiano. Fra breve si porrà di nuovo il dilemma: o Roma o Mosca!».

Borghese pronuncia im-

04680 (66°)	04713 (62°)	12870 (134°)	16623 (177°)	19437 (33°)
19672 (111°)	21267 (147°)	25099 (189°)	25605 (162°)	26462 (97°)
29005 (127°)	30767 (54°)	33567 (172°)	38390 (78°)	38546 (87°)
42316 (10°)	49015 (29°)	49415 (40°)	50161 (23°)	52825 (131°)
55318 (71°)	62920 (84°)	64182 (51°)	65435 (26°)	69314 (117°)
82883 (120°)	83339 (45°)	94065 (60°)		
Serie B	01527 (115°)	03139 (145°)	04029 (75°)	09807 (55°)
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95348 (34°)				
Serie C	05551 (176°)	16889 (63°)	24316 (12°)	25625 (186°)
26871 (74°)	29324 (2°)	33682 (173°)	34257 (194°)	38483 (103°)
40385 (59°)	41953 (152°)	52972 (122°)	54731 (197°)	58012 (142°)
64883 (108°)	69891 (80°)	76007 (3°)	85152 (119°)	87878 (149°)
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Serie D	01716 (128°)	09099 (81°)	10588 (5°)	17725 (182°)
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33437 (17°)	38629 (150°)	39689 (159°)	66604 (163°)	76434 (188°)
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Serie E	05659 (69°)	06053 (174°)	18952 (93°)	20773 (191°)
24975 (141°)	28035 (112°)	30328 (20°)	31332 (137°)	31433 (91°)
33837 (165°)	34308 (151°)	45516 (132°)	43555 (123°)	43781 (101°)
61413 (158°)	78383 (96°)	79251 (195°)	86131 (106°)	91168 (113°)
Serie F	01447 (37°)	04772 (116°)	09504 (72°)	13768 (53°)
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Serie G	11325 (133°)	12765 (25°)	16020 (21°)	19363 (184°)
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Serie K	03105 (168°)	04539 (16°)	12911 (95°)	33138 (166°)
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58391 (64°)	61043 (36°)	71423 (18°)	72037 (76°)	
Serie L	06325 (160°)	12099 (144°)	15479 (140°)	24811 (167°)
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Serie M	00735 (161°)	05925 (46°)	07842 (143°)	08602 (109°)
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21451 (139°)				

ATTENZIONE: i 200 numeri di riserva verranno pubblicati sul Notiziario n. 1/1971 e sono visibili presso la Sede, le Delegazioni e i distributori di carburante dell'Ente.

La città - «E' una g
ammucchiano sui m
zio di emergenza?»

alla sp

TADINI


DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO Chief, EUR			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		X	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, [redacted] <i>Ref for ARB</i>			MICROFILM
SUBJECT Abortive Fire at Valerio BORGHESE Office			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES ACTION REQUIRED: For your information. 1. The attached <u>Il Tempo</u> clipping describes an abortive attempt in October 1970 to set fire to the Guadagni construction firm offices at via Giovanni Lanza 130 in Rome where Junio Valerio B O R G H E S E has an office. The Guadagni construction firm is owned by Carlo Benito G U A D A G N I. 2. [redacted] a World War II colleague of BORGHESE's, continues sporadic contact with the Fronte Nazionale leader. Several [redacted] insinuations that a [redacted] contact with BORGHESE could be arranged have been gently turned aside. 3. [redacted] (now Chief of [redacted]) told [redacted] on 12 January 1971 that he had served as a radio operator under BORGHESE in World War II aboard the <u>Duca d'Abruzzi</u> . 4. Also, Italian national Mario I A V O C O L I, who heads the American Embassy wire room in Rome, has told [redacted] that he was a radio operator for BORGHESE in World War II.			
<p style="text-align: center;">[redacted] - [redacted]</p> <p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT</p> <p>EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(H) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005</p> <p>Attachment: As stated, encl. h/w <i>1 att</i> Distribution: 3 - Chief, EUR, w/Att.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRA-53611	JAN 29 1971 27 January 1971	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [redacted]	

TO: CHIEF, EUR

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, []

ENCLOSED HEREWITH

Fallito attentato nell'ufficio del principe Valerio Borghese



**Disturbati da un inquilino gli
attentatori sono fuggiti ab-
bandonando sacchi di nylon**

Fallito attentato all'impresa di costruzioni edili Guadagni nel cui locali vi è anche un ufficio della Medaglia d'oro principe Ennio Valerio Borghese, il capo del «Fronte Nazionale». Sul pianerottolo dell'interno 2 di via Giovanni Lanza 130, sono stati trovati due sacchi di nylon pieni di benzina ed un involucri di carta compressa imbevuta di benzina con una miccia a lenta combustione. Gli attentatori probabilmente sono stati disturbati da qualche inquilino e sono fuggiti prima di incendiare la miccia. La portiera dello stabile ha dato l'allarme ai carabinieri del Pronto Intervento i quali hanno dirottato in via Giovanni Lanza alcune «Gazzelle». Nel frattempo la stessa portiera aveva asciugato con degli stracci il carburante fuoriuscito dai sacchi di nylon, avvertendo anche un impiegato dell'impresa Guadagni il quale aveva aperto la porta degli uffici consentendo di raccogliere la benzina che era entrata nell'ingresso degli uffici. Come si è detto, negli uffici dell'impresa Guadagni vi è una stanza nella quale lavora il principe Valerio Borghese. Sul luogo

h/w att to OIRA 53611

CS COPY []

BORGHESE

Neo-Fascist Youth Squads Stir Up Italian Political Cauldron

By Don M. Larrimore

Special to The Washington Post

ROME, Feb. 10—Italy is suddenly alive with demands for an end to the crescendo of political violence which has struck in a dozen cities since Christmas. The belatedly burning issue of law and order adds to the woes of Premier Emilio Colombo, whose six-month-old coalition government is struggling for survival in the face of its own internal divisions and a range of knotty economic and social problems.

Most of the current popular outrage is directed against small bands of neo-fascist youths, dubbed "squadristi" after the rampaging squads of toughs with truncheons who helped Benito Mussolini to power 50 years ago.

Today's self-styled urban commandos seem increasingly to prefer home-made bombs to the once-standard street equipment of bricks, iron bars and bicycle chains. They pride themselves on secrecy and speed in executing hit-and-run attacks against the persons or property of Communists and other opponents.

Throughout the peninsula, the neo-fascists have taken the initiative—and the headlines—from young Maoists and anarchists who, though lately rather quiescent, are old hands at "squadristo."

Shrill left-wing rhetoric along with politically expedient moans from moderates have inflated the neo-fascist upsurge far beyond its true importance. Italy's basic situations are not endangered. In seeking to create a "climate of chaos," the rightist extremists have in fact provoked a backlash of nearly unanimous public revulsion against their tactics. That in turn had moved the harried Colombo government to promise a crack-down on so-called paramilitary violence.

The first dramatic step was a ban on all public demonstrations in the entire province surrounding the city of Reggio Calabria on the Italian toe. Since last July, Reggio has been waging a virtual people's rebellion against Rome because the smaller city of Catanzaro was designated capital of the newly created region of Calabria. Neo-fascists have spurred the fighting at the barricades. It is widely assumed that extreme right-wing industrialists have provided the money to sustain the revolt.

Thus far, six persons have been killed and hundreds injured. General strikes have made the port cities always miserable economic situation desperate.

The government ban on demonstrations was accompanied by "total mobilization" of local security forces, who now number 15,000 men, or one for about every dozen Reggio inhabitants. It was imposed after a sneak grenade attack on a peaceful left-wing crowd in Catanzaro last week. A bricklayer was killed and 13 others injured. This escalation of violence shocked Italy as nothing had since the bombing of a Milan bank in December 1969, which left 14 persons dead.

With no one yet charged for the grenade assault, a wave of anti-fascist feeling has nonetheless swept the country.

The constitution bans "reorganization of the former Fascist Party under any name and in any form." The weak and poorly organized Italian right today has no potential Mussolini, although elements of his mystique thread through the neo-fascist ranks.

The former dictator is openly admired by Giorgio Almirante, the 56-year-old secretary of the neo-fascist parliamentary party—the Italian Social Movement (MSI). The party claims 400,000 members, a quarter of them young people. It received 1.8 million votes in the last elections, about 5 per cent of the total cast. Its 37 deputies and senators are

often obstructive and unruly in the legislative chambers.

The neo-fascists are making some political capital with their constant warnings that left-wingers in Colombo's Christian Democratic Party, and leftist socialists in the ruling coalition are preparing a "sellout" which would allow the Communists a slice of national power.

Two months ago, Almirante proposed a national anti-Communist front in which his party would play a key role. "The rise to power of Communism must be blocked," he said in an interview with the Turin newspaper La Stampa. "Alone I can't do it, but neither can the others without me."

Since then, the MSI has repeatedly denied charges that it was directing squadristi attacks. Responsible observers, however, assume that the party gives covert support to some of the 20 extraparlimentary groups of neo-fascists, totalling perhaps some 5,000 active members, now believed to be operating in Italy.

Of these, the most aggressive has been the National Vanguard, which began life at Rome University several years ago and spread to many deep southern cities, most notably Reggio. It specializes in vicious attacks on individual Communists, and says 50 such "actions" were carried out in Rome alone last year. Police maintain that the total membership of this determinedly clandestine group is no more than a fifth of the 1,500 "commandos" it claims.

About 1,000 neo-fascist youths in 20 provinces belong to the better-known National Front, headed by Junio Valerio Borghese who describes himself as a farmer interested in politics. During World War II, Borghese, now 64, commanded the famous X Mas torpedo boat squadron,

which scored most of Italy's few anti-submarine victories against the allies.

Later X Mas, still led by Borghese, was transformed into a ground security force known for its brutal treatment of anti-Mussolini Partisans. For this activity, the rotund commander eventually spent four years in prison. The National Front claims a major role in Reggio's seven-month-old rebellion.

Smaller secret squads exist on many campuses, made up of young extremists impatient with the run-of-the-mill protest marches, sit-ins and fist-fights with Communists staged by such acknowledged offspring of the MSI as Young Italy (69,000 members) and the University Front for National Action (20,000 sympathizers).

Now back in the MSI fold after an ideological quarrel is the New Order, a militant group whose members dress as Nazis and wear the two-edged axe symbol of the collaborationist Vichy regime in France.

Left-wing newspapers alleged last year that New Order agents had gone to Athens to arrange support from the Greek colonels for an impending military coup in Rome. Photographs were published purporting to show youngsters receiving military training at a secret New Order camp in the Italian hills.

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 19 FEBRUARY 1971
IN 269597
PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Service before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO X 13

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

COUNTRY: ITALY

DOI: 1968 TO JANUARY 1971

SUBJECT: THE NATIONAL FRONT: AN INEFFECTUAL RIGHT WING ORGANIZATION OFTEN ACCUSED OF PLANNING A COUP D'ETAT

ACQ: (6 FEBRUARY 1971) FIELD NO. OIR-44838

SOURCE: THE REPORT CONTAINS THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF AND WAS PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AND FOR DISTRIBUTION TO OTHER BRANCHES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

SUMMARY: THE NATIONAL FRONT (FRONTE NAZIONALE - FN) IS A RIGHT WING ORGANIZATION WHICH BANDS TOGETHER A LIMITED NUMBER OF MEMBERS MOST OF WHOM COME FROM VETERAN AND ARMED FORCES ASSOCIATIONS. PURPOSE OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO PREVENT THE "NATIONAL DRIFT TO THE LEFT", IF NECESSARY THROUGH A COUP D'ETAT. THE FN IS THE CREATURE OF FORMER FASCIST ITALIAN SOCIAL REPUBLIC (RSI) NOTABLE JUNIO VALERIO B O R G H E S E. THE FN, WITH ITS RESTRICTED FOLLOWING AND LIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND THE COMIC OPERA STATURE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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OF ITS LEADER, LACKS THE POTENTIAL TO PLAN AND CARRY THROUGH A COUP. END OF SUMMARY.

1. THE NATIONAL FRONT WAS SET UP IN SEPTEMBER 1968 BY BORGHESE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BAND TOGETHER DISSIDENT ITALIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT (MSI) MEMBERS, VETERAN GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS AND RIGHT WING CULTURAL AND POLITICAL CLUBS INTO A BROAD POLITICAL MOVEMENT CAPABLE OF PREVENTING THE "NATIONAL DRIFT TO THE LEFT." THE FN SEES THE PRESENT POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AS THE ROOT OF ALL THE ILLS OF THE COUNTRY; IT OPPOSES THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL POWER BY THE EXTREME LEFT AND BY LEFTIST CATHOLICS AND SOCIALISTS; AND FAVORS THE CREATION OF A STRONG STATE CAPABLE OF GUARANTEEING PUBLIC ORDER, NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CITIZENS. TO PROMOTE THIS INITIATIVE, BORGHESE ORGANIZED GATHERINGS OF VETERANS AND MILITARY ASSOCIATIONS IN VARIOUS ITALIAN CITIES. HE ALSO SOUGHT FINANCIAL BACKING FROM NORTHERN INDUSTRIALISTS, BUT WITH MODEST RESULTS. THE PAUCITY OF SUCCESS IS ALSO DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE NEW ORDER (ORDINE NUOVO - ON) GROUP, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO PROSELYTIZE AND PROVIDE THE ORGANIZATIONAL JUMP OFF POINT FOR FN, HAS REJOINED THE MSI. ONLY SOME 200 "ORDINE NUOVO" MEMBERS REMAINED WITH BORGHESE. THE SUM OF FN ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

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IS REPRESENTED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL DELEGATES REPRESENTING HANDFULS OF SUPPORTERS IN ANCONA, BARI, BIELLA, CATANZARO, COMO, GENOA, FLORENCE, LA SPEZIA, LUCCA, MASSA CARRARA, MATERA, NAPOLI, PALERMO, PARMA, PERUGIA, PISA, REGGIO CALABRIA, SASSARI, TERNI, TURIN, TRIVISO, VENICE, VERCELLI, VERONA AND VICENZA. THESE NUCLEI ORGANIZE GATHERINGS, STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISTRIBUTE HANDBILLS. RECENTLY THE MOST ACTIVE GROUP HAS BEEN THAT OF REGGIO CALABRIA, WHICH HAS TAKEN PART IN THE LOCAL VIOLENCE TOGETHER WITH THE REGGIO CHAPTERS OF NATIONAL VANGUARD (AVANGUARDIA NAZIONALE) AND OF "ON." IN SPITE OF ITS LIMITED FOLLOWING AND FAILURE TO EXPAND, THE FN HAS OFTEN BEEN CHARGED WITH PLOTTING A COUP D'ETAT. THESE CHARGES ORIGINATE WITH LEFT WING CIRCLES INTERESTED IN CREATING ALARMIST SITUATIONS TO KEEP ITS RANK AND FILE COMPACT. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT RIGHT WING CIRCLES TEND TO ENCOURAGE SUCH RUMORS TO ENHANCE THEIR PROWESS AND PRESTIGE. THE RECURRING CHARGES OF FN COUP PLOTTING ARE BASED ON THE ALLEGED ABILITY OF FN TO INFLUENCE THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE AND ON THE PRESUMED PRESTIGE THAT BORGHESE ENJOYS IN ITALIAN MILITARY CIRCLES. BORGHESE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT THESE CHARGES; IN FACT, IN HIS SPEECHES AND IN THE HANDBILLS DISTRIBUTED

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BY FN, HE MAKES MUCH OF THE EXPLOSIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND BOASTS OF THE NON-EXISTING SUPPORT FROM CENTER-RIGHT POLITICAL PERSONALITIES AND VETERANS AND ARMED FORCES ASSOCIATIONS. WITHIN HIS ORGANIZATION, BORGHESI TAKES INITIATIVES AND POSTURES THAT SEEM TO CONFIRM HIS ROLE IN COUP PLOTTING. THIS, IN TURN, PLAYS INTO THE HAND OF THE LEFT WING WHICH POINTS TO THESE INITIATIVES AND POSTURING AS REAL AND DANGEROUS ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

2. IN SPEAKING TO CLOSE COLLEAGUES, BORGHESI STRESSES THE NEED FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN SOLUTION TO THE PERMANENT POLITICAL CRISIS AFFECTING THE NATION. ACCORDING TO SOME OF THESE COLLEAGUES, DURING MAY AND JUNE 1970, BORGHESI DID HOLD MEETINGS OF FN LEADERS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT. THESE MEETINGS WERE PLANNED BY ~~REMO~~ ORLANDINI, BORGHESI'S MOST TRUSTED COLLABORATOR AND FN "CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF" ALSO KNOWN AS "MAJOR ORLANDINI" IN THE ROME RIGHT WING CIRCLES. ORLANDINI IS A FORMER ARMY SERGEANT

Italy Rome
cut: Italy

Fronte Nazionale

aka

WHO, DURING THE ETHIOPIAN WAR, SERVED AS SQUAD CHIEF IN THE FASCIST MILITIA; LATER FOUGHT ON THE GREEK-ALBANIAN FRONT AND WAS COMMISSIONED ON THE FIELD IN 1943. AFTER THE 8 SEPTEMBER 1943 ITALIAN ARMISTICE, HE JOINED THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN GUARD

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OF THE RSI REACHING THE GRADE OF MAJOR. DURING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FN MEETINGS, FANTASTIC COUP PLANS WERE DISCUSSED, GOING SO FAR AS CHOOSING THE FN LEADERS WHO WERE TO TAKE OVER GOVERNMENT POSTS FOLLOWING A PROCLAMATION TO THE COUNTRY BY MAJOR ORLANDINI. THE COMIC OPERA ASPECTS OF THESE SESSIONS DISENCHANTED MANY OF THE SUPPORTERS, WHO LEFT THE FN. THE PLOTTERS' FINAL SESSION TOOK PLACE IN A ROME RESTAURANT WHERE, FLUSHED WITH THE EFFECT OF WINE, THE CONSPIRATORS CLOSED DOORS AND WINDOWS AND SANG THE FASCIST NATIONAL HYMN "GIOVINEZZA."

3. AT PRESENT BORGHESE CLAIMS THAT HE HAS REORGANIZED THE FN GENERAL STAFF, BUT HE HAS NO BETTER ORGANIZATION NOR ANY MORE FOLLOWERS THAN PREVIOUSLY. HE STILL KEEPS POSTURING AND MAKING PARADOXICAL DECLARATIONS WHICH REPEL THOSE TO WHOM HE IS TRYING TO APPEAL. SUCH POSTURING IS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY HIS TURNING DOWN THE MSI INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN ITS NATIONAL CONGRESS IN DECEMBER 1970. IN AN ARROGANT STATEMENT, BORGHESE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO DILLY DALLY WITH STERILE CONGRESSES, BUT WAS THE "MOMENT FOR ACTION." HE HOLDS TO THIS LINE EVEN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, CONVINCED THAT THE COMMUNIST ENTRY INTO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS IMMINENT, CLAIMING ALSO THE EXISTENCE

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OF A SECRET AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER BETWEEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY SECRETARY ARNALDO F O R L A N I AND ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) SECRETARY GENERAL LUIGI L O N G O. BORGHESE TELLS HIS FRIENDS THAT, DURING PRESIDENT NIXON'S LAST VISIT TO ITALY, HE MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ENTOURAGE TO WHOM HE ILLUSTRATED THE GRAVITY OF THE ITALIAN SITUATION, POINTING OUT THAT A COUP D'ETAT COULD PROVIDE THE ONLY SOLUTION, AND ASKED U.S. SUPPORT. THE U.S. POLITICIANS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE REPLIED: "GET MOVING, AND ONCE YOU HAVE TAKEN OVER THE COUNTRY, WE WILL SUPPORT YOU." BORGHESE'S FRIENDS COMMENT TO THIS STORY IS THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT TAKE BORGHESE SERIOUSLY AND THEIR REPLY WAS STRICTLY A DIPLOMATIC ONE.

4. BORGHESE TAKES HIMSELF VERY SERIOUSLY AND CONTINUES TO SPEAK ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF ACTING SOON; THE COUP IS TO BE CARRIED THROUGH WITH THE USE OF UNSPECIFIED COMMANDOS WHO ARE TO SEIZE RADIO AND TV FACILITIES. FORMATION OF A TECHNICAL, NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT WOULD FOLLOW. BORGHESE CLAIMS THAT THE COMMANDERS OF THE ARMED FORCES HAVE AGREED TO PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO THE NEW REGIME. BORGHESE SEEMS UNABLE TO GRASP THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION AND CONTINUES TO FOOL HIMSELF, OR MAKE BELIEVE THAT HE IS FOOLING HIMSELF THAT THE FN CAN REALLY CARRY THROUGH A

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COUP. THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IS THAT THE FN IS NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING THROUGH THE AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF REVOLUTIONIZING THE STATE. AS A MATTER OF FACT THE FN POSITION IN THE RIGHT WING ALIGNMENT IS RATHER WEAK.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. GP-1

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PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, European Division	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, [] <i>off for APB</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	0 Valerio BORGHESE and Manipulation of Funds.		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached for Headquarters background is an article from La Stampa of 5 March 1971 concerning Valerio BORGHESE and his alleged misappropriation, with others, of monies belonging to the Banca di Credito Commerciale ed Industriale of Rome. BORGHESE, is also accused of illegal distribution of profits, and false statements of gains and losses. The Station has no traces on the other Italian nationals cited in the article except for Giulio GALEAZZI on whom there are many ancient traces qualifying him as a high level Vatican administrative consultant etc. The foreign nationals cited were not traced. Gil Robles presumably is the Spanish Christian Democrat leader.

[]

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- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Attachment:
Newspaper article

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MAR 9 1971

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OIRT-14934 SECRET CLASSIFICATION SECRET	8 March 1971
		HQS FILE NUMBER []

Per il "crack", di una banca a Roma

Il principe Valerio Borghese accusato di falso in bilancio

Fra i 17 imputati anche Alfonso Spataro, figlio del vicepresidente del Senato

(Nostro servizio particolare)

Roma, 4 marzo.

Il principe Junio Valerio Borghese, già comandante della decima Mas e presidente del « fronte nazionale », un movimento neo-fascista extraparlamentare, è rimasto coinvolto nel crack clamoroso della Banca di Credito Commerciale ed Industriale di Roma. Gli è stata contestata un'accusa molto grave: falso in bilancio, appropriazione indebita aggravata, illegale ripartizione di utili. Con lui sono imputati l'avv. Alfonso Spataro, figlio del vice presidente del Senato, altre 17 persone che facevano parte del consiglio d'amministrazione dell'istituto bancario, i direttori generali e i sindaci. Tra questi vi sono un cittadino colombiano,

Carlos Faillace, uno svizzero, Hug J. Hermann e due spagnoli, Julio Munoz Ramonet e José Gil Robles.

In particolare, al principe Borghese si rimprovera di essersi appropriato, insieme con l'ex direttore generale Francesco Castaldi e ai membri del consiglio d'amministrazione, Giuseppe Pediconi, Primo Bacchini, Gil Robles, Giulio Galeazzi e Hug Hermann, di circa un miliardo e mezzo (esattamente un miliardo, 499 milioni, 460 mila e 850 lire) che il finanziere arabo, Abdullah Mourah El Sabbah aveva affidato al Credito Commerciale ed Industriale. Con una seconda operazione il principe ed altri membri del consiglio si sono appropriati di 300 milioni di una banca svizzera.

Secondo l'accusa, tutti gli imputati avrebbero omesso di iscrivere fra i passivi le perdite, che nel periodo fra il 1961 e il 1964 furono quasi di sei miliardi di lire; avrebbero conteggiato sulle perdite interessi e competenza per un ammontare di 830 milioni ed avrebbero infine alterato la consistenza delle posizioni debitorie prospettando una liquidità di cassa non rispondente alla realtà.

L'istituto bancario aveva un'attività molto vasta e numerosi clienti soprattutto fra i piccoli risparmiatori, ma fu amministrato in modo tale che nel 1964 fu travolto in un dissesto clamoroso. Intervenne la Banca d'Italia, ma quando ormai era troppo tardi.

G. G.

HURWITH ATTO OIRT-14934 8 MAR 1971

TO: C/800

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, []

CS COPY

H/W ATT 1 TO OIRT-14934 []

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, []

INFO:

FROM:

Chief, EUR

SUBJECT:

Traces on Admiral Gino BIRINDELLI []

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OIRA-54094, 17 May 1971

DDO

1. WOMACE files contain the following trace which possibly pertains to Admiral Gino BIRINDELLI of reference.

The name of one "C.C. Gino BIRINDELLI" is mentioned in an undated ^{OSS}WOHIVE report, pertaining to the 1944-1945 period, which was compiled in conjunction with Plan IVY, a program conducted by WOMIVE, Identity A, and Identity B, for the purpose outlined in Identity C. The WOHIVE document in which the name of BIRINDELLI is mentioned is a report prepared by Identity D concerning a Plan IVY mission that Identity D carried out in northern Italy. In this report, Identity D stated that in the course of this mission, he and other Plan IVY participants travelled to Pescia for the purpose of building a cover story for Identity D. Identity D indicated in the report that he had planned that, in the event of his capture by the Germans, he would say that he had spent a period of leave in Pescia, at the home of his friend, "C.C. Gino BIRINDELLI."

There is no further mention of BIRINDELLI in the above document. WOMACE files contain no traces on Identity D subsequent to the traces on his participation in Plan IVY, 1944-1945.

Central Reference

2. Attached are copies of the following documents concerning Admiral BIRINDELLI which were obtained by WOECRU. Two of these documents (those described in sub-paragraphs d. and e.) contain information on statements made by Adm. BIRINDELLI in February 1970 on the poor financial treatment of the Italian Navy (as reported in paragraph 3 of reference).

a. A biographic report on Subject, prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in November 1969. (Attachment a.)

Distribution:
3 - COS- Rome

Continued

Attachments: A thru I b/v
Identities v A thru D u/s/c

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SUBJECT	[] [] / [] [] - Transmittal of Microfilm Concerning the Involvement of General Vito MICELI in Coup Plans of Junio Valerio BORGHESE				
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>ACTION REQUIRED: Please forward one copy of prints of this document to Station.</p> <p>1. Attached is a microfilm of a report prepared by the Rome Magistrate and presented to the Rome Magistrature concerning the involvement of General Vito MICELI (and others) in coup planning by Junio Valerio BORGHESE. Station would appreciate receiving a copy of the print from this microfilm as soon as possible. Please enlarge and bind the photographs in a format to permit easy reading.</p> <p>2. This microfilm was made from a copy of the report which was loaned to [] [] by [] [] without the knowledge of [] [] []</p>					
<p><i>film destroyed; copy of book sent Rome via TM-926484, 6 Oct 75, copy of book returned in E/IKSN (Italy's safe)</i></p>					
Attachment:		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> CROSS FILE COPY FOR [] [] DO NOT DESTROY </div>		- Bonghese	
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ITALY

INTERVIEW WITH JAMES ANGLETON

Milan EPOCA in Italian 11 Feb 76 pp 26-27

/Interview with James Angleton, ex-chief of CIA counterespionage, at his home in Virginia: "Valerio Borghese Was Useful To Us"; date not given/

/Text/ Robert Faenza and Marco Fini, authors of the book "Gli americani in Italia" have accused James Angleton, director of the ~~American Secret~~ ^{office of Strategic} Services (OSS) in Italy during the war and until 15 months ago head of CIA counterespionage, of having "kidnapped" Milano Valerio Borghese during the Liberation and then having protected him along with others of the former regime. We contacted James Angleton at his home in Virginia to find out his reactions. What came forth was an adventurous story which throws light upon one of the most mysterious periods of the Second World War and a person like the "black prince" who made Italy talk about him for 30 years. But here is the interview with Angleton, which, surprisingly enough, is the first he has granted during his long career.

Q. What do you think of these attacks on you?

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

File
Junio Valerio BORGHESE - 201

A. Whoever knows Italy as I do and is now watching the situation from Washington knows that your country has been one of the Soviets' prime targets ever since the 20's. During the war we ~~confiscated~~ ^{captured} documents which proved the existence of a vast campaign for communist penetration into the government and the armed forces which still exists. Hundreds of Italian prisoners back from the URSS told us, for example, that they had been recruited by the Soviet secret service with instructions to lie low for five years or more, that is until they had reached levels of prominence in the government.

Q. What truth is there to the story of the Borghese "kidnapping"?

A. The story is true, but the authors' motive is not. I will now tell you something which no one knows yet. Around February 1945 the ~~SSS~~ learned from very reliable sources that the Nazi regime was setting up a plan for the creation of a last zone of resistance in Austria, after the complete destruction of Northern Italy by its retreating troops. This "scorched earth" policy which would have cost Italy all her ports, her factories and her lines of communication was intended to create a "revolutionary situation" which could have resulted in an encounter between the Soviets and the Western allies from which Hitler hoped to profit. We decided to try and block the plan and use Prince Borghese for this purpose. To get in contact with him, we chose Commander Marceglia, a member of the X Mas, with

the gold medal for military valor, who had been captured in Egypt after having sunk an English battleship at Alexandria and had just returned from a prison term in India.

Marceglia was left under cover near Viareggio, but was arrested almost immediately by the Germans during a search. Luckily he got permission in prison to call Borghese who told of having fled the South to rejoin his unit. Borghese himself sent to Livorno to get him out of prison, brought him back with him to Milan, reinstated him in his rank and even made him do a series of radio broadcasts, thus giving him a perfect "cover" for his mission. A few days later, Marceglia gave him our message: if he agreed to cooperate with the allies and line up his units to prevent the Germans from blowing up the ports, he would be saved from the partisans who planned to gun him down in the streets of Milan and duly tried by his peers. The prince agreed, and gave Marceglia a 30-day leave to allow him to personally contact the different commanders interested in the project. At the last minute, the Germans gave up their plan and, as Allan Dulles tells it in his book, negotiated with us the separate surrender of troops stationed in Italy through Baron Parrilli, General Wolff and Dollmann. But Borghese fulfilled his duties since it was his men who furnished the detailed maps of the mined fields which were obstructing the port of Livorno.

It was now my turn to live up to my part of the contract. While the war was ending, I secretly went to Milan with Commander Carlo Resio, a courageous officer whom I remember very well, and stayed in a villa which had been prepared for me. When Borghese arrived at my house, I hid him in an upstairs room, while I was getting ready to receive for supper a British colleague of mine who just returned from armistice negotiations with General Vietinghoff. Among other things, my guest told me that he had asked the Germans to bring him the only fascist ringleaders: Valerio Borghese and Colonel Di Leo, head of the RSI's [Defense Information Service. He planned to question them and then hand them over to the partisans for immediate execution. "They are experts," he said. "It's useless to get involved with things that never end."

It was during that dinner when I realized that if I were to keep my word of honor to the prince I would have to take him to the South immediately, into the jurisdiction of the supreme allied command at Caserta. Therefore, the next morning we made Borghese put on an American uniform, put him in a jeep and, after a stop in Florence to allow him to say goodbye to his family, we took him to Rome, where he first was questioned by our ^{intelligence} ~~information~~ services and then handed over to Admiral De Courten for a regular trial. I was never interested in

Borghese's political ideas, and after that adventure I never saw him nor had any contact with him again.

Q. What do you think of the accusations now being brought against you for having used people connected with the old regime to keep Italy tied to America?

A. It's the customary communist tactic of misinformation. I haven't read these accusations, but I am certain that in the book they do not speak of the situation in which we had to work. A strong, competent information service was essential to the defense of the Italian democratic institutions; we helped to establish it, turning to men who had shown their valor and their loyalty to us and to the country during the war.

Q. What do you think of the disclosures about OSS dealings with the Vatican, and especially with Pope Montini, then assistant secretary of state?

A. I feel that it was natural for the Vatican, which at that time lacked resources and means of communication, to lean on us at a time when the Soviets were forcefully repressing Catholic countries like Poland, Hungary, Rumania.

My superior, General Donovan, a devout^u Catholic, worked hard to help priests and others linked with the church who were risking death to flee Eastern Europe. In connection with

this, I should mention a very important matter: when Molotov, then Stalin's Foreign Minister, came to Italy, he became extremely angry because he was assigned a Neopolitan priest whose name, if I remember correctly, was Father Pellegrino, and who was publishing a quarterly magazine in which he denounced many of the evils of communism.

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ENTI NI ANO IL SACCO

forme. E nei contatti teri ed esponenti del maggioranza questi anti statunitensi non i mancato di sottoli- al punto in cui erano rose, per bloccare l'attorale del Pci non ci tanto dei soldi, quan- mostrazione di rinno- à, efficienza e capaci- : del governo. « L'im- li somme di denaro rtanti non farebbe or- strarre l'attenzione da ondamentali che van- li petto », ci è stato ciò la « rivelazione » *Stampa Sera* che sei dollari sarebbero sta- negli ultimi tre mesi ini politici italiani, tra Andreotti, Carlo Do- Giuseppe Saragat e è - secondo le nostre ti - priva di fonda-

la commissione d'in- Congresso ha stima- liardi di lire la som- ita » dall'America nei iocratici italiani nel ultimi trent'anni, non dalla verità. Ma per ttivi bisogna aggiun- llo stesso periodo, l' « investiti » nel Pci ttanti e forse di più. i rapporti Cremlino- unista italiano », ci o, « abbiamo assisti- oluzione. Negli anni rra vi furono ingenti diretti attraverso l' russa a Roma. Ne- mpi, invece, questo ibuto arrivava attra- ne che facevano la lue paesi. Ma per il iamento russo è ora a parte la cospicua riscuote dallo Stato lella legge sul finan- bblico dei partiti, es- ti contare da un la- picue tangenti che commerci e il turi- lia ed i paesi socia- o sul reddito delle i. Tra queste ci so-

della mission. americana a Roma nei confronti del Pci?

L'atteggiamento ufficiale rima- ne quello espresso dall'ambascia- tore Volpe nella sua ormai fa- mosa intervista a *Epoca* dello scorso settembre: la partecipa- zione dei comunisti al governo in un paese membro della Nato determinerebbe una contraddi- zione di fondo, e perciò è nell' interesse degli Stati Uniti di im- pedirla. Dietro la facciata le po- sizioni sono più sfumate. Tro- vandosi a dover spiegare a Wa- shington le ragioni dei successi del Pci, la Cia non ha esitato a riconoscere in molti dei suoi rapporti che all'opposizione il partito di Berlinguer teneva un comportamento democratico e responsabile, e alcuni suoi uomi- ni hanno avuto contatti con alti esponenti comunisti allo scopo di approfondire certi argomen- ti. Ma gli osservatori america- ni temono che, se il Pci arrivasse nella stanza dei bottoni, la si- tuazione cambierebbe radical- mente.

**I SOVIETICI
FECERO TACERE
IL GENERALE
ALLAVENA?**

« Le pressioni su Berlinguer sia da parte dell'Urss, sia da parte di quel 20-25 per cento del partito che è tuttora strettamente legato al Cremlino », ci è stato detto, « diventerebbero enormi. Le probabilità che informazioni segrete fossero trasmesse a Mosca anche contro la volontà dell'attuale dirigenza sarebbero altissime ».

Pesa senza dubbio sull'atteggiamento dei responsabili della Cia un episodio di alcuni anni fa, che pochissime persone al mondo conoscono e che riveliamo oggi per la prima volta. Attraverso un informatore, il controspionaggio americano venne a sapere che un alto dirigente delle Botteghe Oscure aveva aiutato il colonnello Fedekin, allora capo del Kgb a Roma, a reclutare informatori all'interno

PARLA JAMES ANGLETON, EX CAPO DEL CONTROSPIONAGGIO DELLA CIA, CHE FU AGENTE SEGRETO IN ITALIA

Valerio Borghese ci serviva

■■■ James Angleton, dirigente del servizio segreto americano (Oss) in Italia durante la guerra e fino a quindici mesi fa capo del controspionaggio della Cia, è stato accusato da Roberto Faenza e Marco Fini, autori del libro *Gli americani in Italia*, di avere « rapito » a Milano Valerio Borghese nei giorni della Liberazione e di averlo poi protetto insieme con altri elementi del passato regime. Abbiamo raggiunto James Angleton nella sua casa in Virginia e gli abbiamo chiesto le sue reazioni. Ne è venuta fuori una storia romanzesca che getta nuova luce su una delle fasi più misteriose della seconda guerra mondiale e su un personaggio come il « principe nero » che ha fatto parlare di sé l'Italia per trent'anni. Ma ecco l'intervista con Angleton, che, per quanto ci risulta, è la prima che egli rilascia nella sua lunga carriera.

D. Che cosa pensa di questi attacchi contro di lei?

R. Chiunque conosca come me l'Italia e osservi ora la situazio-

ne da Washington, sa che il vostro paese è stato, fin dagli anni venti, uno degli obiettivi primari dei sovietici. Durante la guerra catturammo documenti che provavano l'esistenza di un gigantesco programma di penetrazione comunista nel governo e nelle forze armate, che è tuttora in vigore. Centinaia di prigionieri italiani di ritorno dall'Urss ci riferirono, per esempio, di essere stati reclutati dai servizi segreti sovietici, con l'istruzione di rimanere *dormient* per cinque anni o più, cioè fino a quando non fossero arrivati a occupare posizioni di rilievo nella macchina dello Stato.

D. Che fondamento ha la storia del « rapimento » di Borghese?

R. La storia è vera, ma il motivo addotto dagli autori è falso. Le racconterò ora una vicenda che nessuno ancora conosce. Intorno al febbraio 1945 l'Oss venne a sapere da fonti molto attendibili che il governo nazista stava mettendo a punto un piano che prevedeva la creazione di un'ultima isola di resistenza in Austria, dopo la

sa, la carriera di quest'ultimo fu bruscamente interrotta, nel giugno del 1966, per motivi che non sono mai venuti alla luce. Gli americani sospettano tuttora che egli sia stato vittima di macchinazioni messe in opera dallo spionaggio russo, che temeva le ripercussioni dell'affare.

Che rapporti ha la Cia con l'estrema destra e in che misura è coinvolta con la cosiddetta « strategia della tensione »?

La Cia ha avuto, attraverso i suoi informatori, vaghe notizie sul *golpe* Borghese e le ha passate alle competenti autorità italiane. Non ha mai avuto sentore delle presunte attività eversive del generale Miceli, e perciò non ha potuto

- hanno cercato di prendere contatto con l'ambasciata Usa a Roma, che ha svolto indagini su che cosa rappresentavano, quali progetti coltivavano e, nei casi in cui si è resa conto che avevano piani anticostituzionali, ha troncato immediatamente qualsiasi rapporto. Ci risulta che nel '73 la missione, in vista di ulteriori possibili approcci di questo tipo, chiese istruzioni precise a Washington su come doveva comportarsi. La risposta fu: « In nessuna circostanza gli Stati Uniti intendono essere associati a un colpo di Stato in Italia, perché lo considera controproducente, insensato e contrario agli interessi di entrambi i paesi ».

Per quanto riguarda l'Msi, ci



James Angleton

completa distruzione dell'Italia del Nord da parte delle sue truppe in ritirata. Questa politica della « terra bruciata », che sarebbe costata all'Italia tutti i suoi porti, le sue fabbriche e le sue vie di comunicazione, aveva come obiettivo di creare una « situazione rivoluzionaria » che avrebbe potuto sfociare in uno scontro tra i sovietici e gli alleati occidentali, da cui Hitler sperava di trarre profitto. Decidemmo di fare il possibile per bloccare il piano e di servirci a questo scopo del principe Borghese. Per entrare in contatto con lui, scegliemmo il comandante Marceglia, un membro della X Mas, medaglia d'oro al valor militare, che era stato catturato in Egitto dopo avere affondato una corazzata inglese ad Alessandria ed era appena rientrato da un periodo di prigionia in India.

Marceglia fu sbarcato di nascosto vicino a Viareggio, ma fu ar-

restato quasi subito dai tedeschi nel corso di un rastrellamento. Per fortuna, in prigione ottenne il permesso di telefonare a Borghese, cui raccontò di essere fuggito dal Sud per ricongiungersi alla sua unità. Borghese si recò personalmente a Livorno per liberarlo dal carcere, lo riportò con sé a Milano, lo reintegrò nel suo grado e gli fece addirittura fare una serie di trasmissioni alla radio, fornendogli così una perfetta « copertura » per la sua missione. Alcuni giorni dopo, Marceglia gli comunicò il nostro messaggio: se accettava di cooperare con gli Alleati e schierare i suoi reparti in modo da impedire ai tedeschi di fare saltare i porti, sarebbe stato sottratto ai partigiani che intendevano fucilarlo nelle strade di Milano e regolarmente processato dai suoi pari. Il principe accettò, e diede a Marceglia una licenza di trenta giorni per consentirgli di prendere personalmente contatto con i vari comandanti interessati al progetto. All'ultimo momento, i tedeschi rinunciarono al loro piano e, com'è raccontato nel libro di Allan Dulles, negoziarono con noi la resa separata delle truppe dislocate in Italia attraverso il barone Parrilli, il generale Wolff e Dollmann. Ma Borghese mantenne gli impegni, tanto che furono i suoi uomini a fornirci le piante dettagliate dei campi minati che ostruivano il porto di Livorno.

Toccava ora a me assolvere la mia parte del contratto. Mentre la guerra stava per finire, mi recai segretamente a Milano in compagnia del comandante Carlo Resio, un valoroso ufficiale di cui conservo un eccellente ricordo, e presi

alloggio in una villa che era stata preparata per me. Quando Borghese arrivò alla mia casa, lo nascosi in una stanza al piano superiore, mentre io mi apprestavo a ricevere, per cena, la visita di un mio collega britannico appena reduce dai negoziati di armistizio con il generale Vietinghoff. Tra le altre cose, il mio ospite mi disse che aveva chiesto ai tedeschi di consegnargli due soli caporioni fascisti: Valerio Borghese e il colonnello Di Leo, capo del servizio informazioni Difesa della Rsi. La sua intenzione era di interrogarli e di passarli poi ai partigiani per una immediata esecuzione. « Loro sono esperti », sostenne. « Inutile imbarcarsi in processi che tendono a non finire mai. »

Fu nel corso di quel pranzo che mi resi conto che se volevo mantenere l'impegno d'onore assunto col principe dovevo portarlo immediatamente al Sud, nella giurisdizione del supremo comando alleato di Caserta. Perciò, la mattina dopo facemmo indossare a Borghese una uniforme americana, lo caricammo su una jeep e, dopo una sosta a Firenze per consentirgli di salutare la sua famiglia, lo trasportammo a Roma, dove fu prima interrogato dai nostri servizi d'informazione e poi consegnato all'ammiraglio De Courten per un regolare processo. Non mi sono mai interessato alle idee politiche di Borghese, e dopo quella avventura non l'ho più visto né ho più avuto alcun contatto con lui.

D. Che dice delle accuse che ora le vengono rivolte di essersi servito di elementi legati al vecchio

regime per tenere l'Italia legata all'America?

R. È la solita tattica comunista della disinformazione. Io non ho letto queste accuse, ma sono certo che nel libro non si parla del quadro in cui ci trovavamo ad operare. Alla difesa delle istituzioni democratiche italiane era indispensabile un forte e capace servizio di informazione: noi abbiamo aiutato a costituirlo, rivolgendoci ad uomini che durante la guerra avevano dimostrato il loro valore e la loro lealtà a noi e al paese.

D. Che cosa dice delle rivelazioni relative ai rapporti dell'Oss con il Vaticano, e in particolare con papa Montini, allora vicesegretario di Stato?

R. Dico che era naturale che il Vaticano, che era allora privo di risorse e di comunicazioni, si appoggiasse a noi in un momento in cui i sovietici stavano soggiogando con la forza paesi cattolici come la Polonia, l'Ungheria, la Romania.

Il mio superiore, generale Donovan, che era un cattolico devoto, si adoperò molto per fare fuggire dall'Europa orientale sacerdoti ed altri elementi legati alla Chiesa che rischiavano la fucilazione. Devo ricordare, a questo proposito, un caso molto significativo: quando Molotov, allora ministro degli Esteri di Stalin, venne in Italia, fece fuoco e fiamme perché gli venisse consegnato un sacerdote napoletano, che se ricordo bene si chiamava padre Pellegrino, e che pubblicava una rivista trimestrale in cui si denunciavano molte malefatte del comunismo. ■

alla visita di Ammirante e camerati negli Stati Uniti, essa mi è stata definita uno « sfortunato incidente », un « pasticcio all'

nistra italiana, non so se sarebbe stato un buon investimento. »

La cooperazione Sid-Cia, ottima e proficua negli anni cinquanta e sessanta, ha in effetti

Come opera la Kgb in Italia e che forma prende la sua lotta con la Cia?

Secondo le stime americane, mentre una volta la metà del

liani di quante ne abbiamo noi americani ».

L'attività del Kgb in Italia non è - sembra - aumentata in maniera rilevante negli ultimi