

DD 1223



極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫

其他

宣誓供述者（其ノ二）

供述者

中村孝太郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次  
ノ如ク供述致シマス

表

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- 一 私ノ姓名ハ中村孝太郎デアリマス
  - ニ 私ノ現住所ハ東京都芝區白金今里町一〇六番地デアリマス
  - 三 私ノ生年月日ハ明治十四年（一八八一年）八月二十八日デアリマス
  - 四 私ノ經歷ノ概要ハ次ノ通りデアリマス
- 明治三十四年（一九〇一年）十一月二十二日 陸軍士官學校卒業（第十三期生）
- 同 四十二年（一九〇九年）十二月三日 陸軍大學校卒業
- 昭和 五年（一九三〇年）十二月二十二日 陸軍省人事局長
- 同 七年（一九三二年）四月十一日 陸軍中將
- 同 十二年（一九三七年）三月一日 軍事參議官
- 同 十三年（一九三八年）六月二十三日 陸軍大將
- 同 十三年（一九三八年）七月十五日 朝鮮軍司令官ニ親補
- 同 十六年（一九四一年）七月七日 朝鮮軍司令官ヲ罷メ軍事參議官ニ轉補
- 同 年 九月三十日 退 職
- 五 私ハ昭和十三年（一九三八年）七月十五日朝鮮軍司令官ニ補セラレ同月十七日東京出發飛行機ニテ同日午後任地京城ニ到着シマシタ
- 前任者ハ小磯國昭大將デアリマシタ

六 右ノ發令前即チ前任者小磯朝鮮軍司令官ノ時代ノ七月十一日「ソ」清國  
 境張鼓峯附近ニ於テ「ソ」聯兵ノ越境工學開始問題惹起シ我等一線守備  
 隊ハ隣忍自重之ヲ監視シツ、日滿「ソ」間ニ於テ外交交渉ニヨリ之ヲ打  
 開セントシテ居タノデアリマス。私ハ前職軍事參議官ヨリ朝鮮軍司令官  
 補前任ノ大命ヲ受ケルヤ右ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ同月十六日陸軍中央部ニ出頭シ一  
 應ノ事情ヲ聽取シマシタ

七 私ハ右ニ依リ中央部ハ事件ヲ平和的ニ解決スル方針ヲ以テ外交交渉ニ移  
 シ之カ速ナル圓滿解決ニ努ムルモノナルコトヲ知り且其ノ旨中央部ヨリ  
 指示ヲ受ケ前述ノ如ク急遽赴任シタノデアリマス

八 前述ノ如ク京城ニ着任シテ見マスト七月十六日附ヲ以テ中央ヨリ次ノ趣  
 旨ノ命令カ來テ居リマシタ「即チ張鼓峯附近「ソ」軍ノ不法越境ニ對シ  
 所要ニ應シ在鮮ノ隷下部隊ヲ國境近クニ集中スルコトヲ得」ト  
 私ハ右命令ニ基キ一部兵力ノ推進ヲ行ヒマシタカ絕對ニ事態ノ擴大ヲ避  
 ケル爲豆滿江以西ニ止メタノデアリマス

九 當時朝鮮軍ノ執下部隊中第二十師團ハ北文ニ出動シ第十九師團（師團長

尾高總藏中將一ノミ固有ノ衛戍地ニ位置シ平時狀態ニ在リマシタ

十、右ノ我部隊及朝鮮内ノ狀況ハ何等ノ變化ナク平靜デアリマシタ

十一、張鼓峰附近ハ滿「ソ」國境線内即チ滿洲國內デアツテ本事件ハ關東軍ニ

關係スル所テモアリマスカー一般ノ地形村落、交通等ノ狀態ハ朝鮮軍及朝

鮮ト關係最モ密接デアリマスノデ此ノ地方國境線ノ警備ハ朝鮮軍カ擔任

シ兼下第十九師團下ノ國境守備隊カ之ニ當ツテ居タノデアリマス

十二、前述ノ中央ノ方針ヲ朝鮮軍ハ嚴ニ遵奉シ外交交渉ニ依ル事件解決ヲ待望

シマシタカ在再日ヲ經過スルノミデ外交交渉成立ノ見込ハ立チマセンデ

十三、張鼓峰ハ標高百數十米ノ小丘陵テアルカ附近ハ小松ヤ種々ノ灌木カ所々

ニ點生スルダケテアルカラ赤禿ノ丘陵ノミガクツキリト浮ヒ上ツテ居テ

非常ニ長ク展望ノキク地帯デアリマシタ。此處カラハ滿鮮ヲ結ブ我ガ鐵

道線モ僅カ六軒余ノ彼方ニ手ニ取ル様ニ見エル許リカ十八軒余ヲ隔テタ

羅津港迄モ一眸ノ裡ニ指顧シ得ルト云フ屈強ナ高地デアツタノデアリマ

ス

十四、處テ七月二十日第十九師團ヨリ張鼓峰西側約八〇〇米ノ高地ハ偵察ニ好

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適デアルカラ是非トモ國境守備隊ノ一部ヲ此處へ進メタイトノ意見具申  
ヲシテ來タコトガアリマスカ朝鮮軍トシテハ不慮ノ事態發生ノ虞アルヲ  
願慮シ斯ル行動ハ動モスレハ戰爭惹起ノ端緒トナリ全般ニ波及スル虞大  
ナルモノガアルカラ見合セルヨウニト電報ヲ以テ抑止シマシタ

其次テ七月二十三日參謀本部ヨリ「張鼓峰事件今後ノ處理ニ關シテハ外交  
接衝ハ依然促進スルモ成功ノ見込ガナイトキハ之ヲ打切り先ニ國境方面  
ニ集中シタ部隊ノ主力ハ成ルヘク速カニ奮狀ニ復歸セシメル方針ヲ進メ  
ラレアリ、今後共不用意ナ紛争ノ擴大ヲ防止スル爲十分ナル指導ヲスル  
ヨウ」ニトノ旨ノ電報カ來又七月二十六日大本營命令トシテ「朝鮮軍司  
令官ハ國境ニ近ク集中シタ部隊ヲ適宜原駐地ニ歸還セシメヨ 所要ニ應  
ジ一部ヲ以テ國境警備ヲ強化セヨ」トノ旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

其其處テ私ハ七月二十七日第十九師團出動兵力（步兵一大隊ヲ慶興步兵一  
大隊ヲ古城步兵ニ大隊及砲兵ニ大隊ヲ阿吾地及其西方ニ出動）ヲ原駐地  
羅南ニ歸還ノ命令ヲ發シ諸隊ハ二十八日以降阿吾地驛カラ鐵道輸送ヲ開  
始シマシタ

其處カ七月二十九日午前九時三十分頃「ソ」聯兵ハ沙草峰南方約一〇〇〇

米ノ高地（琿春界約ノ國境線上ヨリ西方約三五〇米ノ線）ニ進出シテ來リ工事ヲ始メマシタカラ其ノ正面ニ居タ我國境守備隊ハ止ムナク之ヲ驅逐シテ其ノ線ヲ占領シマシタカ飽ク迄前後ノ紛糾ヲ避ケル爲再ヒ守備位置（國境線上ヨリ約一〇〇〇米西方）ニ後退復歸シマシタ。然ルニ午後四時三十分頃「ソ」聯部隊ハ更ニ攻撃シテ來テ國境線上ヨリ約五〇〇米モ侵入シマシタ。是ニ於テ我方モ已ムナク第一線ノ兵力ヲ増加シ之ト相對峙スルニ至リマシタ此ノ新事態ハ明カニ國境線際頭デアツテ軍ノ責務上此ノ儘ノ推移ニ委シ置ケナイ重大事デアリマス其處テ第十九師團長尾高中將ハ狀況ノ急變ヲ願慮シ一部兵力（歩兵第七十五聯隊主力）ノ歸還輸送ヲ中止シ之ヲ國境守備隊ノ後方ニ待機セシムルコト、シマシタ私ハ「ソ」軍ノ不法越境ハ之ヲ滿領外ニ擊退スル以外ニナシトシ右師團ノ行動ヲ是認シ且七月三十日午前一時頃概ネ次ノ如ク師團ニ指示シマシタ

「沙草峰西南閉鎖曲線高地ノ我カ部隊ヲ攻撃中「ソ」軍ヲ擊退シ滿領外ニ驅逐スルヲ以テ満足シ當分前記閉鎖曲線高地ニ後退シテ監視スルヲ要スヘキモ彼若シ既ニ沙草峰南側高地ニ後退シアル場合ハ敢テ之ヲ攻撃セス。以テ事件ヲ擴大セサル如ク慎重ニ處理センコトヲ望ム」

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同時ニ中央部ニ對シ概ネ次ノ如ク報告シマシタ

「本事件ハ我カ軍カ張鼓峰ニ於テハ隱忍自重セルニ拘ハラヌ圖ニ乘ツタ」  
ソレ軍ノ不法越境ニ端ヲ發シ次テ其ノ不法挑戩ニ依リ生起シタモノデア  
カラ張鼓峰事件トハ別圖ニ處理セラルヘキモノト確信スル而シテ現對峙中  
ノ「ソ」軍ヲ滿領外ニ驅退スルヲ以テ満足スルヲ本旨トシ事件ヲ他ニ波及  
セシメナイ様ニ指導ス」

更ニ三十日午後師團ニ對シ「敵ノ攻謀ヲ受ケナイ限リ實力行使ハ別命ニ依  
ルヘキ」旨ヲ命令シマシタ

又同日午後參謀本部カラハ「沙草峰事件ハ差當リ不擴大方針ヲ堅持シテ實  
施シツ、アル部隊ノ處理ニ委スル方針ニテ進ミツツアル」旨ノ電報、  
次テ同日夜一沙草峰、張鼓峰附近事件ニ關シ中央ハ現況以上ニ擴大セサル  
方針ヲ以テ局地的商議ニ移スコト、ナツタ 軍ノ行動ハ差當リ左記ニ依リ  
處置セラレ度

イ敵ノ挑戩シナイ限リ我ノ行動ヲ現在以上ニ發展セシメス  
ロ軍ノ配備及行動、敵ノ反謀ニ對シ準備スルノ外暫ク現狀ノ儘トシ其ノ行

動ハ之ヲ慎重ニスル旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

十八 我カ第一線部隊ハ三十日未明迄ニ沙草峰及張鼓峰ノ敵前概ネ八、九  
 百米ノ諸高地ヲ隱蔽シテ占領シ嚴ニ「ソ」聯側ノ行動ヲ監視警戒シマシ  
 タ 然ルニ三十一日午前一時四十分頃「ソ」軍ハ暗夜ニモ拘ラス戰車  
 ヲ伴ヒ且正確ナル支援砲撃ヲ以テ攻撃前進シ來マシタカラ我軍ハ直ニ之  
 ニ應戰シテ反撃シ三十一日午前六時頃迄ニ敵ヲ退シテ張鼓峰及沙草峰  
 ト張鼓峰トノ中間高嶺ノ各「ソ」軍陣地竝ニ沙草峰ヲ何レモ完全ニ占領  
 シマシタ然シ我軍ハ依然國境線内ニ留マリ事件不擴大方針ヲ嚴守シテ居  
 タノデアリマス

十九 八月一日午後大本營カラ「朝鮮軍司令官ハ當分ノ間張鼓峰、沙草峰  
 附近概ネ現進出線附近ヲ占據シ且石以外軍正面ノ滿「ソ」國境ノ警戒ヲ  
 嚴ナラシメヨ」トノ旨ノ命令ト共ニ「張鼓峰沙草峰附近ニ於テ「ソ」  
 軍ノ挑戰ナキ限り軍行動ヲ現在以上ニ進展セシムルナ軍ノ配置及行動  
 ハ敵ノ反撃ニ對シ準備スル以外ハ現状ヲ維持セヨ」ニ右以外軍正面ノ滿  
 「ソ」國境方面ニ於テハ特ニ警戒ヲ嚴ナラシムルモ軍隊ノ行動ハ敵ヲ刺  
 激シナイコトニ留意セヨ



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軍軍ノ行動ハ全般ニ亘リ慎重ナラシムヘシトノ旨ノ指示電報カ來、同時ニ陸軍省ヨリハ本事件ニ於テハ不擴大方針ヲ堅持スルコト從前ト異ナルコトナク公正妥當且平和的見地ニ立チ局地問題トシテ敏速ニ之カ解決ヲ期スル爲事件ヲ速力ニ外交商議ニ移ス方針ナル旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

二十 朝鮮軍ハ右ノ命令指示ノ通りニ處置シ只管事件ノ不擴大方針ヲ堅持シ慎重ヲ期シタノテアリマス

二十一 然ルニ「ソ」軍ハ爾後連日續々後方ヨリ兵力ヲ注入シ猛烈ナル攻撃ヲ加ヘ來マシタカ我方ハ全然受身ノ状態ヲ以テ國境線ヲ頑守スル外何等ノ行動ニ出ツル事ヲ爲シマセンデシタ

二十二 八月一日以降「ソ」軍ハ約二ヶ飛行旅團ヲ以テ直接我カ第一線ヲ爆撃スル外北鮮鐵道、豆滿江橋梁、鮮内各地ニ攻撃ヲ加ヘテ來テ第一線ノ損害、北朝鮮民心ノ動搖ハ逐次増大シマシタ

其處テ私ハ我飛行部隊ノ我領内ニ限定スル出動方ニツキ中央ニ意見ヲ内申シマシタカ認可セラレス最後迄飛行機ハ一機モ出動セシメルコトハアリマセンテシタ

二十三 「ソ」軍砲兵ハ九〇門ヲ下ラス其ノ間新ナキ射撃ト百台余ノ戰車

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ヲ伴フ反復攻撃及飛行機ノ襲撃ノ爲我第一線ノ損害ハ八月九日頃毎日平均二〇〇名ニ達シ第十九師團（平時偏制）兵力ハ涸竭スルニ至リマシタ

二十四

然シ乍ラ一件不擴大方針ハ前述ノ如ク中央統帥部ノ嚴命スル所テ

アツテ朝鮮軍亦之ヲ堅持シ第一線各部隊ハ指揮統率及戰況等ニ於テ著シ

ク苦境ニ立チツツモ嚴トシテ克ク此ノ方針ヲ確守シマシタ

思ヒマスノニ戰鬪ニ於テハ一旦敵ヲ破シタナラバ之ヲ急追シテ再ヒ立

ツ能ハサラシムルヲ以テ最良ノ手段トスルノテアリマス 然ルニ張鼓嶺

附近ノ我第一線部隊ハ不擴大方針ヲ堅持スル爲メ敵ヲ破碎シツツモ之ヲ

追撃スルコトナク依然同一地（國境線内）ニ留マツテ對戦シテ居マス故

「ソ」直ハ新兵力ヲ増加シテ各方面ヨリ絶ヘス執拗ニ我ニ反攻ヲ加ヘ來

テ我一線ノ死傷増大シ苦戦最モ大ナルモノカアリマシタ

二十五 第十九師團長ハ第一線ノ戰況ト損害甚大ナルヲ願慮シ重ニ對シテ

師團全部隊ノ速カナル掌握使用ヲ内申シテ來マシタカ直ハ師團長カ優勢

ナル兵力ヲ掌握セハ不知不識不擴大方針ノ範圍ヲ逸脱スル慮ナシトシナ

イノヲ願慮シ師團ノ苦戦苦境ヲ万察シツツ涙ヲ吞ンデ最後迄其ノ意見ヲ

容レマセンデシタ

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二十六 張鼓峰附近我第一線方面ノ地形ハ豆滿江ノ大河ニヨリ分斷セラレ最前線方面ハ地形狹長デアツテ部隊ノ遮蔽行動煩ル困難デアリマシタ夫レ故張鼓峰沙草峰方面ノミニ於テ正面攻防ヲ繰リ返スノハ事件ノ解決ヲ急速ナラシメル所以デアリマセンノデ正面ト共ニ慶興對岸豆滿江上流左岸ノ地區カラ「ソ」軍ノ右側背ニ兵力ヲ使用シ一舉ニ事件ノ解決ヲ計ルヲ可ナリト判斷シ私ハ之ヲ中央當局ニ謀リマシタカ之モ不擴大方針ノ爲承認セラレルニ至リマセンデシタ

二十七 此トシテ現地ニ於テ事件ヲ急速ニ解決セシムル方法ハ一ニ「ソ」聯側ノ越境企圖ヲ斷念セシムルニ在ツテ之カ爲ニ採ルヘキ方法手段ハ種々アリト雖モ悉ク事件不擴方針ノ逸脫ヲ願慮シ之カ採用ヲ承認セラレナカツタコトハ前述ノ通りデアリマス

茲ニ於テ此及第一線各部隊ハ一貫當面スル地域ニ於テ凡百ノ惡事件ニ耐ヘ陰忍自重終始戰鬥ニ於テ最モ避クヘキ受動的行動ニ甘ンジ現地解決ニ全力ヲ傾注シタノデアリマス  
即チ我第一線部隊ハ自ラ進ンデ「ソ」軍ヲ攻滅シタ事ハ絶無デアツテ常ニ「ソ」軍ノ進攻ニ對應シテ之ヲ擊破シ而カモ「ソ」軍ノ進攻正面以外

ノ地區ニ行動スルコトナク且國境線外ニ追撃セス以テ戦闘及戦闘地域ノ擴大、延テハ事件不擴大方針ノ弛緩ヲ嚴戒シ極力當面スル現地ニ於テ「ソ」聯立側ノ企圖ヲ破碎抑止スルニ努メタノデアリマス

二十八 八月八日頃「ソ」軍當面ノ兵力ハ狙撃師團三ヶ師團 騎兵一ヶ師團 戦車一旅團 飛行機二ヶ旅團ト判断セラレタルニ對シ我方ハ終始第十九師團ノ兵力ノミヲ以テ對戦シ廣正面ニ展開シ其ノ第一總歩兵ハ三千名余ニ過キマセンデシタ

二十九 斯クシテ苦戦中ニ外交折衝中ノ停戦協定カ成立シ八月十一日正午彼我戦闘行為停止ヲ命シタノデアリマス

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昭和二十一年（一九四六年）十二月二十二日於東京

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

供述者 中村孝太郎

同日於同所

立會人 阪<sup>バ</sup> 塾<sup>ジ</sup> 淳<sup>ジュン</sup> 吉<sup>キチ</sup>

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ  
誓フ

宣  
誓  
書

(署名捺印)

中  
村  
孝  
太  
郎

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Translated by  
Defence Language Branch

Affidavit (no.2)  
by  
Kotaro Nakamura

1. My name is Kotaro Nakamura.
2. My present address is:  
No. 106, Imazato-cho, Shirokane, Shiba-ward, Tokyo.
3. I was born on August 28, 1881.
4. The outline of my career is as follows:  
On Nov. 22, 1901 I graduated from the Military Academy (the 13th class)  
On Dec. 3, 1909 I graduated from the Army Staff College.  
On Dec. 22, 1930 I was appointed Chief of the Personnel Affairs  
Department of the War Ministry.  
On April 11, 1932 I was promoted to Lieutenant General.  
On March 1, 1937 I was appointed a War Councillor.  
On June 23, 1938 I was promoted to General.  
On July 15, 1938 I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.  
On July 7, 1941 I was relieved of the position of the said Commander-  
in-Chief and appointed a War Councillor.  
On Sept 30 of the same year I retired from the position.
5. I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army on July 15, 1938.  
I left Tokyo on the 17th of the same month for Seoul by plane and arrived  
there in the afternoon of the same day.  
My predecessor was General KOISO (Kuniaki).
6. Prior to my appointment to this post, namely on July 11 while my  
predecessor KOISO was still Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army, the  
first trespassing of the border by the Soviet Army occurred at Changkufeng  
near the Manchukuo-Soviet frontier. Our garrison guards at the front,  
however, waited patiently and on a strict watch hoping for an amicable



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solution of the problem by diplomatic negotiations between Japan, Manchukuo and Russia. In view of the gravity of the situation, I visited the central army authorities on the 16th of the same month as soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army after having been relieved of my former position of a War Councillor, and heard the explanation about the situation from the officer in charge.

7. I could see from the foregoing that the central authorities had a policy to bring the matter to a rapid and amicable settlement through peaceful means. The central authorities instructed me accordingly, and I hurried for my new post as I said before.

8. When I arrived at Seoul, I found that an order from Tokyo dated July 16 had been waiting me there. The gist of the order was as follows:

"You are authorized to concentrate, if required, the forces under your command in Korea to the very border, in view of the Soviet army's unlawful trespassing near Changkufeng."

In compliance with this order I instructed a part of my forces to move, but restricted their movement to the west of the Tumen River in order to avoid to aggravate the situation.

9. At that time the 20th Division belonging to the Korean Army under my command was in action at the North China front and only the 19th Division (the divisional commander was Lieutenant-General SUETAKA, Kanezō) was staying at the peace time original position.

10. The said unit as well as the general situation in Korea showed nothing unusual and were quiet and peaceful.

11. This incident was also a concern to the Kwantung Army, because the

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Changkufeng area was situated within the Manchukuo-Russian Border, in other words in Manchukuo. But viewed from the practical standpoint of the general topography, villages, communications etc., the district was most closely connected with the Korean Army and Korea. This was the reason why the Korean Army was made responsible for the guard duty at the border in this area and the frontier-guard of the 19th Division under my command was in charge of it.

12. The Korean Army strictly obeyed the instruction of the central authorities and was hoping for a settlement through diplomatic negotiations, but there was no prospect of immediate settlement.

13. Changkufeng is a hill, one hundred and several scores metres above the sea-level, but in the neighbourhood only small pine-trees or various kinds of shrubberies are growing here and there so that the bare hill, floating above them commanded a panoramic view of that district.

The railway line, connecting Manchukuo with Korea is only 6 miles from the hill and can be seen clearly from there, while even Rashin Harbour, which is situated some 18 kilometres from there, is also within sight.

14. On July 20, the 19th Division tendered its opinion, to the Army head-quarter stating that it was its earnest desire to have a part of its frontier guard posted on a hill about 800 metres west of Changkufeng as it offered a nice position for the reconnoitering purposes. We, however, checked it by a telegram, fearing that an untoward incident which are apt to happen might touch off a real fighting thus aggravating unnecessarily the whole situation.

15. On July 23 a telegram was received from the army General Staff to the following effect:

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"Diplomatic negotiations concerning the settlement of the Changshufeng Incident will be continued. The negotiations will be discontinued whenever the chance, of success cease to exist, and the matter is now being considered along the line of evacuating the bulk of the forces, concentrated at the frontier-area to their original positions as soon as possible. You are requested to take sufficient care not to aggravate the trouble by careless mistakes." And on July 26 a telegram was received from the Imperial General Headquarters, in which we were ordered as follows:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army is requested to order his troops concentrated in the area near the frontier to withdraw to their original positions. But, if required, a part of them may be used to strengthen the defence of the frontier."

16. On July 27 I ordered the troops of the 19th Divisions at the front (one infantry battalion at Chingsin, the same unit at Kuchen, 2 infantry battalions and 2 artillery battalions at Awuchi and in the area west of it) to withdraw to their original positions in Ranan. Starting from the 28th of the same month the transportation of the troops were commenced from the Awuchi station by rail.

17. On July 29, at about 9,30 a.m. the Soviet Army advanced to a hill about 1,000 metres south of Shatsaofeng (it lies on the line about 350 metres west of the border-line between Hunchun and Kaiyakn) and began to fortify the hill. Consequently our guards in front of the hill were forced to repulse them and occupy the line since our patrol was fired upon by the Soviet machine-guns. But our troops withdrew immediately to their original positions (about 1,000 meters back west of the frontier line) in order to avoid further troubles. The Soviet army began, however, to attack

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us at about 4.30 p.m. and invaded the area about 500 metres across the frontier-line. Things having come to such a pass, our troops had no other way than to strengthen the forces at the front, in order to confront them. This new situation being obviously an outcome of a violation of the frontier-line, it is too serious a matter for the army to sit tight and let the matter take its own course. Thereupon, Lient. General SUETAKA, the Divisional Commander of the 19th Division ordered a part of his troops (the bulk of the 75th Infantry Regiment) to withhold their movement and wait in the rear of the frontier guard as an emergency step in view of the rapid change of the situation.

I was of the opinion that the only solution was to repulse the Soviet troops outside of the Manchoukuo territory. Therefore I approved the action on the part of the Division and issued an order at about 1.00 a.m. on July 30 to the following general effect:

"We must be satisfied if the Soviet army now attacking our troops stationed on the closed curve hill south-west of Shatsaofeng ~~be~~ repulsed from the Manchukuo territory, and in that event your troops are requested to withdraw to the <sup>above-</sup> mentioned closed curve line hill to keep watch on the Soviet Army's movements. But in order to avoid to aggravate the situation you must act carefully abstaining from attacking them if they have already withdrawn to the hill south of Shatsaofeng.

At the same time I made a report to the central authorities, the gist of which was as follows:

"This incident was caused by the unlawful trespassing of the border by arrogant Soviet Army in spite of the self-restraint exercised by our troops

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at Chungkufeng, and was touched off by an unlawful challenge by the Soviet Army. Therefore I am convinced that this case must be settled separately from the Changkufeng Incident. I will manage to localize the matter, making it a fundamental principle to be satisfied if the Soviet Army confronting us is repulsed from the Manchukuo territory.

And further in the afternoon of the 30th I issued an order to the Division to the effect that it should not resort to arms unless specific orders to that effect are issued with the exception that it is free to do so in case of an attack by the enemy.

Then in the afternoon of the same day we received a telegram from the General Staff as follows:

"It is our policy to leave the handling of the Shatsaofeng Incident to the forces at the front, which are acting on the principle of non-aggrandizement."

In the same night another telegram came, which stated as follows:

"Regarding the incident of Shatsaofeng-chungkufeng area we have decided to leave the matter to local negotiations in order to avoid a further aggravation of the situation. You are to act along the following lines:

(a) Our forces must abstain from any further activity unless challenged by the enemy.

(b) Status Quo is to be maintained as to the Disposition and action of our forces for the present except be ready for the enemy's counter-attack.

Our actions are to be guided by utmost prudence.

18. Our troops at the front occupied before dawn of the 30th several hills about 800 to 900 metres from the enemy position at Shatsaofeng and Changkufeng, under a camouflage and kept a strict watch on the enemy action.

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But about 1.40 a.m. on the 31st the Soviet Army started to advance, in spite of the pitch darkness, accompanied by tanks and under cover of bombardments. Our troops responded to this at once and successfully repulsing completely occupied by 6:00 a.m. on the 31st, all the Russian fortresses in the area between Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng in Manchukuo territory, and Shatsaofeng. Our troops, however, remained within the border-line and strictly observed non-aggrandizement policy.

19. In the afternoon of August 1 we received a telegraphic order from the Imperial General Headquarters as follows:

"Your forces shall keep the existing position in the Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng area for the present and keep a strict watch on the Manchukuo-Soviet Border facing your forces, And another to the following effect:

1. Your forces shall refrain from expanding actions in the Chungkufeng and Shatsaofeng area, as long as the Soviet forces do not challenge us. The Disposition and action of the forces must be maintained status quo except, to be ready for the enemy's counter-attack.
2. As to the Manchukuo-Soviet border district facing our troops besides the said area you must keep it in mind not to irritate the enemy by our action, although a strict watch for them should be specifically required.
3. You must exercise the utmost care with regard to the activities of your forces in general.

At the same time the following telegram reached me from the War Ministry:

"Non-aggrandizement policy is still to be followed. We are going to refer the matter instantly to diplomatic negotiations in order to settle

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it rapidly as a local question, viewed in the light of justice and propriety and for the sake of peace."

20. Our Korean Army observed the afore-going order faithfully and sticking to the non-aggrandizement policy, exercised the greatest care with regard to its own action.

21. In spite of this the Soviet Army continued to increase their forces from the rear positions day by day and made a heavy attack on our troops. We only defended the border-line with stubborn resoluteness in a purely passive way.

22. Since August 1 the Soviet Army began to bomb our front line directly using about 2 Brigades of Air forces. At the same time the North Korea Railway-line, the Tumen River-bridge and several places in Korea were attacked. As the result our casualties at the front mounted and the people's feeling in the North Korea was disturbed day after day.

Such being the case, I suggested to the central authorities to use our own Air forces limiting their sphere of action within our territory. It was not accepted, so none of our planes appeared at the front throughout the period.

23. The Russian artillery forces had more than 90 guns. As the result of their steady bombardment the repeated raids on us with some 100 tanks and the bombing by planes our casualties at the front were calculated to amount to 200 on the average per day around the period of August 9 and the strength of the 19th Division (under peace-time organization) was quite exhausted.

24. As explained before the non-aggrandizement policy, was, however,

...in order to maintain the central headquarters of command...

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a strict order from the central headquarters of command. The Korean Army obeyed this policy faithfully to the last in spite of the difficulties and disadvantages suffered by our troops at the front in strategy as well as in command.

I am of the opinion that once the enemy is defeated it is most advisable to pursue it without losing time to assure that it will not regain power. Our troops at the front near Changkufeng, however, could not pursue the enemy in spite of their gain and remained in the same position (within the border-line) as before as they were obeying the non-aggrandizement policy. Consequently, the Soviet Army made continuous counter attacks on us from every directions quite obstinately ever increasing their strength so that our casualties at the front increased very much and our position was very difficult.

25. The Divisional Commander of the 19th Division suggested that he might be allowed to use all the troops of the Division at his liberty, in view of the difficult situation at the front and our mounting casualties.

In spite of my sympathy I did not accede to his request throughout the period fearing that he might go over the limit of the non-aggrandizement policy unawares, if a superior force were placed under his command.

26. Our Changkufeng-front area was divided by the big Tumen River. The front nearest to the enemy was so narrow in its configuration that the troops could barely cover themselves. I thought it inadvisable to repeat frontal battles in the Changkufent-Shatsaofeng area if we want to settle the matter rapidly. I was of the opinion that we better settle the matter once for all by a flank attack on the right side of the Soviet Army's



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back starting from the upper stream of the Tumen River on the opposite bank of Chinghsing. And I consulted with the central authorities about the foregoing plan. But I could not succeed to get their approval because of the non-aggrandizement policy.

27. The only way to settle the matter rapidly and locally was to make the Soviet Army give up their intension of the trespassing the border. In order to attain this objective we had many plans, but they were not approved as I explained above, because of the fear of going over the limit of the non-aggrandizement policy.

Such being the case, our Army, especially the troop at the front had to adopt a passive attitude, the most unadvisable in battles, enduring unfavorable conditions of every description, in order to do their best to settle the matter locally. In other words, our troops at the front never initiated an attack on the Soviet Army. On the contrary, they always acted defensively and did not act outside the area where the enemy attack commenced, never pursuing it over the border-line. All this was done in order to avoid the expansion of the battle zone and the loosening of the application of the non-aggrandizement policy. They did their best in order to fracture the Soviet Army's intention limiting their activities within the local district.

28. About August 8 the strength of the enemy at the front was estimated to be 3 divisions of sharp-shooters, one cavalry division, one tanks brigade and 2 air force brigades. To cope with this enemy we fought only with the strength of the 19th Division, deploying in a wide field. Our infantry unit at the front had only three thousands men.

29. And in the midst of the hard battle the truce-agreement was concluded and at noon on August 11 both forces were ordered to cease fighting.

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On this 22th day of December, 1947

At TOKYO.

DEPONENT NAKAMURA, Kotaro (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At some place.

Witness: (signed) BANNO, JUNKICHI (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NAKAMURA, Sadao (seal)

- 11 -  
- 12 -

1.  
Affidavit (No. 2) by Kotaro (R. Kataoka),  
Makamura.

1. My name is Kotaro Makamura.

2. My present address is ~~as follows~~:

No. 106, Imazato-cho, Shirokane,

Shiba-ward, Tokyo.

3. I was born on August 28,

1881.

4. The outline of  
my career is ~~this~~ as

follows:

On <sup>22,</sup> Nov. 1901 I graduated

from the Military Academy (the

13th <sup>class</sup> ~~graduate~~)

2.

On ~~2nd~~ Dec 3, 1909 I graduated  
from the <sup>Army</sup> Staff College.

On Dec. <sup>(22)</sup> 1930 I was appointed  
Chief of the Personnel Affairs  
Department of the War Ministry.

On April <sup>(11)</sup> 1932 I was  
promoted to Lieutenant General.

On March <sup>(1)</sup> 1937 I was appointed  
a War Councillor.

On June <sup>(23)</sup> 1938 I was promoted  
to General.

On July <sup>15</sup> 1938 I was appointed  
Commander-in-Chief of the  
Korean Army.

On July 7, 1941 I was ~~dis~~  
relieved of ~~my~~ from the position of the  
said Commander-in-Chief and was  
appointed a War Counsellor.

On Sept <sup>30</sup> of the same year I  
~~was dismissed~~ retired from the position.

5. I was appointed Comman-  
der-in-Chief of the Korean Army

4.

on ~~15th~~ July <sup>15</sup> 1938. I left Tokyo  
(the 17th) ~~on 17th~~ of the <sup>same</sup> month for Seoul by plane  
and arrived there in the after-  
noon of the same day.

My predecessor was General  
KOISO (Kuniaki)

6. Prior to my appointment,  
~~Before I had been appointed~~  
~~to~~ to this post, namely on ~~11th~~  
July <sup>11</sup> ~~in the~~ <sup>while</sup> ~~administration period~~  
~~of the~~ <sup>my</sup> predecessor KOISO,  
was still  
Commander-in-Chief of the

Korean Army the first operation of  
 trespassing of the border,  
~~border transgression~~ by ~~Soviet~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~army~~ <sup>army</sup>  
 occurred ~~not~~ at Changkufeng near the  
 Manchukuo-Soviet  
 frontier between Russia and Man-

~~chukuo~~. Our garrison guards at <sup>the</sup> front, however, <sup>waited</sup> pa-  
 tiently and on a strict watch <sup>hoping</sup> for  
 an amicable solution of the problem  
 the opportunity to take a new turn

by diplomatic negotiations ~~between~~  
 between Japan, Manchukuo and Russia.

In view of the gravity of the situation,  
 I visited the  
 central <sup>army</sup> authorities of the Army on

6

the 16th of the same month as soon as

I was appointed <sup>Commander-</sup>  
<sup>(after having been)</sup>  
in-Chief of the Korean Army <sup>relieved of</sup>

~~from~~ <sup>my</sup> former position of a War  
Councillor, ~~to be informed through~~  
and heard the explanation  
about the situation from the officer in charge  
of the real fact in the front,

~~considering the emergent situation.~~

~~There~~ I <sup>learned</sup> ~~was informed~~ of the following  
fact. <sup>to the central Army authorities</sup>  
~~news by~~ <sup>A telegram</sup> from the Korean

Army, ~~which the central authorities~~

~~of the Army had~~ received on July 13



7.

~~July~~ stated:

" The Soviet <sup>army</sup> occupied Changkufeng

on July 11~~July~~, 1938 and ~~beg~~ started a

military construction.

~~private~~ They ~~had been~~ <sup>seem to</sup> insist

~~old since~~

that the Chang Pond area (a pond situated east of Changkufeng) (Khasan

Lake) ~~should~~ belongs to Soviet

Russia according to the treaty,

while ~~while~~ we <sup>contend</sup> ~~have an opinion~~ that it

is obviously <sup>a part of</sup> Manchukuo's Terri-

tory as the map <sup>published by the Soviets</sup> ~~made on their~~

8.

~~part~~ <sup>indicate</sup> ~~shows it~~. Consequently <sup>the above-mentioned</sup> ~~it is~~  
Soviet action is)

\* Clearly <sup>an</sup> illegal act. However, in view of  
the China Incident still progressing, we will not resort  
~~without our consent~~. ~~We would like~~  
to an immediate counter attack, but approach the Soviet  
~~side~~ ~~however~~, to abstain from repulsion  
on the spot explaining <sup>our</sup> just contention and asking them  
~~of enemy at once~~, considering  
to vacuate.

~~our bad condition under the~~  
~~China Incident, which operation~~

~~is now in progress and to try~~

~~to reason them into compliance~~

~~directly there in front to with-~~

~~draw from the place occupied.~~

In case the Soviets do  
~~But if the Reds <sup>deserve the loss</sup>, could~~  
 accede to  
 not meet our demands for ~~our~~  
~~point~~, we are prepared to repulse  
 would ~~repel~~ them ~~as~~  
~~absolutely~~ by ~~our~~ force."

The General Staff ~~office~~  
 replied to this by ~~telegram~~ <sup>→ sending a telegram</sup>

on July 14 as follows:

1. The General Staff is in accord with  
~~we are of the same opinion~~

with the Korean Army about the

Changkenfeng Incident.

2. In view of the fact that the said point is  
~~In respect that the point, where the trouble~~

~~happened~~, ~~threatens~~ directly  
 menaces) our Korean border, we ~~shall~~ <sup>will at once</sup> make  
 our Foreign <sup>office,</sup> ~~Ministry~~ ~~to protest~~  
 + lodge a strong protest.  
~~strictly against them~~

~~that~~ Further-more <sup>I learnt that</sup> on July 15 the  
 War Ministry] replied by <sup>(sending a)</sup> telegram  
~~also to that~~ <sup>the</sup> following effect:

" As to ~~Regarding~~ the case of the  
 Soviet border trespassing at  
 Changkufeng, <sup>it is our</sup> ~~we~~ intention to settle  
 the matter ~~through~~ diplomatically

~~negotiation and we must exercise~~  
 The most careful consideration must be given before we  
~~exercise the greatest care with~~  
 decide <sup>whether</sup> we ~~repulse them by force, in case they do~~  
~~regard to the question, whether we~~  
 not evacuate in spite of our demand,  
shall repulse them at once or not  
~~if they <sup>would</sup> happen, not to withdraw,~~  
~~in contempt of our demand~~

7. I could see from the afore-  
 going that the central authorities  
 had a policy to bring the matter  
 to a rapid and amicable settle-  
 ment, <sup>through</sup> peaceful means.  
~~transferring the treatment~~

~~to the diplomatic negotiation in~~  
~~order to settle it in peace.~~ The  
 central authorities <sup>instructed me accordingly</sup> ~~as well - gave me~~  
~~which had contents almost~~  
~~order like the foregoing,~~ and I  
 hurried <sup>as I said</sup>  
~~started~~ for my new post ~~in a hurry~~  
 before.  
~~as above mentioned.~~

8. When I arrived at Seoul,  
 I found that from Tokio  
 an order <sup>dated July 16</sup> had  
 been waiting me there.  
~~sent me from the central~~  
~~authorities.~~ The gist of the  
 order was ~~this~~ as follows:

" you are authorized to ~~It is at your liberty~~ to concentrate  
if required, ~~the~~ <sup>under your command</sup> forces in Korea ~~to~~ the

very border ~~if needed to~~, in ~~the~~  
view of <sup>Soviet army's</sup>  
~~due to~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Red's~~ ~~unlawful~~  
unlawful trespassing ~~border transgression~~ near  
Changkaifeng" ~~Assist~~

In compliance with  
~~According to~~ <sup>this order</sup> I  
instructed <sup>a part of</sup> ~~ordered~~ <sup>to</sup> my forces, ~~partially~~  
to <sup>move</sup> ~~advance~~, but restricted <sup>their movement</sup> ~~within~~

to the west ~~side~~ of the Tumen  
river in order to avoid ~~the~~ to

aggravate the situation.

~~expansion of the trouble at any rate.~~

9. At that time  
~~those days~~ The 20th Division

belonging to the Korean Army under my

command was in action

at the North China front, and

<sup>only</sup> The 19th Division (the divisional

commander was Lieut. <sup>General</sup> ~~for~~ SUETAKA

Kamezō ) was <sup>staying</sup> ~~holding his~~  
position.

peace at the <sup>(peace time)</sup> original station.

10. The said unit as well as the ~~people~~

general  
situation in Korea

showed nothing  
~~had nothing~~



unusual  
~~remarkable~~ movement and were

~~keeping peace~~ quiet and peaceful.

11. This incident <sup>(also)</sup> was a concern to ~~do something to~~

~~do~~ with the Kwantung Army, because

~~the~~ Changkufeng <sup>(was situated)</sup> area <sup>(within</sup>

the Manchukuo-Russian Border, <sup>in other</sup> ~~or~~  
 words)

(in Manchukuo. But viewed from

(practical) the standpoint of ~~the conditions~~

of the general <sup>topography,</sup> ~~configuration,~~

villages, communications etc.,

(the district)

I (was most closely connected with

The Korean Army and Korea.

This was the reason why  
 the Korean Army <sup>was made</sup> ~~was~~ responsible for  
 the guard <sup>duty</sup> at the border in this area  
 and <sup>the frontier-guard of</sup> the 19th Division under my  
 command ~~but~~ <sup>was in</sup> charge of it.

12. ~~at~~ The Korean Army <sup>(strictly obeyed)</sup> ~~obeyed~~

~~the~~ instruction of the central authori-

ties and <sup>was hoping for a</sup> ~~expected~~ settlement

through diplomatic negotiations, <sup>(but there</sup> ~~they~~  
 was no prospect of immediate settlement. ~~by~~  
~~lingered on it from day to day.~~

17.

~~And there was no chance to suc-~~  
~~ceed in the diplomatic negotiation.~~

13. Changknfeng is a hill; one  
hundred and several scores metres ab-  
ove the sea-~~level~~<sup>level</sup>, but in the neighbour-  
hood <sup>only</sup> small pine-trees or <sup>various</sup> ~~any~~ kind of  
shrubberies ~~are growing~~ here and  
there so that ~~a mere~~<sup>the</sup> bare hill,  
floating ~~above them~~  
~~silhouetted in the surrounding scene-~~  
~~ry and the summit~~ → commanded  
a panoramic view of that district.

The railway line connecting Man-  
 chukiao with Korea is only 6 miles  
 from ~~the~~ <sup>the hill,</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>can be seen clearly from there</sup> ~~with~~ ~~hill~~, while ~~even~~  
 Rashin Harbour, which ~~is~~ <sup>is situated</sup> some 18 kilometres  
~~away~~ from there, ~~is~~ <sup>is also within sight.</sup>  
~~sight~~ We can see through ~~from~~  
~~in the foreground~~ ~~has~~ ~~important~~  
~~this hill is~~ ~~as~~ ~~strategic~~ ~~point.~~

14. ~~By~~ ~~the~~ ~~way~~, On ~~21st~~ <sup>20</sup> of July, the 19th  
 Division ~~sounded~~ <sup>tendered</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>expressed</sup> ~~opinion,~~ <sup>its</sup>  
 to the Army headquarter ~~requesting~~ <sup>should</sup>  
~~maintaining~~ ~~that~~ ~~its~~ ~~positions~~ ~~should~~  
 stating ~~it was its earnest desire to have~~

19.

a part of the frontier guard posted on  
~~partially advance at any rate to~~ a hill

about 800 metres west of Changhsenfeng

as ~~they deemed~~ it <sup>offered</sup> a <sup>nice position</sup> ~~good point~~

for the reconnoitring ~~duties~~ <sup>purposes.</sup> We,

however, checked ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> by a telegram,

fearing that an <sup>unforeseen</sup> ~~unexpected~~ incident  
which are apt to ~~so that~~ might touch off  
~~might happen~~ ~~because it was~~  
a real fighting thus aggravating unnecessarily  
~~apt to become a clue to open fire~~  
the whole situation.

~~which had a threat to extend over~~

~~the whole front.~~

15.

On July 23  
~~we received~~ a telegram

was received) from the General Staff ~~office~~  
 (army) ~~and~~ July <sup>to the</sup> following effect:  
 " ~~It is going to continue~~ <sup>take pains to</sup>

Diplomatic negotiations <sup>concerning</sup> ~~regarding~~

The ~~future~~ settlement of the Chang-  
 peng Incident } will be continued.

but ~~will~~ } will be discontinued

~~give up~~ The negotiations (whenever) } cease to exist.

~~have~~ <sup>now</sup> the chance of success and  
 the matter is being considered along the line of  
 evacuating the ~~main~~ <sup>bulk</sup> troops of the

forces, ~~which~~ concentrated

at the frontier area to their origi-

nal ~~stations~~ positions as soon as possible:

You are requested to take <sup>(sufficient)</sup> care <sup>not to</sup> ~~further~~ aggravate the trouble by ~~a~~ careless mistakes. "  
~~or enough in future least as was~~

~~expected trouble should carelessly~~

~~happen~~ And on ~~26th~~ July 26

~~we received~~ a telegram <sup>(was received)</sup> from the Im-

perial General Headquarters, in which

~~we~~ we were ordered as follows:

" The Commander-in-Chief of  
 the Korean Army, <sup>is requested to</sup> ~~shall~~ order his

Troops concentrated in the area near

the frontier to withdraw ~~partly~~ to  
 their original ~~positions~~ positions.

But, if ~~needed~~ required ~~to~~, a part of them <sup>(to be used to)</sup> may strengthen

then (the) defence of the frontier. "

16. On July 27 I ordered ~~to be issued on~~  
~~such being the case~~ ~~ordered~~  
~~the troops of~~ the troops of <sup>at the front</sup>  
 the 19th Division's ~~to be issued on~~

(one ~~battalion~~ ~~of~~ ~~infantry~~ at

Chinghsin, the same <sup>unit</sup> ~~power~~ at Kuchan,

infantry,

2 ~~battalions of infantry~~ and 2

artillery,

~~battalions of artillery~~ at Awachi

and in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~area~~ <sup>(west of it)</sup> ~~of it~~ to with-



23.

draw to their original <sup>positions</sup> ~~stations~~ in  
Ranan. Starting from ~~the line~~ <sup>the</sup> 28th of the

same month the transportation of  
the troops <sup>were commenced</sup> ~~begin~~ from the Awuchi

station by railway.

On July 29, at about 9.30 a.m.)

17.

~~The Reds, however, happened~~  
(Soviet army

~~to~~ advanced to a hill about 1,000

metres south of Shatsaofeng (it lies on

the line about 350 metres west

of the border-line between Hunshan

and Kaiyaten) and began to

fortify the hill. Consequently our  
 guards in front of the hill were  
 forced to repulse them and occupy  
 (since our patrol was fired upon by  
 the Soviet machine guns,  
 the line) But our troops withdrew  
 immediately to their original <sup>position</sup> ~~post~~  
 (about 1,000 metres west of the front-  
 ier line) <sup>in order</sup> ~~so as~~ to avoid ~~the~~ fur-  
 ther troubles. ~~to the last~~. The  
 Soviet army <sup>however</sup> ~~nevertheless~~, <sup>Reds</sup> began, to attack us  
 at about 4.30 p.m. and invaded the  
 area about 500 metres <sup>across</sup> ~~over~~ the front-

ier-line. Things having come to such a pass, our troops had no other way than ~~there was no help for~~

~~it, but~~ to strengthen the forces at

the front, in order to <sup>confront</sup> ~~stand~~ face to face

~~with them.~~ This new <sup>situation ~~is~~ being</sup> ~~turn~~ came,

<sup>(an outcome of a violation of</sup> ~~believe, obviously)~~ ~~from the fact that they~~

~~trampled down~~ the frontier-line, it is ~~a~~ too serious a matter for the army to sit ~~and~~ ~~in the~~ light of our ~~right~~ and let the matter take its own course

~~that~~ it is too serious <sup>to</sup> ~~leave~~ the matt

~~er~~ ~~to~~ ~~take~~ its own course. There-

upon, Lieut. General SUETAKA, the Di-

visional Commander of the 19th Division ordered a part of his troops  
 (the ~~chief power~~ <sup>bulk</sup> of the <sup>Infantry</sup> 75th Regiment)  
 to withhold their movement ~~to the original position~~  
~~to hold themselves in readiness in~~  
 and wait in the rear of the frontier guard as an emer-  
~~gency step in view of the rapid change of the situation.~~  
~~gency step in view of the rapid change of the situation.~~  
~~guards, suspending its return trans-~~  
~~portation, as he feared the rapid~~  
~~change of the war complexion.~~

I ~~had~~ <sup>was</sup> of the <sup>that</sup> opinion ~~about~~  
 the only solution was to repulse the Soviet troops  
~~the unreasonable border transgress-~~  
 outside of the Manchoukuo territory,  
~~since by Redo this time that there~~

~~was no help for it~~, but to

~~repulse them from the territory of~~

~~Manchoukuo.~~ Therefore to ~~CO~~ approved the

action <sup>on the part of</sup> of the Division and <sup>issued an</sup> ord-

~~erance them to act~~ <sup>to the following general effect,</sup> ~~on the whole as follows~~

(at about 1.00 a. m. ~~31st July~~; on July 30)

"~~The operation~~ must be <sup>We</sup>

satisfied <sup>if the Soviet army now attacking</sup> ~~only with the repulsion~~  
our troops stationed on the closed curve hill  
~~of Peko from the territory of Man-~~

~~choukno, which are making raid~~

~~on our troops on the closed~~

~~curve line hill~~ & south-west of

be repulsed from the Manchukuo territory  
Shatsaofeng, and your troops are re-  
(in that event)

quested to withdraw to the above-

mentioned closed curve line hill.

to keep watch on the Soviet army's  
movements.

But (in order to avoid to aggravate the situation)  
you must act carefully ab-

staining from attacking them ~~provided~~

~~that~~ if they ~~are~~ have already withdrawn to

the hill south of Shatsaofeng. ~~but the~~

~~case should be expanded~~  
~~might be aggravated~~

at the same time I made  
a report to the central authorities, ~~which was outlined~~  
the

~~fact~~: gist of which was as follows:

" This ~~case~~ incident, was caused by ~~I believe~~ ~~traced~~  
~~back to the unreasonable border trans-~~  
 the unlawful trespassing of the border  
 by the arrogant Soviet Army in spite of the self-restraint  
~~all the more~~  
~~gression by the Reds~~ ~~flashed with our~~  
 exercised by our troops at Chungkufeng, and was  
~~mortification for our troops' pain,~~  
 touched off by an unlawful challenge by the Soviet  
~~because they mortified themselves~~  
 Army,

~~to the limit against them at Chan-~~

~~gkufeng and it has arisen from~~

~~their unreasonable challenge, cause~~

Therefore  
~~quently~~, I am convinced that ~~must~~  
~~be~~ (must be settled)  
 (this case) separately from the Chang-

kufeng incident. And I will

manage to localize

~~leave~~ the matter, ~~not to extend~~

~~over the other area~~, making it

a fundamental principle to be satis-

fied <sup>(confronting us)</sup> if the Soviet army is repulsed ~~only with repulsion of Reds~~ from

(Manchukuo) the Territory. ~~of Manchukuo~~, which

~~are now standing against us~~

~~are now face to face.~~

And further in the afternoon

the <sup>of 30th</sup> issued an <sup>to the effect</sup> order ~~to~~ the Divisions that

it ~~their activity~~ should <sup>not resort to arms</sup> ~~be done only~~ unless specific orders to that effect are issued with the

~~by a further instruction~~ provided that exception that it is free to do so in case of an attack



~~It is our policy to leave the settlement~~ <sup>the</sup> by <sup>the</sup> enemy

Then in the afternoon of the same day we received a telegram from the General Staff ~~office~~ as follows:

"It is our policy, ~~from the present we are~~ taking a policy to leave the settlement ~~the handling of~~ <sup>the handling of</sup> the Shatsaofeng Incident to the ~~front~~ <sup>at the front</sup> forces' liberty, which are acting on the principle of <sup>non-</sup>aggrandizement." ~~is keeping a non-expansion~~ ~~incident.~~ ~~policy steadily.~~

In the same night, another telegram came, which stated as follows:

"Regarding ~~the~~ the incident of Shutsaofeng-chungkenfeng area we have decided to <sup>leave</sup> ~~take a policy~~, to refer the matter to ~~the~~ local negotiations in order to avoid a further ~~aggravation of the situation~~ aggravation of the situation ~~and~~ aggravation of the situation ~~the act~~ ~~you are to act~~ ~~movement must be done~~ along within the following limits lines:

(a) Our forces must abstain

from <sup>(any)</sup> further <sup>activity</sup> expansion <sup>of the cause</sup>, so long  
 unless challenged by  
 as the enemy does not challenge

2.  
 (b) Status quo is to be maintained as to the  
 Disposition and action  
 of our forces <sup>status quo</sup> ~~must be maintained~~

for the present except be ready

for the enemy's counter-attack. ~~and~~  
 Our actions are to be guided by utmost prudence  
~~they need to respect themselves.~~

18. Our Troops' at the front

occupied before dawn of <sup>the</sup> 30th sever-  
 al hills ~~in front of our enemy~~

, about 800 to 900 metres ~~distance~~ from  
 the enemy position)  
~~them~~ (at Shatsaofeng and Changkufeng,  
 under  
 taking measure of a camouflaging  
 and kept a strict  
~~them~~ so they ~~were~~ on guard  
 and kept watch <sup>on</sup> for the enemy <sup>action</sup> at  
 strictly.

But at about 1.40 a.m.  
 on <sup>the</sup> 31st the Soviet army started  
~~the~~ ~~Reds~~ began to advan-  
 ce, in spite of <sup>the</sup> pitch dark <sup>ness</sup> night  
~~being~~ accompanied by tanks and  
 under cover of bombardment.  
~~good~~ batteries.

our troops <sup>responded to this</sup> ~~repelled the~~  
~~fire~~ (at once and <sup>successfully repulsing</sup> repelled

~~them~~ ~~till they~~ <sup>(on the)</sup> at last took possession  
 completely occupied

~~side of the~~ ~~at~~ Changhsienfeng,

→ all the <sup>(Russian)</sup> ~~every~~ fortresses in Manchukuo ~~territory~~  
 (the area)

ry, which lay between Changhsienfeng and Shatsaofeng, <sup>in Manchukuo territory</sup> and ~~the~~

~~entire~~ Shatsaofeng. Our troops, however,

remained within the border-line and strictly observed non-aggrandizement policy.  
~~were keeping the non-expansion~~

✓ ~~policy strictly.~~

19. In the afternoon of August 1 we received  
 telegraphic  
 order ~~by telegram~~ from the  
 (general)  
 Imperial Headquarters as follows:

"Your forces shall keep  
 the <sup>existing</sup> ~~present~~ position line → in the

Changhsufeng and Shatsasfeng area

for the present and ~~make~~ <sup>keep a strict</sup> watch

~~strictly on~~ <sup>on</sup> the Manchukuo-Soviet border

~~in front of~~ <sup>facing your</sup> forces."

and another to the following effect.

"~~and at the same time we~~

~~received an instructive telegram~~

~~too as follows:~~

" 1. Your forces shall <sup>refrain from</sup> ~~assist from~~  
 expanding actions  
~~the further expansion of action in~~

the Changhsienfeng and Shatsao-feng

area, as long as <sup>the Soviet forces</sup> ~~Reds~~ do not

challenge us. The Disposition and

action of the forces must be main-  
 status quo <sup>except</sup>

maintained, ~~but~~ to be ready for the

enemy's counter-attack.

2. As to the Manchukuo-Soviet

border district <sup>facing</sup> ~~in front of~~ our

Troops besides the said area you

must ~~read~~ <sup>to</sup> keep it in mind not

to ~~inflame~~ <sup>irritate</sup> the enemy by <sup>our</sup> action,

although a strict watch for them should

be ~~requested in special~~ <sup>specifically required</sup>.

3. You must exercise the <sup>utmost</sup> ~~greatest~~

care with regard to the ~~whole act~~  
~~activity~~ of your forces in general.

At the same time the foll-

owing telegram reached ~~to~~ me.



from the War Ministry:

" ~~The circumstances in this case, to keep~~  
 \* Non-<sup>aggrandizement</sup> ~~expansion~~ policy <sup>is still to</sup> ~~is still~~,  
 be followed.  
~~what it used to be~~, We are

going to refer the matter instantly to  
~~the~~ diplomatic negotiations in or-  
 der to settle it rapidly as a local  
 question, viewed in the light of  
 justice and propriety ~~and~~ <sup>for the sake</sup> ~~from the~~  
~~viewpoint~~ of peace.

20. Our Korean Army observed the

foregoing order ~~instructive~~ faithfully and ~~was to keep~~ <sup>devoting itself</sup> the non-aggrandizement, ~~expansion~~ sticking to policy, ~~and to~~ exercised the greatest care with regard to its own action.

21. In spite of this <sup>continued to</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>however</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>increase</sup> Soviet army

their forces from the rear positions <sup>day by day</sup> ~~steadily~~ ~~every day ever~~

~~since~~ and made a heavy <sup>attack</sup> ~~saw~~

on our troops, <sup>They replied</sup> ~~They replied~~ <sup>We only</sup>

~~nothing to this, but~~ (defended

the border-line with <sup>stubborn resoluteness</sup> ~~desperate~~

~~courage~~ in <sup>(a fairly</sup> ~~quite~~ passive <sup>for</sup> ~~condition~~ way.

22

Since ~~tot of~~ August <sup>(Soviet army</sup> the ~~Reds~~

began to bomb <sup>using</sup> ~~with~~ about 2

Brigades of air forces. <sup>directly</sup>

<sup>(line</sup> our front). At the same time the

North Korea Railway-line, the

Yumen River-bridge and several

places in Korea <sup>(were attacked.)</sup> ~~that~~ our

casualties at the front <sup>(mounted)</sup> and ~~in~~

~~quite~~ <sup>(the</sup> <sup>(is feeling)</sup> people in the North Korea

was disturbed  
~~increased~~ } day after day.

Such being the case, I  
~~tendered~~ suggested  
~~set forth my opinion~~ to the cent-  
 ral authorities to ~~request~~ <sup>use</sup> the  
~~activity of our~~ <sup>own</sup> (air forces, limit-  
 ing ~~their~~ <sup>their sphere of action within</sup> our territory. ~~They, how-~~  
 It was not accepted, so  
~~over, could not approve my re-~~  
~~quest~~ And } none of our planes  
 appeared at the front } throughout the period.  
~~to the last.~~

The Russian Artillery <sup>forces</sup> had  
~~not~~ <sup>more</sup> less than 90 guns. ~~Resulting~~

As the result of) ~~from~~ their steady bombardments,  
~~the~~ repeated raids <sup>on us</sup> with some  
 100 tanks and the bombing by planes  
 , our casualties at the front were  
 calculated to amount to ~~reckoned by~~ 200 on the average ~~per~~ <sup>per</sup>  
 day <sup>around the period of</sup> ~~about 9th of~~ August, and  
 the strength of the 19th Division  
 ( ~~in~~ <sup>under</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>organization</sup> peace-time ~~footing~~ ) was quite  
 exhausted.

24. As explained before, <sup>aggrandizement</sup> the non-expansion policy,  
 was, however, ~~not~~ ~~as~~ ~~said~~ ~~before~~,

a strict order <sup>from</sup> ~~by~~ the central  
headquarters of command, ~~which was~~

The Korean Army ~~had been~~ obeyed

~~faithfully, and they kept this~~

~~policy~~ (faithfully) (to the last in spite of the  
difficulties and disadvantages suffered by our  
fact that the troops at the front were  
in strategy) (as well as in) Command ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~confronting~~  
~~under extremely distressed circum-~~

~~stances in the way of command and~~

~~our situation.~~

I am of the <sup>(once the enemy is defeated)</sup>  
~~have an~~ opinion that it is most

advisable to pursue it

without losing time, rapidly ~~until~~ <sup>it will not</sup> ~~would be~~ <sup>to assure that</sup> ~~resumed~~  
 (regain) power. again, when ~~we~~

~~happen to defeat the enemy.~~ Our

troops at the front near Changhsien, however,

could not pursue the enemy in spite of their <sup>gain</sup> ~~winning~~ the

fight and remained in the same

position (within the border-line)

as before ~~to stand face to face with~~

~~them~~, as they were ~~observing~~ <sup>the</sup> non-

aggrandizement ~~expansion~~ <sup>policy</sup>. Consequently,

the <sup>Soviet army</sup> ~~part~~ made <sup>continuous</sup> ~~steady~~ counter-attacks  
 attacks on us from every directions  
 quite obstinately <sup>ever</sup> increasing their  
 strength ~~and~~ so that our casu-  
 alities at the front ~~was~~ increased  
~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> much, ~~our forces~~ <sup>and our position was very</sup>  
~~seriously~~ <sup>difficult.</sup>

25.

The Divisional Commander of  
 the 19th Division <sup>suggested that he might</sup>  
 be allowed to use ~~his~~ <sup>set forth his opinion</sup>  
~~on~~ <sup>to</sup> request to command ~~the~~ <sup>all</sup>  
 the troops of the Division at his liberty,



in view of <sup>difficult situation</sup>  
~~in respect that~~ the progress of the

operation <sup>at</sup> the front ~~was serious~~

and our <sup>(mounting)</sup> casualties ~~was~~  
 In spite of my sympathy I did not accede to his request <sup>until the last</sup> throughout the period <sup>might</sup>

I feared that he ~~would~~ go over  
<sup>ing</sup>

The limit of the non <sup>(aggrandizement)</sup> expansion <sup>poli-</sup>

cy unawares, if a superior force  
 were placed under  
~~would be at~~ his command. ~~So~~

~~I could not fall in with his~~

~~views~~ <sup>(with agony)</sup> to the last although I un-

~~derstood well their hard fight~~

26.

~~The configuration~~ of Pan Changku  
 feng-front area was <sup>(divided</sup> ~~from~~ in pieces  
 by the big Yumen River, especially  
 The nearest front to (the) enemy was so  
 narrow in its configuration that  
 the troops could barely cover them-  
 selves. ~~But~~ I thought ~~that~~ it is  
~~unadvisable~~ <sup>unadvisable</sup> to repeat frontal  
 battles in the Changku-feng - Shatsaofeng  
 area } if we want ~~in order~~ to settle the  
 matter rapidly. I was of the

opinion that we ~~best~~ <sup>better</sup> settle the matter ~~by taking a operation to make raids~~ <sup>besides frontal attacks</sup> ~~once for all~~ <sup>(at one charge)</sup> ~~by taking a operation to make raids~~ <sup>a flank attack on the right side of the</sup> Soviet army's back, ~~The Reds back on the right side for~~ starting from ~~on the left bank of~~ the upper stream of the Yumen River on the opposite bank

of Chinghsing. And I consulted with

the central authorities about the ~~aforegoing~~ <sup>plans</sup> ~~which, however, could not~~ <sup>But I could not succeed to get</sup> their approval because of the non-aggrandizement policy. ~~approve it as well owing to the~~

~~"non-expansion" policy~~

27. ~~It~~ <sup>was</sup> to make ~~Reds~~ <sup>(the Soviet army)</sup> give up their



intension of the border. ~~Tramway~~  
 (start here)  
 — this is The only way to  
 settle the matter rapidly and <sup>these</sup> locally  
 on the part of ~~our~~ Army.

In order to attain this objective  
~~For this purpose~~ we ~~had~~ had of course  
 many ~~plans~~ plans, but ~~yet~~ they ~~were~~ were  
 not ~~adopted~~ approved, as ~~above~~ I explained above,  
 because of the fear (of going) over the limit  
 of the non-~~expansion~~ aggrandizement (policy).

Such being the case, our  
 Army, especially ~~every~~ <sup>the</sup> Troop at the front  
 had to ~~stand~~ adopt ~~a~~ passive <sup>attitude</sup> condition,  
 which was, the most unadvisable in  
 battles, ~~bearing~~ <sup>enduring unfavorable</sup> conditions of ever

description ~~or justifying themselves~~  
~~at their post.~~  
~~to the limit~~, in order to ~~make~~ <sup>do</sup> their  
 best to settle the matter <sup>locally</sup> ~~there~~ in the  
~~front~~. In other words, our  
 troops at the front never ~~made raids~~ <sup>initiated an</sup>  
 attack <sup>de Soviet Army</sup>  
 (on) ~~the~~ ~~front~~, On the contrary,  
 they always acted ~~and was the fight~~  
~~on the~~ <sup>defensively</sup> and did not  
 act <sup>outside the area where the enemy attack commenced</sup>  
~~everywhere~~ <sup>but right in front</sup>  
~~of their advance~~, ~~moreover~~, (never pur-  
<sup>ing</sup> ~~sued~~ <sup>them</sup> <sup>it</sup> over the border-line, ~~in~~  
 All this was done in)  
 order to avoid the expansion of  
 the battle <sup>zone</sup> and ~~to stick to the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~loosening~~ of  
~~the~~ ~~battlefield~~, ~~further~~ ~~the~~

52

the application of ~~relaxation of attention~~ to <sup>the</sup> non-  
aggrandizement ~~expansion~~ } policy ~~in the end to~~  
They did, ~~make~~ } their best } <sup>in order to</sup> ~~fracture~~ ~~the Red's~~ Soviet Army's  
intention } ~~possibly~~ } limiting their activities within the  
local district. ~~the district there~~

28.

About ~~8th~~ of August <sup>8</sup> the ~~the~~  
strength of the enemy at <sup>the</sup> front was  
estimated ~~judged~~ to be ~~a force~~ of 3 divisions  
of sharp-shooters, one cavalry di-  
vision, one brigade of tanks and  
2 brigades of air force ~~troop~~,  
To cope with ~~the enemy strength~~  
~~troop~~ (we ~~had~~ fought ~~without~~ only  
with the strength of the 19th Division

Ref No # 12123

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書 (其ノ二)

供述書者

中村孝太郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シ  
タル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

一 私ノ姓名ハ オムラコウタロウ 中村孝太郎デアリマス

二 私ノ現住所ハ東京市芝区白金<sup>今里</sup>所一ノ六番地デアリマス

三 私ノ生年耳日ハ明治十四年(一八八二)年八月二十八日デアリマス

四 私ノ経歴ハ概要ハ次ノ通りデアリマス

明治三十四年(一九〇一)年<sup>土</sup>五月二十二日 陸軍士官學校卒業(第十三期生)

同 四十二年(一九〇九年)十二月三日 陸軍士官學校卒業

昭和五年(一九三〇)年十二月二十二日 陸軍省人事局長

同 七年(一九三二年)四月十一日 陸軍中將

同十二年(一九三七年)三月一日 陸軍参議官

同十三年(一九三八)年六月二十三日 陸軍大将

同十三年(一九三八)年七月十五日 朝鮮軍司令官ニ親補

同十六年(一九四一年)七月七日 朝鮮軍司令官ヲ罷免、陸軍参議官ニ轉補

同 年 九月三十日 退職

五 私ハ昭和十三年(一九三八)年七月十五日朝鮮軍司令官ニ補ケラレ同月十七日東京出發





ト新軍策カハキニシテ其ノ意ヲ示スルコトヲ思フ

トニテナシ七月十四日未謀未討ヨリ「張鼓峰事件」ヲ開スル前至連意電ニ同意ナシキニ

北東ノ直接對峙國境ニ自威ヲ与アルニ鑑ミ前將帝国外務省ヲシテ慎重取議セシムルニ

「張鼓峰」又七月十五日陸軍省ヨリ張鼓峰ニ於ケルソノ前 越境事件ヲ開キキル外交的ニ処

理スルニ針ニシテ「ソノ側」ナク「我」ノ意ヲ示スルニ「張鼓峰」ニ於ケル「撤退」シテ「場」直ニ「七」日取返スル

「我」ノ意ヲ示スルニ「張鼓峰」ニ於ケル「撤退」シテ「場」直ニ「七」日取返スル

七、私ハ右ニ依リ中央部ハ軍部ヲ平和的ニ解決スル方針ヲ以テ外交交渉ニ移シ之カ速ナル

四滿鮮天ニ努ムルモノナルコトヲ知り且其ノ旨四兵部ヨリ指示ヲ受ケ前述ノ如ク急遽赴

任シタノデアリマス

八、前述ノ如ク京城ニ着任シテ見マスト七月十六日附ヲ以テ中央ヨリ次ノ承旨ノ命令ガ来

テ居リマシタ即チ張鼓峰附近ノ軍ノ不法越境ニ對シ所要ニ應シ在營ノ練下部隊ヲ國境近

クニ集中スルコトヲ得ト

私ハ右命令ニ基キ一部兵力ヲ推進ヲ行ヒマシタカ絕對ニ事態ノ拡大ヲ避ケル爲是滿江以

西ニ止メタノデアリマス

九、当時朝鮮軍、魏下郡隊中第二十師團の北支ニ出動シ第十九師團長尾高重義(中将)

三、固有ノ衛戍地ニ位置シ平時状態ニ在リマシタ

七、右ノ我部隊及朝鮮内ノ状況ハ何等ノ変化ナク平靜デアリマシタ

六、旅順岬附近ハ滿洲國境線内約十滿洲国内テアツテ本事件ハ河東嶺ニ關係スル所テモア

リマス力 一般ノ地形、村落、交通等ノ状態ハ朝鮮軍が朝鮮ト國境最ニ密接デアリマスノ

テ此ノ地方國境線ノ警備ハ朝鮮軍ヲ担任シ魏下軍十九師團下ノ國境守備隊カ之ニ當ツテ

居タ、テアリマス

五、前述ノ四天ノ方針ヲ朝鮮軍ハ嚴ニ遵奉シ外交交渉ニ依ル事件解決ヲ待望シマシタカ

注、毎日ヲ經過スルノミテ外交交渉成立ノ見込ハ立チママンテシタ

六、嶺南峰ハ標高百數十米ノ小丘陵デアリテ附近ハ小松ノ種カノ灌木カ所々ニ生長スルカ

一、テテアルカヲ亦喬ノ丘陵ノミガクツキリト浮ク上ツテ居テ非常ニ良ク兵整ノキク地帯テ

アリマシタ。此処カラハ滿洲ヨリ我カ鐵道線ニ僅カ六軒余ノ概万ニ手ニ取ル係ニ見エル

許リカ十八軒余ヲ隔テ夕羅津港迄モ一晝ノ程ニ距離ニ得ルト云フ原野テ馬地デアツタノ

デアリマス

十四 処テ七月二十日茅十九師團ヨリ張鼓峰西側約八〇〇米ノ高地ハ偵察ニ好適デアリ

是非トモ国境并備隊ノ一部ヲ此処ヘ進メタイトノ意見具申ヲシテ承タコトガアリマスカ

朝鮮軍トシテハ不慮ノ事態發生ノ虞アルヲ顧慮シ斯ル行動ハ動モスレハ戦ヲ惹起ノ端緒

トナリ全般ニ波及スル虞大ナルモノガアルカヲ見合セルヨウニト電報ヲ以テ抑止シマシ

夕

十五 次テ七月二十三日參謀本部ヨリ張鼓峰事件今後ノ處理ニ關シテハ外交接觸ハ依然促進

スルモ成功ノ見込ガタイトキハ之ヲ打切り先ニ國境方面ニ集テ部隊ノ主力ハ成ルヘ

ク速カニ旧狀ニ復歸セシメル方針ヲ違メラレアリ 今後共不用意ヲ紛争ノ拡大ヲ防止ス

ル為十分ナル指導ヲスルヨウニトノ旨ノ電報カ来 又七月二十六日大本營命令トシテ朝

鮮軍司令官ハ國境ニ近ク集中シテ部隊ヲ適宜原駐地ニ歸還セシメヨ 所要ニ應シ一部ヲ

以テ國境警備ヲ強化セヨトノ旨ノ電報カ来マシタ

十六 其処テ私ハ七月二十七日茅十九師團等動兵力歩兵一大隊ヲ慶興歩兵一大隊ヲ古城歩兵

二大隊及砲兵二大隊ヲ阿吾地及其西方ニ發動シテ原駐地羅南ニ歸還ノ命令ヲ發シ諸隊ハ二

十八日以降阿吾地駅カラ鉄道輸送ヲ開始シマシタ

七、 必カ七月二十九日午前九時三十分頃ソ聯兵ハ沙草峰南方約一〇〇〇米ノ高地俾春界約

ノ国境線上ヨリ西方約三五〇米ノ線ニ進歩シテ来リテ其ノ線ヲ占領シマシタカ飽ク迄ハ紛糾ヲ遊

タ我々國境守備隊ハ止ムテ之ヲ驅逐シテ其ノ線ヲ占領シマシタカ飽ク迄ハ紛糾ヲ遊

ケル為再々日守備位置國境線上ヨリ約一〇〇〇米西方ニ後退復帰シマシタ 然ルニ午後

四時三十分頃ソ聯部隊ハ更ニ攻襲シテ来テ國境線上ヨリ約五〇〇米ヲ侵入シマシタ 是

ニ於テ我方モ已ムテ第一線ノ兵力ヲ増加シ之ト相対峙スルニ至リマシタ此ノ新事態ハ

明カニ國境線ノ蹂躪テアツテ軍ノ責務上此ノ儘ノ推移ニ委ニ置テナリ重大事デアリマス

其処テ第十九師団長尾高申將ハ狀況ノ急変ヲ顧慮シ一部兵力ヲ派テ七十五聯隊主力ノ掃

運輸送ヲ中止シ之ヲ國境守備隊ノ後方ニ待機セシムルコトニシマシタ

松ハソ軍今回ノ不法越境ハ之ヲ滿領外ニ退退スル以外ニナシトシ右師団ノ行動ヲ是認シ

且七月三十日午前一時頃概テ次ノ如ク師団ニ指示シマシタ

「沙草峰西南方閉鎖曲線高地ノ我カ部隊ヲ攻襲中ノソ軍ヲ退退シ滿領外ニ驅逐スルヲ以テ

充足ニ當今前記閉鎖曲線高地ニ後退シテ監視スルヲ要スヘキニ彼若シ既ニ沙草峰南側高

地ニ後退シアル場合ハ敢テ之ヲ攻襲セズ 以テ事件ヲ拡大ヤサル如ク慎重ニ処理センコ

我方ハ偵察ヲ出シテ其ノ線ヲ占領シマシタカ飽ク迄ハ紛糾ヲ遊

トヲ望ム

同時ニ中央部ニ対シ概不次ノ如ク報告シマシタ

本事件ハ我カ軍カ張鼓峰ニ於テハ隠忍自重セラルニ拘ハラヌ圖ニ乘ツタソノ軍ノ不法越境ニ

端ヲ發シ次テ其ノ不法挑戩ニ依リ生起シタモノテアルカラ張鼓峰事件トハ別個ニ處理セ

ラルヘギモノト確信スル而シテ現時中ソノ軍ヲ滿領外ニ退退スルヲ以テ満足スルヲ本

旨トシ事件ヲ他ニ波及セシメナイ様ニ指導ス

更ニ三十日午後師團ニ対シ敵ノ攻退ヲ受ケナイ限リ実行ハ別命ニ依ルヘキ旨ヲ命令

シマシタ

又同日午後參謀本部カラハ沙草峰事件ハ差当リ不拡大方針ヲ堅持シテ実施シツ、アル現

地部隊ノ處理ニ至マル方針ニテ進ミツ、アル旨ノ電報、次テ同日夜沙草峰張鼓峰附近

事件ニ関シ中央ハ現況以上ニ拡大セサル方針ヲ以テ局地的商議ニ移スコト、ヤツタ

行動ハ差当リ左記ニ依リ処置セラレ度

一 敵ノ挑戩シナイ限り我ノ行動ヲ現在以上ニ發展セシメス

二 軍ノ配備及行動ハ敵ノ反動ニ對シ準備スルノ外暫ク現状ノ儘トシ其ノ行動ハ之ヲ俟

四

重ニス旨ノ電報ガ来マシタ

六

我カ第一線部隊ハ三十日未明迄ニ沙草峰及張鼓峰ノ敵前概ホ八九百米ノ諸高地ヲ隱蔽  
シテ占領シ最ニソ聯側ノ行動ヲ監視警戒シマシタ

然ルニ三十日午前

一時四十分頃ソ軍ハ暗夜ニモ拘ラス戰車ヲ伴ヒ且正確ナル支援砲撃ヲ

以テ攻襲前進シ来マシタカラ我軍ハ直ニ之ニ應戦シテ及奥シ三十一日午前六時頃迄ニ敵

ヲ退シテ張鼓峰及沙草峰ト張鼓峰トノ中間滿領ノ各ソ雷陣地並ニ沙草峰ヲ何レモ完全

ニ占領シマシタ 然シ我軍ハ依然國境線内ニ留マリ事件不穩大方針ヲ嚴守シテ居タノデ

アリマス

七

八月一日午後大平營カラ朝鮮軍司令官ハ当分ノ向張鼓峰、沙草峰附近概ホ現進歩線附

近ヲ占據シ且右以外軍正面ノ滿ソ國境ノ警戒ヲ嚴ナラシメヨトノ旨ノ命令ト共ニ、張鼓一

峰、沙草峰附近ニ於テソ軍ノ挑戰ナキ限り軍事行動ヲ現在以上ニ進展セシムルヲ軍ノ配置

及行動ハ敵ノ及奥ニ對シ準備スル以外ハ現状ヲ維持セヨ 二右以外軍正面ノ滿ソ國境方

面ニ於テハ特ニ警戒ヲ嚴ナラシムル又軍隊ノ行動ハ敵ヲ刺激シナイコトニ留意セヨ

三軍ノ行動ハ全般ニ互リ慎重ナラシムヘシトノ旨ノ指示電報カ来、同時ニ陸軍省ヨリハ

本事件ニ於テハ不擴大方針ヲ堅持スルコト彼前ト異ナルコトナク公正妥當且平和的見地  
ニ立テ局地問題トシテ敏速ニ之ヲ解決ヲ期スル爲メ事件ヲ速カニ外交商議ニ移ス方針ナル  
旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

丙 朝鮮軍ハ右ノ命令指示ノ通りニ処置シ只管事件ノ不擴大方針ヲ堅持シ慎重ヲ期シタノ  
テアリマス

丁 然ルニソソ軍ハ尔後連日続々後方ヨリ兵力ヲ注入シ猛烈ナル攻襲ヲ加ヘ來マシタガ我方  
ハ全然受身ノ状態ヲ以テ國境線ヲ頑守スル外何等ノ行動ニ劣ツル事ヲ爲シママンデシタ  
五 八月一日以降ソソ軍ハ約ニケ飛行旅団ヲ以テ直接我カ茅一線ヲ爆襲スル外北鮮鐵道、豆  
満江橋梁、鮮内各地ニ攻襲ヲ加ヘテ來テ茅一線ノ損害、北朝鮮民心ノ動搖ハ逐次増大シ  
マシタ

其外テ私ハ我飛行部隊ノ我領内ニ限定スル劣動方ニツキ中央ニ意見ヲ内申シマシタカ認  
可マラレス最後迄飛行機ハ一機モ劣動マシメルコトハアリマセンテシタ

五 ソソ軍砲兵ハ九口門ヲ下ラス其ノ間斷ナキ射襲ト百台余ノ戰車ヲ伴フ反復攻襲及飛行機  
ノ爆襲ノ爲我茅一線ノ損害ハ八月九日頃毎日平均ニ口口名ニ達シ茅十九師團平時備制兵



カハ瀕渴スルニ至リマシタ

蓋然シララ事件不拡大方針ハ前逆ノ如ク中央統帥部ハ嚴命スル所テアツテ朝鮮軍亦之ヲ

堅持シ第一線各部隊ハ指揮統率及戰況等ニ於テ著シク苦境ニ立ケツツモ嚴トシテ克ク此

ノ方針ヲ確守シマシタ

思ヒマスノニ戦斗ニ於テハ一旦敵ヲ真破シタナラハ之ヲ急進シテ再ヒ立ツ能ハサレシム

ルヲ以テ最良ノ手段トスルノテアリマス 然ルニ張鼓峰附近ノ我第一線部隊ハ不拡大方

針ヲ堅持スル爲メ敵ヲ裏碎シツツモ之ヲ追慕スルコトナク依然同一地(国境線内)ニ留マツ

テ對戰シテ居マス故ソ軍ハ新兵カヲ増加シテ各方面ヨリ絶ヘス執拗ニ我ニ反攻ヲ加ヘ來

テ我一線ノ死傷増大シ苦戰最モ大ナルモノカアリマシタ

蓋 第十九師團長ハ第一線ノ戰況ト損害甚大ナルヲ顧慮シ軍ニ對シテ師團全部隊ノ速カク

ル掌握使用ヲ内申シテ承マシタカ軍ハ師團長ガ優勢ナル兵カヲ掌握セハ不知不識不拡大

方針ノ範圍ヲ逸脱スル虞ナシトシナイソヨ顧慮シ師團ノ苦戰苦境ヲ万察シツツ涙ヲ吞シ

テ最後迄其ノ意見ヲ容レマセンデシタ

蓋 張鼓峰附近我第一線方面ノ地形ハ豆満江ノ大河ニヨリ分断セラレ最前線方面ハ地形狹

長テアツテ部隊ノ遠敵行動等頗ル困難デアリマシタ。夫レ故張鼓峰沙草峰方面ノミニ於テ正面攻防ヲ繰リ返スノハ事件ノ解決ヲ急速ナラシメル所以デアリママンノ。テ正面ト共ニ慶興村岸豆満江上流左岸ノ地区カエソ軍ノ右側背ニ兵力ヲ使用シ一挙ニ事件ノ解決ヲ計ルヲ可ナリト判断シ私ハ之ヲ中央当局ニ謀リマシタカ之モ不松大方針ノ為承認セラレルニ至リマセンデシタ。

五、軍トシテ現地ニ於テ事件ヲ急速ニ解決セシムル方法ハ一ニソ聯側ノ越境企圖ヲ断念マシムルニ在ツラ之カ為ニ採ルヘキ方法手段ハ種々アリト雖モ悉ク事件不松大方針ノ逸脱ヲ顧慮シ之カ採用ヲ承認セラレナカツタコトハ前述ノ通りデアリマス。

茲ニ於テ軍及第一線各部隊ハ一意当面スル地域ニ於テ凡百ノ惡條件ニ耐ヘ陰忍自重終始戦斗ニ於テ最モ避クヘキ受動的行動ニ甘ンジ現地解決ニ全力ヲ傾注シタデアリマス。即チ我第一線部隊ハ自ら進ンデソ軍ヲ攻盪シタ事ハ絶無デアツテ常ニソ軍ノ進攻ニ對應シテ之ヲ裏破シ而カモソ軍ノ進攻正面以外ノ地区ニ行動スルコトナク且固境線外ニ進出セズ以テ戦斗及戦斗地域ノ拡大、延テハ事件不松大方針ノ弛緩ヲ嚴戒シ極力当面スル現地ニ於テソ聯軍側ノ企圖ヲ破碎抑止スルニ努メタデアリマス。

天、八月八日頃、ソ軍当面ノ兵力ハ狙真師団三ヶ師団、騎兵一ヶ師団、戦車一旅団、飛行機  
ニヶ旅団ト判断セラレタルニ対シ我方ハ終始、第九師団ノ兵力ノミヲ以テ対戦シ、廣正面  
ニ展開シ、其ノ第一線歩兵ハ三千名余ニ過キマセシメシタ  
夫、斯クシテ苦戦中ニ外交折衝中ノ停戦協定カ成立シ、八月十一日正午、彼我戰鬥行為停止ヲ  
命シタノデアリマス

昭和二十一年(一九四六年)十二月二十二日於東京

供述者

中村孝太郎



右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證

明シマス

同日

於 同所

立會人

阪<sup>ハン</sup>埜<sup>ノ</sup>淳<sup>ジュン</sup>吉<sup>キチ</sup>



宣誓書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ默祕セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザ  
ルコトヲ誓フ

(捺  
印名)

中村孝太郎

