

KOBAYASHI, Seino (855)

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(78)

Date: 4 September 1946

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No. 855

CRD No.

Report by: John C. Donnell

Title: Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI

Synopsis of facts:

CIS requested Legal Section concurrence in request for release of KOBAYASHI, an IPS case subject, from Sugamo, for lack of evidence. Check of Legal Section files showed SUBJECT was on a master list of major war criminal suspects cabled from Washington on 15 Sept. 1945. IPS and CIS files showed KOBAYASHI's chief activities during the war were political rather than naval; he served as an IRAA official, President of IRAPS, Member of House of Peers, and Minister without Portfolio in the KOISO Cabinet. Four IPS documents identify SUBJECT with expansionist groups in the 1930's. No evidence found implicating SUBJECT as a "B" or "C" category war criminal suspect. Legal Section concurrence for KOBAYASHI's release granted.

- C -

Details:

At Tokyo:

This investigation was predicated on a telephone call from CIS requesting full information on all war crimes evidence against KOBAYASHI, and further requesting Legal Section concurrence in a CIS request for release of SUBJECT from Sugamo, if evidence available in this section were not sufficiently strong to warrant SUBJECT's continued detention and eventual trial.

1) Legal Section files reflected that KOBAYASHI was named among major war criminal suspects listed in a cablegram message, originally classified Top Secret, transmitted from the Adjutant General's Office, Washington, to CINCPAC on 15 Sept. 45. This list described SUBJECT merely as former President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association, and as a Minister in the KOISO Cabinet.

Distribution:

1 Prosecution
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LEGAL SECTION
INV. DIV.

File No. 855 Serial No. 1
Initials LHD

2) At the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, IPS Case No. 152, on Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI, age 68, address Tokyo, Setagaya-ku, 4-Chome, Fukuzawa, #1741, included the following information on SUBJECT:

a) A File Memorandum written by 1st Lt. R. H. GILLILAND set out the following details of KOBAYASHI's career from a transcription of material in CIS files as of 11 December 1945:

1877 (Oct)	Born in Hiroshima Prefecture
*	Graduated from Naval Academy at Head of Class
1908	Lt. Commander
1909	Graduated from Naval Staff College
1912	Commander
1912	Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
*	" " " " , Washington
*	Instructor, Naval Staff College
1917	Captain
1920	Naval Attache, London
1922	Rear Admiral
1926	Vice Admiral
1927	Delegate, Geneva Naval Conference
*	Director, Department of Naval Materials and Technical Affairs
*	Commander in Chief, 1st Fleet
*	Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
1930	Vice Minister of Navy
1931-33	Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet
1933	Admiral; Supreme Military Council
1933-36	Commander of Chinkai Naval Base
1936	Resigned from Navy following February 26th Incident
1936-40	Governor-General of Formosa
1943	Chairman, Central Cooperative Council, IRAA
*	President, National Government Aid Association
1944	Advisor, Bank of Taiwan
1944 (Aug)	President, IRAPS
1944 (Aug)	Member, House of Peers
1944 (Dec)	Minister without Portfolio, in KOISO Cabinet
1944 (Dec)	Resigned as Chairman, Central Cooperative Council, IRAA
1945 (Mar)	Resigned from Cabinet and as President of IRAPS

(A minutely detailed biographical summary is also included in this file, based on data obtained from records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, Diet Building, Tokyo.)

In addition to this biographical data, Lt. GILLILAND's report included further information from CIS Files on KOBAYASHI's activities during the war, certain pertinent extracts of which are quoted below:

Paragraph 5--"In the 29 May 1944 Asahi Shimbun it says that KOBAYASHI confesses that (Japanese) 'do not yet fully hate the Anglo-Americans and that he recognizes that the Anglo-American attitude to Japan at present is quite different from that of pre-war years.'"

SOURCE: MIS, Chungking, Report No. 10313, 26 Oct 44.

Paragraph 9--"President of the IRAPS...he and KOISO clashed on the matter of integrating the IRAA and the IRAPS: he (KOBAYASHI) won out and the two were not merged...in his acceptance address he promised the fullest and closest cooperation with government policies; referring to the Supreme War Guidance Council, he stated that it was the duty of the IRAPS to

give the most enthusiastic cooperation to that body which has been specially set up to harmonize and unify state policies and war strategies."

SOURCE: FOC, Radio Report on Far East #52,
Washington, 18 Aug 44.

Paragraph 11: "Former President of the IRAPS...has always opposed TOJO's radical and violent actions...last year he opposed TOJO's policy of destroying railways for scrap iron and was praised by the people."

SOURCE: Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information, Chinese Translation,
31 Aug 44.

This report by Lt. GILLILAND also quotes the following CIS information:

KOBAYASHI "resigned from the Cabinet and IRAPS in order to free himself for the task of establishing a new party to take the form of a "National Protection Movement" uniting government, people, and the military services in defense of the Empire. His efforts were hampered by extremist groups, but finally had Premier KOISO's full support. Declined to accept Presidency of Political Association of Great Japan (DAI NIPPON SEIJKAI), organization which took the place of IRAPS."

b) A MEMORANDUM FOR FILE by Captain James J. GAINE, Jr., dated 12 Dec 45, reported certain information on KOBAYASHI's career, as reflected by CIS files on 4 Dec 45, and included also the following notation on KOBAYASHI which was apparently included in the CIS transcription: "He should be apprehended for his advocacy of southern expansion and for his high office in Japanese Government throughout the expansionist years."

c) A mimeographed short form "Analysis of Documentary Evidence" No. 1645, dated 21 May 1946, deals with a militaristic pamphlet entitled, "The Next War Minister" written by Hironobu HONJO on 1 August 1936. According to the IPS "Analysis", SUBJECT and several other high-ranking officers and politicians were implicated by this pamphlet in political preparations for war in the period just following the fall of the HIROTA cabinet in 1936.

d) Another "Analysis of Documentary Evidence" covering document No. 1987, entitled "Report of the society KOSAKU KENJU KAI re occupation policies and future measures in occupied countries", dated simply 1941, implicated SUBJECT and eleven other Japanese politicians in planning policy for the projected Co-Prosperity Sphere. The original document, in Japanese, has not been translated, and it is filed in archives of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Division. The document, composed of three parts, covers the following topics:

1. Policy for management of southern areas occupied as a result of the Asiatic War, December 1941--expulsion of US, British, Dutch influences in these areas, resources to be developed to sustain Japan, etc.
2. Management of territories in the Co-Prosperity Sphere--plan formulated in Military and Colonizing Ministry in December 1941.
3. Report of the Committee for Administrative Measure.

e) A third "Analysis of Documentary Evidence", dated 26 April 1946, made reference to Document No. 1463, dated December, 1941, and entitled "Fundamental Measures To Be Taken in Occupied Territories of South

Seas in Greater East Asia War". Original of this document is in Japanese, and it has not been translated. The document, probably published by the Greater East Asia Investigating Council, but not described specifically by the "Analysis" as such, implicates KOBAYASHI along with seven other Japanese in the perpetrating of aggressive warfare. Six principal points covered by the document are the following:

1. Principle--Japan must re-establish a new order in the South Sea territories of the US, Britain, and the Netherlands, if she planned to occupy these areas.
2. Details of the projected establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
3. Disposition of lands in Co-Prosperity Sphere.
4. Territorial considerations--monetary systems, exchange of resources, etc.
5. Report of "Committee of Measure" for controlling occupied Territory.
6. List of Committee Members--12 names, including that of SUBJECT.
7. Report of the Committee by the Secretary, advising that the committee's objective is to "inspire the government with careful investigation and study" so that such failures as had been made by occupation troops in Manchuria and China would not be repeated in other subsequently occupied territories.

f) A fourth "Analysis of Documentary Evidence", dated 17 June 1946, made reference to Document No. 1954, dated 14 February 1946. This document is an affidavit by a Japanese, Toshio OTSU, pertaining to the organization KOKUSAKU KENKYU KAI (State Policy Investigating Council). Source of the document was the Russian Division, IPS, and the affidavit is in Russian and English. According to the "Analysis", the affidavit implicates SUBJECT in political preparations for war, apparently as a member of the K.K.K., and covers generally the following:

OTSU, former governor of KARAFUTO, stated that the K.K.K. was formed around KONOE to help formulate foreign policy, although OKURA was its real leader. The K.K.K. was approved by the government for collaboration in working out Japan's aggressive plans. It was a society created for the purpose of war. It was to continue the political activities of affiliated individuals outside the government, "for they considered Japan was going to have a war in the Pacific. Important members of the K.K.K. were later appointed to posts in captured territories, i.e. ISOGAI in Hongkong." Only high-ranking officials were permitted to join. Large subsidies were granted the K.K.K. by the Home and War Ministries. The K.K.K. also engaged in propaganda work.

g) IPS Case File No. 152 on KOBAYASHI also includes two reports of interrogation of SUBJECT at Sugamo by Mr. R. T. HUMMER on 10 April 46, and on 13 April 46. Original interrogation reports are filed as IPS Exhibit #834. Only notable admission made by KOBAYASHI was in the 13 April interrogation, during which he stated he had been a member of the Diplomatic Committee of the Great East Asia Construction Investigation Organization, of

which TOJO was president. According to KOBAYASHI, the Investigation Organization's purpose was to study the best means of putting to use the resources and industrial potential of the Great East Asiatic Co-Prosperty Sphere. Malay, the Philippines, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies were included in these studies.

h) A report by Major L. H. BARNARD, dated 25 Jan 46, accompanies another statement by KOBAYASHI on his political career, forwarded to IPS by OCCIO, CIS, on 23 Jan 46. This statement is in effect a defensive explanation of SUBJECT's work as chairman of the Central Cooperation Council of the IRAA, of his Presidency of the National Service Political Party, and of his occupancy of the post of Minister without Portfolio in the KOISO Cabinet. KOBAYASHI is quoted in one passage of this statement as follows: "Of course I strove for the enhancement of the fighting spirit, urging upon the nation to rouse itself. But I did not fail to lay special emphasis upon the greatness of the spiritual and material resources of America and Britain and the impossibility of winning the war by an empty show of warlike spirit. I believe the people understood what I really meant to say."

1) IPS Case File #152 included two memoranda for file, classifying the KOBAYASHI case closed for IPS investigative and administrative purposes. Lt. GILLILAND's Memo dated 12 Jan 46 noted that most pertinent biographical and background data had been obtained from available sources, and it concluded that "unless requests are received for information along specific lines, this file should be considered closed for investigative purposes". A memorandum by 1st Lt. G. R. SPLANE, dated 15 Feb 46, accompanying a biographical study on SUBJECT furnished by the Liaison Commission, Japanese Demobilization Ministry, stated that "all readily available sources of information on SUBJECT have been checked. Pending requests for additional investigation, the case will be considered administratively closed."

3) CIS files on KOBAYASHI in the OCCIO, Dai Ichi Building, contained much data paralleling that already examined by this investigator in IPS files. SUBJECT's position in regard to the Greater Japan Political Association, the presidency of which he had refused to accept after he resigned from the presidency of the IRAPS, was amplified by Headquarters, Sixth Army CIC Information Memorandum No. 13, entitled "HOKO--The Spy Hostage System of Group Control". This memorandum deals with the direct connection between the Hoko System, in its lower echelon neighborhood phases, and the Thought Control Program, directed from the top by the Political Association of Greater Japan. KOBAYASHI was named by this CIC Memorandum as "Principal Advocate" of the organization, headed by President Jiro MINAMI. Source of the Memorandum was given as "Japanese broadcasts monitored as recently as 21 April 1945".

DISCUSSION:

Since KOBAYASHI's record available at the present time does not divulge any hint of his participation in, or command responsibility for war atrocities, he cannot be tried as a Class "B" or "C" war criminal suspect. Because his contribution to the Japanese war effort was mainly political, KOBAYASHI must be classified strictly as an IPS case subject and it is the responsibility of that section to bring him to trial if the above indicated past activities of KOBAYASHI show him to have participated in the planning and/or execution of a war of aggression.

C L O S E D

REPORT ON

KOBAYASHI - Admiral Seizo

Most of the evidence is evidence in his favor.

He was prominent politically as well as professionally.

His political associations appear to have been on the side of peace and good government, but a complete study of the activities of the I.R.A.A. and the C.C.C. should be made.

From the record in hand, I concur in General Willoughby's recommendation.

THOS. D. AITKEN

* * * * *

21 January 1947.

Since writing the above, I have studied as carefully as time permits the indictment of Tojo and others. I would like further time to study his case as it is possible that he may be equally guilty as Hata, Itagaki and others, defendants in the Tojo case.

I recommend that we do not be too precipitate in releasing him.

THOS. D. AITKEN

Author's file

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EA 8600

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and OTHERS)
)
 - AGAINST -)
)
ARAKI, SADA0 and OTHERS)

AFFIDAVIT

I, HORIBA, KAZUWO do swear on my conscience that the following is true:

1. I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as the Secretary of the First Demobilization Bureau.

2. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit A" which has been signed by me is a list of Members of the Institute for the research into total war. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit AA" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit A which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.

3. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit B" which has been signed by me is a list of research student members of the Institute for the research into total war for the first, second and third periods from April 1, 1941 to March 1944. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit BB" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit B which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.

4. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit C" which has been signed by me is a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit CC" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit C which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.

5. THE said documents marked "Exhibit A", "Exhibit B" and "Exhibit C" have been compiled by me from memory and from enquiries made by me, the official records having been burnt or destroyed, and I cannot claim that they are complete.

6. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit D" which has been signed by me is a list of the subjects and practices of education and training for first term students of the Institute in 1941 showing the names of lecturers and the number of lectures on each subject and other particulars. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit DD" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit D which I have procured and handed to the International Prosecution Section.

7. IN my official capacity, I have examined the twentysix documents, particulars of which are contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked "Exhibit E", the said documents being now in the custody of the International Prosecution Section. The said documents have been compiled by the Total War Research Institute as material for research and training in the Institute, or are collections of the results of the work of the research students and were obtained by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from Japanese Government Offices.

8. IIMURA, Jo who formerly held the rank of Lieutenant -General in the Japanese Army held the post of Director of the Total War Research Institute from January 1941 to October 1941. Prior to his holding that post he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and on ceasing to hold that post he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria and subsequently he was appointed Director of the Military War College.

/s/ Horiba Kazuo

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned Officer by the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO at War Ministry Bldg., Tokyo, Japan this 5th day of August 1946.

/s/ Roland Schwarts, Capt. TC
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E.

I. A. R. Joyce hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I did, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO in Japanese and in so doing did truly and correctly translate the contents thereof from English into Japanese. And I further certify that I did at the same time show to him the Japanese translation of the said affidavit which is annexed hereto and that he did read the same and thereafter did sign the said affidavit and the said translation in my presence, having previously duly sworn on oath that the contents of both the said documents were understood by him and were true. And I also certify that all proceedings incidental to the administration of the said oath and the signing of the said documents were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and from English into Japanese and were to the best of my knowledge and belief fully understood by him.

Dated this 5th day of August, 1946 at War Ministry, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ A. R. Joyce

EXHIBIT "AA"LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR

Official post	Name	Former post (Rank)	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
President	Jo Iimura	Lieut. General	Commander of 5th Army	From Jan.1941 to Oct.1941	Control
In charge of President General Secretary	Shin Oka	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache in Shanghai	From Dec.1940 to Nov.1941	Assistant to President
President	Kiichi Endo	Major-Admiral	Commander in Chief of the 1st Despatched Fleet to China	From Nov.1941 to Mar.1943	Control
President	Keisaku Murakami	Lieut. General	Commander of Army	From Mar.1943 to Dec.1943	Control
President General Secretary	Kanji Ogawa	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache to Japa- nese Embassy in China	From Dec.1942 to Jan.1945	Control
General Secretary In charge of President	Kunio Kawamoto	Secretary of Great East Asia Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
General Secretary In charge of President	Taro Wada	Secretary of Commerce and Industry Ministry	Ammunition official of the ammunition Ministry	From Mar.1944 to Apr.1945	Economy
General Secretary	Ryosuke Fujimuro	Major-General	die(Aug. 14th 1942)	From Oct.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Chiaki Matsuda	Captain	Front	From Oct.1940 to Sep.1941	Military affairs
Member	Wataru Watanabe	Colonel	Front	From Oct.1940 to Oct.1941	Military affairs
Member	Shoichi Terada	Secretary of Agricul- ture & Forestry Ministry	Chief of the Marine Production Bureau, Agriculture & Forestry Ministry	From Oct.1940 to Feb.1942	Economy
Member	Seitaro Okamatsu	Secretary of Commerce & Industry Ministry	Chief of Mining Supervision Bureau	From Oct.1940 to Mar.1943	Economy

Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Hiroo Oshima	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of the Business Bureau, Military Aid Board	From Oct.1940 to Jul.1943	Thought
Member	Katsumi Maeda	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Oct.1940 to Jun.1942	Economy
Member	Katsuzo Okumura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Second Rank Secretary of Embassy	From Oct.1940 to Nov.1940	Diplomacy
Member	Tooru Hagihara	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1940 to Feb.1942	Diplomacy
Member	Masaru Nishiuchi	Professor of Army	Professor of Army	From Mar.1941 to Jan.1944	Thought
Member	Kazuo Horiba	Colonel	Front	From Jul.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Tetsutoki Tsuda	Secretary of Communication Ministry	Secretary of Communication Ministry	From Jul.1941 to Dec.1941	Economy
Member	Hideo Hosoi	Secretary of Taiwan-government	Secretary of Taiwan-government	From Aug.1941 to Sep.1942	Thought
Member	Shigeo Honda	Senior staff of South M.R.Co.Ltd.	To South M.R.Co.Ltd.	From Oct.1941 to Mar.1943	Economy
Member	Kaoru Takeuchi	Captain	Ministry of Navy	From Nov.1941 to Jul.1942	Military affairs
Member	Totaro Sasaki	Member of Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	To Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	From Dec.1941 to Dec.1942	Economy
Member	Yuichi Hori	Secretary of Communication Control Office	Secretary of Communication Control Office	From Dec.1941 to Sep.1943	Economy
Member	Tsuru Kuwahara	Secretary of Legation	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Feb.1942 to Jan.1943	Diplomacy

Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Kikuro Higuchi	Railway Investigation Division	Secretary of Railway Ministry	From Feb.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	Tadao Annaka	Secretary of Insurance Board	Secretary of Ministry of Welfare	From Oct.1941 to Jul.1943	Economy
Member	Toshio Mano	Lieut. Colonel	Lieut. Colonel	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Military affairs
Member	Kumao Nishimura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Senior official of Embassy	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Diplomacy
Member	Risaku Yamazoe	Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry	Chief of the Forestry Administration Bureau	From Mar.1942 to Feb.1944	Economy
Member	Jiro Oba	Senior official of Monopoly Bureau, Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Jul.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	Taro Iwase	Member of Yokohama Specie Bank	Headquarters of Investigation and Research Mobilization	From Mar.1943 to Mar.1944	Economy
Member	Mikio Suzuki	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of Section Metropolitan Police Station	From Jul.1943 to Aug.1944	Thought
Member	Genpu Nakayama	Colonel	Front	From Aug.1942 to Aug.1944	Military affairs
Member	Den Harada	Secretary of Agriculture Forestry of Ministry	Secretary of Combined Board	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
Member	Seichi Arafune	Secretary of Communication Control Bureau	Secretary of Communication Board	From Sep.1943 to Mar.1945	Economy
Member	Kenkichi Yoshida	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Diplomacy
Member	Minoru Machida	Secretary of Home Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Aug.1944 to Apr.1945	Thought

EXHIBIT "BB"*Students*
LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR(Note: Those whom no explanations are
given returned to former posts.)

First period students (From April 1, 1941 to March 2, 1942)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Ministry of Railway		Osamu Akutagawa	
Domei-tsushin-sha		Takeo Akiba	
Ministry of Overseas Development		Takashi Ishii	
Ministry of Finance		Kenkan Imaizumi	
Intendance Bureau of War Ministry		Shun Okamura	
Secretariat of House of Representatives		Shiro Okabe	
Home Ministry		Shojiro Kawaguchi	
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Tadashi Kiyoi	
Member of central Bank of Industrial association		Kakuichi Kubota	
Tokyo girls' Higher Normal School		Go Kurazawa	
Ministry of Finance		Toshihiko Sakai	
Member of Nippon Bank		Tadashi Sasaki	
Ministry of Navy		Tadashi Shimura	
War Ministry		Masatoki Shirai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Keizo Tamagi	

Navy Ministry		Yoshio Takechi
Foreign Office		Hiroshi Chiba
Nippon Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	Recruited in course of study	Yukio Chiba
Ministry of Education		Takashi Choji
Tokyo Prefectural Office		Hisao Nakanishi
North China Area Army		Kanichi Narita
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Tsutomu Nomiyama
Foreign Office	Intelligence Bureau of Cabinet	Kaoru Hayashi
Tokyo Higher School	Ministry of Education	Taneyuki Hara
Chosen Government		Hiroo Higasa
Home Ministry		Kiyoshi Fukuda
Mitsubishi Mining Co. Ltd.		Reiichi Hoshina
N.Y.K.		Katsuji Maeda
Judge	Judicial Research Institute	Kantaro Mibuchi
Ministry of Welfare		Katsumi Mibuchi
Daido-Gakuin		Jiro Miyazawa
Ministry of Communication	Yokohama Marine Affairs Bureau	Iwao Mori
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Gaisei Yano
Military Staff College	to proceed to front before graduation	Toshihisa Yamaguchi
Home Ministry		Keiichi Yoshioka

Second period students (From 1st April 1942. to March 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Domei-tsushinsha		Nori Akutagawa	
Judge	Tokyo District Civil Court	Masanori Asano	(dead in June, 1944)
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Yoshihiko Ito	
Rural Rehabilitation Association		Katsuhide Inoue	
Sumitomo chemical Industry Co. Ltd.		Yasuhiko Inochi	
Yokohama Specie Bank		Taro Iwase	
Yamashita Shipping Co. Ltd.		Juichi Urushino	
Home Ministry		Toshio Eguchi	
Ministry of Communication		Shigeru Otsuka	
North China Area Army		Teiken Oda	
Ministry of Railway		Gaku Kanematsu	
War Ministry		Kiyoyasu Kawakami	
Ministry of Education		Fujimaro Kubota	
Intendence Bureau of War Ministry		Takuji Kumagai	
Imperial agricultural Association		Kenichi Koike	
Tokyo Higher Normal School		Nobuaki Kobayashi	
Local Office	Ministry of welfare	Shinjiro Koyama	

War Ministry

Ministry of Commerce
& Industry
Ministry of Over Seas
Development
Nippon Oil Co. Ltd.

Foreign Office

M. H. I. Co. Ltd.

Home Ministry

Ministry of Navy

Ministry of Finance

General Affairs Bureau.
Manchukuo Government
Chosen Government General

Ministry of Agriculture
& Forestry
General Affairs Bureau
Manchukuo Government
Ministry of Welfare

Nippon Steel Manufactur-
ing Co. Ltd.
Taiwan Government

Ministry of Finance

The 4th Higher School

Ministry of Commerce &
Industry
Foreign Office

Ministry of Navy

Nippon Electric
Distribution Co.

Ministry of Great
East Asia

Front

Home Ministry

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Commerce
& Industry

Masatsugu Sakakibara

Kyo Sakuma

(dead in June 1944)

Hideo Sue

Eiji Suzuki

Akira Sono

Fumio Takaoka

Katsuji Tamakoshi

Taizo Doi

Yasuo Nakanishi

Tadao Natsume

Masayuki Hashimoto

Yoshinori Fujimaki

Yoshifumi Futagawa

Kishiro Hoshino

Isao Mizuno

Seiji Minoyama

(dead in March 1943)

Hajime Murakami

Hiroshi Morikawa

Hachiro Yamaji

Zene Yamatsu

Katsuro Yamamoto

Ichiro Watanabe

Third period Students (From April 1, 1943 to Dec. 15, 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Judge	Tokyo District Criminal Court	Gizin Aoki	
Home Ministry	Tokyo Prefecture Office	Masaaki Adachi	
Ministry of Navy		Teizaburo Ara	(dead)
Nippon Manure Co.		Yoshiro Arai	
Army Surgeon School		Katsuhiko Inagaki	
Ministry of Finance		Ryoichi Iida	
Mainichi-Shinbun-sha		Masahiro Imaizumi	
Government Deposit Bureau		Hiroshi Imai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministry of Ammunition	Akira Irie	
Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co. Ltd.		Tsugio Iwata	
Home Ministry		Toshio Ueda	
Chosen Government		Kiyokazu Okubo	
Nippon Nitrogen Manure Co. Ltd.		Tadashi Kakegawa	
Nippon Coal Co. Ltd.		Yoshiro Kanazaka	
Dai Nippon Air Navigation Co.		Tatsuhiko Kawabuchi	
Daido-Gakuin	General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government	Haruo Kitazawa	
Mitsui Shipping Co.		Shuichi Kumano	
Ministry of Railway	Ministry of Communication	Hirotsugu Kobun	
War Ministry		Yoshio Kouda	
Foreign Office		Tasaku Kojima	
Yokohama Higher Commercial School		Shinzaburo Koshimura	

Government Monopoly Bureau	Ministry of Finance	Masakatsu Mitsueda
Manchukuo Government		Asaumi Sato
Local Office	Ministry of Ammunition	Tadao Sato
North China Area Army		Seihei Sawabe
Ministry of Education		Sakuo Teranaka
Tokyo Prefecture	Tokyo Prefectural Office	Kosaku Nakamura
Army Ministry		Masaro Nalamura
Military Aid Board		Isao Nerio
Ministry of Great East Asia		Takehiko Hisatake
Foreign Office		Seizo Hiuga
Ministry of Navy		Ichiro Fujihara
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Mori Masuda
Kochi Higher School		Toshihiko Miyata
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Shigeru Murata
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Toyozo Murata
Mining Control Association		Saburo Morimoto
Taiwan Government		Asataro Yamamoto
Nippon Bank		Ko Yoshizawa
Mainichi-Shinbunsha		Nobu Yoshitake

EXHIBIT "CC"LIST OF THE CONTENTS OF LECTURES AT THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR TOTAL WARFARE

Name of lecturer	Social position of lecturer	Subject of lecture
Jyo Iimura Kiichi Endo Keisuke Murakami Kanji Ogawa	the Head of the Institute " " "	Foundamental principles of National Total Warfare
Arata Oka	the Director of the Institute	Merits and demerits of Japanese On China Incident
Wataru Watanabe Kazuo Horiba Chiaki Matsuda Genpu Nakayama	Member of the Institute " " "	General Principles of Total warfare
Seitaro Okamatsu Shuzo Yamada Taro Oda Yoji Minobe	" the Planning Board Director the Planning Board	Concerning the material mobilization
Shoji Suganami	Chief of Steel Section in the Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Steel
Shoichi Terada	Member of the Institute	General conception of food question; food question; the condition of the marine products.
Einosuke Ishii	Chief of Agricultural Administ- ration Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products.
Risaku Yamazoe Den Harada Mototake Yugawa Ko Kurakami	Member of the Institute " Director of Provision Bureau Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products.
Kanji Kato Tadaatsu Ishiguro	" "	
Tetsutoki Tsuda	Member of the Institute	General conception of communication
Yuichi Hori Shizuo Yoneta	Member of the Institute Director of Marine trans- portation Bureau	Marine transportation

Kikuo Higuchi	Member of the Institute	Land traffic
Sonosuke Nagasaki	Director of transportation Bureau in the Railway Bureau	Railroad transportation
Katsumi Maeda	Member of the Institute	General conception of finance
Uichi Noda	Secretary of Finance	Control of foreign exchange
Hisatsune Sakamizu	"	Finance control
Juichi Tsushima	Vice President of Bank of Japan	Theory on financial matter
Tsuneji Taniguchi	Director of Accountant's Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	Present state of Japanese Finance
Hideo Matsukuma	Director of Revenue Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	System of Japanese taxes
Tadao Annaka	Member of the Institute	General conception of service
Takeo Mori	Intendant Maj. Gen.	Economic history
Tooru Hagihara	Member of the Institute)	
Katsuzo Okumura	")	
Tsuru Kuwatara	")	State of things in foreign policy
Kumao Nishimura	")	
Kenkichi Yoshida	")	
Hikomatsu Kamikawa	Doctor of Law	History of diplomacy
Hidemi Ozaki	the Asahi (newspaper)	State of affairs in China
Kumataro Honda	Ambassador	State of affairs in China
Shigeharu Matsumoto	Domei News Agency	Gossip on China
Saburo Ota	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	State of affairs in the United States of America
Yoshio Nakano	Colonel	State of affairs in Great Britain
Buryo Isomura	Colonel	State of affairs in the Near East
Minister Sakamoto	Minister of Foreign Affairs	State of things in Europe
Ambassador Hongo	Ambassador	State of affairs in Soviet Russia
Hisao Tani	Lt. General	History of Russo-Japanese War
Koji Sakai	Lt. General)	History of World War I
Tsunamasa Shidei	Maj.General)	
Ryosuke Fujimuro	Maj.General	History of China Incident
Tetsuzo Nakajima	Lt. General	Change of Military Power Warfare
Takeji Teramoto	Rear Admiral	Essence of leadership
Masami Ishii	Colonel	Real condition of battle
Wataru Watanabe	Member of the Institute)	
Kazuo Horiba	")	Outline of Military tactics
Genpu Nakayama	")	

Chiaki Matsuda Kaoru Takeuchi	Member of the Institute "))	Outline of Naval tactics
Yozo Miyama Susumu Nishiura	Colonel "))	Organization of the Army
Kikusaburo Okada	Colonel		Military munition mobili- zation
Chiaki Matsuda Sumi Hiraizumi Takeo Yamada	Member of the Institute Doctor of Literature		Organization of the Navy Japanese History "Kojiki" (ancient chronicle)
Masaru Nishiuchi	Member of the Institute		Original meaning of Japanese Nationality
Hiroo Oshima Hideo Hosoi Misao Suzuki Minoru Machida	" " " "))))	trend of thought in the country
Goro Murata	Director of Peace Section in the Ministry of Home Affairs		Trend of the thought in the country
Sotaro Ishiwata	Secretary-General of the assi- stance of the Imperial Rule association		Regarding to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association
Seizo Kobayashi	Admiral		State of affairs in Formosa
Hideoto Mori	Secretary of the Planning Board		Poly-geography of the East Asia

Note: As above-mentioned has been made retracing my memory, it is not yet perfect.

/s/

The 22. May 1946.J. Imura

EXHIBIT "DD"

Subjects and practices of educations and trainings for 1st term students in 1941.

Basic principle of National Constitution	22
NISHIUCHI, Staff Member.	18
YAMADA, President of Jingu Kogakukan College.	2
HIRAIZUMI, Professor.	2
Totalized War	412 (118)
Principle and rules of totalized war.	50
Director of Institute.	10
Superintendent of Institute.	15
TERADA, Staff Member.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	11
WATANABE, Staff Member.	6
HORIBA, Staff Member.	3
SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Section.	2
FUJIMURO, Staff Member with an additional post.	6
Leadership.	
Captain TERAMOTO.	6
State of things in foreign Countries.	34
1941	
Apr. 5. Extra lecture Latest international situations. HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	1
Apr.14. Germany and Italy. Major General OKAMOTO.	1
Apr.28. Politics in China. OTA, Chief of 1st of Far East Bureau.	1
Apr.30 Navy. MATSUDA, Staff Member.	1
May 2. Politics in Europe. SAKAMOTO, Chief of Europe and America Bureau.	1
May 15. Military affairs in U.S.S.R. Colonel ISOMURA.	1
May 20. Problems in the South Seas, Captain HORIUCHI.	2
June 5. Extra lecture. Ambassadors HONDA.	1

June 18.	Navies in Europe.	Captain KOJIMA	2
June 19.	Economics in China.	MORI, Secretary of Board of Planning.	1
June 30.	Powers politics toward China.	SAITO, Yoshie.	1
July 1.)Policy in China.	OZAKI, Hidemi.	2
July 2.			
July 2.	Economics in the South Seas.	YAMADA, Fumio	1
July 4.	Navy of U.S.A.	Captain OGAWA	2
July 4.	Europe and the South Seas	HAGIWARA, staff member	1
July 8.	Political policy of U.S.A.	UKI, Chief of 1st Section of American Bureau.	2
July 8.	Foreign Policy of U.S.A.	ONO, Chief of 2nd Section of American Bureau.	1
July 9.	Foreign Policies in the South Seas.	TOKO, Chief of 2nd Section of the South Seas Bureau.	1
July 14.	Natives in the South Seas.	ITAGAKI, Professor of College of Commerce.	1
July 25.	Foreign policy of Germany.	Secretary FURUUCHI.	1
Aug. 5.	Military affairs of China.	HORIBA, Staff member.	1
Sept. 10.	Extra lecture.	IMAI, 1st Secretary of Japanese Ambassadors in U.S.S.R.	1
Oct. 21.)Affairs in U.S.S.R.	Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.	2
Oct. 23.			
Oct. 28.	Problems in the South Regions.	HAGIWARA, Staff member.	1
Nov. 18.	British Colonial Policy.	OTA, Chief of 3rd Section of European Bureau.	1
Nov. 29.	Economics in Germany.	TACHI, Investigation Official of Bank of Japan.	1
1942 Jan. 24.	Observation of the Great War from British point of view.	Lieutenant Colonel NAKANO.	2
	History of Totalized War.		28
		Lieutenant General TANI	13
		" SAKAI	5
		Vice-Admiral NAKAJIMA	10
	Practical exercises in room, investigations and trainings.		294

Military Warfare.

Essence, strategy and tactics of Military Warfare.	40
WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
HORIBA, Staff Member.	7
Lieutenant General NAKAJIMA.	13
Major General SHITEI	4
ISHII, Staff Member with an additional post.	8
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	1
NAOI, Staff Member with an additional post.	6
Military Organization.	22
WATANABE, Staff Member.	3
Colonel NAKAYAMA.	2
" SANADA.	1
" OKADA.	2
Lieutenant Colonel OSAKA.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	4
Captain TAKADA.	1
ISHIKAWA, Staff Member with an additional post.	1
Captain YANAGIMOTO.	3
" NAGATANI.	2
HASHIMOTO, Staff Member with an additional post.	2
Ships, arms and military materials.	20
WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	19

Political Warfare.
(Diplomatic)

Essence, basic principle, rules and applications of political warfare.	10
HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	10
History of political warfare.	8
Professor KAMIKAWA.	8

Economical Warfare.

Principle and rules of economical warfare.	9
TERADA, Staff Member.	4
OKAMATSU, Staff Member.	3
MAEDA, "	2
History of economical warfare.	6
Major General, Intendance MORI.	6

Economics in War times.
Nil.

Important Materials.		16
1941	Apr. 22. Food situation. ISHII, Chief of Bureau.	2
	May. 1. General plan for material mobilization. SUZUKI, Staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 7. General plan for development of production. YAMADA, staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 10. Iron. SUGANAMI, Secretary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry.	1
	May 13. Coal. TSUDA, Chief of Coal Bureau.	1
	May 14. Fuel oil. AZUMA, President of Fuel Bureau.	1
	June 30. Fertilizer. SHIGEMASA, Chief of Bureau.	2
	July 24. Withdrawal of substitute materials. HIRAI, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 23. Non-iron Metals. WATANABE, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 28. Control of silk thread. YOSHIDA, Seiji.	1
	Oct. 31. Forestry products. IDEYAMA, Chief of Forestry Bureau.	1
	Nov. 7. On reorganization of economy. KANDA, Staff Member with an additional post.	1
	Dec. 2. Substitute fuel. BAN, Chief of Fuel Investigation Institute.	1
	Dec. 9. Agriculture in General. TERADA, Staff Member.	1

Money market and others.		
1941	Apr. 14. Finance. TANIGUCHI, Chief of Intendance Bureau.	1
	Apr. 21. Taxes. MATSUZUMI, Chief of Revenue Bureau.	1
	Apr. 22. Control of Money Market. SEKOMIZU, Chief of Planning Section.	1
	Apr. 24.) Inflation ARAI, Vice Governor of Kogyo Bank.	2
	30.)	
	Apr. 28. Affairs of Money Market. TSUSHIMA, Vice Governor of Bank of Japan.	1
	May 1.) Money order. NODA, Staff Member with an additional post.	2
	2.)	
	May 27. Railroad transportation. NAGASAKI, Chief of Transportation Bureau.	2
	June 12. Ships. YONEDA, Chief of Section.	2
	July 5. Electricity. TAGURA, Chief of 1st Bureau of Electricity Board.	2
	July 10. Services. Saiki, Chief of Section.	2

July 16.	Commerce.	MIZUNO, Chief of Bureau of Commercial Affairs.	2
July 21.	Latest state of affairs in China.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Sept. 11.	Aviation.	OKUBO, Chief of International Aviation Section.	1
Sept. 12.	Communication.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Oct. 31.	Prices.	HONGO, Chief of 2nd Bureau of Price Board.	1
Nov. 18.	Emigrants.	IMAYOSHI, Chief of Takuhoku Board.	1
Inspection.			
	Inspection of establishments in Tokyo Metropolis.		3
Thought Warfare.			19
Principle and rules of thought warfare.			12
		OSHIMA, Staff Member.	8
		HOSOI, "	2
		OKA, Masao.	2
History of thought warfare.			
		Nil.	
Educational questions.			4
		Colonel NAKAGAWA.	2
		HORIIKE, Chief of Planning Bureau of Education Board.	2
Domestic thought questions.			
		MURATA, Chief of Peace Section.	3
Lectures on Science and others.			10
Apr. 7.	On observation of secrecy.	OSHIMA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 24.		KOBAYASHI, ex-Governor General of Formosa.	1
May 12.		HOSHINO, ex-President of Planning Board.	1
May 19.		ISHIWATARI, President of General Affairs Bureau of Imperial Rule Assistance Association.	1
May 22.	Inspection of examination of conscription.	WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
June 17.		SORIMACHI, Eiichi.	1
Sept. 4.		SAKURAZAWA, Joichi.	1
Sept. 11.		MATSUMOTO, Chief of Editorial Office of Domei News Agency.	1

Nov. 17.	Inspection of the expeditionary session of the Diet.	1.
Inspection tour.		61 days
May 8-9.	Inspection of Military Cadets School.	2 "
May 30-June 3.	Inspection of the establishments in Niigata and Toyama Prefectures.	5 "
June 21-28.	Visit to the Great Shrine of Ise. Inspections of Naval Manouvre, and economical establishments of Kyushu and Chugoku, Districts.	8 "
July 19-20.	Visit to the Kashima Shrine.	2 "
Sept. 1-2.	Practice of purification ceremony.	2 "
Sept.14-Oct.19.	Foreign tour.	36 "
Nov.12-14.	Inspection of Military Manouvre.	3 "
Nov.20-22.	Inspection of Agricultural Communities in Ibaraki Prefecture.	3 "

EXHIBIT "E"SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

<u>I.P.S.</u> <u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of compilation by Total War Research Institute.</u>
1543 (1)	"Special Plan of Export and Import under War Conditions." (Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute in April 1938.	27 October 1941
1544 (2)	"Plan for Replenishing Technicians, Skilled Laborers and General Laborers for Expanding Productive Power". (Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute on 17th June 1937.	18th October 1941
1548 (3)	"Data pertaining to natural Petroleum".	June 1943
1355 (4)	"Reports on 1942 Total Research". (Marked Secret).	30th March 1943
1367 (5)	"Daily Log of Training Affairs". (Marked Confidential).	July 1942
1368 (6)	"The Estimates of the Domestic and Foreign situation in the early part of 1941 from the Total War viewpoint". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1471 (7)	"Data in Estimating the Future of East Asia from an Economic Standpoint". (Marked Top Secret). This publication was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute.	5th October 1941
1472 (8)	"Anticipation of Economic Warfare". (Marked Secret).	19th December 1941
1473 (9)	"Study on Total War pertaining to the National strength of Imperial Japan and Foreign Powers". (Top Secret).	March 1944

SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

<u>I.P.S.</u> <u>Doc.No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of Compilation</u> <u>by Total War Research</u> <u>Institute.</u>
1507	(10) "Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance". (Marked Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Institute in January 1939.	25th October 1941
1521	(11) "Table Discussion pertaining to completion Remaining Business". (Marked Secret). "Suggestions for Implementing the Directions for the table discussion". (Marked Top Secret).	1941 1941
1524	(12) "Summary on Total War" - Volume I. (Marked Secret).	1 July 1941
1669	(13) "Documents pertaining to Second Stage Exercises table discussion in the Planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1594	(14) "Discussion from the Standpoint of Total War regarding present situation of Japan". (Marked Top Secret).	10th January 1943
1605	(15) "Documents pertaining to 1942 Exercises in the planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1621	(16) "Draft of Establishment of Greater East Asia-First Phase in the Total War Plan". (Marked Military Top Secret).	18th February 1942
1660	(17) "Opinions on Research Items". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1341	(18) "Asiatic Affairs".	14th December 1941
2228	(19) "Records of Progress of the First Stage Exercise in table discussion of Total War". (Marked Top Secret).	August 1941
1401	(20) "Report of Basic Research of War Time Industry".	March 1943

SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

<u>I.S.</u> <u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of Compilation</u> <u>by Total War Research</u> <u>Institute.</u>
1343	(21) Basic Research Materials for 1942.	1941-42
1342	(22) Table Top Manoeuvres for 1942. (Military "Top Secret")	1942
1331	(23) Anticipation of Diplomatic War in the Total War. ("Top Secret").	24 January 1942
1566	(24) "The Study of the System of National Organ- ization for the Total War of the Empire".	3rd February 1941
1549	(25) Revision of educational system of Total War Institute.	September 1943
1795	(26) Imperial Ordinance No.648 establishing "Control of Total War Research Institute".	30 September 1940.

SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

<u>I.F.S. Doc. No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.</u>
1343	(21) Basic Research Materials for 1942.	1941-42
1342	(22) Table Top Manoeuvres for 1942. (Military "Top Secret")	1942
1331	(23) Anticipation of Diplomatic War in the Total War. ("Top Secret").	24 January 1942
1566	(24) "The Study of the System of National Organ- ization for the Total War of the Empire".	3rd February 1941
1549	(25) Revision of educational system of Total War Institute.	September 1943
1795	(26) Imperial Ordinance No.648 establishing "Control of Total War Research Institute".	30 September 1940.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 891-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, /s/ T. Suzuki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 106 pages, dated 1 October, 1930, and described as follows: Book entitled "A Record of the Privy Council Concerning the Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930," dated 1st October, 1930.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
1 day of Oct., 1946.

Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.

/s/ T. Suzuki
Signature of Official
SEAL
Secretary of Privy Council
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
1 day of October, 1946

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.
NAME
Investigator
Official Capacity

Document No. 891-A

Page 1

Kobayashi, Senzo

RECORD OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
REGARDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

(ORIGINAL)

1st October 1930

RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
REGARDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

The Conference met at 10:25 a.m. on Wednesday, October 1st, 1930.

H. M. The Emperor was present.

ATTENDANCE:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

State Ministers:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI	No. 4
Navy Minister TAKARAE	No. 5
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA	No. 6
Railway Minister EGI	No. 7
Justice Minister WATANABE	No. 8
Finance Minister INOUE	No. 9
Commerce and Industry Minister TAWARA	No. 10
Home Minister ADACHI	No. 11
Agriculture and Forestry Minister MACHIDA	No. 12
Overseas Minister MATSUDA	No. 13
Education Minister TANAKA	No. 15
Temporary Acting War Minister ABE	No. 16

Councillors:

Councillor ITO	No. 18
Councillor YANEKO	No. 20
Councillor KURODA	No. 21
Councillor ICHII	No. 22
Councillor ISHIGURO	No. 23
Councillor YAMAKAWA	No. 24
Councillor KURODA	No. 25
Councillor FURUICHI	No. 26
Councillor MATSUNORO	No. 27
Councillor EGI	No. 28
Councillor SAKURAI	No. 29
Councillor DEN	No. 30
Councillor ARAI	No. 31
Councillor KAWAI	No. 32
Councillor KAMATA	No. 34

Councillor SUZUKI	No. 35
Councillor ISHII	No. 36
Councillor MIZUMACHI	No. 37
Councillor OKADA	No. 38
Councillor FUKUTA	No. 39

Absentees:

Imperial Princes:

Prince YASUHIRO	No. 1
Prince NOBUHIRO	No. 2
Prince KOTOHIRO	No. 3

State Minister:
Communications Minister KOIZUMI No. 14

Councillor KUKI	No. 19
Councillor ISHIMURA	No. 32

GOVERNMENT DELEGATES:

Director of the Bureau of Legislation KAWASAKI
Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation KANAMORI
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA
Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUNAGA
Chief of the Bureau of European and American Affairs of
the Foreign Office HOTTA
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office SAITO
Secretary of the Foreign Office YAMAGATA
Secretary of the Foreign Office SHIOZAKI
Administrative Official of the Foreign Office FUKUDA
Administrative Official of the Foreign Office YAMADA
Vice Minister of Navy KOBAYASHI
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau HORI
Secretary of the Navy Department ENOMOTO
Captain SHIMOMURA
Captain IWANURA
Commander FUJIEA

Reporter:

Chief of the Judging Committee ITO

Chief Secretary:

Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI

Secretaries:

Secretary HORIE
Secretary MIYAO

President (KURATOMI): The meeting will now come to order. As has been previously notified, "The Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930" is brought up for discussion. According to precedent, we shall omit the readings and the subject shall be debated on general principles. The recitation will be omitted and we shall ask the Chief of the Investigation Committee to make a report.

Reporter (ITO): Upon being appointed members of the Investigation Committee concerning the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which is now being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, we have been fully aware of the great importance attached to the situation, and have been destined to give our fullest deliberation upon the matter. Ever since August 18, we have held frequent meetings, listening to explanations in detail from the Ministers of State, and repeatedly deliberating on the matter with each member expressing his respective opinion; thereby we have aimed at achieving complete thoroughness in our investigation.

First, allow me to relate to you the origin of the treaty. The naval armament limitation treaty concluded among Japan, Britain, U. S., France and Italy at the Washington Conference in February 1922, (Taisho 11) had prescribed limitations for total tonnage of capital warships and aircraft carriers to be maintained by each nation, as well as the limitations of tonnage of single warships and the size of mounted guns. As regards auxiliary vessels, however, the treaty had only prescribed limitations for the tonnage of single ships and of the calibre of mounted guns, and did not prescribe any limitation for the total tonnages to be maintained by the respective powers. Accordingly, not more than a few years after the Conference, there is already a tendency among leading Naval Powers for marked competition in building auxiliary vessels. The League of Nations, according to its mission, has made repeated efforts to realize general disarmament of army, navy and air forces alike. But in view of the extent of the sphere of discussion there was a wide difference of opinion among the Powers, and accordingly it was extremely difficult to come to any concrete decision. Therefore, the Government of the United States, sponsoring nation of the said Washington Conference, recognizing the urgent necessity of concluding some agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships among the leading Naval Powers without waiting for the conclusion of a disarmament treaty by the League of Nations, made a proposition in February 1927 (Showa 2) to hold a conference among the above five Powers. The Governments of France and Italy, however, did not accept the proposition.

Negotiations were held among the Governments of Japan, Britain, and the U. S. at Geneva in June, the same year, but as there was a wide difference of opinion between Britain and the U. S. concerning cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, the negotiations ended in failure. Then following the changes in the general political situation in these two countries in 1929, (Showa 4), there was a rapid development of the desire to realize disarmament. As a consequence, the British Government, in October of the same year, proposed to the Governments of Japan, U. S., France and Italy to hold a conference in London, with the object of studying the limitations on types of ships not prescribed in the above Washington Treaty, as well as of deliberating the necessary changes to be effected in the stipulations of the said treaty, after carefully studying Article 21, clause 2 thereof in order to adapt the treaty to recent scientific and technical progress. * With the consent of the Governments of the four powers, Japan, Britain, France and Italy, the representatives of the five powers concerned held a conference in London in January 1930 (Showa 5). After about three months' diplomatic negotiations and much meandering, an agreement was finally reached and a treaty called the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was concluded. This was signed and sealed by the plenipotentiaries of the Powers on April 22, the same year. This is the treaty now being referred to the present Council for deliberation.

This treaty consists of 5 parts and 26 articles, together with 3 annexes added to Part II, besides the preamble and the concluding clause. Parts I, II, IV and V are agreements concerning the five Powers, while Part III is an agreement among Japan, Britain and the U. S. Allow me to omit the explanation of its substance here because it is stated in detail in the written report.

On looking back at the progress towards the conclusion of the present treaty, the Imperial Government, at the opening of the London Conference, had decided, according to the established policy of national defense, its three fundamental principles -- (1) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships; (2) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers; (3) To maintain the present strength of about 77,800 tons in submarines.

The Government had instructed the plenipotentiaries to carry out this demand and had also announced it to the general public. Nevertheless, the Japanese plenipotentiaries could not attain this object in the negotiations and were

forced to make concessions. They had drafted the so-called temporary compromise plan according to the U. S. proposition, and had asked the Government for instructions. The Government gave instructions that the plan had been generally recognized; and thus was concluded the present treaty outlined on the plan. According to the present treaty, Japan has agreed to maintain only 69.75% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships, 60.22% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers, and 52,700 tons of submarines, which will mean a reduction of about 25,100 tons, or about one-third of the present tonnage. Accordingly, the problem of insufficient national defense brought about by the present treaty, as well as the inappropriate measures taken by the government at the time of the instructions, have given rise to much criticism in the country. It was criticised for instance in the recent 58th session of the Imperial Diet and became the subject of much discussion. In view of these circumstances we have made this investigation with special care and have endeavored to study it from various standpoints, and frequently exchanged questions and answers with the Ministers concerned. The following is the outline of the questions and answers.

1. In the past, there were many mistakes in the diplomatic documents referred to the Privy Council. In the present treaty too there were many misprints in the original text, so the Cabinet, after an inquiry, had taken measures to correct them. As it is a matter of great regret that such mistakes should be caused by the carelessness in handling business, we have asked the opinion of the Minister concerned. He has expressed deep regret and has pledged that he would take care not to repeat such mistakes in the future; and he further added that because the omission of the name of the Italian Plenipotentiary was due to the mistake in the original text, it was impossible to correct it and that there was no way but to dispose of this matter by leaving it as it stood.

2. The question of whether or not the instructions of the Government given to our plenipotentiaries in reply to their reference prior to the conclusion of the treaty, were issued with the consent of the Chief of the Naval General Staff-- is a very important constitutional problem, although it may merely seem to be a purely formal point. It was widely played up that the Cabinet had delivered the instructions without going through the formalities and the question gave rise to disputes in the Navy and also gave rise to the "Supreme Command Question" in the recent Imperial Diet. The Navy Minister has obtained the Imperial decision that

the affairs concerning the Naval forces should be dealt with according to the old custom; and that in this case there should have been an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. After the Imperial sanction, he reported it to the Prime Minister and notified him that things would be run in this way hereafter. That the Prime Minister had replied that he had received the notification is a point fully clarified by the documents submitted by the Navy Minister. As we thought it very important to clarify the truth of this question, we first asked the Prime Minister, who had at that time been in charge of the business affairs of the Navy Minister, if he had considered it necessary from the beginning to obtain the consent of the Chief of the Navy General Staff in giving the instructions regarding the agreement on naval strength. The Prime Minister answered that he had considered it necessary that there should have been an accord of opinions between them according to the old custom. Next, to the question whether there had actually existed an accord of opinions between them he replied that the Chief of the Naval General Staff asserted at first that our three great principles were the minimum possible demands from the standpoint of our plan of operations; and therefore he, as the one responsible for the manipulation of troops for operations, could not agree to the naval strength outlined upon the U.S. plan which did not fulfil the necessary conditions. However, in the light of the various circumstances thereafter, he had considered that the Chief of the Naval General Staff after all, had no objections to the measures taken by the Government in giving the instructions. As we harboured much suspicion about this answer, we wanted to hear personally from the former Chief of the Naval General Staff, so we had requested the Cabinet to take measures to have him attend the meeting and explain the fact. The Cabinet, however, refused to do it. When we further questioned the reason why the Ministers of State, in reply to questions in the Diet on this problem, had answered that the Government had decided the matter, after taking the opinions of the military circle into consideration, and intentionally avoided the use of the expression "consent" or "accord of opinion"; the Prime Minister explained that the Cabinet had answered simply "taking into consideration so and so," because it had considered it undesirable to give a detailed account of its relation with the military circle in the Diet.

Moreover, to the question whether Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, who had been the Navy Minister, in signing this treaty did not think the Chief of the Naval General Staff

would oppose the contents of the draft, the Navy Minister answered that, although he had been informed of some dissatisfaction on the part of some of the naval officers at that time, he considered that they would refrain if their opposition involved the risk of a break down in the negotiations. When further questioned why he did not confirm the intention of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister replied that there was a man in charge of business matters of the Navy Minister at that time in the Cabinet and that he had signed the treaty as a plenipotentiary, according to instructions from the Government. He further explained that judging from the telegram received from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time of the instructions, he had thought the Chief had rather agreed to the instructions.

3. Regarding the circumstances under which the Government accepted the proposed compromise which was inconsistent with the so-called three great principles held to be the minimum demand for part of our naval strength necessary for national defense, the Government explained that though they would admit the proposal was unsatisfactory, there had been no possibility of reaching any other adequate agreement, judging from the development of the negotiations. If the conference broke down, it would have had a grave influence upon the international situation of Japan; and considering the financial and economic hardships which would be visited upon our country through competition in shipbuilding, etc., in other words looking at the matter from the general situation of our nation, he considered the Government could not help but accept the proposal.

We then put a question to the Minister concerned, whether the security of the national defense of our country could be secured by the naval strength prescribed in the present treaty; and he answered that it might be difficult to carry out operational plans according to the existing principles of national defense with the above naval strength. On one hand, however, Japan has succeeded in maintaining more tonnage of light cruisers and submarines than expected. While on the other hand if she carries out the right to build replacement ships; does her best to perfect quality by completing equipment and improving armaments of existing ships, equipping ships not subject to limitations; increases the number of airplanes; and makes an effort to develop her troops "technical" power by improving training and discipline and increasing the number of crews, he believed that the security of our national defense could practically be expected.

He further said that the term of validity of this treaty is as short as five or six years, and that through Japan's demand, a prescription has been added to Article 23 of this treaty promising Japan a position to discuss in the next conference from an entirely free standpoint without any restrictions from the present treaty. Therefore, he explained, though there are some points with which we are dissatisfied in this treaty, we are left a way to adjust them in the future difficult though it may be.

4. If the U.S. is to maintain 18 heavy cruisers according to the provisions of this treaty, Japan will have her heavy cruisers considerably reduced in ratio to the U.S. two or three years after 1936 and this will bring about insecurity in our national defense. There are some who are of the opinion that the Chinese problem will then give rise to complications between Japan and the U.S. As we felt anxiety on this point, we asked the opinion of the authorities; the Minister concerned replied that, in order to prepare for the period immediately after the expiration of the treaty term, we must make previous preparations within the extent of the provisions of the treaty, and accelerate the building of new ships after the termination of the treaty; thereby we shall be able to increase our ratio. It is hard to believe that the U. S. will take a provocative attitude toward Japan during that time; and he explained that as the diplomatic relations between the two countries will become more amicable by the conclusion of this treaty, there will be no fear of any war.

5. The Government authorities have explained that the deficiency in naval strength caused by this treaty will be replenished as a result of the next conference. However, Japan has already failed once, at the Washington Conference, to realize her demand to maintain 70% in capital ships of the amount of the U.S.; and she has failed the second time at the recent London Conference to realize her demand to maintain 70% in heavy cruisers and her present strength in submarines. Thus, it will not be difficult to imagine that she will face more difficulties in carrying through her demands at the next conference. Especially, the conditional clause of Article 23 of this treaty not only seems to be meaningless in legal logic but according to the original text of Article 23, the object of holding the conference of 1935 lies in the conclusion of a new treaty with the object of a gradual realization of disarmament. Accordingly, such a demand like the above is likely to be regarded as expansion of armament; especially the demand to increase the numerical strength of

submarines will be contrary to the spirit of the article, and it was feared that it would be impossible to carry through such a demand. When we questioned the Minister in charge on this point, he replied that it does not necessarily mean that Japan should contend her three great principles at the next conference. He further asserted that only by taking into consideration the various changes in the situation during the next few years shall we establish the best policy and strive to carry through its demands; and that even if we should repeat the demands of the three great principles, the total tonnage of auxiliary ships and the cost of construction shall not exceed the limitations prescribed in this treaty, so it cannot necessarily be regarded as an expansion of armaments.

6. It has been acknowledged by the Government itself that the naval strength prescribed in this treaty is insufficient and that, unless some appropriate replacement programme be established, we can never hope for security in our national defense. If so, what will be the result of such a replacement program? What will be the expenditure necessary for it? What will be the surplus fund to be produced by this treaty and will it or will it not lighten the burden of taxes on our people; and if so, to what extent?

As all these questions are very essential for judging whether this treaty will attain its object or not, and are the important items for investigation, we demanded that the Government give us a general outline on these points. To this, the Minister in charge explained that a national defense replacement programme is now under investigation by the Naval General Staff, but as it will not be published till the investigation is complete and approved by the Navy Ministry and further discussed with the other Government departments concerned, the time for decision will be, at the earliest, this autumn, about the time when the national budget will be drawn up. However, as there will be considerable surplus funds following the fulfilment of this treaty, the Government will declare on its own responsibility that part of it will be appropriated for the replacement of deficiencies in our national defense, while the rest will be appropriated to lighten the burden of taxes on the people.

Supposing we consider it on the basis of the total sum of five ^{hundred million} ~~billion~~ yen reserved in the financial programme for 1930 (Showa 5) to 1936 (Showa 11) as an established plan for the Navy, there will still be some surplus fund even if Japan makes use of every right to build the replacement ships prescribed in this treaty. He explained

therefore, that this will be appropriated to the cost of replacements in our national defense and also to the reduction of taxes.

Such, then, was the gist of the questions and answers. In short, the object of this treaty lies in revising and supplementing the Washington Treaty, and concluding an agreement on various limitations in every type of ships for the realization of disarmament. Now, security or insecurity of national defense decides the fate of a country. Accordingly, to conclude an agreement limiting the armament of a country is a matter which requires the most serious consideration.

There is good reason in regard to the military affairs of our country where the military administration has been separated from the military command for years, and each, with its own separate organs, has been cooperating in assisting the exercise of the Imperial authority. However, it is of great regret that there had been in the Navy some controversies, which afterwards gave rise to criticism in the general public, about the measures taken by the Cabinet in deciding their instructions at the time of the signing of this treaty. The Cabinet not only answered that they had thought there were no objections from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time the instructions were decided; but also that the Navy Minister had obtained the Imperial decision that matters pertaining to naval strength should require an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and that the decision had been reported to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has been instructed to stick to the rule in the future, and as there has been a reply of acceptance from him, there is no necessity of discussing the "Supreme Command problem."

This affords us much gratification. Moreover, in looking at the object of this treaty, of course everyone should be willing to give his approval to its spirit of promoting world peace and preventing the danger of competitive armament, and reducing the public's burden. But the question is, as far as Japan is concerned, whether or not she will be able to attain the object with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty without bringing about any deficiency in her national defense. As this is the most important point of argument in judging the results of this treaty, we have made a careful and thorough investigation on this point. The Ministers concerned, however, have admitted that there are deficiencies in the

naval strength prescribed in this treaty, but asserted that the security of national defense could in fact be expected by taking replacement measures. As for the replacement plan, they did not even show us its general outline, nor its principal items, on the ground that they have not yet completed the investigation, and they also have not explained much about the necessary expenditures and the estimates in the reduction of taxes. All that the Government has done was to declare on its own responsibility, that the deficiencies in our national defense will be replenished and that a considerable reduction of taxes will be carried out. But as the national defense replenishment programme essentially, should be drawn up by the mutual agreement of the Minister of State and the organs of the military command, and is not to be declared on the responsibility of the State Minister alone, we thought that the opinion of the organs having direct access to the throne would be greatly instrumental in our judgment of the problem, and we were anxious to hear their opinions by some means or other. Finally, we requested the State Minister to take steps to submit the written document of the Military Council in reply to the Imperial question, but the request was rejected by the State Minister. Originally, according to explanations by the Foreign Minister, this treaty had already been ratified by the U. S. Britain will not complete her ratification as far as Ireland is concerned until November, this year. So, even if Japan should ratify it today it would not come into effect immediately. Accordingly, in view of the grave influence that will be exercised on the interests of Japan by the results of the conclusion of this treaty, we thought it better to spend some time in waiting for the completion of the Government's investigation on the aforesaid national defense replenishment programme, and then to make mature deliberations on the question. We proposed our opinion to the State Minister but he did not approve the idea.

It was a matter of great regret for us, for it has been our duty to consider problems carefully and deliberately. But, according to the explanations of the State Ministers, the internal situation lately has become very deplorable, and they stressed that if the ratification of this treaty is left long undecided, it will give rise to political and economical unrest and exert a bad influence upon the general public. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that, under such circumstances, there was no other way than to adopt a vote on the problem, by limiting our investigations to the extent mentioned above,

and relying upon the responsibility of the authorities concerned. As there seems to be no fear of any other obstacle in the provisions of this treaty, we think it is inevitable, under these circumstances, to give our final decision and recognize this treaty. Relying upon the responsibility of the State Ministers who have pledged that they would take every measure to attain the object of the treaty by carrying out the national defense replenishment programme in concert with military circles and by reducing the burden of taxes, the Investigation Committee has unanimously passed a resolution.

I respectfully report the result of the investigation to the Throne that the Privy Council should pass the draft treaty.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): I should now like to state briefly the opinion of the Government on today's problem of ratification of the London Naval Treaty. The object of the London Naval Treaty, as has just been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, is to prevent the danger of competitive armament for the sake of world peace, and to reduce the burden of taxes; and this treaty has been signed and sealed by the representatives of the Five Powers-- Japan, Britain, the U.S., France and Italy. As far as Japan, Britain and the U. S. are concerned, we have been successful in an agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships which had not been realized at the Washington and Geneva Conferences, and have been able to put a limitation on every type of ship.

Generally speaking, the agreement on the limitation in maintaining strength of auxiliary ships contains more complicated questions than the agreement on capital ships; and at the recent London Conference there has been much meandering in its discussions for which reason France and Italy, finally, refused to join the treaty. Japan, Britain and the U. S., however, judging from the general situation, have concluded the treaty with a spirit of mutual concession and compromise. Therefore, the result of the agreement in the said treaty on maintaining strength in auxiliary ships does not fully satisfy our demands, which will mean that deficiencies will arise in our Naval strength for maintaining and executing the present plan of operations, drawn up according to our established policy of national defense. But the military specialists are agreed in their opinion that such deficiencies can be remedied by taking some other proper replenishment measures, and that any difficulties in our

national defense can be prevented. This replenishment programme is presently under careful investigation by the Government and we are not yet able to give you the actual figures. In short, its object is to replenish the quality and to promote technical power. The outline of its principal items is, as has been explained by the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee. As the fund for the established Naval programme reserved in the financial programme for 1931 (Showa 6) to 1936 (Showa 11) amounts to a total of about half a billion yen, this will be properly appropriated for the expenditure in building replacement ships and for replenishing deficiencies in our naval strength mentioned before and also for reducing taxes. As you all know, the U. S. has already ratified this treaty. As for the British Empire, almost all of the British Commonwealth of Nations have either ratified it or have finished preparations to ratify it, except for Ireland, whose procedure for ratification will be taken either after the opening of her ordinary Diet session in November this year, unless some other means for ratification may be devised before that.

We have not yet received any definite report on it, but, after all, we cannot imagine that difficulties will arise in its ratification. There are some points in the State Minister's reply, given in the reports of the Investigation Committee, which seem to prove that the meaning of our explanation has not been thoroughly understood. But as it is feared that this matter will involve too many complications, I shall not indicate them here. In short, the Government, at this occasion, hopes, in view of the internal and external situations, that the draft treaty will be passed promptly.

No. 36 (ISHII): I received on August 15, the documents relating to the London Treaty, which is presently being referred to the Privy Council. I think the President had appointed the members of the Investigation Committee prior to this, and the said documents were distributed to me at the same time with the members of the Committee. This, originally, is a matter of course, but the previous method was not necessarily like this. So I had once expressed my opinion that, as it is all the Councillors who have been ordered to discuss, it is a duty that every member should have access to the documents as soon as they are called upon for discussion,--that is to say, that I wish the documents to be distributed as soon as possible. I hereby wish to express my gratification, for I believe the recent method of distributing documents, from this standpoint, is an improvement in the proceedings of the Privy Council. I have

one thing I wish to ask the President, though it may seem presumptuous. Three weeks time had elapsed since the Privy Council had been called upon to discuss this matter on July 24 before I had received the documents on August 15. What was the Privy Council doing when such an important problem had been brought up? There had been frequent voices of distrust in the public and I, too, was one that felt suspicion about it. During that time, according to newspapers and other sources, the President had requested the Prime Minister to submit the answers of the Supreme War Council in reply to the Imperial question on about August 5, ten days after the draft treaty had been referred to the Privy Council, and the Prime Minister declined it.

One week after that, the Investigation Committee was organized. Thus, we Councillors could know nothing about the substance of the bill for three weeks though we had been consulted by the Emperor. I believe that when such an important bill is submitted to the Privy Council, the authorities should distribute the bill immediately and hold the Investigation Committee as soon as possible, and if there is something to ask the authorities it should be done after the Councillors are consulted over the matter. I don't intend to denounce the President for his behaviour in the past. I only wish to call his attention to this point, in order to promote the authority of the Privy Council which is the supreme advisory organ for the Emperor. If the President has any explanation to make on this point, I would like to hear it.

President (KURATOMI): No. 36 has just expressed his desire about the distribution of documents. But, it is needless for me to say that Article 7 of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council prescribes that the report of the Investigation Committee should be distributed, together with annexed documents, to all Councillors at least three days before the opening of the conference. In the past, according to this regulation, we had distributed the documents three days before the conference after the report of the Investigation Committee had been submitted. I do not think, however, that this provision is absolute. Accordingly, I do not think it against the regulations to distribute, if necessary for convenience' sake, before the Investigation has been completed. There had been examples when documents had been distributed beforehand in cases when the bill required a large quantity of documents. It is so with the present case. But this cannot be arranged according to the convenience of the Privy Council alone.

The relation with the Government must also be taken into consideration. So, in the present case, I have adopted an irregular measure after having consulted the Government. It does not necessarily mean that such a measure will always be taken hereafter. Moreover, No. 36 has talked as if I had delayed the investigation in order to have the written reply of the Supreme War Council submitted to the Privy Council, but it is not true. I did not demand the presentation of the document, I only advised its presentation, and I did not delay the investigation. As has been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, there are liable to be some mistakes in the documents of the bill. In the present case too, the Government had to take due formalities for corrections, and more than ten days had elapsed during that time. These are necessary procedures for investigation. As I have stated above, it is a usual practice to distribute documents after the investigation is over, so the opinion of No. 36 is unreasonable.

No. 36 (ISHII): I, too, have knowledge of the provision of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council concerning distribution of documents. But according to the provision, it is stated "together with the reports" and not "at the same time as the reports." Moreover, looking at it from the point of common sense, there is no reason why documents should not be distributed beforehand. And as the President has expedited the time of distribution in this case, I only wish that this precedent could be followed in the future. I did not say anything about the past. I only said about the future. According to explanations just made by the President, even in the future, whenever some important problem is referred to the Privy Council, several weeks will be needed for the careful investigation of documents. I cannot help feeling anxiety about the future. I hope that, if any problem is referred to the Privy Council, a committee will be organized immediately and will be ordered to investigate the matter. Then the Councillors can investigate the matter together with the Government authorities and can revise the points which require revision. It is an excessively cautious and therefore unsuitable system, not to distribute documents until the Chief Secretary and his assistants spend some days in investigating the bill and correcting the misprints. But I shall not discuss the matter further. I only wish to express my regret here that my opinion was not thoroughly understood, although I had meant it for the future of the Privy Council.

I shall now wish to put my questions to the Government. First, as regards the three great principles; judging from the expression in the report, "the Imperial Government has decided the three great principles... based on the established policy of national defense," it seems to me that the three great principles had been decided just before the London Conference. So I think the principles had, of course, also been included in the instructions given to our plenipotentiaries. Now, the Navy Minister and other Naval authorities seem to have greatly emphasized the three great principles prior to the conference, stressing that this was the minimum demand for our national defense, and had informed people that in case these principles should not be realized, it would endanger our national defense. Naturally, the general public, lacking expert knowledge, would readily believe it, would be very anxious about it if even the slightest part of these principles is not realized, and believe that it would surely bring about defeat in war. I, myself, was one of those who felt such anxiety, although I have been relieved of it, because it has been pointed out in the reports that these principles should not necessarily be followed in the next conference.

I think that these circumstances should be made clear to the public, as it is because of these three principles that the people are afraid of the U. S. Now, it seems these three principles did not exist at the time of the previous Geneva Conference. Allow me to refer briefly to what the Japanese plenipotentiaries proposed to the plenipotentiaries of Britain and the U. S. at that conference. There were no such principles in the instructions given to the Japanese representatives at that time. But at the Conference, the U. S. wanted an equal balance of power with Britain, while Britain asserted that she would need 620,000 tons of auxiliary ships for she required many cruisers on account of her special position, and tried to reduce the maintenance of Japan's force. As the negotiations became complicated, Japan was compelled to propose that if Britain and the U. S. would reduce the tonnage of auxiliary ships to 470,000 tons, Japan was ready to reduce hers to 310,000 tons. To this, the U. S. agreed on principle, while Britain did not. So Vice-Admiral KODAYASHI studied the matter with FIELD, a U. S. delegate, and made a compromise plan, but it was not agreed on at the conference. As regards submarines, it was decided that Japan, Britain and the U. S. should maintain 60,000 tons respectively. Thus, does not the result of the recent London Conference resemble Japan's proposition at the above Geneva Conference? It is regrettable that there are many among the people who are discontented with this treaty, by which, according to their belief, an unreasonable naval ratio had been forced upon Japan by Britain and the U. S. The naval authorities should have made it known to the public that there had been no oppression by Britain and the U. S. concerning the conclusion of the recent agreement.

Secondly, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence? It seems they did not exist in about 1927 /Showa 2/. Actually, did not our naval authorities consent at the Geneva Conference to our maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines? I do not think that the international situation has become worse during the three years after that. On the

contrary, the Anti-War Pact had been concluded, and it may be said to have advanced the countries a step forward in their peaceful relations. Nevertheless, at the last conference our authorities had demanded that Japan should maintain 78,000 tons of submarines, an increase of 18,000 tons to the former 60,000 tons. I just cannot understand the reason, and I entertain suspicions about the three great principles.

Moreover, as for the national defense replacement program, there was talk as if there was some proper method of replacement, both in the reports of the Investigation Committee as well as in the explanation of the Premier. But what is the meaning of the word "proper"? As Japan had insisted on maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines in 1927 /Showa 2/, and has been compelled to consent to 52,000 tons at the recent conference, the difference of 7,000 or 8,000 tons can (not?) logically be called a deficiency in our national defense. Though the U. S. formally insisted on the five-five-three ratio in submarines, she has recently consented to an equal basis. From this standpoint, we must admit that she, too, has made concessions. As for other auxiliary ships, the recent proposition made by Britain and the U. S. closely resembles the one made by Japan in former years.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that 73,000,000 yen is sufficient for the expenditure in our national defense replacement program, and that it would not only be proper to appropriate the remainder of the half billion yen minus the said sum of 73,000,000 yen to the reduction of taxes, but it would also conform to the previous demand of our Navy. In short, I wish to have the Navy Minister explain when the three great principles came into existence, and had become an irreducible, established policy for our national defense. I also wish to hear the Navy's explanations on the national defense replacement program. I don't want to hear about the concrete plan; the principle alone will be enough.

Except for the above questions and requests, the present treaty is not one which Japan was forced to accept. I agree to this treaty because the recent propositions by Britain and the U. S. are in line with the propositions made by our country three years ago, and it is our duty to accept it. Moreover, I wish to express my whole-hearted approval of the conclusion that this bill shall be passed with faith in the responsible utterances of the State Ministers, as has been stated at the end of the report by the Chief of the Investigation Committee.

No. 5 (TAKARABE): The first point of your question seems to be, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence, which did not exist in 1927 /Showa 2/, at the time of the Geneva Conference. Of course, there was no such thing as the three great principles at the time of the Geneva Conference. To be precise, even at the last conference, they have neither been clearly implied in the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries nor have they been formally declared. Why, then, have there been rumors about them?

In the first place, we had considered it necessary for our Navy to have 70 per cent in strength of the most probable potential enemy, and we had made efforts to maintain this ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference. But, finally, we had failed to attain this object and the ratio was fixed at 60 per cent. Thus, the five-five-three ratio was decided on the condition that the status quo shall be maintained in defense in the Western Pacific. At the Geneva Conference, too, we had contemplated, in general, the maintenance of 70 per cent in auxiliary ships, but the 70 per cent decided was a general estimate and did not go into details regarding the tonnages per types of ships. Speaking of submarines, Japan's demand was 70,000 tons, which is equivalent to the present 78,000 tons. This is because submarines under 800 tons were not subject to any limitations at the time of the Geneva Conference, and so they were not put into calculation. In short, it was a demand to maintain Japan's present strength.

Then there was a question whether there had been no objections in Central Naval Headquarters to the 60,000 tons equal basis decided in their provisional compromise draft by the experts commission of Japan and Great Britain. Yes, there had been many objections. Although, at that time we had acquired the right to maintain more than 70 per cent in cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, it did not reach the 70 per cent mark in total tonnage, so there had been much criticism and argument. Therefore, at the opening of the present London Conference, it was again our Navy's stand to maintain the present strength. Of course, at the time of the Geneva Conference all the powers did not attach so much importance to cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, as today. For this reason, the strength maintained by Japan was even considered comparatively favorable. But today, as a far superior fighting power has been recognized in newly-built cruisers, Japan, too, has demanded 70 per cent. This, however, is not a new and hastily decided policy.

The so-called three great principles are concerned with the military strength necessary for the execution of the plan of operations based on the national defense policy decided in 1923 /Taisho 12/. Thus, the three points - 70 per cent in total, 70 per cent in cruisers with 8-inch guns, and the present strength in submarines - were instructed. No mention was made as to which of the three would be the more important, and the expression "the three great principles" was not used in any of the official documents. Just because these three were the main points in our demands, people called them the three great principles. The Navy has always attached importance to them.

As has been explained by Councillor ISHII, we had failed to accomplish our demand of 70 per cent in capital ships at the Washington Conference, and it was decided at 60 per cent; and also at the Geneva Conference our strength in auxiliary ships was set at 60 per cent in the provisional compromise draft between Japan and Britain. Accordingly, our Naval authorities, after years and years of investigations, were well aware of the difficulties in carrying through our demand of 70 per cent. In view of these former experiences, they had instructed our plenipotentiaries with the three

great principles, for the first time, just before the opening of the last Conference. Prepared to fight with their backs against the wall, they put every effort into obtaining the understanding of the whole nation. For this purpose, young officers made trips to various places and gave lectures, greatly emphasizing the importance of the three great principles. Some of them seem to have pushed their arguments to extremes by stressing that it would mean the ruin of our nation if we should fail to accomplish these principles. These were all manifestations of their patriotic spirit, and as a result, the public opinion was thoroughly unified. I believe this has had much to do with our success at the Conference in obtaining the ratio of 70 per cent in total tonnage.

Though Councillor ISHII seems to be greatly discontented that the military circle has previously much emphasized the three great principles and is showing no effort whatever today in further obtaining the understandings of the people concerning the consequence of this conference, there is a natural limit to the necessity of things. There is a difference between the situations prior to the opening of the conference and that of today. More so, when we think of the next conference. We should make a more thorough investigation on points that will become necessary at the next conference, and strive for the best measures. Generally, the fact that one has a position at one moment, does not necessarily mean that it is one's position forever. For instance, the U. S. at one time, advocated the necessity of submarines, and at another time, she advocated the complete discontinuance of the use of submarines. There can be a great change between the armaments of ten years ago and those of today. So it is only natural that a nation's demands should change according to the circumstances. As to the expenditures for replacement and the tax problem, I believe the Prime Minister will give you the reply.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As to the problems of the national defense replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, the opinion of the Government expressed at the Committee Meeting has been stated minutely in the reports of the Investigation Committee, the conclusion being especially well written, so it will be unnecessary for me to make further explanations at this moment. Moreover, I believe Councillor ISHII will not insist upon my explanation. In short, both the problem of replacement plan and the problem of reduction of taxes are still under intensive investigation by the authorities concerned, and at present we are unable to give you any concrete figures. The gist of the replacement plan is as has been stated by the Navy Minister at the Committee Meeting and which has been quoted in the report. Anything beyond that is uncertain at present and cannot be decided until the budget will have been framed this autumn. As I do not wish to say anything of which I am not sure, I shall refrain from making any further explanation beyond this point at present.

No. 36 (ISHII): I neither wish to ask the Government for any concrete plan nor for any explanation about figures. According to the report, it is stated that the Government would not publish even the general principles of the

replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, but the Premier has just talked as if the Government had given a detailed explanation. Insofar as the Privy Council has been called upon to deliberate on this bill, I feel, as a member of the Committee, that it is proper for me to put some questions to the Government about the replacement plan and the reduction of taxes which are the immediate purposes of this treaty. When it comes to not informing the councillors of even the general outline of the treaty, it is making it too difficult for them to pass any judgment. Merely as a principle, can't we have the general estimation as to what amount, in general, will be appropriated to the expenditure in replacements and what amount to the reduction of taxes; or, on the basis of 7,500 tons deficiency in submarines, what amount will be necessary for replacement? I would like to have as much explanation as you can give on this point.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As I have just stated the opinion of the Government, the total sum that will be reserved from 1931 /Showa 6/ to 1936 /Showa 11/ for the Navy's established program will be about half a billion yen, and this will be appropriated to the expenditures for building replacement ships and replenishing our naval strength according to this treaty, and to the reduction of taxes. But as these are mutually related they must be decided at the same time, and, so, they cannot be clarified until the time when the budget will be framed. Now, not speaking of the amount of money, what is the general outline?

On this point, it has been stated in the explanation of the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee, written in page 23 of the Investigation report, as follows: "Then, can we or can we not expect the security of our national defense with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty? We have queried this point with the Minister concerned. To this, the Minister replied that this naval strength would perhaps be insufficient to maintain and fulfill the plan of operations based on the existing plan of national defense. But, on one hand, we have been successful in securing the right to maintain more light cruisers and destroyers than we had expected; and if, on the other hand, we take steps for replenishment by properly executing the right to build replacement ships, and moreover, strive to perfect the quality of the Navy by completely equipping the existing ships, renovating their armaments, equipping the ships not under limitation, expanding the air-force, etc., and do our best to improve technical strength by renovating the training and education of navy personnel, and increasing the number of crews, I believe we can pretty well rely on the security of our national defense."

This is the explanation of the general outline given at the Investigation Committee. I regret to say that this is all the material I have today, to make any more explanations, and I hope you will forgive me.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): Do you intend to continue this conference in the afternoon?

President (KURATOMI): If the discussion is unfinished we may continue in the afternoon, after we ask the convenience of the Emperor.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): Regarding this treaty, it has been reported after full and impartial consideration by each committee member, so it has been pretty well understood, but there are many matters I wish to question more particularly. However, judging from the replies made by the Government, it seems to me that the Government does not wish to make any answer further than its explanations at the Committee Meeting. So I shall rely on the Committee report and refrain from putting any further questions. But, in the report it says: "According to explanations by the State Minister, the internal situation has become deplorably bad these days...etc." What is the meaning of this? I would like to have a full explanation.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As regards the London Treaty, there had been, prior to its being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, various rumors in public about the influence it will have upon the political world, and some mischievous elements, in line with these rumors, had been spreading a number of wild tales. For this reason, there were indications that unrest had been arising in the political and financial worlds. The treaty was referred to the Privy Council for deliberation on July 24, and after preliminary investigations by the Secretariat of the Council, it was brought before the Investigation Committee which convened for the first time on August 18. Since then more than fifty days had passed till September 17, and the meeting of the Committee had been held twelve times during that period. Meanwhile, the newspapers in Tokyo, not being informed of the proceedings of the Investigation Committee which had been kept secret, indulged in conjectures and published a number of articles. Readers, ignorant of the circumstances, would either harbor suspicions about the destiny of the treaty, or would be sceptical about a probable discord between the Privy Council and the Government. Various organizations, taking advantage of this situation, began one after the other to attempt mischief-making; and among the various articles, there were some that could be classified as reprehensible. They were openly or secretly distributed to various quarters, and every means of alienation and slander were attempted. This being the situation, it was impossible for people to discriminate truth from falsehood and good from bad. As a result, it is a fact that cannot be concealed, that the general public was driven to an indescribable sort of unrest and unhappiness. Even if it were not so, public feeling today is apt to lack stability and self-possession, and it is deplorable that such a condition should long continue.

As long as the destiny of this treaty remains undecided, it will not only be impossible to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily articles in newspapers and all the other scandalous propaganda. The problem of the financial world in particular, is what the Government cannot help but be mostly concerned about.

The present financial situation is being affected by the great world depression as well as by the remedial measures taken after the lifting of the embargo on gold; and this is a most important period, when we shall have to act with caution. Without the utmost effort on the part of the Government and people, united in one fixed policy, I fear the future of our national economy will be greatly endangered.

At this moment of long political unrest resulting from the untoward relations between the Government and the Privy Council, our economic circles have become very nervous from fear that there might be a drastic change any time in our financial and economic policies due to a possible political upheaval; business and financial circles have been unable to manage their business and keep themselves peacefully employed in their work. They could not look on at the course of events with folded arms; but, alarming rumors were meanwhile current, throwing financial circles into confusion and disturbing the public bonds and all the other valuable securities markets, and they were far from being stable.

In the first place, such things as political unrest and speculations on political changes, are not supposed to have so much influence upon the financial circles in ordinary times; but, in this case, it is not very long since the embargo on gold was lifted and its influence has not yet subsided. Moreover, as I have previously related, when the influence of world depression had become considerably grave, and public sentiment had become very nervous, the theory of lifting the gold embargo at par, which had hitherto been advocated rather as an academic curiosity, had become very popular among some of the scholars and editors of newspapers and magazines. For this reason, not only those connected with the stock-markets began utilizing this theory speculatively, but some people holding pretty high positions in the political and financial worlds, especially those with very pessimistic opinions on the present and future situation of our financial circles, whether with intention to deceive or in good faith, had been making observations in some quarters of financial circles that the next Cabinet may make it their policy to prohibit the export of gold again; and when, as a consequence, the exchange rate falls to a certain degree and is stabilized, devaluation will be executed according to it, and then the embargo on the export of gold will be lifted once again. Many began to believe in it; and many, though they did not wholly believe in it, tried to take advantage of such fears in the financial circles for their selfish designs. Such a phenomenon is beyond the imagination of an intelligent man; but as financial circles are presently in a specially nervous condition, this propaganda and supposition, which is partly true and partly false, has in fact exerted considerable influence. Its most outstanding fact lies in the outflow of specie to foreign countries. The considerable outflow of specie during the import period in the first half of the year under the lifting of the gold embargo is not a matter to be suspicious about. But, that there has been a very great amount of outflow in specie at a period of favorable balance of trade in the second half of the year, especially recently, at the end of the year when it is still far from the period for imports, is, I believe, attributable to the instability in the exchange-rate in anticipation of the lifting of embargo on the new par, which will result from the prohibition of gold export, granting the political unrest resulting from the various speculations caused by the delay in the progress of deliberations of this treaty at the Privy Council by political and financial circles; though there may be other reasons for it.

Therefore, if the deliberations of the Privy Council are to be further prolonged in getting to a decision, and if the political unrest is not

eliminated, the tendency mentioned above will become doubly pronounced, and as a result, there is no telling what lamentable phenomenon we shall see in general financial circles.

This, really, is the point the Government had been mostly concerned about in the course of deliberating this treaty. Fortunately, since every member of the Investigation Committee, with the State their first consideration, has promptly concluded their deliberations and approved this bill unanimously, we have finally been able to see stability in political circles since the middle of September. The Government is deeply gratified that we have been able to eliminate the financial unrest which has resulted from these political anxieties.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): I understand. Although there are many questions I wish to ask, a strict investigation has been made by all the members of the Investigation Committee, so I shall respect it and believe in it. I, hereby, wish to express my approval.

President (KURATOMI): As there is no other proposal, we shall take a vote on the bill. All in favor of the investigation report, please stand up.

(Approved unanimously)

The Emperor retires.

(Meeting adjourned at 12:20 P.M.)

Signed by:

President:	Baron Yuzaburo KURATOMI
Chief Secretary:	Hyoji FUTAKAMI
Secretaries:	Sueo HORIE Morio MUTO

Kobayashi

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Page 1

REPORT OF THE SOCIETY "KOKUSAKU
KINKYUKAI"

/page 2/

CONTENTS

- I. Gist of policy for management of the southern areas occupied as a result of the Greater East Asia war. (December 1941).
- II. Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. (December 1941).
- III. Report of the Committee for administrative measures. (October 1941). (Including the register of the Committeemen, the reference materials and the circumstances of the Committee meetings.)

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Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

/page 14-15/

Chap. 3. Future of Soviet territories.

Though this problem cannot be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact, the Maritime Province shall be annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian Empire shall be put into the sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed under the complete control of Japan and Germany with Omsk as the point of demarcation.

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Chap. 5. Independent states in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and their defence.

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The problem as regards Siberia as a whole cannot be decided this instant; it will be influenced by the Japanese-German Pact as well as the extent to which the Soviets survive.

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(This plan was made by the military authorities and the Department of Oversea Affairs in December 1941.)

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Members of the Committee for Administrative Measures, in
the National Policy for the Investigation of the Society
(KOKUSAKU KENKYUKAI):

Mr. Nobuyuki ABE
Mr. Shigeo ODATE
Mr. Shinsuke KISHI
Mr. Fumio GOTO
Mr. Hiroshi SHIMOMURA
Mr. Kensuke HORIUCHI
Mr. Rensuke ISOGAI
Mr. Kinmochi OKURA
Mr. Seizo KOBAYASHI
Mr. Hyogoro SAKURAI
Mr. Sankichi TAKAHASHI
Mr. Hatao YAMAKAWA

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Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures,
together with reference materials.

The Administrative Office of the National Policy
Investigation Society.

Chap. I. The purpose of establishing this Committee.

Assuming that Japan will inevitably expand in the near future either southwardly or northwardly, if our measures are taken without any preparations, it is probable that we shall simply repeat what we are experiencing in the administration of Manchuria and North China. To be unprepared is hazardous. Therefore, our Society is establishing this Committee for administrative measures with the purpose of studying and discussing without delay many sorts of problems forwarding the results to the Government and requesting the Government to make the necessary preparations.

Chap. II. The original plan with an epitome of each member's opinion.

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To what extent ought we to make use of the natives in the
matters of administration?

1. The original plan.

As to this point we must need pay different heed to different cases, that is, for permanent occupation (suppose the Soviet Maritime Province) and in the other events (suppose the Dutch East Indies). For example in the above two cases we are required to think how to make use of the Soviet people, the Indonesians and the Dutch according to the case. Is it good or bad to make use of the natives? If we do, what will be the highest position they can get? Is it proper or improper to place Japanese in the regional prefectural and village administrations. (Of course, in order to watch the others)?

How ought we manage the native officers who were popular or unpopular among the native people?

Is it good or bad to have the system of G.P.U. propped by the natives? Specifically in the case of the USSR., is it advisable to employ White-guard Russians, or not? Especially in Dutch East Indies, is it good to employ Indians, Burmans, Malayans, Chinese, etc. or not?

2. Every member's opinion about the original plan.

Member A. "Needless to say natives should not be used in the Dutch East Indies. Inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies should not be employed either, except special persons. In the case of the USSR I think it would be good to make use of the White-guard Russian emigrants."

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(7) Is it advisable or not to send colonists to the actual places?

1. The original plan.

It may be considered as a good plan for expanding the influence of Japan and at the same time supplying the vegetables and other things that the army needs that we send the simple armed cultivators immediately after the first four months of occupation. This might be necessary in the Dutch East Indies, but in the case with the U.S.S.R., it may be worth even more serious consideration.

- END -

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Page 4

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel, G. I. TERANENKO,
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby
certify that the document "The nature of the future measures
in various maritime areas occupied as the result of the war
in the "Greater East Asia", on 58 sheets was delivered to me
by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow.
on or about _____, 194____, and that the original
of the said document may be found in the record office of the
Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify that this document was found by the
Red Army forces in 1945 in South Sakhalin in the files of
Karafuto Co. Ltd.

Lt. Col /s/ Teranenko
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 29, 1946.

COPY

NAME

03

KOBAYASHI, Seizo

PRESENT STATUS

Sugamo prison

Positions & Organizations

(see original list)

Remarks

Pres. of I R A P S - influential politician in Japan.
advocate of Jap expansion to the South.

Commander in Chief Combined & First Fleet 36-40

Gov. Gen. Formosa 1936-40

Member of Supreme Military Council early as 1933.

Recommendations

Hold for further inv. & possible trial.

List of Officials of Japanese Government
Project No. 1648
21 July 1945

Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI (Retd.): Former President, Imperial Rule Assistance
Political Society (now dissolved)

1877 Oct. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture.
* Graduated from Naval Academy at head of class.
1908 Lieutenant Commander
1909 Graduated from Naval Staff College.
1912 Commander
* Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
* Attache, Japanese Embassy, Washington
* Instructor, Naval Staff College.
1917 Captain
1920 Naval Attache, Japanese Embassy, London.
1922 Rear Admiral
1926 Vice Admiral
1927 Delegate, Geneva Naval Conference.
* Director, Department of Naval Materials and Technical
Affairs.
* Commander in Chief, 1st Fleet
* Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
1930 Vice Minister of Navy
1931-33 Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet
1933 Admiral; Supreme Military Council
* - 1936 Commander, Chinkai Naval Base
1936 Resigned from navy following February 26 army revolt.
1936-1940 Nov. Governor General, Formosa.
1943 Chairman, Central Cooperative Council, Imperial Rule
Assistance Association.
1944 Advisor, Bank of Formosa.
1944 Aug. President, IRAPS
1944 Aug. Member, House of Peers.
1944 Dec. Minister without Portfolio, Koiso Cabinet.
1944 Dec. Resigned as Chairman, Central Cooperative Council, IRAA
1945 Mar. 1 Resigned from Cabinet and as President, IRAPS.

Address: 1741 Fukuzawa 4-chome, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

Generally recognized as statesman rather than naval officer. His administration of Formosa (4 years, 3 months) was one of four longest since island became Japanese dependency. Advocated Japan's southward expansion. (81,82)

Resigned from Koiso Cabinet and Presidency of IRAPS in order to free himself for task of establishing new party to take form of "national protection movement" uniting Government, people, and military services in defense of the Empire. His efforts were hampered by extremist groups but finally had Premier Koiso's full support. Declined to accept presidency of Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seijikai), organization which took place of IRAPS. (83)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America, et al.)

vs.)

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.)

SS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Kazuo YATSUGI, state as follows:-

I was born in NISHIKIE-MURA, SAGA Prefecture in 1899.

I held the office of the Chief of the Business Bureau of National Policy Investigation Association /KOKUSAKU KENKYUKAI JIMUKYOKU cho/ from February 1937 to June 1945. At the same time I was entrusted with the business of the Research Section of the War Ministry from December 1938 to the end of 1944.

During the above period I was made to know and did the following which I am going to testify to, according to my duties.

The National Policy Investigation Association was instituted by Baron KINMOCHI OKURA, a member of the House of Peers, myself and others in 1937 with the purpose to investigate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese Government and to the public.

1. The number of individual members of this Association was approximately 2000 and the number of the juridical persons about 150, all of them paying a subscription.

Among the members of this Association, there were included Japanese Statesmen, political leaders, high officials, retired officers who had formerly held positions of leadership, representatives of the learned class, some Japanese concerns, the representatives of industrial companies as well as banking facilities, etc.

A list of some juridical persons who were members to the Association is as follows:-

- | | | | |
|--|---|---|---------------------------|
| 1. Prime Minister's Secretariat - Yearly subscription | | | ¥3,000 |
| 2. War Ministry | " | " | ¥3,000 |
| 3. Naval Ministry | " | " | ¥3,000 |
| 4. Home Ministry | " | " | ¥1,000 |
| 5. Oversea Affairs Ministry | " | " | ¥ 500 |
| 6. Foreign Ministry | " | " | ¥1,000 |
| 7. Communication Ministry | " | " | about ¥1,000 |
| 8. The Mitsubishi Concern | " | " | ¥5,000 |
| 9. The Aikawa Concern | " | " | ¥5,000 |
| 10. The Mitsui Concern | " | " | from ¥3,000/
to ¥5,000 |
| 11. The South Manchurian Railway Co. | " | " | ¥1,000 |
| 12. Other big companies and banking facilities also subsidized the Association. The annual fee of an individual member was from ¥50 to ¥200. | | | |

The annual budget of this Association was ¥170,000/180,000 for the purpose of carrying out specially important investigations, it received extra contributions. For instance, we received ¥300,000 to cover the special expenses of planning a ten years' programme for the construction of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, including ¥100,000 which was received from the Governmental organizations (viz. ¥20,000 from the Cabinet Information Board which was under the direct control of Hideki, TOJO, ¥20,000 from the War Ministry through Akira, MUTO, ¥20,000 from the Foreign Ministry through the Vice Minister, the then Minister being TOGO, ¥20,000 from the Naval Ministry, and ¥5,000 from the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc.

2. ¥100,000 was contributed by the big companies (including ¥20,000 from MITSUI, ¥10,000 from the SUMITOMO through Keijiro KITAZAWA, a director to the company, and large sums of about ¥10,000 to ¥20,000 each from some other companies.

The above stated ¥300,000 was received in response to a letter addressed to the above named Government office and the brains of the public concerns in which we explained the ways the money was going to be spent.

¥240,000 out of the above-mentioned sum was spent in making the plan for the ten years' programme. The document was issued by this Association in April 1943 and sent to the Greater East Asia and Foreign Ministries. I assure you that the document written in Japanese entitled "The Plan for the Measures for Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in four parts which you showed (and which had been seized when the residence of Baron OKURA was searched) is the very document for which compilation this Association received the above stated subscription of ¥300,000.

The Board of Managing Directors which assumed leadership in the Association had ten members including:

1. Kinmochi OKURA (Member of the House of Peers)
2. Michio YUZAWA (Prior to his taking the Portfolio of Home Minister)
3. Hiroshi SHIMOMURA (Later took the Office of Minister without Portfolio and in the SUZUKI Cabinet was appointed Chief of the Information Board)

I, as the Chief of the Business Bureau, which consisted of 30/40 clerks, was looking after the affairs of the Association.

The work of the Association was sometimes participated in by those who were qualified as not the members of the Association. (For instance, Lt. Gen. Akira MUTO who was in active service not only made speeches two or three times in the interest of the Association but gave financial support as stated above. Lt. Gen. Kenryo SATO also made speeches more than once. Besides the above, some influential Japanese statesmen who were not members participated in the important works of the Association.)

The reports, documents and plans which were made by the Association on the most important problems were submitted to the Government (The Premier's Secretariat) and the Ministers concerned on the instructions of the Board of Managing Directors.

The Governmental Organizations furnished us with necessary materials and data (including those of top-secret character) for investigating important problems regarding national policies and presenting our opinions about them.

In October of the 16th year of Showa (1941) when it seemed definite that Japan should enter a war in the near future, the Board of Managing Directors of the National Policy Investigation Association instituted a Committee for Administrative Measures with the purpose of working out a plan to be submitted to the Government in preparation for wars in the North and in the South.

This Committee consisted of a fine set of men, such as former ministers and generals who were in close connection with the Government and military authorities, including the following principal figures:

Nobuyuki, ABE, Premier in Showa 14/15 /'39/'40/,
President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in
Showa 17 /'42/.

Fumio GOTO, A member of the House of Peers,
Acting Premier in Showa 11 /1936/, Minister
without Portfolio in TOJO Cabinet. President
of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa
18 /1943/.

Seizo KOBAYASHI, Admiral. Vice Minister of Navy.
Minister without portfolio in Koiso Cabinet.

Sankichi, TAKAHASHI, Admiral. A war councillor.

Shinsuke, KISHI. The Commerce and Industry Minister
of TOJO Cabinet. Since Showa 18 /1943/, Minister with-
out portfolio, Vice Minister of Munitions, and others.

I affirm that the document you showed to me entitled
"The Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures"
is the very report that was made by the above-mentioned
committee and submitted to the Premier, Army, Navy, and
Foreign Ministers in October 1941.

During the war, three men of the Committee for Administra-
tive Measures were appointed by the Government to be adminis-
trative leaders in the Southern occupied areas, viz. Lt. Gen.
Rensuke ISOGAI to be Gov. Gen. of Hongkong; Shigeo OTATE to
be Mayor of Singapore and Hyozoro SAKURAI to be political
adviser to Burma.

As stated before, I was on the non-official staff of the Research Section of the War Ministry during the period of Showa 13-19 /1938-1944/. The Chief of the Research Section was Major Gen. Naofuku MIKUNI during Showa 15-17 /1940-1943/.

Early in Showa 17 (1942), there arose a necessity to make clear the official idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was needed for carrying out the function of this Association in investigating this same problem. I requested the War Ministry to show me the documents wherein was expressed the official opinion on this subject.

Early in Showa 17 (1942), in February or March, I borrowed two documents, the titles thereof were - "The Gist of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occupied as a Result of the Greater East Asia War" and "The Plan for the Disposal of Land in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" from the research section of the War Ministry (although my memory cannot identify the person).

I affirm that judging by the contents the photostated copies of the two Japanese documents shown to me are those of the above-mentioned documents which I received from the War Ministry early in Showa 17 /1942/.

I made a report to Baron Kinmochi OKURA at that time concerning these documents. By my autograph signature I certify that each of the 29 photostated pages, judging by the contents, is the same as that of the document in question. The fact that the Overseas Affairs Ministry participated in compiling these documents is clear as is written in them, and the participation of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff is also doubtless, considering that the disposition of the Army and Navy forces in the Southern Areas is mentioned in these documents, such matters being under the exclusive charge of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff, even the Army and Navy Ministries claiming no function in them.

/signed/ Kazuo YATSUGI

30th August 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said YATSUGI, Kazuo was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 30th day of August 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ James MURAKAMI, 2nd Lt. A.U.S.
Lt. James MURAKAMI

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named YATSUGI Kazuo, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Arthur A. SANDUSKY
ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY
Capt., J.A.G.D.

DOC. 1987-B

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REMEDIAL MEASURES
FOR SOUTHERN REGIONS TO BE OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE
GREAT EAST ASIA WAR.

Pages 3-6.

No. 1 POLICY.

When Japan completely occupies the southern regions belonging to the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands as a result of the present Great East Asia War, Japan will be in a position to decide all matters concerning the type of sovereignty, policies, culture, and economy for these regions according to her own desire. However, as it is seen in the Imperial Proclamation of the Declaration of War, the aspirations of the present war are to expel the Anglo-American domination in the Orient in order to ensure Japan's existence, and also to establish the Greater Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to secure the stability of East Asia so that it may contribute to the peace of the world. Therefore, the remedial measures touching these regions should be conducted entirely in accordance with the purport of the Rescript.

No. 2. THE MAIN POINTS.

1. When we occupy the southern regions belonging to the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the influence of these countries shall be expelled.
2. There shall be established in these occupied regions special agents to be in charge of matters concerning policies, culture, and economy so that we may set up an all-round plan as soon as possible in order to establish the Greater Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere which is the aim of the present holy war.
3. In order to ensure the existence of the Japanese Empire and that a national defence state of high degree be built up, the development of the available natural resources of those various regions by their inhabitants under our leadership is a thing to be obtained. The bringing about of the development of such natural resources mentioned above is also of vital necessity for promotion of the well-being of these peoples within the regions, but, taking into consideration the relation of demand and supply of the resources of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Spheres, plans must quickly be made both for an industrial reorganization of the whole Co-Prosperity Sphere, and also in particular, a counter-plan is necessary for a cut in production of such natural resources as are considered to be over-production to the demand of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, (rubber, tin, sugar, etc.) taking into consideration the living conditions of the inhabitants and the industrial economy of the given areas.

4. After peace and order becomes secured, all occupied regions, with exception of those sections spotted to be military operational bases specially under our direct control in the future, shall be so liberated as to have the natives restore their independence with some properly divided area as a unit in accordance with the ability of the natives residing in each area, provided that the independent unit does not necessarily have to be on "one race for one nation" basis.
5. The areas to be independent shall be monarchies according to various situations; and in case of necessity these monarchies shall be organized as coalition monarchies.
6. Although self-government for internal affairs will be gradually granted to each country which has achieved its independence, Japan shall exercise control, through some special organization so far as defense and foreign affairs are concerned so as to secure the stability of East Asia.

(December 1941)

PLAN FOR LAND DISPOSAL WITHIN
THE GREATER ASIATIC CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

(pp.7-14)

No.1. Regions coming under Japanese rule where a
Government-General will be established.

1. The regions to be added to the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Formosa which is to be enlarged.

Hongkong and neighboring British leased territories, and Dutch Macao (will be purchased in future).

The entire Philippine Islands.

Pratas (Tung-sha-Tao), Paracel (Hsi-sha-Ch'un-Tao)

Hainan (will be purchased from China).
2. Regions to be added under the jurisdiction of the South Seas Government Office.

Guam, Nauru, Ocean Island, Gilbert Islands, Wake.
3. Regions to be under jurisdiction of the Melanesia Regional Government-General (provisional naming) or the South Pacific Government-General (provisional naming).

New Guinea (east of long. 141 deg. E., British and Australian mandated), Admiralty Archipelago, New Britain, New Ireland and island groups in its vicinity.

Solomon Archipelago, Santa Cruz Archipelago, Ellice Archipelago, Fiji Archipelago, New Hebrides Archipelago, New Caledonia, and other islands, Loyalty Archipelago, Chesterfield Archipelago.

Taking approximately 180 deg. E as the eastern boundary and north of the Tropic of Capricorn.

4. The regions to be under the jurisdiction of the East Pacific Government-General.

Hawaiian Island, Palmira Island, Rowland, Baker and other islands, Phoenix Is., Niue Is., Rain Is., Marquesas Is., Tuamotu Is., Society Is., Cook and Austral Is., Samoa Is., Tonga Is., (these small islands and lagoon islands lying between Tonga and Fiji belonging to region 3 (above) and not to this Government-General.

These islands are bounded approximately by 180 deg. E and are north of the Tropic of Capricorn.

5. The region to be under the jurisdiction of the Australia Government-General (provisional naming).

The whole of Australia and Tasmania, Rodehe (TH Sic) Is.

6. The regions to be under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand Government-General (provisional naming).

North and South Island of New Zealand, Macquarie Island.

The entire sea up to the South Pole region, south of the Tropic of Capricorn and East of Long. 160 Deg. E (except east of Long. 120 Deg. W).

7. The region to be under the jurisdiction of Ceylon Government-General.

A demarkation line starting from the east boundary north of Portuguese Goa on the west coast of India passing through the north of the southeast Londa divide and north of Dharwal, north of Bellary and north of the Guntakal divide, and then turning a little to the southeast passing along the north side of a railroad a short distance (10 or 20 kilometers) holding the right side of Penner river, after joining the river about the point of Lat. 15 deg. N., and then reach the coast at Nellore--the section south of the above region, that is, Ceylon Is., Laccadive Is., Maldive Is., Chagos Is., Seychelles Is., and islands belonging to this group of islands, and the Mauritius Is., and islands belonging to this group.

8. The regions to be under the jurisdiction of the Alaska Government-General.

The whole of Alaska, the Yukon district of British Canada (from the middle course of the Mackenzie River across Great Bear Lake and then up the Great Slave Lake to the border line of the province of Alberta), the province of Alberta, the province of British Columbia, and the state of Washington of the United States.

9. GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF CENTRAL AMERICA (To be newly established).

Guatemala, Honduras, British Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Columbia, of Venezuela, the region northwest of the Oblique Line running in a southwesterly direction from the Point Lat. 10 deg. 30' N. and long. 68 deg. W to Lat. 6 deg. 50' N. and Long. 72 deg. W. (this territory embraces the large Maracaibo oil-fields), Ecuador, the British Island of Jamaica, Cuba, British Bahama Isles, Haiti, San Domingo, Puerto Rica (the British and French Possessions in the Leeward Islands as well as Trinidad shall be decided by agreement between Japan and Germany as a result of the Peace Conference. This applies also to British and Dutch Guiana).

10. In the event of the Mexican Government declaring war on our Empire and resorting to obstructive measures, it shall, as punishment, be made to cede the territory roughly east of 95 deg. 30' Long., including the Tehuantepec Isthmus Railway west of the said Isthmus. Should the Peruvian Government likely commit unlawful acts towards the Empire by joining the war on the American and British side, it shall, as punishment, be made to cede the territory north of roughly southern latitude 10 deg., and if it should be the same case with the Chilean Government, it shall be made to cede the Nitre Zone north of 24 deg. south latitude, as well as the Saraigomec (phonetics) Island and wile (phonetics) Island (also known as East Island.)

II. REGIONS TO BE MADE INTO INDEPENDENT STATES

1. EAST INDIA KINGDOM.

All Dutch Possessions.

British Borneo, Labuan Island, Sarawak,
Brunei Cocos Island, Christmas Island,
Andaman Islands, Nicobar Islands, Portugese Timor
(To be bought up in the future).

2. KINGDOM OF BURMA.

The whole of British Burma, Assam Province (India), the portion of Bengal Province from the left bank of the River Ganges

to the eastern part of the Shabappur Canal from the Confluence of the River Brahmaputra, with Thailand the boundaries shall be established separately.

The boundaries of the Republic of China shall be left as they are at present, and shall be suitably determined later on when peace becomes established.

3. KINGDOM OF MALAY.

Federal States of British Malay and Territory under British Control.

With Thailand the boundaries shall be established separately.

4. KINGDOM OF THAI

The kingdom shall be separately demarcated.

5. KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

The present territory of Cambodia and French Cochin-China.

6. KINGDOM OF ANNAM

The present territory of Annam and the region of the Laos Kingdom as well as French Tonking Region.

Items Nos. 5 and 6 shall be determined after seeing the future of the Vichy Government.

申告

Rubens

一九四七年六月十日
10/11/47

小林 躋造
Kobayashi, Seizo
213-4.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORGES - PACIFIC
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

申告書

一九四七年六月十一日

小林躋造

向一、會見者ハ昭和十六年十二月七日及昭和二十年九月二日、如何ナル

職務ニ推ラツテ居タカ

答、両日とも何等公務ニ推ラリ居ラス

向二、會見者ノ氏名

答、小林躋造

向三、會見者ガ本名、外使用シタル氏名及有名ナル氏名

答、ナシ

向四、生年月日

答、一八七七年三月一日

向五、出生地

答、廣島市基屋町三番目耶

向六、身長

答、五呎四吋

向七、体重

答、一三〇ポンド

向八、刀痕、眼、目、不具、有無

答、右頬、小サキ疣アリ

向九、現住所

谷、東京都巢鴨聯合國拘置所

向十、住居地

谷、東京都世田谷区深澤町四丁目二七四一番地

向十一、身分証明、様式ト番号

谷、ナシ

向十二、會見者カ捕ハレタ時、例、トト全時、其譯、犯罪ヲ自白シタルコトガアルカ、

谷、ナシ

向十三、會見者現在迄、最高階級

谷、武官トシテハ海軍大將

文官トシテハ國務大臣(小磯内閣)

向十四、會見者ノ業務、年代記録

會見者カ昭和六年一月ヨリ現在迄職務ヲ記入セヨ
前記入時政府カ軍閣役目トシテ記入時地位ヲ記入セヨ

谷、年月日 業務

一九三二、一、一、海軍中將海軍次官トシテ海軍省ニ勤務中

全、一二、一、第一艦隊司令長官兼聯合艦隊司令長官

一九三三、三、一、海軍大將

全、一一、一五、軍事參議官、轉任

一九三六、三、三〇、豫備役編入

全、五、九、二、臺灣總督ニ任官

一九四〇、一一、二七、依願免官

一九四三、六、二九、大政翼賛會中央協力會議々長ヲ委嘱サル

一九四四、八、一四、翼賛政治會總裁、推薦サル

全、日、中央協力會議々長辞任

全、八、二六、貴族院議員

全、一、二、一九、國務大臣(小磯内閣)

一九四五、三、一、依願免官

向十五、^{全、五、}翼賛政治會總裁自然解任、
會見者カ翼賛會公會、地方會、都市支部會及大日本政治會

ノ會員、創立者、組織者デアツラ記入セヨ、其外右団体並支部、但

合及特別事務、編輯ヲレタコトヲ記入セヨ

答、(一)大政翼賛會ノ創立及組織ノ関典セルコトナシ

但一九四三^年六月廿九日大政翼賛會日本部、附置シタル中央協力會議

長タルコトヲ委嘱サレ、今年七月及一九四四年七月内催サレタル第四回第

五回會議ニ議長役ヲ勤メタリ、尚ホ大政翼賛會日ニハ會員制ナシ、

(二)翼賛政治會ノ創立及組織ノ関典セルコトナシ

但一九四四年七月内閣交迭、阿部総裁朝鮮總督ニ任官、欠員上

ナリタル際、會ノ懇囑ト小磯、米内両氏、勸告モアリ、遂ニ之ヲ受諾シ

今年八月十四日第ニ代總裁トナリ翌一九四五年五月會解散ト共、消滅ス

(三)大日本政治會ハ一九四五年三月予カ新党創設、提唱ニ端ヲ発セルモ、其

創立、組織等ニ就テハ一切関典セズ、全會完成之後願向ニ推薦サレタル

カ別ニ諮向モナク、會ニ出入セズ

(四)三會共、機関雜誌等ヲ発刊セルガ其発行者、編輯者タリシコトナシ

向十六、党、組合、協会、学会、協会、学会、政治、学会、軍、学会、愛国、
學會、博士、学会、教養、学会、名譽、学会、運動、学会等、
會員、デアツタラ記入セヨ

何事モ、前記ノコトガ秘密、デモ明記セヨ

答(1) 水交社(日本海軍士官全部、社交的、研究的、俱樂部、海軍士官々
リ、簡、社則、依リ、副會長)

(2) 有終會(日本非現役海軍士官有志ノ会、レテ、時々、集會、時、運、座
レサル、如ク、軍事、及、一般、講演、ヲ、聞ク、主トス、普通會員)

(3) 東京俱樂部(内外人、社交ヲ主トス、並、普通會員)

(4) 日英協會(日、英人、社交的、會、普通會員)

(5) 大太平洋協會(文化、及、太平洋、關スル、研究会、理事、一人)

(6) 國際文化協會(文化、國際的、文化、交流、理事、一人)

(7) 臺灣協會(内、台人、親睦、台灣、紹介、目的トス、一時會長トナル)

(8) 海軍救濟會(海軍保護、普通會員)

(9) 日本赤十字社(医療、保健、事業、普通社員)

右外、國策研究会、太平洋戰事調査会等、ハ、會員、ミ、ア、リ、モ
研究、向題、種類、依リ、臨時、委員、ヲ、委、嘱、サ、レ、タル、コト、アリ

向十七、會見者、家、族、中、前記、処、及、之、關、聯、シ、テ、諸、職、ヲ、擔、リ、又、其、地位、及、
直接、權利者、又、間、接、權利者、ガ、居、タ、ル、居、タ、ラ、氏、名、現、住、所、統、一、柄、
勤務、先、名、役、柄、ヲ、記、入、セ、ヨ

答、該当者ナシ

向十八、会費、外寄附(金銭、土地)ヲ自発的ニ又内証ニ各関係組合、
渡シタリヲ記入セヨ

其外国民カ、上長カラカ或ハ自発的、強制的、寄附シタリ

答、該当事項ナシ

向十九、會見者ハ前記関係組合カラ階級、位、勲、章、領状又ハ名譽
ヲ與ヘシタコトガアルカ、若シアレハ其理由、年月日ヲ詳細ニ記入セヨ

答、日本赤十字社又海員救済會ヨリ有効章ヲ受ケタリ、前者ハ海軍
次官当時、後者ハ臺灣總督在任中、社又ハ會ノ事業、伸展ニ微
カラ致セルヲ認メラレル結果ニテ受領ノ日時ハ記憶シマス

向二十、會見者カ、B、C、各ヲ例外トシ、昭和六年一月一日ヨリ軍関係警
察、法安、公安、刑事會等ニ関係シタコトガアルカ

前記年月日、関係會ノ名、関係中、最高階級、ソレヲ受ケタリ年月日、
役目(註Bハ向十四ヲエヒ、Cハ向十五ヨリ十九迄ヲエフ)

答、該当事項ナシ

向廿一、昭和六年一月一日カラ、會見者ノシタ編輯(題名ト発行者名)、演説
(聴衆負教)、関係會ニ頼ミテ演説又ハ編輯シタナラ其會日名ヲ、
若シ編輯又演説ヲシタコトガナケレバ、其日ヲ記入セヨ

答、(一)著述又寄稿

(A)著述ナシ

⑧海軍現役中海軍省、東京朝日、毎日新聞等に依頼し依り当句
 の全意を得て海軍専門事項ヲ教團に互リ寄稿セルコトアリ、
 其日時又題名ハ確タル記憶ナキモ、当面の向題例へハ軍宿会
 議前、我國主張ノ要矣、又毎年行ハル海軍記念日、日本海
 軍ノ回顧談ヲナスカ如キモノナリ、函紙、ガキ、エレクションハ百ク内外ト
 推定ス

一五四〇年未、台湾總督ヲ辞任シ、一九四四年末國務大臣ニ任セラルトシ、
 野ニ在リ、其間大東亞戰爭起リ、角末新聞社(東京毎日新聞
 が主ナリ)ノ依頼ニ依リ、戰爭ノ關係ニテ教團寄稿セリ、今其日
 時、又題目ヲ尋ケ得サルモ、大体要旨ハ戰爭ノ將來ヲ樂觀スルヲ

戒ルニ在リタリ

(二)講演

台湾ヨリ帰京シテ以來、大東亞戰爭ニ至ル迄、向東京及主要都市
 ノ經濟俱樂部(主トシテ実業家ノ會合)、庶子校等ヨリ招カレ、台湾
 ヨリ見タル南方事情ニ付講演セリ、主トシテ台湾統治ノ體驗ヨリ南
 方異民族ノ對日觀、其資源尙余ノ容易ナラサル事等ヲ述ベ、當時
 一部驕激論者ノ所説ヲ是正スルヲヒトセリ、聽衆ノ數ハ各所区々タルモ
 合算スルハ五六千ナラン、日時等記憶シ居ラス

大太平洋戰爭トナリテヨリ暫ク講演ヲ辭シ居タルガ、一九四四年夏、翼
 賛政治會會任裁トナリ、今年十月ヨリ十一月互リ主要都市ニテ會ノ

演説會ヲ催ス事トナリ、予モ亦之ニ出席セリ、右ハ第八十六(六)臨時
議會開院式、天皇ノ御詞、趣旨ヲ國民ニ徹底セラルル為ナリ、予
ノ演説ノ要旨ハ「戰勢ノ不振ト國民結束ノ要ト」トモエ、ベキモナリ
聴衆ノ數ハ之亦各所区々ナルモ合計スレハ數萬ニ上ルナリ

向ニ上ニ會見者ハ上述ノ外、昭和六年一月一日以降、職務トシテ日本国内
又ハ国外デ団体管理者又ハ支配人タリシコトアルハ其団体名又年月日

ヲ記セ

答、談当事項ナレ

(終)

7 ^{タイリ}日記等ナキ為、日時不明、又記述ニ遺漏アル事知ルズ、上述ハ記憶ニ依ル