

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 **The Chairman:** The chair desires to announce that
3 the bell you heard is undoubtedly a roll-call vote on
4 the Donnell amendment to the pending bill of the United
5 Nations Organization.

6 While the members of the Senate have been excused by
7 the Senate from attending the proceedings of the Senate,
8 while these hearings are on, if any Senator wishes to vote
9 on that, he is at liberty to do so. The Chair thinks he
10 ought to know what it is about before he can exercise his
11 own judgment.

12 **Senator Lucas:** Can the Chair tell me whether it is
13 going to be a close vote or not?

14 **The Chairman:** The Chair cannot. The Chair can only
15 hope it will not be a close vote.

16 **Senator Lucas:** Will the reporter read what General
17 Miles said in his last answer?

18 (The answer referred to, as recorded above, was read
19 by the reporter.)

20 **Senator Lucas:** You believe that would be true whether
21 we were in peace or in war?

22 **General Miles:** Yes, sir.

23 **Senator Lucas:** One other question.

24 Something has been said, General Miles, about the men
25 on watch in Hawaii on the evening of the 5th, 6th and 7th.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 I think it would be well to state just how your men operated
3 at that particular time with respect to hours, that is, in
4 Washington, D. C.

5 General Miles: On the night of the 6th?

6 Senator Lucas: I was thinking of the 5th, 6th, and
7 7th, just previous to this attack, or anytime within a few
8 days previous to Pearl Harbor.

9 The Vice Chairman: The 7th is when it happened.

10 Senator Lucas: Yes, the 7th.

11 General Miles: The officers of the Far Eastern Sec-
12 tion concerned with magic were on duty in the War Department
13 all the afternoon and evening of the 6th. There was also
14 on duty an officer of the division itself. I was there, of
15 course, during the 6th. I do not know exactly when I left
16 on the afternoon of the 6th. I do know I returned early
17 on the morning of the 7th.

18 Do you wish me to go into a little more detail?

19 Senator Lucas: I was trying to ascertain the number
20 of men that you had on duty at that particular time, and what
21 the hours were. Did they have a 24-hour watch at that parti-
22 cular time?

23 General Miles: I cannot answer that question without re-
24 ferring to the records, Senator, with any accuracy.

25 Senator Lucas: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will
3 inquire.

4 Mr. Murphy: General, I notice on page 2216 of the
5 record, that you make the statement, at the bottom of the
6 page, speaking about whether or not any messages had been
7 sent subsequent to November 28, you stated that General
8 Marshall had sent a warning, and then you say, "Anything
9 else was considered to be redundant."

10 Do you want to stand on that statement?

11 General Miles: What page?

12 Mr. Murphy: 2216.

13 General Miles: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: Do you consider messages about the codes
15 being burned by the Navy to be redundant?

16 General Miles: Redundant to the warning. yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: By "redundant" you mean unnecessary, don't
18 you? Isn't that what redundant would mean?

19 General Miles: Desirable, but unnecessary, I would
20 say, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, it is redundant then, to tell them
22 that the codes are being burned throughout the world?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: You feel then, it was a waste of time to
25 do it, do you?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Miles: No, sir, I agree entirely with this message.

Mr. Murphy: If it were up to you in your department, those messages would not have been sent to Hawaii, is that right?

General Miles: No, sir, that is not right.

Mr. Murphy: If you felt it was redundant, would you do it?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Why did not you do it?

General Miles: Because it was desirable to send those particular messages through naval channels. The Command had been warned by the Chief of Staff and we had every reason to believe they were on their toes. We, however, did send, were glad to send through naval channels a message still further strengthening the information which the Chief of Staff had already given the Hawaiian Command.

Mr. Murphy: You feel that the message of December 2nd, the two messages of December 3rd, the message of December 4th, three messages, the message of December 6th, two messages, were all redundant, do you?

General Miles: Which messages are those, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Murphy: You said everything after the 28th was redundant up to the 7th. I am now speaking of Exhibit 37,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1
2 page 39, December 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th. Your answer
3 is as I understand it, they are all redundant.

4 Mr. Gesell: General, we have just handed you a set
5 of those.

6 General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I think it only fair
7 to look at my answer on page 2216 and the use of the word
8 "redundant."

9 Mr. Murphy: Let me read it for you, if you will, please.
10 I am quoting now from the record, at the bottom of the page:

11 "But these things were known in Hawaii. That fortress,
12 like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which
13 was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered
14 to be redundant."

15 Now, the interpretation I gather from that is you feel
16 that these messages from the 28th to the 7th were redundant.

17 General Miles: Redundant in the sense of warning that
18 command, yes, sir. That is what I am speaking about, the
19 warning of the danger.

20 Mr. Murphy: You realize that the Navy sent them. I
21 take it if they were here now in your office they would not
22 have been sent.

23 General Miles: No, sir, that is not true.

24 Mr. Murphy: Then why did not you send them?

25 General Miles: You do not have to tell a commanding

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 general, but once that a danger faces him. You may,
3 however, see fit to give him further information as to the
4 situation he faces.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, your office did not
6 send any of them, did it?

7 General Miles: My office did not send any of them for
8 reasons I have given.

9 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you also say it was inherent in
10 the situation that there would be the possibility, probability
11 and likelihood of an attack on Hawaii. Was it inherent
12 in the situation that war would be commenced that way?

13 General Miles: Not necessarily.

14 Mr. Murphy: I understood you to say that the reason
15 why you did not put in your message of December 5th, and
16 other messages, something about a possible surprise attack
17 on Hawaii, was the fact you did not want to, in effect,
18 explain the obvious.

19 General Miles: Did not want to what, sir?

20 Mr. Murphy: Explain the obvious.

21 General Miles: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: Was not that the purport of your testimony
23 as to why you did not include that in the note of December
24 5th?

25 General Miles: The note of December 5?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Yes, or the report of December 5. I
3 will give it to you.

4 Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 33.

5 General Miles: Memorandum of December 5 to the Chief
6 of Staff? Is that the one you refer to, Mr. Congressman?

7 Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir. Do you have that?

8 General Miles: I have the memorandum.

9 Mr. Murphy: On the 5th you spoke of all the likelihoods,
10 you spoke about the possibility of an attack on Russia to
11 the north, you spoke about an attack possibly on Indochina;
12 you spoke about the possibilities to the south, and you spoke
13 about the possibilities to the Philippines, but you did not
14 say anything about Pearl Harbor.

15 I understand you, on many occasions throughout the record,
16 say it was inherent in the situation about an expected attack
17 there, and I am wondering why it would not also be inherent
18 in the situation to expect an attack on the Philippines at
19 the very time you gave the report, that you would include
20 the Philippines in one or two paragraphs, but you never
21 mentioned Hawaii?

22 General Miles: Mr. Congressman, in the document to
23 which we refer, we were trying to evaluate the lines of
24 action which the Japanese might take at that particular time,
25 or in the period which we were trying to cover. Now, one of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 these lines of action which we thought very probable was
3 a southern expansion, which might involve the Philippines
4 and that was why the Philippines was mentioned, but since
5 it was inherent in the situation if we went to war with
6 Japan that Hawaii and Panama particularly might very well
7 be attacked, because of the great advantage which Japan
8 might accrue from a successful attack on those places, it
9 was not necessary to repeat in that particular paper this
10 obvious fact, known to military men.

11 The sole reason for the garrison on Hawaii was the
12 defense of a naval base in a Japanese war.

13 Mr. Murphy: What was the reason for the garrison at
14 Manila, if it was not for the same purpose?

15 General Miles: Primarily for the same purpose.

16 Mr. Murphy: Then why make a distinction in one and
17 not in the other?

18 General Miles: We did not make a distinction as to
19 the probability of Japanese attack, sir. We simply said
20 one of the lines of advance might involve the Philippines.

21 Mr. Murphy: The thing that disturbs me, General,
22 is throughout your testimony I certainly get the inference
23 that you were probably the only person in Washington who
24 expected the attack at Pearl Harbor, simply from your testimony,
25 because each time you go back to say how obvious it was, and

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 how inherent it was in the situation, and yet I have read
3 these reports of yours through from cover to cover and I
4 have not seen it mentioned once. Apparently people at
5 Hawaii did not think it was so obvious because they were
6 taken by surprise, and apparently the others in Washington
7 did not think it was so obvious because they were taken by
8 surprise.

9 I am wondering if it is a fair inference to take from
10 your testimony that you thought there was at least a great
11 likelihood that there was going to be an attack on Pearl
12 Harbor, and that, by the way, commenced the war? I think
13 that is a fair inference from what you have been saying
14 throughout this hearing.

15 General Miles: I am very glad to answer that question
16 if that is your inference, Mr. Congressman. It comes down
17 to what I have already testified on these two principles
18 which follow in making an estimate. I did not ignore any
19 action of the Japanese which was within their capability.
20 I knew they were capable of making an attack on Hawaii just
21 as I knew they were capable of making an attack on the
22 Philippines or Panama.

23 I did not believe, up to a very late date, that it was
24 probable that they would make that attack at the outbreak
25 of war, for the reason that I have already stated, that such

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 an attack as was actually made had to result from two
3 separate decisions of the Japanese; one to take on a war
4 with a great naval power, and presumably with the two great
5 naval powers, a very risky proposition in the long run as
6 has transpired; and second, to start that war, or at least
7 make this attack on a great fortress and fleet, which in-
8 herently jeopardized the Japanese ships making the attack
9 to some extent, and which rested almost solely for success
10 on the unpredictable circumstance that they would find that
11 fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet that attack.

12 The Grunert Board makes a statement that before Pearl
13 Harbor everybody in Washington expected the attack on Pearl
14 Harbor, and afterwards everybody was surprised except the
15 Secretary of War.

16 Mr. Murphy: I think, judging from your testimony, that
17 there was at least a likelihood of an attack. That is what
18 troubles me.

19 General Miles: That is the difference between what you
20 know is possible for the enemy to do, and what you are rather
21 surprised at what he is doing, because you have given him
22 credit for the best good common sense. I think "surprise"
23 even in that sense is too strong a word. You did not think
24 it probable that he would make that particular attack.

25 Mr. Murphy: General, I notice on your report of

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 December 5, Section 28 of Exhibit No. 33, on the second
3 page of that report, the following -- and this is as of
4 December 5, 1941 --

5 "The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least
6 four months in which they may strengthen their position
7 in one or more of the four important theatres of war,
8 and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces,
9 subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with
10 their chosen long-range strategy for the defeat of the
11 Nazis."

12 Do you think that was an accurate statement on December
13 5, 1941?

14 General Miles: That is at page 2?

15 Mr. Murphy: That is on the second page, under tab 28.

16 General Miles: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: The last paragraph on the bottom of the
18 page.

19 I assume you include in there the United States, and
20 you make the statement that the anti-Axis nations would have
21 four months in which to strengthen their position, and that
22 was two days before Pearl Harbor.

23 General Miles: I was not referring to the United States,
24 sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: You were leaving the United States out

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 when you spoke of the anti-Axis powers?

3 General Miles: Yes, sir. The anti-Axis powers
4 were those powers then in war against the Axis powers.

5 Mr. Murphy: You did include Japan then under the
6 theory that she was one of them under the Tripartite Alliance?

7 General Miles: She was an Axis power.

8 Mr. Murphy: And we were not an anti-Axis power at
9 that time?

10 General Miles: We were not anti-Axis; we were neutral
11 at that time.

12 Mr. Murphy: In view of what we were doing in the
13 Atlantic to aid in the defeat of Germany, we were not at
14 war, but would you not call us an anti-Axis power at that
15 time?

16 General Miles: My use of the term "anti-Axis" in
17 this paper referred to those nations actually at war with
18 the Axis powers.

19 Mr. Murphy: All right.

20 Now, then, I ask you to turn over to the page at which
21 you mention the Far Eastern theatre under your subheading 6.
22 Have you got the page?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: You state there, on December 5:

25 "The most probable line of action for Japan is the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 occupation of Thailand."

3 Now, were you speaking only in the event she went
4 south, or were you speaking of the next move when you said
5 that?

6 General Miles: I did not quite understand that.

7 Mr. Murphy: Will the reporter read that?

8 (The question referred to, as recorded above, was
9 read by the reporter.)

10 Mr. Murphy: Let me make it clearer. Under the sub-
11 heading 6 you said:

12 "Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of
13 her military over-extension. She has the following lines
14 of action open to her:"

15 And then you list a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and i, and
16 then you say:

17 "The most probable line of action for Japan is the occu-
18 pation of Thailand."

19 Was that the action you expected Japan to take on
20 December 5, 1941?

21 General Miles: That was the line of action we expected
22 her to take as the most probable.

23 Mr. Murphy: You certainly were not looking forward
24 to an attack on Hawaii as the most probable thing they were
25 going to do at that date, were you?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h16

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2 General Miles: No, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you state that the Fleet was
4 primarily a problem for naval intelligence while it was
5 in the port at Pearl Harbor, and there has been time and
6 time again through the reports I have read something to
7 the effect that while the Fleet was in port, its protection
8 was the responsibility normally of the Army.

9 Would that change your answer? At sea, the Fleet
10 takes care of itself, but while in port, the Fleet is sup-
11 posed to be protected by the Army; is that true?

12 General Miles: Yes, that is true. My reply, however,
13 is that the evaluation of those messages that primarily
14 concerned the Fleet was the primary responsibility of the
15 ONI.

16 Mr. Murphy: It normally would be, General, but it
17 there were going to be a bombing of Pearl Harbor, it was
18 the prime responsibility of the Army to protect the Fleet
19 while it was in the Harbor. That would be shifting quite
20 a good bit of the responsibility on your shoulders, would it
21 not, in the evaluation of the report?

22 General Miles: Oh, yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: I notice at page 2189, General, at the
24 bottom of the page, "Military intelligence was specifically
25 concerned," -- and this is General Miles speaking --

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 "particular concerned, and practically solely concerned
3 so far as the General Staff went, with anti-subversive
4 precautions and operations."

5 Is not that a very strong statement, in view of the
6 fact that you were also obliged to give reports from time to
7 time as to the situation of the Armies throughout the world
8 as viewed in the eyes of the Army, and what the enemy was
9 doing?

10 General Miles: I see now, Mr. Congressman, that is
11 an ambiguous answer. What I meant to say was that so far
12 as the General Staff was concerned, we were the division
13 primarily, particularly and almost solely charged with
14 looking into anti-subversive activities.

15 Mr. Murphy: That was one of your functions, but
16 certainly not the sole purpose.

17 General Miles: No, sir, not in the least one of my
18 main functions.

19 Mr. Murphy: You were one of the General Staff who was
20 to look after anti-subversive activities?

21 General Miles: Yes.

22 Mr. Murphy: You would not let your answer stand that
23 "military intelligence was specifically concerned, parti-
24 cularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far
25 as the General Staff went with anti-subversive precautions and

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 operations?"3 You mean by that that you on the General Staff, that
4 that was one branch to take care of that, but not to the
5 exclusion of your other duties?

6 General Miles: That is true, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: I notice on page 2197, as well as in many
8 other places throughout the record, that you did not see
9 General Short's reply until the early part of January,
10 1942, and I am wondering why or how it could happen that
11 there was a message sent out on the 27th of November which
12 would seem to indicate that war was coming, and your respon-
13 sibility in G-2 was to find it out, and I cannot understand
14 how it could be that your department would not know of the
15 reply from the war theatre, from November 27 to January
16 1942, when the very purpose that you were created for was
17 to be advised and to be advising on what had taken place
18 throughout the world, as well as in our own army.19 General Miles: No, sir. Military Intelligence had
20 no responsibility as to the measures taken.21 Mr. Murphy: I did not mean that. But you were to
22 advise. You were advising all of these people on this list
23 about what was happening in Russia, what was happening in
24 Germany, in the Middle East, and why you would not also
25 want to advise what was happening in our own theatres?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 General Miles: Mr. Congressman, please note that
3 General Marshall's message of November 27 directed General
4 Short, General MacArthur, and the other generals to report
5 measures taken, I believe, is the phrase used. The answer
6 then was presumably just that report of measures taken by
7 one of the major divisions of the United States Army, and
8 on that subject Military Intelligence had no responsibility.

9 Mr. Murphy: I take it that it was part of military
10 intelligence division's responsibility to follow the move-
11 ments of the Germans and Russians, and to follow the move-
12 ments of the British Army and to follow the movements of
13 the Dutch Armies, but not to follow the movements of the
14 United States Armies.

15 General Miles: It was no responsibility of Military
16 Intelligence to follow the movements of the United States
17 Armies. Generally, I knew, as did all officers of the Army,
18 particularly those stationed in Washington, of the main
19 movements, the maneuvers of the United States Armies as a
20 matter of interest, but it was no responsibility of Military
21 Intelligence Division to follow those movements or any
22 measures taken as the result of the warning message of
23 General Marshall.

24 Mr. Murphy: I am talking about generally throughout the
25 war. Did not Military Intelligence throughout the war follow

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 the progress of the American Armies and did not they
3 have to write reports on what progress we were making,
4 how the enemy was disposed, and how the American Army
5 was disposed; would not that be the function of Military
6 Intelligence?

7 General Miles: No, sir, that is the function of opera-
8 tions.

9 Mr. Murphy: The Military Intelligence did not stop
10 working when the war started, did it?

11 General Miles: They did not what?

12 Mr. Murphy: They did not stop working when the war
13 started?

14 General Miles: No, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: They followed only the enemy movements
16 rather than following our own forces; is that right?

17 General Miles: I did not get that.

18 Mr. Murphy: They went only to the enemy instead of
19 following our own forces in their movements?

20 General Miles: Yes, sir. Military Intelligence is
21 charged with informing Operations and the Command as to
22 what they think the enemy is doing or what they think the
23 enemy is about to do, and not to follow our own forces.

24 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you did not see the Short
25 telegram, or know of its existence until January of 1942,

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1 or some six or seven weeks after November 27, 1941?

2 General Miles: That is true, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: I notice in all of these reports you
4 have made, Exhibit 33, that you have signed your name as
5 the acting head of G-2. Were you not the actual head,
6 or were you just acting temporarily?

7 General Miles: I was the actual head, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: Why did you sign it "Acting"? Did
9 Marshall sign his name as the as the acting Chief of Staff?

10 General Miles: No, sir. That "acting" was due to
11 the fact that my previous service with troops in the six
12 years preceding my details as G-2 had not been sufficient
13 to enable the Chief of Staff to make me a member of the
14 General Staff, so he made me the acting Chief of Staff,
15 G-2. For all practical purposes, I was Chief of Staff,
16 G-2.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Murphy: Now, were you the only member of the staff, of the General Staff, who signed his name "Acting"?

General Miles: I believe I was, sir.

Mr. Murphy: I notice it is Brigadier General on December 5, and I notice now you have the rank of Major General. That was subsequent to December 5, was it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir, that was, sir.

Mr. Murphy: I also notice, General, throughout the record, that you first state that so far as the Consular officials, the Intelligence, they were directly responsible to you; that would be our Military Attache at Tokyo, he would be directly responsible to you, would he not?

General Miles: In the military hierarchy, yes. Of course, he was also a member of the Ambassador's staff.

Mr. Murphy: Right. G-2 at Hawaii you would reach ordinarily through General Short?

General Miles: The G-2 of any overseas department was an officer directly responsible to the Commanding General of that overseas department selected by him.

Mr. Murphy: Then this question of intercepts, as to whether or not you would send the intercept, you stated quite clearly that you did not convey the intercept as such because of security reasons. You then stated, however, that you did not, at least several times in the record, that you did not

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 convey any of the substance of the intercepts, and, apparently,
3 because of the reason that the Chief of Staff, General Marshall,
4 was responsible for that happening. There was one place in
5 the record, however, where you do say that from time to time
6 you did send some of the substance of intercepts. At other
7 places you say you didn't send it because of security reasons.

8 My question is would there be anything to prevent you
9 from sending the substance of the intercepts without ascribing
10 the origin to the intercept itself and thereby give the
11 Theater Commander the benefit of information you were getting?

12 General Miles: Only the same security reason which pre-
13 vented our sending the text of the message. In other words,
14 if the Japanese found by breaking our code -- we didn't know
15 whether they were doing it or not -- that we were sending
16 information to Hawaii or anywhere else you like which we
17 could have gotten only from magic it would have divulged the
18 secret just as much as if we had sent the text of the message.

19 Mr. Murphy: Didn't the Navy do exactly that between
20 December 2, 1941 and December 6, 1941?

21 General Miles: In certain cases they did.

22 Mr. Murphy: But the Army never did; is that what you
23 mean?

24 General Miles: I am not prepared to state offhand without
25 examining the record if the Army ever did.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Wouldn't it have been difficult in writing
3 your appraisal of the situation from time to time to rule out
4 of your mind the fact that you had these different impressions
5 gained from a reading of the intercepts and weren't you giving
6 the Command the benefit of the knowledge that you had from
7 the intercepts in your reports?

8 General Miles: I don't quite get the question.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, you wrote reports from time to time
10 to the General Staff. The General Staff would send out messages
11 to the Theater Commander. Do you follow me so far?

12 General Miles: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, in order for you to write your
14 report to the General Staff you based that upon certain in-
15 formation, some of which information you obtained from the
16 intercepted messages; isn't that right?

17 General Miles: That is right, yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: So that in effect in giving your reports
19 based upon all the knowledge you had at the time to the General
20 Staff and then having that go out to the field you were in
21 effect passing on the substance of what you had learned in
22 the intercepted messages, weren't you?

23 General Miles: To that extent, yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Throughout the record you have created the
25 impression, to me, at least, that the responsibility for the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 substance of this information not going to the field was
3 General Marshall's responsibility apart from any wishes you
4 might have had in the matter.

5 Did you mean to create that inference?

6 General Miles: I think I said, sir, that the responsi-
7 bility for any message, whether it came from magic or otherwise,
8 which caused the implementation of war plans, or any other
9 major tactical decision by a major unit of the U. S. Army,
10 should emanate from General Marshall or his principal assistant
11 for war planning operations.

12 Mr. Murphy: Well, supposing it weren't up to the point
13 of implementing the war plans, but was a very vital piece of
14 information which the Commanding Officer ought to have. Was
15 there anything said to you by General Marshall that prevented
16 you from seeing that it went out to G-2?

17 General Miles: The magic had to be safeguarded.

18 Mr. Murphy: You could give the substance of it. The
19 Navy did.

20 General Miles: We could have, if we thought it necessary,
21 give the substance of that message, but we were closing on
22 that secret as much as possible.

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, at page 2188 of the record -- I
24 just want to lay the ground for what is to come. As I under-
25 stand it, there is an absolute difference between you and

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 General Gerow as to what part you took, if any, in the prepara-
3 tion of the message of November 27?

4 General Miles: Page 2188?

5 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

6 General Miles: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Is it General Gerow's feeling that you did
8 have something to do with that message?

9 General Miles: It is, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, you say you never saw
11 that message except some weeks afterwards?

12 General Miles: I stated in my memorandum of January 30
13 that I was not sure that I had seen the actual text, but I
14 knew the substance.

15 Mr. Murphy: I am wondering why you and several Generals
16 would sit around a table and discuss the adequacy or inadequacy
17 of a message, as to whether or not it should be supplemented,
18 without having a look at the message itself. You sat down
19 with General Bryden and others and talked to them about warn-
20 ing the Air Corps group at Hawaii and elsewhere. Then you
21 yourself sent a subsequent a message and/or an additional
22 message against subversive activities. That would have you
23 participating in the sending of two additional messages.

24 Do I understand that you sent the two additional messages
25 without having looked at the original message itself?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Miles: Yes, sir. The two additional messages sent on November 28 had nothing directly to do with General Marshall's warning message of November 27. My message of November 27 to the G-2 did, however, and I knew, I must have known at that time, at the time I sent it, that anti-subversive warnings had not been contained in General Marshall's message.

Mr. Murphy: Well, wouldn't it have been a good idea to look at the message to see what it did say when sending out supplemental messages? What was wrong with looking at that message of the 27th? Why didn't you?

General Miles: I don't remember that I saw the text of that message but I did know its contents. Why I didn't actually go over to War Plans Division and insist on seeing the textual message I don't know, sir.

Mr. Murphy: G-2 wasn't interested in the contents sufficiently to have a copy in its files?

General Miles: No, sir; we would not have kept a copy of so secret a message in our files. It belonged in War Plans Division files.

Mr. Murphy: G-2 wouldn't have anything in their files to show the substance of that message in order to follow the progress of future events?

General Miles: Not in G-2 files, no, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Is it General Gerow's opinion that you did

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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have some participation in the formulation of the message of the 27th of November?

General Miles: I believe it is, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, at page 2079 of the record you spoke about your accomplishments in setting up a Joint Intelligence Committee. You said that that committee had its first meeting on October 11, 1941. You also stated that you felt that a crisis was developing about the middle of November.

Why didn't you call a meeting, why didn't somebody call a meeting of that Joint Intelligence Committee instead of waiting until after the war started?

General Miles: That, Mr. Congressman, is one of the best examples that I know of of the need of unification of the services. It actually took from July 14 to December 8, in those critical days, to integrate and establish a committee for intelligence within the Joint Army-Navy Board, which was the high policy making agency of the Armed Forces.

Mr. Murphy: But you have already said, at page 2079, that you already had a meeting on October 11. Why didn't you call a meeting between then and December 7 or 8? What efforts did you make to have a meeting? Who did you consult about it?

Here is a working organization formed on October 11, 1941 and a crisis is developing and there are no meetings until the day after the war started. Why not?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Miles: I regret to say, Mr. Congressman, there were still discussions and difficulties going on between the War and Navy Departments as to just what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetera.

Mr. Murphy: Did you personally, as Acting Head of G-2 of the Army, make any effort to have a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee after the middle of November and prior to December 7, 1941?

General Miles: I pressed several times for the establishment and operation of that committee.

Mr. Murphy: Will you state exactly what you did between November 15 and December 7, 1941; to whom did you talk and to whom did you protest and with whom did you press?

General Miles: I went several times, I am sure, to General Gerow, who was the War Department representative on the Joint Planning Committee, the Joint Board, urging action in that matter.

Mr. Murphy: Will you give the date, as best you can?

General Miles: I cannot give the dates from memory of any discussion of this matter. I only know that during that period I was constantly pressing for an establishment, which I myself had initiated, in which I was very much interested.

Mr. Murphy: Turning to page 2079 of the record I want

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 to quote you exactly:

3 "The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their
4 first meeting on the 11th of October, 1941, but did not
5 actually function until the 8th or 9th of December."

6 I ask you this question: Was General Gerow a member of
7 the Joint Intelligence Committee?

8 General Miles: He was not.

9 Mr. Murphy: Why would you go to him to have your own
10 committee meet? Who was the head of it? Who was the head
11 of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

12 General Miles: The Joint Intelligence Committee was to
13 consist of the head of Military Intelligence, myself, and the
14 head of Naval Intelligence.

15 Mr. Murphy: Why would you ask General Gerow to hold a
16 meeting?

17 General Miles: Because, sir, the whole proposition of
18 the Joint Intelligence Committee had to be processed first
19 through the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board and
20 then receive the approval of the Joint Board. There was
21 great difficulty with the Joint Planning Committee as to how
22 we would work with them, where we would work. General Gerow was
23 the representative on that committee with whom I was dealing.

24 Mr. Murphy: Were there any minutes taken at the meeting
25 of October 11, 1941?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Miles: Any what, sir?

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Mr. Murphy: Any minutes, notes?

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General Miles: That I do not know, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Is there anything in writing that will tell that the functions of that committee were and why it was set up?

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The record shows, while you are looking it up, that the establishment of the committee was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October and by the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and that appropriate orders were issued.

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That is your testimony at page 2079.

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General Miles: In looking up this matter, Mr. Congressman, I consulted Colonel Montague, who was then one of my officers, and a former secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee. I think he was the first secretary. He has given me a memorandum dated the 2nd of November this year on this matter.

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Mr. Murphy: Is there any official document we might call for that would show us the function of that committee and its purpose and what had been done to formulate it up to December 7, 1941 and why it didn't meet?

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General Miles: The memorandum from Colonel Montague states this:

"***there are in the file rough drafts of J.B. 329 (Serial 710) by General Gerow and Admiral Turner re-

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 spectively. These papers indicate a controversy between
3 them as to the scope of the functions of the proposed
4 J.A.N.I.C."

5 Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee.

6 "General Gerow wished the committee to collate,
7 analyze and interpret information with its implications,
8 to estimate hostile capabilities and probably intentions.
9 Admiral Turner wished to limit it to presentation of such
10 factual evidence as might be available, but to make no
11 estimate or other form of prediction". In J.B. 329
12 (Serial 710) Admiral Turner won."

13 It also makes a statement here which sounds rather ridi-
14 culous in these days, but that was what was going on:

15 "The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not
16 fully activated until 1941 because until then the head of the
17 foreign branch office of Naval Intelligence was unable
18 to obtain agreement within the Navy Department as to
19 the office space to be provided. Except for this diffi-
20 culty the committee might have been activated by the
21 first of December."

22 Mr. Murphy: There were only two members. Wouldn't you
23 be able to have a meeting at your office, with war coming on
24 and a crisis developing?

25 General Miles: No, sir, we did not meet until we could

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 finally get actually to work on it. The personnel of that
3 committee, the actual working personnel of that committee were
4 not, I think, the heads of G-2 and ONI, but subordinate officers
5 detailed by them. We were then to review their work.

6 Mr. Murphy: I am going to ask counsel, Mr. Chairman, to
7 go into this matter more thoroughly. I think we ought to have
8 brought before us somebody who can tell us the detail of why
9 this committee didn't function and a survey of the whole
10 picture.

11 The Vice Chairman: Counsel will take note of that request.

12 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Congressman, I think on the request of
13 why the committee didn't function, on the Army side General
14 Miles is the best witness.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, as I take it, your answer on
16 the record is that the reason you and the Admiral did not meet
17 during the crisis from November 15 to December 7 was as con-
18 tained in your answer which you read from the paper, a state-
19 ment of Colonel Montague to the effect that the Navy man was
20 having difficulty in getting an office in which you were to
21 meet, you two men?

22 General Miles: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: That is what you read; that is the way the
24 statement read. What was the reason you didn't meet?

25 General Miles: Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, and

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 I met frequently during that period. The actual Joint In-
3 telligence Committee, as such, as part of the Joint Board,
4 was having a great deal of difficulty in getting established,
5 a difficulty which I think would be largely eradicated if
6 we had had a unified department of national defense.

7 Mr. Murphy: I will come to that, but you do say, however,
8 at page 2079 of the record:

9 "The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their
10 first meeting on the 11th of October 1941 but did not
11 actually function until the 8th or 9th of December."

12 At any rate, that is a fact.

13 General Miles: That is factual so far as the meeting
14 is concerned, yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: You talk about a unification of the services,
16 and I am not going to get into that, but will ask this: If
17 you felt the messages from the 27th of November to the 6th
18 of December were redundant and the Army was the head of this
19 Board what would have happened to those messages?

20 General Miles: They would have been sent.

21 Mr. Murphy: By whom? Who was going to settle your
22 differences?

23 General Miles: I thought they should be sent and have
24 repeatedly so testified.

25 Mr. Murphy: You may interpret "redundant" a little

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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differently than I do.

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General Miles: They were redundant to the warnings of which I was speaking when I used the word "redundant".

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Mr. Murphy: Now, let me ask this question, General:

I see in Exhibit 37 a number of messages sent to all of the commands between the 27th of November and the 6th of December about destroying codes and machines, but I don't see any message from either the Army or the Navy to Hawaii as to what to do. Do you know of any such messages?

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General Miles: No, sir, we didn't want them to destroy their codes.

Mr. Murphy: At Hawaii?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You thought that was a very likely place to be attacked?

General Miles: Surely.

Mr. Murphy: You have them destroying the codes every place else in the world except one of the places where an attack was quite probable.

General Miles: Mr. Congressman, the Army and Navy and State Department ordered the destruction of codes only in places in which those codes could be immediately seized by a foreign power.

Mr. Murphy: If they had ships that day they might have

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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been; I mean on the 7th of December.

General Miles: What did you say?

Mr. Murphy: They might have been, isn't that so, God forbid, but they might have been?

General Miles: I think the authority in Hawaii would at least had time to destroy their codes. Even if they landed on Hawaii we did expect considerable resistance to be given to the Japanese.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, I see a message from the Navy, none from the Army, but a message from the Navy, to Alusna Tokyo Alusna Bangkok, Astalusna Peiping, Astalusna Shanghai, I see another for the co mardet Peiping, co mardet Tientsin, I see another for Navsta Guam. But I see nothing about Hawaii.

At any rate, neither the Army nor Navy told them at Hawaii to destroy their machines or codes?

General Miles: No, sir, we did not want those machines destroyed for any reason we could then foresee. We expected Hawaii, at least, to put up a very good fight and allow time to destroy codes and anything else.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: And that notwithstanding the fact that a
3 message came from Hawaii on December the 6th that the Japanese
4 at Hawaii were destroying their codes.

5 General Miles: Yes, sir, but our police at any time af-
6 ter war was declared could have jumped that consulate and taken
7 those codes but they could not jump our headquarters.

8 Mr. Murphy: General Miles, as I understand it, - and I
9 wish you would correct me if I am wrong, - in your predictions
10 of what might happen you expected a possible attack on the
11 Maritime Provinces to the north, which would be Russia, or
12 an attack to the south, which would be the Malay Peninsula or
13 Thailand or the Dutch East Indies and that the Japs would
14 probably -- not probably, but might attack the Philippines
15 so as to prevent the Philippines being on their flank, isn't
16 that right?

17 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: Yes. And then the other step, that if they
19 were going to attack the Philippines because they did not
20 want a flank movement they might take the other step and go
21 on and get the fleet and stop that from being another flank,
22 to protect them in their march to the south, isn't that right?

23 General Miles: That is correct, sir. The minute they
24 became involved with the United States: they might take
25 Hawaii, Panama or anything else.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: But, as I understand it, no one of respon-
3 sibility in Washington or elsewhere anticipated that the Japs
4 would take the move to attack the Fleet before they attacked
5 the Philippines, to remove any subsequent attack on their
6 flank; isn't that right, so far as you know?

7 General Miles: If by the word "anticipate" you mean
8 that they thought it the most probable thing or even a prob-
9 able thing, I think you are right, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: That is exactly what I meant, as the pos-
11 sible thing and the most likely at the beginning of the war.

12 General Miles: Yes.

13 Mr. Murphy: All right. I was wondering, General:
14 Over at page 2177 there was a joint dispatch on economic sanc-
15 tions and there was not a joint dispatch about the possible
16 likelihood of war beginning.

17 General Miles: 21?

18 Mr. Murphy: On page 2177 there is a joint dispatch
19 stating that economic sanctions would be placed in effect but
20 there is a separate message about the likelihood of war.

21 Mr. Gesell: That joint dispatch is also in the exhibit,
22 is it not, Congressman, exhibit 32?

23 Mr. Murphy: I think I have it here.

24 Mr. Gesell: At page --

25 Mr. Murphy: Exhibit 32, yes, at page 2; yes, page 2.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Gesell: Page 2.

3 Mr. Murphy: Dated July 25, 1941.

4 Mr. Gesell: That is right.

5 General Miles: What was the question, Mr. Congressman?

6 Mr. Murphy: My question is why did they have a joint, or
7 why did you, the Army and the Navy, have a joint dispatch
8 dealing with or telling about the likelihood of economic sanc-
9 tions and a separate dispatch on November 27, 1941 about the
10 likelihood of war?

11 General Miles: I am not able to answer that question,
12 Mr. Congressman. I do not remember that I had any part in the
13 drafting of the dispatch of July 25th, which you refer to as
14 the joint dispatch on economics, and I have already testified
15 that I do not remember of having had any part in the dispatch
16 on November 27th.

17 Mr. Murphy: Did you have any part in the dispatch of
18 November 24th on page 2184 of the record?

19 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with
20 Japan very doubtful."

21 Mr. Mitchell: Page 5 of exhibit 32.

22 General Miles: No, sir, I do not remember of having had
23 any part in the drafting of that dispatch.

24 Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator Brewster would be the next in

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 order but he advises the chair that he is unavoidably absent
3 this afternoon and Congressman Gearhart will now proceed to
4 inquire of General Miles.

5 Mr. Gearhart: General Miles, Hideko Tojo was the Premier
6 of Japan and I am told that there was a Foreign Minister of
7 Japan by the name of Togo. Now, that name Togo in Japan is
8 just about the counterpart of the names of Jones, Smith and
9 Johnson in the United States. In view of that I wonder whether
10 or not the name Togo which is signed to these telegrams which
11 were sent to Honolulu inquiring about the disposition of
12 ships was, in fact, the Foreign Minister or somebody else in
13 the government who was assigned to carry on that particular
14 inquiry. Do you know?

15 General Miles: I do not know, sir. I do not think it
16 was the Foreign Minister, but I did not raise that point when
17 I was being asked.

18 Mr. Gearhart: I don't think so either for the reason that
19 he does not sign the similar notes of inquiry to Panama and
20 to Manila.

21 I have been very interested in your testimony in respect
22 to assuming that the attack might come at Hawaii, especially
23 interested in view of the fact that that assumption is not
24 reflected in any of the papers that I have seen that have been
25 offered in evidence in this case. In fact, from the papers

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 the contrary would seem to be the case.

3 As a matter of fact, wasn't there a widespread opinion
4 in Navy and Military circles that the mighty fortress of Pearl
5 Harbor was beyond even thought of attack, as was the mighty
6 British bastion down at Singapore?

7 General Miles: No, sir, I do not think there was any
8 widespread, - I never heard of any opinion that Hawaii or any
9 other of our overseas departments were invulnerable to attack.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Well, then, how do you account for the
11 fact that the exhibits that have been introduced here prac-
12 tically ignore the possibility, as far as writing is concerned,
13 of an attack upon either Singapore or upon Hawaii?

14 General Miles: Well, they did not ignore it, sir. The
15 messages, the warning message of November 27th very definitely
16 did warn Hawaii. Now, if you are referring to my estimates
17 of the situation or other papers prepared for the General Staff
18 it is, I have repeatedly said, true that I did not burden that
19 very busy gentleman with what I knew that he knew.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Will you point out one message which
21 warned Hawaii which was not one of a series of messages sent
22 to all of our overseas commanders?

23 General Miles: I know of no message sent particularly
24 to Hawaii and not to any other overseas command warning them.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Well, then, that does not answer my ques-

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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2 tion, does it, that Hawaii was considered by everybody all
3 of the time as being a place that was within danger during
4 the last week of November and the first week of December of
5 1941?

6 General Miles: Yes, definitely I think, sir, that the
7 message which went to Hawaii as well as the other overseas
8 departments --

9 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you said there was no message which
10 was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other out-
11 lying departments.

12 General Miles: That is true, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii
14 which was not sent to the others, is that not true?

15 The Chairman: Congressman, I think the witness said
16 he knew of no messages sent to Hawaii that were not sent to
17 others. He said that he knew of no such messages.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I do not want to put any words in
19 the mouth of the witness.

20 The Chairman: Yes, I understand.

21 Mr. Gearhart: So I will ask you to answer the question
22 yourself, General.

23 The Chairman: The question that the Congressman asked
24 you was whether any other message was sent to Hawaii which
25 was not sent to other stations and your answer was that you

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 knew of no such messages.

3 General Miles: I knew of no warning message which was
4 sent to Hawaii and not sent to other overseas departments.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Then to refresh your memory I will call
6 your attention to the message that General Marshall sent on
7 the 7th day of December 1941. Was that sent to all of the
8 other outlying bastions?

9 General Miles: Yes, sir, it was.

10 Mr. Gearhart: The same message was sent to Manila that
11 was sent to Hawaii?

12 General Miles: It was.

13 Mr. Gearhart: The copy which appears among the other
14 papers of this particular exhibit, the small one in the pink
15 binding, does not indicate it; but do you know, as a matter
16 of fact, that that message was sent to the Philippines and
17 to Panama, other places?

18 General Miles: I do, sir, of my own knowledge know
19 that that was the Chief of Staff's direction.

20 Mr. Gearhart: That appears very clearly from the other
21 messages but it does not appear clearly from the copy of this
22 particular message.

23 Why were not copies that were sent to the others in-
24 cluded in this book, or if different ones were sent why were
25 not they set forth, or if the same one was sent why doesn't

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 it appear in this book? Are you sure of it? That is what I
3 want to know.

4 General Miles: I am absolutely sure that the message of
5 December 7th was by direction of the Chief of Staff sent to
6 Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines and the West Coast.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. What did you think should have hap-
8 pened in the Hawaiian Islands when they received their mes-
9 sage of November 27th?

10 General Miles: I thought that they would go on full
11 alert prepared for any eventuality that might happen to them
12 in a Japanese war.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Did you see the report that General Short
14 made in reply to that order or that direction that he received
15 on November 27th?

16 General Miles: Not until the following month.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, his reply was:

18 "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.
19 Liaison with Navy re your radio 472 27th. Short."

20 Do you know whether or not that message was received by
21 General Marshall?

22 General Miles: I know now that it was received by
23 General Marshall.

24 Mr. Gearhart: You know now that it was not received by
25 him?

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 General Miles: I know now that it was received by
3 General Marshall.

4 Mr. Gearhart: That it was received by General Marshall.

5 You also know, as one who keeps in touch with these pa-
6 pers, that General Marshall did not voice or telegraph any
7 objections to the precautions that General Short had taken as
8 reported in the telegram that I have just read?

9 General Miles: I do, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: It must have been satisfactory, is that
11 not a correct conclusion to draw from that situation?

12 General Miles: I would much prefer, Mr. Congressman,
13 that General Marshall answer that question. He is to appear
14 before you this week.

15 Mr. Gearhart: I will draw your attention that a similar
16 telegram was sent on the 27th to General MacArthur in Manila
17 and in order to emphasize the difference in the reports I
18 am going to read from the MacArthur report and then I will
19 ask you how do you account for the difference. General Mac-
20 Arthur says in his report:

21 "Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio
22 624, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified
23 in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures
24 have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by pre-
25 sent state of development in this theatre of operations

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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2 everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful
3 defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial rela-
4 tions exist between the Army and the Navy. MacArthur."

5 Now, how do you account for the fact that these two
6 gentlemen, officers of the United States, replied so differ-
7 ently? How do you explain it?

8 General Miles: I can only account for that, Mr. Con-
9 gressman, by the assumption that those two commanding Gen-
10 erals viewed General Marshall's message, a similar message
11 sent to the two of them, in a totally different way.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Now, isn't it a fact that the telegram
13 that was sent to MacArthur was different from the telegram
14 that was sent to General Short and it was that difference
15 which brought forth those differences in replies? Is that
16 not correct?

17 General Miles: I do not remember, Mr. Congressman, that
18 there was any material difference between the message sent
19 to General MacArthur and that sent to General Short.

20 Mr. Gearhart: There is a very material difference and
21 it consists of just this sentence which is contained in the
22 message to Short but is not in the message that was sent to
23 MacArthur. (Reading):

24 "Suggest reconnaissance and other measures as you
25 may deem necessary, but these measures should be car-

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

2 ried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civilian popula-
3 tion or disclose intent."

4 Now, it is that omission of that phrase in the telegram
5 to MacArthur that probably accounts for the difference in the
6 two replies, is that not correct?

7 General Miles: I do not think that is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: All right. Let me hear what you think
9 about it.

10 General Miles: The prohibition against disturbing the
11 civilian population in this way applied far more at Hawaii,
12 American territory, than to the Philippines, in which there
13 was a much smaller number of American citizens, but the es-
14 sential thing, Mr. Congressman, it seems to me is that that
15 prohibition was as old as the United States Army. We have
16 always attempted to do our job without unnecessarily disturb-
17 ing or alarming or alerting the civilian population. I think,
18 since you asked me, that it had practically no effect in that
19 very important war warning message.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Then why did you prepare a different tele-
21 gram, one containing it and the other not containing it?
22 That is not your practice, is it, when you send joint tele-
23 grams all over the different departments that we have in the
24 United States? You send the same telegram. Here you gave
25 General Short definite instructions not to do something,

1 Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart.

2 whereas you did not give General MacArthur the instructions not
3 to do the same thing.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, may I interrupt? This
5 witness had nothing to do with it. He did not give these in-
6 structions.

7 Mr. Gearhart: I thought this witness testified that he
8 had a part in the writing of this telegram of November 27th.

9 Mr. Mitchell: No.

10 General Miles: I testified exactly the opposite, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: You did not have anything to do with it?
12 Then you cannot account for the differences in those two tele-
13 grams?

14 General Miles: I cannot state that of my own knowledge.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Well, then as a military expert could
16 General Short have sent airplanes all up into the air on re-
17 connaissance and establish a reconnaissance all over those
18 islands without exciting the people?

19 General Miles: I believe he could, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Could he have alerted the island under a
21 number 3 Army alert without apprising the people of some in-
22 tent behind it?

23 General Miles: I had seen exactly that situation in the
24 Island of Oahu under the guise of maneuvers and I do not re-
25 member that the civilian population was very much disturbed.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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The preceding General, as we know, had them out on the Number
3 alert for several weeks.

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The Chairman: General, have you completed your answer
5 to that last question?

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General Miles: Have I what?

7

The Chairman: Did you complete your answer to the last
8 question?

8

9

General Miles: Yes.

10

The Chairman: Well, unless the Congressman is practical-
11 ly through we will recess here.

11

12

Mr. Gearhart: No, I am not practically through.

13

The Chairman: We will recess until ten o'clock tomorrow.
14 General, you be back at that time.

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General Miles: Yes, sir.

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(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock P.M., Monday, December 3,
17 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10:00 o'clock
18 A.M., Tuesday, December 4, 1945.)

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