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cerned things went well for sometime. Sometime around the end of July Ribbentrop told me that the German Army was desirous of having Japan enter the conflict. He said nothing further and he definitely stated these were the views of the German Army. Around the beginning of August for the first time we noticed that the Germany Armies were not doing as well as they had been doing previously, and in this regard I heard from my Military Attache that he had talked with members of the German General Staff, who had said that the movement of troops and the lengthening of the supply line had made the campaign very difficult. It was about this time, the beginning of August 1941, that Ribbentrop asked me to come and see him, and when I went I found that Field Marshal Keitel was there. Keitel made the statement that the German Armies would be forced to come to a standstill for about three weeks in order to look after the problems of supply and to shorten their line before advancing again.

I bring up this point because you questioned me the other day in regard to whether I had talked with high-ranking officers of the German military on various occasions. This was the one and only time in which I saw a military man.

- Q. When you met on this occasion Keitel and others, did they ask Japan to come into the Russian conflict?
- A. No.
- Q. But on the other occasion when Ribbentrop talked with you, he indicated to you that the German Army wanted Japan to come in. What did you say to Ribbentrop in reply to that suggestion from him?
- A. I told him that this was not up to me to decide and I would let the Japanese Government know of what he had said.
- Q. What was your personal feeling and attitude towards the proposition?
- A. Japan was not obligated to enter this conflict and it was something that I could not make a statement on one way or the other, so that all I conveyed to my Government was that this desire had been voiced. I received no answer to this communication.
- Q. But I want to know what your own personal attitude was, not your Government's.
- A. Even as an individual I did not feel that Japan should enter the war. To add one further thing at this point: Ribbentrop

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as Foreign Minister was not cognizant of the detailed plans of the Army and overall large scale operations were related to me by Hitler. Detailed talks on military matters were handled in my Embassy by the Military and Naval Attaches, respectively, who told me about these talks.

- Q. What was Ribbentrop's reaction when you failed to receive any reply from your Government to your despatch informing them of the request he had made of you that Japan join Germany in the conflict?
- A. This was not an official request from the German Government and simply was that the German Army desired it. I shall go into this matter further, but at this point I can at least tell you that while there were further telegrams there was never an answer from the Japanese Government.
- Q. Can you also tell me briefly now the reaction of Ribbentrop to your failure to receive a reply to these several despatches?
- A. He never made any comment. I believe it would have been too much for him to expect an answer when only a few minutes before he had been talking about getting Russia into the Tripartite alliance and had informed Japan of this desire. Japan on her part as an independent nation was not obligated to act on any such whim or desire on the part of the German Army or whoever it might be. From time to time, after the situation in Russia became difficult for the German Armies, I heard from my Military Attache that the German Army was very eager to have Japan join the conflict. Following this initial request from Ribbentrop there were two or three occasions on which he made the same request and based on which I sent telegrams to the Japanese Government. There were no answers.
- Q. On those occasions did you ever give Ribbentrop any encouragement or suggestion that you would do everything within your power to accomplish what he wanted?
- A. I did not. To continue, I never once heard from Hitler himself regarding Japan's entry into the Russian conflict. All talks of this kind were with Ribbentrop. Also, following the outbreak of the conflict between the United States and Japan there were requests upon two or three occasions from the German Army to the Japanese Military Attache, and also from Ribbentrop, to me. In general, this is the story of German-Soviet relations up until the outbreak of the Pacific War and of German-Soviet-Japanese relations also. If you have any questions please go ahead with them, because in so far as my narrative goes I shall go into such things as the no-separate peace pact.

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- Q. General, I have some questions on these matters to ask, but I think we will defer those for a time and let you proceed with your narrative.
- A. The no-separate peace pact was first brought up around the first or second of December 1941, by a telegram from the Japanese Government to me. The gist of this telegram was as follows: that the Japanese Government in case of a United States-Japanese conflict desired Germany's participation in this war, and further that the Japanese Government desired that a no-separate peace pact be signed. In this regard I had heard sometime in November and had conveyed this news to Japan, from a man named Dietrich, the Reichspreschef (head of the German press under Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister), that Hitler would be in favor of entering the conflict in case a United States-Japanese conflict started. Based on this information the Japanese Government in this telegram to me stated that they were desirous of having me approach Hitler in regard to Germany's entry in case of war with the United States.
- Q. What was the occasion of the conversation between you and this man Dietrich?
- A. I met Dietrich on the occasion of talking to him regarding the wishes of some of the Japanese correspondents in Berlin who wanted to visit the front or had other desires along these lines. It was Dietrich's job to grant these requests and, therefore, I had called upon him in this regard. It was at this time that he brought up this matter.
- Q. We will adjourn until tomorrow.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~is~~) G. Osmond Hyde, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 26th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

March 4, 1946
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 27 February 1946, 1340-1630 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer
Questions : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, you may proceed with your narrative at the point where you left off yesterday.
- A. To clear up this before I go any further: almost since the beginning of United States-Japanese talks I had received absolutely no information concerning their progress from the Japanese Government, nor had I received any information about relations with the Soviet Union. The main reason for this, I believe, was that formerly we had used couriers to carry information of this sort, but due to the difficulties because of the German-Soviet war this became impossible, and for security reasons no communications of this sort were sent. Around the 29th or 30th of November 1941, I received word from Japan to the effect that Secretary of State Hull's reply of November 26, to Japanese proposals was extremely severe in tone. Not knowing much about what the negotiations had covered, I was not able to make an analysis of the situation, this being the first communication regarding United States-Japanese negotiations that I had received. Following this, I believe it was around the end of November or the very beginning of December, I received another communication to the effect that the Japanese Government had issued an order to its Consulates in the United States to burn all but a very small portion of their codes.
- Q. Did these communications all come from the Foreign Office?
- A. Yes. Now, these were the two communications that I had received before the orders from the Government regarding the no-separate

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peace pact, of which I have told you.

Q. This message that you referred to yesterday that you got on the first or the second of December 1941 came from the Foreign Office also, did it?

A. I am not absolutely certain whether this communication regarding the no-separate peace pact came before or after the one that told me of the orders to burn code books. In any case I may be a couple of days off in my dates and I have the feeling that this one regarding the no-separate peace was around the third of December - I just wish to clear up this matter of dates.

Q. These telegrams or these despatches that you received from the Foreign Office, I suppose, were all signed MATSUOKA?

A. MATSUOKA was no longer Foreign Minister at this time. In any case, signature or no signature, all these despatches came from the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister at this time was TOGO.

Q. Did TOGO succeed MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister?

A. No. TOYODA came in between.

Q. So that then MATSUOKA was succeeded by TOYODA and TOYODA was succeeded by TOGO, and TOGO was the Foreign Minister at the time of these messages we have just been talking about.

A. That is correct.

Q. Yesterday you mentioned the fact that you had a conversation with Dietrich, whom you identified yesterday, sometime in November. Would you tell us what it was Dietrich said to you on that occasion?

A. I went to see Dietrich as I believe I told you regarding the wishes of some of our correspondents who wished to receive permission to visit the Russian Front. The point was that other members of my staff had already approached him and been unsuccessful so that the correspondents wanted me to take it up directly. As a matter of fact I do not know Dietrich very well. He was generally at this time at Supreme Headquarters, which I think was in East Prussia. In any case, when he came back to Berlin I called on him, and in the course of the conversation he quite suddenly told me that Hitler had said at one time that should there be a United States-Japanese war Germany would also enter the conflict. That was all; I relayed this information to the Japanese Foreign

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Office and it was based on this that when they sent me the despatch regarding the no-separate peace pact that they suggested that it should be possible to get Germany to make such a promise.

- Q. Did Hitler ask Dietrich to deliver that message to you?
- A. No. As I go on in my narrative regarding negotiations leading up to the no-separate peace pact I think you will be able to get a clearer picture of this information that Dietrich gave me.
- Q. Proceed.
- A. Following the receipt of this despatch containing the orders from the Japanese Government I conveyed the message to Ribbentrop. In this regard it was a practice of Hitler and Ribbentrop to spend a great deal of their time at Supreme Headquarters during this period, and they were generally not around Berlin. I had thought that perhaps I might have to go to Supreme Headquarters, but it just so happened that Ribbentrop was back in Berlin at this time. If I remember correctly, and I am pretty sure that I am right, Ribbentrop told me that he was on his way to Hungary at the invitation of Admiral Horthy to go on a hunt. While this has no actual bearing on what we have been talking about, it was the practice in Europe at this time to discuss many political problems during these hunts. In any case I was fortunate in catching Ribbentrop in Berlin. I passed on the contents of the despatch to Ribbentrop, but I did not mention the fact that I had heard the news which I have recounted to you from Dietrich. Ribbentrop then asked me whether there was going to be a war or not - you may recall that the despatch did not definitely say that there would be war, only that in case there was a war such and such was desired. In reply to his questions I told him that I knew of Hull's severe reply and also of the burning of the code books in the United States, and that relations were evidently extremely strained, but whether war would actually come about or not I could not say. The reason I did not speak of the information I had received from Dietrich was that I felt if Hitler had not wanted this idea of his divulged it might go badly for Dietrich if I spoke of it then. I felt that only in case objections were raised would I bring up the matter. Ribbentrop stated that this was an extremely grave decision that Germany would have to make and that before he could give any reply he would have to communicate with Hitler at Supreme Headquarters. I shall continue further,

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but would like to go up to this point. I do not remember whether it was that day or the next, but in any case Ribbentrop sent for me again and when I went he stated that Soviet forces had just launched/severe counter-offensive in the Moscow Sector and a portion of the German Armies was surrounded. Therefore, he said, Hitler had gone personally to the area to direct operations and that he had not been able to make contact with him yet. It is a further fact that there was a very bad storm raging around Berlin at the time, and I believe that all communications were badly hampered. In any case he asked me to stand by for a while, as he was trying very hard to make contact with the Fuehrer.

Q. Now, General, this all happened on the day you received the despatch from Tokyo containing these instructions to approach the German Government?

A. As I just told you, I am not absolutely certain of whether it was that day or the next.

Ribbentrop then questioned me, asking whether Japan had anything to offer on her part and, too, whether she was prepared to draw up another pact regarding mutual aid. By this I mean that the tripartite alliance stated that only in case of an attack on the signatory nations were the others obligated to go to the aid of the one who was attacked. Now Japan, in effect, was asking for Germany's assistance even if she was the attacker. It, therefore, followed that Ribbentrop wanted to know what counter-proposal Japan had to offer. My word "pact" may be a little too strong - perhaps something like diplomatic document or agreement would be better. In substance, the Germans at this point were becoming very foxy and wanted payment for goods delivered if they supplied the goods. I told him that this would mean doing away with the Military Commission that existed at the time or at least taking away their prerogatives, so that I was not in a position to make any counter-proposals, and that I would communicate about this matter with the Japanese Government. Ribbentrop then said that he wished me to not send such a communication yet, as this was simply his own idea and he would have to communicate with Hitler before any official negotiations were entered into with the Japanese Government. I then sent a despatch to the Japanese Government - this was around the third or fourth of December 1941 - relating how I had informed Ribbentrop about their wishes and how Ribbentrop had not been able to contact Hitler yet. There comes a brief recess in the proceedings at this point.

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- Q. I want to return again to the conversation you had with Dietrich. I asked you a while ago if Dietrich had been instructed by Hitler to make known to you the things that he did on the occasion that you have told us about and you said the answer to that was "No." Now tell me, did anyone instruct Dietrich to inform you of that matter other than Hitler?
- A. No, I do not believe so. Dietrich was a man who was very close to the Fuehrer and this matter must have come up in the course of some conversation they had. I believe he brought it up on his own initiative entirely.
- Q. About what date in November did Dietrich bring this matter up with you?
- A. I am not certain. I recall it as being two to three weeks before I received this order from the Japanese Government and that would place it sometime fairly early in November.
- Q. This then was only a casual conversation between Dietrich and yourself in which Dietrich made known to you the views of Hitler to which you referred yesterday?
- A. Yes.
- Q. General, tell me this, why did you send a communication to your Government in Tokyo regarding this matter that had been stated to you casually by Dietrich who, you say, had not been instructed to bring it to your attention by anyone officially in the German Government?
- A. It being something that the Fuehrer had said I felt it was important enough to pass on to my Government.
- Q. But all you knew was that Dietrich had indicated to you that Hitler had made such a statement. From what you say Dietrich went beyond his authority in even mentioning it to you for you have indicated that you did not want to tell Ribbentrop about it because it might get Dietrich into trouble. In view of all those circumstances why did you make the subject of that conversation the matter of an official communication to your Government?
- A. Whatever it might have been based on it is the duty of an Ambassador to inform his Government regarding any information that he receives, even if it happens to be something that has appeared in the newspapers. To not do so would be to violate his Government's trust and fall down in his duties.
- Q. Did you make it clear to your Government in Tokyo that this

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- was information that had come to you from unofficial sources?
- A. Yes, definitely. Had there been an order following this from the Japanese Government to me to ascertain whether this was an official statement or not, I would then have been obliged to approach Ribbentrop and Hitler secretly or otherwise, depending on what my Government wished.
- Q. And now, General, are you telling us that your Government instructed you to approach the German Government with a view to the German Government joining with Japan in the case of hostilities between Japan and the United States, basing such instruction solely on the communication that you sent to Tokyo in which you related some information you had received from unofficial sources?
- A. No. That is not so. Naturally, the Japanese must have been intending to go to war as subsequent events clearly indicate and, therefore, they communicated with me.
- Q. And that communication with you would have come even though this Dietrich matter was not in the picture?
- A. Yes, I am sure it would have.
- Q. Actually, the fact that you sent this despatch after talking with Dietrich had nothing to do with this matter?
- A. Had the German Government refused I could then have brought up this Dietrich matter.
- Q. Now, General, you have evaded my question. What I want to know is this: the fact that you sent a message to your Government in Tokyo relating to them the information that you had received in a casual communication with Dietrich had nothing to do with the fact that Tokyo very soon thereafter sent you a message instructing you as Ambassador to approach the German Government for the purpose of obtaining from them a promise of mutual aid in the event Japan should attack the United States?
- A. That is correct. The fact that they added the information regarding my conversation with Dietrich on to the despatch was nothing more than - in other words, a tail tacked on to the bull.
- Q. Could we say this - that it was a reminder that you had information that you had received from Dietrich that you could bring to the attention of Hitler and Ribbentrop in an attempt to persuade them to agree to the proposition of the

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Japanese Government? Would that be correct?

A. In substance, yes.

Q. A while ago you indicated that after you sent the despatch to Tokyo about December 4, we came to a recess in the negotiations. Will you take it up from there now?

A. Following this I received an almost daily request from the German Government for any further news as they, too, were very anxious to find out whether war was actually going to break out or not. On my part I was extremely anxious to contact Hitler, but as it transpired right up to the start of hostilities we were not able to contact him.

We now come to December 7, 1941. Sometime during the afternoon I received a despatch from the Foreign Office in Tokyo to the effect that they wished me to speed up negotiations and come to a decision as quickly as possible. I do not know for certain when this telegram was received, but after being decoded it was handed to me about 5 P.M. Because of this communication I decided under any circumstances to send a telegram to the Japanese Government regarding the progress of my talks with the Germans so far. This meant that I would have to include that which Ribbentrop had requested me not to communicate about, as it was his own idea and not the official views of the German Government. In my telegram I wrote up the full history of these talks and while I did not say that Ribbentrop had requested me not to communicate about it I definitely stated that these views regarding unconditional aid were Ribbentrop's alone because it had been impossible to make contact with Hitler as yet. We of the Embassy Staff had a conference about the communication we should send and based on that this despatch was drafted and completed around 7 P.M., Berlin time. Around 8 P.M., Berlin time, after having given orders to send off this despatch I returned to my official residence. After about ten or twenty minutes I received a phone call from Counsellor KAWAHARA informing me that he had heard from a man named NOHARA, an Embassy employee, that this man had heard on the radio that the Japanese Navy had attacked Pearl Harbor. Immediately following this telephone call I called the Japanese Embassy and ordered that the despatch which had been prepared be canceled - that is to say, not be sent. Following this Ribbentrop telephoned and said that he had heard the news over the air that Pearl Harbor had been attacked, but that was all he knew, and did I have any further information as to whether the report was true or not. I

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answered that I had only heard about it a few minutes before and knew no more than he had recounted. He then requested me to come right over to his home and while I had not yet even had my dinner I went on over. He once again asked me if I knew anything further and I answered in the negative. Ribbentrop then told me that as a matter of fact he had received a telephone call from Supreme Headquarters in which they said that they had heard this over the radio, but did he, Ribbentrop, know anything more about it. I then asked him whether, having been able to contact Hitler, he had spoken about the matter of Germany's entry into the war, and Ribbentrop answered that Hitler had stated he was in accord with Japan's wishes, but wished to wait until an official confirmation of the start of hostilities was received from Japan. Ribbentrop and I broke off the conversation at this point and I returned home. The next day I received the official report from Japan and communicated this fact to Ribbentrop. We then began drawing up the pact. This pact has been made public, but as I recall the main points they were that no cessation of hostilities or a separate peace would be entered into by any of the signatories without prior discussion. There was another point to the effect that after the war the three nations would continue to cooperate, but this is simply an addendum, and of very little importance. This pact has absolutely no secret or extra provisions which were not made public.

Q. What date was it signed?

A. December 11, 1941. Now, in so far as this treaty goes, while I may have been off slightly on dates, the actual facts leading up to it are as I have recounted it and I believe that both Ribbentrop and Gaus would know of it also.

Q. The actual drafting of the pact then, according to your statement, started on December 9, and it was signed on December 11. Is that correct?

A. The drafting of the pact began on the 8th and the pact was signed on the 11th.

Q. When did you get some instructions and from whom did you get them as to what was to go into the pact?

A. The draft was made in Germany and communication with the Japanese Government was not only carried on through me and

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from me to the Japanese Government, but also from the German Government to the German Embassy in Tokyo and from the Embassy to the Japanese Government - the reason for this being that communications at the time were extremely difficult.

- Q. When did that series of communications start?
- A. On the 8th. Because of the great hurry normal procedure and red tape was done away with, and we proceeded at a great pace.
- Q. Are you telling us that this circle of communications, relative to what was to go into this pact, between you and Tokyo and between Germany and the German Embassy in Tokyo and between the German Embassy in Tokyo and the Foreign Office all started on the 8th of December and you had that pact concluded and signed by December 11th?
- A. It was a very simple pact and did not necessitate detailed discussions.
- Q. But you have just indicated to us that you had some detailed despatches. You have told us that you sent despatches to Tokyo, Tokyo sent despatches to you, that the German Foreign Office sent despatches to its Embassy in Tokyo and they communicated with your Foreign Office in Tokyo, and in turn messages came back from the German Embassy in Tokyo to the Foreign Office in Berlin. How in the world did you ever send those messages so fast and decode them and accomplish this task in three days' time?
- A. I do not understand why you appear to be concerned about the length of time. Had communications not been so difficult a thing of this type could have been consummated in two hours. All that was required was for the German Foreign Office and myself to reach an agreement on the pact, communicate this to the Japanese Foreign Office and receive a reply.
- Q. I thought probably that is what happened, but you told us of this series of communications between the offices of the German Government and its Embassy in Tokyo and your Embassy in Berlin and your home office in Tokyo? And I assume that they were all in code?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. It would seem to me, therefore, that it would be impossible for you to have prepared and coded your message and sent it along the way, for the German Government to have prepared and coded its messages and transmitted them, to hold the subsequent conferences in Tokyo, to have prepared, coded and transmitted the reply to you by your Foreign Office, and the German Embassy in Tokyo to have prepared, coded and transmitted its reply, and both replies to have been decoded in Berlin. It just seems to me that the time element makes that impossible.
- A. The first point is that the original orders for this had come from the Japanese Government. As long as Germany agreed to enter the war and to not make a separate peace that part of the pact was looked after. Point two is that there were no complicated agreements or negotiations entered into. It was a very simple pact. The third point which becomes a technical one involving the question of whether it could have been carried out as quickly as it was - the only reply I can give is that it is entirely possible, and in fact could have been consummated, once an agreement was reached, in a matter of hours.
- Q. But, General, when I first asked you from whom you got your instructions as to what was to go into that pact, you went to great pains explaining to us this series of communications that you indicated went between your office in Berlin and the Foreign Office in Tokyo and also between the German Foreign Office in Berlin and its Embassy in Tokyo and of the conferences that took place in Tokyo between the German and Japanese officials. Now, my whole question is to know how all those communications could be prepared, put in code, could be transmitted to Tokyo, be decoded, the conferences held in Tokyo, the replies prepared in Tokyo, coded there, transmitted to the respective offices in Berlin, decoded there, the document drafted, and the whole thing been done in three days. Now, you have not answered that.
- A. To clear this matter up, I suggest first that you take a look at the treaty which does not cover more than half a page. To recount briefly the negotiations which were entered into, starting on the 8th of December: the pact was drawn up by Gaus and the Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, USHIBA, and this draft was immediately despatched to Tokyo. The reply came the next day or shortly thereafter and said that they were in accord with the provisions except that a couple of minor points in wording they desired to have changed. Also,

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Also they stated that while they were perfectly willing to have the whole pact drawn up in German there should be an understanding that a Japanese version would also subsequently be drawn up. This communication with the proposed changes in wording was passed on to Gaus who agreed to the changes. A new draft was drawn up, sent to Tokyo and O.K.'d. That was all. As a matter of fact the final draft was drawn up and approved by the morning of the 10th.

Q. We will adjourn until tomorrow.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xx~~) G. Osmond Hyde, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 27th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xx~~) OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

Place

Date

March 4, 1946

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 28 February 1946, 1340-1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, you have indicated that you want to make a statement relative to the matters we were discussing when we concluded our meeting yesterday. You may proceed with your statement.
- A. Point one: regarding the negotiations leading up to the no-separate peace pact - Japan was in an extreme hurry to bring the pact to a consummation because she felt that politically and spiritually, that is to say, for the public morale, this pact should be promulgated as soon after the start of hostilities as possible. For this reason, Japan was willing to make concessions in so far as wording went and did away with the usual procedure of going through the Privy Council, which was necessary in making up most treaties. Point two is that the pact had no more clauses to it than (1) that Germany would enter the war with Japan and (2) that she would not conclude a separate peace. A precedence had been set around 1917 by the then Allied Nations when they drew up a no-separate peace pact. This was called the London declaration or something of the sort. The whole pact covered no more than half a page or so.
- Point three was that doing away with the usual procedure of signing the pact in three languages, that is to say, German, Italian and Japanese, it was decided to carry out the actual signing with the German version alone, the others to be signed later.

Point four is that cutting through the red tape which generally accompanied the Privy Council's dealings with a

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treaty a very simple procedure of simply reading the German version and deciding upon it was followed. On Germany's part she was able to conclude a treaty quickly.

Point five is that the only provisions Japan requested to have changed were such minor points that it was not even necessary to discuss it with Ribbentrop, but could be taken up directly by the men who were drawing up the text of the treaty.

- Q. General, I am just a little bit puzzled, - yesterday in your statements regarding the handling of these communications between Berlin and Tokyo and Tokyo and Berlin you indicated that it was all done in a comparatively fast time. I believe you stated that the treaty itself was ready sometime on the 10th of December. When you compare this example of speed in such matters with the delay experienced in the United States with respect to messages from Japan on the date hostilities started - in the latter case it took a long time to decode the message and transmit it to the authorities in Washington - I do not understand how there was so much delay in Washington and such haste in Berlin. That is the reason I questioned you about that yesterday.
- A. I do not know what the reasons are for the delay in Washington, although I have heard that there was a delay. Perhaps the message to the State Department was a long one, whereas ours was a very simple thing.
- Q. Also, General, at the time of the negotiations relative to the surrender you will recall that there were several days that were used in transmitting messages and decoding them and that the reasons for the lapse of time were charged to the time that it required to send these messages and decode them. If it took so much time then, how could you do it so fast when you were concluding this no-separate peace pact?
- A. I can only say that this pact was consummated with unprecedented speed in Japan. I do not believe that there ever was a case when things went so fast.
- Q. As a matter of fact, before December 8, was not there some sort of understanding between the Japanese Government and the German Government and the Italian Government relative to a pact such as this one that you consummated on December 11, 1941?
- A. If you mean by that, was there a text drawn up beforehand, the answer is no. The text is such a simple thing that an

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expert should be able to draw it up in five minutes.

- Q. I am not particularly concerned with the text, but there must have been some sort of understanding between the three nations that could have existed, not reduced to any type of writing?
- A. Italy was not very important in these discussions and I believe that Italy and Germany were constantly in touch with each other by telephone, and as soon as Germany had decided to enter into the pact Italy would be obliged to do so also. While there was no text drawn up, it naturally follows that because of my prior discussions with Ribbentrop, as soon as Germany acceded to Japan's wishes, the actual drawing up of the pact would become a simple matter.
- Q. General, even before you received the instructions from your Foreign Office that came to you around the first, second, or third of December, for you as Ambassador to discuss this matter with the German Government, had not there existed some sort of understanding between the Japanese Government and the German Government that in the event of a war an arrangement such as was perfected in the no-separate peace pact would be agreed to between the two Governments?
- A. None at all. There are some things relative to that that might be of interest to you.
- Q. You may state those things now.
- A. I believe that Germany at the time the United States-Japanese conflict started was extremely surprised by the suddenness with which it came about. I can say this without equivocation. As a matter of fact, we were very surprised in the Embassy. I can also state that there were absolutely no talks with the Germans relative to entry into a United States-Japanese conflict prior to the talks leading up to the no-separate peace pact, of which I have told you. I feel that Germany was extremely desirous in the beginning of keeping the United States on a strictly neutral basis. As time went on, however, she may have felt that the United States entry into the war was inevitable sooner or later - I do not know for sure whether she thought it could not be avoided or whether she thought there might still be some possibility of keeping the United States out of the conflict. In any case there was fear that the United States would enter the war and a certain group among the Germans, which I believe to be the German Army, did not want the United States to come into the war. This desire, I am sure, was based on the

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fact that the German Army felt they had lost the First World War because of United States intervention. In any case Germany acted with extreme prudence and circumspection in committing herself at the time that talks came up regarding the no-separate peace pact. I recall that Ribbentrop said to me that such a pact might be fine for the Japanese people's morale, but he, on his part, had to look out for the German people. Following the actual signing of the pact, a meeting of the Reichstag was called and an explanation of why Germany entered the war against the United States was given.

- Q. Do you remember what explanation was given at that meeting of the Reichstag?
- A. There is a full text of this available, I believe, but as I remember it they stated something to the effect that United States intervention prior to actual outbreak of hostilities had been such that war was inevitable and had come about because of this activity on the part of the United States.
- Q. Who was the Ambassador from Japan to Italy at this time?
- A. HORIKIRI, Zembei.
- Q. Had he been there very long as Ambassador?
- A. I believe he was there from around January 1941 to sometime in 1943.
- Q. And who did he succeed in January 1941?
- A. AMAU.
- Q. Now, you know, of course, that the Japanese Ambassador in Italy received a message from Tokyo at or about the same time you received your message that you remember as having arrived during the first three days of December 1941?
- A. I do not believe that he received such instructions.
- Q. I have some rather definite information, General, that would indicate that he had a message instructing him to proceed to approach the Italian Government in the same way you were instructed to approach the Berlin Government and that he had his message at least by December 3, 1941.
- A. I do not know for certain; he might have had some instructions, but I doubt it, for the reason that Italy's security was bad and there had been cases where secrets had leaked

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out so that in an important negotiation of this sort it would seem unlikely that the Italian Government would be trusted with it until it had been consummated or decided upon in Germany.

- Q. It was decided upon in Germany on December 3 or 4 in so far as Ribbentrop was concerned. How could you hope to get Italy in it unless you told them about it?
- A. I can not state definitely when Italy was contacted, but it is my personal opinion that they were told about it sometime after the outbreak of hostilities.
- Q. My information is that the Japanese Ambassador in Italy called on Mussolini on the third of December and invoking the appropriate clause of the Tripartite Pact the Ambassador asked that Italy declare war on America, that is the United States, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States, and that the Ambassador proposed to Italy that Italy sign with Japan an agreement not to conclude a separate peace.
- A. All I know is that in the communication which I received there was no indication that the same despatch had been sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Italy. Further, I recall that Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, when called in to sign the pact looked rather put out, as he had not heard about it until then.
- Q. Do you mean to tell us, General, that they invited the Italian Ambassador to Berlin to come into a room and sit down then and there and sign a treaty that he never heard of before?
- A. I do not mean he heard about it for the first time then at the signing of the pact, but I know that on the 10th when I asked Ribbentrop whether we should not inform the Italian Ambassador about it, he said not to worry and that he would look after it when the time came. I believe, of course, that Mussolini knew about it and had been consulted by phone, but it is my further belief that the Italian Ambassador in Berlin did not find out about it until very late in the proceedings, possibly on the night of the 9th or sometime during the 10th.
- Q. Did he find it out from Ribbentrop or from you?
- A. From Ribbentrop.
- Q. Now, General, let us suppose that you had been in the position of that Italian Ambassador and someone brought you in

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the night before the pact was to be signed or the day that it was to be signed, and said, "Ambassador, we have a treaty here that is going to tie your nation in a war, and it is going to provide that you can't make a separate peace in this war with the United States." Would you sit down there and sign that treaty?

A. The Ambassador alone could not make such a decision. The orders, of course, had come from Mussolini.

Q. Do you know when he got his orders from Mussolini?

A. I do not know that. I simply know that the Italian Ambassador to Berlin certainly received the news very late. It might be a little crude to put it so bluntly but in all dealings of the three countries Italy definitely played a secondary role, and as long as Germany acceded to anything Italy would tag along dutifully.

Q. General, did you talk with the Ambassador from Japan to Italy about this matter?

A. No, never.

Q. And are you telling us now that he had no idea of what was going on until after the treaty was signed?

A. I do not know. I believe he might have had a communication from the Japanese Foreign Office to the effect that negotiations for this no-separate peace pact were going on in Germany, so be cognizant of that fact.

Q. The information that I have, General, that I called attention to a few moments ago when I told you that the Ambassador from Japan to Italy had a message similar to the one you had instructing him to approach the Italian Government as you were instructed to approach the German Government comes from a very reliable source, and it is very important, it seems to me, that he should have received it on or about the same day that you have told us you received yours. You are not positive that he did not receive such a message, are you?

A. I am not positive.

Q. I read to you a moment ago that in the message that was sent to the Italian Ambassador in Italy he was instructed to invoke the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact and ask Italy

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to declare war on America immediately after hostilities had commenced between Japan and the United States. Will you tell me what clause in that treaty is the clause to which reference is made in that telegram?

- A. I can not figure what he meant by appropriate clause, as the only one I can think of is the clause which states that the signatory nations will enter the war along with the one that was attacked. There are no other separate secret agreements and this certainly differs from the orders I received, so that it is beyond me to explain what it is all about.
- Q. Then you would say, would you not, General, that as far as the treaty itself is concerned, there is no clause in it that would require Italy to join in the hostilities that were going to be commenced by Japan?
- A. That is a very strange phrase - appropriate clause - in any case, it is up to Italy to decide whether she is going to enter the war or not, and certainly she was not obligated under the terms of the Tripartite Pact to enter into war if Japan launched the attack.
- Q. General, what groundwork had been done that would justify your Government in Tokyo in instructing its Ambassador in Germany to approach the German Government and ask them to join Japan in the event Japan commenced hostilities with the United States, and further agree that there should be no separate peace.
- A. It came like a bolt out of the blue. There was no groundwork for it, nor had I received any instructions, nor did I know anything about it until I received this despatch. It was so unexpected that Germany also did not realize there was going to be war until hostilities actually started.
- Q. Well, it did not seem to startle Ribbentrop very much, for according to your statement yesterday, he merely asked you if you had another pact ready that you, in your statement yesterday, suggested should take the place of the then existing Tripartite Pact.
- A. I believe that because he did not think war would come about so suddenly he wished to talk over the matter of getting Japan's unconditional agreement to wage war, even if Germany were the aggressor.

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- Q. Now, General, all of this happened in a very brief period of time - a week or eight days at the most. You have already told us that Germany did not want to wage war against the United States, but rather Germany wanted to keep the United States neutral, and at the time you approached Ribbentrop Germany had its hands pretty well filled, it seems to me. It is difficult for me to understand how under such circumstances Germany would agree to extend the war to include the United States, and to further agree to enter into a no-separate peace^{pact}, unless an understanding had theretofore existed between Japan and Germany.
- A. There were absolutely no agreements that had been made previously and had Hitler not been the type of man he was - to digress a bit, Hitler was apt to enter into agreements and make promises for Germany without consulting with others, such as his commitments in Africa, which, I believe, were opposed by a goodly portion of the General Staff - so that I think that this decision was made strictly by Hitler. Had there been a previous arrangement, it would not have been necessary for Ribbentrop to say that he would have to consult with Hitler before he made any commitments.
- Q. General, that is inconsistent with what you have told us. You stated yesterday and on other occasions, and you stated today, that Hitler wanted to keep the United States neutral and did not want the United States in the war. Now, notwithstanding the fact you knew he felt that way, according to your statements you approached him and asked him to join Japan in the war against the United States.
- A. It is only my own idea on it, but while Hitler wished to keep the United States neutral, I believe he had reached the point by December 1941, where he felt that because of possible clashes between German submarines and American men-of-war in the Atlantic and because of American intervention so far, war was probably eventually inevitable. As I have said, I believe Germany's wish was to get Japan into the war against Russia, but as long as she was going to war with the United States, it would be impossible for Germany to believe that she would do this. However, looking at it from Germany's point of view, it was better than nothing to have Japan occupy America's war potential and, hence, Hitler must have made the decision to agree to Japan's proposals.

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- Q. The other day, General, you discussed with us a conversation that you had, I believe, with Ribbentrop - I am not sure whether Hitler was present or not - you were talking about the subject of the United States furnishing supplies to some of the then warring nations. Ribbentrop, according to what you told us, wanted to stop it, and Hitler said no, that it was impossible to expect that. Now, since then, another time when you have been talking with us, you made this observation: you said, and I am quoting: "In regard to where I left off the other day, which was where I was speaking of German thoughts in so far as United States-Japanese relations went, I stated them, and I wish to repeat now, that I firmly believe that Germany wished to stay neutral in case of a war between Japan and the United States, and in general simply wanted the United States to remain strictly neutral." Now, since you knew the attitude of Germany on these matters that I have mentioned, I am puzzled when I try to justify in my mind what basis you had to approach the German Government and ask them to join you in a war against the United States, unless you had some understanding, verbal or otherwise, that they would do so.
- A. I do not recall making the statement that Germany wished to stay neutral in case of a war between Japan and the United States. The rest of it is correct: Germany wished to keep the United States neutral. This might have been some mistake or perhaps you misunderstood my statements, as it seems to be a rather long speech. In any case, I repeat that I do not know how Germany felt in so far as her status went in case of a United States-Japanese war.
- Q. The other day when you made the statement from which I just quoted, it was not the first time that you referred to the German thoughts regarding the United States. When you mentioned it the first time you indicated that you wanted to talk about it later. I gave you that privilege. Then you eventually came to it, and the statement I have read you today is what you told us. In addition to what I have read you went a little further, and this would seem to substantiate this idea of neutrality, for you said further - now I quote: "This was what she felt at the time. To go a little further, Germany felt that she had lost the First World War because of the United States entry into it, and, therefore, was particularly keen on keeping the United States strictly neutral." The reason you have advanced there for the position that Germany had was the experience that Germany encountered when the United States entered the First World

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War, and it is entirely consistent with your previous statement that Germany wanted to remain neutral. Now, inasmuch as you indicated that to us the other day, I ask you again how could you justify approaching Germany to join Japan in a war against the United States unless there existed some secret understanding between the nations that you have not yet seen fit to tell us about.

- A. There was absolutely no prior agreement, but whether there had been an agreement or not, Japan's decision to wage war as an independent nation had nothing whatsoever to do with Germany entering the war. Having made this decision for her to approach Germany with a view to requesting her entry into it is not strange, considering that there had been and was in effect at the time a Tripartite alliance.
- Q. And what was there in the Tripartite alliance that would justify you asking Germany to join Japan in a war that Japan started?
- A. The orders to me from the Japanese Foreign Office did not state that they were going to wage a war against the United States. It simply said that in case of a war with the United States, and from my point of view an argument could be advanced that on Japan's part she had been driven to a place where it became necessary for her to wage war; in other words, based on the clause in the Tripartite alliance, which promises aid in case of aggression, Japan could contend that she had been attacked. This could, if Germany wished, be decided upon by the Commissions I have told you about, but as it happened they made their decision anyway. What I am getting at is that as far as my approaching Germany went, I said that the Japanese Government desired Germany's entry into the war in case of a Japanese-American conflict. I do not know whether you have included this in the record or not, but I am pretty certain that I said that the original orders regarding these matters that I received from the Japanese Government did not tell me to bind the pact, but to get Germany's promise that she would do so. To explain a little further: Japan might have said, based on the interpretation of the word "attack", which appears in the text, and by interpretation I do not mean from one language to another, that the attack had been started by the United States, because of acts which made it impossible for her not to go to war. This is not my argument, but one that Japan could possibly have advanced in case Germany had refused to enter the war on the grounds that she was not obliged to do so. In any case, in approaching Germany as I did, I did not have to state that Japan was going to be the attacker.

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- Q. But, General, while you say this is not your argument, you are by your argument suggesting then that this treaty means more than one would think that it meant by reading it. It would appear, would it not, that it has now by this argument been extended so as to mean that the word "attack" includes disagreements between nations with respect to which no actual fighting has commenced.
- A. It all comes down to a question of interpretation which, being couched in legal language, could be interpreted one way or another. Specifically, if Japan had attacked the United States, let us say, and Germany had refused to go into the war on the grounds that it was not within her obligations as per the provisions of the Tripartite alliance, Japan at this point could once again, let us say, bring up the argument that her interpretation of the provision is that because of America's acts, she was forced into the war, and, therefore, the pact applied.
- Q. General, I want to leave this for a few minutes, and go back to the day that MATSUOKA left Berlin. MATSUOKA attended a dinner, did he not, immediately before he left Berlin for Moscow?
- A. I believe it was a reception given by Ribbentrop. I do not recall for certain whether it was the day that MATSUOKA left or before that.
- Q. My information is to the effect that at that dinner or reception, whatever it was, you were present, Ribbentrop was present, Ambassador Ott was present, Stahmer was present, and some other man from your Embassy, whose name I do not have.
- A. Yes, they were present.
- Q. Do you remember who this other man from your Embassy was?
- A. Counsellor KASE, I believe.
- Q. My information is that on that occasion MATSUOKA suggested to Ribbentrop that he, MATSUOKA, was going to Moscow to seek this non-aggression pact, and that he asked Ribbentrop how he felt about it, and I am further told that Ribbentrop replied in an indirect manner by stating that the feeling between Russia and Germany at that time was very strained and he indicated to MATSUOKA that any dealings with Russia would be looked upon by Germany with suspicion. Do you remember that?
- A. I have not heard from MATSUOKA that Ribbentrop went as far as to say that Germany would view with suspicion any such negotiations. As I told you the other day, I have heard that Ribbentrop did not particularly say he favored the alliance, nor did he particularly oppose it.

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- Q. Can you tell us how Ambassador Ott happened to be in Germany at that time?
- A. It is more or less diplomatic protocol for the Ambassador Resident in the country to proceed ahead and make preparations if the Foreign Minister was going to visit the Ambassador's home country. To go further on the MATSUOKA-Ribbentrop matter, as subsequent events showed - that is to say, the things that Counsellor KASE found out when he went to Moscow - MATSUOKA must have known from his conversation with Ribbentrop that Germany did not particularly desire Japan to get friendly with Russia.
- Q. At this point let us adjourn until tomorrow.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 12 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.


I, (~~was~~) G. Osmond Hyde, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 28th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

March 4, 1946
Date

G. Osmond Hyde



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A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember the names of anyone/who might have been present on that occasion?

A. ^{else} Stahmer was also present. In addition, a German Minister, Schmidt, acted as MATSUOKA's interpreter. I am certain that all these people were present at the initial meeting with Ribbentrop, but I am not absolutely certain that Ott and Stahmer were at the initial meeting with Hitler - however, I think they were.

Q. Do you know the first name of Schmidt?

A. I do not now recall his first name. There were two Ministers Schmidt. This was the one that was the linguist. He interpreted for MATSUOKA from English into German and vice versa.

Q. One other question about Schmidt. Schmidt, who was the linguist, I assume then, was present at all of the meetings at which MATSUOKA was present?

A. At any meeting where German was being spoken Schmidt was probably present. However, Ribbentrop's English is excellent, so I am not certain whether he was present at the meetings between MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop, or not.

Q. Now, when you have held meetings with Ribbentrop, I suppose Schmidt was present?

A. No.

Q. What language did you speak when you were holding meetings with Ribbentrop?

A. In German. I think you could put it this way: at all meetings held officially between the two Foreign Ministers Schmidt or some other interpreter was present. However, in the private meetings between Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA, as both of them spoke good English, I can not be sure that Schmidt or some other interpreter was present.

Q. You may continue, General.

A. In regard to yesterday's conversation about the attack clause in the Tripartite Pact would you be so good as to read it back to me, as I want to be absolutely certain as to how it was put down.

Q. We will be glad to read it back.

(The portion of the record referred to was read by stenographer.)

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A. I find that to be substantially the words that I used and find it to be correct.

Q. You may proceed.

A. One thing before I continue. In regard to your question about whether I knew of the Japanese Ambassador to Italy having passed on essentially the same things that I had received in my orders from the Japanese Government to the Italians, I have thought it over very carefully and I still can not recall having heard anything of the sort. In this regard, around this time, both Germany and Japan were extremely circumspect in trusting Italy with matters of a secret nature, as there had been leaks in Italy previously. Basing it on this, I feel that there was no such order, but I have no proof of it, nor do I have any recollection of it, so I can not state definitely.

Q. You may continue.

A. One other thing, before I proceed on matters following what I spoke of yesterday: sometime early in December prior to the start of United States-Japanese hostilities, I received a despatch from Japan to the effect that in case hostilities broke out between the United States and Japan, this information would be conveyed to us by tacking on to the end of a regular broadcast from Tokyo something about the weather. In other words, while I do not recall the exact code words, which were to be used, it was something like "in the Tokyo vicinity east wind and fair", repeated three times, or something of the sort. However, as it so happened, we never heard this message in our Embassy, and when I checked up later, wondering whether it had ever been sent out, I discovered that some other Embassy had heard it, but our facilities must have been poor, for we definitely never received same. While these are just a few things that came to mind, I would like to recount them to you for what they are worth. The first is that I read somewhere in the newspapers that Hitler and Ribbentrop had both urged war against the United States. This, as I have already told you, was definitely not so. The second point is concerning an article I read in the Chicago DAILY TRIBUNE, sometime around 15 November 1941, when the Japanese Embassy party was passing that city by train. In this article it said that Hitler had declared he would enter a United States-Japanese conflict immediately upon its outbreak. Hitler was reputed to have made this statement on the 29th of November 1941 - Ribbentrop was also supposed to have said this. It so happens that I had not seen Hitler since the meeting in June when we discussed Soviet relations, of which I have already told you. Further, if Hitler had promised such a thing the Japanese

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Government in its despatch to me would not have felt obliged to mention the Dietrich matter, nor would Ribbentrop have brought up the matter of counter-proposals, as it would have been a matter that was already understood and agreed to. The third point is that I recall a U. P. despatch of 10 January 1946, in which it says that the British prosecutor at Nuernberg stated that Ribbentrop had promised to enter a United States war and had urged Japan to wage war against the Soviet Union. The article was a bit confused at this point and I am not exactly sure what was meant by this statement, but in any case I believe there is some mistake. This was not so. These are newspaper articles, of course, but I mention them here in order to try to clear up any erroneous impressions.

- Q. In connection with what you have just stated, General - I have a copy of a telegram that was transmitted by Ott in the early part of December, the date that I have is December 5, to the Foreign Minister of the German Reich. These words appear in the telegram "they tend to the opinion that, for reason of interior policy, it is unavoidable to declare existence of a state of war or to declare war on America, either simultaneously or after the beginning of hostilities." What does that telegram mean to you?
- A. I would take it from that that Ott felt that Japan was about to engage in hostilities.
- Q. It would also appear from this despatch that there had been some discussion with Ott relative to when Japan should declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States, for he said, for reason of interior policy it is unavoidable to declare existence of a state of war or to declare war on America, either simultaneously or after the beginning of hostilities.
- A. I do not believe that Ott had any discussions relative to this. I believe he gave his own opinions on the basis of intelligence that he had in his possession. Where this came from I do not know, but had he heard this officially it would have been very important to name his source. To add on a bit, I feel that this might have been information he received from Solge, whom I told you about the other day, with whom he was working during this period.

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- Q. Was Solge connected with the Foreign Office in Japan?
- A. No, but he was very friendly with OZAKI, who was later executed for Communistic activities. This man was called KONOYE's "Brain Trust."
- Q. Regardless of whether Ott participated in the discussions or obtained this information from some intelligence sources, it would seem to follow that Japan actively had considered starting hostilities without any formal declaration of war, would it not?
- A. According to that despatch, yes.
- Q. General, this despatch has on it the date, 5 December 1941. At this time I am not sure that that is the date it was sent or the date it was received, but I assume that if this is the date it was received it would be in the Foreign Office not later than the following day, and that was the time when you were keeping in very close touch with Ribbentrop, for you had not yet, according to your narrative, been able to contact Hitler. Did Ribbentrop say anything to you about this despatch or bring it to your attention?
- A. I think that is the date it was sent. In any case, if it was sent on the 5th it should have been in the hands of the Foreign Minister shortly thereafter. In answer to your question, however, I heard nothing from Ribbentrop concerning such a despatch. I bring up two points which are based simply on my own conclusions: that (1) because of very poor communication conditions at the time, it is possible that Ribbentrop did not receive this message until after the beginning of hostilities, and (2) that it is also possible that Ribbentrop did not place much stress on what Ott had sent him.
- Q. You may continue.
- A. What I intend to speak to you about now is the military negotiations which were entered into by the three powers. These are not my direct concern, hence, I can tell you only of the things that I heard and know of, but I feel that if I narrate them, it may make it easier for you to view the overall picture. If you desire a more detailed account I suggest you question the men who are directly involved in it.
- Q. If you recite the narrative, state from whom you heard matters and give me the names of the people that are involved.
- A. The no-separate peace pact was signed on the 11th of December 1941 and some five or six days later, I am not sure of the

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date, a despatch was received from the leaders of the Japanese Army and Navy addressed to Admirals NOMURA and YOKOI and General BANZAI. When I say Japanese military leaders here, I mean the two Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. This despatch in effect stated that Japan desired a military alliance with Germany and gave the points that she wished brought up. I never personally received any orders regarding these matters from the Government or the Army and Navy. Differing from the organizational set-up in Japan, in Germany the Foreign Minister is also concerned with military matters and so I was asked by my Military Attaches to convey the news to Ribbentrop that Japan was desirous of binding a military alliance. The three military men whom I have named met with Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the Wehrmacht and had several meetings. After about one week a military alliance was signed. I do not recall all the provisions, but in general they dealt with such matters as the area of operations in the Indian Ocean, which would be under German supervision and those that would be under Japanese supervision, and further what communications would be used by the ships of the German Navy and the Japanese Navy in case they were to work together. There was also a clause to the effect that both parties would attempt to figure out ways and means whereby aerial liaison might be maintained between the two nations. However, in actuality, to the best of my knowledge, the Army never set up any plans for joint operations, and while the Navy occasionally had contact with the German Navy in the Indian Ocean I do not believe that any intense joint operations were planned or executed.

- Q. Did this alliance have any provisions in it that provided for aid, the type of aid Germany might give Japan?
- A. I do not believe there was any provision of that sort.
- Q. Do you know where we could obtain a copy of this alliance?
- A. The Army or the Navy should have one.
- Q. Who signed this document for Japan?
- A. I am not sure, but I believe both NOMURA and BANZAI signed or perhaps only one of them.
- Q. At this time who was the War Minister?
- A. TOJO. The Chief of Staff was SUGIYAMA. The Navy Minister was SHIMADA, and the Navy Chief of Staff, NAGANO.

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Q. You may go ahead.

A. In regard to this alliance I do not know for certain whether Italy entered into it or not. This is a point that might not be very important and reflects upon another man, but, I believe, that in this period the German Government never let Ott know about things in detail.

Q. Upon what do you base that statement, General?

A. That is difficult to say, but I believe that Ott did not get along too well with the German Foreign Office.

Q. You must have some reason for saying that, General. What is the reason?

A. This is not something I particularly like to talk about, as it concerns another man, and if I were saying good about him, it might be different, but because this reflects upon him I am not very happy about it. In any case, I feel that Ott was never looked upon with too much favor by the Nazis because of his former connections with Schleicher - he was killed by the Nazis, you may recall, in June 1934. In the days that Schleicher was Defense Minister Ott was also in the Ministry and worked under him. Whatever the reasons may be, I feel that Ott was somewhat anti-Nazi and for this reason did not have their full trust and confidence.

Q. I can appreciate your reluctance to talk about another man when the remarks you have to make might not be favorable of him. I understand that thoroughly, General, but I am interested in knowing these things that you know about Ott - it is necessary that I know them - now this man Schleicher was killed in 1934. A good many years after that Ott was named Ambassador to Japan. Why was he selected as Ambassador to Japan if he did not have the confidence of the German Government?

A. I do not know for sure, but it is my personal opinion that Ott was not selected for the post by Ribbentrop, but upon the urgings of the German Army superiors; there not being a suitable man around other than Ott he was given the post.

Q. Well, then, would it not seem logical that Ott would know considerable about the things that were going on between Japan and Germany, because, as you have recited this story of the events to us you have often indicated that the Japanese

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military authorities have been taking the lead in these matters. You have told us about the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and other things, and always the military is very much in the picture. Since that is true, is it not logical to expect that the German Ambassador during part of those days, who was a military man and who was selected for that post, not because Ribbentrop particularly wanted him, but because the military people wanted him, that he should know then what was going on in Japan.

A. That may be so, but if you will look into the matter, I am sure you will find that Ott had very little to do with negotiations regarding these treaties, and in so far as the German Government went, he was notified very late in the proceedings.

Q. Continue.

A. To make a final statement about Ott, he was well received by the Japanese Army. As I think of it, it seems to me that this might have been one of the main reasons why he was selected as Ambassador. However, after he became Ambassador his connections with the Japanese Army were not as close as they had been when he was Military Attache, I believe. This, in general, is my story up until the time the war started. If there are any particular things you wish me to speak about in the period following the war, I shall be glad to do so. However, this seems to me to be an excellent place to stop for the present.

Q. I may later have some questions to ask you about the period after the war started. Today, I have no questions to ask you regarding that period of time. I think during the remainder of today's session we might check up on a few things we have mentioned rather hastily in passing and maybe you can elaborate a little on some of them. You told us on the 14th of February that at the time the Tripartite Pact was signed, or at about that same time, there were certain secret memoranda agreed upon between Japan and Germany, and I assumed Italy. The next day you repeated the statement that there were in existence some secret diplomatic documents between the signatory nations to the Tripartite Pact. You told us that one of those had to do with the mandated Islands and their status. I wonder if you will now tell us all you can about that diplomatic document that related to the mandated Islands and their status.

A. I had nothing to do with drawing it up and hence am very vague about it, as I read it only once to acquaint myself with

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the sort of things that were included in the treaty. I am sure you can procure a copy. In any case, from the very faint recollection I have of it, it seems to me there was something to the effect that if Germany won the war and got back the mandated islands she would sell them to Japan or have regard to Japan's feelings regarding them - something of the sort; I am not sure exactly what it was.

Q. Would Germany sell them to Japan?

A. I am sure there was such a diplomatic document, but what it said I do not know for certain, whether it was worded as strongly as to say sell or give, or anything of the sort, I do not know.

Q. Do you know the reason for entering into such a diplomatic document by Japan and Germany?

A. The status of the mandated islands had not been cleared up yet, and obviously for that same reason it could not be made public.

Q. What do you mean "had not been cleared up yet"?

A. Germany had not won the war and no one knew what the results of the war would be, so the mandated islands were not once again in her possession. Further, what Germany meant by this was that she would not mess around with them in case they once again became her possessions. I can state that this was definitely not an agreement based on the premise that if Japan did something or other for Germany she would receive the mandated islands in return.

Q. What did you need a diplomatic document for on that subject?

A. Without it Germany might have grabbed up the islands herself.

Q. You also mentioned that there was a diplomatic document with respect to Greater East Asia. Will you explain to us just what that document was?

A. This was an agreement as to what would be meant by the term "Greater East Asia" - that is to say, to what points its limits would extend. If at this point you ask me why this was necessary, the answer is that Germany at this period certainly expected to win the war against England, and had she won that war, there would have been a change in world influences, so that it became necessary to have an agreement as to how far Japan's influence would extend in Greater East Asia. What did

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Japan have to offer in return? Germany wanted to keep the United States neutral and Japan's so-called "Silent Navy" would cast a strong influence upon the United States to maintain this neutrality, which, in case Germany had won the war, would have been the grounds for some reward to Japan. Another would be that America's neutrality would be preserved if, as a result of Japanese-American talks, Japan could influence the United States to keep out of the European conflict.

- Q. On the same day that we mentioned the diplomatic documents that you have just been talking about we also discussed Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact and Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact. You indicated to us then that there was a secret agreement relative to the Commission that was to be set up under Article 4 and you also indicated that there was some understanding between the three nations relative to that word "unprovoked" that you applied to Article 3. Will you tell us about the secret understanding or if there was a secret diplomatic document regarding those matters?
- A. I said "unprovoked" definitely, but that was because I did not remember the text very well, and actually has no bearing upon the matter. In any case, in so far as a secret agreement regarding the Commission went, rather than call it secret, it was simply an agreement about the internal set-up of the Commission.
- Q. General, when you mentioned this secret agreement - it was after I had read to you Article 4 as it appears in the Japan Year Book for 1941 and 1942, - I pointed out that nowhere in Article 4 does it state that the Commission was to decide who had been attacked and who the attacker might be. When I called that to your attention you said, and I quote, "I believe that nowhere on the surface will you find that, as it would weaken the pact. It is, I think, a secret agreement." That is the document I wanted you to tell us a little more about.
- A. I do not think that this agreement went so far as a thing that was signed; perhaps it is in the document which states what the duties of this Commission will be.
- Q. General, I have tried to give you every opportunity to tell us anything and everything that you wanted to tell us and in the way that you wanted to tell it to us, of the matters and events that have been the subject of this interrogation. I am exceedingly anxious that you have every opportunity to make

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known everything that you want to tell us. I am wondering now if you have come to the end of your story or if you have still other matters that you feel you want to talk about.

A. As the matters following the outbreak of the war are of no particular importance, I believe on the whole I have come to the end of my story. I think I have told you of all matters of importance.

Q. General, of course, you know that matters that have been the subject of our discussions these many days we have been in to see you are being made the subject of an investigation and other interrogations. Maybe there will be some things come up in your mind that you know in the course of our work we will find out about, and you may want to say more to us regarding such things. If that should happen, I want you to be sure to let us know, because I want to make sure that you have every opportunity to make every disclosure about anything that is involved.

A. It is as you say, if there were some things that I have not told you of yet, I should tell you about them. I believe that I have covered practically everything. However, I shall think it over.

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- A. It is as you say, if there were some things that I have not told you of yet, I should tell you about them. I believe that I have covered practically everything. However, I shall think it over.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

L. C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (☒) G. Osmond Hyde, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 1st day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (☒) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

Mar. 7, 1946.
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

CHARGE OUT SLIP

Date: 13 Jan 1948

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. _____

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. _____

BACKGOUT DOC. NO. _____

FILE NO. _____

PRESSTRANS _____

U.S.S.B.S. _____

DEFENSE DOC. NO. _____

Signature _____

Room # _____

Parts of Doc. # 2157 - A ~~B~~ C - I
(Oshima Interrogations 1 Feb '46, 6 Feb '46
15 Feb '46) are now 3355 - A - B - C

IPS Document No. 3355 A,B,C,D, is part of
IPS Document No. 2157.

#2157 - INTERROGATIONS OF OSHIMA, Hiroshi, Feb -
March, 1946.

#3355-A--1 Feb. 1946
3355-B--6 Feb. 1946
3355-C--15 Feb. 1946
3355-D--7 March 1946

Inter of

1, 6, 15 Feb 46

(2157 A, C and I)

Extracted and made

IRS Doc 3355 for

use as rebuttal evidence

(note 2156 C is also part of 3.355)

Wheeler

EVIDENTIARY DOC. # 2157

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi

INCLUDED IN THE FOLDER ARE THE FOLLOWING DATES:

- 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, Feb. & 1 March 1946

who suggested it and to whom?

I am not sure of what the circumstances were, but I believe that there were talks between Italy and Germany which brought it about.

By this time it had gone out of my hands and I can only say that I recalled that there was talk from the German side of recruiting Italy in the past.

Excerpt from Interrogation of Oshima, Hiroshi, dated 4 February 1946, pp. 31 and 32.

Q. Do you know the circumstances incident to Italy becoming a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. By that I want to know who suggested it and to whom?

A. I am not sure of what the circumstances were, but I believe that there were talks between Italy and Germany which brought it about.

By this time it had gone out of my hands and I can only say that I recollect that there was talk from the German side of recruiting Italy in the pact.

* * * * *

Excerpt from Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 4 Feb 1946, page 32

- Q. You have told us about the secret pact and I think you have described it pretty well to us - that was signed between Japan and Germany at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was entered into. Now, I am wondering if there were any other secret understandings you have not told us about that were entered into between Japan and Germany at or about the same time.
- A. Not as treaties, but on this point I would like to tell you some things and if you have any specific questions, please interject them. In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this - I believe it was in September or October 1938 - that these discussions came about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda.

Excerpts from Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi
dated 26 February 1946

* * *

"Q. General, I have some questions on these matters to ask, but I think we will defer those for a time and let you proceed with your narrative.

"A. The no-Separate peace pact was first brought up around the first or second of December 1941, by a telegram from the Japanese Government to me. The gist of this telegram was as follows: that the Japanese Government in case of a United States-Japanese conflict desired Germany's participation in this war, and further that the Japanese Government desired that a no-separate peace pact be signed. In this regard I had heard sometime in November and had conveyed this news to Japan, from a man named Dietrich, the Reichspresschef (head of the German press under Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister), that Hitler would be in favor of entering the conflict in case a United States-Japanese conflict started. Based on this information the Japanese Government in this telegram to me stated that they were desirous of having me approach Hitler in regard to Germany's entry in case of war with the United States.

* * *

Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi dated 27 February 1946:

"Q. General, you may proceed with your narrative at the point where you left off yesterday.

"A. To clear up this before I go any further: almost since the beginning of United States-Japanese talks I had received absolutely no information concerning their progress from the Japanese Government, nor had I received any information about relations with the Soviet Union. The main reason for this, I believe, was that formerly we had used couriers to carry information of this sort, but due to the difficulties because of the German-Soviet war this became impossible, and for security reasons no communications of this sort were sent. Around the 29th or 30th of November 1941, I received word from Japan to the effect that Secretary of State Hull's reply of November 26, to Japanese proposals was extremely severe in tone. Not knowing much about what the negotiations had covered, I was not able to make an analysis of the situation, this being the first communication regarding United States-Japanese

negotiations that I had received. Following this, I believe it was around the end of November or the very beginning of December, I received another communication to the effect that the Japanese Government had issued an order to its Consulates in the United States to burn all but a very small portion of their codes.

"Q. Did these communications all come from the Foreign Office?"

"A. Yes. Now, these were the two communications that I had received before the orders from the Government regarding the no-separate peace pact, of which I have told you.

"Q. This message that you referred to yesterday that you got on the first or the second of December 1941 came from the Foreign Office also, did it?"

"A. I am not absolutely certain whether this communication regarding the no-separate peace pact came before or after the one that told me of the orders to burn code books. In any case I may be a couple of days off in my dates and I have the feeling that this one regarding the no-separate peace was around the third of December - I just wish to clear up this matter of dates.

"Q. These telegrams or these despatches that you received from the Foreign Office, I suppose, were all signed MATSUOKA?"

"A. MATSUOKA was no longer Foreign Minister at this time. In any case, signature or no signature, all these despatches came from the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister at this time was TOGO."

* * *

EXHIBIT NO. 490

2157

大島浩大使ノ訊問（抜萃 頁三十一、三十二）

一九四六年二月四日 熱日附

（三一頁）

問

貴方ハ伊太利ノ防共協定加入ニ伴フ事情ヲ知ツテ居リマスカ。ト言フノハ、誰ガ誰ニ對シテ提案シタノデアアルカヲ知り度イノデス。

答

如何ナル事情カ私ハ判然知リマセン。只其ノ條約ガ成立スルノニハ獨伊兩國間ニ對談ガ行ハレタコトト信ジマス。

（三二頁）

其ノ時ニハ此ノ件ハ私ノ關係ノ外ニアツタモノデスカラ、私ハ其ノ條約ニ伊太利ガ加入スル様、獨逸側カラ話ガアツタコトヲ思出スト云フコトヲ申上ゲラレルダケデアリマス。

RETURN TO ROOM 361
COPY