

Doc. 2326

(42)

"Notes on the Conversation between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the State Minister Meissner in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

"At first MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for the presents handed to him in the latter's name which he would always consider a permanent treasure, and honor as a constant souvenir of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the friendly reception which he had received in Germany from the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Ministry and of the entire German people. As long as he lives he would never forget the friendliness shown him here from all sides. Upon his return to Japan he would endeavor with all his powers to convince the Japanese people of the fact that the latter are treated by the German people with honest friendliness and respect.

* * * * *

"MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a struggle with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (MATSUOKA) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic efforts from entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare and would be fought out in the Pacific and the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It is a question of how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and the like, could best be exploited by Japan.

"To sum up, MATSUOKA requested that the Fuehrer see to it that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely of England, but also America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would

be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer emphasized, that Germany on her part would immediately draw the consequences, if Japan should get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved whether with Germany or with Japan. It would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

"MATSUOKA once again repeated his request, that the Fuehrer give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

"As regards Japanese-American relationship, MATSUOKA explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not strike decisively the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just this way would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. MATSUOKA was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to go along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand MATSUOKA's position, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of military sovereignty). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an unavoidable fight at a time he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any extension of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

"MATSUOKA replied, that the United States or rather their ruling statesmen had recently still attempted a last maneuver against Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention of assisting in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education /oriented/ on English lines which many had received.

"The Fuehrer commented on this, to the effect that this attitude of America meant only that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed they one day could advance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the position of power of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

"MATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (MATSUOKA) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, telling a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his intrinsic plans towards Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

"Should he, MATSUOKA, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers of the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

"Besides this, MATSUOKA made the express request that nothing be cabled in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

"The Fuehrer agreed and assured for the rest, that he could depend completely on German reticence.

"MATSUOKA replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT

OK

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al.

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL,
hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General
Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as
such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records
of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during
the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is
a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document
which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the
trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit
USA 33.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as
aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tri-
bunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as
a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and
caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said
document in order to verify the existence and contents of said
Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of
said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded
as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal

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II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1881-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said

Doc. No. 532

International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
O-2052152
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and, or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 4th 1941 in Berlin between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of State Meissner.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt. Col.
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,
LT. COLONEL, IGD., O-508524

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2324 to 2329 inclusive

1 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Collection of excerpts from reports, magazine articles and other data regarding aggression against USSR, plans for such aggression, and instances to show violations of existing treaties.

Date: See below Original Copy Language: Russian and English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Russian Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ITAGAKI; NIMAMII; MATSUOKA; TOJO;
KWANTUNG Army

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression against Russia, Violations of existing treaties

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Doc. No. 2324

Excerpts from report on provocative actions of Japanese in Lake KHANKA Area during Oct and Nov 1936.

Doc. No. 2325

Report on detention of ship "DVINA" of Far Eastern Shipping Agency by Japanese authorities on 20 July 1943. Ship was detained without justifiable reason for 35 days and Soviet crew subjected to indignities.

Doc. Nos. 2324 to 2329 incl - Page 2 - SUMMARY Cont'd

Doc. No. 2326

Excerpts from notes regarding discussion between FUEHRER and Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in presence of Reich Foreign Minister and of Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin, 4 Apr 41.

Doc. No. 2327

Extracts from article of General Major TOJO, Hideki, in magazine "GAIKO DZIHU" of 15 Dec 33 entitled "On the New Situation in the Far East". (Japanese)

Doc. No. 2328

Extracts from KURODA, Reizi's article in journal "DAIDMONDA" of 1 Dec 36 on "Brilliant Reality and Failure of the Theory of Cooperation Between Japan and England". (Japanese)

Doc. No. 2329

Extracts from book "Great MANCHURIAN Empire", published on account of the Ten-Year Jubilee by State Organization KYO-WA-KAI, and Chief Bureau of Russian Emigrant's Affairs in KHARBIN, 1942. States that KYO WA KAI has a special mission to spread the spirit and ideology of the State not only among entire population of MANCHUKUO, but throughout the world, Extracts reveal General ITAGAKI, Capt. KATAKURA, as members of special committee which met in Apr 32 in MUKDEN for forming foundation of KYO WA KAI and General MINAMI, General NISHIO and others as issuing special directives concerning intrinsic nature of KYO WA KAI.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 532

18 December 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat: Notes regarding the discussion between the Fuehrer and MATSUOKA in Berlin.
Date: 4 April 1941 Original () Copy () Language: Ger.
Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

A partial translation of this document can be found in the Document book of the U.S. Chief of Counsel at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany (Doc. 172). MATSUOKA assures Hitler that he will, upon his return to Japan, do his utmost to convince the Japanese people of the sincere friendship and esteem, which are bestowed upon them by the German people.

MATSUOKA reports about his talks with Mussolini, with whom he agreed that America is Enemy No. 1, that she should be watched but not tempted. He also agreed to Mussolini's statements about Russia. He promises to try to convince certain Japanese of the unshakeable solidarity of Germany and Italy.

He then refers to his audience with the Pope (p.6), in which he tried to convince the Pope that Roosevelt prolongs the war, regardless of the question whether he or America are right or wrong. Then he asks Hitler for co-operation of the German authorities with the Japanese Military Commission, especially regarding submarine warfare. He continues: "In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to make preparations for a fight with the United States, because in that case America possibly would side with Great Britain.... Army and Navy had....to count upon the worst situation, i.e. with a war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South

Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan."

Hitler stressed that Germany would immediately draw the consequences if Japan would get involved in a conflict with U.S. MATSUOKA repeats his request for new inventions, for "the Japanese Navy has to make immediate preparations for a conflict with the U.S."

MATSUOKA declares his belief in the unavoidability of a war with the U.S. "if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Only thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. MATSUOKA was considered in these circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then under less favorable circumstances than at present."

Hitler declares that he would reply immediately to any extension of the war either by Russia or by America.... Providence favored those who will not let dangers overcome them, but who will bravely face them. Then ensues a discussion of the American attitude and its effect on the Japanese public.

MATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (MATSUOKA) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper

Doc. No. 532-Page No. 3 - SUMMARY Cont'd.

plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, MATSUOKA, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this MATSUOKA made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Analyst: 2d Lt. Steiner,
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 532

Excerpts from Notes Fueh 20/41

the NOTES

regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would

conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness/would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could ad-

vance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1881-PS

4 April 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN
Pfc.

Документ № 1881-195.

В документе говорится о беседе
Оршера с министром внутренних дел и
содержит сведения в присутствии Райх ми-
нистра внутренних дел о возможности
войны Японии с Советским Союзом
о помощи Японии в военном отноше-
нии со стороны Германии.
Обсуждается вопрос о сотрудничестве.

Утверждена переводчица:

Мухомов

Иванов

26/11 1945г.

TOP PRIORITY

STRAUS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

19 Sept. 1946

TO : TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 532-B for Taranenko

Arrange for translation as follows:

German to Eng.
German & Jap.
3-way check.

Text of notes on the talk between Hitler, and Matsuka, Jap. Foreign
Minister, April 4, 1941 in Berlin.

Translate that which is indicated in blue pencil on pages 1 and 2, 6, and 14.

Mark as 532-B.

NOTE: This has been partially done for Mr. Tavenner and a copy of
the English and Jap. translation are attached to save translation work.
As for the parts not covered by Mr. Tavenner's request a translation
submitted by the Russian Div. is attached which should be used, if
correct. If corrections are made, notify Lt. Col. Taranenko's office
of these. Return the Eng. and Jap. copy to Doc. Proc. file (En. 364)1

hbb

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

532 (2026)

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APO 124A U.S. Army

38 March 1946

This is to certify that the photostatic copies listed below are true copies of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and are now in the custody of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality:

- 1877-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuka, at Berlin on 29 March 1941.
- 2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at Fuschl.
- 1834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56/R. Extract of a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941.
- 2954-PS Memorandum about the conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.
- 2897-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 14 July 1941. #1217.
- 2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097.
- 1881-PS Memorandum about a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Reich and Minister Meissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
- 2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941.
- C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan. Fuehrer Headquarters. Dated 5 March 1941.

(Sgd.) GERALD SCHAEFER
1st Lt. Inf.
Chief, Documentation Division

國トノ開戦ハ出來得ル限り避クル様努力致スナラ
 シ、併シ若シ彼ノ國ガ新嘉坡ヲ攻撃スル事ヲ決心
 スルナラバ日本海軍ハ勿論米國トノ同等ニ對シ準
 備セザルヲ得ズ何故ナレバ斯ル場合ニ於テハ米國
 ハ十中八九英國ニ加勢致ス事ハ勿論デアル。彼ハ
 (松岡)個人トシテハ合衆國ガ英國側トシテ參戰
 スル事ハ外交上ノ努力ニ依リ掣肘シ得ルト信ジテ
 居リマス、併シ日本ノ陸軍及ビ海軍ハ最悪ノ場合
 一即チ米國トノ戦争ヲ豫期セザルヲ得マセン。陸
 海軍ノ人々ハ斯ル戦争ハ五年又ハ其レ以上ニ亘リ
 且太平洋ニ於ケル一ゲリラレ戦争ノ形ヲ採リ而シ
 テ南洋ニ於テ決戦ニ至ラント云フ意見ヲ持ツテ居
 リマス、此ノ理由ノ許ニ獨逸ノ採リシ一ゲリラレ
 戦術ニ於ケル經驗ハ日本トシテハ最大ノ價值デア
 リ、如何ニシテ斯クノ如キ戦争ガ最モ功妙ニ行ハ
 ルベキカ又如何ニシテ潜水艦ノ練テノ技術的改良
 即チ潛望鏡其ノ他凡ユル機械ニ付キ精細ニ亘リテ
 日本當局者ガ利用シ得ルカハ重大ナル問題デアリ
 マス。

一簡言スレバ松岡氏ハ適當ナル獨逸當局者ガ日
 本人ニヨリ必要ナル是等陸海軍ノ改良及發明ヲ日
 本技術家ノ研究ニ提供致サセル様總統ガ配慮セラ
 レン事ヲ懇願セリ。

「總統ハ是ヲ約束致シ且ツ獨逸モ亦合衆國トノ衝
突ハ望マシクナイト考慮セルコト而シ獨逸ハ斯ル
過發事件ニ對シ已ニ對策ヲ講ジタル旨ヲ指道セリ。
獨逸ニ於テハ世人ハ米國ノ聯合國ニ對スル貢獻ハ
輸送ノ可能性ニ左右サレ而シテ輸送ノ可能性ハ又
利用シ得ル船舶屯數ニ司配サルモノトス。然ルニ
屯數ニ對スル獨逸ノ戰爭ハ單ニ英國ノミナラズ米
國モ又其ノ打撃ヲ痛感スルニ至レリ。獨逸ハ一人
ノアメリカ人ヲモ歐洲ニ上陸サセザル様準備セル
ト共ニ北米ニ對シユ一潜水艦及空軍ヲ利用シ最モ
強力ナル國爭ヲ展開スルニ至ラン、ソハ獨逸ノ將
兵ガ天性アメリカ人ニ比シ遙カニ優秀ナル點ヲ離
レテモ獨逸ノ經驗ハ未ダ何ノ經驗モナキ米國ニ比
シ多大ノ優劣性ヲ持スルニ因ルモノナリ。

會談ノ進行ニ從ヒ總統ハ若シ日本ガ合衆國トノ
戰爭ニ卷キ込マルル場合ニ於テハ獨逸ハ獨逸ノ方
トシテ直チニ其ノ結果ヲ引受クルト極言セリ。總
統トシテハアメリカトノ戰爭ニ初メニ卷キ込マル
、ノガ獨逸デアレ日本デアレソハ問題ニ非ズ、獨
逸ハ常ニ一度ニ一國ヲ排除スルコトニ努メ其後他
ノ國ト妥協スルニ非ズシテ寧ロ此ノ一國ヲ所決ス
ルニアリ。故ニ獨逸ハ已ニ述ベシガ如ク日米開戰
ニ際シテハ何ノ躊躇スル所ナク徹ニ一大打撃ヲ與

ヘン何故ナラバ三國同盟ノ強味ハ共同動作ニ依ル所大ナレバナリ、之ニ反シテ彼等ノ弱點ハ三國ガ一國宛別々ニ打負カサレル場合ヲ作ル事ニ於テノミ生ズルナラン

松岡氏ハ再ビ彼ノ要求ヲ繰リ返ヘシ適當ナル獨逸當局者ガ日本人ニ取り重大ナル最近ノ改良及發明ヲ日本軍人ノ利用ニ供スル様總統ガ司令ヲ與ヘラレンコトヲ望メリ。何故ナレバ日本海軍ハ合衆國トノ衝突ニ對シ早急ニ準備スル必要アレバナリ。

日米關係ニ付キ松岡氏ハ彼ノ國ニ於テ若シ日本ガ現在ノ如キ步調ヲ今後モ辿ルナラバ廻カレ早カレ合衆國トノ戰爭ハ不可避ノモノナラント常ニ唱導セル事ヲ説明セリ。彼ノ意見ニ從ヘバ此ノ衝突ハ遅ク起ルヨリモ寧ロ早急ニ勃發セン。彼ハ論點ヲ進メテ曰ク然ラバ何故ニ日本ハ都合好キ瞬間ニ決定的打撃ヲ與ヘテ米國トノ戰爭ト云フ冒險ヲ自ラ負ハザルヤ斯クノ如キ方法ニ於テノミ日本ハ多分徵代ニ亘ル戰爭ヲ避クルコトヲ得ン、殊ニ若シ南洋方面ニ於テ優勢ナル地位ヲ得バ猶ホ然リ。實ヲ云ヘバ日本ニ於テハ斯クノ如キ思想系統ヲ辿ルコトヲ好マザル人々ガ相當數アリマス。斯ル人々ノ間ニ於テハ松岡氏ハ危險ナル思想ヲ懷抱セル危險人物ト見做サレテ居リマス。然シ彼ハ言ヒマシ

タ若シ日本が現在ノ行程ヲ辿リ續ケルナラバ何日
 カハ何レニシテモ戰ハザルヲ得ナイダロウ而シテ
 ソレハ現在ニ於テヨリモ是カニ惡條件ノ許ニ置カ
 ル、ナラン。

總統ハ彼ニハ松岡氏ノ立場ガ好ク了解スル事ガ
 出來ルト云ヒマシタ何故ナレバ彼モ亦同様ナ立場
 ニ置カレシ事アレバナリ。(即チ「ライランド」
 ノ回復、軍政上ノ主權ノ宣言)彼モ亦若ク且勇氣
 横溢セル頃ハ松岡氏ノ如ク好條件ヲ開擴シ以テ避
 ケ得ザル戰ノ危險ヲ冒スベキダト云フ意見ヲ保持
 シタモノデアリ、如何ニ後ノ採リシ態度ガ正當ナ
 ルモノデアツタカハ其後ノ事件ノ推移ニ依ツテ證
 明サレ彼ハ現在ノ戰爭範圍ヲ如何ナル程度迄モ進
 メル事ニ對シ、其レガ露西面ニ依リテモ又ハ米國
 ニ依リテデモ、直ニ其ニ應ズル難答ヲ與フル事ニ
 於テ寸秒モ敢ヘテ躊躇セザルベシ、神ノ攝理ハ常
 ニ危險ヲシテ彼レニ襲ハシメズ寧ロ危險ニ進ンデ
 直面スルモノニ好意ヲ示セリト。

是ニ對シ松岡氏ハ答ヘテ曰ク合衆國即チ寧ロ其ノ
 指導的地位ニアル政治家達ハ最近次ノ如キ宣言ヲ
 ナス事ニ依リ未ダニ日本ニ最後ノ働キ掛ケヲ企畫
 セリ、即チ合衆國ハ若シ日本ガ合衆國宛ノ仕向ケ
 地ニ護謨及錫ノ輸送ニ對シ自由行動ヲ許スナラバ

支那又ハ南洋問題ノ爲メニ敢ヘテ戰ヲ跳マザルベシ然シ一度日本ガ六英國ノ没落ヲ來ス事ニ援助セシガ爲メニ參戰セシトノ印象ヲ與ヘルナラバ亞米利加ハ日本ニ對シ直ニ開戦スルナラント「斯ノ如キ論鋒ハ自然ニ日本人ニ對シ相當ノ好果ヲ發揮セリ何故ナレバ日本ノ教育ハ可成英國ノ文化ニ多クノ日本人ヲ心酔セシムル様仕向ケタレバナリ。

總統ハ是ニ對シ次ノ如キ秘評ヲ加ヘタリ斯ノ米國ノ態度ハ英帝國ガ存在セル限り何日カハ日本ニ向ツテ英國ト手ヲ携ヘテ進撃シ得ルトノ希望ヲ表現セルモノニシテ一度英帝國ガ没落セバ米國ハ勢ヒ孤立セザルヲ得ズ其場合日本ニ對シ何ノ手段モ講ズル能ハズトノ憂慮ヲ抱ケル證左ニ外ナラズ

其時獨逸外務大臣ハ口ヲ挾ンデ曰ク阿米利加人ハ如何ナル状態ニ於テモ證カニ東亞ニ於テ英國ノ強力ナル地位ヲ維持セン事ヲ希望セル事ハ明カナルモ一方如何ナル程度ニ米國ガ日本ト獨逸トノ連合行動ヲ憂慮セルカハ諸般ノ態度ニヨリ證明サレシ所ナリト。

松岡氏ハ猶ホ語ヲ續イデ彼トシテハ此際日本國內ニ於ケル眞ノ状態ニ付キ徹底的ニ明確ナル描寫ヲ總統ニ與ヘル事ハ彼ニ取ツテハ重大ナルモノト思考スト述べマシタ。是ガ爲メニ彼ハ又殘念ナガ

ラ日本外務大臣トシテ彼ノ計畫ニ關シ伯林ニ於テ
總統及ビ獨逸外務大臣ノ面前ニ於テ解説セシガ如
キ言葉ノ一言ヲモ日本國內ニ於テハ發言シ得ザル
ト云フ事實ヲ總統ニ御知ラセザルヲ得ナイノデア
リマス。若シ彼ガ敢ヘテ發言スルナラバ政界及財
界ニ於ケル彼ノ立場ヲ多大ニ毀損スルニ至ルデシ
ヨウ、以前一度彼ガ外務大臣ニナリシ前自分ノ目
論見ヲ一人ノ親シキ友ニ洩ラシテ非常ノ失敗ヲ醸
シタコトガアリマス。確カニ其ノ友人ガ世間ニ發
表シタ様ニ見エマスガ其ノ結果種々ノ風潮ガ宣傳
サレ然モ自分ハ外務大臣トシテ其風説ニ極力反對
セナケレバナリマセンデシタ。尤モ普通ハ自分ハ
常ニ眞實ノ事ヲ申シマスガ、斯ル事情ノ許ニ今回
新デ討議セル問題ヲドレ程早ク日本總理大臣又ハ
陛下ニ報告シ得ルカハ斷言シ得ザル所デアリマス。
先第一ニ日本ニ於ケル狀勢ノ推移ヲ明瞭ニ且ツ注
意深ク研究セザルヲ得マセン然ル後好機會ヲ捕ヘ
テ最後ノ決心ヲナシ近衛公及天皇陛下ニ彼ノ妥當
ナル計畫ヲ白狀セナケレバナリマセン。其ノ時コ
ソハ御互ノ最後ノ決定ハ數日ノ間ニ行ハナケレバ
イケマセンナゼナレバ然ラザル限り計畫ハ人々ノ
批判ノ中ニ葬リ去ラル、恐レガアリマスカラ。
若シ彼松岡ガ彼ノ企圖ヲ實行スル事ニ失敗スル

ナラバソハ彼ガ勢力、説得力及び外交的手腕ニ於テ缺クル所多キ證據デアリマス。幸ニシテ彼ガ成功スルナラバソレハ彼ガ日本ニ於テ相當ノ勢力ヲ保持セル事ヲ證明スルコトニナリマス、彼自身トシテハ必ズヤ成功スルナラント確信ヲ持ツテ居リマス。

彼ガ歸朝ノ上質問サル、ナラバ彼ハ陛下、總理大臣、陸海軍大臣方ニ實際新嘉坡ノ事ガ論議サレタ事ヲ認メル積リデアリマス然シソハ單ニ假想上ノ根據デアツタト申シマス

此ノ外松岡氏ハ新嘉坡ノ問題ニ關シテハ決シテ電報ヲ打タザル様明確ナル要請ヲナシマシタ何故ナレバ電報ニ依ルト事件ノ洩ル、恐ガ多分ニ有ルトノ強キ理由ヲ持ツテ居ルノデ若シ必要ナラバ彼ハ特使ヲ派スルト言ヒマシタ。

其所デ總統ハ贊成シ而シテ彼ハ獨逸人ノ沈黙ニ全々信賴シ得ル事ヲ他ノ人々ニ代リテ松岡氏ニ保證ヲ與ヘマシタ。

松岡氏ハ答ヘテ言ヒマシタ彼ハ獨逸人ノ沈黙ヲ信ズルガ而シ不幸ニシテ同様ナル事ヲ日本ニ付イテ言ヒ難シト。

討議ハ遂ニ激言ノ個人的訣別ノ辭ヲ御互ニ述ヘテ終結ヲ告グルニ至レリ

柏林千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）四月四日、

署名 シミット

米國主席檢察官事務所

米國陸軍一二四A 陸軍郵便局

昭和廿一年三月廿八日

下記ニ列擧セル複寫寫眞ハ聯合軍最高指揮官ノ指示ノ下ニ聯合軍ニ依リ捕獲セラレタル敵國書類原本ノ眞正ナル「寫シ」ニシテ且ツ現在樞軸犯罪ニ對スル米國首席檢察官事務所ノ保管ニ係ルモノナルコトヲ證ス

一八七七IPS、一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ三月二十九日伯林ニ於ケル獨乙外務大臣ト日本松岡外務大臣トノ會談ニ關スル覺書

二九二九IPS、一九四三年ノ昭和十九年ノ四月十八日「フシユル」ニ於ケル獨乙外務大臣ト大島大使トノ會談ニ關スル覺書

一八三四IPS、外務省、獨乙外務大臣、第五六/R、一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ二月二十三日「フシユル」ニ於ケル新任日本大使大島トノ會談覺書抜萃

二九五四IPS、一九四三年／昭和十八年／三月六日外務大臣大島大使會談ノ覺書

二八九七IPS、電報東京、一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月十四日附井一二一七

二八九八IPS、電報東京、一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月十三日附井二〇九七

一八八一IPS、一九四一年／昭和十六年／四月四日伯林ニ於テ獨乙國外務大臣及「マイスナ」大臣ノ面前ニ於テ行ハレタル總統ト日本國外務大臣松岡トノ會談ニ關スル覺書

二八九六IPS、電報、ウエストフアレン「特別列車、第七〇七號、一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月十日附

〇一七五 日本トノ共同ニ關スル指令第二四號、總統大本營、一九四一年／昭和十六年／三月五日附

文書課長 歩兵中尉

シエラード、シエーフアード（署名）

II (原本) 法廷ニアリ

供述書

Schepers
repacked
A. Schepers
BY

余 ジェラード・ニエファー / GERARD SCHAFER ハ正式ニ宣誓ヲ行ヒタル上
左ノ如ク証言陳述ス

一、余ハドイツニユニールニルクニ於ケル合衆軍主席檢事事務所内
文書交付課長ニシテ、且ツ玉隆軍事裁判所ニ証憑トシテ提出
受理セラルニ先ダテ右事務所ニ於テ余或ハ余カ前任者ハ、右文
書交付課ニヨリ「ハールIPSナル番号ヲ付セラレタル接收敵軍文
書原文ヲ所持、保管、管理セリ

二、上記原文書ハ聯合米遣軍最高指揮官隷下軍隊ノドイツニ
外務省綴及ビ記録ヨリ接收入手セルモノナリ。

三、該接收敵側文書ノ原文ハ押收、接收後、余カ「ドイツ文書
ノ接收寫真版作製及ビ保存ニ関スル供述書」ナル頭書ノ下
ニ、九四六年ノ昭和三十年ノ四月十五日附ヲ以テセル供述書ニ於テ
詳細説明敘述セル方法ニ依リ「ドイツニユニールニルク / NURNBERG /
所在合衆軍主席檢事事務所内文書交付課ニ交付セラレ、同課ニ
テ編綴シ、番号ヲ附シ寫真版ニ作成セリ。尚余ハ此処ニ該供述
書ヲ証明、是認確認シ且ツ之ニ言及スルコトニ依リ、本供述
書ノ一部ト爲セリ。

四、本供述書ヲ附ナル文書ハ上記接收敵側文書ノ原文ノ寫真
且ツ正確ナル寫真版ナリ。

五、右ニ言及セル接收敵側文書ノ原本ハ、アメリカ合衆軍ソノ他諸軍
/ HERMAN WILHELM GOERING /
「ヘルマン・ウィルヘルム・ゲーリング」
其ノ他ニ対スル訴訟ノ裁

判中ニハ際軍事裁判所ニ証拠トシテ提出、受理セラレタルモノニテ、
 又右記文書交付課ニ依リ、^{右ノ如ク}証拠トシテ提出ノ際、同ハ際軍事裁判
 所書記長ニ手交セラレ、斯クテ該接收敵側文書原本ハ現在同
 ハ際軍事裁判所又ハ其ノ書記長ノ所持、留保スル所トナリ居リ、
 該原本ノ寫真取ハ量ニ詳述セル理由ニヨリ該原本ノ使用不可能
 ナルヲ茲ニ之ヲ提供スルモノナリ。

署名 ジェラード・ニエーマ / GERARD SCHAETER /

一九四一年/昭和二十一年/四月十日、余ノ前ニテ署名宣誓セラル

ジョン・W・オーキンス / JOHN W. MCHINCLOSS /
 〇一五〇五二五二

法務局 陸軍大尉

JAGD Capt

國際軍事裁判所

アメリカ合衆国 フランス共和

大英王國北アイルランド聯合王國並ニ

ソヴェット社会主義共和聯邦

一対一

ヘルマン・ウィルヘルム・ゲリーグ 其ノ他全被告

證明書

下記署名ノ陸軍准將ウィリアム・レ・ミツェルハ茲ニ左記事實ヲ証明ス

右者ハ國際軍事裁判所ニ於テ正規ニ任命セラレ權能ヲ附與セラレタル書記長代理ナルト且ツソノ任務トシテ前記裁判所ノ全記録並ニ前記訴訟ノ裁判中證據トシテ承認セラレタル全文書ノ所持保管及ビ管理ニアタレセナルコト

本證明書ノ添附セラレタル文書ハ前記訴訟ノ裁判中ニ從來證據トシテ承認セラレ書証USA第三三号トシテ認証セラレタル原文書ノ真正ナル寫真版寫本ナルコト

前記證據トシテ承認セラレタル右記原文書ハ書記長トシテノ下記署名者ヲ通ジテ上記國際軍事裁判所ニ依リ押收セラレタルモノニテ下記署名者ノ保有且ツ留保ニ係ルモノナルコト下記署名者ハ茲ニ證明書ヲ發行シ前記書証ノ存在及ビ内容ヲ立証センガタニ及ビ更ニ前記書証ノ原本ハ右記ノ如ク押收セラレタルが故ニ手取ヲ能ナシ事實ヲ立証セガタニ前記文書ノ

BR

No. 4.

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右記寫眞版原本同証明書ヲ添附セシメタルコト

ドイツ
/NURBERG/
ニールンブルクニ於テ作成
一九四六年/昭和二十一年/四月十一日

WILLIAM L. MITCHELL/
ウィリアム・L・ミッチェル(自署)
玉階軍事裁判所書記長

供述書

PR

余、パウル・シュミット / PAUL O. SCHMIDT / の正式に宣誓を行ヒタル^上如ク証言陳述ス

一、一九三三年 / 大正十二年 / より一九四五年 / 昭和二十年 / 五月ニ於ケルドイツ^上崩壊迄余ハドイツ外務省 / 主任通訳官ニシテ且ツ本職ノ任トシテ重要ナル外務省及ビソノ他ドイツ政府指導者及ビ外^外政府代表者トノ間^間アラユル会議ニ自ラ出席シ通訳及ビ(或シ)書記ヲ勤メタルコト

二、前述ノ如キドイツ外務省 / 主任通訳官タルニ加ヘテ余ハ亦一九三九年 / 昭和十四年 / 以後ハドイツ外務省 / 秘書官長ニシテ又余ノ最終ノ官位ハドイツ外務省ニ於ケル大臣ナリシコト

三、上記諸会合ニ於テ通訳及ビ(或シ)書記ヲ勤メシ間、行ハレシ会話ヲ筆記スルハ余ノ公務ニシテ且ツ履行セシコト、カール会合ノ終結毎ニカール筆記ヨリ同會合ニ於テ語ラレシコト及ビ起リシコトノ完全ニシテ詳細ナル記録ヲ調製セルコト

四、余ノ調製セシ記録ハカール諸会合ニ於テ語ラレヌ起リシコトニ關スルドイツ政府ノ公式文書トナリシコト、記録ノ寫シ一部ハ該外務省ニ於ケル秘書ノ権能ヲ行フドイツ外務省ノ大臣官房ニ提出サレシコト、カール各会合ノ記録ノ列ノ寫ニ一部ハドイツ外務大臣ノ秘書官ニ提出サレシコト、カール各会合ノ記録ノカール寫ニ一部ハ余ノ許ニ保有サレシコト

五、前述セル如ク余が記録ヲ作成セル上記諸会合ハ丁史的重
要件ヲ持テルモノナリシコト及ビカニル諸記録モ亦丁史的目的ノ
タメニカニル諸会合ノ記録ヲ持続シ保存センガタメ持ニ余ニ依
リテ調製セラレシモノナルコト

六、此処ニ添附ノ書類ハ余自ラ此処ニ述ベタル方法ニ依リ調製
シ一九四一年/昭和十六年/四月四日ベルリンニ於テ外務省国家
大臣及ビ外務大臣マイスナ/MISSNER/同席ノ下ニ總統ト日
本松岡外務大臣ト向ノ会議ニ因スル系記録ノ真実且ツ正確
ナル真真版ナルコト

七、前記ノ該会議ニ余ハ自ラ出席シ通訳及ビ或ハ書記ヲ勤メ
シコト及ビ余ニ依リテ調製サレシ記録——添附ノ書類ハソノ真真
版ナリ——ハ同会議ニ於テ語レ且ツ起リシコトノ真実ニシテ
正確ナル報告ナルコト

八、余ハ本供述書及ビ添附ノ書類ガ日本戦争犯罪人ノ起訴ニ
因リ使用セラルコトアルベキコトヲ通知セラレ且ツ承知シ居ルコト
且ツ亦本供述書ヲ余ハ自由ニ自發的ニ而シテ上記事實ヲ了解
ノ上作成セルモノナルコト

博士ハウル・O・ニヒミト/Dr. PAUL O. SCHMIDT/

一九四二年/昭和二十一年/五月三日 ドイツ、ニールンベルク/WAR-
ANBERG/ニ於テ余ノ前ニ於テ署名宣誓セラル

スミス・W・ブルックハート/SMITH W BROOKHART JR./

總監局 陸軍中佐

〇一五〇八五二四

國トノ開戦ハ出來得ル限り避クル様努力致スナラ
 シ、併シ若シ彼ノ國ガ新嘉坡ヲ攻撃スル事ヲ決心
 スルナラバ日本海軍ハ勿論米國トノ國争ニ對シ準
 備セザルヲ得ズ何故ナレバ新ル場合ニ於テハ米國
 ハ十中八九英國ニ加勢致ス事ハ勿論デアル。彼ハ
 (松岡)個人トシテハ合衆國ガ英國側トシテ參戰
 スル事ハ外交上ノ努力ニ依リ掣肘シ得ルト信ジテ
 居リマス、併シ日本ノ陸軍及ビ海軍ハ最悪ノ場合
 一即チ米國トノ戦争ヲ豫期セザルヲ得マセン。陸
 海軍ノ人々ハ斯ル戦争ハ五年又ハ其レ以上ニ亘リ
 且太平洋ニ於ケル「ゲリラ」戦争ノ形ヲ採リ而シ
 テ南洋ニ於テ決戦ニ至ラント云フ意見ヲ持ツテ居
 リマス、此ノ理由ノ許ニ獨逸ノ採リシ「ゲリラ」
 戦術ニ於ケル經驗ハ日本トシテハ最大ノ價值デア
 リ、如何ニシテ斯クノ如キ戦争ガ最モ功妙ニ行ハ
 ルベキカ又如何ニシテ潜水艦ノ練テノ技術的改良
 即チ潛望鏡其ノ他凡ユル機械ニ付キ精細ニ亘リテ
 日本當局者ガ利用シ得ルカハ重大ナル問題デアリ
 マス。

「簡言スレバ松岡氏ハ適當ナル獨逸當局者ガ日
 本人ニヨリ必要ナル是等陸海軍ノ改良及發明ヲ日
 本技術家ノ研究ニ提供致サセル様總統ガ配慮セラ
 レン事ヲ懇願セリ。

「總統ハ是ヲ約束致シ且ツ獨逸モ亦合衆國トノ衝突ハ望マシクナイト考慮セルコト而シ獨逸ハ斯ル過發事件ニ對シ已ニ對策ヲ講ジタル旨ヲ指道セリ。獨逸ニ於テハ世人ハ米國ノ聯合國ニ對スル貢獻ハ輸送ノ可能性ニ左右サレ而シテ輸送ノ可能性ハ又利用シ得ル船舶屯戩ニ司配サルモノトス。然ルニ屯戩ニ對スル獨逸ノ戰爭ハ單ニ英國ノミナラズ米國モ又其ノ打撃ヲ痛感スルニ至レリ。獨逸ハ一人ノアメリカ人ヲモ歐洲ニ上陸サセザル様準備セルト共ニ北米ニ對シユ一潜水艦及空軍ヲ利用シ最モ強力ナル鬪争ヲ展開スルニ至ラン、ソハ獨逸ノ將兵ガ天性アメリカ人ニ比シ遙カニ優秀ナル點ヲ離レテモ獨逸ノ經驗ハ未ダ何ノ經驗モナキ米國ニ比シ多大ノ優秀性ヲ持スルニ因ルモノナリ。

會談ノ進行ニ從ヒ總統ハ若シ日本ガ合衆國トノ戰爭ニ卷キ込マルル場合ニ於テハ獨逸ハ獨逸ノ方トシテ直チニ其ノ結果ヲ引受ケルト極言セリ。總統トシテハアメリカトノ戰爭ニ初メニ卷キ込マル、ノガ獨逸デアレ日本デアレソハ問題ニ非ズ、獨逸ハ常ニ一度ニ一國ヲ排除スルコトニ努メ其後他ノ國ト妥協スルニ非ズシテ寧ロ此ノ一國ヲ所決スルニアリ。故ニ獨逸ハ已ニ述ベシガ如ク日米開戦ニ際シテハ何ノ躊躇スル所ナク敵ニ一大打撃ヲ與

ヘン何故ナラバ三國同盟ノ強味ハ共同動作ニ依ル所大ナレバナリ、之ニ反シテ彼等ノ弱點ハ三國ガ一國宛別々ニ打負カサレル場合ヲ作ル事ニ於テノミ生ズルナラン

松岡氏ハ再ビ彼ノ要求ヲ繰リ返ヘシ適當ナル獨逸當局者ガ日本人ニ取り重大ナル最近ノ改良及發明ヲ日本軍人ノ利用ニ供スル様總統ガ司令ヲ與ヘラレンコトヲ望メリ。何故ナレバ日本海軍ハ合衆國トノ衝突ニ對シ早急ニ準備スル必要アレバナリ。

日米關係ニ付キ松岡氏ハ彼ノ國ニ於テ若シ日本ガ現在ノ如キ步調ヲ今後モ辿ルナラバ遅カレ早カレ合衆國トノ戦争ハ不可避ノモノナラント常ニ唱導セル事ヲ説明セリ。彼ノ意見ニ從ヘバ此ノ衝突ハ遅ク起ルヨリモ寧ロ早急ニ勃發セン。彼ハ論點ヲ進メテ曰ク然ラバ何故ニ日本ハ都合好キ瞬間ニ決定的打撃ヲ與ヘテ米國トノ戦争ト云フ冒險ヲ自ラ負ハザルヤ斯クノ如キ方法ニ於テノミ日本ハ多分敵代ニ亘ル戦争ヲ避クルコトヲ得ン、殊ニ若シ南洋方面ニ於テ優勢ナル地位ヲ得バ猶ホ然リ。實ヲ云ヘバ日本ニ於テハ斯クノ如キ思想系統ヲ辿ルコトヲ好マザル人々ガ相當數アリマス。斯ル人々ノ間ニ於テハ松岡氏ハ危險ナル思想ヲ懷抱セル危險人物ト見做サレテ居リマス。然シ彼ハ言ヒマシ

タ若シ日本が現在ノ行程ヲ辿リ續ケルナラバ何日
 カハ何レニシテモ國ハザルヲ得ナイダロウ而シテ
 ソレハ現在ニ於テヨリモ甚カニ惡條件ノ許ニ置カ
 ル、ナラン。

總統ハ彼ニハ松岡氏ノ立場ガ好ク了解スル事ガ
 出來ルト云ヒマシタ何故ナレバ彼モ亦同様ナ立場
 ニ置カレシ事アレバナリ。(即チ「ライランド」
 ノ回復、軍政上ノ主權ノ宣言)彼モ亦若ク且勇氣
 横溢セル頃ハ松岡氏ノ如ク好條件ヲ開擴シ以テ避
 ケ得ザル戰ノ危險ヲ冒スベキダト云フ意見ヲ保持
 シタモノデアリ、如何ニ彼ノ採リシ態度ガ正當ナ
 ルモノデアツタカハ其後ノ事件ノ推移ニ依ツテ證
 明サレ彼ハ現在ノ戰爭範圍ヲ如何ナル程度迄モ進
 メル事ニ對シ、其レガ西面ニ依リテモ又ハ米國
 ニ依リテデモ、直ニ其ニ應ズル確答ヲ與フル事ニ
 於テ寸秒モ改ヘテ躊躇セザルベシ、神ノ擲理ハ常
 ニ危險ヲシテ彼レニ變ハシメズ寧ロ危險ニ進ンデ
 直面スルモノニ好意ヲ示セリト。

是ニ對シ松岡氏ハ嘗ヘテ曰ク合衆國即チ寧ロ其ノ
 指導的地位ニアル政治家達ハ最近次ノ如キ宣言ヲ
 ナス事ニ依リ未ダニ日本ニ最後ノ働キ掛ケヲ企畫
 セリ、即チ合衆國ハ若シ日本ガ合衆國宛ノ仕向ケ
 地ニ護謨及錫ノ輸送ニ對シ自由行動ヲ許スナラバ

支那又ハ南洋問題ノ爲メニ敢ヘテ戰ヲ跳マザルベシ然シ一度日本が大英國ノ没落ヲ來ス事ニ援助セシガ爲メニ參戰セシトノ印象ヲ與ヘルナラバ亞米利加ハ日本ニ對シ直ニ開戰スルナラント「斯ノ如キ論鋒ハ自然ニ日本人ニ對シ相當ノ好果ヲ發揮セリ何故ナレバ日本ノ教育ハ可成英國ノ文化ニ多クノ日本人ヲ心酔セシムル様仕向ケタレバナリ。

總統ハ是ニ對シ次ノ如キ秘語ヲ加ヘタリ斯ノ米國ノ態度ハ英帝國ガ存在セル限り何日カハ日本ニ向ツテ英國ト手ヲ携ヘテ進撃シ得ルトノ希望ヲ表現セルモノニシテ一度英帝國ガ没落セバ米國ハ勢ヒ孤立セザルヲ得ズ其場合日本ニ對シ何ノ手段モ帶ズル能ハズトノ憂慮ヲ抱ケル證左ニ外ナラズ

其時獨逸外務大臣ハ口ヲ挾ンデ曰ク阿米利加人ハ如何ナル状態ニ於テモ證カニ東亞ニ於テ英國ノ強力ナル地位ヲ維持セン事ヲ希望セル事ハ明カナルモ一方如何ナル程度ニ米國ガ日本ト獨逸トノ連合行動ヲ憂慮セルカハ諸般ノ態度ニヨリ證明サレシ所ナリト。

松岡氏ハ猶ホ語ヲ續イデ彼トシテハ此際日本國內ニ於ケル眞ノ状態ニ付キ徹底的ニ明確ナル描寫ヲ總統ニ與ヘル事ハ彼ニ取ツテハ重大ナルモノト思考スト述べマシタ。是ガ爲メニ彼ハ又殘念ナガ

ラ日本外務大臣トシテ彼ノ計畫ニ關シ伯林ニ於テ
 總統及ビ獨逸外務大臣ノ面前ニ於テ解説セシガ如
 キ言葉ノ一言ヲモ日本國內ニ於テハ發言シ得ザル
 ト云フ事實ヲ總統ニ御知ラセザルヲ得ナイノデア
 リマス。若シ彼ガ敢ヘテ發言スルナラバ政界及財
 界ニ於ケル彼ノ立場ヲ多クニ毀損スルニ至ルデシ
 ヨウ、以前一度彼ガ外務大臣ニナリシ前自分ノ目
 論見ヲ一人ノ親シキ友ニ洩ラシテ非常ノ失敗ヲ顧
 シタコトガアリマス。確カニ其ノ友人ガ世間ニ發
 表シタ様ニ見エマスガ其ノ結果種々ノ風潮ガ宣傳
 サレ然モ自分ハ外務大臣トシテ其風説ニ極力反對
 セナケレバナリマセンデシタ。尤モ普通ハ自分ハ
 常ニ眞實ノ事ヲ申シマスガ、斯ル事情ノ許ニ今回
 斯デ討議セル問題ヲドレ程早ク日本總理大臣又ハ
 陛下ニ報告シ得ルカハ斷言シ得ザル所デアリマス。
 先第一ニ日本ニ於ケル狀勢ノ推移ヲ明確ニ且ツ注
 意深ク研究セザルヲ得マセン然ル後好機會ヲ捕ヘ
 テ最後ノ決心ヲナシ近衛公及天皇陛下ニ彼ノ妥當
 ナル計畫ヲ白狀セナケレバナリマセン。其ノ時コ
 ソハ御互ノ最後ノ決定ハ數日ノ間ニ行ハナケレバ
 イケマセンナレバ然ラザル限り計畫ハ人々ノ
 批判ノ中ニ葬リ去ラル、恐レガアリマスカラ。
 若シ彼松岡ガ彼ノ企圖ヲ實行スル事ニ失敗スル

ナラバソハ彼ガ勢力、説得力及び外交的手腕ニ於テ缺クル所多キ證據デアリマス。幸ニシテ彼ガ成功スルナラバソレハ彼ガ日本ニ於テ相當ノ勢力ヲ保持セル事ヲ證明スルコトニナリマス、彼自身トシテハ必ズヤ成功スルナラント確信ヲ持ツテ居リマス。

彼ガ歸朝ノ上質問サル、ナラバ彼ハ陛下、總理大臣、陸海軍大臣方ニ實際新嘉坡ノ事ガ論議サレタ事ヲ認メル積リデアリマス然シソハ單ニ假想上ノ根據デアツタト申シマス

此ノ外松岡氏ハ新嘉坡ノ問題ニ關シテハ決シテ電報ヲ打タザル様明確ナル要請ヲナシマシタ何故ナレバ電報ニ依ルト事件ノ洩ル、恐ガ多分ニ有ルトノ強キ理由ヲ持ツテ居ルノデ若シ必要ナラバ彼ハ特使ヲ派スルト言ヒマシタ。

其所デ總統ハ贊成シ而シテ彼ハ獨逸人ノ沈黙ニ全々信頼シ得ル事ヲ他ノ人々ニ代リテ松岡氏ニ保證ヲ與ヘマシタ。

松岡氏ハ答ヘテ言ヒマシタ彼ハ獨逸人ノ沈黙ヲ信ズルガ而シ不幸ニシテ同様ナル事ヲ日本ニ付イテ言ヒ難シト。

討議ハ遂ニ數言ノ個人的訣別ノ辭ヲ御互ニ述ヘテ終結ヲ告グルニ至レリ

柏林千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）四月四日、

署名 シミット