


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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVIV
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO 455
(Jap Intell No 30)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 27 Nov 8 29 1966

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSBS.

Subject: Activities of Naval Attache Staff, Washington,
Before Pearl Harbor Attack.

Person Interrogated and Background:

- Rear Admiral YOCUYAI A, Ichiro.
- Dec 1, 1930: Promoted to Lt. Comdr, Attached to the Navy Ministry (Bureau of Military Affairs).
- May 1, 1931: Language Officer in the U.S.
- May 2, 1932: Assistant Naval Attache to Washington
- Oct 1, 1933: Recalled to Japan
- Nov 16, 1933: Attached to the Navy Ministry (Bureau of Military Affairs).
- Nov 15, 1935: Promoted to Commander
- Dec 15, 1936: Staff Officer, of 5th Destroyer Squadron
- Aug 15, 1940: Attached to the Naval General Staff
- Sept 10, 1940: Naval Attache to Washington
- Nov 15, 1940: Promoted to Captain
- Aug 21, 1942: Returned to Japan by the exchange ship, the GRIPSHOLM.
- Aug 26, 1942: Attached to the Naval General Staff
- Nov 14, 1942: Captain of the "UIA" (light cruiser)
- Oct 5, 1943: Secretary to the Minister of the Navy
- May 1, 1945: Promoted to Rear Admiral
- May 20, 1945: Attached to the Naval General Staff
- Aug 14, 1945: Attached to the Navy Ministry


NOTE: Rear Admiral YOCUYAI A, first went to Washington in 1932 and again in 1940 and was included among the surrender Envoys to MANILA.

Where Interrogated: Meiji Building, Room 712

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACFELFORD

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY

Allied Officers Present: None.



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SUMMARY

Rear Admiral YOKOYAMA was the Naval Attache in Washington during the year preceding the Pearl Harbor attack and according to him his instructions from the Naval Ministry upon leaving Japan were to concentrate his attention upon preventing war with the UNITED STATES. In addition to working with the Ambassador toward this end, he and his two assistants performed the usual Japanese function of collecting what information they could from magazines, newspapers and other publications. Reports were made to the Naval General Staff not periodically, but when information warranted. On the subject of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the former Washington Attache said that it came to him as a surprise and that he had provided none of the information used in connection with the blow.

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Q.1. What were the most important sources of information and information-gathering agencies for military operational information, in the order of their importance.
a. before the war; b. after the war had started?

A. Speaking in terms of military intelligence, I feel that the primary thing is the future. You can employ spies and other various means, but one of our primary worries was that spies would turn counter-spy and be picked up by counter-intelligence. America being what it is with freedom of the press, etc., a great deal of material comes out in magazines and newspapers. By this method, we picked up much information. Accordingly, that is where I laid my primary stress.

Q.2. Would you say that applies equally to the periods prior to, and after the war started?

A. Before the war. I had no connection with the intelligence system after the war started because I came back by the exchange boat, the GRIPSEOLM.

Q.3. Were your Naval Attaches fairly effective in gathering military information before the war?

A. Before answering that question, I would like to explain that when I got my orders to leave for Washington, Admiral OIKAWA, then Navy Minister, informed me that "usually the job of naval attaches was to secure military information; that was their primary aim. However, the situation being what it is now, I want you to proceed on the basis that we are not aching to fight with America; we do not want to; we are not going to. I don't care anything about military information. What I want to get across is the fact that there will not be war between the U. S. and Japan." I left on the 4th of October 1940, after the Tri Partite Pact was signed. I understood Admiral NOMURA would probably become Ambassador to Washington, and I was to assist NOMURA to the greatest extent I could in aiding a peaceful solution. Admiral OIKAWA explained further that despite the signing of the pact, the American people feeling toward the Pact as they did, the situation was becoming worse. He wished me to help solve the matter in peace. As Naval Attache, I had permission to assist Admiral NOMURA to the full extent, regardless of gathering information. I did not attempt primarily to collect military intelligence. Accordingly I passed along information appearing in newspapers and magazines, but did not create any extra organizations aside from those that were already on hand.


Q.4. What was the size of your Naval Attache group in Washington at that time?

A. Two assistant Naval Attaches and about five secretaries.

Q.5. What were their primary duties?

A. To collect information from magazines and newspapers and to aid me in my primary task of helping the Japanese-American situation as much as possible.

Q.6. I understand that when you came back to Tokyo, not possibly immediately but later, you came into the position where you were in charge of Naval Attaches. I want to speak generally about Naval Attaches, not especially in Washington, but the general organization. What was the approximate size of the Imperial Japanese Navy Attache



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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd) ---

Corps before the war started? How many officers would have been assigned to that type of duty?

A. The position I had here as Secretary to the Minister of the Navy had no immediate connection with information-gathering from foreign sources. I think you are misunderstanding the position I was in.

Q.7. Do you know, from any sources, how many officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy were assigned attache duties before the war started?

A. I submitted a list of all naval attaches some time ago. I believe if you look over that list, you will find your information there.

Q.8. Do you know how, and by whom, attaches were selected and assigned?

A. The selection is made by the head of the Bureau of Personnel, but in consultation with whom, I do not necessarily know. He must certainly have discussed these with the Minister of the Navy and the Head of the Naval General Staff. To repeat, the selection is made by the Head of the Bureau of Personnel.

Q.9. To whom did you submit your reports when you were in Washington?

A. Usually, to the Head of the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff. Sometimes, to the deputy head of the Naval General Staff.

Q.10. Who issued instructions to you?

A. The Navy Minister and the Head of the Naval General Staff.

Q.11. Did naval attaches have any special training before they left for their foreign posts?

A. No.

Q.12. When you say there were no instructions given, am I to understand that there was no indoctrination of any kind or any short course as to what might be expected and desired of them?

A. Prior to leaving, they were attached to the Naval General Staff and given a desk in the 3rd Section. At that time, they have an opportunity to look over the files and brush up on the general situation in the country to which they are to be assigned.

Q.13. What routine reports were required of you while you were naval attache to Washington?


A. None.

Q.14. Did you report whenever you considered it necessary?

A. Yes, whenever I wanted to report, I did. There were no periodical reports.

Q.15. What type of thing did you report?

A. My principal mission was to assist Admiral NOMURA in



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Interrogation of R. Adm. YONOCYAMA, IJN, (contd)

the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the difficulties between our two countries.

Q.16. Did you report from time to time on the progress of that?

A. The main issue was dispatched by Admiral NOSHURA. I reported the general trend, especially its important aspects, making some suggestions. In line with my principal mission, given to me by Admiral OICAWA, I was in favor from the beginning of commencing negotiations as soon as possible. I dispatched reports to that end to the Navy in Tokyo, suggesting they get conferees over as soon as possible. Reports aside from those I have mentioned were mostly factual information which appeared in periodicals and newspapers.

Q.17. Were any other reports, centering interest in these other sources of information, made by the Naval Attache's Staff in addition to your own reports?

A. Everything went through me; no other reports were made by others.

Q.18. Did you, as a matter of policy, include in your reports findings of your two assistants and other members of your staff from newspapers, magazines, etc.?

A. Yes.

Q.19. Would the ambassador send your reports directly to the Naval General Staff or to the Naval Minister?

A. I had a direct line to the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. I did not have to go through the ambassador.

Q.20. You would send all your reports directly, and never by the ambassador?

A. I did not believe there were any reports that were of sufficient importance to go through Admiral NOSHURA's hands.

Q.21. In the light of your own career as a naval officer, would you consider that you sent back to Tokyo, from Washington, any information that was of particular military value?

A. I believe I submitted the most important report after coming back to Tokyo. In it, I stated that the Japanese Government and people were too confident of victory. I knew the vast capacity of American production, the Navy and Air Force. I expected a severe counter-attack was imminent and I warned Japan's officers of this.

Q.22. How was this report received in the "higher councils" here in Tokyo?

A. Anybody could see it. It was not a special report. Naturally, however, I had to report to the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. They could take that material as they wished. I do not know how they disseminated my report.

Q.23. Wasn't it a rather unpopular sort of report?

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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd).

A. Yes, I believe so. But I knew America as I had spent some time there.

Q.24. When did you learn of the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. After the operation had been executed, from American radio broadcasts. It was a complete surprise to me.

Q.25. With regard to the wider and more general field of naval attaches and the gathering of information, did you feel that naval attaches were able to gather much militarily important information before the war?

A. I am not qualified to answer that because I was only conversant with Washington and how it worked there. I believe it was really inadequate, the quality of information that was received from abroad.

Q.26. Were there any particular reasons why it was inadequate?

A. In Washington, I believe it was inadequate. Our primary mission was to avert war. If we had attempted to gather military information, we could have done more, but our primary concern was to avert war, and most of our efforts were in that direction.

Q.27. At what time did you feel that war with the U.S. was inevitable?

A. I never dreamed that the Japanese would strike America first. I thought that as negotiations broke down something might happen in SIAI or possibly in the PHILIPPINES or MALAYA, but I never believed "they" would make such an attack. Until Secretary of State HULL's message of 26 November, I felt quite hopeful.

Q.28. Did you believe there was a chance of averting war until the time of this message?

A. If I were premier, I could have done that. I was helpless as a naval attache.

Q.29. Did you feel that the situation could have been saved and that war was an unwise move for Japan?

A. If both countries had considered the situation very coolly, I believed the war could have been prevented.

Q.30. Looking back on your experience in Washington, what did you consider the outstanding causes or issues which precipitated the war? What were the issues that could not be settled?


A. The China problem was the most difficult. Free trade and other difficult points also contributed, but I felt they could be solved.

Q.31. What concessions by the U.S. at that time did you feel might have averted war? Did you have any specific instructions? Your primary mission was to assist in these negotiations. Were you being instructed from Tokyo?

A. The ambassador was instructed by the foreign minister, and he asked my opinion, and I assisted him.

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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd)

Q.32. What concessions on the part of the U.S. might have saved the situation?

A. Compromises regarding the China program.

Q.33. What would that involve?

A. As President Roosevelt told Admiral NOJIMA, the president would become the intermediary in the negotiations between China and Japan.

Q.34. Did you have Lt. Comdr. TANAMOTO in your office in Washington?

A. He was there with me in 1933, when I was assistant naval attache.

Q.35. Did he remain in Washington after you left?

A. I believe so.

Q.36. You know Lt. Comdr. TANAMOTO?

A. Yes. He died.

Q.37. Do you know when he left Washington?

A. I do not remember.

Q.38. Well, when was it approximately? Was it 1933? 1939? Later than that?

A. I do not know when he came back to Japan.

Q.39. He is the officer who briefed the Pearl Harbor striking force at "TAMAN BAY" before the attack. Where did he get his information?

A. I do not know anything about that.


Q.40. Did Lt. Comdr. TANAMOTO spend several years in Washington?

A. I do not believe so.

Q.41. Looking back on your experiences in the U.S., particularly to the moment you heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you think Japan had a fair chance of winning a war with the U.S.

A. The attack was quite a shock to me. I did not consider whether it was a "winning" or "losing" war. My principal concern was with regard to my position. I was not familiar with the situation in the home front at all. Accordingly, I did not attempt to estimate the Japanese Government's confidence. As the war progressed successfully for the Japanese, after two or three months, I felt a little optimistic. According to my conclusions, however, Japan had no way to reach "Washington" and destroy all American fighting power. I felt Japan might not lose the war, but she could not win the war, resulting perhaps in a negotiated peace.

Q.42. Recalling specifically your experiences in Washington up to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, did you feel that you might have carried on your work had the strike on Pearl Harbor not been made?



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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd).

A. I did not know the real situation in Japan, so my judgment may be a little defective, but, considering my mission, it was my desire to continue negotiations despite the attack.

Q.43. You felt that there might have been some hope in carrying on negotiations?

A. Yes, if Japan would make great concessions and request the U.S. to make concessions - give and take. Then, we could save the situation.

Q.44. What battles or action did you see, if any when you were Commanding Officer of the "IUA".

A. I transported military regiments to RABAU. On my way back, a submarine torpedo was fired at my ship, but I made a good evasion and slipped away. It was dark night and raining, and I couldn't see the submarine at all. After that, I was bombed by 16 B-24s at CILABES, "AGASSAR". There were no direct hits.

Q.45. How high were the B-24s at that time?

A. About 4,000 metres.

Q.46. What was the approximate date of this attack?

A. May 26, 1943.

Q.47. What was your particular assignment when you were attached to the Naval General Staff in May 1945?

A. Nothing. I was on the waiting list and I had a lot of free time. I had no specific duties with the Naval General Staff.

Q.48. In August you were attached to the Navy Ministry. What was your particular assignment there?

A. I was involved with the ending of hostilities. I was sent to MANILA, to YOKOSUKA to see Adm. SPURANCE, to see Gen. SUTHERLAND in YOKAHAMA.

Q.49. During your naval career, have you had any particular connection with naval intelligence or information systems other than attache duties?

A. No.

Q.50. Did you get any preliminary information that led you to suspect the submarine or B-24 attack previously mentioned?

A. It was a surprise.


Q.51. ~~When~~ Commanding Officer of the "IUA", were you provided with any estimates as to the number and location of submarines in your areas of operation?

A. "I got information that such and such was torpedoed in a certain place, that there were so many enemy planes thought to be in an area and that sort of thing".

Q.52. Where did you get that sort of information?

A. From the 2nd Southwestern Area Fleet.

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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOSHIZAWA, IJN, (contd).

Q.53. Were you in any further action after the B-24 attack?

A. One of the ships, the cruiser FINU, suffered a near hit and my ship convoyed her.

Q.54. What was the nature of these missions at that time?

A. Transporting men and materiel.

Q.55. While assigned in Tokyo, while it was not your job to analyze the reports that came in from the attaches, did you read over those reports from time to time?

A. The senior secretary to the Minister of the Navy was very busy, and I didn't have enough time to read over all detailed reports. I merely initialed papers and rushed them through.

Q.56. You didn't read even sample reports?

A. They came in large numbers, and were usually unimportant. I had to sign all papers which were issued from the Navy Department to the Navy, which involved considerable work, so I didn't pay much attention to the attache reports.

Q.57. On your ship, who did the intelligence work?

A. There was no intelligence officer.

Q.58. Did anyone assume intelligence duties as extra duties?

A. A staff officer of the fleet was in charge of the information work, but there was no special intelligence officer on each ship.

Q.59. What were the primary duties of this staff officer who also handled these intelligence duties?

A. Staff torpedo officer.

Q.60. What was the particular nature of those reports from the 3rd Department?

A. They were so comprehensive, I cannot pick out a particular portion of it. Generally they consisted of military information, judgement of situations, organization and location of enemy forces.

Q.61. Were they quite voluminous?

A. Yes, and when they came in, they were in large amounts.

Q.62. Was Admiral ONO or Admiral NAKASE head of the 3rd Department at that time?

A. Admiral NAKASE.

Q.63. Did he visit the Navy Minister very often?

A. No.

Q.64. The information for the Pearl Harbor attack was very specific and complete. Have you any idea as to where and how that information was collected and compiled?

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Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd)

A. I believe that was the duty of the Naval General Staff.

Q.65. From August 1941 until December 7, 1941, were you called upon for any particular reports or unusual information, specifically, requests such as to the whereabouts, size, ability, intentions, etc. of the U.S. fleet?


A. I do not recall.

Q.66. If there had been such, do you think you would have recalled it? Were you asked for specific information very frequently?

A. No, not particularly.

Q.67. Any further information on the Attack at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I have nothing further to add.



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