

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - RESTRICTED -
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 341

PLACE: Fukuoka, Kyushu
DATE: 31 Oct 45

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Subject: Japanese Army Aircraft Allotments.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt Col FUJII, Kazumi - Not a pilot; graduated from the Military Academy in 1933; Staff Officer, Manchurian Air Force 1941 - Jan 1942; Staff Officer Northern Area Army Jan to Oct 42; Staff Officer Kiska Garrison Oct 42 - Aug 43; Staff Officer Northern Area Army (Hokkaido) Aug - Oct 43; Staff Officer in Supplies at Air Hq (Koku Hombu) Oct 43 - Aug 45; Staff Officer Sixth Air Army for Supplies, Line of Communications and Maintenance since 5 Aug 45.

Where interviewed: Fukuoka Base Command, Fukuoka, Kyushu.

Interrogator: S/Ldr E. Warwick Bloxham, (RAF) MI

Interpreter: Capt Dow Parkes, MI

Allied Officers Present: 1 Lt Donald Meiklejohn, MI

SUMMARY:

Basis and procedure of monthly aircraft allotment; ferrying procedure and losses; monthly allotment figures by plane types Sept 44 to July 45; maintenance personnel; employment of gliders.



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Interrogation

Q. What supplies did your office handle in Air Hq (Koku Hombu)?
A. Aircraft.

Q. How were aircraft requisitioned by the Air Armies and Flying Divisions?

A. Requests were initiated by the Flying Divisions and sent through the Air Armies.

Q. What was your role in making the allotments?

A. My office allotted planes to the Air Armies, which in turn made allotments to their Flying Divisions; the planes actually were flown directly to the Flying Divisions.

Q. Did you tell each Air Army how many planes it was to have?

A. Yes; Air Hq had a monthly plan which tentatively allotted each Air Army a certain number of planes.

Q. Does that mean that monthly production was the basis of allotment?

A. Yes; the requests submitted by the Air Armies were not the primary determining factor.

Q. Were all the aircraft produced each month allotted at once or was a certain percentage of production held in reserve?

A. All planes in serviceable condition were allotted at once, and only obsolescent aircraft were held in reserve -- this was the condition at the start of the war. By the end of the war no planes at all were being held in reserve.

Q. What do you mean by obsolescent planes?

A. Planes which, although individually unused, were of a type not then in use.

Q. Can you give an example?

A. The light bombers KI-43 and KI-45; these obsolescent types were brought out and used in units, including suicide units, after April 1944.

Q. When were these obsolescent types used up?

A. By October 1944; after that there was no reserve at Koku Hombu. However, there may have been reserves at FAs and FDs. Some obsolescent planes were in use until the end of the war.

Q. What particular factors determined your office in making monthly allotments?

A. Reports of the condition of each unit, which would serve to determine how the requests of the various units should be weighed.

Q. Then the allotments were based on prospective FA operations?

A. Yes, the current condition of the unit and its prospective operations carried the most weight.

Q. Did your office have to do only with allotments or also with ferrying planes to units?

A. We issued allotment orders to depots, and at the same time we sent a copy of the order to the transport units for ferrying. The

ferrying was the direct responsibility of the transport commander and only indirectly our responsibility. We also studied production trends in connection with allotments.

Q. Did you make up the ferry schedule, or did the Koku Yusobu (Air Transport Depot)?

A. The Yusobu.

Q. How many aircraft were allotted monthly to the FAs?

A. I do not recall detailed figures; all available figures are missing and any relevant information is in Tokyo. I will guess at the figures, however, as follows:

Sept 44	1200 to 1300 (all types, some going to schools)
Oct	1200 to 1300
Nov	1200 (about)
Dec	900 (about)
Jan 45	800
Feb	450 (tentative)
Mar	500
Apr	500
May	400
Jun	350
Jul	300

Q. What caused the decline in planes available for allotments?

A. The bombing of factories was the main factor.

Q. Were there raw material shortages?

A. I can not answer that as well as the Military Supply Depots. I don't think myself that raw materials were much of a problem. The bombing was the main trouble, because of its effect (i) on transportation, (ii) in forcing dispersal and (iii) causing workers' absenteeism.

Q. Can you break down allotments by trainers and operational planes?

A. The following table may not be exact, but it is approximate:

	Total	Fighters	Bombers	Recce	Tnrs, etc.
Sep44	1230	850	100	80	200
Oct	1230	850	100	80	200
Nov	1230	850	100	80	200
Dec	900	650	80	70	100
Jan 45	800	600	50	50	100
Feb	450	350	30	20	50
Mar	500	400	30	20	50
Apr	500	380	50	20	50
May	450	340	50	10	50
Jun	350	260	40	10	40
Jul	300	220	30	10	40

Q. Were you in charge of supplies?

A. No, just a member of the staff. Maj Gen Harada was in charge and was succeeded by Kawashima and then by Matsuzawa.

Q. Did you handle anything besides planes?

A. No.

Q. How many planes were lost in ferrying?

A. 20% on the average, including those damaged. The figure varied from 30% to 10%.

Q. Where did most of the losses occur?

A. Over water, because of navigation difficulties and bad weather.

Q. How was the 20% divided between damage and loss?

A. About 50-50; half of those damaged were repairable and the rest were lost. Some losses were caused by Allied action.

Q. What was the quality of the pilots in the ferry command?

A. Not the cream of the pilots; some of the pilots were civilians and were better than the Army pilots.

Q. What was the relation between production and allotment figures?

A. They were approximately the same thing (further questions failed to change this answer).

Q. When you went to 6 FA, what was its condition?

A. It was not good, but improved rapidly.

Q. What particular problems did you find?

A. There was a lack of skilled technicians - all the skilled personnel were left in SWPA and the Philippines. We had to employ civilians.

Q. What was the maximum glider allotment a month?

A. 50

Q. Were gliders ever used to ferry freight or men?

A. Yes, both - as far as Manila, under tow by heavy bombers. One bomber towed one glider, and the use of one bomber to more than one glider was being experimented on. The gliders mainly used were the KU-3 and KU-7.

Q. Did you stop making gliders before the end of the war?

A. No, but production had fallen off.

Q. Where were they made?

A. At Hirasuka, near Kawasaki, and at Tottori.

Q. Did your allotment table include Manchuria?

A. Yes; there were produced there a maximum of 60 a month, and an average of 30, with a minimum of 10. There were KI-79, a few KI-84 and (in 1943-44) KI-49.

End of Interrogation