

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 402.

(Japanese Intell. No. 35)

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 21 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject; Intelligence Organization and Procedure, Japanese Army.

Person interrogated and background:

SUGITA, Kazuji, Col.

1920-1922 Military Preparatory College.
1922 For 6 months attached to 37th Unit OSAKA.
1922-1924 Military Academy--graduated a 2nd Lt.
1928-1931 Staff College(as 1st Lt)
1932-1936 General Staff, 2nd Department.
1937-1938 In America as exchange officer.(spent 5 months
with 26th Infantry at Plattsburg)
1938-1939 Traveled through England, Germany, Poland
and the Balkans.(on War Department orders)
1939-1940 General Staff, 2nd Section.
1940 Traveled in U.S., Mexico, Canada. (on War Department
Orders)
1941 Staff Officer with 15th Army, French Indo China.
1942(April) Returned to General Staff.
1942(September) To Rabaul, as Liaison Officer,(2 months
at Guadalcanal with 17th Army)
1942(November) Staff Officer with newly organized 8th
Area Army.
1943(May) Returned to General Staff, 2nd Department,
6th Section.
1945(August) Ordered to Korea as staff officer.(returned
to Japan 3 days after surrender)

Where interviewed: Meiji building.

Interrogator: Major R.S. Spilman, AC.
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR.

Interpreter: Major J.C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

NOTE: Col. SUGITA spoke fairly good english. He was
cooperative and the information is believed to
be entirely reliable.

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Transcript of Interrogation: SUGITA, K. Col.)

SUMMARY:

The Headquarters Organization in the Area Army at the beginning of the war, consisted of the Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff and deputy, over 2 sections:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) G-1 (Rank of Colonel) | (2) G-2 (Rank of Colonel) |
| (a) Operations(2 officers) | (1)Transportation(1 officer) |
| (b) Intelligence(1 officer) | (2)Supply (1 officer) |
| (c) Personnel(1 officer) | (3)Communications(1officer) |

The entire staff included 10 to 12 officers. A similar organization may exist in a large army (GUN) but all functions are usually combined into a single section. As the war progressed an attempt to increase the number of junior officers (and NCO's) assigned to intelligence was only partially successful due to the shortage of staff officers. By the end of the war, however, all Divisions and most Regiments were assigned an Intelligence Officer or NCO.

Before 1943 Area Army Intelligence in the Solomons was poor and inadequate for operations. The only sources of information were the Navy, which had the only planes in the area and infrequent reports from infantry units. According to Col. SUGITA there was a lack of coordination within the Army, a lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy and a general deficiency of knowledge of modern methods of warfare.

Prisoners captured at Guadalcanal were few and those taken on New Gineau only 2 filtered back to the Area Army at RABAU. An order from the Area Army to forward all captured documents was ignored by troops in the field. The small amount of equipment captured was not sent back to TOKYO for research due to a shortage of transport facilities. No special communications intercept unit was attached to the Area Army.

Aerial photography, after an army air division had arrived in 1943, was confined almost entirely to mapping. A little interpretation was done by officers not specially trained for it. Observation posts and natives supplied some information as to air attacks and movement of troops. No TOKUMU KIKAN unit was attached to the Area Army at RABAU. A KEMPEI TAI Unit of about 100 men was used to police natives and did not contribute operational information.

A consolidated report was distributed to both higher and subordinate commands at regular 10 day intervals.

When Col. SUGITA was in the 6th Section (1943), it was the largest in the 2nd Division having 20 to 30 officers. The Russian Section was a close second.

Q. Were you chief of the 6th Section, charged with U.S. Intelligence for the General Staff in 1943.


A. No. Col. YAMAMOTO was chief. I succeeded him after 6 months and was chief for 5 months.

Q. In the Japanese Army what is your definition of intelligence (JOHO)?

A. JOHO means evaluation of information. Agencies collecting special types of intelligence are CHOHO (communications), SENDEN (propaganda) and BORIAKU (agents). Liaison must be close throughout these branches. This division is actually followed in the General Staff.

Q. Was an intelligence section set up in at KOMEN GUN (Area Army) in the field?

A.



Q. Below the Area Army is there a similar organization?

A. No. In the GUN (Army) there is only 1 Section combining Intelligence, Operations, Communications and Supply. An especially large Gun might have both sections.

Q. Was the staff organization of the Gun designated by the Area Army or from Tokyo?

A. From Tokyo.

Q. What was the Division(SHIDAN) organization?

A. A Chief of Staff.(Col. or Lt. Col.)
 1 Operations officer.
 1 Intelligence officer.
 1 Supply officer.

This was the set up at the beginning of the war. Later, when Staff Officers became scarce sections were consolidated. In the 17th Army at Guadalcanal there were 3 junior officers in intelligence. In 8th Army Headquarters at RABAU there were 5 or 6. This was finally increased to 10 at my request.

Q. Is the Division Intelligence Officer assigned by the Area Army?

A. He is assigned by the Division Commander, but the Table of Organization is set up in TOKYO.

Q. Are there Intelligence Officers in units below the Division, e.g., a Regiment?

A. At the beginning of the war there were not. Sometimes even the Division lacked one even though one was called for in the table of organization. This was due to the success in CHINA and the ease with which information was acquired there. Toward the end of the war Intelligence Officers or Non-Commissioned Officers were assigned to Regiments and sometimes to Battalions. The 8th Area Army was assigned 5 to 10 Non-Commissioned Officers for intelligence work in the later stages of the war.

Q. In the 8th Area Army, what were your duties?

A. I was at first with the 2nd Division and had great difficulty getting information about your forces at GUADALCANAL from the 17th Army Headquarters at RABAU. So I established liaison with the Navy which had planes and fleet units operating in that area. The Army had only radios, some information from natives and a little from prisoners of war. I interrogated a few.

Q. Did you capture any documents of value?

A. Very few. Some officers were returned to RABAU from GUADALCANAL, to recover from illness and gave us a little about tactics.

Q. Did you have instructions as to the handling of prisoners and documents?

A. Troops were supposed to send documents to Headquarters but it was difficult. They were more interested in carrying food. Headquarters issued orders but the troops didn't carry them out.

Q. What were your duties at Guadalcanal?

A. I went there with 17th Army Headquarters as liaison officer. My main purpose was to acquire information as to the numbers of your divisions and general strength. We got a little from documents and more from break through of our 2nd Division on 14 October.

Q. Were any prisoners taken from the infantry?

A. I don't know. Some aviators were captured.

Q. What other methods did you use to get information?

A. We set up an observation post on the mountains to count planes on the field and the number taking off. In general our information was very poor due to the lack of aircraft, lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy, lack of coordination within the Army itself with small isolated units scattered over the Pacific and a lack of knowledge of modern warfare and equipment.

Transcript of Interrogation:(SUGITA, K. Col.)

Q. How did you estimate the strength of the reinforcements we landed?

A. Our information was poor. Observation posts saw a little; reconnaissance aircraft from Shortlands scouted the area and landed at Rennel Island. We estimated also from the number of ships that arrived.

Q. What information did you obtain from wire tapping or radio intercept?

A. Not very much. In RABAU we intercepted and understood some of the reports of your planes to base.

Q. Did you get advance warning of air attacks on RABAU through radio interception?

A. No. An observation post at the tip of the island was able to warn us by radio 10 to 15 minutes prior to an attack?

Q. Was there radar warning?

A. I'm not sure. None that was effective.

Q. Was captured equipment examined and were reports made?

A. Very little equipment was captured and that came under the Supply Section. I don't think it was sent back to TOKYO. The only transportation was by air and space was limited. Some captured documents may have been sent back. I didn't send any.

Q. What information did the 8th Area Army receive from higher headquarters?

A. Most was the general situation at home, in Europe and America. A little on American tactics but we already had the best information on that.

Q. What reports did you send up?

A. After the 8th Area Army was organized (26 Nov. 1942) we sent up, through the Chief of Staff, to Headquarters, information about U.S. forces on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, data on your air attacks. These went out by radio, daily; no written reports. I tried to get more information about your ships, airdromes and aircraft from subordinate units but they failed to make reports.

Q. To what extent did you take aerial photos?

A. Only the Navy had planes in the area until 1943. After that we took photos mainly for mapping purposes since we had no maps of the SOLOMONS or EASTERN NEW GUINEA. Reports were made through the 8th Army to the 6th Area Division which filled them if they could. Some pictures were taken of ground units but they were not satisfactory.

Q. What interpretation was made?

A. This was done at 6th Division Headquarters by officers who had no special training. Changes appearing since previous photos were annotated. Interpretation of infantry positions was not very useful.

Transcript of Interrogation: (SUGITA, K.Col.)

Q. What information did you attempt to get from prisoner interrogation?

A. About 3 English speaking civilians were attached. We wanted the number of regiments, dates of arrival, ship movements, aircraft movements and the situation in America (or Australia) or New Zealand).

Q. What prisoners were taken?

A. Most were Australian pilots from New Guinea, captured at New Britain. Only 1 or 2 infantrymen were sent back to RABAUL and I did not see them.

Q. What information did you get from natives?

A. Natives came to Rabaul from Buna and Bougainville by canoe with information about your coastwatchers and parachute troops. Natives were friendly until we evacuated Guadalcanal and Buna then they became unfriendly. Those on New Britain remained friendly.

Q. Did you keep a situation map?

A. Yes, showing daily changes in the front lines. We summarized the enemy situation every 19 days and sent a written report to higher headquarters and to units under us. If there were great changes we made special radio reports. Sometimes estimates of the situation were made by conference of the staff or by the Intelligence Officer alone. They were usually accepted.

Q. What communications intelligence did you have in the 8th Area Army?

A. There was no special unit but some monitoring was done.

Q. Did you have a TOKUMU KIKAN Unit at RABAUL?

A. No.

Q. Did you have a KEMPEI TAI?

A. Yes - about 100 at RABAUL.

Q. Did they acquire Combat Intelligence?

A. No. They obtained information about natives, whether they were friendly or not. They were in uniform. A small unit was attached to the 17th Army but not to units below that.

Q. In what areas were TOKUMU KIKAN Units operating?

A. In CHINA and MANCHUKUO but none in the Pacific.

Q. What were relations between KEMPEI TAI and Army Intelligence?

A. We had a daily conference which included both units and Navy representatives and either commands present.

Transcript of Interrogation: (SUGITA, K. Col.)

Q. Did you send out technical intelligence information to the field?

A. Yes - what little we had about heavy equipment, bulldozers, large tanks and gun calibres. These reports were sent out once or twice a month to all armies.

Q. What else did these regular reports contain?

A. The enemy situation, friendly situation, location of ground and air units, the general situation and predicted enemy movements.

Q. How many were in the 6th Section?

A. About 20 officers at the start of the war and about 30 at the end, very few enlisted men.

Q. Was this section divided into sub-sections?

A. Yes but it changed frequently. When I was there, there were:

- (1) American Section.
- (2) British Section.
- (3) General War Situation Section.
- (4) Northern, Central and Southwest Pacific.
- (5) A special Air Section (part of the time).

Q. Was the 6th Section the largest in the 2nd Division?

A. The Russian Section was nearly as large. Many of our officers had studied in Europe but few in America. Our American Section was relatively poor.