

**AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE
KINGDOM AND REPUBLIC OF GREECE
(1967-1973)**

RICHARD L. SHURTS

1974

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TOWARDS
THE KINGDOM AND REPUBLIC OF GREECE
(1967-1973)

by

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Greece lies at the focal point of the Mediterranean world, which is itself the area of overlap between Europe, Asia and Africa. Focus is a useful metaphor, for a focus can be either a source of heat and light or a point on which rays converge: and Greece has been both.

C. M. Woodhouse
The Story of Modern Greece

Relations between the United States and Greece during the period 1967 through 1973 provide an interesting opportunity for an analysis of the various factors influencing the policy formation process between friendly nation states. During this time the government of Greece had been radically altered, and the United States was in the process of re-formulating and defending its resultant policy towards the newly-installed government. This period of Greek/American relations can be characterized as highly unstable, as the policies of the two countries were subject to strong pressures from sources external to, as well as within, each state.

The main areas of criticism were focused on the manner and form of the Greek government that emerged after the April 21st coup d'etat and the characteristics and motives of American policy towards the ruling military junta. Serious charges have been levied against the United States regarding suspected American participation in the coup, ranging from knowledge, encouragement, and condonement of the overthrow to active participation in

the planning and execution of the takeover.¹ While mention of these criticisms will be made, a thorough evaluation of the validity of these charges is considered beyond the scope and intent of this study.

Although it is recognized that foreign policy cannot be viewed as operating exclusively on a bilateral basis, for purposes of this discussion, the emphasis will be placed on events occurring within each state and on the international level that have a direct effect on the relations between the two states.

The Greek question has proven to be an extremely emotional issue. Although modern Greek history has been largely characterized by unstable political systems, including powerful as well as weak monarchs, periodic military takeovers, dictatorships and civil war, she is rightly held in esteem by westerners as the symbol of individual human rights and the democratic tradition. Greece is, if not in form and practice at least in spirit and history, the "cradle of democracy." The imposition of authoritarian government and the reported excesses

¹ Examples of charges of varying intensities include: Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (Garden City, 1970); Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (Baltimore, 1969); Margaret Papandreou, Nightmare in Athens (Englewood Cliffs, 1970); a column of Marquis Childs quoted in Democracy at Gunpoint and originally appearing in the Washington Post; and the remarks of Representative Don Edwards (Calif.) appearing in the Congressional Record, August 31, 1967, page 24895.

during its establishment in power evoked genuine sympathy in western circles, and emotion played a significant role in policies proposed in opposition to the Greek government in power.

Largely dependent upon American support, particularly military aid, the Greek situation raises questions as to American motives in providing this type of assistance. Perhaps more crucial to American foreign policy in general, how much can, or should, the United States influence other sovereign states in their own domestic affairs? And using the case of Greece's association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an example, how much effect does one state's internal policies have on the efficacy of external alliance systems? The latter question has obtained currency through frequent proposals to eject Greece from NATO for violation of principles of democracy contained within the organization's charter.²

Greek opposition leaders have been particularly vocal and effective in pointing out in all available forums the

² Recent proposals can be found in the testimony of Representative Donald M. Fraser (Minn.) and that of Helen Vlachos before the House Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings on Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy (hereafter referred to as Hearings; Greece and Spain), (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pages 58-59 and 354-355 respectively.

moral, political, military and legal reasons the United States should take overt action against the Greek government. However, these efforts have not resulted in definitive actions by the United States, rather the American government's official position has been explained in terms of a dilemma. On one hand agreeing with the necessity for Greece to return to democratic processes while asserting that the best way to accomplish this return is through working with the government in power and urging them back to representative government. In this manner, strategic security interests can be protected during this transition phase.³

Because of the many and varied influences on the formation of American foreign policy and the numerous events concerning Greek/American relations during this period, a brief background discussion and chronology are considered necessary for the later analysis. Due to space limitations, the chronology will cover only major domestic and foreign events that have significant effect on the bilateral situation.

³ Perhaps the clearest statement of American policy is to be found in Current Foreign Policy, "Greece: U. S. Policy Dilemma," U. S. Department of State Publication 8604 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

Background

Modern relations between the United States and Greece can be conveniently dated from the withdrawal of German troops from Greece in 1944 and the subsequent civil war between the royalist and the communist resistance groups.

During this period, western support was given to the Greek monarchy in exile in London while on-scene assistance was given to the pro-monarchy factions by the British Army of Occupation, the main allied military force present in Greece. Through active British assistance, the leftist National Liberation Front, the EAM, and its armed counterpart, the ELAS, had been subdued, and a coalition government had been formed under the leadership of George Papandreou. Following attempts to disarm the ELAS, the six EAM ministers resigned from the government and called a general strike. This action led to increased tensions and the eventual outbreak of civil war on December 4, 1944.⁴

With increased British assistance, the rebels were eventually put down and on February 12, 1945, a peace treaty was signed between warring factions at Varkiza.

⁴ For a discussion of these events as seen from the Greek viewpoint, see Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki, 1963) and "America, Britain and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXVIII, #4, December 1963.

The treaty called for the disarming of the ELAS, national elections, and a plebiscite to determine the status of the Greek monarchy. Although the peace treaty was signed, EAM and communist-led guerrilla activities continued throughout the countryside. In the general elections of March 1946, judged by 1500 American, British, French, and South African supervisors as a fair expression of opinion, the rightist faction captured a large majority in the Parliament and a September plebiscite recalled the Greek King to his throne.⁵

By the fall of 1946, increasing amounts of aid to the Greek rebels were provided by Greece's communist neighbors, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, thereby contributing to the increases in terror throughout the rural areas. The terror, in turn, swelled the numbers of refugees streaming towards the population centers, especially the Athens area. The large numbers of refugees added more stress to the already strained Greek economy.⁶ With the need to maintain a large military to oppose the communist forces in the north and a heretofore inability to effect a workable recovery plan from

⁵ For a further description of associated events during this period as seen and interpreted by an American observer, see Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955) especially pages 68-72.

⁶ Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, pages 73-74.

the destruction of World War II, the ability of the Greek government to withstand this latest challenge was in serious doubt. In February 1947 the British revealed to American officials their inability to uphold their military and economic commitments in providing support to the Greeks and with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States assumed an active role in the political and economic future of the Greek state.⁷

Prior to the April 1967 coup, United States' relations with Greece have, by and large, been relatively stable and generally have not been subject to large-scale controversy and criticism. Exceptions to this generalization have occurred during periods of Greek domestic crisis, when attention has been focused on the form and political orientation of the contesting Greek factions, and during periods of Greek and Turkish dispute over the Cyprus question.

American/Greek relations from the Truman Doctrine to the 1967 coup have been largely concerned with three long-range goals. First of all, the reconstruction of the Greek economy from the destruction of the wars and the subsequent development of the economy; secondly, the

⁷ For a thorough discussion of the formulation process of American foreign policy during this period, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969).

construction of a viable military force to ensure Greek territorial security and fulfill her assigned functions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and finally, the promotion of political stability within the Greek state in order to accomplish the first two goals in an efficient manner. It is in the achievement of this last goal that American means and motives have been most seriously questioned.

Economic Reconstruction and Developmental Assistance

American economic assistance was inaugurated with the report of the United States Economic Mission in February of 1947 and President Truman's approval of an initial sum of \$250 million in aid to Greece.⁸ Formally the Greek Charge d'Affaires and the Greek Embassy First Secretary were informed that:

President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall had decided to take measures . . . to strengthen and restore the economic position of Greece; to permit that country to meet its needs for relief and military supplies; and to make possible the execution of long-range programs that was expected to last for seven years. . . . The complete and sincere cooperation of the Greek Government was indispensable for the success of this undertaking. . . . This cooperation would rest on the assurance that the suggestions of the U. S. Government would be followed.⁹

From that time through 1966, the United States provided

⁸ Acheson, Present at the Creation, page 221.

⁹ Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pages 478-479.

Greece with \$3,750 million in aid, about equally divided between military and economic assistance. Of this total, \$3,411 million was in the form of direct grants and \$339 million in loans. Major economic aid was ended in 1964, while military aid continued. Military aid for fiscal year 1967 was approximately \$65 million.¹⁰ The administration of aid funds was directly controlled by the American Economic Mission, and through prior agreements, the Greek government was, in effect, required to obtain American approval before any major decision was adopted.¹¹ During the first phases of aid, this feature was accepted by most Greeks as a small price for survival, but as the aid program continued and the rebel threat diminished, it became a source of irritation.

The first phases of American aid were directed at the defeat of insurgent forces and immediate war relief. Advances in the economic sector were predominantly results of military spin-offs, e.g. repairs and improvements in the road system were necessary to support the military campaigns against the rebels.¹² By April of

¹⁰ J. P. C. Carey & A. G. Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, (New York, 1968) page 213.

¹¹ W. H. McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956, (New York, 1957) page 35.

¹² McNeill, American Aid in Action, page 50.

1948, Greece was included within the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of her economy, and American economic planners had set a target date of 1952 for the attainment of economic and social stability. In the Greek situation, this target proved to be unrealistic with the Civil War continuing until October of 1949. As a result, an attempt was made to cram four years of reconstruction into two and one-half years through substantial increases in the amounts of aid.¹³ The results were not as successful as desired.

Aid policies and programs were directed at sectors on a priority basis determined by the two governments. These sectors included the forced resettlement of refugees back to their home areas in order to get them off the swollen relief rolls (22% of all Greek governmental expenditures in 1949 went into relief measures); transportation; agricultural improvements and reform; assistance to industry through a Central Loan Committee to encourage new development; and the attainment of pre-war industrial output levels.

The American efforts in these sectors, especially the first three, were, by and large, successful. However, in the arena of fiscal and government administra-

¹³ Ibid., page 48.

tive reform, cooperation was lacking and measures were largely resisted by the Greeks. As pointed out by McNeill:

Greek politicians found no real need to do more than agree in words with American demands for economy and reorganization in government. So long as the Americans were prepared to pump hundreds of millions of dollars into the economy each year, why should the Greek government not run an unbalanced budget. . . .The Americans would have to make the deficits good; and if they complained. . .one could mollify them with promises for the future. Greeks were very much inclined to feel that the United States owed them a great debt of gratitude for having fought the guerrilla¹⁴ war and stopped the advance of Communism.

Partly as a response to observed attitudes similar to those quoted above, the United States became more concerned with the structure of Greek government and more overt in its attempts to influence governmental reforms and, if failing in these efforts, to work towards its replacement by a "more receptive" government. The expressions of these efforts were normally in the form of threats of reduction in American aid or statements by American representatives in Greece, criticizing Greek use or misuse of funds and statements critical to the political system, attempting to pressure the Greeks into making desired alterations. Perhaps the most striking example of this type of pressure is the statement by the late Ambassador John E. Peurifoy:

¹⁴ McNeill, American Aid in Action, page 61.

Because the American government believes that the reestablishment of the "simple proportional" election method, with its unavoidable consequences of the continuation of governmental instability, would have destructive results upon the effective utilization of American aid to Greece, the American Embassy feels itself obliged to make its support publicly known for the patriotic position of the Prime Minister plasteras with regard to this subject.¹⁵

Although there were recurring problems, such as income distribution and urban-rural mix, by 1964 the United States was sufficiently pleased with Greek economic recovery and stability and ended American economic assistance. The Greek economy had progressed from one of the lowest standards of living in Europe to the attainment of a fairly respectable per capita share of the Gross National Product of \$530 in 1966 and a steady growth rate of 8% per year.¹⁶

Greek/American Military Relations

In the discussion of American military assistance to Greece, the dual nature of the national and NATO-oriented relationships between the two countries can be most clearly seen. During the first stages of assistance, military aid was concerned with rebuilding

¹⁵ Public statement of Ambassador Peurifoy, published in the Greek newspaper Eleftheria, 15 March 1952 and quoted in T. A. Coulombis, Greek Political Reactions to American and NATO Influence (New Haven, 1966), page 54.

¹⁶ Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, pages 4 and 213-214.

and supplying the Greek military in order that they could effectively conduct a successful campaign against the rebel forces. Once survival was ensured, goals were re-oriented towards shaping Greek defenses into an efficient force for the resistance of external pressures from her Balkan neighbors and to assume a vital role within the defense fabric of the NATO mantle. Greece's strategic importance and her role within the organization will be discussed in a later section.

With the establishment of the American Military Mission in Greece during 1947, assistance took the form of supplying personnel to assist in training Greek forces as well as providing military hardware.¹⁷ As with any advisory program, close contacts were established between American and Greek officers and professional and personal relationships were developed. This type of working arrangement often results in criticism and speculation as to the "true role" of the advisors and the degree of political influence and control exerted by the American military. The Greek situation was no exception.¹⁸

In addition to the technical, professional and supply

¹⁷ McNeill, American Aid in Action, pages 38-47.

¹⁸ For two examples of this type of criticism and speculation, see A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, especially pages 70-73 and S. Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy (New York, 1967), especially pages 33-34.

fields, the American and Greek governments have concluded treaties regarding location of American bases and communications facilities on Greek soil as well as storage of naval supplies and weapon site determinations. These facilities include an Air Force Base at Athens, a communications station northeast of Athens at Marathon Bay and an Air Force station at Iraklion, Crete. NATO facilities that are available for American use include the naval facility at Souda Bay and a nearby missile firing installation on Crete.¹⁹

The Role of the United States in Promoting Greek Political Stability

The degree of American participation in the promotion and attainment of Greek political stability prior to the 1967 coup is extremely difficult to document and is largely a subjective evaluation. As previously indicated, stable, domestic, political conditions were considered an integral part of the effective utilization of American aid and as such, American officials were prone to asserting their views into the Greek domestic theater.

It must be admitted that at times the American Embassy exerted strong influence over Greek political affairs.

¹⁹ See the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Greece and Turkey (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings, Greece and Turkey (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 1803-1804.

Personal contacts and public statements by Ambassador Henry F. Grady and Ambassador Peurifoy (quoted earlier) were used in attempts to effect reforms of the Greek electoral system and promote what they believed to be a healthy political system. The morality and legality of such influences and pressures have been frequently challenged. For example, one author has characterized Ambassador Peurifoy as an almost sinister figure who was "the architect of the process of undermining the Liberals" through economic blackmail and open intervention.²⁰ It is perhaps an inevitable consequence that given the vast degree of military and economic aid provided by the United States and the active roles played by her representatives that the Greeks should view the United States as "big brother" and common attitudes develop in Greece that American influence is a "recognized institution" and that nothing happens on the Greek domestic scene without Washington's approval.²¹

This view tends to gain additional confirmation when the focus is widened to include Greek foreign policy, including her participation in NATO and America's position in the alliance. In addition, the interim solution of

²⁰ Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, pages 122-126.

²¹ Ibid., page 106.

the Cyprus dispute in 1958 giving Cyprus her independence, and the imposition of a United Nations peacekeeping force in 1964 are viewed by many Greeks as examples of the United States indirectly applying measures to stabilize the Greek/Turkish conflict to the detriment of Greece's best interests.²²

The events immediately preceding the April 21st coup are of singular importance in discussing American influence in and policy towards Greece. Extensive amounts of literature have been published concerning this period of Greek history, a considerable share written by those who were participants or close to those who were. As a result, the works are highly emotional and subjective in that they are either apologia or designed to evoke sympathy and/or support of a particular side to the controversy. It is largely within this framework that the majority of claims are voiced that the United States played a significant role in both furthering conditions conducive to a breakdown in the democratic process and direct support to both the "royal" and the "colonels" coups. Most critics that are members of this school claim that American representatives in Greece, as well as Johnson

²² For a wide variety of opinions by Greek military and political leaders regarding Greece's relations with the United States and NATO, see Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influence.

administration officials, wrongly believed that it was in America's best interests to oppose the Papandreou. They insist that the Center Union Party was the first truly effective democratic party in Greece, and their programs and policies were misinterpreted by the United States as threats that Greece would move away from the western bloc. In addition, they further state that because the United States misjudged the political ambitions and affiliations of Andreas Papandreou, they colluded with the rightist opposition in efforts to discredit him and his followers.²³

Because these charges naturally flow into alleged American complicity in the revolt, as well as providing a basis for continued support for the regime after the coup, a brief description of the Greek political crisis of 1964 to 1967 may assist in determining the factors that have influenced American foreign policy.

George Papandreou and the Center Union came into power in February of 1964 on the heels of a series of unsuccessful coalition governments that had resulted from an inconclusive 1963 general election. As the name indicates, the party drew its support from the center of the political spectrum and, although having numerous in-

²³ For example, see A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 212-236.

ternal factions, was held together by the figure of George Papandreou. Although the policies of Papandreou varied slightly from those of his right-wing predecessors, he did tend to favor less economic dependence on the United States, social and agricultural reforms of questionable fiscal responsibility, and a more independent role towards NATO. Regarding the latter policy, in 1965, with the increased possibility of war with Turkey over the Cyprus issue, Greek forces were withheld from NATO exercises thereby prompting additional speculation that Papandreou was opposed entirely to Greek association with the alliance.²⁴

Opposition from the right intensified with the Prime Minister's acceptance of an invitation to visit the Soviet Union and the revelation that his son, Andreas, was involved in awarding a large government research project to a close personal friend.²⁵ Pressure was applied by opposition leaders in the parliament, and the charges were countered by charges that it was the United States that was pressuring for Andreas' removal because they were afraid of his liberal tendencies. This incident revived dormant assertions that "the era when the Ameri-

²⁴ Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, page 187.

²⁵ Ibid., page 185 and Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, pages 196-197.

can Ambassador determined the formation of Greek cabinets has come back again."²⁶ Although Andreas Papandreu resigned his position in November of 1964, by April of the next year he was back in the government as his father's primary deputy and heir apparent to the aging Prime Minister's party leadership.

During his first ministerial appointment, Andreas had taken a fairly strong position regarding enosis (union) of Cyprus with Greece.²⁷ When he returned to the government, his main responsibilities lay in dealing with the Cyprus conflict. In his capacity of Deputy Minister for Co-ordination, he accompanied his father to Washington on invitation of President Johnson to discuss the Cyprus problem. As a result of the inability of the "little summit" to reach mutually acceptable positions, some observers date this event as the start of intensive activity by the CIA and the U. S. Military Mission in Greece to undermine and overthrow the Papandreu government.²⁸

²⁶ As stated in "The Events that paved the Way to a Dictatorship," The Greek Observer (London, 1970), June-July 1970, page 18.

²⁷ A. Papandreu, Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 129-132.

²⁸ Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, pages 189-190 and Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy, pages 25-35, both give heavy emphasis to the role played by the CIA in Greek affairs but fail to give reliable data or documentation to prove their claims.

On the other hand, opponents of Andreas point to his positions towards Cyprus and his visits there after his dismissal as the motive and the opportunity for him to organize the leftist Army organization ASPIDA in an attempt to overthrow the monarch and establish a "Nassarite" dictatorship with Andreas as its leader.

The political battles between the government and the opposition continued full force. Investigations were held into the administration of the previous conservative government, under Constantine Karamanlis, charging financial scandals and improprieties. The report on the Aspida plot (left wing) was published, and Papandreou forwarded it to the judiciary accompanied by a report on the "Pericles" plan (right wing) that charged election rigging in the 1961 elections. Papandreou ordered his Defense Minister to dismiss a list of high ranking officers; the Defense Minister refused; Papandreou dismissed him, but the Defense Minister refused to vacate his post.

At this point in time, recollections of the events become noticeably varied between observers and participants. During this phase, the political situation became increasingly complicated with the entrance of the monarch into the arena. With this event the conflict was broadened to include republican vs. monarchical is-

sues as well as left vs. center vs. right and government vs. opposition.

George Papandreou presented to King Constantine his list of Army officers to be dismissed and a proposal that Papandreou also assume the portfolio of Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister. Six days later Papandreou was summoned to the royal court, and Constantine transmitted his refusal to purge the officers or allow him to assume the Defense Ministry while that department was conducting the investigation of Aspida and Andreas' alleged involvement in the affair. Interpreting the King's position as going well beyond his constitutional authority, Papandreou resigned (or threatened to resign, depending upon the recollection) and surprisingly Constantine accepted.²⁹ Through defections from the Center Union ranks, Constantine formed an interim government. These actions were opposed by Papandreou on the grounds that he could not legally form a government from the majority party, but rather was required to dissolve parliament and call for new general elections.³⁰

With Papandreou unceremoniously removed from power

²⁹ For a detailed discussion of these events, see A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 153-183.

³⁰ Ibid., also Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, pages 199-204.

sixteen months after he had obtained a majority popular electoral victory, he immediately became the object of increasing numbers of demonstrations on the streets of Athens. The composition of the demonstrators was largely made up of students and members from the center and left of the political sphere, including workers and EDA supporters.³¹ As the demonstrations increased, the degree of control broke down and clashes between the police and demonstrators became common.

The interim government failed to receive a vote of confidence as the demonstrations continued. When another interim Prime Minister was sworn in, the demonstrations assumed a more violent character as streets were barricaded and some automobiles were turned over and burned.³² After another series of no confidence votes and street disturbances, Stephanopoulos was able to form a right-center coalition with defectors from the Center Union; and after ten weeks of near anarchy in the Parliament, as well as in the streets, the government received a vote of confidence and order returned to Athens.³³

Remarkably the coalition held together until December

³¹ C. M. Woodhouse, The Story of Modern Greece (London, 1968), page 288 and Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, pages 193-195.

³² The Greek Observer, June-July 1970, page 19.

³³ Ibid.

of 1966, at which time the right believed that their chances in an electoral contest had improved sufficiently, so they withdrew their support of the government in order to force elections. Stephanopoulos resigned and requested that a non-political government be appointed and elections conducted within six months.³⁴

During the period in which the coalition was in power, the Center Union became more factional with Andreas leading the radicalized left wing of the party. The right wing had previously broken and formed a new Liberal Democratic Center Party and joined in the coalition. In addition to internal disunity, the void between the monarchy and the Center Union continued to grow as Andreas tried to attract republican followers through statements in opposition to the King.³⁵

Although the government was in the hands of a caretaker Prime Minister, a governor of the Bank of Greece, no moratorium was called on political conflict within the Parliament and events pressed on their seemingly inevitable conclusion. Charges continued to be levied by

³⁴ Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, page 208.

³⁵ For further development, see D. G. Kousoulas, "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967," Orbis (University of Pennsylvania, 1969) Spring 1969, pages 332-358, also Dr. Kousoulas' testimony in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 358-401.

and on all segments of the political spectrum. Attacks were followed by counterattacks, a pattern not unusual to Greek politics. The left had its "Pericles," the right its "Aspida," the republicans had the King's interference in parliamentary matters, the monarchists had the political chaos. There were rumors of a leftist coup and ones of a rightist coup. To further season events, there were periodic bombings that the right blamed on the left and vice versa.

Throughout these events, Andreas Papandreou continued to attack the interim government as confirmed supporters of the Crown and attempted to identify American representatives as the "real" force behind the conservative and monarchial supporters.³⁶ It was over the issue of Andreas Papandreou and his relations with ASPIDA that the crisis came to its abrupt conclusion.

Even with a "non-political" government in power, pressures were still applied to charge Andreas with conspiracy to commit treason through his alleged role in ASPIDA. The main stumbling block to these efforts lay in his constitutional immunity as a Parliamentary Deputy while Parliament was in session and continued immunity from arrest within four weeks after the dissolution of

³⁶ A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 193-203.

Parliament.³⁷ When Andreas' father introduced legislation extending this period of immunity to cover the entire period between dissolution and general elections (45 days), the right and the center split causing the downfall of the interim government on March 30. Constantine attempted once more to have a minority government formed and when the efforts of Kanellopoulos failed, Parliament was dissolved on April 14 and elections set for May 28, forty-three days later. The situation had developed where Constantine had run out of options. He refused to turn the government over to Papandreou, who may have been able to command a majority in Parliament, and the only alternative was an election in which it was widely accepted that the Center Union would again obtain a sizable majority, perhaps larger than in 1964.

The political arena again moved to the streets as clashes between right and left student groups took place and workers battled police, resulting in eighty-five persons being wounded.³⁸ Rumors became louder concerning the possibility of a royal coup and the imposition of a royal dictatorship. However, when the coup was executed, it came from sources not immediately associated

³⁷ The Constitution of Greece, 1952, Articles 62 and 63.

³⁸ The Greek Observer, June-July 1970, page 20.

with the Crown, and Constantine's relationship with the "Colonels' Coup" was not readily ascertained.³⁹

³⁹ Carey & Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, pages 211-212.

Chronology⁴⁰1967:

On the morning of April 21st, the government of Panayotis Kanellopoulos was overthrown by a military coup d'etat. At 6 a.m. Athens radio announced that the military had taken power through a royal proclamation allowed under the Greek constitution "to preserve order against an obvious threat to the public security."⁴¹ By this proclamation constitutional liberties were suspended, martial law instituted and the country considered to be in a "state of seige." Under the latter provision, further individual rights, such as habeas corpus and assembly, were suspended and the military government was given extended powers of search, seizure, censorship and the extension of courts martial jurisdiction to political and press offenses as well as to those directed against the army.

Supreme Court chief prosecutor C. V. Kollias was installed as Premier, and the coup's military leadership identified and took the following offices: Lieutenant

⁴⁰ For the composition of the chronology, extensive use was made of the New York Times. Only direct quotations or items of interpretation provided by contributors to news stories, editorials, etc. will be footnoted from this source.

⁴¹ Peter Schwab and G. D. Frangos, Greece Under the Junta (New York, 1970), page 13.

General G. E. Spandidakis, deputy premier and defense minister; Colonel G. Papadopoulos, minister to the premier; Brigadier General S. Pattakos, interior and security minister; and Colonel N. Makarezos, economic coordination minister.

Once the government had been taken over and the proclamation promulgated, communications were severed, Greece's borders were closed and a large number of political arrests of suspected leftists or communists continued.

Earlier in the day, prior to the proclamation, the majority of Greece's political leaders were placed under house arrest. These included George and Andreas Pápandreou (Center Union), Kanellopoulos (ERE), Stephanopoulos, Mitsotakis (Liberal), and Passaliades (EDA).

Within the first forty-eight hours between 2500 and 6000 political arrests were made by government forces. Most prominent figures were detained in hotels in the Athens area while the majority filled local police stations, jails, soccer stadiums and were later transferred to Leros, Yioura and Agios Efstrastios islands.

During this time Ambassador Phillips Talbot sought assurances that political prisoners would be properly treated and received guarantees that there would be no summary executions.

The United States announced on the 26th of April that its program of economic and military aid to Greece was under review. However, by this time, it appeared that there was little political opposition in Greece. The junta was firmly in place, and Constantine would support their actions while urging an eventual return to parliamentary government.⁴²

The remainder of the month in Greece was concerned with the enunciation of the first of the junta's reform programs and initial steps towards normalization of contacts with the outside world.

In a news conference on April 28, Papadopoulos characterized Greece as a patient that required surgery to save its life and would have to be tied down during the operation.⁴³ The first events in Greece's treatment included the removal of the democratic left's political party, the abolition of political youth movements and initial planning for constitutional revision that would create a strong, independent executive arm. Municipally-owned land was distributed among landless farmers and employers were directed to pay traditional Easter bonuses to workers. Diplomatically, the American and British

⁴² New York Times, April 26, page 1 and April 27, page 1.

⁴³ New York Times, April 28, page 3.

Embassies recognized the appointment of Economou-Gouras as Foreign Minister, however officially, Secretary of State Rusk stated that the United States awaited concrete evidence that democratic systems would be re-established.⁴⁴

On the domestic scene during the month of May, the regime continued to solidify its position within Greece while easing some of the more questionable restrictions enforced during their first days in power such as bans on tourists with beards and long hair. Solidification measures included banning over 250 organizations politically oriented from liberal to pro-communist, municipal and communal officials become appointive vice elective, civil service tenure was suspended for six months to allow removal of "inefficient bureaucracy" and the purging of the Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Internationally, events were highlighted by Greek government appeals for increases in military and economic aid from the United States; growing international concern for the well-being of political prisoners, especially that of Andreas Papandreu as expressed by the American economic community; and the NATO Defense Minister's meeting in Paris where Secretary McNamara reportedly

⁴⁴ New York Times, April 29, page 1.

warned Greek Defense Minister Spandidakis that the United States would cut off military aid if Greece failed to return to constitutional government.⁴⁵ Other American representatives believed that a selective embargo delaying some arms shipments to Greece would nudge the regime back towards democratic processes.

For the remainder of the summer, external opposition to the Greek regime became more vocal as the government continued to rule by decree, suppress internal opposition and began to reply to international criticism. Expatriated Greeks who were especially vocal in their opposition, such as Melina Mercouri, were deprived of their citizenship and their property confiscated, while governments hostile towards the Greek state were threatened with breaks in trade relations.

Internally, the government's campaign against the political left continued with the outlawing of the music of and later the arrest of the composer Mikis Theodorakis, a self-proclaimed member of the Greek Communist Party and ex-parliamentary deputy.⁴⁶

At the conclusion of the first six months of rule by

⁴⁵ New York Times, May 12, page 1.

⁴⁶ For his personal description of events during and after the April coup, see M. Theodorakis, Journals of Resistance (London, 1973).

the junta, internal opposition had proven to be ineffective. Political opposition within the ranks of the Army was neutralized through "selective retirements" that were approved by the King. George Papandreou and eight other political leaders were released, although his son Andreas remained in custody as he had been previously charged with conspiracy to commit treason.

Externally, ex-Premier Karamanlis finally issued a statement opposing the military government and hinted that he might be willing to head a new government.⁴⁷

December of 1967 witnessed the abortive attempt of King Constantine to execute a counter coup. The attempt was initiated by a radio broadcast from Larissa, announcing the King's dismissal of the junta and asking the aid of the Army in restoring democracy, and ended with the arrival in Rome of the royal family. At this time, the suspected power structure of the junta was revealed with the appointment of Colonel Papadopoulos as Premier and General Patakos as Deputy Premier by Lieutenant General Zoitakis, who they had earlier named as regent. With the new power structure defined, the leaders resigned their army commissions, granted amnesty to those involved in the counter coup and opened negotiations with Constantine

⁴⁷ New York Times, November 29, page 3 and December 6, page 3.

over the terms for his return to Greece.

Towards the end of the month the regime, more secure in its position, declared amnesty for most of the non-communist political prisoners, including Andreas, lifted house arrests of George Papandreou and P. Kanellopoulos, and announced that a plebiscite on the new constitution would be held early in the next year.⁴⁸

1968:

By the end of January 1968, the United States, as well as Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, Portugal, Canada, and Italy had resumed normal diplomatic relations with Papadopoulos' Greece. Later in the year the United States resumed delivery of major military equipment, thereby ending the "selective embargo." Other events on the international scene concerning Greece included the first formal charges levied against the government concerning mistreatment and torture of political prisoners and the subsequent investigations by the International Red Cross and by the Council of Europe into the Greek

⁴⁸ New York Times, December 24, page 1 and Section IV, page 2.

situation.⁴⁹ Domestically, the year was primarily focused on two events, the introduction of the new Greek Constitution, and the death of George Papandreu.

The constitution, presented in July, placed the Greek government in the hands of a strong executive branch. The monarch was to serve the function of a "symbol of the nation's unity." He would no longer appoint or dismiss ministers, and would be the titular head of the armed forces, which would be commanded by the government. The armed forces would be charged with protecting the regime and social order as well as providing for the national defense. The real power of the state would lie in a "Council of the Nation" composed of the Premier, Speaker of Parliament, parliamentary party leaders, Supreme Court President, President of the Constitutional Court, president of a body of former premiers, chiefs of the armed forces and the deans of the three leading Greek universities.

Parliament would be reduced to 150 members, and no

⁴⁹ For further discussions of charges of torture of Greek political prisoners and the role played by international bodies in investigating and reporting on these charges, see Christopher Wren, "Greece, Government by Torture," Look, May 27, 1969, pages 19-21; James Becket, "Torture in Democracy's Homeland," Christianity and Crisis, May 27, 1968, pages 115-120 and Barbarism in Greece (New York, 1970); and John A. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power (St. Louis, 1971).

one except the Premier and the party leaders could be elected for four consecutive terms.

The press was forbidden to criticize the king or the church, undermine the armed forces, assist in overthrowing the state, propagate illegal views or promote outlawed organizations.

In addition, motions of censure by parliament against the Premier would be limited to intervals of no less than one year and martial law was to continue until lifted by the parliament.⁵⁰

The constitution was submitted to a plebiscite in September and approved by a vote of 92% to 8%. Although balloting was made compulsory for all Greeks between 21 and 70 and living within 300 miles of their voting district, approximately 22% abstained from voting.⁵¹ With the death of George Papandreou, the last figure of popular political support from the pre-coup period was removed from within Greek territory. Huge crowds lined the two-mile funeral procession route and defied martial law provisions by chanting political slogans. When a

⁵⁰ For a thorough discussion of the 1968 Constitution, the official text and explanation as released by the Greek government and commentary both pro and con, see the Appendix to Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 407-459.

⁵¹ New York Times, September 30, page 1 and October 2, page 3.

group of supporters began calling for "Andreas" and "down with the junta," police forces moved in and arrested 40 of the demonstrators.

During the year attention was also focused on the special military court that tried A. Panagoulis for the attempted assassination of Papadopoulos. Panagoulis was convicted and sentenced to death. Under Greek military law, the sentence is required to be carried out before a firing squad within 72 hours. Through international appeals, including those of Pope Paul and the United Nations Secretary General, Panagoulis was given an indefinite stay of execution by the Greek government.

1969:

Internal Greek events during 1969 were characterized by increased acts of terrorism by government opposition forces and the government's resotation of some basic rights.

The large majority of terrorist activities were directed against American personnel and property in Greece and took the form of frequent bombings and threats of kidnapping or death towards American diplomats who cooperated with the government in power.

American officials' automobiles and downtown buildings were favorite targets of bombings that hoped to persuade the United States to take a tougher stand against

the government. In addition to these efforts, attempts were made to discourage tourism through the bombing of Olympic Airways' Athens terminal.⁵²

Towards the end of the year, internal control was relaxed somewhat through the restoration of rights of association and assembly, and guarantees of the inviolability of private homes. Press restrictions were eased and jurist committees established to draft legislation for full implementation of the new constitution.

1969 witnessed the Greek government's most serious external challenge to its continued existence. The opposition to the regime came from formal European organizations, American political personalities and the last serious attempt by the most "acceptable" Greek political figure to return to power.

Strong opposition to the Greek regime was voiced through the Council of Europe during the year. Under the Council's European Commission for Human Rights, a report was issued charging the Greek government allowed torture of political prisoners and denied human rights through martial law.⁵³ The committee's report was is-

⁵² Schwab, Greece Under the Junta, pages 78-82.

⁵³ A summary of the findings of the Commission, the published "Opinion of the Commission" and other related material can be found in Becket, Barbarism in Greece, pages 106-114.

sued as a result of a two-year investigation (the committee also charged the government with obstructing their investigation by not allowing free access to prisoners or prison facilities) and was released prior to the Council's formal meeting in December. Greek representatives disavowed the contents of the report, insisted that martial law was necessary to maintain directed development towards democracy and "resisting external interference in Greek affairs" withdrew from the Council on December 13th, rather than face probable expulsion.⁵⁴

Prior to these events, the NATO Political Committee, headed by Senator Javits, had approved a resolution urging members to pressure the Greek government to restore parliamentary democracy, free elections and rule of law.⁵⁵

American administration criticism of the Greek regime was evidenced by a partial arms shipment suspension. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the suspension was formally acknowledged and stated that the freeze would continue until progress was made toward more democratic procedures and constitutional

⁵⁴ New York Times, December 13, page 1.

⁵⁵ New York Times, October 17, page 9.

government.⁵⁶ Senate opposition to aid for Greece was led by Senators Pell, Moss, Javits, and Goodell and consisted of, in addition to verbal statements, delaying the confirmation of the new American Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca; an attempt by the Foreign Relations Committee to ban military grants to Greece and failing in obtaining support for that measure, a Senate approved resolution urging the Nixon Administration to make "all possible efforts" to persuade the Greek government to restore constitutional government.⁵⁷

Both internal and external Greek political opposition to the Papadopoulos administration received a considerable boost when Constantine Karamanlis broke a two-year period of silence and spoke out forcefully from Paris. Karamanlis urged the Greek military forces to help overthrow the "tyrannical" regime and offered to lead an interim government that would reform the constitution and prepare for free elections.⁵⁸

Karamanlis' position was widely approved by "moderate" Greek politicians and the event was viewed as possibly providing the needed impetus for unifying Greek opposition

⁵⁶ The Greek Observer, July 1969, pages 17-18.

⁵⁷ New York Times, December 13, page 3.

⁵⁸ The complete text of Karamanlis' statement is included in Maurice Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis (London, 1973) pages 198-202.

to Papadopoulos' government. Hopes for rapid unification and quick action were immediately dissipated as factions of the Greek spectrum made their reservations known concerning methods for the overthrow and the form and substance of the interim government.

By the end of the year it appeared that Greece was becoming progressively isolated from her European allies, and the possibility of Greek expulsion from NATO was frequently discussed in western political circles.

1970:

The third year of rule by the "Greek Colonels" witnessed continued internal stabilization, and perhaps a greater realization by external opponents that it would take more than verbal attacks to cause the removal of the Papadopoulos government.

Internally, the year provided the last of the "large-scale" political trials in which 34 alleged members of the "Democratic Defense" were accused and convicted of sedition in plotting to overthrow the government through violence (bombings, etc.). Defendants withdrew earlier confessions of guilt charging that they were obtained through torture or coercion and although all were convicted, generally lighter sentences were given those re-

quested by the government prosecutors.⁵⁹

In October, the Greek Premier called for elections in late November for a 56-member "Consultative Committee on Legislation." Ninety-two candidates were to be selected by regional, professional and labor organizations. One-half of these candidates were to be chosen for membership in the committee by Papadopoulos and the remaining ten members appointed directly by the government. In December the regime further emphasized their confidence in their position by announcing the release of 305 political prisoners, this action combined with earlier releases in the year reduced government estimates of political prisoners held to approximately 300. However, Papadopoulos also announced that political freedoms denied by martial law since 1967 would not be restored during 1971, thereby further reducing American hopes for an imminent return to democratic procedures.⁶⁰

Internationally, the primary focus of events generally concerned American relations with the government and in particular an increase in Executive/Congressional antagonisms over the conduct of foreign relations and in-

⁵⁹ New York Times, March 28, page 3; March 29, page 3; and April 13, page 1.

⁶⁰ New York Times, December 25, page 9 and December 30, page 24.

ternal congressional debate over the proper way to lead Greece back to democracy.

Congressional disagreements with the Nixon administration were emphasized through administration renewals of naval vessels on loan to Greece and through the disclosure that supplies of surplus military equipment, above levels authorized by Congress, had been delivered despite the limited arms embargo.⁶¹ During these discussions, administration sources revealed apprehension over the rise of Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and displayed an increased propensity towards lifting the embargo. After the Senate's rejection of an amendment to the military sales bill that would ban further arms shipments to Greece,⁶² Defense Department contacts with Papadopoulos took place, and in September the State Department announced the resumption of full arms shipments valued at \$56 million.⁶³ Relations were further highlighted by the visit of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer to Athens in October.

American policy was further defined by Secretary Laird's statement that the modernization of Greece's

⁶¹ New York Times, March 16, page 2 and April 17, page 1.

⁶² New York Times, July 1, page 8.

⁶³ New York Times, September 23, page 4.

armed forces had high priority in efforts to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, and it would be better that commitments be met by Greece rather than increases in American military personnel.⁶⁴

Non-American opposition during the year was provided organizationally by the Council of Europe's Ministerial Committee's resolution, and individually through the efforts of Mikis Theodorakis, who was unexpectedly released and allowed to emigrate during the spring.

Theodorakis, after his arrival in Paris, called for the overthrow of the "creature of American imperialism" through the formation of a national council of resistance.⁶⁵ A resolution of the Council of Europe made public the 1969 European Human Rights Commission report and called for the Greek government to abolish torture and ill treatment, restore fundamental freedoms and release political prisoners.

By and large, the Papadopoulos government appeared to be firmly in control and confident of its internal position at the end of 1970. They had apparently overcome what was considered to be their most crucial test in at least winning the United States' financial and

⁶⁴ New York Times, October 6, page 13.

⁶⁵ New York Times, April 30, page 13.

military support and accepting that moral support of their non-democratic characteristics would not be forthcoming. In their view the United States needed Greece for NATO defense requirements, and it appeared that the Greek form of government was of secondary consideration.

1971:

Events concerning American/Greek relations during the year were dominated by increased Congressional activity directed towards reducing or eliminating aid to Greece and the events surrounding the visits to Greece by Secretary of Commerce Stans and Vice President Agnew. Other than the visits, the only domestic items of note included policy statements of Premier Papadopoulos regarding goals of education, social justice and economic development for his fifth year in power and the announced reduction of martial law. In addition, an attempt was made to free Panaghoulis that gained notoriety through the participation of Lady Amalia Fleming, the widow of Sir Alexander Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin. Later in the year, Lady Fleming was stripped of her Greek citizenship and forceably sent to London.⁶⁶ The visits of Vice President Agnew and Secretary Stans, although separated by six months, evoked similar responses.

⁶⁶ For a personal account of these events, see Amalia Fleming, A Piece of Truth (Boston, 1973).

Both seemed to go beyond "official" administration levels of support in their public utterances, and both were accepted by the Greek government as visible proof of American acceptance of the Papadopoulos regime. On the Congressional front, widely publicized hearings were held by the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe concerning "Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy." These hearings provided a forum for both supporters and opponents to the Greek government, including spokesmen for the leading resistance movements, both Greek and American. Combined with Secretary Rogers' foreign policy statement in March, the hearings provided the clearest enunciation of administration policy and the major practitioner's interpretation of that policy. These included Ambassador Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger P. Davies and Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand. Besides the hearings, the committee also adopted an amendment to the military aid bill which restricted aid to Greece and was later approved by an eight vote margin on the floor of the House. Both the House and Senate's adopted version of the amendment contained an escape clause that could be utilized by the President if he deemed it in the overriding interests of the nation.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ New York Times, August 4, page 1.

In European diplomatic events, at a private session of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand was quoted as having said that the United States is disappointed over Greece's internal policies but regards the regime as the lesser of two evils. Secretary Hillenbrand objected to distortion of his comments by the press and received the apologies of the Council's president who expressed his distress of reports appearing in the press concerning parts of confidential exchanges of views and held that such reports quoted incompletely and out of context, misrepresent facts.⁶⁸

During the year Ambassador Tasca seemed to increase his diplomatic contacts with those Greek leaders currently out of power; however, he denied that this signalled a change in administration policy. His meetings included a courtesy call on the deposed monarch, the first since Ambassador Tasca's arrival in Athens in January of 1970, eighteen months earlier, and a meeting with Karamanlis in Paris.

1972:

Domestically, the fifth year of rule by the Papadopoulos government featured further consolidation of

⁶⁸ New York Times, May 19, page 4.

the Premier's power through his assumption of the regency, after dismissing and retiring General Zoitakis, and through minor reorganization that placed additional close associates in influential positions.

Although it appeared that Papadopoulos was now in his most secure position since he assumed power, increasing student agitation and the reappearance of student strikes indicated serious opposition was still present within Greece. These elements were acknowledged during his annual message to the Greek people in which he stressed that economic advances that had been achieved would be wiped out if politicians were in power and "subversives" were not restrained by martial law.⁶⁹

Diplomatically, Greece's horizons were broadened through the arrival of French Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Jean deLipkowski, the first westerner (other than American) of ministerial rank to visit since 1967, and through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China.

Greece received an additional boost through the official visit of Secretary of State Rogers on the 4th of July. Although Rogers noted differences between American and Greek governments, he made it clear that the United

⁶⁹ New York Times, December 24, page 13.

States would strengthen military ties with Greece in spite of criticism of the Greek government's suppression of democracy.⁷⁰ Later in the year this position was further strengthened by Rogers' speech before the American-Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association in Atlanta when he stated that it would not be in the best interests of the United States to try and coerce Greece into changing its form of government and that other countries' choice of government "must in the final analysis be what their people want or will permit."⁷¹

Although Rogers' visit and statements normally would have evoked strong opposition from anti-Papadopoulos forces, the level of criticism was further intensified by domestic American election year politics. Concern for the Greek situation was highlighted by the adoption of a plank in the Democratic Party Platform calling for an end to support of the Greek military government, and the release of a letter by Senator McGovern to a resistance leader stating that he would halt all aid to Greece with-

⁷⁰ New York Times, July 6, page 3.

⁷¹ New York Times, August 25, page 3.

in ten days of his inauguration.⁷²

Two additional events complete Greek/American relations for the year: the announced waiver by the President of the previously-mentioned ban on military aid and the United States Navy's proposal to "homeport" units of the Sixth Fleet in Greece with the resultant Congressional hearings regarding this proposal.

Prior to the President's departure for China, the formal notice to the Congress was signed, and the State Department announced that President Nixon had decided that overriding interests of national security required he waive the Congressional ban on military aid to Greece. The State Department also announced that approximately \$70 million in arms, consisting of tanks, F-4 Phantom aircraft and ground equipment would be sold to Greece before June 30th. This action evoked intensive criticism by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Near East who charged the actions were linked to negotiations currently in progress for arrangements to homeport ships of the Sixth Fleet in Athens.⁷³

⁷² For transcripts of the letters involved in this event, see the House of Representatives Joint Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East, Hearings on the Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece (hereafter referred to as hearings: Homeporting), (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), page 259.

⁷³ New York Times, March 4, page 1.

Hearings were held during March and April on the proposal, and a committee report issued in December severely criticized the Defense and State Departments for selecting Greece as one of the overseas sites and questioned the political validity of the homeporting concept itself.⁷⁴

1973:

Greek domestic politics dominates any discussion of the events of this year, for it was during the period that events appeared to outdistance any coherent political plans and culminated in a military coup that seemingly had as its primary goal the braking of the runaway "Greek State Express."

The major events of this evolution included an attempted naval coup, the abolition of the Greek monarchy, an unopposed plebiscite establishing Papadopoulos as President of the Greek Republic, extensive granting of amnesty to opponents held as political prisoners, removal of Papadopoulos' junta associates from power and replacement by a civilian cabinet, student/worker violent demonstrations, armored suppression of the demonstrators and martial law reestablished in Athens. One week later, on November 25 a military coup was successfully executed.

⁷⁴ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Decision to Homeport in Greece, A Report with Minority and Additional Views, (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

The beginning of 1973 witnessed the continuation of the student strikes of the previous year, and although the police forcibly removed demonstrators from occupied buildings on one occasion, the strikes were ended by negotiations between student spokesmen and university officials, a process that one year earlier probably would not have been considered by government authorities. On May 24, the Greek government announced that they had stopped an attempt by a group of naval officers to overthrow the government. Statements linked politicians abroad with instigating the plot and challenged Constantine to disown the unsuccessful attempt.⁷⁵ Two days later, in an associated event, the commanding officer of the Greek destroyer "Velos" requested and received political asylum from Italy for himself and 30 officers who had joined him in mutiny against the Greek government. Events were analyzed as part of a plot to overthrow Papadopoulos and return the monarch to Greece. The leaders of this attempt reportedly included two retired flag officers and approximately 35 senior officers. The plot was discovered before the involved ships could depart from ports, except for the "Velos," who was participating in NATO exercises at the time. On the day after

⁷⁵ New York Times, May 25, page 3.

the Velos mutiny, the Athens newspapers reported that the regime had now decided to hold a referendum to determine the future of the exiled King and asserted the King's silence over the naval affairs was sufficient proof that he had blessed the abortive coup.⁷⁶

On June 1, the last tie of the Greek government with the pre-coup situation of 1967 was severed with the announced abolition of the Greek monarchy by Premier Papadopoulos. Declaring Greece a "presidential parliamentary republic," the Premier announced a referendum would be held in July to approve these actions and general elections would be held before the end of the year. In announcing the abolition, Papadopoulos attacked Constantine for his "immature" actions in collaborating with reactionaries and asserted he was active in conspiratorial and seditious activities including the recent mutiny of the Greek Navy. Papadopoulos appointed himself "Provisional President of the Republic" and also continued as Premier.⁷⁷

No immediate statement was forthcoming from the State Department, but press secretary Hare related that the United States position "remains unchanged."⁷⁸ Senator Fulbright

⁷⁶ New York Times, May 28, page 1.

⁷⁷ New York Times, June 2, page 1.

⁷⁸ New York Times, June 2, page 10.

requested Secretary Rogers take the opportunity of the abolition to review policy towards Greece. Later the State Department's position was "that due to Constantine's exile since December of 1967, abolition of the monarchy really did not alter the actual situation in Greece and reiterated Secretary Rogers' recent statement that the evolution of the political system is an "internal affair of the Greek people in which the United States cannot appropriately intrude."⁷⁹

Constantine issued a statement on June 2 that he was now ready to fight; he called on the armed forces and the Greek people to reestablish their sovereign rights and proposed the lifting of martial law and granting of amnesty as well as freedom of the press after the successful overthrow of Papadopoulos. Greek language versions of the statement were broadcast to Greece by Great Britain, West Germany and other European nations. Although the police in Athens were placed on special alert, the remainder of the Athenians were unaffected, and the city remained calm.

The referendum was held on July 29 with Papadopoulos as the sole candidate for President and the decision on the abolition of the monarchy to be decided by a vote for

⁷⁹ New York Times, June 2, page 10 and June 3, page 3.

or against Papadopoulos. Final results showing pro-government vote of 78% were accompanied by loud charges of fraud and voter intimidation. The referendum granted Papadopoulos the presidency until 1981 and gave him vast powers over issues of foreign policy, national security and public order. Initial analyses of the vote revealed that the central Athens area voted 60% against Papadopoulos, while the rural areas were overwhelmingly for the government of the Premier/President.⁸⁰

On August 19, George Papadopoulos took the oath of office as the first Greek President. In a nationwide broadcast after the ceremony, Papadopoulos surprised observers, especially opposition critics, by announcing a broad amnesty for all political crimes committed against the government since 1967. He abolished martial law, announced that a political cabinet free of junta members would be created in October, political parties would be authorized to operate in September, and a freely-elected parliament would be established in 1974. In addition, he announced he would pardon Panagoulis, who had tried to assassinate him in 1968. Within the next two days, decrees were signed implementing the above and approximately 330 prisoners were released, including civilians and naval

⁸⁰ New York Times, July 31, page 10.

officers involved in the abortive coup and the mutinies earlier in the year.

In the United States, Secretary Rogers welcomed the news from Athens and stated that the "United States has consistently urged the Greek government to return to a political system that guarantees civil liberties and insures the participation of the Greek people."⁸¹

On October 6, the military junta was dismantled and on October 8, Spyros Markezinis was sworn in as Premier of the first all-civilian cabinet since 1967. Markezinis' main tasks were to reestablish contacts with leading political opponents in Greece in order to arrange for effective parliamentary election participation by the Greek political spectrum.

The month of November brought an end to the drama of the previous six and one-half years. Police and demonstrators clashed following a memorial service for former Center Union Prime Minister George Papandreou on November 4. With police absent from the ceremony, chants of "death to the tyrants," "unite," and "down with Papadopoulos" were taken up, and thousands of demonstrators marched to the center of Athens, initially overwhelming police resistance and then breaking into smaller groups when police reinforcements arrived. Violence erupted with demonstra-

⁸¹ New York Times, August 21, page 3.

tors throwing stones and police wielding clubs.

On November 13, seventeen Greeks charged with rioting were released after a trial in which excess police brutality was charged. Twelve of the defendants were judged not guilty and five others were sentenced but then released after appeal.

On the 15th, students again took to the streets urging the overthrow of Papadopoulos, blocked traffic in the center of the city and took over Athens Polytechnic University. The police were reluctant to take action against the students because of the criticism received in handling the November 4 demonstrations.

Crowds inside and adjacent to the campus were estimated at 10,000. The University Senate requested that the government keep the police off the campus grounds, and the government complied. The situation on the 16th degenerated with continued street fighting between demonstrators and police. Statements of support from Kanellopoulos and Mavros were received by student leaders who earlier had called for a general strike. New dimensions to the strike of the students were added with the appearance of approximately 200 building construction workers who were regarded by the government as the most militant of the leftist groups in Greece.

With the fighting continuing into the night, shortly

after midnight Greek army troops crashed through the gates of Athens University and dispersed the student and worker demonstration. Papadopoulos declared martial law in Athens; tanks withdrew from the city; students and workers returned, set up barricades, overturned buses and the police were again unable to maintain order. As a result, the army tanks were called back, and the central area of Athens was not under control until the 4 p.m. curfew.

Scattered fighting continued on the 18th and the 19th. By the 20th, general activities in Athens had returned to normal, with the exception of the stringent security measures and the curfew imposed on the populace. Government announcements stated that thirteen were killed during the fighting and stressed that martial law requirements of soldiers and citizens must be obeyed. The government also announced that approximately 250 people were in prison on charges of sedition. On November 20, Kanellopoulos, Mavros and Zigdis were placed under house arrest for instigating the student revolts. Investigations continued into the causes, guidance and perpetration of the recent violence. By Friday, November 23, the curfew had been reduced to the hours between one and five a.m. and martial law relaxed. At five o'clock in the morning on Sunday, November 25, tanks and ships surrounded a seaside villa 26 miles southeast of Athens. Inside,

President George Papadopoulos was placed under house arrest by army officers, thereby ending six years and seven months of his control over the Greek government.

The leaders of the latest military coup appeared to be from the more militant right-wing sector of the Greek Army. Lieutenant General Phaedon Gizikis assumed the Presidency and a civilian, Adamandio Androutsopoulos became the new Premier. The key figure in the coup and perhaps the most powerful in the new structure was Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, the Chief of the Greek Military Police.

American Foreign Policy Formation

Most critics of American foreign policy since the April coup have argued the primacy of the United States in any efforts to return Greece to democratic government. They claim that the Americans actually promoted the coup through their opposition to the Center Union and its leaders. This opposition precipitated the political crisis of 1965 and 1966 that encouraged a takeover of some type (not necessarily the one that took place the following year). Because most Greeks believe, the argument continues, that the United States supports the military government, popular resistance is minimized and political opposition is necessarily ineffective. Any peaceful challenge to the military regime from the civilian sector requires American approval in order to succeed. The argument asserts that the colonels could not remain in power if the United States opposed them, therefore repudiate the military junta, halt all aid, and the regime will crumble.⁸²

The remainder of this study will focus on the influences and the issues involved that led two administrators, one Democratic and one Republican, to adopt a policy other

⁸² For further development of this line of argument, see the various testimonies of opposition leaders in Hearings; Greece and Spain and Hearings: Homeporting.

than the forceful actions suggested above.

Realizing that no clear definition can be made between influencing factors and accepting the dangers of introducing a degree of artificiality by doing so, the discussion will be broken into three categories: political, military, and economic considerations. Further references to "opposition" positions and proposals will be included within each category.

Political Considerations

The clearest statement of American foreign policy in regards to the Greek military government was provided by Roger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs during an appearance before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 12, 1971. Secretary Davies characterized the Greek situation in terms of a dilemma in which American policy has been to:

. . .protect our important security interests there and in the broader area of the eastern Mediterranean and Near East, while preserving a working relationship with the regime through which we can exert our influence to encourage a return to representative government.⁸³

Restated, the dilemma is one that in order to secure our national interests, we find ourselves allied, both through NATO and bilateral agreements, to a government

⁸³ Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 28-29.

whose political system is contrary to those principles of democracy upon which the alliances were formed. The question is twofold, how do we work with that government when every contact is viewed as support of that government's political form, and how do we "encourage" that government back to an "acceptable" form without alienating it and compromising our national interests in the process?

The major political issues involved in Greek/American relations concern, first and foremost, the nature of the military regime itself, its assumption of power, and its relations with the United States through NATO and bilateral agreements. In regards to the latter issue, the military junta reaffirmed its military commitments to NATO and confirmed that it would honor its bilateral agreements with the United States. Recognition of the government after the coup was not considered necessary because representatives were accredited to the monarchy rather than to individual governments. This policy continued through Constantine's departure into exile in December of 1967 as a regency was established to reign in his absence. When Greece became a republic in 1973, recognition no longer was considered an issue because the monarch had been in exile for almost six years, and the personnel of the republic were for the most part

the same as those who ruled under the monarchy.⁸⁴

It is on the nature of the assumption to power and the subsequent rule of the military government that the majority of controversy is centered. Most critics assert that the conditions present in the Greek political arena immediately prior to the coup, while seemingly unstable and characterized by some excesses, was fairly close to "normal" for Greek politics and certainly not a prelude to a communist takeover as claimed by the military.⁸⁵ The Greek military government, on the other hand, emphasizes the violence in the streets as indicative signs of leftist efforts to assert their influence and viewed the events occurring in parliament as symptomatic of a complete breakdown of order. The military viewed the scheduled May elections capable of producing two results, an outright victory by the Center Union whose left wing would align itself with the "communist front" EDA, thereby giving the government a strong leftist base, or a close electoral battle in which the EDA would hold the balance and align with the leftist leaning Center Union. In either case, their interests would not be furthered. There was a possibility of an ERE victory, but both the military's

⁸⁴ New York Times, June 3, page 3.

⁸⁵ Hearings: Greece and Spain, pages 473-474 and page 402.

and the crown's patience had wore thin with the democratic process as practiced in the "cradle of democracy."⁸⁶

American objections to the Greek regime primarily concern the restrictions of individual freedoms through the continuance of martial law. As soon as the colonels had seized power, martial law was proclaimed and Greece was considered to be in a state of seige which further restricted the rights of individuals. Large-scale arrests were directed against leftist elements, but also included moderate political leaders. Estimates vary in the numbers involved during the first few months but generally they fall between 2,000 and 6,500. Many of these were released after initial processing. The junta justified the imposition of martial law through analogies of Greece being a "sick" patient as well as the necessity to restrain subversive segments of Greek society.

During this initial phase of rule, the United States adopted a "wait and see" attitude, while expressing concern over the fate of political prisoners and temporarily suspending some heavy equipment in the pipeline to Greece.

Although the colonels indicated when they assumed power that it was not their intention to perpetuate their rule, return to democratic government was to prove to be

⁸⁶ Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 358-361.

a protracted process. It appeared, by 1968, that the process may have begun in earnest and perhaps the United States' gentle persuasion was producing some concrete results.

It was the military's avowed purpose to rebuild the Greek democratic system, and the first step in this process was the drafting of a new constitution and its submission to plebiscite.⁸⁷ The drafting of the constitution by the junta and its submission while the nation was still under martial law, and therefore open to questions of validity, was loudly criticized by opposition forces. However, the performance of this function by the military has more than adequate precedent in modern Greek history, as the first three constitutions were provided as results of military coups.⁸⁸

While the constitution was drafted and approved, portions relating to elections, political parties and individual rights were still suspended and awaited implementing legislation. Some of the restrictions on personal freedoms were eased, censorship relaxed somewhat and some political prisoners were released during 1969 and 1970.

⁸⁷ For a description of the main features of the 1968 Constitution, see the earlier chronology of the events of 1968.

⁸⁸ Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 405.

While criticism continued over the delay in the restoration process and doubts were raised concerning the government's true intentions, the main emphasis shifted to the question of torture.

The Greek government, particularly the internal security police and the army were charged with using torture as an accepted administrative process in extracting confessions from political prisoners. With the appearance of an article in Look magazine in May of 1969⁸⁹ and the earlier publication of a report by Amnesty International regarding torture in Greece, the Greek situation and the American policy toward her became a more frequent subject of discussion and debates within the Congress of the United States.

By the end of 1970, it appeared that some progress had been made in this transition process; however, Prime Minister Papadopoulos announced in December that in 1971, no further political steps would be taken towards elections. This statement prompted Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco to express their disappointment that the Greek government had not done more in its movement to restore representative democracy.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Wren, "Greece: Government by Torture," Look, May 27, 1969, pages 19-21.

⁹⁰ Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 37-38.

Although disappointment was expressed, official United States policy remained the same.

While American policy never "officially" changed, the Nixon administration accepted that the transition would be a long process whose timetable would be set by those in power in Greece.⁹¹ The government continued to urge Papadopoulos along the road to democracy by applauding democratic reforms and loosening of restrictions within Greece. As pointed out in the chronology, this period was highlighted by visits of high ranking civilian government officials inaugurated with Secretary Laird and followed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Vice President Agnew, Secretary of Commerce Stans and concluded with Secretary Rogers.

The position of the American Ambassador in Greece has been significant not only as providing the visible link in relations between the two states, but also in this instance his conduct in displaying support or opposition to the regime and his reporting of internal conditions within Greece. In particular, his assessment and reporting to the State Department the degree of support the military regime voluntarily receives from the populace,

⁹¹ See testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger P. Davies in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 25-56.

is of significant importance in determining American policy.

Ambassador Phillips Talbot, criticized for his lack of intervention during the pre-coup political crisis, as compared to earlier criticisms of excessive intervention by his predecessors, was active in urging restraint immediately after the coup and perhaps was instrumental in preventing excesses of the summary execution variety.

Ambassador Henry Tasca has had considerable influence in determining American policy. The nine-month delay in naming a successor to Ambassador Talbot was widely interpreted as an indication of American disapproval of the Greek government and an attempt to speed up the process of returning to democracy. Although the State Department did not confirm the intent, it did admit that the nomination was being delayed.⁹² However, once Ambassador Tasca assumed his post, Greek/American relations began to improve. Although reports of Ambassador Tasca are not available for analysis, and his testimony before congressional bodies is extremely censored, it can be inferred from available statements that he strongly supported returning to normal relations be-

⁹² New York Times, August 12, 1969, page 8.

tween the two states.⁹³ Within a year of his confirmation, the military aid embargo was lifted, aid resumed, and the earlier-mentioned series of visits began.

The role of Congress has been twofold in determining policy. First of all in advising the administration through debates, comments on the floor and through its committee hearing system, and secondly, through its control over appropriations. The Congress has been effective in providing a forum for both pro and anti-junta viewpoints, and it has been fairly evenly divided over the Greek issue. Those measures that have been adopted to express opposition to the government of George Papadopoulos have been also designed to allow the administration to override congressional action if deemed necessary.

Strong opposition from members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and demands for a "hard-line" have proven to be largely ineffectual in altering administration policy regarding political and military relations with Greece.

As previously mentioned, Congress has provided an effective forum for both sides to the Greek question, as witnessed by numerous transcriptions and frequent inser-

⁹³ Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 303-322.

tions into the Congressional Record, as well as the hearings by committees of the House and Senate cited earlier. Besides periodic hearings regarding foreign aid and military assistance, specific hearings have been held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1970 concerning "United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Greece and Turkey" and by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees in July, August and September of 1971 regarding "Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy" and in March and April of 1972 concerning "Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece." These hearings will be discussed further in the section on military considerations. In addition to the above, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees issued a report on the Homeporting decision, and the Senate issued a staff report on the situation in "Greece: February 1971."

The latter report, completed by two staff members who visited Greece for one week, was extremely critical of the American Embassy's performance as well as that of the State Department. In its concluding remarks the report states that:

In the military sphere, it would appear that our declared policy objectives have been achieved. . . . By contrast, the declared policy objectives in the political sphere have not been achieved. The "trend toward a constitutional order" is at best ambiguous, and the confident predictions by American officials with regard to the reestablishment

of parliamentary democracy have not been borne out by events. . . .The policy of friendly persuasion has clearly failed. The regime has accepted the friendship, and the military assistance, but has ignored the persuasion. Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more leverage on us with regard to military assistance than we have been willing to exert on the regime with regard to political reform. We see no evidence that this will not continue to be the case.⁹⁴

The acknowledged congressional leaders of the recent opposition to the Greek government during this time frame were Senators Claiborne Pell and J. W. Fulbright and Representatives Donald Edwards and Donald M. Fraser. Greek opposition leaders in exile, while successful in gaining exposure for their positions, also have been unsuccessful in altering American policy. Varying considerably in political philosophy, the more celebrated ones include, Mikis Theodorakis, poet, composer, former deputy of the EDA, and acknowledged leader of the Greek Communist Party; Andreas Papandreu, Greek political leader mentioned frequently in previous sections and currently Professor of Economics at Toronto University; Melina Mercouri, actress and her husband Jules Dassin; Helen Vlachos, former publisher and editor of Kathimerini, the leading Greek conservative daily; Constantine Karamanlis, former conserva-

⁹⁴ U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Greece: February 1971, a staff report, (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), page 16.

tive Prime Minister and leader of the ERE; and the deposed monarch, King Constantine II. It is interesting to note that of the above, both Karamanlis' and Constantine's criticism of the colonels were generally restrained and relatively infrequent up to the time of the abolition of the monarchy, at which time Constantine broke his silence and forcefully expressed his opposition to the government in power. The obvious diversity of interests of the Greek leaders and the widespread political positions have led to a severe lack of united efforts and has considerably hampered the movement.

Military Considerations

It has been frequently asserted that the United States has security interests of sufficient magnitude in the Eastern Mediterranean that it wouldn't make any difference what kind of governments were in power in Greece and Turkey, the American government would try to maintain friendly working relationships in order to secure these interests.⁹⁵ Although perhaps overstated, a general overview of Greece's position within NATO's strategic defense structure and her role in contributing to the alliance, may further explain the significance of Greece to the NATO and American defense fabric.

⁹⁵ See Senate Hearings, Greece and Turkey for varying positions on this issue.

Italy, Greece and Turkey provide what is commonly referred to as the "Southern Flank" of NATO. Their position within the alliance is to present a forward defense against the advance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries into the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, through maintaining control over the Turkish Straits, the seas and the land masses contiguous to the Straits, the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas. Strategists believe that this can be accomplished through successive defense lines available within the southern region and can be successfully defended in the eventuality that Central Europe is occupied and unable to provide assistance.⁹⁶

An analysis of the force levels immediately available in the southern region reveals that in land forces and in air power, the Warsaw Pact nations (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Soviet Union have a definite advantage over NATO forces. In the case of the Soviet Union, only those elements located within the southern and southwestern areas that would be available are considered. The NATO calculations include American units that are forward deployed such as tactical air units identified

⁹⁶ For a good general analysis of the military strategy involved, see C. Margaritis, "Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1973, pages 112-147.

for NATO operations. This numerical advantage, in men as well as equipment, is balanced by the naval superiority of the "Southern Flank."⁹⁷ It is in the recent advances in the Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that analysts see a threat to the maintenance of the balance.

Greece's geographic position is critical to the Southern Flank. Centrally located, its loss would isolate the Eastern Mediterranean as well as exposing Italy's and Turkey's flanks and granting additional access to the Mediterranean.

Greece contributes to NATO combat force levels that include twelve army divisions, eleven combat squadrons of 225 total aircraft, and approximately 44 surface and subsurface combatant and patrol vessels.⁹⁸ In order to maintain these forces, Greece devotes about 4 to 5% of her annual Gross National Product for defense, ranking her fourth in NATO behind the United States, Portugal, and Great Britain.⁹⁹ Due to the large NATO commitments, it is necessary for Greece to retain a relatively large percentage (8.9%) of the men of eligible age in the regular

97 Ibid.

98 The Military Balance 1973-1974 (London, 1973)
page 22.

99 Ibid., page 74.

armed forces. Greece has been largely dependent on American military aid and credits for equipment procurement and modernization. Since the April coup, the United States has provided Greece with approximately \$130.4 million in grant aid and \$221 million in credit sales through fiscal year 1974.¹⁰⁰ As a result of Greece's modernization program and increased economic position, the Greek government stated that she would no longer require military grants commencing with the 1974 fiscal year.

Critics have frequently charged that through the granting or withholding of military aid to Greece, the United States can pressure the Greek government into making desired reforms. However, both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations have stressed the necessity of providing aid to Greece in order to maintain the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent. Initial embargos of heavy equipment were lifted after the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968, as it was recognized that the credibility of the Greek forces had suffered as a result of the equipment delays since the April coup. As Deputy

¹⁰⁰ Figures derived from information provided by U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act S. 1443, 93d Congress 1st Session, May 1973 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973) page 95 and Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 212-213.

Assistant Secretary Davies related:

We have come to recognize as a general proposition that withholding military or economic assistance is an ineffectual tactic in persuading foreign governments to move in directions we consider desirable. When pressures of this kind by this and other governments have been attempted, they generally have not succeeded.¹⁰¹

Irrespective of the material condition of the Greek armed forces, their effectiveness has been questioned due to the large number of forced and voluntary retirements of general and flag officers after the April coup, the King's counter coup, and the naval uprisings of 1973. It can be deduced from the comments regarding Greek units' performance in NATO military and naval exercises, that if their force effectiveness has been reduced, it has not been apparent to military observers.¹⁰²

Another area of criticism regarding Greek/American relations concerns the frequency of visits by high ranking military personnel to Greece. Upon further analysis, however, it can be shown that at the highest level visits, almost all of these were of the courtesy type associated with NATO command assumption or observation

¹⁰¹ Hearings: Greece and Spain, page 27.

¹⁰² See remarks of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as quoted in Hearings: Homeporting, page 5, concerning status of Greek military in 1969 and his most recent comments as reported in the New York Times, July 14, 1973, page 24.

of NATO exercises held on Greek territory.¹⁰³ The large majority of the other visits are routine visits of units of the Sixth Fleet and have little if any protocol contact with the leaders of the governmental apparatus. The frequency of the visits of this type are fairly stable and politically cause little impact.

In addition it should be pointed out that within the Mediterranean there are only approximately seven regularly visited ports that can absorb the numbers of people involved by a visit of an aircraft carrier or a carrier task force without severe problems; of these seven, Greece has two or three, depending upon the time of year, Athens, Corfu and Rhodes.¹⁰⁴ Greek ports are considered extremely desirable liberty ports for American sailors; besides the attractions of a metropolitan area and the advantages offered by Athens, Greek prices compare favorably with Spanish and Italian ports and are considerably less than those of the French Riviera.

Irregardless of the intentions or purposes of visits by American military leaders, it can and has been viewed as "de facto" approval of the Greek government. This

¹⁰³ For a listing of military visits since 1967 to mid-1970, see Senate Hearings, Greece and Turkey, pages 1839-1840.

¹⁰⁴ Hearings: Homeporting, page XX.

also is an issue concerning the Navy's decision to "home-port" units of the Sixth Fleet in Athens. Homeporting has been characterized by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., as a largely administrative decision made to uphold deployed force commitments and improve retention during a period of declining numbers of ships and excessive demands placed on naval personnel.¹⁰⁵ The plan involves the gradual forward deployment of two carrier task forces, one homeported in Yokuska, Japan and one in Athens, Greece and through this concept reducing the frequency of long-term navy carrier deployments and accompanying family separations. The concept would provide for dependents to reside in Athens, living "off of the local economy," and stressed that no large-scale construction was planned or necessary as the ships were not being based in Greece, but would be using Athens as its home port while deployed to the Sixth Fleet.¹⁰⁶

The Navy Department had conducted a series of briefings for congressional representatives, and in March and April of 1972, joint hearings were held before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the "Political and Strategic Implications

¹⁰⁵ See testimony of Admiral Zumwalt in Hearings: Homeporting, pages 6-37.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

of Homeporting in Greece." In December the subcommittee published a report on "The Decision to Homeport in Greece." The report criticized the State and Defense Department's decision and concluded that:

Homeporting in Greece today does a serious disservice to American relations with the Greek people, to ties with our NATO allies and, most importantly, to our own democratic traditions. The subcommittees recognize that the United States has legitimate military and security interests in Greece relating both to NATO and Middle East responsibilities. These interests must be balanced, however, by appropriate concern for the suspension of democratic government in Greece since 1967. The homeporting decision did not, we believe, properly reflect that concern. . . . We consider the danger of pre-eminence of military and strategic considerations over political values a fundamental problem of American foreign policy decision-making today.¹⁰⁷

In contrast, the minority views stated that:

Obviously there is room for honest differences of opinion regarding the basic concept of homeporting, and also regarding our country's relationship with the present Greek government the subcommittees' report. . . . actually ignores the testimony developed during the hearings, and comes to conclusions which cannot be supported by the evidence. The result is more an airing of a preconceived point of view than a critical and objective examination of the issues.¹⁰⁸

Economic Considerations

¹⁰⁷ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Decision to Homeport in Greece, A Report, 92d Congress, 2d Session (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pages 1-2 (hereafter referred to as Homeporting Report).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., page 25.

As previously mentioned, American economic grant aid to Greece was halted at the end of fiscal year 1962 as a result of Greece's improved economic position and potential for continued stability. Some continuing economic assistance has been provided through sales of surplus agricultural products and Export-Import Bank loans, although the amounts are relatively small in comparison to earlier grants.¹⁰⁹ Greece continues to maintain close economic ties with the United States, but America's share of Greek import trade is declining as Greece expands her association with the European Community.¹¹⁰

In general, Greece's economy during the late 1960s and beyond has exhibited significant economic growth. Since 1969 her rate of growth in Gross National Product has ranged between 8.3% and 10.5%, while estimates for 1973 exceed 12%.¹¹¹ It is because of Greece's rapidly expanding economy that she is starting to experience the phenomenon of inflationary pressures so prevalent

¹⁰⁹ Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 481.

¹¹⁰ For the most current statement of the Greek economy, see U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Greece (hereafter referred to as Economic Trends), October 20, 1973.

¹¹¹ See Economic Trends, April 27, 1970 and October 20, 1973.

in industrialized western societies. Other indicators of Greece's rapid growth are contained in her rise in per capita GNP from \$698 in 1967 to \$1,232 in 1972 while the unemployment rate has dropped from 7.6% to 1.5%.¹¹²

Structurally the Greek economy has some serious defects. A country in the process of development, Greece's agricultural sector, while providing employment for almost 50% of the labor force and 60% of Greece's exports, only provides 20% of her GNP. Industry employs about 25% of the labor force while the service sector provides 50% of the GNP and employs a smaller segment of the labor force.¹¹³ Greece's imports far exceed her exports, providing her with additional problems in trade relations. For example, in 1972, Greek exports amounted to \$871 million while her imports totaled \$2,145 million.¹¹⁴ However, Greece's earnings from "invisibles," emigrant and worker remittances, tourism and shipping, combined with increasing capital inflows have prevented this imbalance from drawing down of Greece's foreign exchange reserves.

112 Ibid.

113 U. S. Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, "Basic Data on the Economy of Greece," May 1972.

114 Economic Trends, October 20, 1973.

It is in the areas of tourism and capital investment that the United States plays a major role in the modern Greek economy. Due to Greece's association with the Common Market, she provides a point of entry for the United States through investment in Greece.¹¹⁵ By enactment of favorable foreign investment laws, Greece has encouraged investment, and American investors have responded to the degree that as of 1972, American capital investment in Greece totaled approximately \$275 million and represented almost 50% of all foreign capital investment allowed under Greek law.¹¹⁶ In addition, by the end of 1970, there were \$191 million in foreign bank deposits in Greece, of this figure, \$144 million were from the United States.¹¹⁷ Through the first nine months of 1973, the Greek government authorized \$235 million in proposals for new foreign investment with the United States accounting for \$41 million of that total.¹¹⁸ The largest American investment in Greece as of May 1972 was the Esso-Pappas petrochemical and steel complex valued at approximately \$166 million.¹¹⁹

115 Economic Trends, October 20, 1973.

116 Ibid.

117 Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 31-32.

118 Economic Trends, October 20, 1973.

119 Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 31.

Greece continues to provide one of the most desirable vacation areas for European and American tourists. Tourism, in turn, provides one of the most important sectors of the Greek economy. Tourist arrivals in 1970 numbered approximately 1,600,000 while the foreign exchange earnings from these visitors amounted to over \$190 million, of this amount Americans accounted for over \$109 million.¹²⁰ Greek tourist arrivals increase annually at a rate between 20 and 30 percent, while total receipts have been rising at an even faster pace.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Ibid., page 32.

¹²¹ For the Greek government's viewpoint of the Greek economy, see The Revolution of 21st April Builds a New Greece, Greek Ministry of Coordination, Public Relations Service (Athens, 1970).

Foreign Policies Available to the United States

As has been mentioned in the preceding discussions, any policy adopted by the United States has to consider the political, the strategic military, and the economic aspects of our relations with the Greek state. If it is assumed that it is in our best interests to retain the strategic advantages Greece provides, as well as to protect those American investments in the Greek economy, our policy should be such that it minimizes the risks of losing those advantages or jeopardizing those investments. However, if it is assumed that the military advantages are not of significant import or can be separated from the political considerations, then the risk factor is reduced to a considerable extent and a more active or aggressive policy can then be pursued. An assumption that accomplishes this "separation" or "neutralization" of these factors is the frequently asserted position that militarily and economically, Greece is almost entirely dependent upon the West and in particular, the United States, and as a result, internal Greek forces would never allow the Greek government to become completely alienated from the United States and seek military support outside of the NATO framework.¹²²

¹²² See especially the testimony of T. A. Coulombis and E. P. Demetracopoulos in Hearings; Greece and Spain, and G. Rallis in Hearings: Homeporting.

In analyzing the merits of policies available to the United States in her relations with the military government of Greece, certain basic assumptions regarding the Greek situation and the long range goals for Greece are generally agreed upon by proponents of various courses of action. These assumptions are: that Greece should return to representative government and democratic processes; it is desirable that this return process be accomplished through political vice military means; and the national interests of Greece and the United States as well as those of the NATO alliance should be protected. Although there are those who would disagree as to what these interests are, or should be, these goals for the Greek state are generally accepted and differences arise only in the proposed means to accomplish the end product.

Of the three assumptions, the premise that Greece should return to democratic processes is perhaps the most commonly accepted. All parties concerned, including the military government that frequently alludes to Greece's return to democracy and characterizes itself as a "parenthesis in the political life of Greece,"¹²³ accept that the authoritarian state is to be replaced by a representa-

¹²³ Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 26.

tive democracy based upon a constitution. Differences occur when discussing the conditions and the individual events in the process as well as the timing of the transition. An example can be seen in the disagreement over the issue of the Greek Constitution. Pro-governmental sources favor the democratic process to be conducted under the 1968 Constitution. Opposition forces take the position that the new constitution was thrust upon the Greek people under the pressures of martial law and as such should be disallowed, and the previous constitution reinstated as the supreme law of the land.

Regarding the issue of the means by which Greece will return to democratic process, the American point of view, administration policy as well as those in opposition, favors a political solution to the Greek problem rather than a military one which connotes an internal uprising and the overthrow of the present regime by dissident elements of the Greek military or a popular revolution. Either of these two military situations presupposes bloodletting of varying degrees. Greek opposition to the current military government by and large also favors a political solution. Frequently, however, warnings are voiced regarding the increasing probability of a military solution as the democratization process as guided by the

military government seems to falter and stall.¹²⁴ Of the two military solutions, an internal coup seems to be preferable to the Greek leaders in exile rather than a popular uprising which would probably precipitate large-scale bloodshed and possible civil war. Those who score the likelihood of the latter occurring fall generally within the ranks of the resistance leaders, both internal and external, whose political ideology falls into the left segments of the political spectrum.¹²⁵

The political solution to the problem involves the military government restoring normal political process, i.e. formation and operation of political parties, the abolition of martial law and the entire process culminating in general elections. It is in the timing of these events, as well as in the degrees of political freedom to be allowed during the transition, that the sharp differences among Greek politicians themselves as well as between themselves and the government in power can be most clearly seen. The political leaders demand a rapid reversion to democratic processes, while the government reserves the right to establish its own time schedules

¹²⁴ See testimony of D. Papaspyrou in Hearings: Home-reporting, pages 86-106.

¹²⁵ Two examples can be found in M. Theoradikis, Journals of Resistance and in Margaret Papandreou's testimony in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 169-181.

while guiding this transition, rebuilding Greek democratic institutions to their specifications, and altering the timing as they feel that circumstances warrant.

Within the broad premise that Greek, American and NATO interests should be protected, the greatest disparity occurs in attempting to define what those interests are. It is frequently and accurately stated that militarily Greece and the United States receive significant benefits from their bilateral relations, the United States through its use of bases and facilities located on Greek soil, and Greece from American military aid in training Greek forces, as well as in its receipt of equipment and technology. Within the NATO alliance framework, strategic benefits are realized through Greece's contributions of men and material to the alliance fabric and geographically through her strategic location. Any evaluation as to who benefits more from the association would be largely subjective and exceedingly difficult to quantify in a reasonable manner with changing scenarios.

The main question raised in a discussion of the relationships between the United States and Greece, and between these states and other member NATO nations, is the issue of Greece's participation in an alliance whose main goal is the protection of the democratic way of life, while Greece stifles that way of life within her own

national boundaries.

Although no official attempt has been made to exclude Greece from the Atlantic Alliance, most member nations have expressed concern over the lack of democratic freedoms and have urged the Greek government to return to representative government. Within this body, Denmark and Norway have been the most vocal in their opposition to the Greek regime and to the United States' position and manner of dealing with the military government.¹²⁶

For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that given the first two goals of the return of democratic processes to Greece, and its accomplishment through political means, the United States, Greece and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consider it to be within their best interests to retain close, friendly working relations.

In general, the United States has two basic foreign policies it can adopt toward the military government of Greece. Policies that can best be described as "hard-line" position and a "soft-line" policy. Although there are varying degrees of hardness and softness, which will be discussed later, the basic "hard-line" position asserts

¹²⁶ See earlier cited recommendation of the Council of Europe in chronology covering 1970 and Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 59-60, 314, and 328-329.

that the Greek military government assumed power through extraconstitutional and therefore illegal means, it holds its citizens in a police state against their will, and the United States as the leader of the free, democratic world has an obligation to take the lead in opposing the regime. The United States should revoke all ties with this government until democracy is restored in Greece. This view advocates the expulsion of Greece from NATO, encourages American support of resistance groups within and external to Greece, and calls for the withholding of all economic and military aid. This policy emphasizes America's "moral obligation" to take positive steps (short of direct military or subversive intervention) to aid in the overthrow of the military junta.¹²⁷

The basic "soft-line" policy accepts the fact that the government in power, irregardless of its method of assuming power, is the established government of Greece, and because of predominant security considerations, it is in our best interests to maintain close working relationships with the Greek state. Although we do not agree with the form of government and abhor excesses con-

¹²⁷ This position can be applied in varying degrees to the testimony given in the two hearings as well as the public statements of such individuals as Representatives Edwards, Fraser and Brademas, Senators Fulbright, Pell, Jackson and Javits, as well as the previously mentioned Greek opposition leaders.

cerning individual rights, we can best facilitate Greece's return to representative government through working with the present leaders and assisting them along the road to democracy by persuasion and encouragement. With varying degrees this "soft-line" policy can be associated with both the Johnson and Nixon administrations' dealings with Greece since 1967.

In the case of the "hard-line" policy, the emphasis is placed upon the United States taking direct actions that will demonstrate clearly to all concerned that we are in opposition to the military government of Greece. Through these actions, both the Greek government and the Greek people will know that the military government does not have the backing of the United States and, presupposing the lack of a broad popular internal base, the only course of action available to the military government is to turn power over to a non-political interim government. This government will then arrange for nationwide general elections through which the Greek people will express their desires. This policy emphasizes the premise that the power of the regime is based on two pillars, the support provided by the Greek Armed Forces and the belief by the Greek populace that the United States backs the military government. Once the United States ceases to actively support the colonels, the Greek military will

follow the same course. Consequently, if the government did not voluntarily relinquish power, it would be seized by pro-American military segments. In addition, this policy also accepts the premise that Greece will remain, under almost all eventualities, aligned to the West and will not attempt to take a neutralist position in the Cold War.

The actions that can be taken by the United States within this policy framework provide for the previously-mentioned degrees of hardness. These actions have, by and large, been proposed, with varying degrees of emphasis and combination, by opponents of the policies of the Nixon and Johnson administrations. The most commonly cited actions include encouraging the expulsion of Greece from NATO; reducing or terminating all military aid to Greece; strong statements of American opposition to the Greek government, while reaffirming our close friendship to the Greek people in general; maintaining our military presence but reducing the level of our contacts, e.g. reducing the JUSMAAG commander billet from Major General to Colonel; stopping all courtesy visits of high ranking American government and military officials; and increasing support of anti-junta opposition groups and individual leaders from the pre-coup political scene.

Advocates of this policy, while disagreeing on the

appropriateness of individual measures, agree on the primacy of the role of the United States and the need for some type of "affirmative action" by the American government. While admitting that circumstances could develop that even the execution of a hard-line policy may not bring about the rapid return of Greece to the democratic fold, the United States at least will have fulfilled its moral responsibilities to the principles of democracy and the Greek people themselves through its demonstrated opposition to authoritarian rule.

As previously mentioned, the "soft-line" policy emphasizes the primacy of maintaining the strategic military benefits realized through our association with the Greek state. In particular, this policy points to Greece's location in proximity to potential world trouble spots and her contributions to NATO's "Southern Flank" as being of overriding importance in Greek/American relations. In addition, this viewpoint accepts the necessity of Greece's return to democratic processes but emphasizes the United States does not have the ability to force change on the Greek government and asserts that our influence over Greek political developments is marginal.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Hearings; Greece and Spain, page 40.

"Soft-liners" generally attempt to separate the military issues from the political ones. That is to say, it is asserted that it is in the best interests of all parties concerned to have the Greek military in a high state of readiness to enable it to efficiently carry out its NATO functions. To accomplish this, American aid is required and any disagreements over the form or policies of the Greek government should not affect the amount and type of aid given to the Greek military. Therefore, in the Greek case, it is not appropriate to use military aid for political purposes. Besides the inappropriateness of withholding military aid in an attempt to force political change, advocates of the "soft-line" policy stress that Greeks of all strata would react unfavorably to attempts of this type, thereby raising anti-American sentiments and perhaps encouraging those elements who would have Greece take a more independent or neutralist stand vis a' vis the West.

Greek supporters of the military regime often criticize the emotion attached to the Greek question. These supporters focus attention on the pre-coup political situation, characterize it as corrupt, chaotic, and inviting to attempts at a communist takeover. They point to the numerous governments that have held power since World War II as further proof of the instability of Greek

political life. In their view, the April coup did not overthrow a viable democratic system but rather saved Greece from complete disaster. While not necessarily agreeing with some of the methods employed by the government, they do agree with the long-range goals of the government in power and the necessity of restructuring the parliamentary system.¹²⁹

Both Greek and American advocates of this type of policy assume that the only way Greece can peacefully return to a representative system of government is through the consent and collaboration of those individuals currently in power and therefore stress the necessity of maintaining close working relations with them and encouraging their democratization efforts.¹³⁰

Actions to be taken in support of a "soft-line" policy towards Greece would include: the maintenance of required levels of military aid; maintaining "normal" diplomatic, civilian and military contacts with the Greek government; application of pressure limited to private diplomatic exchanges; public praise and encouragement given to positive efforts taken along the

¹²⁹ See testimony of D. G. Kousoulas in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 358-401, 403-406 and N. Destounis, in Hearings: Homeporting, pages 129-142.

¹³⁰ See statement of Ambassador Henry J. Tasca in Hearings; Greece and Spain, pages 305-306.

road to democratic processes; and maintaining all available lines of communications between the two states.

Advocates of the "soft-line" policy refuse to attach any time schedule to the transition process and consider this element to be controllable only by the Greek state and the Greek people themselves. The Greek domestic situation is viewed as uncertain at best due to inabilities in evaluating such factors as the degree of political dissatisfaction or apathy present in the Greek population, or the degree of popularity enjoyed by the military government as a result of apparent economic gains and increased order in Greek society during their rule.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the preceding discussions, American relations with the Greek state since the April 21st coup have, by and large, remained friendly while proving to be extremely frustrating to a large segment of the American political scene. After seven years of rule by the colonels, Greece appears to be a long way from realizing her return to democratic government. It must, however, be readily admitted that the situation in 1974 has improved considerably from the early period of military rule. This has been demonstrated by increased individual rights and freedoms, and a significant improvement in the economic welfare of the Greek people. The fact remains that a democratic political system is not in operation in Greece, and the new leaders have given no indication that it will be in the near future. The dilemma for the United States, as outlined by Secretary Davies, is still applicable.

This period of American/Greek relations can, if viewed objectively, be a valuable source of experience from which we can draw in formulating future policies toward the new military government in Greece. Although the ruling figures have changed, the new Greek leaders present many of the same arguments justifying their takeover and their goals for Greek society as did their predecessors seven

years ago. Indeed, many of the leaders are members of the 1967 junta and only recently turned against Papadopoulos because they believed he was carrying out the liberalization process in too rapid a manner and had created for himself a "personality cult."¹³¹ With a new military government in power, the situation is such that it may be an opportune time for the United States to review the last seven years of American efforts to aid Greece along her return road to democracy and evaluate the efficacy of our foreign policy towards the Greek military government.

A review of the last seven years reveals some general characteristics of the Greek situation and America's foreign policy efforts to deal with this problem, and lessons that can be learned from the experiences. First of all, both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations have viewed strategic military advantages as overriding considerations of political ideology. This can be most clearly seen by public statements and congressional testimony in which administration spokesmen emphasize the role Greece plays in NATO, the importance of this alliance to American security interests, and indications of reluctance to take any action which may jeop-

¹³¹ See "Another Junta in Athens," Time, December 10, 1973, pages 66-67.

ardize the advantages provided by Greece. AS has been testified to by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Russell Fessenden:

. . .the concern about the constitutional government situation in Greece is one that we very definitely take into account both as it affects opinion in this country and elsewhere in Europe but I don't think it would be entirely honest of me if I were to say that that was the overriding concern in all of our policy towards Europe and the Near East. It is a factor which we must take into account. . .but not one that is so great that it would dominate and overrule some of the more basic concerns we have about maintaining the strength of NATO, maintaining an adequate NATO and U. S. posture in the Middle East and so forth.¹³²

Secondly, the return of Greece to democratic processes, if carried out by the present governmental directors, may well be a long process whose timetable will only marginally be affected by low key American pressures. Greek government leaders have frequently stated that they will decide when the conditions of Greek society are amenable to a return to representative government, and the last seven years have shown that they are in no great hurry to return the system to the control of the Greek populace.

Thirdly, in accomplishment of American foreign policy goals, the United States has been somewhat successful in promoting increasing relaxation of internal restrictions

¹³² Hearings: Homeporting, page 183.

in Greece and maintaining the viability of the Greek/American military relations, but has failed to realize the second horn of the dilemma, a democratic Greece. Although we have attempted to make a clear delineation between military and political considerations, the efforts have been largely ineffective as military aid and political contacts are still viewed as proof of American support of the military regime.

Finally, the most important variable has to be included, that of the desires and views of the Greek people. It is in this determination that the greatest degree of difficulty is encountered. Because of the very nature of the present Greek state, with the metropolitan sector of Athens under fluctuating degrees of martial law and the remainder of the countryside under less conspicuous degrees of police and military control, a true measure of how much popular support is enjoyed by the military government is difficult to gauge by normal methods. Supporters of the government point to the victories scored in the plebiscites held in 1968 and 1973 as adequate proof of widespread support, while opponents state that the elections were held under the gun of a restrictive system, and the large majorities obtained give additional credence to their claims because the results were atypical of "normal" Greek political be-

havior.

Perhaps of more revealing consequence is the largely apathetic behavior of the Greek people themselves. Even with inclusion of acts of extremism such as incidents of bombings, internal opposition has been infrequent, of relatively small scale, and generally limited in participation to students and what could be described as the normally "liberal" elements of Athenian society, i.e. construction workers and other labor segments. The only broad-based demonstration held was on the occasion of George Papandreou's funeral in November 1968, and it can be safely stated that large segments attended to pay their last respects to a popular Greek leader, and were not there primarily in opposition to the government in control. Although there are a few political leaders in Greece that provide periodic enunciations of opposition to specific programs or statements of the government, the most vocal opposition comes from ex-political leaders who are in exile (either forced or voluntary), base their knowledge of Greek events on reports from "underground" sources, and after seven years of opposition to the government, have still been unable to find a common base on which to unite their individual efforts.

As has been testified by many observers who have had extended visits to Greece in the past few years, the Greek

people appear to be pacified. While retaining a deep-seated desire for the return of democratic functions, they nevertheless are pleased with their increased economic status, accept the stability provided to the political arena, and tolerate the loss of some individual rights for the overall increased security provided by the military government.

With the new opportunities provided by the recent change in Greek leadership and with the above lessons in mind, the United States should modify its "soft-line" foreign policy towards Greece to present a firmer position regarding the democratic transition and a more unified pursuance of this policy by the various practitioners. Specifically, this modification would include: increased application of pressure by the American Ambassador urging the new leaders to resume the democratization process as soon as possible; increased public statements of concern over Greece's progress towards democracy expressed by American officials in Greece as well as in the United States; a strongly-worded request for a timetable or plan of transition with estimated completion dates for given phases; and a general policy statement that based on the structural developments and reforms completed by the Greek military governments since their assumption of power in 1967, the United States believes the

necessary framework for a democratic Greece is sufficiently in place to accomplish the return to democratic processes and believes it to be in the best interests of the Greek state to do so in the near future.

In addition to the above lessons learned, other factors make a hardening of the American position desirable at this time. The risk in weakening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through withholding military aid from Greece has decreased with the improved material status of Greek forces and the overall decreased tensions between the East and the West through détente and an unravelling of the complex Middle East situation. Although Greece no longer receives military grant aid, she still is largely dependent upon credit sales and American investments, thereby making it unlikely that she will be able to assume a long-term, independent economic or political course. Also with the homeporting of a Carrier Task Group Commander in Athens, the frequently objected to visits by high-ranking naval officers will reduce in visibility as the other flag officer visits in the Mediterranean will be in other ports while the resident commander's returns to homeport will lack the protocol normally accompanying visits of American admirals to foreign ports.

In carrying out this revised policy, the United States

has to retain the flexibility of action so as not to make our relations with the Greek government a "cooperate or else" proposition. It is not desirable to force the government into a position where a break with the United States is seen as the only way to protect Greek sovereignty. Irregardless of whether the United States takes action or not, she will be accused of intervention in Greek domestic affairs. Those who oppose the Greek government will see "non-action" as de facto American approval of the regime, and the government may see any opposing action as undue interference. Increased American pressures may not affect the eventual outcome of the Greek situation; however, we do have to consider our own political principles in making it clear to the people and government of Greece that the United States favors the return of Greece to representative government and will co-ordinate its actions as well as its statements to the accomplishment of this goal. Finally, it must be re-emphasized that, as has been pointed out by Secretary Rogers and other observers of the Greek scene, in the final analysis the actual accomplishment of the return of Greece to the membership of democratic nations and the future of the Greek state itself will be determined by the Greek people.¹³³

¹³³ New York Times, August 25, 1972, page 3.

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