

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Vice President Rockefeller
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 24, 1975
 11:37 a.m. - 12:47 p.m.

PLACE: The White House
 The Oval Office

SUBJECTS: Middle East; Murphy Commission

Kissinger: I think they [the Israelis] have decided on a confrontation. [He shows the President a ticker item.] I am lunching with Sol Linowitz. Max Fisher said that if we can get Linowitz and Ziffren on our side, it would help him -- also Lew Wasserman.


Vice President: I am having dinner with Percy, Jackson and some liberal Senators.

Kissinger: How should we conduct this meeting?

President: I scanned the paper, but I need to study it over the weekend.

Kissinger: Why don't I brief the paper to you? [He outlines the paper.] We decided in late '73 to try to break up the Arab coalition and put the U.S. in the role of negotiator, to avoid discussion of a final settlement and insulate Israel from European and Japanese pressure by showing some progress. The basis of the strategy is that Israel would buy time by giving some territory. So each step was slightly inequitable to Israel. One of the greatest benefits has been that now even Asad is willing to

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 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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AUTHORITY SAC Review 9/19/04; State v. sit 3/8/04
 BY lab NLF, DATE 4/17/07

have separate peace talks. That may be what collapsed things, because Israel wasn't ready. You will recall Hussein was willing to accept half of the Allon plan -- which they rejected. This led to Rabat. Suspension of the Egyptian negotiations now means that the step-by-step approach is in serious difficulty -- to put it mildly.

Basically, we now have three choices: (1) to go for an interim agreement like the one in March; (2) to go for a larger interim agreement, or (3) to go for an overall settlement, with one or all the countries. The present situation is deceptively calm because the Arabs and the Soviet Union think we will pull something out. If the Arabs are convinced there is no progress, and that our aid to Israel is an obstacle, then we are in trouble. The Saudis are saying if there is no progress within a year they would not accept the '67 borders.

Vice President: That's right. But they are willing to accept the existence of Israel. If there is no progress, they would bring whatever arms they could to destroy Israel.


Kissinger: The Arabs have a series of steps they can take to increase the tension -- they can call for the removal of the UN force, or threaten an embargo. This would bring the Europeans to put pressure on us, and the Soviet Union would get more belligerent. In this climate, if there is a war, you would have trouble behaving provocatively to prevent Soviet intervention. I told Muskie that if there is a war we would have to move the Sixth Fleet close in and put Marines on board. He said there is no way the Democrats could buy that. I said, "Why don't you tell the Jews that?" He said he couldn't do it alone. The Jews in Maine would mobilize against him.

The Arabs are coalescing again. You saw that Asad and Sadat formed a committee.

Sadat needs the passes and the oil and an unbroken line to the oil. Rabin I think can't do that without you bringing massive pressure -- and you would have to do the same within six months on Syria.

[Scowcroft left to get the maps and returned. Secretary Kissinger described the only possible line through the passes for an interim settlement.]

The West Bank and Syrian problems are not solved by any interim agreement in the Sinai, unless they would agree on follow-on moves.



Our choices are two forms of an interim and two forms of an overall agreement. I think if they would give us an interim essentially free, we should take it. If we have to pay, I think it's not worth it.

No Arab is willing to give more than the '67 borders. You shouldn't go this route. Tactically you don't have to announce at the outset, but your decision is the same. Our option is to announce before Geneva that it should be the '67 borders, and set out all that the Arabs have to give.

[He described the pros and cons of announcing before or after Geneva.]

You don't have to decide now. We could talk it over with Sadat. In the context of an overall plan, we could propose interim steps taking seven years or so to get there. This avoids the Israeli argument on an interim that they give up more than the Arabs, because they don't get equivalent security.

President: In the final settlement, isn't there more for Israel than the Arabs?

Kissinger: I have to give you their argument: The final borders are so dangerous that they would rather have the present borders and no peace.

Vice President: Would an overall settlement be jointly guaranteed by the U. S. and the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: I am in favor of offering American guarantees. Congress is skittish, but put it on them.


Vice President: This is the greatest deal for Israel. They could get into the Arab money. The ordinary Arab will think this is a fair deal.

President: Even some Jews will.

Kissinger: Rostow will part with you on the basis that the borders must be secure.

We could have played the interim deal three more years before we would have to face this.

President: If we laid all this out, no Jew who was fair could say this wasn't a good deal.



Kissinger: Four-fifths of the Jews will oppose you.

President: The non-Jewish community would raise questions about the \$2 billion economic guarantee.

Vice President: Wouldn't a Presidential statement include something about American interests? We have a stake in this. Not only the oil embargo, but a capital embargo. If all this money went to the Communist bloc....

Kissinger: If the Arabs stop recycling to the U. S. and go to Europe, or even worse -- if they hold it or give it to the Communists, we are in trouble.

President: I must say I tilt toward a final settlement.

Kissinger: We don't need a decision now. But we must maintain coolness and discipline in the meantime. Our coolness is one of our assets.

President: To start all the torture we went through over the past months....

Kissinger: You will still need interim steps to keep the movement going under an overall settlement.

Vice President: Let me discuss the Murphy Commission. Mansfield came to me to object to Goodpaster sitting in, that the whole exercise is a waste of time.

President: Mike thought it would be loaded. It didn't come out that way and he is better. He wants Andy out?

Vice President: Yes. I said, "How about me out?" But he said it's too late to change that.

President: What shape are the papers in?

Vice President: I am doing the best I can, and the NSC and Captain Howe have done very well, but it is not a good effort and I may have to file a minority report. Even Abshire and Casey are not too helpful. They were both in the State Department under Rogers. They want to separate State and NSC and strengthen State. I told them this is providing the President with a strong State.

President: Talk to Abshire. He is a good friend of mine. Casey I don't know that well. He is not well-organized or effective. Really work on Dave.



P/VP/K

24 Apr 75 ✓

K I think they ~~are~~ have decided on a confederation (shows
tribes etc)

I hanging w/ him ^{maker? said} if we can get him +
Zipper on our side, it would help him - also
Wasserman.

VP I hanging him w/ Play, Johnson + some liberal leaders.

K How should we conduct this meeting

P I remember a paper, but I need to study it over a
weekend.

K Why don't I brief a paper to you? (Partners a paper)

We decided in late 73 to try to break up a coalition +

put US in role of negotiator + avoid final settlement +
maintain I from E on a pay pressure by showing prog.

The basis of the strategy is I would buy time by giving
territory. Each step was slightly irreversible + I.

One of greatest benefits has been that Assad withing A

have separate peace talks. That may have collapsed
things because I not ready. You will recall

if we were willing to accept a plan - which they
rejected. This led to Rabat. Suspension of E negot

memo sbs approach is in series of. - A part of strategy.

Basically we have 3 choices:

(1) Intermittent

(2) Larger interim

(3) Overall settlement (w/ over all countries)

Present sit. is deceptively calm because Arabs + SV

think we will pull something out. If Arabs are

convinced no pay ^{them} to our aid to I are obstacle we

in trouble. Scandis saying if no prog w/ in

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AUTHORITY see lbc review 9/9/04; State visit 3/8/04

W llh

NLE DATE 4/19/07

ye they would not accept 67 borders.

VP That right. But they willing to accept ^{some} existence of I.
If one says, they would say whatever they want to do & destroy
I.

K Arabs have a series of steps they can take to ↑ tension &
removal of UN force, Chouathin ~~can~~ exchange. This
would bring E on to put pressure on us & CSU would
get belligerent. In this climate, if a war was the
you would have trouble backing proactively to
prevent Sov intervention. I told that (Muskie) if
a war we would have to move 6th Fleet close in &
put Marines on board. He said no way Demos could
buy that. I said why not you tell Jews. He said
couldn't alone. Jews in Maine would mobilize
against him.

The Arabs are crawling again. You saw a Asal-
Salat with friends.

Salat needs pass/aid to an underhanded him. Robin
I think can't do that w/o before bringing massive
pressure - and you would have to discuss some of it
to me on eye.

(I left to get maps)

(Describes only possible time other passes for
western settlement)

The W Bank & Syria puts me out solved by
any interim agreement in Sinai, unless they
would agree on follow on moves.

One choice and 2 forms of interim & 2 forms
of overall agreement.

I think if they would give us an interim essentially free, we should take it. If we have to pay, I think it's not worth it.

No Arab willing to give more than 67 borders, you shouldn't go this route. Tactically you don't have to announce at outset, but your decision is - same.

Our option is announce before Amman - 67/68 total peace & ~~set~~ set out all - Arabs have to quit.

~~Doing it before~~ (Decided process of announcing before or after Geneva)

You don't have to decide now. We could take it over w/ Galat. In context of overall plan, we could propose interim steps taking 7 yrs or so to get there. This avoids I argument on interim that they give up more than Arabs, cause they don't get equivalent security.

P In final settlement isn't there more for J than Arabs.

K I don't give you this argument. Final borders are so complex that they either have these present borders + no peace.

VP Would overall settlement be jointly guaranteed by US + SC?

K I'm in favor of offering US guarantee, Congress is skeptical, but put it on them.

VP This greatest level for J. They can't get into Arab morning.

VP The advisory board will think this is a fair deal.

P From some Jews.

K Reston will part of eyes on basis that bonds must be secure.

We could have played a better deal 3 more years before we'd have to face this.

P If we laid all this out, no fair Jew could say this wasn't a good deal.

K 4/5 of Jews will oppose you.

P Um - Jewish unity would raise questions about 2 bill even guaranteed. >

VP Wished P statement included something about US interests. We have a stake in this.

Not only oil embargo but a capital embargo. If all this money went to Arab bloc.

K If Arabs stop recycling US & go to F.M., a even worse if they hold it & give to Arabs, we in trouble.

P I must say I tilt toward final settlement.

K We don't need division now. But we must enter talks & discipline in negotiations. One weakness is

P To start all - tactics we want them over a just weeks...

K You will still need interest they to keep movement under overall settlement.

VP Mansfield wants me to object to Goodpastor setting in, that the whole exercise is a waste of time.

P Think that ~~he~~ it would be lauded. It didn't come that way & he is bitter. He wants Andy out?

VP Yes. I said how about me out, but he said the date to change.

P What things are papers in

VP I don't know but I can read NSC & Amur done very well but it not a good effort and I may have to file a minority report. Even Osborne and Casey not as helpful. They were with in State under Rogers. They want to separate State & NSC & strengthen State. I think that this is providing C P w/ a strong State.

P Talk to Osborne. He a good friend of mine. Casey don't know ^{that} well. He is not well organized or effective. Really work on Dave

Anything which could be
considered as a goal to go after
has been given to Congress.
