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The History of the Chinese Communist Party  
(July 7); The Progress in the Northern Attack  
and the Separation of the national Party  
from the Communist Party (P. 184 - P186)

Title Eng \_\_\_\_\_  
Jap 文那共产党史 (昭和 2. 2)  
北伐、進展 + 國共分離 P. 184 - P 186

Phase China

Requested by Mayalei

Def Doc No. 96a - I

T.D.C. No. 1094 - I

Certificate attached

not attached

Assigned to translator \_\_\_\_\_

Assigned to checker \_\_\_\_\_

Assigned to processor \_\_\_\_\_

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文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分、林馨ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ 三 頁ヨリ成ル支那共産黨史ト題スル書類ハ日本政府 外務省ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年 三月十四日

於東京

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ  
同日於同所

立會人

浦部勝馬  
浦部

960-1

昭和七年七月

秘  
55

# 支那共産黨史

外務省情報部

中央8

## 北伐の進展と國共分離

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四、一二反動報道接一、コミニテルに震轟した。トランキイ派はそれ見たこと幹部派を攻め立てた。そニア五月十八日から三十日まで中委會を開いて討論一下結果、はやく五月決議を發表し、今後の方針として農民運動の徹底と主張し、土地の沒收及び国有地の清算と共に共産黨がモリ指導権と握ることを決議した。討議及び決議の内容は大略左の通りである。

五、決議の内容は(一)支那革命の意義(二)國民革命の危機と新形勢(三)支那革命の部分的敗北と反革命派の主力。

(四)労働者農民の組織と支那共産黨の根本使命(五)支那共産黨と国民党(六)武漢政府の政權問題、軍隊及び支那共產黨の使命(七)当面の革命政策(八)各国共産黨と支那革命のハドド付近勝負(支那革命はレエニーリー勝利)。是にて七月一日帝国主義に対する最も重要なファクタは「内閣反対派社会主義者トオヌシ」として、ワミーテル、内閣反対派社会主義者トオヌシ、英國マクドナルド等、支那革命主導して内乱とする誤謬を攻撃し、次いで蔣介石上海クラウニアタア以後の危機に因して、『資產階級反革命派と帝国主義者との戦争』た。終結果支那は於て階級間の相互關係は根本的變化を起す。至るところトロッキイ派の反對論の中心である。支那革命は於て資產階級より提携しては、一九二六年の十二月決議を経て、遂に正義である事を主張し、北伐の成功は何よりも如實にこれを證明するものである。

ある。但し資産階級と提級と同時に彼等の前途半端な態度を掲げしブルデヨアが必然的に帝國主義者側に傾くべきを豫期して労働運動民衆は充分の用意あるべからず指命した。しかる今や支那革命はその最高潮に入り農村革命が反帝國主義運動の中心となリブルデヨアは去つて反革命派側に走つた。支那共产党はその作戦方略を根本的改變しなければならぬ。又武漢に於シモ勤機上叛變必然避くべからざる豫期しぬればならぬ」と説き改めて支那共产党に対する左の指令を與へた。

- (一) 農村及び都會に於ける多数民衆運動の展開を図ること。
- (二) 勞働者及び農民を武装すること。
- (三) 左派国民党をして農民組合労働組合手工業組合等を包含する大民衆團組織に轉化せしむること。
- (四) 共產黨はその階級戰線に於ける陣容を堅正べること。
- (五) 国民黨内に共產黨員を残留せしめること。然らばれば革命に於ける勞働者の指導を確立することが出来ぬ。
- (六) 武漢政府及び国民党を化して労働者及び農民の革命專制機關となすこと。
- (七) 北伐軍を援助すると同時に農民革命の徹底を図り又蒋介石軍の背後の潰潰に努め時機を見て武力を用ひても同軍を倒す事を期すこと。
- (八) 勞働者農民及び小ブルジョアの戰線を堅め大衆運動の指導者たらしむこと。
- (九) 共產黨内の結束をはじめ労働組合その他團体組織の

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の中止、鞏固する秘密機關を設ける事。

次にト「何故上海の労働者をして蒋に反抗せながるか」と云ふ。トロツキイ派の反対論に対するものである。場合上海労働者は成算が立たず、如何なる場合にも叛起せよとはレエニーリ戦略上反す。3. 若しありの場合廣く戰陣を張つてば支那プロレタリアの花たる上海労働者、蔣及び帝国主義者、聯合武力に虐殺され乍らあら」と答へ。最後に各國共産黨に対する援助不充分である事を責め、今後各自國の抗戦武器入手を阻止せんことを要求してゐる。

この決議に基く「一六月初旬、コミニテルニがら、當時漢口滬在中の印度共産黨首領ロオイに宛て有名な農民武装の密電が發せられ十五日ロオイはこれを汪兆銘に内示した事に依づ、武漢政府、反共産決定を是るに至つたりであるが、それは後に敍述する所とし、次にには、これにて敍述を急ぎ、  
「農民運動、農用と一體化せし、農民問題こそ、國共分裂の最重要な原因であるから。

Translation Certificate

960-T  
I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S / *Charlie S. Terry*  
Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date April 25, 1947

Stenciled  
Checked  
Corrected

Translated by  
Sadako Ohki

960-I  
July, 1932

[Secret]  
No. 555

The History of the Chinese

Communist Party

— The Board of  
The Information Bureau,  
Foreign Office.

— The Progress <sup>of</sup> in the Northern Attack  
Expedition

and the <sup>Severance of Relations between</sup> Separation of the Nationalist Kuomintang.

Party <sup>and</sup> from the Communist Party.

(P.184-P.186)

When informed of the April 12th reaction,

the Comintern was astounded. The TROTSKY  
faction <sup>attacked</sup> group <sup>censured</sup> the <sup>leaders'</sup> leading group saying

this served them right. Therefore, as the

result of <sup>D</sup> deliberations held by the central

committee meeting held from May 18th to 30th

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resulted in)  
the so-called May Resolution, was issued;  
which laid down <sup>objectives</sup>  
~~it was decided~~ (as the future policy to insist  
in a thorough promotion of the farmers)  
until  
movement, to carry it on to the confiscation  
<sup>are achieved</sup>  
and nationalization of land, and that  
<sup>being given the leadership</sup>  
the Communist Party) control leadership  
<sup>this movement.)</sup> administrative authority of  
in ~~achieving this~~ government; the proletarian

A summary of contents of the discussion  
of the resolution is as follows:

and the resolution is ~~given~~ in the following.

The <sup>6</sup> import <sup>the lies</sup>  
~~contents~~ of the May Resolution is  
in eight items  
divided into 8 items: (1) Significance  
of the Chinese <sup>revolution</sup> <sup>caused by</sup> <sup>outset the revolution</sup> <sup>As LENIN had predicted,</sup>  
national revolution and a new general  
collapse  
situation; (2) partial defeat of the Chinese

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revolution and the main <sup>strength</sup> power of the  
anti-revolutionary <sup>faction</sup> group; (4) the  
organization of labourers and farmers  
and the fundamental mission of the  
Chinese Communist Party; (5) the Chinese  
Kuomintang  
Communist Party and the Nationalist Party;  
the question of the administrative authority of  
(6) the WUCHANG-HANKOW Government; the problems  
of political power and the mission of the  
armed forces and of the Chinese Communist  
Party; (7) the present revolution<sup>ary</sup> policy;  
(8) the communist parties in all countries  
and the Chinese revolution. At the  
outset the Resolution states, "As LENIN ~~had~~ predicted, the  
beginning, it <sup>of the various</sup> Chinese revolution  
has become the most important factor <sup>opposing</sup> ~~in opposing~~

"world imperialism" as LENIN predicted;  
 proceeds to and, attacked <sup>certain</sup> ~~some within the Comintern~~, members  
 namely Thomas, socialist of the Amsterdam school,  
 MacDonald of Britain, and others, for their  
 mistakes in regarding the Chinese revolution  
 as a civil war. <sup>Regarding</sup> As to the crisis after  
 CHIANG Kai-shek's coup d'état in SHANGHAI,  
 it says "The propertied class went over to  
 the side of, anti-revolutionists and the  
 imperialists; consequently, interrelations  
<sup>among social</sup> ~~between the~~ classes in China have undergone  
 fundamental change". In regard ~~with the cooperation~~  
 with the propertied class in the Chinese  
 revolution, which was the <sup>very cause</sup> center of the <sup>objection</sup> opposite

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opinion ~~of~~ by <sup>faction</sup> the TROTZKY'S group, & the

resolution

"reiterates and justifies the December  
(and tries to justify the ~~cooperation~~ <sup>collaboration</sup> by)

1926 Resolution, asserting" the success

~~expedition~~

of Northern ~~attack~~ bears a most eloquent  
testimony simultaneously with ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> witness to this fact. However, while

co-operating

~~cooperating~~ with the propertied class,

we pointed out

~~it exposes its half-hearted attitude~~

~~instructed~~ <sup>and masses</sup> and ~~poor~~ workers to be sufficiently

prepared in anticipation of <sup>the</sup> bourgeoisie's

inevitable inclination toward ~~the side~~

of imperialists. The Chinese revolution

has now reached <sup>its</sup> climax; the revolution

of the ~~farm~~ <sup>organization</sup> villages has become the

centre of the anti-imperialistic movement;

and the  
Bourgeoisie has gone over to the side  
of the anti-revolutionists. The Chinese  
Communist Party must <sup>effect a</sup> fundamentally  
change its tactics; and (in WUCHANG and  
HANKOW) we must anticipate unavoidable  
disturbances and <sup>uprisings</sup> ~~rebellions~~. Again The  
Chinese Communist Party <sup>was</sup> given (the  
following) <sup>directive!</sup> ~~instructions~~:

1. To <sup>plan</sup> aim at the development of  
various popular movements in <sup>organization</sup> ~~farming~~  
villages and cities,
2. To arm workers and farmers;
3. To convert the <sup>left wing</sup> ~~leftist~~ nationalists  
into a large popular organization

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including farmer's associations, ~~workers~~  
<sup>labor</sup>  
~~unions~~

unions and ~~unions~~ of handcraftsmen<sup>1</sup>

4. ~~The communist party~~ <sup>To have the</sup> <sup>itself</sup> strengthen  
its ~~organization~~ <sup>for</sup> formation in class war

5. ~~To retain some communists~~ <sup>I have certain members of the</sup> <sup>Party remain</sup>  
Kuomintang <sup>the communist Party</sup> within  
the Nationalist Party; <sup>lest it lose its</sup> otherwise it cannot  
control leadership <sup>of</sup> for workers;

6. To convert the WUCHANG-HANKOW govern-

Kuomintang  
ment and the ~~Nationalist Party~~ into a <sup>sole</sup>  
revolutionary dictating organ for  
workers and farmers;

7. ~~To plan the~~ <sup>for</sup> <sup>attainment</sup> thorough achievement

of the farmer's revolution, while assisting  
the North<sup>Expeditionary</sup> Attacking Army, <sup>and</sup> <sup>strive</sup> to ~~make~~ efforts

A

for the disorganization of the  
of the rear line of the  
to ruin CHANG Kai-shek's army's rear line  
~~at an opportune moment for~~  
~~the rear, and to take the opportunity~~  
~~the complete destruction of~~  
~~of destroying the same army even~~  
~~with the use of armed~~  
~~by using force, revolt under~~

8. To solidify the ~~warfare~~ fighting front  
of workers, farmers and petit bourgeoisie to make  
them leaders of ~~popular~~ mass movements;

To unify  
9. Not to speak of the unity within  
the Communist Party, ~~to provide~~ and establish

(powerful) agencies  
formed secret systems within workers'  
unions and other organizations and

systems. most parties in all countries  
for their movement in response to the criticism of

and Next, the answer for the ~~opposite~~ criticism  
faction (" that is, ~~interference~~)  
opinion of TROTZKY's group, Why were

not the workers in SHANGHAI made to  
 the resolution  
~~it~~ answers:  
 resist CHIANG?" — "On that occasion  
 workers in SHANGHAI had no hope of  
 success. To rise in revolt under  
 whatever  
 any circumstances, is ~~contrary to~~ LENIN's  
 tactics. If a <sup>extensive fighting front</sup> ~~broad formation~~ had been  
 established  
~~spread in that~~ <sup>instance</sup>, the workers in SHANGHAI,  
 the flower of Chinese proletariat, would  
 have been annihilated by the combined  
 force of CHIANG's army and imperialists."  
 Finally, it <sup>criticizes</sup> ~~blames~~ the resolution  
 for the communist parties <sup>of</sup> all countries  
 for their insufficient support of the Chinese Communist Party,  
 and requested each country's <sup>them to prevent negative control</sup> (armed interference  
 in  
 with) China on the part of their respective countries.

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Based on this resolution, the famous, secret <sup>telegraphic directive to</sup> telegram for arming farmers was <sup>despatched</sup> ~~sent~~ from the Comintern in the first <sup>ten days</sup> decade of June to the ROY (?),

the leader of the Indian Communist Party, who was then <sup>(then staying)</sup> in HANKOW. The fact that

ROY secretly showed this to WANG Chao-ming resulted <sup>'in the'</sup> in the WUCHANG-HANKOW Government's decision <sup>to adopt anti-communistic policies.</sup> <sup>(however,</sup> ~~of opposing communists. This~~)

will be described later. ~~Let us~~ <sup>now</sup> glance

at ~~the development of the farmers'~~ movement, which has been <sup>not</sup> ~~touched upon~~ <sup>so</sup> ~~neglected~~

in the foregoing description. <sup>Since</sup> The questions concerning the problem of farmers <sup>are</sup> the most

important <sup>cause</sup> reasons of the } severing of relations  
secession  
~~between~~ ~~of the Nationalist Party~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~from~~ the Communist  
Party, let us now glance at the  
development of the farmers'  
movement, which has not yet been  
touched upon in the foregoing  
description.