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[IV] ~~We are afraid that~~ ^{Any other} ~~another~~ policy ~~beside~~
~~the above~~
is apt to lead the situation to ~~the~~ war.

Once we open ~~the~~ war with her,
there is no hope of finishing the war and
saving our honour unless we strike
a fatal blow ~~to~~ ^{on} the Chiang Kai-shek's
Government, while it is absolutely
necessary for us to prepare for
financial pressure, ^{and} needless to say
some diplomatic troubles ~~for~~ ^{from} Britain
and America. After all, we do
not hope to look on with indifference
the situation which will ~~be~~ ^{lead} led to

8
the war, ^{without any} ~~having~~ hope of ^{deciding} ~~saving~~ the
^{world}
~~situation~~ by a quick victory.

~~The~~ Plan II (A)

"A Proposal which ~~we should make~~ the
Nanking Government, ^{should be made to} recognize ~~together with~~
immediately upon the settlement of actual incident
~~the policy of settling the incident~~
in the ~~actual place~~".

The present disgraceful affair has,
on the one hand, originated from anti-japanese
movement in China and, on the other, it
has been caused by the fact that
officers and civilians in North China have
been influenced by a movement of the
National Government which ^{was} ~~has been~~ liable

to obstruct the cooperation between Japan
and the Political Committee of KISATSU.
HOPEH and CHAHAR Provinces

The National Government ^{has} successively declared

and asserted to control the anti-
japanese movement and , on the

other hand, the National Government
does not dare to oppose to a

legitimate ^{Sino} Chinese-Japanese coalition

in North China, ^{In view of these facts} we hope that the

National Government ^{would} ~~should~~ conclude

an agreement with the object of ~~stopping~~

the controlling of anti-japanese movement

and ^{from} the ~~China~~ - Japanese coalition in North China in order to settle the incident Δ and to make clear the relation between Japan and China.

Δ (in case of the withdrawal of our troops)

Note:
(Reference)

Perhaps Nanking Government will not accept our demand above mentioned on the ground ^{question of} ~~insisting~~ that the withdrawal should be settled first, but it is not quite hopeless.

But in this case Nanking Government ^{might} will assert that settlement conditions

of the incident should be sealed
between Japan and ^{the} Nanking Government,
and we are ^{there is fear} ~~afraid~~ that if the
Nanking Government ^{might} ~~would~~ deny
the direct negotiation between Japan
and ^{the HOPEI and CHAHAR Provinces} ~~China~~ (KISATSU)

We should be cautious about it.

Plan II (B)

13

~~The 2nd plan (B)~~

Previously we declared that our object of despatching troops lay in making China apologize and in getting guarantee to prevent the recurrence of this disgraceful incident.

But the present incident is mostly due to the fact that China has made it her business to ~~do~~ ^{make} anti-japanese movements and has not ~~proved~~ ^{shown} any sincerity for ^{the Sino} ~~China~~-japanese agreement.

Accordingly, we think it is most important for us to demand from China(1) the

~~perfect~~ ^{full} control of anti-japanese movement
 and (2) the affirmation of ^{the} an establishment
 of special administration in three
 districts of North China, ^(see reference) to make
 clear the relation between Japan and
 China, ^{and} consequently to secure the stability
 of the Orient.

If ^{the} Nanking Government ~~could~~ recognizes
 our demands above mentioned, we shall
 withdraw our ^{reinforcements} additional troops to
 their actual stationing ~~place~~ after
 having ascertained the settlement of the
 present incident.

In case of the negotiation with the National Government, we would like to show our respect for Chinese sovereignty upon land, if necessary.

(Reference.)

① The ~~perfect~~ ^{full} control of anti-Japanese movement.

Nanking Government should control the ~~communicated~~ ^{actually} movements which ~~had~~ ^{been} the ~~center~~ ^{essential} element of anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurian movements and dissolve secret societies which ~~are~~ ^{is} injurious to diplomatic relations

in order to control ~~partially~~ ^{fully} the anti-japanese movements. Moreover, the National Government should promptly put into practice the extermination of anti-japanese education, the control of anti-japanese text-books and magazines, the freedom, safety and ~~the~~ guarantee of Japanese people's travelling journey in China.

② Special administration of the three districts in North China.

i National Government should
 recognize the special administration
 which is suitable for particular
 situation in ~~Hebei, 察哈爾~~ HOPEH, CHAHAR
 and
 SHAN TUNG
 Shan Tung.

ii This special administration should
~~cooperate~~
~~cooperate~~ (with that of Japan
 in order to exclude communism.

o Reference.

"Sino-japanese agreement plan concerning the establishment of special administrative committee in three districts"

based on the following articles

We agree with each other

concerning ^{the} three districts in north China in order to ~~strengthen~~ ^{promote friendly} good relations between Japan and China and to secure the stability of the Orient.

Art. I.

The National Government should establish a special administrative committee of

the HOPEH, CHA HAR, and SHAN TUNG Provinces
~~three districts~~ in Tientsin in order
to manage ~~the~~ administration, ~~of~~ ~~Hopeh~~,
~~CHAHAR~~ ~~SHAN TUNG~~
~~察哈爾~~ and ~~山東~~, and, National

Government should give authority, which
can be applied to special situation,
to the committee according to the
objects of art. 2 or art. 4.

Art. II

~~The~~ A special administrative committee
of ~~the~~ ^{the} three ~~districts~~ ^{provinces} should cooperate
with Japan and ~~engage~~ in ~~the~~ ~~committee~~
~~business~~ of preventing ^{all} communistic
actions in order to exterminate communism.

Art. III.

The National Government should establish special institutions (with our consent) concerning tax system, highway system, banking system and financial, industrial and traffic systems.

Art. IV.

We should circulate and connect with each other concerning various, especially economic and cultural institutions, institutions which are necessary for ^{SINO} China - Japanese ^{coalition} ~~cooperation~~.

(Note)

Those we mentioned above are the essentials of our demands which are to be presented to ^{the} Nanking Government assuming the withdrawal of our troops, and as we have proposed our demands of this kind in every opportunity bringing every pressure ~~to bear~~ upon China, ~~and~~ they should be called "~~the~~ items ~~which were~~ already experienced", it is quite hopeless that Nanking Government would accept our demands by ordinary coercive negotiation.

Of course, we should be ready for encounter all over China or semi-permanent struggle if we want to carry through our purpose, and when we begin negotiation with ^{the} Hanking Government with our expeditionary forces inside Hanking (for example Kantō army) and with ^{other} reinforcements outside Hanking, it is certain that ^{the} Hanking Government will not accept our demands ~~surely~~, consequently our troops will be mortified and ~~it~~ will thus result in ^{causing} ~~promoting~~ an encounter between Japan and China.

Plan to meet situation

~~Saving plan of a case when our~~

Troops encounter ~~with~~ the Chinese army!

I In ~~A~~ case of encountering only with

Feng Chih-an army

① We ^{will} drive Feng Chih-an army away
from CHAHAR Province
察哈爾 district.

② We ^{will} show to ^{the} Nanking Government our
strong attitude of ^{being ready to} defeat ^{the} Chinese
Central army by our real ^{strength} ability

if they come up north to help the

Feng Chih-an army.

③ We ^{will} make Nanking Government recognize

the self-government of ^{HOPEH and CHAHAR} Chinese Government
to some extent. (~~It~~ ^{this} will not be realized
unless we strike ^{at blow on the} Nanking Government a
~~blow~~.)

ii We ^{press upon the HOPEH and CHAHAR} give pressure to Chinese Government
itself in order to separate it from the
Nanking Government.

II. ^{In} A case of encountering only ~~with~~
the 29th army.

① We ^{will} drive the 29th army away
from ^{CHAHAR} ~~察哈爾~~ except ^{the} pro-japanese
people.

② We ^{will} show ~~to~~ ^{the} Nanking Government
 our strong attitude of ^{being ready to} defeat ~~the~~ Chinese
 central army by our real ability
 if they come up north to help
 the 29th army.

③ We ^{will} establish a new government
 with Wu Pei-fu and Chi Hsieh-quan
 at the head, and this new government
 in fact, reality, will
~~be~~ ^{be} the self-governing government
 which ^{quite} is independent from ^{the} Nanking
 Government.

④ We ^{will} make ~~Nanking~~ Nanking Government recognize
~~a~~ ^{the} new Government and its

self-government. (^{this} ~~It~~ will not be realized
 unless we strike ^{blow on the} ~~the~~ Hanking Government
~~a blow~~.)

⑤ We should maintain public safety
 within a province ^{where a} ~~of~~ new Government ~~has been~~
~~set up~~
 by only peace preservation corps and
 make it a rule not to despatch
 troops there. As for frontier guard,
 Japanese army should be the main force,
 which will lead the
 of it with Chinese (new-organized ^{Chinese} guard
 corps ^{to work together there.} which are to be led by us.

Note:
(Notice)

- I. In the case of I or II,
 must be
 we ~~cannot help preparing for~~ ~~a~~
 situation that it will lead to anti-
 Japanese and boycott movements ^{which} ~~and~~
 it will ruin our commercial ^{rights} ~~supremacy~~
 in China, even if it will not sever
 diplomatic relations will not be severed
- II In the case of II, we ^{will} ~~become~~
 in North China
 to establish a Government ^{as that}
 HOPEH, SHANTUNG,
 of KITŌ, but we ^{must be} should prepare
 diplomatic
 for the complicated relations, especially
 that between Japan ^{with Great} and Britain.

III. In the case of encountering with
the 29th army and the Central army.
That is in case of war with China as a whole
(~~namely the war all over China.~~)

In this case we ^{will} make Chiang
Kai-shek ^{agree to} ~~recognize~~ all our
demands.

5-1)

[The 1st Plan]

On Aug. 6 this plan was consulted between HORINOUCI & UMEZU, vice-
Ministers of Foreign & War Offices and underwent some adjustments —
Kindly refer to P. 43 —

Evening 5 Aug 1937

[I] The Foreign Office will try secretly and as quickly as possible to have
the Chinese make proposals for peace.

[II] The conditions for saving the situation are mainly as follows:—

(1) The eastern & northern areas of PAOCHANG — CHANGPEI —

LUNGMEN — YENKING — MENTOUKOU — line (including areas

on the line) and the adjoining areas in the HOPEI Province,

left of the Yungtung & Hai rivers (including CHANGSINTIEN

& its neighboring uplands and TIENSIN & its neighborhood)

shall be a disarmed zone shutting out Chinese troops.

The maintenance of peace & order in these districts shall be

in charge of the 'Peace Preservation Corps' (If necessary,

(P. T. O.)

52)

a time limit shall be attached to the disarmed zone. But in case a time limit is attached, an understanding shall be reached that on its termination another disarmed zone shall be newly established along the Sino-Manchurian border, drawn by a fixed line. (30 kilometer from the Great Wall, for instance).

N. B. (I) For a disarmed zone a more sufficient tract of land is desirable as following: The

eastern & northern areas of PAOCHANG—CHANGPEI

— LUNGMEN — YENKING — MENTOUKOU — CHOW-CHOW —

KUAN — YUNGTSING — SINGAN — TULLUCHEN — HSINGNUNCHEN

(P. T. O.)

53)

— KAOSHALING line, including CHANGSINTIEN & its neighboring uplands & the neighborhood of TIENHSIN & TAKU.

However, we will be ready to accept the above (1) conditions if necessary.

N. B. (II) If necessary, we will express our willingness

to reduce ^{human power of our garrison} as voluntarily as possible ~~our garrison's~~

~~man-power~~ so far as the man-power at the time of the Incident's outbreak is concerned.

N. B. III The TANGKU Peace Agreement (including various agreements based thereon), UMEZU-HO YING-CHIN &

DOHIMARA-CHIN TE-CHUN Agreements shall be abolished.

(P. T. O.)

54)

(Though it is a matter of course that the Central Army having penetrated into the HOPEI Province shall have to be shut out of the Province)

N. B (IV) Although, as a matter of principle, the control of anti-Japanese movements and measures against Bolshevization in the above disarmed zone should be justifiably and naturally requested, its material arrangements shall be included in a ^{*} plan for general adjustment of Sino-

Japanese relations,

^{*} [It seems to be the above-mentioned plan
P. 24-]

(2) We agree to the dissolution of the KIHCHAY & KIHTUNG

Governments as well as direct administration of the

(P. T. O.)

55)

NANKING Government in these districts.

We hope, however, that the Chief Administrator in these districts would be an influential person suitable for realizing Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

N.B. I In the above (2) connection an agreement shall be reached on the gist of economic collaboration in NORTH CHINA and it goes without saying that it should be along the line of joint management based upon Sino-Japanese equality.

N.B. II Although we are prepared for dissolution of the KIHTUNG Government, considerations should be given

(P. T. O.)

56)

* It seems to be the above-mentioned P. 24 -

for making the most of it in the negotiations,

[III] Negotiations for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations from a

new standpoint shall be made concurrently with or

following the peace negotiations of the above [II]. Its

plan shall be mentioned in another article.*

N. B. (I) If the above peace agreement is reached between

JAPAN & CHINA, armies of the two countries shall be

withdrawn. However, in relation to the UMEZU - HO YING-CHIN

agreement- etc., ~~it is not till~~ ^{our army shall not commence} withdrawal of the

evacuation until the withdrawal of the Central
Central Army from the HOPEI Province is fully effected that
Army from ~~evacuation~~ Hopei Province is fully effected

~~our Army will commence~~ Our intention of evacuation, however,

(P. T. O.)

57)

will be timely announced on reaching the above peace agreement.)

N. B. II Further, on reaching the above peace agreement

a mutual announcement shall be made that the two Countries will henceforth enter into a 'New Deal' from a new standpoint for realization of rapprochement.

61)

[signed by the Vice-Minister]

Matters To Be Negotiated Concurrently With
Adjustment Of Diplomatic Relations.

The above-mentioned policy for saving the situation
expects : first, to relieve possible danger of clash
between Japanese & Chinese armies by setting up
a disarmed zone etc. ; second, to get rid of
the very cause of the rooted feud between the
two countries through a general adjustment of
diplomatic relations, thus establishing a really bright
Sino-Japanese relations on a new ground.

Therefore, it is our ideal that, with the
above bright relations fairly underway, questions

62)

pending between JAPAN & CHINA should be amicably solved in the regular course of negotiations, ~~the two countries'~~ ^{ever promoting the} good understanding ~~over promoting~~ between both countries,

However, with the development of the war situation ~~and~~ the people's expectation for the war achievement ~~ever~~ ^{would} grow ~~and~~, it is natural that they would be too eager for acquiring material conditions to be satisfied with such regular course of negotiations as mentioned above. Taking this domestic

63)

circumstances into consideration, negotiations shall be made on the following ^[special] conditions concurrently with that of diplomatic adjustment, taking the greatest possible care lest it should run counter to the magnanimous spirit of the above-mentioned situation-saving measures,

Special Conditions

[A] To form a big syndicate under Sino-Japanese joint management and carry on the following enterprises:-

(1) Marine Transportation; Amalgamation of the Chao Shang Chu
[Chinese Trade Bureau?]

(P. T. O.)

69)

and Nisshin & Dairen Steamship Cos.

(2) Aviation: -

1) SHANGHAI-to-FUKUOKA, TSINGTAO-to-

FUKUOKA, FUKIEN-to-TAIHOKU, CANTON-to-

TAIHOKU. aviation shall be put into

operation.

2) MANCHURIA-to-CHINA aviation (into which

shall be merged the Hweitung Co's

commercial line)

As for EUROPE-to-ASIA aviation, although it

is to be studied whether it should be included

(P. T. O.)

in the above syndicate or otherwise negotiated,
 the following 3), for the time being, shall be
 taken into considerations:

3) To merge the EUROPE-to-ASIA Aviation Co.
 into the above syndicate (We shall buy
 up German-owned shares of the company)

(3) Railways: —

- 1) Construction as well as management of
 TSINGTAO / TSINAN railway & its extension.
- 2) Construction & management of TIENTSIN
 / SHIHCHIACHWANG railway.

(P. 10.)

66)

3) Construction & management of CHENGTE

/ PEIPING railway.

(4) Mining: —

1) LUNG YEN iron mine.

2) TSING SING coal mine (German-owned

shares, however, shall be bought up by the

Japanese.)

[B] Solution of pending questions (^{the top number} ~~the order of the~~
of the following, ^{generally} chiefly shows ~~the order~~
following (1) — (3) ^{shows that of urgency}) : —
of the matter to be solved.

(1) Conclusion of Sino-Japanese customs agreement.

(Its details will be showed in List "Kō" table.)

(P. T. O.)

[Not contained in this set of documents]

67)

Lowering or removal of export & import
duty.

(2) Removal or softening of prohibition &

restriction of export & import (Its details

will be showed in List "Otsu") Not contained in this
set of documents

(3) Production of ^{salt} and removal of ^{its} export
restriction.

[END]

Draft made with the request of

Foreign Minister Hachiro ARITA

The first Section of Asia Bureau
Nov. 25, 1938.

1. Elements of our diplomacy with China.

Our diplomacy toward China aims to establish a new order by the political, economical and cultural concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and this relies on the following points:

1) We do not make peace with Chiang Government.

In case Chiang recognises and joins the newly established government we will consider in particular.

2) We wait the establishment of the new central government which will be created on ~~with~~ the basis of many pro-Japanese governments and operate the following in concert with the new central government:

- a) The concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China,
- b) Sino-Japanese concert in economy and ⁱⁿ national defense, the establishment of the special political and economic position of Mongolian Border (a puppet Government set up in 1938, with its jurisdiction over Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces),
- c) Establishment of the special sphere at the lower reaches of Yantsekiang for the economic concert between Japan and China.

d) ^{Establishment of} ~~We not only established~~ not only the special sphere in islands near the coast of South China of the basis for Sino Japanese concert in but ~~make~~ [^] the important cities in China. ~~the~~

~~basis for Japan Sino Japanese concert~~

e) ^{Estimation of the} ~~the~~ rights and interests of the powers in China ^{allowing} ~~was estimated~~ and ~~let~~ the third parties which

are pro-japanese participate in the economic development in the New China, unless their operations conflict the following:

a) Japan controls the defense of North China and Mongolian Border.

b) The monetary system, custom and maritime custom systems are to be regulated with the view of establishing Japan, Manchukuo and China economic block.

2. Elements of our diplomacy with the third parties.

In settling the China conflict we avoid the method of cooperating with the third parties, but by settling the conflict quickly with the aid of the axis powers we will make the third parties ^{support} ~~recognise~~ our

~~special position~~ attitude or remain spectators.

The points of operations are as follows:

1) We promote the political relations between Japan, Germany and Italy and the economic concert between two blocks, Japan and Manchukuo on one side and Germany and Italy on the other.

2) We make Britain, America and France recognise our policy toward China by the skilful settlement of the conflict and make them stop their aiding

Chiang Kai Shek and give up their policy of settling the conflict by their ~~concert~~ ^{joint operation}

~~As for the rights~~
~~and interests of ^{the third parties} Britain in China, with the view~~

~~to settle the matter smoothly, we estimate them and~~

~~settle the matter~~ As for the guarantee of the

rights and interests in China of the third parties,

we make the most of them, ^{and} with the view
to avoid ~~the~~ unnecessary frictions
to ~~settle the conflict smoothly~~ we settle ~~it~~ ^{quickly}

the matters which do not harm the superiority
of Japan in China.

3) We ^{take every endeavour} ~~do our best~~ that USSR may not take
part in the present conflict.

Item 96 (in triplicate)
"The 3rd Administrative Policy Toward
North China,"
Feb. 20, 1937.

was withdrawn from
here, for reproduction
upon request of
Mr. Phelps.

July 1, 1946.

J. J. J. J.

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網處次
理

Item #1634-9

北支指導方策
昭和十二年四月十六日
外務、大藏、陸軍、
海軍四大臣決定

was withdrawn
by instruction of
Mr. Phelps,

July 2, 1946.

J. Jamishige

English translation

Doc. No. 1634-9

Item # 7

國策の基準

外務大臣花押

總理陸海軍大臣

昭和十一年八月十一日

was withdrawn
by instruction of
Mr. Phelps,
July 2nd, 1946
J. Tomishige

Eng. trans.

Doc. No. 1634 - C

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1634

17 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: File; Important Decisions re: International and National Policies.

Date: Dec 1937- Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
Nov 1938

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No () (In part)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HIROTA, Koki; UMEZU, Yushijiro;
(TERAUCHI); NAGANO, Osami; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; (SUGIYAMA)
(KONOE); KAYA, Okinori; KIDO, Koichi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: All China Military
Aggression, Economic Aggression, Preparations for War,
Relations with Germany, USSR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains plans and policies decided upon by the War,
Navy and Foreign Ministers and Minister conferences mostly
in regard to China. An index in English is attached.

Important Items:

1. Preliminary arrangement with the Army concerning
policy towards China. (Report by MORISHIMA); Feb 15, 1935.
(Translation attached.)

Cites the tug-of-war between the business men, interest
in friendlier relations with China and young army officers
who held the view that HUANG should be overthrown and such
a person as WU PEI FU should be made their partner.

The reporter (apparently an official of the Foreign
Ministry) relates his discussions with Army and Navy officials
in Manchukuo and China, among them UMEZU who was then
Commander in Chief of the Jap Army in China and their
agreement obtained. The report states: "In TSINAN, I saw
HANATANI, too. I thought he had changed a good deal from

what he was for a time. Anyhow, I felt that as our army in North China was firmly controlled by its Commander-in-Chief UMEZU, the general situation would not take a wrong course." Upon return to Tokyo, further consultations with the Army led to Draft C, but due to objections by the army, an agreement was not reached until Nov 1934. This agreement had the form of Draft D. Diplomatic officials concerned were notified and advised to keep close contact with Army and Navy authorities.

The above mentioned Draft C states the aims of the China policy (cooperation among Japan, China and Manchukuo with Japan as center; development of commercial right in China.) and asserts "We must try to attain our objective step by step."

It continues: "On the other hand development of our commercial right in China, namely our building of a firm economic stand in China is not only in itself the basis of our policy towards China, but also is it an effective measure to control China with our influence and compel her to seek to approach us." Instead of forceful measures, "both Japan and, at the same time, the absolute deadlock in the interior government will lead China into such a position as will compel her.....to approach us."

Disturbances in the political situation in China should be caused only when inevitable for the protection of Japanese rights. Otherwise Japan will develop an atmosphere of dependency on her among the government officials and people and will put an end to the Anti-Japanese movement. The NANKING regime should be brought into such a situation that its existence depends on a new turn in the relations to Japan. Its attitude should be turned in favor of Japan "by so acting toward it that pro-Japanese persons will be appointed to official posts."

As to North China, the NANKING government should gradually be deprived of its influence there. Accordingly the same policy as stated for the NANKING regime should also be adopted towards the North China regime, allowing for a considerable amount of give and take. "We must develop such an atmosphere that the government officials and people in the North China area would come to possess a pre-occupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movements in that area, and after all, by developing our interest and creating the general atmosphere untainted with the anti-Japanese color, we should bring about such a situation as will make it impossible to ignore the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China whoever the leader of the government in North China may be." Generally, the

same attitude should also be applied towards the South-West Party and other local governments, whereby it is desirable that they should maintain their neutral attitude towards Nanking.

Economically, a condition should be brought about "in which the special economic relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China cannot be altered for political or other reasons."

2. Matters pertaining to policy towards China (War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers); Oct 4, 1935. (Translation attached.)

Aim: Cooperation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China with Japan as center.

Method: Make China (central and local government) adjust relations to Japan and Manchukuo. Economic and cultural fusion between Manchukuo and, at least, North China.

Chinese cooperation against "red menace" from Outer Mongolia. Conclude agreement re friendship and cooperation and, later, agreement regulating the new relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Attached document states: "Although in carrying out the present policy, we may take advantage of the political situation in China, by setting off the central and local governments in China against one another and by other means according to circumstances, it is not our true aim to do so with the object of especially promoting or interfering with the unity or disunity of China. Our aim lies in the realization of the points stated in the gist."

3. Outline of a plan for dealing with North China (War Ministry) Jan 13, 1936 (Translation attached.)

A copy of above outline was sent by HIROTA to diplomatic representatives in China and Manchukuo.

Establishment of Autonomy in North China is cited as a principle object. Support and guidance will be given to the new political organization.

Following is an outline of the Army plan for North China autonomy, beginning with Hopeh and Chahar ("The Hopeh-Chahar Political Council"), Peiping and Tientsin and gradually extending to the Five Provinces. The East Hopeh-Self Government ("East Hopei Autonomous Council") should finally merge into the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council.

In discussing the question of the extent of self-government for the people there the plan states: "We should aim at and endeavor for the realization of such a state as will leave no room for the Nanking government to carry out anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies, and by leaving the rest for gradual achievement in future we should avoid too hasty desire for an acquisition of independent powers."

The guidance should cover economic, military, educational affairs and "guidance of the general populace. Details should be left to the Chinese people. Jap advisors should be confined to various committees with the Hopeh-Chahar political council and the 29th army and to a minimum in number.

Operations towards Inner Mongolia are to be continued but confined to areas north of the Great Wall, so as not to disturb the expansion of the autonomy movement in Suiyuan.

"The management of North China would be the duty of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China, and as a rule, he should execute this duty by direct contact with the Hopeh-Chahar and East Hopeh governments; in doing so he should aim at giving advices and guidances informally."

4. This item has 3 parts: (a) Outline of Diplomatic Policy, Foreign Ministry, 29 June, 1936 (Extensive analysis attached). In paragraph 4, an understanding with Germany and friendship with Poland is urged, so that these countries "check the USSR from behind." (b) Outline of State Policy by the War and Navy Ministries, June 30, 1936 (Extensive summary attached to the document.) According to it, the fundamental policy of the Empire lies in "stabilization of the national defense and obtaining a firm position in the East Asiatic continent and, at the same time, advancing and developing into the Southern Seas."

✓ A plan for mobilization of Japan for a greater war than then existing is indicated in Point 2; the army must be strengthened "so that we can smash her /USSR/ Far Eastern Force with one single blow in the beginning." The Navy must be able "to hold the command of the Western Pacific against the American Navy." The military will assist in the diplomatic policy from the inside "without appearing on the surface." Public opinion must be unified "into a firm resolution of the people to break through the emergency." The development of industry and trade is stressed with special mentioning of "those necessary in executing national policies and in completing the national defense."

Further mentioned are: Improvement of the physique and "thoughts" of the people, development of aviation and shipping, autarchy re: materials for national defense, completion of a system of information and propaganda.

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The above outline/was submitted by the Army and Navy Ministers to the other 3 cabinet members participating. A note of criticism is injected by the Finance Minister and, especially, the Foreign Minister (ARITA), who "disapproves of such measures as special trading in East Hopeh" and expresses uneasiness about the phrase "to safeguard against Britain and the U.S." The Premier /HIROTA/ finds the plan satisfactory on the whole.

5. Basic Principle of National Policy, decided by the Premier, Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers on Aug 7, 1936. (Translation attached)

Follows in general the lines of Item 4. However, in the outline, after the words "the fundamental national policy is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asiatic Continent" (see above under 4a), the words "by means of diplomatic policy and natural defense, mutually dependent on each other" are inserted. The fundamental national policy includes the advance of Japan towards the South Seas. Also mentioned is the necessity of preparation against England and America. It is stated that, "with the completion of Manchukuo.....the repletion of our national strength and the intensification of the national defense should be accomplished." Diplomatic, financial and other policies should be geared to this basic national policy.

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Here the "increasing armed revolutionary power" of Soviet Russia is given greater stress as in the foregoing. It also deals with the question of the Soviet-Manchukuo and Manchukuo-Mongolia border. Reference is made to the decision of Oct 4, 1935 (see Item 2 above).

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The decision also deals with relations to the Philippines, Netherland Indies and Siam. /A.No.: The above decisions were the basis for later decisions, contained in this volume. Comp. Items 8 and 13./

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Consists of two drafts (?) varying only in a few words from each other and from Item 5 above.

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This decision deals with the policy toward China in accordance with the definition of Japan's foreign policy on Aug 7, 1936 (see Items 5 and 6 above).

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Defines the measure of Autonomy to be achieved by North China. Deals with Hopeh and Chahar Provinces (Article III) the East Hopeh Autonomous Council which should finally be placed under the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council (Article IV) and SHANTUNG, SHANSI and SUIYUAN Province, which are to be attracted by anti-communistic and pro-Japanese sentiments as well as by economic cooperation.

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Stress is given to the necessity of avoiding "the erroneous impression to China and other powers that our Empire has the intentions of enlarging the truce zone, advancing the frontier of Manchukuo, or else realizing the independence of North China. So in future policy towards North China, together with strict precautions against actions which may arouse such unnecessary misinterpretations, it is vitally important to attend solely to the execution of cultural and economic measures having as main objects

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17. The Foreign Office's Opinion re: Saving the North China Situation, July 30, 1937, (Translation attached) and plans resultant therefrom. States the Foreign Office's opposition to establishment of local governments, stresses the necessity of settling the North China Affair by direct negotiations with the Nanking government. This government should be recognized as the central government, Chiang should be impelled to accept Japan's requests unconditionally by way of capitulation or the Chiang regime should be brought to collapse as an internal reaction of the Central Army's defeat by the Japanese army. If this fails, Japan should "evacuate skillfully and with good grace, announcing that we have attained our objective....."

Included are also: Detailed suggestions made by the Foreign Minister to the War Minister to be put in practice after accord with the Navy Minister has been reached. (Dated Aug 3, 1937.)

The plan for the negotiations with Nanking aims at a widening of the region of the TANGKU Agreement. If accepted by Chiang it would mean a "smashing blow to the whole central army" and would substantially separate the region

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This is followed by a plan, signed by the Foreign, War and Navy Ministers in the Premier's office on Aug 7, 1937.

The final plan is contained in pp. 43 ff. of the attached translation.

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The army asked that a slip be attached to the Foreign Ministry plan (Item 17?) stating that its character is a plan of the F.M. re: response to the proposals by China. In case the Incident should be prolonged "the North China theater could not be left as it is now." F.M. and Navy oppose this proposal. In particular, "with regard to the Inner Mongolia Problem the essential policy in question alone cannot give the Navy a sense of security about the future attitude of the KWANTUNG Army." It is suggested that the three ministers reach an agreement on this point, viz: not to "act positively toward the area as we had done hitherto."

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The defeat of the Chinese 29th Army and the Chinese Central Army, which might come north to help the 29th Army, the establishment of a new government with WU-PEI-FU and CHI-HSIEH-HUAN and the possibility of Anti-Japanese boycott movements are envisioned.

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The Incident is to be concluded "by effective efforts of the armed forces together with timely diplomatic action."

The Military and Diplomatic Operations are then discussed. The document urges "to exercise utmost care not to overstep the limits fixed by International Law."

Total National Preparations corresponding to the occasion are to be resorted to "in anticipation of the possibility of the International situation reaching the stage of its extreme aggravation." (Nationwide mobilization wartime laws, national unity, etc.) Outline for the diplomatic readjustment and its aims are included.

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This draft foresees cooperation between Japan and the newly established China Government.

The conflict is to be settled quickly with the aid of the Axis Powers. Political relations between Japan, Germany and Italy and economic concert between the two blocks (Japan-Manchukuo and Germany-Italy) are to be fostered.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1634

17 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: File: Important Decisions re:
International and National Policies.

Date: Dec 1937- Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
Nov 1938

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No () (In part)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HIROTA, Koki; UMEZU, Yushijiro;
(TERAUCHI); NAGANO, Osami; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; (SUGIYAMA)
(KONOE); KAYA, Okinori; KIDO, Koichi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: All China Military
Aggression, Economic Aggression, Preparations for War,
Relations with Germany, USSR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains plans and policies decided upon by the War,
Navy and Foreign Ministers and Minister conferences mostly
in regard to China. An index in English is attached.

Important Items:

1. Preliminary arrangement with the Army concerning
policy towards China. (Report by MORISHIMA); Feb 15, 1935.
(Translation attached.)

Cites the tug-of-war between the business men, interest
in friendlier relations with China and young army officers,
who held the view that HUANG should be overthrown and such
a person as WU PEI FU should be made their partner.

The reporter (apparently an official of the Foreign
Ministry) relates his discussions with Army and Navy officials
in Manchukuo and China, among them UMEZU who was then
Commander in Chief of the Jap Army in China and their
agreement obtained. The report states: "In TSINAN, I saw
HANATANI, too. I thought he had changed a good deal from

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Page 1

what he was for a time. Anyhow, I felt that as our army in North China was firmly controlled by its Commander-in-Chief UMEZU, the general situation would not take a wrong course." Upon return to Tokyo, further consultations with the Army led to Draft C, but due to objections by the army, an agreement was not reached until Nov 1934. This agreement had the form of Draft D. Diplomatic officials concerned were notified and advised to keep close contact with Army and Navy authorities.

The above mentioned Draft C states the aims of the China policy (cooperation among Japan, China and Manchukuo with Japan as center; development of commercial right in China.) and asserts "We must try to attain our objective step by step."

It continues: "On the other hand development of our commercial right in China, namely our building of a firm economic stand in China is not only in itself the basis of our policy towards China, but also is it an effective measure to control China with our influence and compel her to seek to approach us." Instead of forceful measures, "both Japan and, at the same time, the absolute deadlock in the interior government will lead China into such a position as will compel her,....to approach us."

Disturbances in the political situation in China should be caused only when inevitable for the protection of Japanese rights. Otherwise Japan will develop an atmosphere of dependency on her among the government officials and people and will put an end to the Anti-Japanese movement. The NANKING regime should be brought into such a situation that its existence depends on a new turn in the relations to Japan. Its attitude should be turned in favor of Japan "by so acting toward it that pro-Japanese persons will be appointed to official posts."

As to North China, the NANKING government should gradually be deprived of its influence there. Accordingly the same policy as stated for the NANKING regime should also be adopted towards the North China regime, allowing for a considerable amount of give and take. "We must develop such an atmosphere that the government officials and people in the North China area would come to possess a pre-occupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movements in that area, and after all, by developing our interest and creating the general atmosphere untainted with the anti-Japanese color, we should bring about such a situation as will make it impossible to ignore the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China whoever the leader of the government in North China may be." Generally, the

same attitude should also be applied towards the South-West Party and other local governments, whereby it is desirable that they should maintain their neutral attitude towards Nanking.

Economically, a condition should be brought about "in which the special economic relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China cannot be altered for political or other reasons."

2. Matters pertaining to policy towards China (War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers); Oct 4, 1935. (Translation attached.)

Aim: Cooperation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China with Japan as center.

Method: Make China (central and local government) adjust relations to Japan and Manchukuo. Economic and cultural fusion between Manchukuo and, at least, North China.

Chinese cooperation against "red menace" from Outer Mongolia. Conclude agreement re friendship and cooperation and, later, agreement regulating the new relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Attached document states: "Although in carrying out the present policy, we may take advantage of the political situation in China, by setting off the central and local governments in China against one another and by other means according to circumstances, it is not our true aim to do so with the object of especially promoting or interfering with the unity or disunity of China. Our aim lies in the realization of the points stated in the gist."

3. Outline of a plan for dealing with North China (War Ministry) Jan 13, 1936 (Translation attached.)

A copy of above outline was sent by HIROTA to diplomatic representatives in China and Manchukuo.

Establishment of Autonomy in North China is cited as a principle object. Support and guidance will be given to the new political organization.

Following is an outline of the Army plan for North China autonomy, beginning with Hopeh and Chahar ("The Hopeh-Chahar Political Council"), Peiping and Tientsin and gradually extending to the Five Provinces. The East Hopeh-Self Government ("East Hopei Autonomous Council") should finally merge into the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council.

In discussing the question of the extent of self-government for the people there the plan states: "We should aim at and endeavor for the realization of such a state as will leave no room for the Nanking government to carry out anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies, and by leaving the rest for gradual achievement in future we should avoid too hasty desire for an acquisition of independent powers."

The guidance should cover economic, military, educational affairs and "guidance of the general populace. Details should be left to the Chinese people. Jap advisors should be confined to various committees with the Hopeh-Chahar political council and the 29th army and to a minimum in number.

Operations towards Inner Mongolia are to be continued but confined to areas north of the Great Wall, so as not to disturb the expansion of the autonomy movement in Suiyuan.

"The management of North China would be the duty of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China, and as a rule, he should execute this duty by direct contact with the Hopeh-Chahar and East Hopeh governments; in doing so he should aim at giving advices and guidances informally."

4. This item has 3 parts: (a) Outline of Diplomatic Policy, Foreign Ministry, 29 June, 1936 (Extensive analysis attached). In paragraph 4, an understanding with Germany and friendship with Poland is urged, so that these countries "check the USSR from behind." (b) Outline of State Policy by the War and Navy Ministries, June 30, 1936 (Extensive summary attached to the document.) According to it, the fundamental policy of the Empire lies in "stabilization of the national defense and obtaining a firm position in the East Asiatic continent and, at the same time, advancing and developing into the Southern Seas."

A plan for mobilization of Japan for a greater war than then existing is indicated in Point 2; the army must be strengthened "so that we can smash her /USSR/ Far Eastern Force with one single blow in the beginning." The Navy must be able "to hold the command of the Western Pacific against the American Navy." The military will assist in the diplomatic policy from the inside "without appearing on the surface." Public opinion must be unified "into a firm resolution of the people to break through the emergency." The development of industry and trade is stressed with special mention of those necessary in executing national policies and in completing the national defense."

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The above outline/was submitted by the Army and Navy Ministers to the other 3 cabinet members participating. A note of criticism is injected by the Finance Minister and, especially, the Foreign Minister (ARITA), who "disapproves of such measures as special trading in East Hopeh" and expresses uneasiness about the phrase "to safeguard against Britain and the U.S." The Premier /HIROTA/ finds the plan satisfactory on the whole.

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CHARGE OUT SLIP

OCT 28 1946

DATE _____

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 1634 D, I, J, K.

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. _____

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE *J. O. Jackson*
ROOM NO. 371 *(A, J, K)*

In Court

215
219
977-79

(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

"IMPORTANT DECISION RE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES".

Question Concerning Policy Towards China.
(7 December 1934)

I. General principle

1. The fundamental principle of our policy towards China lies (a) in making China follow the policy of the Empire to insure peace in East Asia by cooperation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China, with the Empire as centre, as well as (b) in developing our commercial right in China.
2. In view of the present situation in China, however, it is not only most difficult for us to quickly attain the object given in (a) of Article 7, by enforcing our policy against the political situation in China, but there is also danger of bringing about a contrary effect, if we are to carry out such a policy in haste. We must try to attain our object step by step.
3. On the other hand, development of our commercial right in China, namely our building a firm economic stand in China, is not only in itself the basis of our policy towards China, but also is it an effective measure to control China with our influence and compel her to seek to approach us. In order to develop the commercial right given above, it is necessary for us to strictly correct the anti-Japanese attitude of the central and local governments, while paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places in China which have close economic relations with Japan, and also growing an atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend on Japan.
4. Our side, therefore, should avoid, under the present circumstances, to take forcible measures going against the natural transition of the Chinese political situation. We should rather act in such a way as to lead their natural transition favorably for us and enforce earnestly and persistently the plans which are considered necessary for us in view of the actual condition in China, with the result that side by side with an absolute deadlock

in the domestic administration of China, which is considered a natural outcome of the transition of the Chinese political situation, we force China, after all, into such a situation that she is finally compelled to approach us.

II. Gist of Policy

1. General policy

(a) Although we should act with the idea to impress the Chinese government officials and people all the more with the firm resolution on our side that if the Chinese side continues her policy to destroy the peace in East Asia without awakening to its general situation, we will not give up requesting China to correct herself. We should take a strict and fair attitude towards her that if the Chinese side actually shows sincerity for a new turn in the Japanese-Chinese relations, but we must not seek friendship of our own accord. In case the Chinese trespass on our right, we should adopt necessary steps according to our own particular stand.

It is further necessary to pay attention to reforming the anti-Japanese policy, availing ourselves of their interior struggles.

(b) It would be inevitable that if we should cause agitation in the political situation in China as the result of our taking measures necessary for the protection of our interest as is stated above. Otherwise, we must not so act as to especially complicate the situation in China. We should develop our commercial right by paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places of China, especially in those places which are closely connected with Japan economically, in order to develop the atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend upon Japan, while, as to the anti-Japanese movement, we should firmly request that it should be given up.

(c) The Chinese psychology of befriending distant states and of antagonizing neighbors, which is the greatest obstacle for Japan and China to approach to each other, namely the psychology which makes China trust to chance to check Japan by borrowing foreign power, should be excluded with all our might, as well as various movements based on this psychology and the corresponding support given to China by foreign countries. For this purpose, diplomatic and economic policy should be enforced in a positive manner.

2. Policy towards the Nanking regime.

As the guiding principle of the National government fundamentally differs from the Empire's policy towards China, our basic principle towards the Nanking regime lies in bringing it, in the end, into the situation in which the existence of the Nanking regime depends on its showing sincerity in bringing a new turn for the relations between Japan and China. For this purpose, we must carry out persistently (a) and (b) in the General Policy given above. Especially, we must request the Nanking regime to give up the anti-Japanese movement, particularly, to control the movements of the party; while, as to the solution of the pending problems and the development of our interest, we must make more positive efforts than before, and lead the Nanking regime in our favor by taking such steps as will appoint persons convenient for us to carry out our policy for the government posts under the command of the Nanking regime.

3. Policy towards the government in North China.

Although we wish for a condition that the political influence of the Nanking regime will not extend to the North China area it will be difficult to bring about such a situation quickly, unless we are determined to use an enormous actual power. Therefore, we should aim, under the present circumstances, to gradually intensify the situation so that the political influence of the Nanking regime may be deprived of its power in the North China area according to the actual condition of that area. This plan should be realized step by step. Accordingly, we are to adopt, with necessary changes, our policy towards the Nanking regime stated above towards the government in North China as well. If the government in question is powerful and shows sincerity, we should deal with it with good-will and exert ourselves for the solution of the pending problems and maintenance and development of our interest, while trying, at least, to blockade the activities of the party actually. We should replace the official posts under the command of the government in North China with such persons as are convenient for the accomplishment of our policy, in order to develop the atmosphere in which the government officials and people in North China may come to have a preoccupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movement in that area, until at last, by developing our interest and promoting the general atmosphere untainted with anti-Japanese color, we shall bring about the condition in which the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China cannot be ignored, whoever the leader of the regime in North China may be.

4. Policy towards the Southwest Party and other local governments.

It is needless to say that towards the Southwest Party and the other local governments we should apply the general policy stated above and the policies which are based on it and which we apply towards the Nanking regime and the government in North China. But as it is desirable in checking the attitude of the Nanking regime against Japan that the Southwest Party, HANFU-KUEI, YUANJISHAU and others should keep the condition of confronting with the Nanking regime or assume inseparable attitude with it, we should show friendship towards these governments and maintain proper connection with them, if they show good-will towards us.

The new growth of such local political governments, however, should be left to the natural transition of the political situation in China. We must be careful not to be partial in supporting the Nanking regime. We should avoid to take such steps as will help the new growth of local governments in a positive manner.

5. Policy concerning the development of commercial right.

While enforcing each policy stated above, we should try to develop our commercial right in China. We must try to attain this purpose by leading each government to our advantage. At the same time, by seeking our object widely among financial groups, as well as among people in general, in order to promote economic relations with the nation. We must further contrive to develop a general atmosphere untainted with the anti-Japanese color and bring about the condition in which the special economic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China cannot be altered for political and other reasons.

(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

Paragraph 9.

Later, it was recognized by the respective Bureaus that the above-mentioned Paper D should be treated by the Foreign, Army and the Navy Ministries as "a description of the principle of what was agreed upon by the Section Chiefs concerned of the Army and Navy Ministries and the Foreign Ministry upon consultations under the supervision of the respective Bureaus".

.....
(Annexed Paper D)
(On separate sheet)

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File.

"IMPORTANT DECISION Re INTERNATIONAL and NATIONAL POLICIES."

The gist of plans for dealing with North China.

13 January 1936. The Army Department.

A. 1. Kimitsu (confidential) No. 8.
21 January 1936.

To Ambassador Ariyoshi in China.

From Foreign Minister HIROTA.

re dispatch of a copy of "the gist of plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army.

We have already informed you by telegram of an outline of "the plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army. Attached hereto, we send you a full text of the above-mentioned plans.

Copies sent to Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Manchoukuo, Chang-chia-kon.

Instruction to the commander of the stationary troops in China.

"Gist of plans for dealing with North China".

13 January 1936.

Policy:

The principal objects to be borne in mind in dealing with North China area, are to assist the Chinese people in realizing a self-government in North China by themselves, and thus to let the people enjoy their lives and jobs peacefully; also to let them adjust their relations with Japan and Manchoukuo, and thus promote the mutual welfare of these three nations. In order to realize the above objects, we are determined to give support and guidance to the new political organization and thus expand and strengthen its functions.

Gist of the plans:

1. Territorially speaking, the five provinces of North China will be made the object of the above-mentioned self-government; but we must be careful not to be too eager to enlarge in self-government area; on the contrary, we should first aim at a gradual realization of self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar provinces as well as in Peiping and Tientsin cities in accordance with the points given in paragraph 2 and others of this letter, and thus, we should aim at inducing the remaining three provinces to join the two voluntarily. Our advice and guidance to the Hopeh-Chahar political council should be given

through Mr. Sung cho Yuan for the time being, and self-government movements by the people should be encouraged insofar as they remain fair and just, and should make use of them in gradually realizing an actual self-government among the people of these two provinces, thus laying firmly the foundation of the self-government for the five provinces in North China.

With regard to the East Hopeh self-government, we should uphold its independency as long as the self-government function of the Hopoh-Chahar political council remains unsatisfactory, but when the self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar Provinces is established to such a degree as will generally justify our confidence in it, we should induce the East Hopeh self-government to merge into the Hopoh-Chahar political council at the earliest opportunity as possible.

2. With regard to the extent of the self-government, it would, of course, be better to let the people have as much liberty as possible, but for the present, we should aim at and endeavor for, the realization of such state as will leave no room for the Manchu Government to carry out anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies, and by leaving the rest for gradual achievement in future we should avoid too hasty desire for an acquisition of independent powers.
3. With regard to the guidance to be given by us, we should endeavor principally to guide in the economic field, especially in finance, and also, in military affairs, along with the education and guidance of the general populace; and in doing so, we should confine our guidance in the general line, leaving, as much as possible, the details to the task and responsibility of the Chinese people. In this connection, we should like to call your special attention to the following points:

In giving guidances this time, we are to take no such measures as might be misunderstood (by the world) that Japan is going to set up an independent state like Manchukuo, or she is intending to carry out an expansion of Manchukuo; accordingly, appointments of Japanese advisers should be confined to various committees within the (Hopoh-Chahar) political council and to the 29th Army, and their members should be restricted to the smallest possible number; moreover, these personnel and material which are necessary for public utilities and exploitation of industries, etc., inclusive of advisers mentioned above, should be sought from Japan proper as far as possible. With regard to economic penetration, it should be left principally to voluntary debouchment of private capital, and should be so guided as to serve for the realization of the principle of live and let live.

4. Operations towards Inner Mongolia should, of course, be continued on the line pursued hitherto; but those measures which might become obstacles to the strengthening of self-governing power of the Hopoh-Chahar political council and an expansion of self-government in Shan-si and Sui-yuan provinces, should be held back for the time being and the southward expansion of Mongolian influence should be

kept under proper control; consequently our operations in Inner Mongolia should generally be confined to the areas north of the Great Wall of China, and should not be allowed to extend into the area belonging to East Sui-yuan and Sunong villages.

5. The management of North China would be the duty of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China, and as a rule, he should execute this duty by direct contact with the Hopeh-Chahar and East Hopeh governments: in doing so, he should aim at giving advices and guidances informally.

With regard to economic penetration, the stationary forces should not assume a leading part, but should guide it from aside. However, for the convenience of assisting the Hopeh-Chahar political council, for the time being we are going to establish in Peiping a provisional organization which would be placed under the supervision of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China (concerning problems of the self-government organizations as well as of controlling advisers, etc.).

The Kwantung Army and various organizations in North China should cooperate in these operations. Besides, each military attache in China should act in concert with these operations, especially the military attachés to the Japanese Embassy and those residing in Nanking should try, from time to time, to convince the Nanking Government of the necessity of granting self-government to the North China area, and at the same time should try to get the approval of the Nanking Government for the six items pertaining to self-governing power for North China area, or at least, get the Nanking Government's promise that they will carry out no maneuvers which will disturb the self-government in North China.

6. In carrying out "these plans", the various military organizations mentioned above, should keep close contact with the officials of the Foreign Office and the Navy stationed in China, as and when the occasion may require.

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File

"Important Decisions re International and National Policies"

Basic Principle of National Policy, 7 August, 1936,

Decided by Prime Minister
Foreign Minister
Finance Minister
War Minister
Navy Minister

- I. The basic principle of governing the state is to realize the ideal of the founding of the Empire, which means to solidify, based on righteousness, the national foundation inwardly and prosper outwardly, making the Empire both in name and reality a stabilizing power in East Asia, thus securing peace in East Asia, and contributing to the well-being and happiness of the whole world.

In view of the situation in and out of the Empire, the fundamental national policy to be established by the Empire is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asia Continent by dint of diplomatic policy and national defence, mutually dependent on each other, as well as to advance and develop the Empire toward the South Seas. The basic principles are as follows:

1. It is the realization of the Imperial way to correct dominating policies of the powers and to share mutual happiness according to the real spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity. This should be our consistent guiding principle for our outward developing policy.
2. We should replete our national defence and military preparations, which are necessary to secure peace for the nation, protect its development, and to ensure the position of the Empire, which should be a stabilizing power in East Asia.
3. The fundamental principles of our continental policy are as follows: a sound development and accomplishment of Manchoukuo; intensification of national defence of Japan and Manchoukuo in order to eradicate the Soviet menace in the north and at the same time to prepare against Britain and America; and realisation of a close cooperation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China for our economic development. In carrying out these policies, we should be careful to have friendly relations with other countries.

C E R T I F I C A T E

5 September 1946

I hereby certify the attached copies are the true extracted copies of official documents in the files of this Bureau.

/s/ S. Nakanishi
Sadayoshi Nakanishi

Acting Director,
POW Information Bureau

P.O.W.

Document No. 1630-C

Page 2

No. 1

EXTRACT FROM MONTHLY REPORT NO. 5 ON PRISONERS
OF WAR, POW INFORMATION BUREAU. (Vol. UA-1)

1. General Affairs.

- (3) On 25th and 26th June, necessary directives regarding POW matters (on the basis of the documents distributed at the meeting of the Chiefs of POW Camps held on 25 and 26 June) were given to the Chiefs and staff personnel (appointee Chiefs of the Branch Camps) of Korea and Taiwan POW Camps, at the POW Information Bureau.

EXTRACT FROM MONTHLY REPORT FOR JULY ON PRISONERS
OF WAR, POW INFORMATION BUREAU (Vol. UA-1)

1. Group Instruction regarding the treatment of Prisoners
of War.

(1) On 7th and 8th July, at the POW Information Bureau,
Group Instruction regarding the treatment of prisoners
of war was given to the chiefs and some of the staff
personnel of the Thailand, Malaya, Philippine Islands,
Java and Borneo POW Camps to be established in the
near future.

Ranks and names of the attendants, the curriculum
schedule, the address of instruction of the War
Minister and list of the documents distributed are
shown in attached appendices No. 1 - 4.

ATTENDANTS

Prisoner of War Camp	Rank	Grade	Name
Thailand Prisoner of War Camp	Chief	Major General	SASSA, Makoto
	Staff	Lt. Colonel	ICHIMOTO, Tami
	"	Lt. Colonel	YAMAMOTO, Seichi
	"	Lt. Colonel	NAGATOMO, Yoshitada
	"	Lt. Colonel	TOYODA, Sotomatsu
Malaya Prisoner of War Camp	Chief	Major General	FUKUE, Shimpie
	Staff	Lt. Colonel	MAKIMURA, Aizo
	"	Lt. Colonel	SAKANO, Hiroaki
	"	Major	MATSUDAIRA, Shoko
Philippine Island Prisoner of War Camp	Chief	Major General	MORIMOTO, Ichiro
	Staff	Major	IWANAKA, Yasuaki
	"	Major	MAEDA, Kazuo
Java Prisoner of War Camp	Chief	Major General	SAITO, Seiei
	Staff	Lt. Colonel	KAWAMURA, Hideo
	"	Lt. Colonel	KAWABE, Tadashi
	"	Major	MATSUNAGA, Masayoshi
	"	Major	EBIKO, Yoshitaro
	"	Major	ANAMI, Misoo
	"	Major	HAYASHI, Hisaichiro
Borneo Prisoner of War Camp	Chief	Major	SUGA, Tatsuji

Curriculum Schedule

<u>Date</u>	<u>Items to be Explained</u>	<u>Explainer</u>
July 7	War Minister's Address of Instruction	Read by the Chief of Prisoner of War Administration Section
	Speech and explanation of Prisoners of War disposition by the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau and concurrently the Chief of the Prisoner of War Administration Section.	
	General situation regarding prisoners of war; various international regulations regarding prisoner of war; business regulations of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau; Prisoner of War Administration Section and Prisoner of War camp.	Colonel YAMAZAKI
	Prisoner of War labor Prisoner of War punishment	Lt. Colonel YASUDA
	Information regarding prisoners of war Various notices regarding prisoners of war Prisoner of war identification cards Prisoner of war sanitation	Major YAMAUCHI
July 8	Prisoner of War allowance Prisoner of War relief Prisoner of war abandoned and confiscated personal property Military internees	1st Lt. YOTSUMOTO
	Prisoner of war correspondence Information regarding enemy war dead	1st Lt. SAITO
	Round Table Conference	

War Minister's address of instruction given to the newly appointed chiefs of prisoner of war camps, at the War Ministry on July 7, 1942.

(This speech is known as Document No. 1630-A)

List of Distributed Documents

1. Curriculum schedule for the conference of the newly appointed chiefs of prisoner of war camps.
2. War Minister's address of instruction.
3. Gist of the Chief's speech.
4. Various regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and some documents for reference.
5. Explanation of the principle of the disposition of prisoners of war.
6. Matters to be explained in connection with affairs concerning prisoners of war.
7. Matters regarding prisoners of war labor.
8. Matters regarding prisoners of war punishment.
9. Matters concerning the labor of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers.
10. Essentials regarding the transportation to Japan proper of prisoners of war who have excellent technical knowledge.
11. Regarding information.
12. Regarding notices concerning prisoners of war.
13. Regarding prisoners of war identification cards.
14. Regarding prisoners of war sanitation.
15. Matters pertaining to prisoners of war allowance.
16. Answers to questions regarding prisoners of war allowance and extracted documents for reference.
17. Matters regarding prisoners of war relief.
18. Matters regarding prisoners of war confiscated articles, personal belongings, abandoned property, and wills.
19. Matters regarding military internees.
20. Matters for reference in connection with the treatment of internees in the occupied area.
21. Questions and answers regarding the matters for reference pertaining to the affairs of prisoners of war.
22. Outline of the International Red Cross Commission and Japan Red Cross Prisoner of War Relief Committee.
23. Matters regarding prisoners of war communication.
24. Matters regarding the enemy war dead.
25. Chart showing the division of business in the Prisoner of War Information Bureau and the Prisoner of War Administrative Section.

Documents for reference:

- Prisoner of War Information No. 1 - No. 5.
- Example of Regulations for controlling prisoners of war at POW camps.
- Example of the standing orders of prisoner of war camps.
- Example of the service stipulation of prisoner of war camps.
- Example of regulations covering prisoners of war daily routine.
- Example of the C.Q. stipulations of prisoners of war camps.
- Example of the regulations regarding the guard at prisoner of war camps.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1630-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Acting Director POW Information Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, and described as follows: Extract from Monthly Report for July on Prisoners of War, POW Information Bureau (The 25 documents listed in Appendix IV and reference documents referred to were burned)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): POW Information Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of December, 1946.

--/s/ S. NAKANISHI -----
Signature of Official
SEAL

Acting Director
-- POW Information Bureau --
Official Capacity

Witness: K. Yokoi /s/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of December, 1946.

-- /s/ Henry Shimojima -----
NAM

-- Investigator IPS -----
Official Capacity

Witness: R. H. Larsh /s/

THE 3rd ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY TOWARD NORTH CHINA

Feb. 20, 1937.

The object in view

1. The principal object of administrating North China is to complete our aim of making Manchukuo quite pro-Japanese and pro-anti-com-intern, procuring defense materials, enforcing transportation, preparing the defense against U.S.S.R. and establishing the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China.
2. To complete the above object, we do our best for the economic policy in North China, aid in secret government of North China and make Nanking Government recognize the speciality of North China and aid the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Principles

1. Attitude toward Administrating North China

The measures which we took for North China made the foreign powers think that we were aggressive in China. So we must abstain from all the actions as give other powers misunderstanding of our intention. We should do our best for the culture of the people in North China.

For the economic development of North China we welcome the investment of private capitals. To the demand by the Government of East Hopeh and by that of Nanking we should always respond with sympathetic attitude. For the special trade and for free flight in East Hopeh we continue our already decided plan to settle the matter quickly.

2. In guiding the government of Hopeh and Chahar, we must take a fair attitude, evade all the militaristic policies in finance, economy and military affairs and win the popular mind.
3. In guiding the government of East Hopeh, we aid the progress in its inner government and its industries. We must establish there the paradise free from the exploitation by Chinese militarists.

Considering that East Hopeh cannot govern itself, we must not take any measures as to hinder the guidance of East Hopeh.

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Considering that East Hopeh cannot govern itself, we must not take any measures as to hinder the guidance of East Hopeh.

4. Guiding the governments of Shantung, Shanhsi and Suiyuan.

We aim the concert of these governments with Japan by our cultural and economic policy for these governments. As it may stimulate the anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese if we carry out our anti-comintern and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchukuo propaganda, we must pay strict attention.

5. Object of developing Economy.

We welcome the investment of private capitals, and by the extension of our rights and interests in North China we establish the close friendship between Japan and China. By thus establishing the friendship not only in time of peace but in time of war we may procure the materials for munition industries.

As for the interests and rights of the third parties, we must estimate them, and in case of need we concert with them or we make the most of their capitals.

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File

"Important Decisions re International and National Policies"

The second administrative policy toward North China.

Determined by the Ministries concerned on 11 August 1936.

- I. The main purpose of our administrative policy toward North China is to assist the people in North China in procuring perfect independence in administration and to set up anti-communistic and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian area and to secure necessary materials for our national defence, as well as to improve the facilities of transportation against the possible invasion of Soviet Russia, and for making North China a base for the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as for mutual aid.
- II. For this purpose, we should guide the local political powers and make the Nanking Government recognize the characteristic feature of North China so that the Nanking Government may not only hinder the self-administration of North China, but also may afford a special and comprehensive power of self-government.

The gist of the policy.

- I. Contents of self-government.

The contents of self-government consists in making the North China Government exercise its power over the finance, industries and transportation of North China and in making North China free from the anti-Japanese interference of the Nanking Government by our taking political and economic policy, aiming at the cooperation and the mutual aids of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as by the promotion of the happiness of the people in North China. We should strictly avoid such acts as would be suspected of disapproving China's territorial right of North China or of bringing about an independent country free from the Nanking Government or of making North China an extension of Manchukuo.

- II. Scope for self-government.

Five provinces in North China should finally be put under self-government. We, however, should not be too eager to enlarge this area, for that is not our purpose. We should put our efforts mainly in brightening Hopeh and Chahar Provinces by developing economically and keeping the public minds easy and stable. As for our measure toward the other three provinces, see Clause No. 5.

- III. Guidance of Hopeh and Chahar political powers.

Our fair and square attitude is required for the guidance of the political powers of these two provinces. We should improve the

governmental system and purge and innovate the personnels of the governments. We should also try to abolish the financial, economic and military administration of the Chinese military cliques, thus brightening the whole area and drawing the people's heart to Japan.

However, in carrying out these measures confidentially, we should act in such a manner as to make the Nanking Government assist us in our policy toward North China, and by making the most of the Nanking Government, we should strive for the best results.

IV. Guidance of the East Hopeh Autonomy Government.

In guiding the East Hopeh Autonomy Government, an advice should be given to the government so that the internal administration may be reformed, and that the reforms may serve as example for the Hopeh and the Chahar Government to follow.

Also, considering the fact that the said Autonomy Government cannot stand alone, we should see that no measure is taken toward the government that may prove a hindrance to the federating of the five provinces of North China.

It must be recalled that East Hopeh should be placed under the political power of the Hopeh and Chahar Autonomy Government as soon as the latter has been recognized to be consolidated enough to function as an independent government.

V. Guidance of Shantung, Shansi and Suiyuan Autonomy Governments.

It is not a wise policy to force Shantung under the Hopeh and Chahar Autonomy Government, for such a measure would make it hard for the province to depend upon Japan and would threaten the existence of the province itself. Accordingly, we should try to bring about a closer interrelation between Japan and the province by taking measures aiming at the diffusion of anti-communism and pro-Japanese sentiment as well as by forming an economic cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo, and China.

The same measure should be taken toward Shansi and Suiyuan. It is a matter of course that our policy toward these two provinces should not conflict with that toward Inner Mongolia. As our policy toward China should be carried out smoothly, we should not take such a measure as to eliminate the political powers of the provinces or to place the provinces under the political power of Inner Mongolia.

VI. The purpose of our economic development in North China is to create an inseparable connection between China and Japan based on the mutual economic interest promoted by the civilians' free investment and also to make it contribute toward the preservation of friendly relations between Japan and North China, both in time of war or peace. Iron, coal and salt existing in the province should be utilized for our national defence and for the promotion of our transportation facilities and electric power. And these materials should, in case of need, be produced with our own capitals.

Along with our economic development, we should make the third countries respect our interests. If necessary, we should undertake enterprises jointly with these countries, make use of their capitals and materials, and should be careful to cooperate with them, especially with England and the United States.

Supplement.

(Decided by the Ministries concerned
on 11 August 1936)

1. The separate paper No. 1 has been devoted to a description of the measures which we should recommend to the local political power of Hopeh and Chanar in the near future.

Note: The same measure should be adopted for the East Hopeh Government.

2. The separate paper No. 2 has been devoted to a description of the natural resources which should be utilized soon for our national defence. The definite details of our measures are subject to alternation; upon further investigation, we should also consider the means of obtaining the funds required for carrying out our plan.

I. Regarding custom tariff.

The object of imposing tariff is to make the Hopeh and Chahar Autonomy Government gain the custom tariff of Hopeh. (They should subtract from the custom revenues the amount necessary for redeeming the foreign debts allotted and the amount necessary for covering the custom expenditure and if necessary subtract the liable portion of the domestic loan).

This procedure should, as a rule, be done through mutual understanding between the Hopeh and Chahar Autonomy Government and the Nanking Government. And if the Nanking Government opposes it, we should force the custom superintendent to consent to the Hopeh and Chahar Government's command of the custom house, thus gaining for the latter the proceeds of the tariff. On no occasion, however, should we seize the customs house by force, or forcefully interfere with the personnel of the customs house, or split or disunify the tariff system, or set up a special custom system or a special custom area, nor should we seize or reserve the allotments to redeem the foreign loans.

II. Financial Policy.

Although our ultimate aim in view is to set up a central safe in North China, independent of financial control by the Nanking Government, the present financial conditions in North China and the monetary and financial policy of the Nanking Government and other state of affairs do not allow us to realize it presently. It is advisable to

investigate the existing financial organs in North China like the Hopeh Bank, select one from them and solidify it enough to be the central safe in Hopeh and Chahar.

III. Control of the central power of tax imposition, excluding custom duties.

Regarding the central power of imposing of salt duty and other duties, it should be executed according to Clause No. 1. Care should be taken not to interrupt the unification of taxation, and double imposition of taxes must be avoided. While aiming at collecting income, we should leave alone that part concerning foreign debts.

IV. Transportation and Communication.

We should unify and improve the existing facilities of transportation and communication. The extent of their administration should be determined according to the development of concrete problems. However, they may be divided into two groups, namely, those connected with the local administration and those connected with the national government. The former should be made to acquire as much power as possible, while in the latter case a close connection should be kept between the transportation and communication facilities of the Nanking Government so that national unity may not be severed.

C.F.

The decision reached at the Washington Conference regarding the unification of Chinese national railways is to be referred to.

Annexed No. 2.

A. Resources for our national defence.

I. Iron ore.

The iron mines in Lungian and Hopeh should be developed first of all.

The Hsingchung Company should be appointed to begin mining, aided by the South Manchurian Railway Company. However, whether the outcome should be exported in the original form or transformed into iron and then exported depends upon the condition of the iron manufacturing industry in Japan and Manchukuo, and also depends upon whether it is profitable or not for the industrialists in Japan and Manchukuo.

The mining operation of the Kinlingchen Iron Mine should depend upon the progress of the mining operation in Hopeh and Chahar, since Japan has considerable interest in the former mines.

II. Coal mines for coke production.

The Tsingsing Mine has much to do with the construction work of the Tsinshi Railway, and its products should be exported into Japan. Therefore, the mine should be developed under the joint management of Japan and China.

We should urge the unification of the small mines centered around the Shantung and the Poshan Mines and run them consolidatedly.

As to the mining of the Kailuan Mine, we should not mine it at the sacrifice of the Tangshan Mine or the iron manufacturing industry in North China. And the mining of the same should finally be brought under the joint management of Japan, England, and China.

Production should be suitably increased in the Tsingsing and the Poshan Mines for this purpose.

III. Salt making industry.

Improvement and the promotion of the production of Changlu salt and Shantung salt.

Although the salt industry should be left to the Chinese people to run it, necessary Japanese financial and technical aids should be given. The improvement and the increase of production of Changlu salt as well as its exportation to Japan should be speedily attained according to the established policy.

IV. Cotton Industry.

We should try to improve and promote the cotton industry, first in Hopeh and Shantung and then in Shansi and other provinces. Needless to say, it is necessary to make the Chinese awaken to the need of improvement and increase of production. But proper advice and encouragement on the part of the North Chinese Government should be given. It is to be recollected that Japanese financial and technical aids should be rendered.

We should make the Cotton Warehousing Company and the Transportation Company, which are to be set up by the Hsingchung Company, facilitate cotton transportation and its transaction for the development of the cotton industry.

V. Liquid fuels manufacturing industry.

We should encourage the liquidating work of the coals which are produced in North China, especially in Shansi, with Japanese skill and capital.

VI. Wool Industry. Encouragement of wool industry by improving and increasing sheep.

Efforts should be made first in Chahar, Hopeh and Shantung, and then in Suiyuan and other northwestern districts of North China. We should not be too eager for success in the improvement and increase of sheep, but for the time being, we should put stress on giving technical guidance to the industry.

B. Other establishments for our national defence.

While we should encourage the development of the aforementioned industries, we should keep up with their management even in time of war. For this purpose, we should try to strengthen the means of transportation in North China, especially the railway for the transportation of the coals of the Lungian and the Tsingsing Coal Mines, and if necessary we should improve speedily the ports and bays concerned. The improvement of the Pingsui Railway and its westward extension and the extension of the Shantung Railway are matters of vital importance for our national defence and economy. Therefore, we should carry them into practice.

OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(Decided by the Ministries
Concerned on 11 August 1936)

For the present, our policy toward China should be according to our foreign policy defined on 7 August 1936. It is as follows:

(Part of Item 8: beginning of Item 8, Chapters 1 and 4)

(1) Our Policy Toward North China.

The main purpose of our policy toward North China is to make the area anti-communistic and to make it friendly to Japan and Manchukuo and to secure national defense materials for Japan as well as to better its transportation facilities so that our national defense against Soviet Russia's invasion may be perfect and the cooperation and mutual assistance of Japan, Manchukuo and China may be secured. It is to be learned that the area to be turned friendly toward Japan, China and Manchukuo consists of 5 provinces in the northern part of China.

However, it is not a wise policy for Japan to try to extend our power or to try to gain administration in a hurry, since such a policy will surely cause more trouble without achieving the very object. We may say that it would be detrimental to our diplomacy toward Soviet Russia. We should rather devote ourselves to gain administration over Hopeh and Chahar first and then to get the rest of the provinces ready for economic cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as for making them anti-communistic and pro-Japanese.

Regarding the manner of our administration, we should try to realize substantial gain regardless of the denomination of our administration. Again, we should be careful not to disgrace the Nanking Government. The wisest way for us is to lead the Nanking Government to acknowledge our administration as if it were willingly entrusted to our charge. And, in our accepting it from the Nanking Government, we may place the Nanking Government under obligation. We may in turn ask a favour of the Chinese Government.

In order to gain as much as possible from this bargaining, the Japanese Central Government as well as the local Japanese officials should become one in acting rigidly as well as according to circumstances lest it should allow the Nanking Government to take the so-called double policy.

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File
"Important Decisions Re
International and National Policies"

PLANS FOR GUIDING NORTH CHINA

(Decided by the Foreign, Finance, War and Naval Ministers)

16 April 1937

General Policy

1. The essence of the guidance of North China is to make the said area virtually a firm anti-Communist pro-Manchu Japanese region, and also contribute to the acquisition of communicational facilities, thus partly preparing against the Red threat and partly forming a foundation for realizing the unity and mutual aid of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

2. In order to attain the above aims, for the present our first and main efforts will be in carrying out economical measures with the North China populace as object. When carrying out the above measures, besides internal guidance of the North China regime, the Nanking regime must be guided through policy applied to it to recognize the special position of North China, and to voluntarily cooperate to the policies of Sino-Manchu-Japanese unity and mutual aid.

Important Principles

1. Attitude in guiding North China.

It cannot be denied that our policy towards North China what with the geographical peculiarities of the region, has not infrequently in the past given "the erroneous impression to China and other powers that our Empire has the intentions of enlarging the truce zone, advancing the frontier of Manchukuo or else realizing the independence of North China. So in future policy towards North China, together with strict precautions against actions which may arouse such unnecessary misinterpretations, it is vitally important to attend solely to the execution of cultural and economic measures having as main objects secure and facile life and work for the North China populace, thus contributing to the achievement of our expected aims."

In developing North China culturally and economically, we must strive to assume a liberal attitude and labor for a free expansion of civilian capital; together with that; it is necessary to deal with an understanding manner, the demands of the Hopei-Chahar or the Nanking regimes which can be considered pertinent or understandable from the view of "face". Concerning the problems of special trade in the Hopei-Shantung area and unrestricted flying in North China, speedy solutions must be planned.

2. Guidance of the Hopei-Chahar regime.

In guiding the Hopei-Chahar regime, the most open and upright attitude must be maintained, and it is especially necessary to strive to win the people's goodwill by liquidating militaristic misrule of finance, economics, military affairs and all other matters, thus constructing a healthy region.

3. Guidance of the Hopei-Shantung Autonomous Government.

In guiding the Hopei-Shantung Autonomous Government the improvement of its internal administration shall be especially endeavored, and together with all out development of industry, it shall be made into a model region of safe and easy life and work, truly free from militaristic exploitation and misrule,

thus endeavoring to realize as concrete facts, our Empire's just and equitable true will.

In the above policies, it must be considered that the Hopei-Shantung Autonomous Government cannot exist solely by itself, and it is necessary not to exact any measures which may be an obstacle in guiding the various regimes of North China.

4. Guidance of the Shantung Shansi and Suiyuan regimes.

The chief view in policy towards these regimes, especially that of Shantung, is to, by the gradual execution of cultural and economical measures with Sino-Manchu-Japanese fusion and unity as its aim, make still more firm the joint connections between them and our Empire. In the above policy the most open and upright attitude shall be maintained, and it is necessary to avoid political measures which may be feared might only excite the populace's emotions and give the Chinese excuses for anti-Japanese moves.

5. General lines for economical development.

The aims of economical development of North China is, together with promoting our interests which advocates the free advance of civilian capital, to invite Chinese capital also, thus constructing as inseparable Sino-Japanese situation based on the economical profits of Chinese and Japanese in accord, and to contribute to the maintenance of North China's pro-Japanese attitude both in peacetime and in war. Especially the development of those military resources vital to national defence (iron, coal, salt, etc.) and the establishments of communications, electricity, etc., connected to this shall be speedily realized, by special capital if necessary.

In the economical development, together with making the third powers respect our special position and interests in North China, their interests shall be respected, and if necessary projects will be made jointly or their capital and material utilized, thus, unity and mutual aid with them, especially Great Britain and the U.S.A., shall be considered also.

The Basis of National Policy

June 30, 1936 (SHOWA 11)

The War and Navy Ministries

I. The fundamentals of administering state affairs lie in strengthening our national foundation at home and bringing about the prosperity of our nation abroad so that, on the basis of the relations between sovereign and subject, our Empire may secure the peace of the Orient and contribute to the welfare of mankind as the real stabilizing power in East ASIA, thereby realizing the ideal underlying the foundation of our nation. In view of the internal and external situation of the Empire, her fundamental policies must consist in advancing and developing in the Southern Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Oriental continent for the stabilization of our national defense.

These fundamental policies are as follows:

(1) We must strive to correct the great Powers' aggressive policies and share happiness and favor with others according to a real principle of give and take; that is to say, our guiding principle must be to realize the spirit of the 'Imperial Way' (KODO) by a consistent policy of overseas expansion.

(2) We must complete our national defense armament in order to maintain peace and tranquillity, to safeguard our prosperity and to secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East ASIA in fact as well as in name.

(3) We expect the sound development of MANCHUKUO and hope by accomplishing this to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense; thus in order to promote our economic development, we intend to get rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R., while preparing against BRITAIN and the U. S. and bringing about close collaboration between JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA. This is the basis of our continental policy in the execution of which we must also pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.

(4) We plan to promote our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the Outer Southern Seas, and without rousing other powers to action, we must attempt to extend our strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of MANCHUKUO in addition to the above, we may expect the full development of our national resources and the completion of our national defense.

II. On the basis of the above fundamental national policies we expect to reform our government system so as to make it suitable for the present external and internal situation, and to unify political, financial and economic policies both within and without the country. The essential points are as follows:

(1) Defensive armament preparations.

a) The aim of our military preparations is to enable us to cope with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilize in the Far East. Especially, our force in MANCHUKUO and KOREA must be strengthened so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning.

b) As for the navy, we must complete its armament sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U. S. Navy.

(2) The first principle of our diplomatic policy lies in the smooth execution of our fundamental state policies as well as synthesizing and renewing them. The military will give undercover assistance without appearing on the surface so that the activities of our diplomatic organs may progress advantageously and smoothly.

(3) We must reform and improve our administrative system and establish an economic and financial policy by means of every facility available so as to strengthen our defensive strength and to promote our economic development vigorously. For this purpose, we will take suitable steps concerning the following matters.

a) We should direct and unify internal public opinion and make the resolution of the people steady to tide over the present emergency.

b) We should appropriately improve our political and economic systems in order to develop the important trade and industries which are necessary for the execution of national policy and national defense.

c) We should take appropriate measures to stabilize the life of the people, promote their physical strength and lead their thoughts into sound channels.

d) We should make appropriate arrangements for the rapid development of the aviation and shipping business.

e) We should promote the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for resources and materials important for national defense and industry.

f) We should reform our diplomatic organs and also draw up a system of information and propaganda in order to make our diplomatic function and the spread of our culture in the world more active.

Matters Pertaining to Outline of the
State Policy

June 30, 1936

The War and Navy Ministries

I. The vision of Japan is to make clear the justice and cause of the country, to plan the rise of the country and to realize the peace of the East and contribute to the welfare of the human being.

"In view of the internal and external situations of the Empire, the fundamental policies of the Empire must lie in advancing and developing into the Southern Seas as well as obtaining firm position in the East Oriental continent stabilizing the national defense."

Document No. 1634-I

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1634-I

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and described as follows:

Outline of the basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministers

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
20th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Matters Pertaining to Basic Principle
Of State Policy, 30 June 1936

Conference of Premier, Army, Navy,
Foreign, Finance Ministers

On 30 June 1936, after the cabinet conference ended, the premier, the foreign and finance ministers remained on request by both the army and navy ministers. At the meeting of the above five ministers, the navy minister presented the annexed report (Basic Principle of State Policy) and explained it.

1. First, the finance minister remarked that "to correct the militaristic despotism of foreign powers", etc., as stated in (1) of Item 1 has been his intentions and have followed this policy to date. He therefore stated that he had no objections to this policy in general. But he added that it is essential that Japan too, must not carry out militaristic despotism.

2. The foreign minister declared that he too had no objections to this proposal and that its principles coincide with the foreign policy which he had under consideration. However, detailed plans have been conferred on by the three ministers and that they are being prepared now under his care. He agreed entirely with what the finance minister had said. For example, he thought it would be better to avoid using methods such as the special trade with East HOPEH. To this, the navy minister remarked that he too agreed with them and further explained that the preamble of (1) states, "according to the great cause and righteousness".

3. The foreign minister said that in view of the present international situation, it was necessary for JAPAN to make efforts to avoid isolation. Since in (3) of Item 1, it is stated "strive for friendly relationship with foreign countries", the foreign minister considered the spirit to be in line with his idea. However the phrase "to provide against England and America" seemed to be cause for some apprehension and he requested a definition of this phrase. The navy minister explained that this was only a provision for military preparedness in case of emergency and that it was absolutely not intended to look upon England and America as enemies. The foreign minister then stated that under the

present international situation, Japan should not only be regardful of keeping friendly relationship with England and America but should strive further to assume a more conciliator attitude than in ordinary circumstances.

4. The finance minister remarked that "to make efforts to render assistance from the inside and to avoid outward activities" in (2) of Item 2 is exceedingly satisfactory. He sincerely hoped that it would be carried out in this manner.

5. The foreign minister asked the finance minister that if war should break out, would Japan be able to furnish was expenditures without relying on foreign loans? To this question, the finance minister replied that it would be difficult to rely on foreign loans. There would be no other means than floating national bonds and the issuance of paper currency. The finance minister further explained that the finance minister is at present promoting the merging of local banks to expedite the circulation of currency from local provinces to the Bank of Japan.

6. Finally, the premier said that in general, he had no objections to this plan. The navy minister declared that if there are no objections to this principle, a more concrete plan will be drafted based on this principle.

Remarks: At the conference of the three ministers on July 3rd, the foreign minister inquired whether the concrete plans mentioned in the last part of this report had been drawn up or not by the Army or Navy. The navy minister replied that the plan was not particularly drafted but that his subordinates may possibly be studying it.