


LESSONS OF  
THE WORLD-WAR

AUGUSTIN HAMON

2<sup>oo</sup>



The author of this book, a well-known French sociologist, has been for many years a keen anti-militarist, but in the case of the present war he is a strong supporter of the Allies. The book, however, is not a propagandist work: it is a penetrating, detached, and highly critical study of the causes of the Great War and its effects on the life of the nations. M. Hamon traces in considerable detail the political, social, and economic changes already brought about in the life of the belligerent peoples, especially England, France and Germany; considers the effects of the war on morality (in the widest sense), on the position of women, on liberty and democracy, on the *status* of the working-classes, and numerous other matters, and in his concluding chapters attempts a cautious forecast of the situation after the conclusion of peace.

**LESSONS OF THE WORLD-WAR**

*PRINCIPAL WORKS BY THE  
SAME AUTHOR*

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Paris, 1884 (Turkish translation, Constantinople, 1889).
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- L'AGONIE D'UNE SOCIÉTÉ (Sociological Essay). Paris,  
1889.
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Three volumes, Paris, 1891 and 1893.
- LE SOCIALISME ET LE CONGRÈS DE LONDRES  
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Paris, 1895 (Czech and Spanish translations).
- DÉTERMINISME ET RESPONSABILITÉ. Paris, 1897  
(English, Portuguese, and Spanish translations).
- LE MOLIÈRE DU XX<sup>e</sup> SIÈCLE: BERNARD SHAW.  
Paris, 1913 (English and Spanish translations).

# LESSONS OF THE WORLD-WAR

BY

AUGUSTIN HAMON

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UNIVERSITY OF PARIS; LECTURER AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

*Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas.*

“There is no motive in the world strong enough to cause a  
scholar to refrain from expressing what he believes to be the  
truth.”

ERNEST RENAN.

TRANSLATED BY

BERNARD MIALL

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

PATRICK GEDDES

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
1919

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TO  
HENRIETTE HAMON  
MY COMPANION,  
WHOSE DILIGENT COLLABORATION HAS  
ENABLED ME TO WRITE THIS  
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY



## TO THE READER

**W**AR, and above all a war such as that which for more than two and a half years has been ravaging the world, hastens and reinforces the current of social events. It accentuates their consequences, which are rapidly developed. This is why it is possible at once to perceive the many lessons which arise from this gigantic social phenomenon, which sets in motion all the material, intellectual, and moral forces of the crowd, of the nations, of all humanity.

I was keenly interested by the wonderful sociological lessons afforded by this war when Mr. Victor Branford, Honorary Secretary of the London Sociological Society, invited me, in June, 1915, to take part in a Summer Meeting, organized for July by the well-known Professor Patrick Geddes, at King's College (University of London), whose subject was to be "The War: its Social Tasks and Problems." I at once accepted, and decided to deal with the sociological lessons taught by the world-war in four lectures. My auditors, and among them Professor Geddes, gave them a reception which encouraged me to treat more profoundly the questions which I was able only to touch upon in my four lectures.

When, therefore, Mr. Lea, the Registrar of the University Extension Lectures Board, asked me to give ten lectures at Birkbeck College (University of London) from November, 1915, to March, 1916, I proposed—and this was agreed upon—to speak of "The Lessons of the World-War." But the more

deeply I probed into the subject of my inquiry, the more it expanded before my eyes, so that I was led to give thirteen lectures in place of ten.

It is these lectures which I now publish in volume form. They have already appeared, but greatly curtailed, since they were reduced to less than half their length, in *La Guerre Mondiale*, a daily publication of the house of Atar, in Geneva. A complete version has been published in Spanish by the *Prometeo* publishing house in Valencia. Portions of chapters have appeared in *La Revue de Hollande*, *La Grande Revue*, *The Truth-Seeker*, *La Libre Presse Internationale*, and *Les Documents du Progrès*. The text of the French and English editions is an almost exact reproduction of the lectures which I delivered before the English audience which attended my course of lectures at the Birkbeck College. I say "almost," for the events which have occurred between March, 1916, and the present moment have necessitated a few additions, and here and there some point has been emphasized; but these changes have not in any way modified the deductions which I expressed before my audiences. I hope the censorship—for in 1916 there is, in France and in England, a censorship of the products of the human mind—will allow both Frenchmen and Englishmen to read what Englishmen were free to hear in the lecture-theatres of the two colleges of London University. This is a scientific work, the result of objective thought, without prejudice or partiality. May it be read in the same spirit, and thereby assist in the propagation of that which I believe to be the truth.

AUGUSTIN HAMON.

TY AN DIAOUL,  
PORT BLANC EN PENVÉNAN,  
CÔTES DU NORD.

December 20, 1916.

## POSTSCRIPT

**T**HIS volume, with its XIVth chapter—consisting entirely of unpublished matter, since I wrote it, in July, 1917, for this English edition—was to have made its appearance in September, 1917. The British censorship saw fit to place a veto on its publication. Then, in the last days of December, 1917, it removed this veto.

The lapse of time between June, 1917, and the moment of writing these lines, or the moment when this volume is published, does not, after all, in any way affect the book as a sociological study. The events analyzed in these pages are cited only as data from which lessons and a moral are to be deduced. *Lessons of the World-War*, as the title intimates, is not a volume of ephemeral actuality, which must of necessity appear at a given moment. It is a scientific work, whose value is independent of the date of its publication.

AUGUSTIN HAMON.

January 30, 1918.

## PREFACE

The sociological importance of this war—The field of battle—The numbers of the belligerents and the combatants—The intellectual and moral hyper-activity of humanity—There are lessons to be learned.

**T**HE present war is an event of such great sociological significance that it is impossible to keep in view all its consequences, and, above all, all its developments. A fresh distribution of the political world is about to result from this war. Economic repercussions will necessarily ensue, for politics and economics always exert a reciprocal influence. The result of these economic and political modifications will be a change in the social world, and afterwards, but in a lesser degree, a modification of human psychology. The world-war is destined to play so great a part in the evolution of the human race that one may well ask whether there has in the past been any event of equal gravity and influence.

Be the consequences and their development what they may, the war possesses, at the present moment, an enormous importance, owing to the number of nations which it involves, the stupendous number of soldiers who are mutually contending, and the considerable terrestrial area over which these men are hurling themselves against one another and killing one another. Fourteen Powers are at war: on one side four—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria; on the other ten—Serbia, Russia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan, Italy, Portugal, and Rumania;

involving on the one side more than 800 million inhabitants, and on the other barely 160 millions. The conflict is spreading over the whole earth. Men are fighting simultaneously in France, Belgium, Alsace, the Trentino and the Carnatic, Macedonia, Dalmatia, Galicia, Poland, and Courland. They are fighting or have fought at the Dardanelles, in the Caucasus, in Mesopotamia, in Persia, and on the Suez Canal. They are, or have been, fighting in Central Africa and South Africa, in the Far East, in Australasia, in the Falklands, at Easter Isle, and in the Arctic Ocean. They are fighting on the earth and under the earth, since this is a war of saps and mines, as were the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; they are fighting on the water and under the water; lastly, they are fighting in the air. Millions of men are occupied in this task of butchery, and never in the past do we find such numbers of human beings endeavouring to kill one another; for there are more than forty millions, if we count all the armies of the belligerents, with their reserves and their territorials or *Landwehr*.

Not only are millions of soldiers fighting on the various fronts, but the entire populations of towns and villages take their departure, flying before the invader, or are by him removed from their native soil and transported to other and remote regions. Nearly a million Belgians have fled to France, Holland, and England; nearly 100,000 French civilians have been transported to Germany, and afterwards returned to France by way of Switzerland. Hundreds of thousands of Prussians or Galicians fled westward before the Russian armies, and later, when the tide had returned upon itself, more than four million Poles, Ruthenians, and Letts were compelled, whether readily or unwillingly, to abandon their countries as the Austrians and the Germans invaded them. More than 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins fled before the enemy; hundreds of

thousands of Armenians have been massacred or uprooted by the Turks.

Everywhere, in the Southern as in the Northern Hemisphere, men have abandoned their callings, their fields or factories, shops or offices, in order to go forth to fight. White men, yellow men, black men, brown men—all have met and are still meeting in an indescribable *mêlée*. Nearly two million men were transported from the ends of the earth to the place of battle. Nearly four millions are prisoners, incarcerated in camps, in the midst of hostile countries; and this has been so for months upon months. These phenomena recall the migrations of the peoples in the prehistoric and proto-historic epochs, when men fled before the hordes of the invader.

The sociological importance of the world-war is further revealed by the variety of the methods of warfare and by the duration of the conflict. The most recent methods of warfare are combined with the most ancient. Javelins, slings, grenades, howitzers, and incendiary fluids have reappeared, emerging from the museums of ancient weapons to play an important part. And side by side with the employment of these ancient weapons, which are barely modified, we perceive the utilization of the most recent and improved scientific and industrial methods: railways, motor-cars, aeroplanes, motor-cycles, dirigible balloons, submarines, asphyxiating gases, etc.

The war, for a space of years—we cannot as yet foretell when it will cease—has broken up the habitual social and political and economic life. It has been necessary to organize something different from that which existed, to adapt ourselves to the new conditions. This adaptation has been more or less tardy, more or less rapid, according to the rapidity of comprehension of the peoples, according to their plasticity in respect of external circumstances, or according to their state



of preparation. A general fermentation of the mind, directed towards a single end—the war—is everywhere manifest. There has been and is a veritable hyper-activity, intellectual and above all scientific in character. The means of destruction have been improved in a degree unequalled by anything else; but the means of conservation have followed the same ascensional process. The treatment of the sick and wounded has progressed and is progressing day by day, although the international exchange of scientific improvements and discoveries has been greatly reduced, since it occurs only in the interior of the two belligerent groups.

A moral hyper-activity has manifested itself, paralleled by an intellectual hyper-activity; there has been a general and uncontrollable need of action, which has manifested itself under the most various forms of mutual aid. The neutral nations have felt this need as well as the belligerents. A breath of altruism has blown over all the quarters of the terraqueous globe. It has on the whole counterbalanced the sanguinary tempest which has ravaged the world, and is of good augury for the future.

This moral and intellectual hyper-activity is an effect of the war as a human cataclysm. The war, by its destructiveness, its labour of death, has produced the same effect as an earthquake, or other terrestrial cataclysm, productive of an equally great mortality. It would be an error of reasoning to count the moral and intellectual hyper-activity which the war has produced as an asset of warfare.

The world-war is thus a social phenomenon of the first importance. A host of lessons arise therefrom, lessons regarding the future of humanity. Here we can obviously do no more than outline a portion of this teaching, so various is it, so great and so complex. But this outline even will show the serious nature of the lessons of the war. It will indicate, we believe,

the paths which humanity must pursue if it wishes to derive a real profit, corresponding to the human hecatombs and the mountains of ruins which the mad ambition of a fraction of the German rulers, the caste of Junkers, and the leaders of the metallurgical industry, have let loose upon humanity.

We must, however, avoid illusions. To all human beings who are actors or spectators, the war seems terribly long; but compared with the life of humanity the war has lasted only for the briefest moment. And the psychological changes which it will provoke will doubtless be very minute, barely visible, for it takes a long time to modify the minds of men. At the most a few seeds of these modifications will have been sown in the human brain. There they will grow and develop under the influence of the political, economic, and social conditions to which the war will give birth. Only many years later, when the war is no longer anything but a lifeless memory to living men, will humanity feel the psychical effects of the cataclysm which, in the dawn of the twentieth century, has ravaged and is still ravaging the earth.

## INTRODUCTION

**M**Y old friend, M. Hamon, insists that I write a word of introduction for him to his English readers; for in his invincible foreign ignorance he treats as of mere modesty, and refuses as melancholy fact, my assurance to him that I have not yet succeeded in making that desirable acquaintance for myself. But in these times of common anxiety, any reader of the war news may drop into conversation with his neighbour un-introduced. So, when M. Hamon's name comes up, and one is asked, as an old and frequent sojourner in France and in Belgium, what one knows of him, I am pleased to be able to answer, "Much, and all to his credit." He is a veteran publicist, who was for many years at the helm of one of the most open-minded of Franco-Belgian reviews, *L'Humanité Nouvelle*, one essentially in touch with active and progressive minds throughout the world. As concerned not only with social, political, and economic theses and discussions, but also with literature and drama, with art and science, with education in the widest sense, the editor of such a review, while thus helping his no less varied readers in many directions, also educates himself, and so becomes an encyclopædist in an age of specialisms. Better still, he becomes a man of sympathies outranging party limits, outstepping national boundaries, and thus keeping alive to human facts and tendencies, both near and far. His studies and his teachings have thus ranged from home schools to

Universities; and his criticisms from metropolitan activities and thought-streams to their resultants, as now in international strife.

Our writer's life-education has thus been in more than editorship. As befits the sociological movement in which he has been one of the pioneers, he has oscillated between activity and reflection, between city and studious hermitage; as from quiet years of Breton village life and reflection to his academic platforms at Brussels, Paris, or London. Such, in summary, has been the life-preparation of our writer for his present ambitious task: that of producing perhaps the book of the war, at any rate one of the most many-sided and comprehensive. And while as stoutly and convincingly loyal to the common cause as if he were among the defenders of Verdun, or the victors of the Somme, he yet maintains the critical calmness of his editorial chair, and never loses sight of that general movement of European—say rather Occidental and even human—development, which, despite all divisions and wars, is yet moving towards a civilized unity, and this in the future even more than in the past, despite the wide-riven present.

Here, then, is the enormous task in which he at least relatively succeeds, where full contemporary success is impossible. He is seeking to interpret the present supreme efforts of the nations concerned, in their interactions with their internal life, their social organization; and these not only during the war, but as remodelling factors and influences thereafter.

Twenty years ago, in his *Psychologie du Militaire Professionnel*, he foresaw beyond any writer the horrors which have since been inflicted upon the invaded territories, and this exceptional insight has since matured and extended in its range without losing its penetration and directness. Yet with all this he has no harshness; his judgments of events, his views towards

settlement, are less severe than will be those of most of his readers, as certainly than are mine; but in this one must all the more respect and admire him for being able—despite the frightful menace, trial, and suffering through which his country, only less than Belgium itself, has passed—to range himself along with those noblest writers, Belgian and French alike, who have freed their souls from vindictiveness, and who do not despair of the coming, and over the whole world, of a deeper philosophy of state, a remoralized statecraft, a renewed social education.

Yet the book is no mere counsel of such coming perfections, nor even a signpost of ways of progress towards it. Above all, it remains topical, though always in the larger sense: indeed, in this respect it is wellnigh encyclopædic; so much so that even to indicate the main points he deals with would require long pages. These, however, are clearly indicated by the well-filled chapter headings, which cannot but attract the reader, whether he be concentrated on specific issues, or in more general study of the contemporary situation. Our author is economist and psychologist by turns, and yet together; and so goes on interpreting for us, not only enemy, allied, and neutral countries, their soldiers and civilians, their Governments and diplomatists, but also Churches of all faiths, and those outside them as well. He is in touch with the workers, and at home among their problems, from those of munition works and mines to-day, to their yet more anxious and perplexing after-war future. Nationalism and internationalism, capitalism and Socialism, religion and morals, education and science, the old professions and the newer, all come under his review; and thus it leads onwards towards suggestions well worth pondering, as how to make the war settlement more enduring through wisdom, and reorganization more effective also.

Even Kaisers and their unthinking cliques are

learning by this time that war does not pay; but our writer states this with far deeper significance. Even the extreme pacifists are realizing that no arbitrational machinery, however excellent, can assure the future; but M. Hamon goes deeper into the conditions of international peace than they have done, and ends with no vague Utopia, but with practical proposals.

In many ways, then, this book is needed and timely; and even by those to whom its views and conclusions may be here and there unacceptable, it will be found stimulating to further thought. What better can be said in a situation when all men's thought is more or less in perplexity and in criticism, in inquiry and search? Those whose minds are clearly made up outside the deeper discussions M. Hamon so frankly speaks his mind in, will not contribute so substantially to their solutions, nor enter so surely into the resultant hope.

PATRICK GEDDES.

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# LESSONS OF THE WORLD-WAR

## CHAPTER I

### TERRORISM AND UNTRUTH

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**I**N the world-war now raging, what impresses us first of all is the violent and terrifying manner in which it has been, and is still being, fought. This fact impresses us for various reasons. In the first place, the Governments involved have regarded it as being to their advantage to lay stress upon the brutalities, the cruelties, and the violations of the so-called laws of warfare which have been committed by the belligerents. Then for nearly half a century there had been no war in the West, and the British, French, and Belgian democracies had

forgotten what warfare is. Moreover, pacifist and anti-militarist ideas, the ideal of liberty, democratic habits, and, to some extent, the ideals of Christianity, being diffused throughout the world, a normal opinion had been created, which reproved acts of violence and brutal and forcible attempts upon the rights and liberties of the individual person or nation. Let us add to these reasons the perfecting of the German organization; the methodical way in which the system of terrorism on which the conduct of the war was based was realized in practice; the extraordinary discipline which the German people obey in a passive and servile fashion; and, lastly, the application to the objects of warfare of the most highly developed scientific knowledge. All this has made this war the most terrible that has ever been seen. Besides, if we consider the multitude of men who are fighting upon so many different points of the earth's surface, we shall understand the immense loss both in human lives and in property of every kind.

It is really impossible to ascertain precisely and certainly the figures of the losses suffered by each of the belligerents. All the Governments, indeed, have sought to keep their peoples in the completest ignorance of these losses. They have deliberately shed over the nations a dense atmosphere of untruth and ignorance; further, they have concocted this atmosphere of a mixture, cunningly compounded, of lies, truths, and omissions. The Governmental authorities, in whatever country, always endeavour to keep the minds of the governed masses in swaddling-bands. During the first eighteen months of the war the British authorities published figures of their losses, and these were such as could be credited. But since they have increased, owing to the fact that the army is more numerous and occupies a more extended front, no totals have been published. Some newspapers give a list of the dead,

or sometimes of the wounded, but no one knows whether it is complete.

France, Russia, Serbia, Belgium, Italy, Turkey, and Bulgaria have published nothing officially. Germany has given official lists of losses as affecting the various states of the Empire. But when we study these lists closely, we find that they are incorrect; that the totals given are less than the reality. The statistics are "cooked" in such a way as to deceive the German and Allied public as much as the enemy and neutral public. Austria, it seems, has published lists of casualties, but it is only at rare intervals that we see them repeated in the French, British, or Swiss press.

Naturally in each country the public has tried to plumb the obscurity cast over its losses, and the individual gives way to conjecture. As a rule, thanks to imagination, one is inclined rather to exaggerate the losses; at all events, unless one bases one's calculations on judicious observation and deduction.

The analysis of the figures published by the German, British, and Austrian Governments yields results which are pretty much alike as regards the gross losses and the elements which compose them. The gross casualties are constituted by—(1) the killed, and those dead of wounds or sickness; (2) the seriously wounded—that is, those who will be permanently crippled or infirm; (3) the wounded who are capable of recovery, and who after convalescence can return to the front; and (4) the missing, including the prisoners and those whose fate is unknown, and who, by the way, are most usually among the dead. I have taken the average of the reports of these three armies, so as to be as near the truth as possible and as far as possible to avoid errors. In this way I have drawn up the following table. But in reading it one must remember that the figures must not be taken as having an absolute value, but merely as representing a probability of accuracy and an indication of the reality.

TABLE OF LOSSES TO THE END OF THE THIRTIETH MONTH OF THE WAR (JANUARY, 1917).

	France. 1	Great Britain. 2	Russia. 3	Germany. 4	Austria- Hungary. 5	Serbia. 6	Belgium. 7	Turkey (8 months of war). 8	Italy (11 months of war). 9	Bulgaria (16 months of war). 10	Rumania (5 months of war). 11	Totals.
Killed, dead of wounds and sick- ness, 22.40 per cent.	1,209,600	302,400	2,205,000	1,881,600	1,425,600	130,000	43,700	190,500	181,450	39,450	17,920	7,627,220
Seriously wounded, 13.50 per cent.	729,000	182,300	1,680,000	1,134,000	1,102,200		26,500	109,350			10,800	4,974,150
Wounded ca- pable of re- turning to the front, 50 per cent. (a)	2,700,000	675,000	4,305,000	4,200,000	2,904,000		97,500	381,500	405,000	82,960	40,000	15,930,960
Missing (pri- soners and others) 14.6 per cent. (b)	761,000	190,300	2,310,000	1,184,400	1,168,200	30,000	27,300	63,000	114,210	13,600	11,280	5,873,290
Totals...	5,400,000	1,350,000	10,500,000	8,400,000	6,600,000	300,000	195,000	635,000	810,000	136,000	80,000	34,405,620
Monthly aver- age of gross losses (c)	180,000	—	350,000	280,000	220,000	10,000	6,500	22,700	27,000	8,500	16,000	—

## NOTES RELATING TO THE FOREGOING TABLE.

(a) The proportion of recoverable wounded to the total of the wounded is 78 per cent. We think this proportion is more correct than the 80 per cent. to 90 per cent. given in the German scientific reports. This, we consider, is intentionally given too high. It results from this that, of the 34,405,620 men who, in the course of thirty months of war, have been put *hors de combat*, 15,980,960 have been able to return to the front.

(b) In the category of "missing" are also great numbers of dead or wounded men who die on the field of battle, but cannot be picked up or recovered. It is impossible to give the exact percentage of these dead among the missing. It is probable that the dead form more than 10 per cent. of the missing. It seems to me probable that the figures relating to prisoners are greater than the reality as regards France, Germany, and Great Britain. When warfare is a matter of trench fighting the number of prisoners is small.

(c) We have not given the monthly average of the gross losses for Great Britain, as the British Army has increased since the beginning of the war, and tends to occupy a wider and wider front. As a result, this average increases progressively. In the first year of the war it was 27,000, then 32,300. Since the middle of 1916 it has oscillated in the neighbourhood of 100,000.

While this table is based on the relations existing between the various categories of casualties and the gross casualties, it is also based on the figures representing the gross monthly losses for France—180,000.

1. *France*.—We have given 180,000 as the gross monthly losses for France for various reasons: (a) This figure was given us in 1915 by French politicians who were likely to be well informed. (b) It was published by Colonel Feyler in the *Journal de Genève*, and this writer obtains his information from a reliable source. (c) It may be deduced from the figures published in a circular issued by the *French Relief Fund*, which appeared on the French "Flag Day," July 14, 1915. (d) The monthly number of the killed (40,000) is confirmed by the figures to be obtained by arriving at the numbers of the dead by means of an inquiry affecting the communes of France. It seems that the percentage of the dead in respect of the population varies, at the end of two years of war, between, 2, 3, and 3·5 per cent., according to the communes. This gives us, at the end of the twenty-fourth month of the war, an average of 1,100,000 dead. (e) The Society for the Study of the War (Copenhagen), gives in its Bulletin 885,000 dead for two years of war. The *Correspondance Politique de l'Europe Centrale* (Zurich) estimates, by an ingenious and plausible calculation, that the number of dead for two years of war amounts to 1,100,000. A manifesto from the minority of the French socialist party speaks of a million dead, without, however, indicating the duration of the war. But as the manifesto dates from November, 1916, it is probable that

the figure refers to at least two years of war. All these figures are very near those at which I have arrived.

2. *Great Britain*.—As a basis I have taken the official figures given to the House of Commons in January, 1916; and to these I have added, for the six months completing the second year of the war, the figures based upon a monthly rate of 32,000 (gross casualties), and for the following six months a rate of 100,000 gross casualties monthly. Great offensives are always murderous.

3. *Russia*.—For the first year of the war the proportion of prisoners is 31 per cent.; from this it follows that the proportion of dead and wounded is less than in the Western armies. In the following months the proportions tend to approximate themselves to those obtaining in the West. It is highly probable, considering the disorder of the administrative services, that the proportion of the recoverable wounded able to return to the front is less than 50 per cent. I have adopted the following ratios: Missing, 22 per cent.; dead, 21 per cent.; seriously wounded, 16 per cent.; recoverable wounded, 41 per cent.

4. *Germany*.—The figures officially published give an average gross monthly loss of about 150,000. This figure cannot be correct, for it is impossible that the German Army has had fewer losses than the French Army in so lengthy a campaign. It is impossible for many reasons: (a) Germany has an army nearly twice the size of the French Army. (b) It is fighting on two fronts, whose length is more than double the front on which the French are fighting, whose length has been decreasing since August, 1915. Consequently, the number of Germans in the first line is greater than that of the French, in proportion to the total size of the army, even if we take into account the replacement of men by machines (Germany mobilized about 10,000,000 men). (c) For a long time the German offensives were delivered in compact masses; even at Verdun, in 1916, their assaulting waves were in close formation.

Considering the ratio of the French casualties to the total strength of the French Army, we find that the monthly proportion of gross casualties is one-thirty-sixth of the total of the army. According to the statements of a deputy in the Chamber in November, 1916, France mobilized one-sixth of her population, or nearly 6,500,000 men, and one-thirty-sixth of this number gives us 180,000 as the gross monthly wastage. This is the figure which I have taken as the basis of my calculations. It is rather less than that which I have given in an article published in *The Outlook* in July, 1915, and than the figures given by various Swiss and English writers. On the other hand, it is higher than the figures given by those writers who have adopted as exact the official figures of the German Government. These figures are erroneous. The error committed is, we fancy, deliberate; it is based simply on the signification of the word "losses." When we say, or read, that "the losses of the German Army amount to an average of 150,000 monthly," we understand that "the dead, the missing,

and all the wounded, whatever the gravity or the slightness of their wounds, amount to 150,000 per month." That is what the public understands; but it is deluded, for the actual meaning of the phrase is as follows: "The German Army loses each month 150,000 combatants which it cannot replace, for they are the dead, the missing, and the seriously wounded, who, when healed, will be incapable of serving." In short, those wounded men who, after treatment, return to take their place in the army, are not included in the figure of 150,000 casualties per month. In this way the German Government deceives the public, without publishing lying figures! It is interesting to note this Jesuitical proceeding.

5. *Austria-Hungary*.—The proportion of prisoners is considerable—17·7 per cent.; which diminishes the percentage of dead and of wounded, which is 16·7 per cent. for the seriously wounded and 44 per cent. for the recoverable.

6, 7, 8, 9, 10.—For Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Bulgaria, and Turkey we have only the figures published by the Society for the Study of the War (Copenhagen). To judge by the figures which this society has given in respect of the greater belligerents, it is probable that the losses indicated are less than the reality.

As for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the rate of mortality is much higher on account of local circumstances, defective ambulance services, and defective civilization. On the other hand, the percentages of wounded, both incurable and recoverable, and of the missing are lower. The *Bulletin de la Societe d'Études de la Guerre* gives the following percentages in respect of gross casualties: 44 per cent. of dead for Serbia; 30 per cent. for Turkey; and 29 per cent. for Bulgaria. We have no figures for Montenegro. Japan has fought the Germans only in China, and Portugal only in Africa. Their losses are very small.

11. *Rumania*.—Rumania has been at war for five months only; her losses must be fairly large. We have seen no figures relating to the subject. Those which we give are based on the ratio between the French Army and an army of 600,000 men.

It will be noted, in the foregoing table, that the decreasing order of losses for thirty months of war, in terms of the belligerent nations, is, as regards the five greater Powers, as follows: Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, British Empire. This progression of losses according to nations may be represented by a curve which runs parallel to a curve representing the numbers of soldiers mobilized by these nations, and, excepting the case of Great Britain, it is parallel to the curve of population. This is only logical.

During these thirty months of war the effective

consumption of "human material," according to the military expression, which transforms men into things, is, in round figures, 18,000,000, since nearly 16,000,000 have been able to return to the front after being put *hors de combat*. The total strength of the belligerent armies is about 50,000,000. So there still remains about 30,000,000 of "human material" for consumption. This, however, is very unequally divided between the two groups of belligerents. The Central or Imperial Powers are represented by 12,000,000, while the remainder, or 18,000,000, belongs to the group of the Entente.

This simple examination shows us that the world-war can have only one logical ending: the crumbling of the power of the Imperial nations. It is a question of time, as preparation for war, the inventions of the human mind, and the check of the offensive of the Imperial Powers in September, 1914, on the Marne, have made this war a war of exhaustion in "human material" and material of other kinds. This time we may approximately estimate, if we suppose that the percentage of losses remains as it is at present, and taking into calculation the exhaustion of "human material" only. At the end of about twenty-three months the exhaustion of "human material" would be sufficient to force the Imperial Powers to cease from struggling. There would be left to them only 6,000,000 men, all of whom would have been wounded and returned to the front, while the Entente Powers would still possess nearly 3,000,000 men intact, as well as 8,000,000 of convalescent wounded; without speaking of the resources of the British Empire, which at present amount to 2,000,000 or 3,000,000, or of the entire Japanese Army. It seems, therefore, that the war cannot continue longer than December, 1918, if we consider only the question of "human material."

In thirty months of war the number of dead exceeds 7,627,220, for among the missing we may probably



count 500,000 to 600,000 dead, if not more. The number of the seriously wounded, infirm, or crippled by the loss of a limb, of sight, of hearing, or by insanity, etc., amounts to nearly 5,000,000. So at the end of January, 1917, humanity has suffered an effective loss of 13,000,000 of men between eighteen and forty-eight years of age. Behold the work of war! In very truth, humanity is at present bent upon its own destruction!

Let us note, moreover, that this human loss, the work of war, is a minimum; for we must add to it the host of civilians shot, hanged, massacred, or dead of moral and physical suffering and famine, in Belgium, the East and North of France, Galicia, East Prussia, Poland, Armenia, Rumania, Macedonia, the Trentino, etc. We are not considering the increased mortality, in most of the countries at war, due to the bad conditions of life which are the inevitable consequences of war. Women, and above all young children, pay the heaviest tribute to the Moloch of warfare. According to what has been stated concerning the massacres in Armenia and the ruin of Serbia and Poland, we must add more than 5,000,000 for the total of civilian casualties. In thirty months of warfare 18,000,000 of dead or lifelong invalids!

All the figures here cited, far from being exaggerated, are more than probably below the truth. Their hugeness immediately demonstrates the extreme harmfulness of war. Those whom death has taken are indeed men in their youth or in the full prime of their riper years. The products of their intellectual and physical energy are for ever lost; as are the efforts of training, education, maintenance, and labour which they represented. To estimate these losses in money is an impossible thing, for no one knows what great work of science, or art, or literature, or industry might have been produced by this or that young man of those who rest in the trenches of the Yser, in the mountains of

Alsace, the Carpathians, or the Carnatic, on the plains, amid the lakes of East Prussia, or in the regions of the Tigris and the Euphrates, or on the slopes of the hills of Gallipoli, or in the great ocean.

War, in the twentieth century, has proved to be what it was in antiquity; what it was in the Middle Ages; what it was in more modern times.

War means not only to put soldiers, combatants, out of action; it is to ruin, to exhaust the enemy from every point of view: moral, intellectual, and physical. It has always meant this, and will always do so. It is its nature. It is impossible to change the nature of a being or a thing without destroying that being or that thing. One cannot even alter its nature, however little, for, as the poet Destouches has said:

“Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop.”

Men have sought to alter the nature of war by rendering it civilized and humane, or rather less inhumane. And they have codified warfare, believing that its laws and regulations would be observed. This was a somewhat childish task, bound to fail, and no one who really reflected could have expected professional soldiers to observe the rules established by diplomatists and jurists. This humanization of warfare, that essentially anti-human process, appeared madness to those who were not content to observe the surface of things. Now the facts have demonstrated in a startling fashion the complete failure of all war legislation. One cannot codify crime, and war is a crime, a crime of bloodshed, theft, rape, incendiarism, pillage, and ruin of every kind.

The human hideousness of war has more especially been emphasized by the acts of the German Armies, which realized in practice, with admirable method, the doctrine of the conduct of war as drawn up by the German Great General Staff in its famous treatise *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*.

“ . . . The means of warfare . . . may be sum-

marized under the two conceptions of *Cunning and Violence*, and judgment as to their applicability may be embodied in the statement:

“ Any means of war may be employed, lacking which the object of war would be unattainable. On the other hand, all deeds of violence and destruction which are not demanded by the object of war are reprehensible.”\*

This very definite formula summarizes the entire doctrine concerning the conduct of the war as it has been waged in all times and all countries. It is in reality terrorism taught as a system leading to victory by the crushing of the enemy. We must render thanks to German militarism for having had the courage to throw off its mask, and to speak aloud the truth concerning the nature of war; and even more for having demonstrated, by practice, in the twentieth century, the *real* and *eternal* nature of war.

This system of terrorization, applied to armies and populations, explains the multitude of crimes (murders, thefts, rapes, incendiarism, slavery) committed against civilians in all the regions invaded by the enemy. The system of reprisals, which is one of the forms of terrorism, explains the killing of prisoners, which has to a certain extent been going on and is still being practised. It is, in a word, a debauch of cruelties committed on every side, such as centuries of humanity had not witnessed, because for centuries there had been seen no such war of nations against nations, peoples against peoples. Formerly one saw fractions of peoples at war, but this time entire peoples are involved.

Among the generative elements of these acts of cruelty and violence are, it is true, alcoholism and the lust of blood, but the principal element is the military mentality, whose most important characteristics are:

\* See “*Frightfulness*” in *Theory and Practice*, by Charles Andler, tr. and ed. by Bernard Miall (pp. 116, 117). T. Fisher Unwin, 1916.

the spirit of slavish obedience, infatuation, prepotency, untruthfulness, and moral anæsthesia. This military mentality has been formed by education and discipline based upon fear. We shall return directly to this employment of fear as a basis of education; but first let us make a few remarks as to one of the results of this method of education—namely, untruthfulness.

One of the great lessons of the war is the light thrown, for all those who have taken the trouble to observe and reflect, on the employment of untruth as a means of handling men. This employment of untruth has impudently flaunted itself everywhere, but to a varying extent, according to the state of democratization attained by the various Governments.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is necessary, before we probe any farther into the lessons which are taught by the world-war, to define what we mean by democracy and democratic government when we make use of these terms. We do not refer to an absolute democracy—that is, to an entire people governing itself directly. We refer to peoples which delegate a certain number of men to govern them for a determined period. It results from this practice, in actual fact, that clans or groups are formed among the mandatories and those who delegate them, which betray a very strong tendency toward oligarchy. But as the numbers of ruling groups, and of those who compose them, increase with the degree of political civilization attained by the nations, it follows that the more politically advanced the nation, the more representative are these ruling clans of the material interests and the moral aspirations of the masses. So that we may with certainty assert that in our Western state of civilization oligarchical governments tend more and more to assume a form which is actually democratic. It is these governments to which we refer when we make use of the term “democratic government,” as

opposed to the autocratic system of government. An autocratic government is a caste government, which takes as little note as possible of the interests and aspirations of the masses. It does not represent them, nor does it wish to represent them. It governs by and for one or several determined castes.

\* \* \* \* \*

Now that we have explained what we mean by the terms "democratic government" and "autocratic government," let us return to the employment of untruth as a means of government. It has been employed in all ages, and in all countries, with the greater intensity the more autocratic the government, for the foundation upon which this system of government is based is fear and obedience. The peoples must obey their rulers; it is therefore unnecessary, and even harmful, that they should know the truth, for then they would reason and form their own judgments. It is enough for them to believe the statements of their rulers, and to obey them. To obtain this result readily, the best method is to allow only such things to come to the knowledge of the masses as will confirm their faith. This method, consequently, consists in plunging the masses into a dense atmosphere of ignorance and untruth, and, therefore, of illusion. All Governments have set themselves this task during the present war, for democratic methods of government have been more or less replaced by the autocratic methods inherent in the military authority. The General Staffs have surpassed themselves in the elaboration of lies. The palm must incontestably be awarded to the German Great General Staff and Government. They have employed, and are still employing, untruth with perfect method and admirable continuity. The German and Austro-Hungarian communiqués have not, since the commencement of hostilities, appreciably wavered in their system of untruth. They lie impudently, inventing facts, and

reporting events incorrectly. The object of these modifications of the truth is obvious: to lead the public, national, enemy, and neutral, into error. The military critic of the *Journal de Genève*, Colonel Feyler, has on several occasions drawn attention to these lies, and one of his articles criticizing the German communiqués was entitled "A Romance."

The French communiqués were at first untruthful almost in the German manner—that is to say, in the military manner. Then, under the pressure of circumstances and the democratic mental conditions of the population, the degree of untruthfulness diminished, and its form underwent a change. The lie by omission began to predominate, and still holds the field. The French communiqués do not make incorrect statements, but they abstain from telling *all* the truth. One may say as much of the English and Russian communiqués. The latter were at first absolutely untruthful; this was the effect of the autocratic Governmental spirit. But under the influence, first of the democratic Western Allies, and then of events which forced the Russian bureaucracy to relax its authority, the Russian communiqués underwent modification to the point of no longer sinning, so to speak, save by omission. Naturally it is the reverses which are omitted.

The study of these despatches, although tedious, leads to amusing discoveries, revealing a somewhat childlike state of mind in the military men who draft them. It seems, for example, that they believe that by abstaining from speaking of an event they suppress the occurrence of that event. They are like the ostrich, which imagines itself entirely concealed when it hides its head.

The military authorities also resort to ambiguity of phrase and expression. When their communiqués speak of sanguinary losses, it is always the enemy who has suffered them; and so forth.

The German Government has brought this system of untruthfulness and bluff, which is a mode of lying, to an extraordinary development. The entire Press, whatever its political tendency, has been utilized to keep the masses of the people not only ignorant of the reality, but in an atmosphere of illusion. The illustrations in the newspapers have been employed to this end. They have contained, for example, drawings which represent untruths, such as the burning of the London Docks by Zeppelins. In disciplined and obedient Germany the Press, with rare exceptions, has been merely the mouth-piece or the reflector of the ideas of the Government and the ruling castes.

In France, under the influence of the military spirit and authority, manifestations of a similar tendency were observable at the outset. But the democratic education of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the highly developed critical spirit of the country, soon checked and stifled this autocratic tendency. It became necessary to draw the line at omitting a portion of the truth. The ignorance of the masses, and even of the intellectual élite of the masses, is thereby partially maintained, but they are not deceived to the same extent as by the German system of the propagation of effective lies. In the British Empire the omission of the truth has been practised to a less extent than in France, but it undoubtedly takes place. This may be verified by reading the newspapers of neutral countries, and also by what transpires concerning the secret diplomatic conversations between Allies and neutrals. It is impossible to keep whole nations in a state of complete darkness; some little ray of light always filters in, which enables individuals to reconstitute the approximate truth, and the crowd to abandon itself to the divagations of imagination.

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The war, and the events which preceded it, have clearly demonstrated, to the nations educated in democracy, the power of secret diplomacy. When I say "secret diplomacy," I mean "secret" as regards the mass of the nation, as regards even the majority of the ruling classes. But this diplomacy, naturally, is not secret as regards a small number of the elect, the rulers of the rulers. All this secret diplomacy, which has ended, for this party, in unloosing the present scourge upon humanity, and for that in allowing it to be unloosed, is really in absolute contradiction of the democratic principle of the Governments of the Western peoples. The essential idea of secret diplomacy and government by bluff and untruthfulness is that the popular masses are like flocks of sheep: they are incapable of finding their own way; it is necessary to lead them. They need shepherds and sheep-dogs. This essential idea of government by untruth and by secret diplomacy, by means of darkness hovering over the nations, by the intellectual swaddling of the masses, is absolutely opposed to the democratic principle. This principle, in effect, amounts to this: that the nations should rule themselves, at least by means of delegates, whom they cannot elect and conscientiously support unless they are acquainted with the truth and reality of things.

Government by means of untruth and secret diplomacy leads to the worst sort of folly and harm. We may say positively that if the French people and Parliament had in 1913 been acquainted with the reports which figure at the beginning of the French Yellow Book, the armaments of France would not have been insufficient, as they were, in July, 1914. From the tribune of the French Chamber of Deputies the President, M. Deschanel, has discreetly hinted as much, to the unanimous applause of the Chamber. If the conversation between M. Cambon and M. von Jagow, *à propos*



of the Belgian Congo and the small Powers (Belgian Grey Book, 1915) had been made known to the international public, the political situation would not have been what it was in July, 1914. It is probable that if the English people had known what was known to secret diplomacy, the nation would have been prepared for war, whereas it was by no means so prepared in July, 1914.

The attitude and the behaviour of the peoples of Great Britain, France, and Belgium in this war show how injurious these autocratic methods of government have been to these peoples. It is interesting to note that just as Germany has pushed to the highest degree the system of terrorism and military untruthfulness, so she has pushed to the highest degree the system of diplomatic deception in respect of all—her own citizens, her allies, her enemies, and neutrals. The German Government published, like all other Governments, an official volume, the White Book, containing the diplomatic documents which preceded the war. Rarely has one seen a more empty publication, or one throwing less light upon the facts. Only the Austrian Red Book can be compared with it. The intention to deceive the public is even outrageously apparent in the German White Book, for the documents—far from numerous—which figure in it are not presented in their chronological order. And one has to look into the matter to perceive its signification. This weakness of the German and Austrian diplomatic publications strikes all who read them. A German jurist, in a very remarkable book, *J'accuse*, has expressed himself most powerfully in this sense. However, the manner in which the documents and commentaries are presented to the reader reveals both the contempt of the German Government for public opinion and the absence of the critical spirit in the majority even of educated Germans. We see plainly that the White Book is concocted in order to cast the

responsibility for the war upon Russia. And in the process of concoction the German Government did not hesitate to employ lies which it very well knew to be lies; for example, the statements concerning the acts of war first committed by the French, Russians, and Belgians.

The habitual manner in which even cultivated Germans believe the statements of their master, of their rulers, has prevented them from perceiving the fundamental contradiction between the first attitude of the Government, which threw the whole responsibility upon Russia, and its subsequent attitude, when it represented France and Russia as the victims of British duplicity, which was solely responsible for the war. The German is not troubled by such contradictions: he believes his master, and obeys. For him, the ruler cannot lie! And the ruler, in his turn, is convinced by the obedience of the popular and middle-class masses that the lie is a truth, or will appear as such in the eyes of all. And he is thus induced to lie again and again. One lie involves another, and so forth. Thus we have seen the German Government forging and falsifying documents in order to excuse its violation of Belgian territory, whose neutrality it had guaranteed. I am here alluding to the report of the Belgian General Ducarme, of which a deliberately falsified reproduction appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and afterwards in a pamphlet published in the Dutch language.

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The German Government was one of the signatories of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, and it violated this treaty deliberately, believing that it was in its interest to do so. This fact has plainly proved that treaties between nations, just as contracts between individuals, are of no value save by the will of the contracting parties. But when contracts between individuals are in question their illegitimate rupture is

submitted to the sanction, more or less efficacious, of the courts of law. As regards treaties between nations there is at present no other sanction than war. And if we consider the whole matter thoroughly, we see that this is not really a sanction at all, for it may happen that the result of the war may favour the State which has violated its signature and broken its word. War, in short, is nothing other than the duel, the "judgment of God" of medieval times. The only difference is that instead of being the "judgment of God" as between individuals, it is a judgment between national collectivities.

War, as a means of settling disputes between collectivities, is in truth a still barbarous if not a savage system. It ought to be abandoned and replaced by a system analogous to that existing for settling disputes between individuals. It is possible, even easy, if humanity so desires, to find a practical sanction which shall prevent a State from violating its signature, which shall force it to make reparation for its misdeeds, precisely as such a sanction exists to-day for the individual.

One of the consequences of war is this principle: "might makes right." This principle, which formerly prevailed in the social and commercial relations of individual and individual, has disappeared from our code of morals, since all disputes between individual persons are settled by judgments which are theoretically based upon justice. I say theoretically, because it is fallible. It is necessary that the principle "might makes right" should cease to exist in international relations, if humanity wishes to avoid the perpetuation of warfare and increasing improvements in the butchery of its members; in a word, if it wishes to avoid self-destruction.

Unhappily, the idea that "might makes right" is one of the most widespread ideas in existence. It is,

indeed, at the root of all education of childhood and all governmental methods. The root of this idea is fear. And it is on fear that education is founded; and it is on fear that the management of men is based. According to the state of democratic advancement to which the nations have attained, the employment of fear in education is more or less extensive; but it is employed to some extent everywhere, save, perhaps, in a few families whose ideas are so advanced that they are in some danger of being treated as insane.

Naturally, it is in the autocratic States that fear is most extensively employed. But in this respect the autocratic States do not differ in kind from the democratic States. There is only a difference in degree. This is the case because the democratic States are still impregnated with autocratic principles. The politics and morality of the democracies is still based upon fear. This is a residue of religious morality and religious teaching, of the ideal of brute force ruling the world, the results of our animal ancestry.

In Germany the employment of fear has been systematized with perfect method. Germany is the most highly militarized country in existence, and the foundation-stone of militarism is fear. This admission is made by the greatest of contemporary German soldiers, Marshal von Hindenburg. He writes, in fact, that "one will never achieve anything without compulsion." Now, compulsion means fear, for compulsion can only take effect if one fears it.

The consequences of the education and control of men by fear are extremely serious, above all, of course, when its employment is general and systematic. An obedient population results, whose spirit is servile and its credulity childish. There is an actual suppression of all spirit of criticism. The word of the ruler takes precedence of everything. The noxious effects of this mental condition are enormous, not only in the case of

individuals, but also in collectivities. It is true that the passive discipline of a population makes massed action possible, but this massed action is not so powerful as it would be were the discipline voluntary. Passive obedience, in fact, has suppressed individual initiative, or has at least very greatly restrained it. It tends to reduce it to zero. The result is that the mass of the people becomes an aggregate of machines moved by an external will. It is the sum, purely and simply, of identical units; of arms without heads. Voluntary discipline gives quite another result; for then obedience is rational. The mass of the people is then an aggregate of individuals possessing one single will. It is no longer a sum of units, but a multiple, and the units are not arms without heads; they are heads with arms.

This difference between passive discipline and voluntary discipline explains why the German Army, despite its strength in men, which was three times as great as that of the French Army, and despite its armament and its supplies, which were greatly superior to those of the French Army, was beaten at the Battle of the Marne. A German physician, Dr. Delius, understood this very clearly when he wrote in *Der Tag*: "The French soldier possesses a manifest superiority over other soldiers. He feels that he is a citizen of his country, instead of a machine yielding blindly to discipline. He understands the duties which his rank as citizen imposes upon him for the defence of his country. It is from this conscious patriotism that the French derive their powers of resistance, their obstinate determination to conquer. This patriotism would have enabled them to undergo trials even greater than those which they have suffered."

This difference between passive discipline and voluntary discipline explains why the Germans were held up by the Belgians at Liège and on the Yser; why, for two and a half years, despite their methodical preparation,

they have been held up along the whole of the Franco-Belgian front. The German Army found itself confronted by nations in arms, by nations having one thought and one intention: to defend their liberty, their autonomy, their right to dispose of themselves. And this thought, this intention, were not imposed on the peoples by the will of a master; they were born spontaneously, the inevitable consequences of circumstances acting upon men accustomed to live in freedom, a freedom which as yet, alas! is imperfect, but which, by the very nature of things, will increase from more to more. It is because these circumstances did not appear to the British citizen in an identical light that the British participation in the war was so gradual, although the war was vital to Great Britain—more vital even than to France and Russia. We have the proof of this in the fact that each direct attack upon the British nation, such as the bombardment of the coast towns, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the murder of Miss Cavell, etc., provoked a rush to enlist.

The superiority of voluntary discipline over the discipline imposed by fear is clearly revealed in this war. Another fact which is revealed is the importance of not breaking the initiative of individuals, and of not believing that men can be compared to machines, and controlled as such. This is a lesson to which we would call the attention of the partisans of the Taylor system\* in the industrial utilization of human beings. The benefits which the industrial production derives from such treatment are apparent, not actual, for they will be detrimental to future production. The "mechanization" of individuals lessens their intellectuality, and there is no task, however trivial and however mechanical, which does not demand intellectual effort and a critical mind. Living beings are different

\* A system of industrial organization exemplified in the well-known Ford automobile factory. Its essence is specialization.—Tr.

from the machines which men construct, and the forgetfulness of this truth leads to the commission of a thousand stupidities, and the formation of a host of false conceptions.

The passive discipline which impregnates the whole German people has almost entirely abolished the critical spirit in the majority of Germans. The result of this has been, and still is, that the Germans fall into the grossest psychological errors as regards other peoples. They have measured others by their own ell, and have supposed them like themselves—that is, yielding to fear, obedient machines. The German rulers had so little critical spirit that they were unable to foresee that all the British dominions, Ireland,\* and India, would be loyal. They could not understand, being reared in obedience and the habit of executing orders—that is, under the incessant influence of authority—what the power of liberty was in those nations accustomed to enjoy it.

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Liberty! So different are the things which men understand by this word that it will be best to explain it a little. Cicero said: "Liberty is *potestas vivendi ut velis*." And Sir Robert Fulmer writes: "Liberty is the liberty of each to do as he desires, to live as he pleases, and not to be fettered by laws." This is absolute liberty, which in truth exists nowhere, for the will of each of us is subject to the influence of a thousand ties, to the fact of the universal environment. The liberty of which we are speaking is political and social liberty—that is, the absence of constraint alien to the individual and imposed upon him against his will. A people is free when the mass of individuals composing it have the right to establish laws and regulations for

\* The Sinn Fein rebellion of April, 1916, was not an event of importance. Only a few thousand insurgents were involved. But it shows how harmful was the old English policy of coercion, for the psychical condition of the Sinn Feiner is a product of this ancient policy.

themselves; it ceases to be free when a human will foreign to its own will forcibly constrains it to act as it did not wish to act. In the peoples whose government is democratic liberty is less restrained than in peoples whose government is autocratic. Authority makes itself less felt in such peoples, and this condition of comparative liberty creates, for those who enjoy it, a social environment which is of such a nature that they would not at any price be deprived of it.

The German rulers, accustomed to being obeyed, cannot conceive the power of the love of liberty in those peoples which enjoy it. They cannot imagine that the Belgian people would rather die than cease to be free to govern itself in its own way, free to speak the tongue which pleases it. The German rulers could not conceive that the Poles, Alsatians, Czechs, etc., would bear in mind the permanent efforts at "Germanization" to which they have been subjected. The German rulers could not, because of their education, comprehend the force of aspiration toward liberty. And this force was such that those nations which had been conquered and subjugated for years or for centuries prayed for the victory of an autocracy like Russia! They set their hopes upon the Western democracies: the British Empire and France. They trusted in their moral force for the accomplishment of the official promises of the Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia. Germany and Austria had, it is true, made the same promises to the Poles, even before the Russian Government had done so. But how could men build on the promises of the German Government, when they saw it violate its signature by the invasion of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg? The development of the results of these actions was infinite and inevitable.

The German lack of the critical spirit, a result of German discipline, prevented the Germans from perceiving the consequences of the violation of their signa-



türe, just as they did not understand the revolt of the world's opinion against their actions: against the rupture of their treaties, their acts of violence and of terrorism.

The events of this war demonstrate, therefore, in the first place, the enormous social value of the spirit of criticism, and the great harm worked by passive obedience, by discipline suffered and enforced. From this war, too, results the glorification of the spirit of revolt, that spirit which is the begetter of all the progress won by the human mind.

## CHAPTER II

### THE COST OF THE WAR

The number of men under arms—Professional soldiers are disappearing in the mass of occasional soldiers—The uselessness of long military service—The importance of militias—The bankruptcy of militarism—The importance of individual initiative—Individualism—The mentality of the French soldier—The engineer and administrator replace the professional soldier—Foreign or domestic policy conditions military strategy—War a survival of barbarous periods—Decorations a survival of tattoo-marks—Ordinary criminality in time of war: it does not disappear, but changes its aim—War is a succession of crimes—Horror and hatred of war—The development of anti-militarism.

War as a means of acquiring wealth—Pillage and requisition—The dispossession of conquered peoples—Application to Europeans of the methods applied by Europeans to so-called inferior races—The Germanic race a superior race!—The acquisition of property by means of warfare is a survival—Its impossibility—The devastation and the losses of war—An estimate of the losses in property and in men—The cost of the war—The payment per head required to repay it—The general ruin of the nations—The conquered cannot indemnify the conquerors—Justice and reason would call for the seizure of the property of those who caused the war: the Germanic Emperors, Kings, Princes, and landowners—Disarmament seems bound to come.

**T**HE present war is remarkable for the enormous number of men engaged in it. If in these numbers one includes all the reserves and territorials conformable with the law in those countries in which obligatory service exists for all men, we find that the number of soldiers of all arms and all ranks amounts to more than 50,000,000 for the fourteen belligerents (British Empire, France, Belgium, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Japan, Portugal, Rumania, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). This enormous mass of men is a product of compulsory service, and only

of compulsory service, for the British Empire, including its colonies, accounts for only one-tenth part of these 50,000,000 soldiers. Moreover, in the course of 1916 the Empire also resorted to compulsion, which increased its resources in men.

The greater number of these men, of course, were, before the war, civilians—business men, manufacturers, professors or school-teachers, artisans or peasants—and to-morrow, after the war, those who survive will return to their trades and professions. From this it follows that the professional soldiers have been swamped in the midst of the combatant masses. In the beginning, as officers, they held the posts of command, so that their importance was great. But the longer the war continued, the more this importance diminished. The continued effect of battles and the fatigues of war played a part, where they were concerned, analogous to that of the sea on the rocks, which it lashes with incessant surf. At the end of a few months a great proportion of the professional officers were out of action—killed, wounded, or prisoners—and the subaltern commands were filled by occasional soldiers, lately civilians. This phenomenon occurred in all the armies—in those obtained by voluntary recruitment as well as those which resulted from compulsory service.

We may, therefore, positively assert that the present war is a war not of professional soldiers, but of civilians made soldiers for the moment. And it has already lasted more than two and a half years! This proves the value of a few weeks' training—of three months at most—in transforming the peaceful civilian into a skilful combatant.

From the general fact that the war is being waged entirely by the civilians of yesterday and to-morrow, it results that we have a striking proof of the uselessness of long military service in time of peace. The famous French three years' law, which, according to the mili-

tarists, was necessary to save France, has had no time to take effect in this war, yet France has held her own and is holding her own, and is even doing so *better* than at the beginning. The uselessness of this law is demonstrated by the facts. Another thing which is taught by this war is the utility and importance of militias, of the armed nation, able to rise up swiftly in defence of its threatened liberties. Training is necessary, but there is nothing to be gained by making it exceed a few weeks; the facts prove this. We have here a striking proof of the consequences which emerged from the war of secession in America, and which, owing to the influence of professional soldiers, had been misunderstood and contradicted.

Another of the lessons of this gigantic war, a war such as humanity had never seen, is the complete bankruptcy of the militarism based on passive discipline and indisputable authority. Despite her wonderful organization and the sheep-like obedience of her millions of men, Germany will be defeated. But if to her powers of organization and her numbers she had added the force of individual initiative, a moral force, France could not have resisted her in September, 1914. England would have been powerless, being without an army, and Germany would have triumphed. But her military system of education and of life had broken within her the mainspring of individual initiative, leaving only the force of the collective initiative. Man obeyed because he was accustomed to obey, like a beast in a herd.

In France a different phenomenon was to be observed. The entire nation, excepting a very small number of bellicose Chauvinists, was pacific; but when it saw that war was inevitable, and that it was necessary either to obey the Germans or to fight them in order to resist them, there was a rush for the firing-line, and all these men were ready to make war upon war. I cannot prove this better than by quoting a fragment

of a letter written in the trenches of the Yser on December 11, 1914. The writer, a simple Breton farmer, highly intelligent, a soldier in a territorial regiment, disappeared in March, 1915, probably killed at the time of the first employment of asphyxiating gases.

“. . . Wounded the 30th of October before Bixschotte,” writes M. Olivier Guyomarch, “by a shell-splinter in the foot, while returning from carrying information to a Lieutenant of artillery who was killed (I was *homme de liaison*—that is to say, a messenger on the field of battle), I was evacuated to Mortain, then sent home, and rejoined the 3rd of December, at the depot at Guingamp. The same day I asked leave to go to the front once more in the place of a father of five children. I had gone of my own will on the 18th of September, too. It is not that I am a Jingo. *I make war with enthusiasm upon the warlike spirit incarnate in Germany, and I will fight to the end in the same faith, to lay low the Prussian ‘corporalism,’ which is the cause of so much sorrow and so much desolation.* Sorrow and desolation? No need to tell you at any length if this is true. If one has not been present one cannot picture to oneself what a battle is in our days. What an immense faith in a peaceful future is needful in order that one may hold out against so many horrible things, so much suffering, material and moral. This is why I, a bachelor, an *anti-militarist*, am to-day, with delirious enthusiasm, making war on what I believe to be the obstacle to the progress of society toward more goodness, more brotherhood, more civilization; on the German soldiers and the spirit which animates them.

“We are in the trenches facing the Yser. The fighting is less violent here than where we were before this.

“Do not pity me if I fall, for I believe I am serving a noble cause, a cause worthy of absorbing all our energies, all our enthusiasm. . . . May a fruitful peace,

which shall repair all this desolation, emerge from our sufferings."

The spirit which dictated this letter, so admirable in its simplicity, was and is that of nine-tenths of the French combatants. To save their liberty! To live in freedom! That is what fired them, that is what still inspires them. Herein a phenomenon has occurred analogous to that which occurred a hundred and twenty-five years ago, at the period when the Imperials were threatening the growing French Revolution, at the period when Rouget de Lisle symbolized the aspirations of France in the *Marseillaise*.

Every citizen was conscious of the menace hanging over him, the menace of the victory of the modern Imperials. Every citizen rose and hastened to defend, not his terrestrial country, not his economic country, but his patrimony of liberty, his manners and his customs. It is this individualistic spirit which exists in every Frenchman and Frenchwoman, which formed a national consciousness of enormous strength, which enabled the French to resist and partly to repulse an invader who was both more numerous and better organized, and better prepared than the French were.

The present war has proved that voluntary discipline—that is, the discipline which the soldier imposes upon himself, by reason and not by fear—gives the combatant a superiority over his enemy. We know, indeed, that the Frenchman is by no means a docile soldier; his critical spirit is highly developed; he "growls" at everything. Let us recall his popular nickname of *grogner*—"growler." But in action he disciplines himself instantaneously under the pressure of circumstances and his own reason and his own judgment. He is not a machine in movement; he is a living, intelligent being in action. And the result is that he has triumphed, on the Marne and elsewhere, over troops more numerous and more highly disciplined. Some-

times even he has triumphed in spite of leaders who, frightened and bewildered, ordered retreats—orders which were not obeyed. Thus in this war the rôle of individual initiative, of the tense and reasoned will of each individual, appears to be very considerable. The basis of this initiative, of this individualism, is liberty, the autonomy of the individual. Moreover, even in those who imagine that the force of a collectivity passively obeying its leaders is always greater than that of a reasoning collectivity, there exists some intuition of the force of the individual initiative, since we see the German and Russian autocracies invoking the ideals of liberty and the defence of liberties in order to sweep the nations into the war. But in these nations there could be only vague aspirations, for the basis—education and the habit of liberty—was lacking, owing to the autocratic methods of government prevailing. Perhaps in this absence of individual energy and initiative we should perceive one of the causes of the defeat of the Russian armies by the armies of Germany, better organized and better led.

One of the lessons of this war is the considerable diminution of the rôle of the professional soldier, while that of the engineers and administrators increases in importance in proportion. Here we have a true industrialization of the war; the professional soldier has had to adapt himself to the new form of warfare, so different from the traditional and classic form. Bayonet fighting has in reality grown rare; there are relatively few wounded by the *arme blanche*, although the newspapers, illustrated and otherwise, represent or describe bayonet charges. On the Western front the men often shrink from employing the bayonet or the dagger, which has been substituted for the bayonet in trench-fighting. They prefer the grenade. In this we must recognize a diminution of the spirit of violence, of the taste for murder in the human being.

Humanity is witnessing not merely a war of armies and fleets, but a war of artisans and industrial engineers. It is as much an industrial struggle as a military struggle, on account of the quantity of munitions, weapons, equipments, and provisions which are required. Everything, therefore, works together in reducing more and more the importance of the professional soldier.

But the command still remains in the hands of the professional soldiers. From this results an inevitable disorder in many services, and in the employment of the physical and intellectual energies of the men available. The echo of this disorder is heard even in Parliament, and we find proofs of it, related at length, in the official reports. Everywhere we find this disorder, even in Germany, where organization had nevertheless reached a high degree of perfection.

One little fact which the sociologist and psychologist ought to note is the fact that during these two and a half years of war the great General Staffs, those of the Commanders-in-Chief, have never been bombarded by aeroplanes or dirigibles. The spots in which they are established is known to all, enemies as well as friends, and yet they remain untouched, while aeroplanes and dirigibles set out to sow their bombs upon distant cities! The fact is curious and significant. It is a proof of the solidarity which unites all professional soldiers, independently of the nations to which they belong.\*

This war, then, has enormously reduced the importance of the professional soldier, even in the exercise of his profession: warfare. He is even forced to subordinate his strategy to policy; he is the servant of the politician, the statesman. Never has this function of the professional soldier been more plainly apparent than in this war, and it has fallen to Germany, the military nation *par excellence*, to demonstrate the subordinate

\* See *Psychologie du Militaire professionnel*, by A. Hamon, Paris, 1898, p. 25.



rôle of the professional soldier ! This, however, is only logical, for military strategy is only the means of realizing the end indicated by the politician.

When we consider the German offensive we see very plainly that this or that act of war has been executed with reference to this or that political object, or with reference to several political objects, such as to influence neutrals in the Balkans or America, to influence the German population, to affect the subscriptions to the war loan, etc. This is plainly apparent to any thinking person, for these acts of war have no direct utility in themselves. Their only direct result is a great consumption of men and munitions, without a correlative weakening of the enemy. The same phenomenon, by the way, has been observable in certain offensive actions of the Allies.

War is truly a barbaric survival in our century of industrialism; so that it was bound to bring in its train a whole revival of customs dear to our ancestors of bygone centuries. Thus we beheld a display of the most miscellaneous decorations. To existing decorations fresh ones were added. Crosses of War, Orders of Merit, Victoria Crosses, etc., were pinned to a multitude of breasts. Not that these various playthings were the parents of heroic acts ! No, they had no influence on the occasional combatants, the civilians of yesterday and to-morrow. The soldier, in the moment of battle or in the trenches, thinks of one thing only: of "pulling through" as well as he can, at all events without being killed; and he says to himself: "The more I kill, the less chance I have of being killed." This often leads him to commit heroic actions, but this heroism, none the less, is based on egoism, on the idea of self-preservation. Never does the idea of a reward intervene to impel him to action. This discovery, which resulted from a psychological investigation conducted by M. Lahy and confirmed by the letters from the front

which I myself have received, is highly important, for it follows from this that rewards are useless, and without any value in determining human action. This confirms what I have written concerning rewards and punishments as a method of education.\*

The decorations which our rulers are distributing so liberally, thinking thereby to repay the sacrifice and the suffering of millions of human beings, are simply the survival of the tattooings and other marks of war-like valour, such as, for example, the wolf-tails of the Redskins, so dear to our savage ancestors. Man still remains something of a child, contenting himself with little, and above all contenting himself with appearances.

However, it is also important to see in these decorations an æsthetic aspect of warfare. War is so horrible, with its train of death and desolation, that humanity, in the course of the years, has felt the need to beautify and adorn it. And hence arises a multitude of medals and also of uniforms. He who wears the uniform loves to display it. In England, for example, the military spirit is non-existent, and the officer always goes abroad without his weapons. However, one sees the khaki uniform there, often, for that matter, very smartly cut and worn, displaying itself in drawing-rooms and in the streets, to the great delight of the women, who, to whatever social class they belong, are almost all sensitive to the charm of modern tattoo-marks and wolf-tails.

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An interesting phenomenon, which has been noted in every country, is the diminution, in this war, of ordinary criminality. The correctional courts and the assizes have much less work to do. This is the repetition of a phenomenon which was observed at the time of the war of 1870. Those who only perceive the appearance

\* See *The Universal Illusion of Free Will and Criminal Responsibility*, London, 1898; *Éducation et Liberté*, Paris, 1912.

of things have deduced therefrom the fact that war is a moral agency. This is an absolutely false interpretation of an actual fact. Criminality diminishes during the war, not because men are more moral, but because men who have the instinct of murder, rapine, and parasitism—criminals, in short—find in the very feats of warfare an outlet and expression for these instincts. This is proved by the fact that feminine criminality does not diminish, while juvenile criminality increases. Crime is not disappearing; it is not even changing its form; it is simply changing its object. To kill a man becomes meritorious, for he is the enemy; the rape of the daughter of an enemy is a matter of no importance; as for pillage and theft, they are not even venal offences, but the current coin of war. Moreover, a host of acts which are purely and simply common crimes are methodically organized by all the belligerents; for example, the theft of documents, of despatches. But the palm in this kind of common criminality must uncontestedly be rewarded to Germany, whose official representatives in the United States, for example, fabricated false passports and false depositions, and even went to the length of assassination, of blowing up bridges, factories, and ships.

The leaders, in short, excite in their men the most perverse, inhuman, and brutal instincts of humanity; and by a complete reversal of the ordinary ideas of morality they transform the lowest, cruellest, and most sordid actions into admirable performances, worthy of all imitation. Far from punishing them, they reward them by money, decorations, promotion, and titles.

Militarism is a school of crime. This aphorism, which I wrote in 1893, has unhappily been only too abundantly proved by the events of this war. On certain fronts or portions of fronts the command has erected into a system the "cleaning up" of the trenches—that is to say, the killing with the knife of all the "human

material" found therein. Before offensives the men are made to drink wine, or ether, or a mixture of these two narcotics, according to the army in question. Semi-drunkenness is indispensable if a man is to do his deadly work and give rein to his brutal and anti-human instincts. War thus becomes a school of crime, a university of hooliganism and worse, whose bitter fruit may well be tasted in the years after the war.

War, indeed, is merely an endless succession of crimes of every sort: assassination, murder, concerted and individual theft, rape, attempted murder or assassination, destruction of property, fabrication of false documents, etc. The official inquiries undertaken by the various Governments concerning acts of warfare have shown that this is indeed the case. It is enough, for example, to read the "Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages," presided over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, with its volume of evidence, and *Les Violations des Lois de la Guerre par l'Allemagne*, published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This contains photographic proofs impossible of denial, for they constitute an actual confession by the authors of the criminal acts in question.

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The present war is causing so many horrors, with its millions of dead, its millions of cripples, its millions of wounded, its thousands of millions of loss, that if all humanity consisted of reasonable beings a stupendous anti-warlike feeling would spread throughout the whole world. Will it be thus? Will this war be the last war? It is impossible to predict with certainty. But one thing is certain: that among the combatants—and all those who have had letters from or conversations with those who have been at the front will testify to this—a veritable horror of warfare has sprung up. Soldiers and officers of all the belligerent armies have seen things so frightful that they have acquired a

hatred of war. Listen to these fragments of letters, two from common soldiers and the third from a British officer. One, cited by Romain Rolland, comes from a German, and is written to a professor in German Switzerland; the other is from a letter which was sent to me by a working cabinet-maker, a French reservist.

“All of us,” writes the German soldier, “even those who at first were the most eager in the struggle, wish for nothing to-day but peace, our officers as well as ourselves. . . . The desire for peace is intense with us—with all those, at least, who are at the front, and are obliged to kill and to be killed. The newspapers say that it is hardly possible to moderate the warlike ardour of the combatants. They lie, knowingly and unknowingly.”

“From the 25th of September (1915),” writes the French soldier, “until the 1st of October, I was living amid frightful and unprecedented bloodshed. Never has the —th Regiment seen such things as have happened during these six days. It is horrible. You and all the learned folk do not know what the trench war is, for if you knew you would all, in the name of humanity and civilization, demand peace. You should see men or portions of men fly into the air, to a height of 40, 60, or 100 feet. You should see heads, arms, and legs of men, horses, and mules lying about everywhere on the field of battle.”

Any comment would lessen the horror of this description.

And the officer, a young Englishman, a volunteer, writes: “I do not think of what I do, of what I see, of what I hear, of what I feel, for if I did I could not bear it. It is not *myself* that is here; it is some fellow who doesn't think, but does his work, whether for good or ill; it is only thus that one can keep one's nervous equilibrium. Life in the trenches is a hell full of

vermin, cold, and damp, and ignobly filthy, mentally as well as physically. All those who are there hope only for one thing—to get wounded so that they can go home.’

All those soldiers who have been under fire hate the war, which is a veritable hell, as many Englishmen have written in the letters published by the newspapers. The civil population on the Continent has the same anti-warlike feeling, for it has felt the results of the war more strongly than the British population, which, thanks to its insular position, has partly escaped them.

One of the lessons of this war is therefore the hatred of war and the love of peace. The lesson is dearly bought, but we think it will be effective.

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Parallel to this growth of anti-warlike feeling there has been a development of anti-militarism. This is entirely logical, since war and militarism go hand in hand. Military discipline is always harsh and brutal. It shocks all men accustomed to the relative liberty of civilian life, and the result is discontent, and finally an anti-militarist feeling.

That man, whosoever he may be, who possesses power tends to abuse that power. He likes to display his power, and he can do so only to the detriment and vexation of those who are under him. Naturally the result is that a spirit of opposition grows up in these latter, a spirit of hatred for the social organization which is wronging them. The basis of military discipline is always constraint by a will external to the individual. Obedience is based, not on the free will of the soldier, but on his absence of will; the soldier is transformed into an obedient machine which is set in motion by the commander. It results from this that military discipline is based on the fear of punishment, the variety of which is small and the severity great, for it extends to the death penalty.

From the psychological point of view the results of military discipline are serious. On the one hand this discipline diminishes individual initiative; on the other, it produces a hyper-excitation of the spirit of authority. In all those, indeed, to whom a fraction of power is imparted—that is, in the officers, from the corporal to the General—a kind of madness or intoxication of power supervenes. This phenomenon occurs even in those who only the day before were civilians, and who will become civilians again to-morrow. The results of this surexcitation of the spirit of authority are innumerable acts of arbitrariness and prepotency. Such actions shock those who are the witnesses or victims of them, the more violently when they are used to the democratic customs and the liberty of our Western countries. There is a gulf between the aspirations of the men and the manner in which they are treated! Thus a professor, now a soldier, wrote to me in 1915: "For fourteen months I have been a slave!" These words truthfully express the feeling which inspires the great majority of French soldiers, who need a big share of energy in order to hold out against all the nuisances and discomforts of militarism, and to maintain their desire to continue this war until the triumph of the Allies, so as to kill warfare. But little by little there accumulates in these men a mass of petty and restrained rebellions, which at the end of the war will break forth in a vast outcry against militarism.

I believe the feeling of the English soldiers is the same, to judge by some fragments of letters which I have been enabled to read. This anti-militarist feeling of the British citizen who has become a soldier in defence of his liberty is entirely logical, and it would be surprising if it did not exist in all the citizens of a country, in which there is so much love of individual liberty.

And this spirit of anti-militarism, which is growing up even among the neutrals—it is enough to read the

Swiss newspapers, for instance, to perceive this—is it also developing in the Germans? We cannot say certainly that it is, but it seems probable. The servile, passive obedience of the Germans is a source of surprise to us Western democrats. The soldiers submit without flinching to treatment which would provoke mutiny in the French and English armies. It is a positive fact—I have it from the letter of a French soldier who was an ocular witness—that German soldiers are chained to the machine-guns! However, despite this passive acceptance of the worst of treatment, abasing the dignity of a man to the point of causing its disappearance, there is, in the depths of the German masses, civilian yesterday and to be civilian to-morrow, a vague, secret feeling of revolt against militarism. We can perceive this in certain of the daily notes written by soldiers and published in the official publication of the French Government, *Les Violations des Lois de la Guerre par l'Allemagne*, and in M. Joseph Bédier's pamphlet, *Les Crimes allemands d'après des témoignages allemands*. We can also perceive it in some fragments of German letters published by Romain Rolland in the *Journal de Genève*. For the rest, it would be rather astonishing if the German people were to submit, without any feeling of rebellion, to the misdeeds of an exacerbated militarism. It is still obeying, owing to its fear of punishment, but in the depths of its nature there exists a violent contradiction between the economic and intellectual condition of its civilization and its political condition, which is a century in arrears. This contradiction is provoking a subterranean activity which will one day manifest itself in a terrible explosion of anti-militarism. Logic shows that this is so, and we believe the phenomenon of the present war will confirm the principle: all action engenders a reaction.

Suffering is essentially educative. And in this war the men of all countries will have suffered so much,



or have witnessed such suffering, that they will have learned many things. One of their lessons will be: the development in the human heart of a profound anti-bellucose and anti-militarist feeling.

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In all times war has been a means of acquiring property, like trade, industry, or brigandage. The present war has not failed in this sociological mission. By means of requisitions and acts of pillage, methodically organized, whole regions have been emptied of provisions, of machinery, of raw materials, and even of household articles of furniture, which have been transported to Germany. The fact has been denied, but it exists none the less, and we have a proof of it in the order of a corps commandant, who complains of disorder in the transports, caused by the despatch of articles of plunder—a printed order of the day, which was published in the *Berner Tagwacht*. There have even been advertisements of the sale of the products of pillage! The review of Dr. Ostwald, the chemist, *Das Monistische Jahrhundert*, published such an announcement in its issue for September 30, 1915. At the head figured these words: *War Booty*.

That has come to pass in the war of the twentieth century which has occurred in all previous wars. The only difference, as far as there is any, is to be found in the method and organization of modern spoliation. One of the goods which war enables men to seize is money, and one of the methods of collecting it is the system of collective fines, of ransom for offences, supposed or real. This has been practised on a large scale in Belgium, France, and Poland—in short, in all the regions invaded. It is purely and simply the revival of the *Wehrgeld* of the old Germanic law. This enables the victorious collectivity to enrich itself cheaply by the spoils of the vanquished collectivity.

Moreover, the intention to despoil the vanquished—

that is, the theory that war is a method of acquiring wealth—has been openly avowed by the German leaders. They have repeatedly declared their intention of appropriating the conquered territories by seizing the soil, the factories, the houses, and expelling the original inhabitants. It is impossible otherwise to understand the following phrases, which we cite from two official petitions sent to the Chancellor of the Empire, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by some very important associations of agriculturalists and manufacturers, and by a body of "intellectuals."\*

"The means of economic power," we read in these petitions, "existing in these (French) territories, including large and medium-sized estates, will be placed in German hands by such methods that it will be France who will *indemnify* and *receive* the owners. . . . Enterprises and properties (Belgian) *must* pass from anti-German into German hands. . . . The territories which Russia will be forced to cede to us will be . . . territories of agricultural *colonization*. . . . The Russian war indemnity must be paid in kind . . . the political cession of territorial property, *freed from all private proprietorship*. . . . The most important enterprises and properties must pass from anti-German to German owners, the indemnities payable to the old proprietors being the charge of France."

In short, all these phrases mean only one thing: the expropriation of the landlords, the expulsion of the inhabitants of the soil. The conquered territories are colonies, territories to be populated. The Germans pretend to need such colonies owing to the increase of their population, thanks to their high birth-rate. The

\* There have been two petitions—one from the intellectuals and professors, the other from the "League of Agriculturalists," the "Directing Committee of the League of German Peasants" (now the Westphalian Peasants), the "Central Union of German Manufacturers," the "Manufacturers' League," and the "Union of the Middle Classes of the Empire." This is dated May 20, 1915.

ruling classes of Germany have thus affirmed their intention of applying on a large scale the system which they introduced in so-called German Poland. This transformation of European territories into colonies to be peopled can only take place on one condition: the expulsion *en masse* of the owners of the soil, without troubling about their nationality, by the simple right of superior might, *quia nominor leo*. The German rulers, in making these demands, care nothing for the neutrals who may be the proprietors of factories and estates in the territories conquered by Germany. The right of ownership is for them non-existent from the moment that such becomes their will. Always the conception that might is right, which necessarily implies the suppression of liberty in the regions where this conception prevails and is applied.

This system of appropriating the goods of the vanquished, in contradiction with our customs and the so-called laws of war, is, as a matter of fact, applied with more or less rigour by all the Western peoples to the Asiatic, African, and American peoples of the soil. Europeans have regarded them as inferiors, whom they honoured greatly by devouring them. The Germans wish to apply this system to Europeans, their neighbours, because they consider that these Europeans belong to inferior races, and that the Germanic race is the only superior race, the chosen of God, elected to rule the world. Here is a curious phenomenon, due to a veritable hypertrophy of the ego, provoked by a military education acting upon a caste which is steeped in the pride of caste, and upon classes accustomed through the generations to passive obedience and servility. This conception of the Germanic race as the chosen people of God is merely the transformation, in our days, of the ancient belief that the Jewish race was the Chosen People. It is, in short, a survival of a barbaric epoch.

Similarly, war as a means of acquiring property is a survival from earlier periods, from those in which industry and commerce had not attained their present development. The employment of this system of acquiring wealth betrays in those who practise it a complete absence of the spirit of analysis and deduction. It is a conception of a wholly primitive nature. And it is only logical that it should be found in the military mentality, in which all spirit of criticism has been eliminated by the hypertrophy of the spirit of authority and the spirit of obedience.

If we reflect even for a moment we perceive the impossibility of the realization of the Germanic ideal: the industry of war as a means of acquiring wealth. The financial, industrial, and commercial conditions of the modern world, with their infinite complexity, interpenetration, and international character, are absolutely opposed to such a system. The whole edifice of production and exchange in our societies is founded in the last resort on credit—that is, on the good faith of the contracting parties, on the security of contracts. Dispossession by war is the very opposite of these factors. It is, accordingly, the destruction of the whole structure of finance, industry, and commerce. It is a return to the commercial methods of the Middle Ages, which existed in continual fear of the bands of mercenaries in the pay of the petty nobles. One requires the primitive intelligence of the perfect professional soldier, the perfect petty noble, to imagine that war would enrich the conqueror in the twentieth century. But if the German ruler has been endowed with this rudimentary intelligence it is the fault of his military education, of his military mentality, which leads him to regard men as machines, and which deprives him of all critical spirit and kills in him the spirit of liberty. We here discover by another road what we have already discovered: the noxious character of the military mentality, the

begetter of death, and the excellence of the spirit of liberty, the leaven of human progress.

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War is not a mode of acquiring wealth, for it does not pay, to employ a commercial expression. It destroys more than it brings in.

Let us consider the present war. What do we see? Towns and villages in ashes; factories and workshops dismantled; fields ploughed by shells; forests splintered and destroyed; roads obliterated; bridges broken; railway lines and stations blown up; and vessels sunk. We behold, in short, all the means of production and exchange demolished and annihilated. Ashes and shapeless heaps of stone and metal, tangled heaps of trees, and unsown fields replace them. And in this work of destruction are included all the achievements of the human mind, both in the present and in the past. Furniture, books, stuffs, tools and machinery, works of art of the bygone centuries—all this is now but a waste of desolation. Here is the direct work of the war, the actual manner in which it enriches humanity, and also the conqueror, who thus finds himself the owner of ashes and ruins, if so be that he can remain in possession of them.

But beside these losses by the destruction of things there is the loss due to the misuse of human energies, and the destruction of the very implements of war: munitions and weapons. Human energies tend to employ the implements of death rather than the implements of life. There is, therefore, a misuse of the forces of humanity, the inevitable result of a state of war. Arms and munitions, manufactured unrestingly, are destroyed by the mere fact of their employment, and with extreme rapidity. All the human labour absorbed by this manufacture vanishes without leaving behind it anything of use to the human collectivity. It leaves dead and wounded men, a product which cannot be regarded as useful to the life of humanity!

After the war, in short, there will be fewer products than before the war, on account of their violent destruction, their non-production, or their rapid wear and tear. It follows from this that the result of war is a stupendous destruction, which far exceeds the few useful or favourable results which may ensue, such as the reconstruction of destroyed houses, villages, or towns under conditions of greater salubrity; or the improvement and replacement of machinery. In war there is an infinite multitude of human efforts which disappear by reason of the destruction of the things in which they are embodied.

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It is extremely difficult to estimate the value of the things destroyed, and still more difficult to estimate the value of the men killed or crippled for life. However, we can arrive at a very approximate result which will enable us to form some idea of the immensity of the losses suffered by humanity as the outcome of this war. Economists and statisticians have given different figures; but those of English, French, and Belgian origin are fairly similar. The figures given by a German statistician, Herr W. Michaelis, and published by him in *Ueber Land und Meer*, are very much lower. Examining his statistical inquiry, we plainly perceive that it is his desire, not to reveal the actual situation to the public, but to conceal at least a portion of the losses and the expenditure caused by the war. Science is subordinated to a political aim; so here again the truth is falsified.

The losses in property and goods destroyed are enormous, without speaking of the losses resulting from the consumption or wear and tear of munitions, weapons, and equipment; from the non-utilization of the factories and the merchant fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary; from the disorganization of the industry, commerce, and finance of the world; from the unproductiveness of the millions of manual and intel-

lectual workers employed in warfare. Let us consider only the landed property and real estate, the industrial products and the movable property destroyed in Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, the north-east of France, Eastern Prussia, the Bukovina, Transylvania, Galicia, Serbia, Rumania, the Trentino, Macedonia, etc., and the ships of the belligerents and neutrals which have been sunk in every sea. We may without fear of exaggeration estimate that all this devastation represents at least £2,000,000,000. So much for things.

The value of the men is still more difficult to determine, for all depends on the value attached to the average individual. We find this valuation floating between £400 and £1,000. I will take the lower figure, £400. Then the 8,000,000 dead represent a value of £3,200,000,000. The seriously wounded will almost all be unproductive. The little they may produce will hardly compensate for the diminished value of the men slightly wounded, or sick, or enfeebled by fatigue and privation. Attaining the number of 5,000,000 after two and a half years of war, they represent a loss of £2,000,000,000, for we may estimate the value of each as £400, as in the case of the dead. And as a matter of fact they will not only be almost unproductive, but they will still be consumers. They will therefore expend without producing.

So the loss in men, dead and crippled and infirm, estimated in money, amounts approximately to more than £5,200,000,000, giving each unit a minimum value of £400. Here we have an absolute loss, with no possibility of recuperation. To this we must add the value of the women, children, and civilian adults killed, massacred, or dead of want and privation. We thereby reach a total money value of £6,000,000,000, perhaps £7,000,000,000, as representing the loss in human beings. Let us note that the end of the world-war is not even in sight as yet; that it may last a year, perhaps two

years longer; that other nations may take part in it; that everything leads us to suppose that the devastation will increase; for the rulers of the Imperial Powers, knowing themselves lost, will strive to bury themselves under the ruins and to shake the world as they disappear.

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Let us now examine the cost of the upkeep of the war—that is, the expenditure which enables the belligerents to obtain rifles, guns, machine-guns, aeroplanes, dirigibles, motor-cars, submarines, cruisers, transport services, tons of shells, explosives, provisions, and clothing, etc., for the soldiers, and even for the civilians. According to the credit voted by the Chambers and the declarations of Ministers, one may approximately estimate the annual war expenditure at an average figure of £2,456,000,000 for Great Britain (not counting the credits of the Dominions, but including the advances to the Allied Governments); £1,400,000,000 for Germany; £1,200,000,000 for France; and £1,000,000,000 for Austria-Hungary and Russia. As for Italy, her expenditure did not amount to £320,000,000 during the first year of the war, but it increased during the course of the second year. We do not know what is the expenditure of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Bulgaria, Portugal, Rumania, and Japan. We may estimate it, without fear of exaggeration, at £800,000,000 for the thirty months of war. To sum up: we have, as the expenses of war by the end of January, 1917, the following figures, in millions of pounds:

	Million Pounds Sterling.
British Empire .. .. .	3,640
France .. .. .	3,000
Russia .. .. .	2,500
Italy .. .. .	560
Germany .. .. .	3,500
Austria-Hungary .. .. .	2,500
Other belligerents .. .. .	800
<b>Total ..</b>	<b>16,500</b>



This refers only to the belligerents, and the figures are below rather than above the reality! But the expenses incurred by the war are not confined to these; for the neutral Powers—Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland—have been obliged to place their armies more or less upon a war footing. The result has been a very heavy expenditure for all these peoples.

We may say, then, at the end of thirty months, that the war has involved, for all the European nations, an expenditure of more than 16,000 million pounds. And as the war does not seem likely to end yet, it follows that this expenditure will continue, and that this gigantic total will increase, attaining perhaps 23,000 millions if the war lasts until the end of 1917, or 29,600 millions if it does not cease before the close of 1918. The monthly expenditure of the whole of the belligerents must be estimated at not less than 1,550 millions. The nations at war are literally rushing upon their own ruin.

However, much of this expenditure does not represent a total loss. All this money does not disappear in smoke and shell-splinters. Some of it only changes hands. But a great proportion of these vast sums is a total loss, owing to the destruction of munitions, the rapid wear and tear of things, and the employment of all the material of war to the ends of destruction.

Apart from this, moreover, the expenditure is always borne by the mass of each nation, which will have every year to pay the interest and the sinking fund, for all these sums are raised in the form of loans at long or short date. Great Britain alone resorted to taxation in order to cover a portion of the war expenditure during the two first years. Reckoning the interest and amortization at 6 per cent., we see that the peoples of the belligerent Powers will have each year to pay nearly one thousand million pounds in order to redeem this indebtedness after thirty months of war; about

£1,400,000,000 if the war does not terminate before the end of 1917, and £1,800,000,000 if it lasts until the end of 1918.

This is not all, for we must add to this sum the pensions awarded to the widows, aged parents, and children of the killed, together with the pensions of the disabled and the families whose support they were. What will these pensions amount to? We may reckon upon an average of £20 per annum per killed or disabled soldier. So for the 13 millions of dead or disabled soldiers we obtain an annuity of 260 million pounds, which we must add to the 1,000 millions already cited. So that if the war were to last one or two years longer these 260 millions would become 360 or 460 millions.

To sum up: by the end of thirty months the war has burdened the future generations of the belligerent nations with an annual payment of £1,260,000,000 merely in respect of the redemption of war loans and the pensions of widows, children, and disabled soldiers. This, I repeat, is a minimum, for I have reckoned the interest and sinking fund at 6 per cent., and they will be higher, to judge by the loans already made. The average pension will probably exceed £20, at all events for the Western peoples.

This is not all. Indeed, the £1,260,000,000 which the belligerent nations will be forced to pay annually, in order to provide war pensions and sinking funds, must be increased by the sinking fund of the indemnities and other expenditure which will make good the destruction of property, and this, as we have seen, represents a capital of at least 2,000 million pounds. This means another 120 millions *per* annum. That is, if peace had been signed by January 31, 1917, the belligerent peoples would have to submit to taxation to over some 1,400 millions annually, in order to redeem all the indemnities and war expenditure and pensions! If the war lasts till the end of 1917, the annual amount

of these taxes will reach 1,860 millions; if it lasts till the end of 1918, nearly 2,400 millions. Before the vastness of these burdens one asks oneself whether the nations will consent to support them, or whether they will go into financial liquidation.

Of course the proportion of losses and expenditure, and therefore of indebtedness, varies with the different belligerents. It follows that the annual interest will vary in the same fashion. We are thus able to draw up an approximate table showing the financial situation of the five great belligerents at the end of thirty months of warfare:

	<i>France.</i>	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>Russia.</i>	<i>Germany.</i>	<i>Austria-Hungary.</i>
Expenditure in millions of pounds ..	3,000	3,640	2,500	3,500	2,500
Sinking fund and interest .. ..	180	218	150	210	150
Killed and disabled	1,938,600	484,700	3,885,000	3,015,600	2,527,800
Pensions in millions of pounds ..	38.8	9.68	77.6	60	50.6
Indemnities for destruction in millions of pounds ..	240	—	400	—	—
Interest on and sinking fund of these indemnities ..	14.4	—	24	—	—
Total of interest, pensions, and sinking funds in millions of pounds .. ..	233	228	251	270	200
Population in millions .. ..	39	47	170	68	51
Taxation per head in pounds sterling ..	5.96	4.64	1.48	3.96	3.92

The figures in this table are approximate, and are of no value save as an indication of the reality. Their

approximation is, we think, below the reality—perhaps 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. below it.

From these figures we may judge of the magnitude of the financial disaster which has overtaken the nations as a result of this war. It is truly ruin for them. And it will be impossible for the victors to demand an indemnity from the vanquished. The only means by which the conquerors could partially indemnify themselves for their expenditure would be the seizure of territories and the expropriation of individual proprietors, whether indemnified or not by the conquered nation thus dispossessed of its territories. This means is inapplicable, as I have shown, and could only have been conceived by the primitive military mentality.

However, justice would require that the authors of the world-catastrophe should use their wealth to repair the devastation heaped up by them. This is possible, but it is doubtful if it could be enforced, as it would be an attack upon the capitalist class, which always displays a certain degree of solidarity, independently of frontiers. If the Kings, Princes, and landowners of Germany and Austria-Hungary were to be forced partly to repair the ruin of which they are the authors, it would be necessary, on the conclusion of peace, to seize their land, their personal and real estate. The property thus seized would be handed over to the German nation and the nations on whose territory it lay, but it would be burdened with a heavy mortgage, so that the entire rental, instead of belonging to the Kings, Princes, and landowners, would for a term of years be employed to indemnify the ruined Belgians, French, Poles, Rumanians, and Serbs. After the lapse of these years the revenue would once more belong to the German, Hungarian, and other nations. This system would make it possible to indemnify, to some extent, those who have been ruined by the war, and this without impoverishing the German, Hungarian, Czech, and other peoples, the

victims of the rapacious folly of their rulers. Only the landowners, princes, and kings would suffer the natural and logical consequences of their actions. Impoverished, condemned to work for their living, their mentality would gradually undergo modification under the influence of changed social conditions. They would cease to be harmful parasites, and would be transformed into useful producers. But this is a dream: men are not wise enough to realize it. They will only be so when all men rule themselves, refusing to be divided into rulers and ruled.

Thus at the end of the war each nation will have to maintain the sinking fund of its expenditure and the devastation it has suffered. This will be a stupendous burden for all, in addition to already heavy taxation. It seems improbable that the nations will be able to support this combined burden; it will follow that they will be obliged to reduce their other expenses. This reduction can only be made in respect of military and naval expenditure. This alone can be reduced. I believe, therefore, that the present war will render impossible the system of armed peace which since 1870 has been ruining Europe.

The suppression of armed peace means disarmament. War will have killed war by the very excesses which it has committed; and this benefit, resulting from thousands of crimes, may be laid to the credit of those who unloosed it upon the world. We must credit them with this result of their actions, but at the same time we must observe that it is contrary to their intention. They intended to fortify militarism and autocracy, but by the force of events militarism and autocracy will be largely destroyed and diminished by the war. This result will prove once again that the complete development of the consequences of our acts escapes us, and that these consequences are often the contrary of the aim pursued.

## CHAPTER III

### ECONOMIC FACTORS AND RESULTS

Commercial, industrial, and financial disturbance—The seizure of the means of transport—The frontiers closed: a survival of barbarism—The consequences to commercial, industrial, and domestic life—The importance of coal—The importance of mining labour—The impossibility of making the professions hierarchical—The lesson of terrestrial solidarity—The increase in the standard of living—The enrichment of some and the impoverishment of others—Disturbance of agriculture—The fixation of prices: the maximum—The importance of the mastery of the seas—The opposition between the Germanic policy in respect of neutrals and that of the Allies—Neutrals and the war—Their attitude towards the violation of Belgian neutrality—The influence of the German threats, lies, and corruption—Fear a means of controlling men—Commercial and industrial interests incline the neutrals to remain neutral—Diminished authority of the United States of America—The opposition between Kings and peoples in the Balkans—Conservatives, Catholics, and aristocrats in the neutral countries are pro-German.

The reconstitution of economic life—The peoples adapt themselves differently to the conditions arising from the war—Progressive science and industry due to mental hyperactivity—The influence of the system of division of labour on human invention—The Taylor system is detrimental to human progress—The reorganization of labour—The scarcity of hands—The indispensable nature of labour—Female labour—Forced labour: slavery—The militarization of the working class—The necessity of Trade Unionism.

**T**O the stupendous devastation and expenditure of which we have already spoken we must add the general and profound perturbation suffered by the entire trade and industry of the whole world. Any precise valuation of this perturbation, and of the losses which inevitably resulted therefrom, is almost impossible; but we can, without fear of being accused of exaggeration, estimate it as being at least four thousand millions sterling for the first thirty months of the war.

All the figures which we give are, we hasten to repeat, a mere indication of the reality, which, we believe, exceeds them. These are dead losses, both for the individual and the nation.

The disturbance of trade and industry extends to numbers of non-belligerent peoples. The Stock Exchanges and other exchanges were closed at the outset of the war, even in the United States. The German exchanges remained open, but the business done on them was purely fictitious. Here again we have a method of bluffing and deceiving the public concerning the actual state of affairs. The holders of metallic currency, especially of gold, held on to it, and there was an end of heavy, ringing coin for purposes of exchange. In all the belligerent countries there was an enforced legal currency of bank notes of various kinds. The State Banks issued fresh notes, while at the same time they gathered in as much gold as possible. In England they created bank notes of 10s. and £1 sterling, and while these were being prepared postal orders were made negotiable and were enforced as legal tender. In France the notes of 20 francs, which were in existence, but were no longer in general circulation, reappeared. Notes of 5 francs and 10 francs were issued by the State. Cities and Chambers of Commerce were authorized to issue notes of 1 franc and 50 centimes, to have currency only in the department of issue, which were always redeemable for notes of the Bank of France. In the Central Empires also notes of 50 pfennigs, 25 pfennigs, and even 5 pfennigs or a *heller* were issued. Metallic small change was replaced by paper small change.

In many countries a postponement of debts and rentals—that is, a moratorium—was declared. Even to-day, after two and a half years of war, the moratorium still exists, but modified and diminished in various ways, according to the country. War has closed the frontiers to the exportation and importation

of a host of manufactured products, in belligerent as well as in neutral countries. The ships of the belligerents were seized in all enemy ports. Moreover, as the empire of the sea belongs to the Allies, thanks to the British Navy, the German and Austrian merchant vessels took refuge and became immobilized in all the neutral ports.

The industrial or commercial properties of the enemy were in the same way either seized or sequestered. This did not occur immediately in all countries. Even after a year of war certain mining industries, in the British Dominions, were still controlled by German proprietors! There is such an interpenetration of economic interests between the citizens of different nations that these conservative and defensive measures have everywhere profoundly disturbed production and exchange. The moratoria have prevented bankruptcies, save in Germany, where the Press refers to such. In that country, no doubt, the Government resorted only to a partial moratorium. But one thing is certain, that there was one, just as in other countries, for about July, 1915, the German and neutral newspapers were speaking of measures which suspended the action of certain items of the moratorium. Another thing is equally certain—that the Imperial Government officially denied the existence of this moratorium: still the same policy of untruth, to “bluff” and delude the German and foreign public.

Certain branches of commerce have been almost entirely checked, or have at least very greatly diminished, especially the “luxury trades,” even in neutral countries. The maritime commerce of Germany and Austria was entirely annihilated. Belgian industry and commerce were brought to a dead stop by the invasion of the country. The mobilization of the men between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight on the Continent suspended the activity of almost all the



factories, or at least enormously decreased it. Only Great Britain, thanks to her insular position and the absence of compulsory service, was able to continue to conduct business almost as usual. What still further disturbed commercial and industrial affairs was the seizure by the State of the railways for purposes of military transport, and of the telegraph and telephone services, and the posts. Everything was subordinated to the armies, and all civilian communications were naturally held up and delayed. Now commerce depends on the rapidity and certainty of all means of communication, and without commerce industry is necessarily idle. Production is useless if there is no consumption.

The frontiers of the belligerent countries were naturally entirely closed. Moreover, during the course of the war the frontiers between certain belligerent and neutral countries were completely impassable for various periods of time. They were strictly guarded in a permanent manner, and more or less closed. Thus the frontier between Belgium and Holland was covered by a network of barbed wire and iron wires traversed by a high-tension electric current. Between Alsace and Switzerland the German Government created a neutral zone on Alsatian territory, and divided it from the zone of military operations by a barrier of barbed wire. I quote from the *Journal de Genève* the following lines, which depict the situation: "Circulation is free between the neutral zone and Switzerland, but prohibited between the neutral zone and Alsace and the Grand Duchy of Baden. Those who wish to pass from the neutral zone into Germany must go by way of Switzerland, but they cannot without special permission send letters across the frontier. In a few exceptional cases the inhabitants of the neutral zone are allowed to pass directly into Alsace and the Grand Duchy, making use of passages contrived for the purpose. *It is forbidden*

*to approach within 20 metres of the barrier or to communicate with persons on the other side. Between 8 o'clock in the morning and 5 o'clock in the afternoon small quantities of provisions and merchandise may pass the barrier from north to south; they must be deposited at a distance of 30 metres from the barrier; after examination they will be passed through the barrier by the officials and sentries. For indispensable agricultural work the passage of the barrier may be permitted to peasants who, on the left bank of the Rhine, will be under military supervision while at work.'*

I have taken the trouble to give the condensed text of the decree of the German General commanding the frontier region, for it is characteristic. One feels, on reading it, as though carried back to a period some centuries ago, when State was isolated from State. The famous Great Wall of China is surpassed in the twentieth century by these barriers of cement-lined trenches and barbed or electrified wires. Men are applying to themselves the methods of isolation and imprisonment which they apply to the animals in their zoological gardens! It would be grotesque were it not so profoundly sad.

All the Powers have been practising isolation to a greater or less extent. A Bulgarian regulation concerning travellers says: "Travellers are strictly forbidden to descend at intermediate stations or to enter into relations with the inhabitants of the country, either in the railway-stations or in the train itself. Travellers are strictly forbidden to carry with them printed matter or manuscripts of any kind, photographs, or photographic apparatus." England prohibits private persons from sending printed matter to neutrals. In France, during the first months of the war, it was necessary to have a permit if one wished to travel a greater distance than twelve kilometres (about seven and a half miles). At

the time of the Irish rebellion England literally isolated the "sister isle" from the whole world. Even at the frontiers between allied countries the supervision was so strict that people were often undressed in order to be searched. Moreover, travelling was made so disagreeable that no one wanted to travel.

This isolation of one country from another is a pure survival of the methods and conceptions of barbarous periods. And here we find yet another proof that war appeals to all the surviving traces of savage and barbarous epochs. But as a result of centralization and of State power, these methods of isolation were much more restrictive, prohibitive, and effective in the twentieth than in the tenth century!

The material closing of frontiers between belligerents and neutrals was completed by the prohibition of exports which all Governments enforced in the case of a number of products, both raw materials and manufactured articles. The logical result of these prohibitions was a serious check to commerce and industry and a vast disturbance of domestic life. The belligerents employed, as one of their weapons, their power of permitting or prohibiting the exportation not only of the goods which they themselves produced, but also of those goods which used merely to pass through their territories, or which were carried on the adjacent seas. In this way they endeavoured to prevent the neutral nations from exporting goods to the belligerent Powers. Owing to their geographical situation and their mastery of the sea, Great Britain and France made the greatest use of this weapon. And it was thus Germany and her allies who suffered most from this species of blockade. But the enemies of Germany and the neutrals had also to put up with the commercial and industrial consequences of the suppression of exports. Thus, for example, certain dye-stuffs were lacking everywhere because they were of German origin and their ex-

portation was impossible. Italy, before entering the war, was unable to obtain the sulphate of copper so necessary to her vines save by the good will of Great Britain. Switzerland was able to obtain cocoa and oils only because France and Italy wished her well.

Germany was greatly lacking in raw materials: wool, cotton, copper, nitrates, etc. And to procure these she had to have recourse to the neutrals, from whom she bought them at a very great cost, due as much to overcharging and unavoidable limitation of supplies as to the fact that these materials were more often than not contraband of war. A host of products were, in fact, declared contraband of war, which legalized their seizure upon the seas if they were destined for the enemy. But the list of these contraband substances was increased only in a slow and progressive manner. Capitalistic interests, in the Western Powers as well as in neutral countries, opposed the establishment of a strict blockade of the Central Powers. Such a blockade might have existed at the end of the first six months of the war, if not earlier, and it was only toward the twentieth month of hostilities that it became serious, though still incomplete. An example of these capitalistic interests was given in the House of Commons on December 2, 1915. It was proved by a member, Mr. Bigland, that the exportation of linseed oil, at first prohibited, had been authorized anew because the manufacturers refused to continue its manufacture if they could not export the oil. Great Britain required the manufacture to continue, so that the oil-cake essential to the feeding of her cattle should be produced. As Mr. Bigland remarked, it would have been a simple matter for Great Britain to manufacture oil in order to obtain oil-cake. But this was not done, on account of capitalistic interests. In March, 1916, it was proved in the House of Commons that the British Navy was deliberately allowing car goes

of petroleum to pass, although their enemy destination was known. This was the result of conventions concluded with the American Oil Trust.

Economists used to write—as M. Leroy-Beaulieu, for example—that “war is the seed-time and harvest-time of the capitalists.” Once again this has been verified during the present war, thanks to the blockade, which was a possibility, but was deliberately ineffective. And among those who enriched themselves the most were the neutral capitalists, principally those of the maritime countries.

It is understood, then, how greatly all obstacles to rapidity of communications, how all restraint of exportation, must react upon the world's commerce and industry. There was a coffee crisis in Brazil because the German market was closed, and time was required to reopen it partially through the intervention of neutrals. In the United States cotton-mills were shut down for the same reason. Cocoa, iron, and coal were almost unobtainable by the Swiss factories; dye-stuffs were lacking in the United States, etc. While certain industries were held up, others were overworked, because they were connected with the war; trades disappeared, but others were created, and increased to extreme proportions, owing to the paralysis of Germany.

Statistics presently showed that the Central Powers, besieged, so to speak, by the Western Allies and Russia, were obtaining provisions and raw materials from the neutrals. The Western Allies sought to prevent this, more or less rapidly, in accordance with the interests of their own capitalists. Then guaranteed import trusts were created, or a neutral State would intervene, guaranteeing the non-exportation of goods to Germany and Austria. New commercial organisms came to life as needed. But you have seen what a profound and general disturbance of the whole world's commerce and industry has been caused by the war.

The importance of coal became obvious to all those who reflected for a moment. It was seen to be truly the life-blood of industry and commerce, and of the war itself; as indispensable to their continuance as is blood to the life of man. The European neutrals thus found themselves the tributaries of Great Britain, for Great Britain alone could export coal. Germany owned many coalmines capable of providing coal for export, but her merchant fleet could not sail the seas, and her exports were confined to the neutrals bounding the German Empire. Great Britain and Germany employed their exportable coal as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon the neutral States. This phenomenon is of great sociological interest, for it reveals the great part played by geological and geographical conditions in the matter of national power. The pressure which Germany could exert was very limited, owing to the fact that she did not enjoy the freedom of the seas.

Another fact was brought into prominence by the coal problem—namely, the indispensable nature of man-power in the mining districts. While the nations were able to dispense with not only the rich folk who do no work, but also with many others belonging to the professional classes, such as barristers, magistrates, professors, solicitors, merchants, business men, artists, etc., the manual trade of the miner proved to be absolutely indispensable. This fact is of great importance, for it shows that in a complex humanity such as ours everything is so intimately interconnected that it is impossible to form a hierarchy of the professions and the classes. It is impossible to establish the superiority of one over another—that is, from the standpoint of social *utility*, which is evidently the only existing criterion. And from this fact, that it is impossible to create a professional hierarchy, we deduce the equivalence of all functions and all professions in our human societies. Here is a great acratie lesson: *No masters.*

It is the verification of the moral of Lafontaine's fable, "The Limbs and the Stomach."

Rubber, cotton, petroleum, copper, wool, hides, nitrates, and many other products, appear to be indispensable to the war and to the life of all. And thus it became apparent to all how dependent is man on the products of the soil, and on the soil itself. In these facts may be read a veritable lesson in terrestrial solidarity. Man is thus visibly and indissolubly bound to his terrestrial environment, to the terraqueous globe on which he lives, and to all of whose conditions he is subject. He is one of its products, like all the other products, animal, vegetable, and mineral, which he finds indispensable. What a lesson of world-wide and universal solidarity!

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In agriculture, in the belligerent and even in the neutral countries, the reaction of the war was no less perturbing than in commerce and industry. Labour was lacking everywhere, even in North America, on account of the mobilization of Europe. In the regions occupied by the troops, when there was fighting, the countryside was ploughed up by shells, and the sowing of crops suffered. The Germans, and to some extent the French and Russians, employed prisoners of war on agricultural work, in order to replace the lacking labour. In a sense, this was forced labour. Everywhere the herds and flocks were decimated—even in South America. The armies had need of meat, and the belligerents lacked fodder. Germany had no grain for the pigs. There were slaughterings *en masse*. The grazing industry was in this way more or less affected; in Belgium, Poland, Galicia, and Serbia, bled white by the invaders, this industry was really annihilated. Horses became rare, and hundreds of thousands were brought from overseas.

Everywhere the prices of products went up, in vary-

ing proportions in different countries. In Germany and Austria, deprived of direct imports, certain products rose 200 per cent. and 300 per cent. But thanks to her long preparation for the war, and her organization, Germany was for a long time able to avoid a too general and excessive increase of prices. Moreover, she resorted to requisitions and the fixing of maximum prices. The other belligerents and some of the neutrals did the same. It was in the Central Empires that the increase of prices was greatest. In other countries it averaged from 25 per cent. to 40 per cent., but certain products underwent an increase of 100 per cent. and even more. These increases are by no means due to the difficulties of the moment, above all in the Western countries of the Entente. The scarcity of labour, the increase of freight dues on account of the decrease of shipping available for mercantile transport and the danger of navigation, the diminished areas devoted to certain crops, etc., have not been responsible for increasing the prices of products to their present level. The cause of this increase is principally speculation. Patriotism notwithstanding, business is business. So, side by side with the heaping up of ruin, fortunes are made both in belligerent and in neutral countries. Mercantilism never loses its rights.

The Governments, so that they may appear to prevent this scandalous fortune-making, which was and is based on death and devastation, resorted to requisitions, confiscation, maximum prices, and the taxation of war-profits. But whether in the case of the sale price of things indispensable to the life of man, or in that of the profits of industry, the maximum was always so fixed as to leave a handsome first profit for capitalism. The power of the State has actually, despite appearances, been exercised for the benefit of the capitalist class. This sociological phenomenon has been visible in the case of all the nations at war, just as it has been obvious



that the municipalities have everywhere endeavoured, so far as they were able, to act rather on behalf of the people. They have striven, in fact, to regulate prices more in the interests of the masses than in the interest of a capitalist minority. This was the case because the municipality is, as a rule, in more intimate contact with the population than is the Government, which is principally in contact with the ruling class of great capitalists—landowners, merchants, manufacturers, and financiers. Everywhere, moreover, the State has more or less inhibited the action of the municipalities. From these sociological phenomena, which are constant, and brought into full prominence by the war, these consequences result: that in the interest of the democracy the administrative group should be small; there is an opposition between democratization and centralization.

The important part played by the mastery of the sea is one of the great lessons of this war. It is thanks to this mastery that those countries which do not possess it are all but isolated. The men of to-day have witnessed a spectacle which has never been witnessed before: that of the siege of two nations. To be sure, this siege was not at first very effective, and even now it is not complete. The cause of this is the complexity and the profound interpenetration of capitalistic interests in both the belligerent and the neutral nations. On the other hand, it was necessary to take into account the rights of those neutrals which possess common frontiers with the Central Empires. This, for the Allies, was a moral no less than a material obligation. The life of Great Britain, on account of her property system, which is detrimental to agriculture, is dependent upon alimentary imports; with these the country cannot possibly dispense. It is also obliged to export products, manufactured or otherwise, in order to maintain the balance of exchanges and not to impoverish itself.

All this forced the British Empire to make only a

moderate use of its naval power. But the reverse of the picture is this: that this moderation has enabled Germany to obtain a certain amount of provisions and raw materials, and the result of this has been the prolongation of the war, with its retinue of death and mutilation and devastation.

The Western Allies were veritably the masters of the sea. The fleets of the Central Empires were blockaded in their ports, whence they emerged only for occasional raids. With wonderful energy and audacity the Germans endeavoured to contest this mastery by means of their submarines. In the course of the war their fighting powers and their navigable qualities have been greatly improved. Negligible at the outset, their work of destroying the merchant shipping of belligerents and neutrals has become more considerable. At the end of thirty months of war it has become so considerable that the Allies are forced to give it their full attention. But in order to appreciate this work justly we must remember the number of ships from all the ports of the globe which daily enter or leave the Allied ports. Their work then appears far less considerable than it does when we read the newspaper announcements of the vessels sunk. The Western Allies were the true masters of the sea at the opening of hostilities. Had they chosen they could have effected a complete and effective maritime blockade of Germany and Austria. It was their right. "To interrupt the navigation of the enemy," said the German Chancellor, Caprivi, in 1892, "is an indispensable means of warfare. He who makes war desires victory, and if he has sufficient energy he attains this end by employing all and every means, including those of naval warfare and the interruption of all trade with the enemy."

It was therefore the right of the Entente to blockade the Central Empires; but to make the blockade effective, as they could have done, they must to a certain extent

have infringed the rights of neutrals. In that case they must have resorted to the policy of menace and intimidation practised by Germany.

The brutal and insolent policy of the German Government originates in the militarist spirit in which it is steeped to the marrow. But another cause of this policy is the fact that the caste of Junkers plays a very important part in the government of the country. The Junkers are before all else landed proprietors, who, by the very fact that their wealth consists of landed property, are indifferent to the displeasure of neutrals. The British position is very different. The political government of Great Britain is in the hands of the commercial and industrial upper middle class, which is dependent upon neutrals both as customers and as providers.

Here we perceive the economic causality of political phenomena. And here is yet another lesson which arises from this war for the observer who is able to analyze events.

In the world-war now raging we plainly perceive the opposition and the results of the different policies of the two belligerent groups. On the one hand Germany acts with decision and audacity, compelling events, intimidating neutrals by her threats, and often forcing them to do things that they do not wish to do. On the other hand Great Britain, France, and Russia, hesitating, groping, consulting one another, and regarding themselves as bound by international laws which their enemies disregard, tend to arrive at compositions, to gain time, to postpone decisions, to accept compromises, waiting, to tell the truth, for time to solve problems by the logical development of events and their consequences.

The opposition between these two policies is absolute. The results also are very different. The policy of the Allies prolongs the war, postponing victory or diminishing its importance, and lessens the moral force of the masses.

who understand neither hesitations nor delays nor tergiversations. On the other hand, this policy engenders genuine sympathies in neutral countries, although the effects of these sympathies are not always visible, as the immediate material interests, and the fear inspired by Germanic threats, have prevented their manifestation. The other policy, that of Germany, produces discontent, irritation, and disaffection in neutral countries. But it gives an appearance of victory which maintains the *moral* of the nation at the required level. This policy once more, by its brutality and insolence, reveals the noxious character of the militarist spirit and education, which have instilled into the Germanic mind this naïve belief: that fear is the principal motive of human action.

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The first acts of the war were the violation of the territory and the will of two small neutral States: the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and Belgium. These acts, committed by a great Power against two small Powers, were a direct menace to all other small States.

Might comes before Right; Might creates Right: these are maxims which the small States cannot accept without signing their own death-warrant. It therefore seemed only logical that all the other neutral Powers should be conscious of their solidarity with the two small violated States, and should, before the whole world, protest against this violation: an act which, in reality, is between collectivities what theft and murder are between individuals. However, no official protest was made by Sweden, or Norway, or Denmark, or Switzerland, or Holland, or the Balkan States, or Spain, or the United States, or South America. Everywhere the iniquity committed was greeted by silence! Rulers and peoples remained speechless, save a few individuals who here and there had the courage to flagellate the workers of iniquity. The spirit of

international solidarity was dominated by fear in the hearts of the rulers. Sometimes even, as in Switzerland, the rulers sought to impose silence on those who dared to protest against the crime.

This silence of the neutrals was due to two chief causes: fear and interest, commercial and industrial. Then the military strength of the Imperial Powers had created, in certain neutral countries, an atmosphere of admiration, especially in the military world, which, with its customary lack of intelligence, regarded the victory of the Germans as assured. Accustomed to obey and to be obeyed, passively, the soldier insensibly loses all spirit of criticism; he grows stupid. He did not therefore see that the Imperial Powers, whatever their military strength and their organization and their degree of preparation, could not conquer the Allies, who were far richer in men, in money, and in resources of every kind, while they possessed, moreover, the mastery of the sea.

And in truth the principal agents of the immobility of the neutrals were fear and their material interests, petty and immediate. They refused to see that the victory of the Empires would mean death to their liberties, and that without liberty life is not worth living. They were afraid, and fear suppresses all possibility of reasoning. Moreover, this fear was skilfully fed by threats, lies, and corruption. In Sweden, Holland, Denmark, the United States, the Balkans, and Spain—everywhere, in fact—a campaign of intimidation, untruth, and corruption was systematically organized. Untruthfulness attained heights of which none had ever dreamed. In China and America the most bewildering news was published. Newspapers announced the disappearance of the British Navy, sunk by the Germans. Others declared that Germany had imposed peace, and had taken such and such British or French or Russian provinces or colonies, etc. There was no

shame apparent in this campaign of lies and subterranean manœuvres; it was conducted even by official personages. Everyone will remember the revelations of the New York *World*, when it published the official German documents and the correspondence of the Austrian Ambassador and other papers seized upon Mr. Archibald or Captain von Papen. All means were good from the moment they seemed to lead to the desired end. Fear was not enough, so Germany sought to employ corruption. She offered money to the Italian Socialist party, which of course refused it. But individual persons accepted it, so that one saw so-called democrats defending the Imperial Powers, and Jews like Sven Hedin on the side of the Imperial Empires, whose Governments and rulers are anti-Semite, and against France, which was the first of all countries to liberate the Jews!

Let us remark, in passing, upon the immoral effects of all these manœuvres of intimidation and untruthfulness and bribery. Once more we perceive the falsity of this maxim: that war is a moralizing agency.

More, perhaps, than by fear the neutrals were impelled by material interest to accept with good grace the violation of Luxemburg and Belgium and to smile upon the brutal and insolent Germans. The basis of modern society is wealth; it is founded upon money. Money, therefore, does not smell, whatever its origin, and whatever results may follow its employment.

Now although the war is more or less checking production in the belligerent countries, it has not decreased consumption. It was necessary, therefore, that the neutrals should if possible fill up the deficit in production and supply the belligerents. The mastery of the seas, in the hands of Great Britain, put a stop to the movements of German vessels. Neutrals had thus to replace Germany. So in Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the United States the war has been a

time of harvest for capitalists. The countries bordering on Germany have become storehouses of goods; and they levy a handsome tribute on Germany. The more difficult it becomes to obtain raw materials of all kinds, the higher the prices fixed by neutral manufacturers and merchants become. They make up for the smaller bulk of products by an increase of prices.

All laws and regulations are liable to be broken when interest points the way. The Germans pay handsomely, and there has been a battle of wits in hiding contraband on the one hand and discovering it on the other. But what a harvest of gold in those neutral countries!—not for the whole nation, indeed, but for a minority of merchants and manufacturers, whose directing influence has increased accordingly.

Of course their influence is active in a pro-German sense. One does not willingly kill the goose with the golden eggs. And it would have meant killing it, had the neutrals qualified the conduct of the German Government as it deserved, or protested officially against the deliberate attack upon the liberties of Belgium and of Luxemburg. This pacific attitude, little worthy of neutrals such as Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, etc., still further emphasizes the moral greatness of Belgium, who dared to defend her liberty weapons in hand.

Moreover, in these neutral countries the interests of the manufacturers and business men act in concert with those of the military and aristocratic classes, in a pro-German sense. It is an interesting sociological fact that in all neutral countries the aristocracies, the military classes, and the Princes have been more or less in favour of the Germans. Autocratic and conservative forces—whether Catholic, as in Spain, and to some extent in Holland and Switzerland, or Protestant, as in Sweden, Switzerland, and Denmark—have always proved to be desirous of the triumph of the Imperial Powers.

These latter were, and have truly become, the symbol of autocracy. The forces of reaction in these countries had a clear conscience, as well as the democratic forces, for it was seen that these, in the neutral countries, had openly declared for the Western Allies. Class and caste interest came into action, dividing the individuals of the same nationality. The lower classes, whether in town or country, the lower middle and the middle classes, were in all the neutral countries of Europe opposed to the landed aristocracy, the great capitalists of commerce, industry, and finance, the military caste, and the Kings.

This social phenomenon was very sensible in the Balkans, where a flagrant opposition between the Kings and the peoples manifested itself. This opposition was reinforced by the fact that the majority of the Sovereigns were more or less of German origin, or connected with German Princes. The fact is undeniable, but we do not think it can be the result of a preconceived policy settled long beforehand. The German Government knew how to profit by the circumstances, but had not, I think, prepared them some ten to thirty years beforehand.

However this may be, it was obvious that Kings had a policy calculated in their own personal interest, in opposition to the actual interests of the peoples whom they governed. Insensibly the Kings came to persuade themselves that the State was—themselves. Naturally, they tended as autocrats to seize the reins of power, and to govern without troubling about constitutions and elected bodies. The Parliamentary and constitutional democracy tends to change into a personal autocracy. This phenomenon is constant, everywhere and in all ages. A pronounced development of democratic customs and the spirit of democracy is needful if a people is to prevent the triumph of this tendency. The Balkan peoples, whatever the democratic spirit which



may lie at the very root of their being, have not yet attained the level of civilization on which the peoples of France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Switzerland have their being. The personal policies of their Kings were therefore possible, although in opposition to the interest and traditions and aspirations of the peoples. Thus King Carol of Rumania, violating the Rumanian Constitution, was able to sign a private treaty with Germany, a treaty which his Ministers declared null because *ultra vires*. Thus we saw King Constantine dissolve the Greek Chamber on two occasions because it favoured the policy of Venizelos, and not his own. Thus, too, we saw King Ferdinand of Bulgaria draw the Bulgarians into a war against the Russians who had given them independence! And in all countries we saw Parliaments prevented from sitting, so that the will of the peoples' representatives might be disregarded. The antagonism between Kings and peoples presented itself in the twentieth century as it had in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and France. But while the peoples of the Balkans gave way, the more highly evolved peoples of England and France revolted. The Kings lost their heads.

From these facts we must draw one lesson, which can only be that of the harmful nature of autocratic Kings and Governments. This harmfulness has once more been confirmed by the patience which the Allies of the Entente have treated Constantine, the King of the Greeks. This appeared so contrary to the interests of the Allies that the English, loyal though they were, asked themselves whether dynastic interests and caste interests were not the cause of this patience. It seems to us that there is no doubt that this patience, which has been highly injurious to the interests of the Western Allies, has its cause in the solidarity of caste which unites Kings and Emperors. Thus the interest of men is to govern themselves in small collectivities, rendering

needless any delegation of powers, for we must never forget that every delegate tends to govern in his own interest, and the interest of his caste or class, and not in the interest of his mandatories, the people.

Fear and material interest guided not only the neutrals adjacent to the Central Empires, but even the great Republic of the United States. The German menaces, crossing the Atlantic, affected the American rulers. To the attacks upon its citizens, killed by German submarines when they sunk the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, etc., the Government replied by diplomatic Notes, to which Germany replied in her turn. And what with reply upon reply the time passed, and . . . Germany continued to sink ships! It would have been laughable, had it not been melancholy, to see a strong and numerous people consenting to be thus befooled.

To what causes was such an attitude due? It seems that we must attribute it: (1) to the German menaces—not the menace of the Germanic armies or fleets, but the menace of an insurrection of the populations of German origin which are dwelling in the United States; and (2) above all that false form of humanitarianism and pacifism which leads men to accept all insults and iniquities without revolt. To revolt against iniquity is the surest sign of the humanitarian spirit. Non-resistance to evil, the eschewing of violence, is a childish conception, for it encourages evil.

Material interests seem to have played a less part in American neutrality than in the neutrality of the small European States. Indeed, by the very fact that they did not possess the mastery of the sea, the Germans could obtain but relatively little in the way of supplies from the United States. The great purchasers were, by the force of things, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. However, as under the benevolent eye of the Allies American products were reaching neutral countries, and thence Germany, the continued

neutrality of the States possessed a certain material interest. But far greater material interests were involved in neutrality toward the Allies, or an alliance with them, on account of the great exportation of machine-tools, arms, ammunition, hides, cotton, horses, mules, etc. The rupture of the relations between the United States and Germany would have involved little material loss, while the rupture of relations with the Allies would have resulted in a loss to American commerce of hundreds of millions of pounds.

Thus, the United States made no protest against the attack upon the liberties of Belgium and Luxemburg. They continued to maintain courteous relations with the Governments which were traitors to their own signature. They did not protest in any way against the obvious violation of the Hague Conventions, of which they were signatories! They allowed their own signature to be protested, thus upholding the doctrine that conventions are "scraps of paper." And they submitted to the drowning of their citizens by order of the German Government.

By such an attitude the Government of the United States, which meant to be humanitarian and pacifist, was really anti-humanitarian and anti-pacifist. It prolonged the war, and therefore the slaughter and the devastation of the war. Its conduct upheld the concept: "Might creates Right." This maxim, let us remember, is essentially immoral, for its basis reposes on violence, constraint, and fear. By such an attitude the Government of the United States considerably diminished the moral authority which it enjoyed. It made itself the laughing-stock of the belligerents and the small neutral nations, which remembered that the United States, so humble before mighty Germany, had behaved very differently to feeble Spain. The popular masses of the Entente and of certain neutrals thought thus because they were ignorant of the real state of

opinion and feeling prevailing in the midst of the American people, the great majority of whom intended to apply the Monroe Doctrine, and to keep out of war; so that it was painful for European democrats to see the Great Republic acting in a manner contrary to the interests of humanity, and itself in some degree destroying the moral force which it possessed. Very often the most realistic policy is that which is able to rise superior to the petty contingencies of immediate individual interests, and to perceive the ideal collective interests. However, the American people saved its country from complete moral bankruptcy in the eyes of Europe by the admirable impulse of solidarity with which it succoured the Belgians, the Serbs, and the French of the northern departments.

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The war, by its continuance, has forced all the nations to reconstitute their economic life. They have been forced to take measures to make up for the lack of raw materials, to supply the needs of the war in arms and munitions, to allow for the changes of taste and habit caused by the state of war. Industries have been created; others have disappeared; others have changed their locality. And the migration of hundreds of thousands of persons has played its part in these industrial displacements, just as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the wars of religion and the accompanying exodus resulted in industrial displacements. The Governments joined forces with private initiative, and supported it, in order to effect this reconstitution of the economic life, and to adapt the people to the new conditions of life. Germany and France displayed most activity in this respect. Germany, partly prepared for present contingencies, found the work of adaptation easier, while France had to improvise everything. However, the preparedness of Germany did not prevent her metallurgical and other

industries from suffering deprivation. Everyone, the governing classes as well as others, had counted on a struggle of a few weeks' duration, or at most of three or four months, and now the war threatened to last for years. As soon as the ruling classes were aware of this they caused German industry to be organized for war production. This was done rapidly, thanks to the habit of passive obedience and the mechanization of the individual. And very soon all the productive energies of the country, intellectual as well as manual, were co-ordinated to obtain the maximum result.

France was not quite so prompt, although she soon arrived at a correct view of the situation. But everything had to be created, everything improvised; her leading industrial provinces were occupied by the enemy. Her admirable intellectual suppleness, her great imagination, her capacity for work were apparent to all under these tragic circumstances. And only those were astonished who had not known France, or had known her only through her fashionable newspapers, or by frequenting the cosmopolitan, fashionable, and parasitical society of Paris, the capital which devours so many men. And again the centralized bureaucracy and the military autocracy which ruled the country were forces which inhibited, rather than stimulated, any individual initiative.

All autocratic tendencies are essentially distrustful of novelty. The more centralized and authoritative a Government—such as the military authority which ruled France during the first months of the war, and to a certain extent rules it still—the more inimical it is to novelty and change. The natural law of the least effort explains this characteristic of authority, and another cause is the inevitable process of stultification apparent in any person who wields power uncontested and uncriticized. Now the love of novelty is an essential cause of progress, which results always from a change.

It is not every change which causes progress, but all progress is engendered by a change. And from this truth we derive this lesson: man should be a lover of novelty, and a change should always be preferred to the *status quo*, even at the risk of making things worse. The perfection of things and persons is only the consequence of many and incessant experiments. So we ought to be willing to make these experiments.

While France rapidly grasped the situation created by the war in all its amplitude, Great Britain failed to realise it. Yet, curiously enough, many of the country's rulers were aware, from the outset of the war, that it would last for years.

The economic life of Great Britain was far less prejudiced, on account of its insular conditions, which also saved it from territorial invasion. Great Britain was also less prompt in organizing its industry for the purposes of the war. Nearly a year elapsed before this was done.

All branches of human knowledge are affected by this war: metallurgy, physics, chemistry, mechanics, electricity, optics, photography, naval architecture, aircraft construction, therapeutics, serotherapy, dietetics, microbiology, surgery, and many other arts and sciences play an important part in the tragic events of the day. All human energies are directed to increasing the means of conflict and resistance and the means of repairing losses.

The difficulty of obtaining certain raw materials, or even their complete suppression, accordingly as the countries which produced or consumed them were or were not free to export and import them, has compelled men either to seek substitutes for these products, or to endeavour to find them at home or in other countries. Thus old abandoned mines have been re-exploited; and mines have been opened which in better times would have been left closed on account of difficulties of exploitation.

The necessity of creating things promptly, of replacing machinery which could no longer be obtained and labour which was lacking, etc., has provoked, in scientists and inventors, a mental tension productive of new things. At the same time, collectivities have felt the need of organizing individual efforts, the better to bring to light the inventions of the human mind.

So long as the war lasts it will be impossible to estimate the progress realized in all branches of human knowledge, for each belligerent jealously guards the secrets of the work of its scientists. In neutral countries the desire to profit by their inventions leads to the same result. Personally I have no doubt that when peace is concluded we shall find that the same inventions will have been made in the various countries, which are now like water-tight compartments, without means of communication, of the vast ship of humanity. This absence of communications in the international scientific and intellectual world retards the work of the human mind, which cannot profit here by what is discovered there.

Yet, considering all things, we may say that war, by surexciting the minds and energies of all, has promoted scientific and industrial progress. Good often results from evil, for every coin has a reverse and an obverse side. But for a just appreciation one must first of all note, and enter to the debit side of the war, the fact that this surexcitation of mind and energy produces a physical and psychical exhaustion, which sometimes amounts to mental disequilibrium, while it sometimes becomes a matter of pathology. It must be noted, secondly, that in this connection the action of war is simply catastrophic. It is probable, we may even say certain, that humanity could so organize itself as to enjoy in time of peace an equally great production and utilization of human inventions.

As far as can be judged from what is known, it does

not seem that there have been any great inventions: nothing actually new. There have been, more particularly, improvements, developments, and enlargements of existing apparatus and machines. Nothing really new has as yet appeared in this war. This absence of notable new inventions should not surprise us. It is due, on the one hand, to the fact that as human progress increases, the field of actually novel discoveries grows smaller; and on the other hand to the division of labour and the specialization of the worker which are the regrettable rule of modern society. The manual and intellectual worker is turned into a machine which unceasingly performs the same series of movements to produce the same series of effects. Industry and science, under the conscious and unconscious influence of German science, and the desire for the maximum immediate yield—a result of the capitalistic basis of human society—have undergone a veritable process of militarization, whose consequences are disastrous to the human mind. Human intelligences have been literally reduced to the condition of mechanical elements; they have become the mere organs of a mechanism of greater or smaller dimensions, created for a determined end.

The horizon of the worker has been diminished, his intellectual and manual liberty restrained. Now the work of truly novel invention can be accomplished only by free human beings, with wide horizons, endowed with an imagination which is not fettered by the inveterate habitude of an always identical task. The work of invention can only be accomplished by human beings capable of a great many kinds of work, possessing a great variety of knowledge, and a critical spirit continually on the alert and always at work. In a word, invention is always the product of a brain in love with change and in revolt against that which is. All this amounts to saying that the brain of the inventor is



just the contrary of the brains produced by specialization and the division of labour. The latter produce stone-masons, not architects. Here we find yet another injury which the spirit of authority, the militarist spirit, inflicts upon human beings, and yet another form of the injury caused by restraint of liberty.

There is one important lesson which the war teaches us: the absolute condemnation of the Taylor system, which some would like to see generally introduced throughout the industrial world. Man is an animal living with a life of his own, and not a machine driven by a will external to itself. All tendencies and efforts to effect the mechanization of man are monstrous stupidities born of the more or less atrophied brains of specialists, ignorant of psychology and the science of education.

Perhaps, too, we ought to regard the public ignorance of the needs created by the war, deliberately maintained by the Governments, as responsible for the absence of great inventions. To be sure, these needs are more or less understood in the limited circles of the specialists, and according to their specialities; but they are not understood by the public in general, which is the real productive reservoir of human invention. We find here yet another instance of the prejudice caused by the ignorance imposed on the masses by the policy of Governments which are glad in this way to escape criticism and the labour which this would impose. The enregimenting of men in water-tight compartments is fatal to the creative faculties of humanity. It is fatal to the development of the individual. It is because this system of enregimentation is so highly developed in our modern society, in which everything is bureaucratized and centralized, that we have nowhere seen an individuality emerge during this world-crisis.

Than the catastrophic environment none could be more favourable to the revelation of strong and original

individualities. Remember the host of great soldiers, scientists, orators, and statesmen who appeared, for example, during the crisis of the great French Revolution, when Frenchmen, both upon the frontiers and within them, were struggling for liberty. The present environment is of a similar nature, yet it does not yield the same harvest. The cause of this difference is the existence of a social framework so powerful that men are retained in the national regiment at a determined spot, favourable or unfavourable, no one cares which. It is impossible to escape from this framework in order to act and to work freely. And this is the same everywhere, in the independent organizations of industry, politics, and the labour world, as well as in those of the Governments. What a waste of energy, what loss of intelligence and power! Man is truly insane when he is loth to remember that liberty is the only social environment in which the individual can fully develop in energy and intelligence, and in which, as a result, the aggregate of individuals which we call the collectivity displays the greatest power, the truest greatness.

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To reconstitute the economic life, it has been necessary to reorganize labour, which, on the Continent, was almost completely disorganized by mobilization. Great Britain, owing to her insular position, escaped this disorganization. In France and Germany work was at first actually resumed only in all those industries which were necessary to the war and to the life of the nation. This could not be otherwise, since all the workmen were soldiers. In France the labour unions (*syndicats*) were unable to play the part they might have played had they counted a greater number of members. The whole country suffered by this, owing to the lack of organization of labour in the munition factories and arsenals, the replacement of skilled artisans by men who were not artisans at all, but were seeking to escape

the danger of the trenches. In this connection there was a loss of time, a waste of skill, and a waste of energy, which at the front became a loss of men and property.

The country is thus suffering from the result of the opposition of the middle classes and the weakness of the working class in the matter of labour organization. We thus discover that actions develop their consequences long after the moment of action. We also perceive how great is the solidarity of humanity, despite the apparently contrary nature of class interests. The final result which arises from our observations is that the existence of classes is detrimental to humanity.

Another result of the weakness of the labour syndicates has been that the workers have not profited by the current conditions as the capitalists have done, thanks to the power of their unions. Wages hardly rose at all except in Great Britain. There the working class applied to itself and its individual interests the same spirit as that which has everywhere been displayed by the capitalist class, which has sought to profit by the circumstances and to enrich itself. The British working class had a clear idea of its indispensability, of the scarcity of labour, of the necessary intensification of production, and therefore demanded, and obtained, an increase of wages. This was, as a matter of fact, modest, and did not correspond either with the enrichment of certain classes of manufacturers and business men, or with the indispensable nature of the workers.

In France and Germany things were not the same, although wages were in some cases increased. The lack of national labour, to a certain extent in Germany, and more in France—in the course of the war the positions became reversed—made it necessary to resort to workers from neutral countries, to whom higher wages were offered, and then there was a scarcity of labour in the neutral countries. And owing to the lack of male workers in all the belligerent countries it became

necessary to have recourse to the labour of women. They have taken the place of men on the railways, the tramways, the arsenals, the munition works, etc. Everywhere an equality of wages between the sexes has been demanded, but as in most industries the trades unions were weak and the employers strong, women's wages have been lower than those of men. However this may be, we have here an important social phenomenon, for it tends to develop the idea of the economic equality of the sexes, which would certainly result in political equality. One of the results of the world-war will certainly be the promotion of Feminism.

A curious revival of past methods of work has reappeared, especially in the invaded countries, but in a modified form in other countries. I am speaking of forced labour.

German militarism, which is very consistent, applies its method of menace and intimidation to labour. It forces workers of both sexes to work for it, under penalty of imprisonment, or even of death. At the outset, the German Government practised this system with a certain timidity, for it applied it only here and there to a small number of persons. But as the war continued, it needed both to increase the rate of production of munitions and to liberate German workers from its war factories or from agriculture. Then it put into practice the theory which its Great General Staff had frankly expounded in the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*. It forced the male inhabitants of the countries which it had conquered, and of which it was for the time being in occupation, to labour for it. It employed constraint, officially and without the slightest shame, although this was a violation of the Hague Conventions of which it was one of the authors and signatories; and although, in the case of the Belgians, it was a violation of the promises made to the Dutch Government and to Cardinal Mercier. Perhaps a million men, as many Belgians

as Poles and Frenchmen, were thus deported and transported where need was, like so many cattle. The majority of these slaves—for this is really a revival of slavery—belong to the working class, and the rest to the lower middle classes. No doubt, if the war continues, this slavery will be extended to the rest of the bourgeoisie, and perhaps to the aristocracy. The decrees and regulations of the German Government, the manifestoes of protest issued by the Belgian workers, by Cardinal Mercier, etc., which may be read in all the newspapers, show with what impudence, brutality, method, and detail this slavery was effected by the German military caste. It also made use of its two millions of prisoners for various kinds of labour. Field labour, and even military works, were carried out by enslaved enemies. In a less degree the other belligerent nations have followed this example of the employment of prisoners. But the labour has not been forced. In France prisoners are only employed in the fields, in the mines, on the roads, and in the quarries, far from the battlefields.

And seeing these millions of men working for their enemies, one inevitably recalls the works whose greatness is attested by their still stupendous ruins executed by men enslaved in the same fashion, thousands of years ago, by the Emperors of Assyria, Medæa, Persia, or Egypt.

In virtue of her conception of discipline based on the fear of punishment, Germany regulated the labour of her citizens until they were really slaves. They had to remain in the factories or the fields even against their will. There was a special militarization of the working class, which the middle class to some extent escaped. The same phenomenon occurred in France in a less degree, for the method was applied only to the munition factories and arsenals and to workers mobilized as soldiers.

Despite these notable and perceptible differences,

this extremely important fact was observed: the liberty of the individual in labour contracts was suppressed. This is a tendency to enslave one class for the profit of the collectivity, administered and commanded by another class.

In England the power of the trades unions prevented the same thing from happening. There were attempts in that direction; there was even a law passed, the Munitions Act, which would have had the same result; but a law is of no value unless everybody accepts it, and the few opponents are weak. A law is a non-existent thing when hundreds of thousands of individuals deliberately refuse to obey it. The trades unions, conscious of their strength and their right to defend their individual and class interests—as did the employers' unions—rendered this law, which was an attempt to destroy their liberties, inoffensive. This fact shows the enormous value for the proletariat of combining in powerful trade associations.

From all these economic phenomena which we have just passed in review one general characteristic emerges: the diminution of liberty, the tendency of the rulers to resort to constraint and intimidation as soon as this is possible. And from this results this consequence: that men must unite in order to be strong and to resist all attempts to diminish liberty, and to annihilate all attempts to resort to intimidation.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BELLIGERENTS AND THE WAR

The various nations and the war—They react in different ways—Military authority assumes the supreme power—Constitutions suspended and liberties suppressed—Germany: her militarism, her mentality, her preparation for the war, her megalomania, her foreign and domestic policy—Russia: her bureaucracy, corruption, and disorder; authority and its effects; its liberalization is inevitable—France: antagonism between her democratic habits and the autocratic Government; the Conservative and Catholic parties; a vain attempt to militarize France; Parliament recovers its power; the actual democratization of France—Great Britain: the voluntary system opposed to compulsion; Parliamentary control; the English mentality; the Conservative and Democratic parties; the Churches; the Trades Unions; the Welsh miners' strike; the Munitions Act.

**D**IRECTLY the war broke out, even before the commencement of hostilities, the military authorities took the upper hand in the different countries affected. There were declarations of a state of war, as in Germany, or of a state of siege, as in France. In those countries in which the Parliamentary power was a fiction—as in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—the Sovereigns acted in an autocratic manner. In the truly Parliamentary countries the Parliaments suspended the Constitution and gave the fullest powers to the military authorities. Certain neutral Powers considered themselves forced by circumstances to act in the same manner, for mobilization was decreed in these countries. Switzerland, for example, mobilized on July 31, twenty-four hours earlier than France. Everywhere the suspension of Constitutions resulted in the suppression of a portion of the liberties acquired by the peoples. This was naturally greater or smaller

according to the country. In Germany and Russia the suppression of liberties was excessive; Germany was in reality isolated from the world from July 27 or 28, 1914. Beyond the frontiers nothing leaked out of what was being done in Germany. Nothing of what was being thought and said beyond the frontiers entered the country.

Germany, under the fiction of Parliamentaryism, is in reality an autocracy. The power is centralized in the hands of a few men. The rest obey. German unity was achieved under the hegemony of Prussia, and it was imposed upon individuals and collectivities by fear. Among the consequences of this unity and this spirit of obedience we must note rapidity of action and organization, and audacity in decision and action. German authoritarianism provokes events, and, careless of obstacles, makes straight for the aim which it sets itself. . . . But it has set itself this aim with an intelligence perverted and diminished by the absence of all criticism, by the habitude of being passively obeyed. And so this aim, instead of being the greatness of Germany, becomes the ruin of Germany. The excessive power of the rulers, by destroying their own critical faculties, has rendered them megalomaniac, absolutely incapable of seeing, judging, and understanding realities. The military mentality, which has penetrated them to the marrow of their bones, has put blinkers on their eyes. They can perceive only a portion of the factors concerned. Therefore they make gross and clumsy mistakes in their foreign policies, and in the psychology of peoples, especially of Western peoples. They go into foreign countries without really entering into them and without comprehending them. Their megalomania has clouded their understanding. They imagined that India, South Africa, and Ireland were about to revolt against England; that the Dominions were about to break loose. They believed that the revo-



lutionaries in France and Russia were about to cause a revolution because of their dread of war, and without heeding that Germany would enslave them. They thought that Belgium would be only too happy to give them passage; and they perceived nothing insulting in the proposals which they made Great Britain in the hope of securing her neutrality. They understood nothing of all this, because they are accustomed to obey and to be obeyed mechanically, and do not really understand the meaning of the word "dignity" applied to individuals or collectivities. For them everything is subordinate to the limited and immediate object. Nothing else counts. . . . Moreover, they have the profoundest contempt for human life. Men are cattle, flesh to be slaughtered according to the interests of the herd-keepers. One must go far back into the past ages to find such conceptions. They were part of the mental furniture of the Emperors of the Medes and Persians and Assyrians thousands of years ago.

How is it that the German mind has been completely invaded by this intense general megalomania? Nearly a century and a half of preparation has been needful: preparation undertaken by Prussia, and executed by the schools, Universities, and barracks. But it was in the second half of the nineteenth century that this work attained its full scope, and ended in an extraordinary faith on the part of all Germany in the superiority of the Germanic race—tall, blond, and dolichocephalic. Now, as a matter of fact, the majority of the Germans are neither tall nor blond nor dolichocephalic! The Germanic race is fully as non-existent as the Latin race. It is a romantic, poetical idea, not a scientific fact or idea. And it is worth noting that it was not the Germans who conceived the idea of the superiority of the tall, blond, dolichocephalic race. It was a Frenchman, Gobineau, who was the first in the field. His great supporters and propagandists were a Pole,

Treitschke, and an Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain! The Germans did not create the idea, they developed it—a result of their limited intelligence, restrained by their spirit of discipline, which prevents all creation, all invention, and only permits of improvements.

The critical spirit being suppressed in the Germans, they did not see how unscientific it was to conceive of a race with a linguistic basis. A common language has never indicated unity of race. Unity of race can be based only on anatomical and physiological characteristics. There is no Germanic race, yet Germany has a cast-iron belief in its existence and its superiority. It believes in it to the point of believing that all the really great men of the whole world are Germans. We have seen German writers and University professors claim as Germans: Dante, Michelangelo, Da Vinci, Murillo, Giotto, Velasquez, Voltaire, Diderot, Shakespeare, Bernard Shaw—but I know I am forgetting some of them.

The idea which the Germans entertain of the so-called Germanic race has nothing to do with science: it is a religious idea. It is not based on reason at all: it is founded on faith. It is at the same time both a cause and an effect of the power of the State, of the religion of the State, I should say, to be more precise. The God obeyed and adored in this religion is the State. It is not a metaphysical abstraction; it is a concrete reality, embodied in the person of its High Priest, the Kaiser, and the entire hierarchy of its priests: the warriors, professors, great landowners, and capitalists.

The whole nation has for years undergone training in order to obtain the fusion of all its individuals in a single collective being, the *State*. One must neither discuss, nor reason, nor judge; one must believe, one must have faith. In order to maintain this blind faith the rulers, the priests of this religion, distort, alter, or

suppress the facts. Everything is subordinated to the aim pursued; so that we see "cooked" statistics, while foreign scientific works are deliberately neglected and ignored. The people must be kept in ignorance of all that may shake its faith. This system of the destruction of the critical spirit has been methodically followed for years, but it has of course attained its maximum in this war. For months the German people were ignorant of the French victory of the Marne, or the reply of Belgium to the German ultimatum of August 2, 1914. It is in absolute good faith that the generality of the Germans live in blindness. The German *Empire* has slain the German *mind*, as Nietzsche predicted. For the German masses there is but one truth: the official truth, announced by the German Government. All that others may say is tainted with error by the simple fact that it does not emanate from the German authority.

It is this blind faith which explains how it is that the German censorship urges the Press to publish official enemy communiqués. It knows that not only will the masses refuse to believe them, but that on comparing them with the German communiqués they will perceive the differences, and will thus become more and more impressed with their untruth and the veracity of the German communiqués.

It is this blind faith which explains the stupefaction manifested by the German people when they realized the contents of President Wilson's Note, after the sinking of the *Sussex*, in April, 1916—above all, when the Imperial Government had been obliged to admit, almost openly, that its original denial was a lie.

The State is God, and everybody behaves more or less as a functionary. To the God everything must be sacrificed. The greatness of the God justifies all the means employed to increase his power. And so we see

the German rulers violating their signature, with naïve candour, by the invasion of countries whose neutrality was guaranteed by them, by the employment of weapons which they had pledged themselves not to employ, by the deportation and enslavement of the Belgians, which they had promised Holland they would not accomplish. "Necessity knows no law," says Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, with brutal frankness, to the applause of the Reichstag. "Our troops," he said, "have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already set foot upon Belgian territory. This is *contrary to the law of nations*. . . . *The illegality*—I speak frankly—the *illegality* which we are thus committing we shall seek to repair so soon as our military object shall have been attained." One cannot more openly assert that the end justifies the means. This, let us remember, is a religious maxim, a Jesuit maxim.

In this State religion, as in every religion, there is a clergy and a clerical hierarchy. At the top are the soldiers, then, beneath them, the mass of the priests, represented above all by the professors, the educators of youth. As in the great Asiatic Empires, we observe the intimate union of the warrior and the priest. The one does not act without the other; mutually they support one another. Militarism is the support of Imperial Germany, the antithesis of the Germany of Goethe and Beethoven. Listen to the University professors in their famous Manifesto: "Without German militarism, German culture would long ago have disappeared from the surface of the globe. . . . The spirit which reigns in the army is also that which reigns in the German people."

With such a militarist frame of mind, the German professorial phalanx could only endeavour to train the population to become a flock of sheep. It tended to suppress all individuality, and to confine minds and characters to *one* type. What was the result of this

work of enslaving the human mind, methodically carried on for decades ?

We have had testimony as to this result in the docility with which hundreds of thousands of men went to the slaughter at Verdun, exactly as sheep go to the slaughter-house, without the slightest gain to themselves or their national collectivity. We have testimony to this effect in the philosophy, literature, and arts of the period of the Prussian hegemony. - For half a century Germany has given to the world no great philosopher, no great artist, no great literary man. Since Wagner, the revolutionary, Germany has produced no great musician. In painting, the same is true, so true that Germany had to adopt and make her own two Swiss painters, Böcklin and Hodler, who were as a matter of fact products of the Swiss democracy.

The general militarization of the people has killed the germs of greatness which might have existed in the Germanic soul. To give birth to strong personalities who should dare to emerge from the beaten path and rebel against accepted forms and ideas, an atmosphere of liberty is needful. It is lacking in Germany, just as it was lacking in France in the time of Napoleon I. Imperialistic greatness, which always reposes on the greatness of arms, excludes the greatness of arts and letters.

By destroying all traces of the critical spirit and the spirit of revolt the militarization of the German people has engendered a veritable pathological condition: megalomania. This state of collective mania, produced by the spirit of obedience, obtained by fear, is a sociological phenomenon of enormous importance. Differences of age, class, profession, education, and religion seem to play no part whatever in the spread of this megalomania, which has stricken everybody.

"Germany is the physician who will heal the human race," says one, while another, the secretary of the

Berlin Academy of Sciences, M. Hermann Diels, writes: "Germany is the sanctuary upon this earth in which the principle of order and discipline has taken refuge."

The megalomaniac always expects the rest of the world to accept him at his own valuation, and is angered if one appears to doubt his greatness. So with the German. As proof of this I will cite these few lines written by a German jurist, Herr Otto von Gaerke: "All the nations, willingly or *unwillingly*, must understand that the German *Kultur* is the best, the most solid, the most robust; that it is the most indispensable element of the world's civilization."

Facts can never modify the convictions of a megalomaniac. With the best faith in the world, he interprets them in the sense of his delirium, or else he denies their existence. Such is the German.

"We are waging war," said the Court preacher, "with a conscience and a gentleness of which history has hitherto afforded no example." "*Kultur* and religion," we read in a manifesto, "render the soldier *incapable* of committing atrocities, of behaving with cruelty. The assertions of our enemies are *incompatible* with the flourishing condition of our schools."

One sees to what a pathological state of mind the Germans are reduced. The present war has torn away all the veils which concealed it from the eyes of the world. There is here an actual and regrettable diminution of a people which was great in its intelligence and its accomplishment.

What has permitted the general expansion of this deadly megalomania? The absence of the political spirit in the German masses. Prince von Bülow has recognized that the Germans are not a political people, but he has not inquired into the purely educative and social causes of a state of affairs so prejudicial to the Germanic people. The absence of the political spirit, to which all the events of this war bear witness, is due

simply to the docility of the German people, to its habit of putting its faith in its rulers, and the fact that it is not accustomed to choose its own path. The German people is, from the political point of view, at a stage of civilization perhaps fifty years in arrears of the peoples of France, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. Its political revolution was cut short in 1870 by the victory of Prussia over France. This victory was in reality a far greater defeat for the whole of Germany than for France. The moral and political impulse of France continued, and was even augmented; that of Germany was arrested, and only its economic impulse has continued to develop.

Consider for a moment how the consequences of an act make their appearance after a long period of years. In this case it needed almost half a century for them to develop in their true amplitude. Earlier than this one saw only one aspect of these consequences—the brilliant aspect, the appearance rather than the reality. Only a few men, geniuses enlightened by extraordinary foresight, had perceived the actual reality. Thus Nietzsche wrote, in the midst of the war of 1870: "I regard Prussia as a power extremely dangerous to culture. . . ." And in his *Unreal Considerations* this philosopher writes a passage, which I may substantially summarize as follows: "A great victory is a great danger. It is easier to win it than so to act that a profound defeat does not result from it. This defeat, more irreparable than any military rout, would be the extirpation of the German spirit on behalf of the German Empire. . . . The German Empire will slay the German spirit. It is a costly thing to achieve power. Power brutalizes the mind." And elsewhere, returning to this idea, Nietzsche writes: "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles!* I fear that this may have been the end of German philosophy."

It was, for the time being, the end alike of German

philosophy and German literature and German art, which were killed for a time by the methodical training which men received in passive obedience—that is, in the habit of no longer thinking, no longer reflecting, no longer judging, no longer criticizing. Authority has stifled all desires of individualism in the German soul. Without individualism one may have large and powerful flocks of men, but one has neither art, nor science, nor philosophy, nor literature, nor real humanity, rejoicing fully in life.

The German Empire has obscured the German spirit, if it is true, as Niebuhr said, that “the true constitution of the German is anarchy.” The German Empire has not killed this spirit for all time, because education cannot kill nature. It can only obscure it, veil it, cover it for a longer or shorter period, according to its degree of vigour and the degree of weakness of the folk subjected to it.

During the whole of the nineteenth century Germany celebrated and practised “organization” without analyzing what she meant by the term. She did not see that the organization which she was realizing was mechanical, *not a living thing*. Her aim was to organize the world as a mechanism set in motion by mechanicians, just like a locomotive or a weaving-loom. Impregnated to the depth of their being by the militarist conceptions of authority and constraint, the German rulers have seen humanity as a lifeless mechanism, like the machinery of a foundry or ironworks. They have forgotten that it is a living collective organism, composed of living individual organisms.

Why did they not recall the thought of their great Schiller: “Organization has condemned to crawl like a snail him who should have soared like an eagle. Organization has not yet produced a single great man; it is liberty that gives birth to colossi and extraordinary beings”? They would then have realized their funda-



mental error. And instead of this mechanical organization, they would have created a living organization, founded on liberty, imitating living nature and not dead machinery. The natural, not the mechanical, sciences should serve to guide men in the organization of human society. Here is one of the great lessons of the world-war.

It is probable that Germany will emerge re-tempered from the tragic circumstances of the present. Defeated, she will free herself from the authority of blood and iron, and her spirit will resume its natural course. Her former culture, which was human and not Germanic, the culture of her thinkers and artists of the past centuries, will be born anew in the brains of her children, because this culture is the true German culture, that which corresponds to the nature of the German people, while her present *Kultur* is a deformity which has, like a varnish, covered the real nature of the people. It has been superimposed on this nature by a skilful training, imposed little by little by the authority of the Prussian Junkers, by means of fear and untruth.

So from such a state of affairs we must draw this conclusion: authority tends inevitably to diminish the individual, and therefore the collectivity, which is an aggregate of individuals. Liberty, which is the antagonist of authority, is the leaven of greatness, both in individuals and in collectivities.

We find yet another proof of the harmful nature of autocracy in the manner in which Russia has behaved during the war. In the stupendous struggle which she had to maintain, she needed the effort of all. This could be obtained only by an honest agreement, by the union of all parties. The Russian revolutionaries and Socialists understood this. So we saw exiles like Prince Kropotkin, Bourtsev, Rubanovitch, and Plekhanov pronouncing themselves energetically in favour of the Allies, and calling the Russians to fight

as one man against militarism and Germanism. . . . Bourtsev, who lived in Paris, left for Petrograd with the object of placing his knowledge and his intelligence at the service of his country. . . . He was at first met with arrest, then with a sentence of penal servitude. The reactionary bureaucracy had not laid aside its arms; without recking of the interests of the collectivity, it continued its disorder and its fraud. Moreover, the factions continued to fight among themselves for the benefits of power. The more autocratic elements, composed very largely of nobles of Teutonic origin, as were many of the Baltic nobles, dared even to be openly pro-German. They obtained support in the highest circles of the Court, and also among the Ministers. On several occasions there were veritable acts of treachery, such as that of Colonel Miassoyedov and his accomplices. They professed to have been actuated by patriotism; the triumph of Germany was to insure the victory of the autocracy over the democracy of the Western Allies.

On the other hand, the Orthodox clergy, owing to their narrow spirit of proselytism and their longing to employ violence in order to bring the heretics to their way of thinking, urged those factions which were Russophile but autocratic in tendency to place the forces of the State at their service. And in conquered Galicia one saw Russian soldiers compelling the Ruthenian Uniats to accept conversion to orthodoxy. Persecution flourished. He who persecutes is sowing hatred. The Russians realized this when, the tables having been turned, they had to abandon Galicia and withdraw. These persecutions, the fruit of Russian authoritatism, did more harm to the cause defended by Russia and her Allies than many military defeats.

Although powerful, the Russian bureaucracy was not so strongly organized that it was able to suppress all discordant efforts. In its bosom, and in the Govern-

ment, men of liberal tendencies endeavoured to struggle against the death-dealing autocracy. It was thus that they obtained public promises of the autonomy of a united Poland, of the political equality of the Jews, etc. But all these were vain promises, often given with the object of deceiving the Western Allies. No liberties were actually granted; the forces of reaction were again triumphant over the forces of progress. The Government, either through lack of comprehension or through autocratic interest, refused to employ the stupendous moral force which would have resulted from a complete political amnesty and a truly liberal and democratic policy. This policy, however, is in the very bones of the Russian people. Its tastes and habits are essentially democratic, as may be discovered by reading the realistic novels of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoievski, Gorky, etc.

The Duma was powerless, despite its unanimity. The Council of Empire was in the same case. Yet the leaders of the autocratic parties were leaving it, in order to adopt Liberal ideas: such was Baron von Rosen, a great Baltic noble. The forces of reaction gave way for a moment during the great retreat. Bourtsev and a few others were liberated. It was possible to believe that the Duma, upheld by the people of the cities and the countrysides and the Zemstvos, would succeed in saving Russia from the deadly slough into which the bureaucracy was plunging it. But alas! this was not so. The forces of reaction soon recovered themselves, and continued to pursue their Germanic policy. The military mentality had so far penetrated the bureaucratic caste that some revolutionary cataclysm was needed to rid the country of it.

Not only is this policy of autocratic violence and constraint prejudicial to the Russian people; it is prejudicial to Russia's Allies in the present world-war.

It is the Russian claim to endless annexations of

territory—evidence of a veritable German policy—which has alienated the sympathies of the Swedes in the north, and of the Bulgarians, the Rumanians, and the Greeks in the south-west. It was these Russian demands which prevented the conclusion of alliances with the latter Powers during the first two years of the war, which delayed the conclusion of this auto-destruction of humanity. Millions of deaths and the expenditure of thousands of millions of francs have resulted from this narrow policy of the Russian autocracy. The path of autocracies, whether Russian, German, or otherwise, is sown with death and devastation!

In the eyes of the whole world the Russian autocracy diminished the moral force of the Western Powers, representatives of the principle of liberty fighting against the principle of authority symbolized by Germany. It is probable that the war will not end before the forces of progress have, in Russia, conquered the forces of reaction. The Liberalization of Russia seems to us to be an inevitable consequence of this war. In the behaviour of Russia, and its consequences, we see how great is the evil of autocracy, of the principle of governing peoples by authority based upon constraint and fear.

In the dawn of the war, in all countries, the rulers appealed to the union of all classes and opinions, to a party truce. Everywhere, except in Russia, there was an amnesty for political offences and for strikers. However, the truce of parties was rather apparent than real, for everywhere there was a clash between the tendencies of Liberalism and those of authority.

In France this antagonism was most emphatic. The country remained five months without a Parliament. We can hardly say that the Press existed, so strong and so numerous were the restrictions with which the censorship surrounded it. There was a Government

which consisted of a President and a Ministry and soldiers, and under cover of this the forces of reaction rapidly assumed a combative attitude. The Catholic Church, relying on the reactionaries of every shade, thought the occasion favourable for recovering its former preponderance. It began a tactless and violent propaganda. It considered everything permissible: the violation of laws and consciences. It was a clumsy policy, for the forces of the vanguard immediately responded to the forces of reaction. Protests, at first isolated, became united and increased in force. Democracy resisted the attempt of the clericals and reactionaries. Its leaders, pushed on by the mass of the people, took part in the campaign of resistance.

In reality the "holy alliance" died before it had seen much life. . . . It was only a formula, which for a time deceived the simplicity of the masses. The movement of opposition to the reactionary thrust came from the crowd and not from the politicians. It was the crowd which inspired the Parliamentarians with the courage to resist the Governmental attempts to restrain the action of Parliament, in imitation of the German Government.

The complexity of the problems to be solved, the stultified and routine-bound mind of the military authority which was in part substituted for the civil authority, facilitated the spread of disorder and fraud; while some men were dying in the trenches others were growing rich!

However, the powers of Conservatism could not lay their hands on the Governmental organism, for resistance was organized everywhere. Urged on by the soldiers, the civilians of yesterday and to-morrow, by the citizen soldiers and by the non-militarized crowd, the Members of Parliament and other politicians reacted and reminded the Government that Parliament was the real and only representative of the national will.

The Radicals, effectually assisted by the Socialists and Syndicalists (Trades Unionists) forced the Chambers to reopen some months after the opening of hostilities, and since then they have actually been sitting continuously, supported by the opinion of the popular masses, despite the more or less open or underhand campaigns conducted by the Conservatives and reactionaries of every shade.

The work of Parliament since its reunion has been a task of control, whose great utility is apparent to all unprejudiced eyes. It would have been far more important had there not existed, in certain Governmental circles, a more or less secret opposition, and intrigues, due to distrust of the democracy, to diminish the activity of the Radical and Socialist parties. This anti-democratic task will probably have disastrous results for the parties of reaction, for a sullen discontent is gaining a hold over the entire nation, affecting the citizen soldiers, perhaps, even more than the civilians. This discontent has been actually fomented by abuses of power, by the clumsiness, the mistakes, and the deficiencies of military and civilian authorities and the Catholic leaders. It hardly seems probable that this will fail to end in more or less violent and universal demonstrations against militarism and in favour of liberty. The French nation is on the whole profoundly democratic. It has progressed enormously during the last twenty-five years.

The manner in which it has passed through the present crisis during the last year or more shows that the people possess the mental maturity, the will to action, and the energy which are necessary if they are to be their own master.

The resistance of the masses and the democratic leaders to the militarization of France has naturally reawakened the conflict of the political parties. This was fatal and inevitable. And it is as well, for this

conflict forces men to use their critical faculties, and prevents them from slumbering in the *far niente* of power. A country in which there was no conflict of political parties would soon be the prey of an autocracy, or would disappear in death. Criticism is, in fact, the essential element of life and human progress.

In Great Britain the change of life provoked by the war was far less considerable than in Germany and France. The process of change was different, owing to the insular position of the country. And this is not one of the least important lessons of the war, this new demonstration of the very great part which geographical conditions play in the lives of nations. The war did very little to disturb the customary life of Great Britain, especially in the first months. Commerce, industry, and the life of business and pleasure continued there almost as before. It was only after the lapse of a few months that the scourge of war made itself really felt by the English people. It is true that Parliament, in the first days of August, had voted a Defence Act which suppressed *all* liberties—liberty of the Press, liberty of speech, publicity of justice, *habeas corpus*, etc.—but it was applied only with extreme prudence, and almost imperceptibly. The modification of everyday life was all the smaller in that there was no mobilization of the men capable of service, as there was no compulsory service.

In order to obtain an army the United Kingdom had to rely upon voluntary recruiting. As a matter of fact, this expression must be understood in the sense that no legal coercion was employed in order to force men to enlist. But many forces were brought to bear upon Englishmen to compel them to enlist. Ideas of patriotic duty, and of the necessity of setting a good example, and the fear of public opinion, exerted a powerful effect upon the intentions of the upper and middle classes. As for the proletariat, the economic conditions certainly

constituted one of the most influential factors. The pay and the separation allowance for wives and children were satisfactory. And many employers brought all possible weight to bear upon their clerks, workmen, or servants, in order to compel them to enlist. They cut down wages, and in some cases even went so far as to dismiss their employees. On the other hand, there were some who opposed the enlistment of their employees, as this would have unsettled their business affairs. It is important to take note of all these social phenomena, for they teach us this great lesson: that effective liberty does not exist when there is economic dependence. Actual liberty presupposes economic equality. As La Boëtie said, nearly three hundred years ago: "He who is poor is a slave."

However, in this voluntary system we must, on the other hand, admit an improvement on the system of legal compulsion with penal sanction. It is an improvement because the penal sanction—that is to say, fear—does not enter into it; because the individual, obliged to choose, acts on his own responsibility, after having weighed, more or less, the consequences of his actions. To tell the truth, this voluntary system, in which a man acts from free choice, raises a man instead of reducing him to the level of a machine, or a wheel in a machine. Voluntary recruitment gave the British Empire—counting the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the army and the navy—more than five million men! This is a result which we cannot sufficiently emphasize, for it shows to what a degree of political development this Empire has attained, in which so many men have had a sufficient notion of their collective interests to make the *voluntary* sacrifice of their lives in the interest of the liberty of all.

With the voluntary system it is necessary that the rulers shall convince the masses of the utility of this or that action. One can no longer enforce it; a man



must be persuaded to act. This necessitates the use of the Press, and of speeches, and public meetings—that is, it necessitates an intensification of political life. And from this follows the necessity of a real Parliamentary system, with a Parliament which effectively controls the acts of the Ministerial authority. At the beginning of the war some injury, under the name of the “party truce,” was done to this strict Parliamentary system. The censorship partially stifled the Press; the control of Parliament was diminished under the pretext that everything could not be told. There was a tendency, as elsewhere, but in a less degree, toward a return to autocratic forms of government. Regressive conditions of environment tended to provoke a regression of governmental methods. This is a sociological phenomenon which is always recurring.

However, the intense political life which impregnates the whole British nation insured that the majority of the nation should for a long time, and with the greatest energy, oppose compulsory service, involving measures of coercion which certain newspapers and societies were recommending. The obligatory nature of military service was not insisted upon at the beginning of the war, but only when the lapse of time had enabled the war to make its talons felt in the British Isles.

While in France the longer the war lasted the more ordinary life tended to re-establish itself, in the British Isles it tended to become modified. The political power of the Conservative elements seemed to increase. As in France and in Germany, they attempted to utilize the war for their individual and class aims. But as in France, they encountered the resistance of the democratic forces, and it seems that in France, as in Great Britain, these democratic forces have triumphed, although in a different manner.

The forces of reaction which led the campaign in favour of compulsory service finally won the day—

in April, 1916. But their victory, from the reactionary point of view, was as a matter of fact entirely spoilt by the long resistance of the democrats. It was a victory without a morrow. As a matter of fact, compulsory service only very slightly increased the number of soldiers; but the principle was admitted, and then, according to requirements, it was possible to raise the age-limit.

The movement for compulsory service, which eventually triumphed, was provoked by the Conservatives, more, in truth, for capitalistic than for national ends. The Liberals and the Labour Party, who were opposed to it, were also its opponents for individual and class reasons rather than for national reasons. However, in upholding the voluntary principle they were upholding the principles of liberty and democracy, which the Conservative elements were in real truth attacking.

It is worthy of note that the two parties, in their arguments for and against, relied particularly upon one single fact: the suppression of the French railway workers' strike of 1910. This strike will be remembered; the military mobilization of the workers and clerks broke it. Hence the Conservatives argued that compulsory service would enable them to dominate the trades unions and to check strikes when these threatened. As for the Radicals and Labour men, they deduced a similar argument: that they would not accept compulsory service because this would result in their being enslaved by the capitalists.

When one looks beyond the surface aspect of the French strike of 1910 one perceives the unsoundness of the argument on which Conservatives, Liberals, and Labourites took their stand. As a matter of fact, the illegal mobilization—for it was absolutely illegal—of the railway clerks and workers only succeeded owing to the weakness of the railway unions. If *all* the railway-men had been members of a union, instead of a

small percentage, the illegal decree of mobilization would have been like a cautery upon a wooden leg. No one would have obeyed it, even had it been legal. And no one would have dared to apply it. A law is never applied when those who infringe it number tens or hundreds of thousands. Apparently the strike of the French railway-men in 1910 failed because of the Ministerial decree; in reality it failed because of the weakness of the union.

Compulsory service in Great Britain will not weaken trade unionism, which constitutes one of the foundation stones on which the entire democratic structure of that country is based.\*

The power of the Conservative elements seems to be increasing for various reasons. One is the lack of the spirit of equality in Great Britain. The social differentiation of the classes is much more pronounced there than in France. In Great Britain the nobility, as a class, is constantly renewing itself by relations with the middle classes. The principal owner of landed property, and deeply interested in industry and commerce, it plays a very considerable part in political life, while in France the political rôle of the same class is so small as to be all but negligible. This social phenomenon is due to the property system. The result is that in England there is no solid and powerful peasant class, a class of small owners attached to the soil, and in spirit equalitarian and democratic. France possesses such a class: it is the great reservoir which nourishes the life of the labour world and the intellectual world, which are the foundation stones of the greatness and energy of France.

\* The truth of this deduction, which I announced in December, 1915, to my audience at Birkbeck College, was proved in December, 1916, when Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister. He promised the Labour party that various of their demands should be realized. This fact shows that the Minister recognized the power of trade unionism, which compulsory service had not diminished.

Although the political spirit exists in the brain of every British citizen, it may be stated that the working classes are not greatly interested in political life. They seem to be preoccupied only by economic and trade conditions. They leave political management to the aristocracy and the middle classes, which provide the greater portion of the Parliamentary *personnel*. There are various causes for this sociological fact. *First*, the property system, by stimulating emigration, causes those elements which are most deeply imbued with the spirit of liberty, equality, and criticism to emigrate, to the impoverishment of the country, for it loses its best and most energetic citizens. *Second*, the great amount of political liberty enjoyed prevents the proletariat from feeling very acutely the need of interesting itself closely in political life; a certain number of middle class politicians and aristocrats look after matters political; it is accounted their work. *Third*, the feeble imagination and slow comprehension of the majority of the English people.

To what is this lack of intellectuality due? To my mind it is the result of the kind of education and instruction in vogue. Games and sports have too far taken the place of studies and intellectual subjects. The result is an idleness of mind which, by virtue of the natural law of the least effort, maintains itself and tends to increase. The Englishman of the middle class does not attach the same importance to education and scientific or literary knowledge as does the Continental citizen. It is necessary to maintain a proportion between sports and intellectual tasks, so as to develop the human animal in all his fulness and physical and intellectual beauty. France and England have often forgotten this, the first neglecting sports and the second intellectual studies. This predominance of sports has maintained in the British mind a certain spirit of brutality, of which we find the effects not only in the

proletariat, but often in the so-called superior classes. They accept, for example, and approve of the educational methods of the great schools, where the system of corporal punishment is piously maintained.

Blows as punishments actually lower the dignity of those who receive and those who administer them. There is herein a still greater moral abasement for the master than for the child. This preservation of corporal punishment in the schools of the aristocracy and the middle class is a mere survival of the Biblical ideal of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. It is a remnant of the barbarous conceptions of antiquity. It is also a certain sign that the educators believe that fear is the best means of training and controlling men. And in this those educators who resort to corporal and other punishments belong to the same psychological category as the German soldiers who evolved the theory of terrorism expounded in the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*, and realized it in practice in the legal assassination of Miss Cavell.

The British love of punishment is a very interesting sociological phenomenon, for it shows that the dead of thousands of years ago, the dead of little, barbarous Judæa, are still ruling the men of the twentieth century. This is rather a painful discovery for the thinker who loves progress, and it must be still more painful for the Christian who venerates these words of Christ: "*Judge not, that ye be not judged. He that is without sin, let him cast the first stone.*"

Other factors also intervene to engender this intellectual slowness of the British citizen. Tobacco, perhaps, which is a narcotic, must be incriminated, for the inhabitants of the United Kingdom smoke to excess. The Englishwoman is in general more intellectual than the Englishman. There must also be anthropological causes, for there is no doubt that notable differences are observable as regards rapidity of comprehension

and imagination between the Englishman, the Welshman, the Scotsman, and the Irishman.

Lastly, however it may be, intellectual sluggishness engenders slowness of action and lack of foresight. These are the two characteristics which have led to the policy of "wait and see," which has been the great principle of the British Government during this war. The insularity of the country has permitted of its application without any mortal danger resulting. The result of this policy is the prolongation of the war, for the British Empire has by no means rapidly exerted the effort of its whole power. It has not done so even after two years of war. There results from this prolongation of the war a considerable increase in the loss of men and money by all the belligerents. It is true that in compensation the ruin of Germany is all the more complete, and that advantages accrue to British industry and commerce. Another result of the prolongation of the war is the engendering, in all the nations at war, of a truly revolutionary situation, due to impoverishment and suffering. Class antagonisms are exasperated, class interests are clashing; at the same time the violent conditions under which men are living is reflected in their mentality, and is developing in them a spirit of violence which peace tended to abolish.

The policy of "wait and see" has other causes also: the differences of opinion concerning the war which existed in Great Britain, especially at the beginning of the world-crisis. The French people rose as a single man, having one single mind, when it saw the German Government hurling its armies against it in order to enslave it. The Belgian people did the same. But in Great Britain the situation was different. As Mr. Lloyd George has said, if on July 31, 1914, a referendum had been taken in the United Kingdom to discover whether the country was to enter into the war then imminent, there would have been 95 per cent. of votes against any

such intervention. Influential financiers in the City told this Minister that they ardently trusted that Great Britain would keep out of the Continental conflict! The British nation was not attacked. Its insular position made it believe that it lay outside the struggle.

There was a real incomprehension of the actual European situation. The war unloosed by the great land-owners and industrial capitalists of Germany was directed far more against the British Empire than against France or Russia. The German rulers desired the hegemony of the world, and they could achieve it only by destroying the British power, and the independence and liberty of the Empire.

They expected, moreover, to arrive at this hegemony by means of two stages: *First*, the hegemony of Europe, obtained by crushing France and Russia in 1914, thanks to the neutrality of Great Britain. *Second*, ten to twenty years later, the hegemony of the world, by crushing Great Britain, thanks to the forces of the whole of an enslaved Europe.

One of the reasons of the incomprehension of the people of Great Britain is historic: the intangibility of this country in the past, thanks to its insularity, and, as a result, its triumph over the other Continental Powers. People did not perceive that conditions were changed, on account of the progress of science, and that intangibility was a thing of the past. The lack of intellectuality in the British mind explains this incomprehension.

Happily for the future of humanity, Germany violated little Belgium, whose neutrality was guaranteed by the signature of the British Government. And this completely changed the anti-warlike feeling of the population. The majority, without being conscious that it was to its interest, from a pure sense of loyalty and justice, pronounced in favour of the war, and in so doing decreed the defeat of Germany. If the majority of the nation felt the necessity of crushing the Germanic power with

its autocratic spirit, there was a strong minority which thought otherwise because it did not realize the situation. Under the influence of time this minority weakened, but even now it is sufficiently important, by reason of its numbers and its quality, to be reckoned with. It is composed more particularly of democrats, the Conservative element being wholly for the war.

The attitude of this minority must be attributed very largely to its Christian ideals. Its members are more or less partisans of non-resistance to evil by violence, and this led some to defend the ideal of peace at any price. This was to expose the flank to the attacks of the Conservative party, which did not fail to seize the opportunity. It seemed thereby to increase in importance, while the strength of the democratic party seemed at the same time to diminish. Besides the fact that these differences of opinion as to the war diminished the liberty of action of the British Government, and to a certain extent explained its policy of "wait and see," they revealed, in all classes of the population, a narrowness of conception due to a lack of intellectuality. Only a few isolated individuals perceived that the world-war was far more than a conflict of economic interests. The force of events had transformed it into a conflict between two political principles, and two moralities: that reposing on liberty, and that reposing on authority and fear.

The war, as it continues, has made the British population keenly aware of its grip. All have seen the inconveniences of the policy of accommodation, of the principle of "wait and see." All have come to understand that the struggle is a matter of life or death. And the minority has continually crumbled away.

It happens, however, notwithstanding the errors of conception of this small democratic minority, that its resistance to the pretensions of the capitalist class—landowning and industrial—has played, and is playing,



an eminently useful social rôle. It is upholding the spirit and the politics of liberty. I would almost say that it is saving the European democracy from sinking into the slough of militarism and the autocracy dear to the capitalist classes of all countries.

From this point of view the action of the workers and their unions will have a happy and considerable influence, far greater than the inconsiderable temporary evils which may result therefrom. There is no doubt that such evils have occurred, for the trades unions have continued to carry out their policy as though the country were not at war.

In times of peace the employers responded to the intensified labour of the workers by cutting down wages. The retort of the workers was: the reduction of the output of each worker. Gradually the habit of reducing output took a hold of them, for it was the only means by which they could maintain their wages at a figure sufficient for their very modest livelihood. When the war broke out the collective interest called for an intensification of production in the munition works. This the workers did not understand. Reduced production had become a habit: they continued in that habit. And so the Allies and the British nation reaped what the capitalist class had sown. The collectivity suffered the disastrous consequences of the policy of class interest pursued by capitalism.

The miners' strike in South Wales in 1915 once more illustrated this same phenomenon, although perhaps in a different way. This strike, against which so many people of all political opinions fulminated, was one of the most useful acts which a labour collectivity has ever committed. The miners defended their interests exactly as the capitalists who are enriching themselves do every day of the war. But from this defence of private interests we learn a lesson of immense importance: in the first place, we learn the strength of the proletariat when

organized in their unions; in the second place, we learn—and this is even more important—what an enormous part is played by manual labour, which is, in fact, indispensable. How petty, after this, appeared the rôle of the mine-owners, landlords, and others! Every thinking man was made aware that the British collectivity, that the whole of humanity, could live without these owners, while it could not live without the miners. This lesson is one of the most important I know of.

The law relating to munitions, which was passed in order to obtain a modification of the Labour policy, has very largely failed. The miners' strike in South Wales, and many other incidents, have made this clear. The non-application of this law has been the general rule, wherever those who infringed it have been numerous. Once again we may put this fact on record: that a law is only valid when the majority of the persons to whom it applies accept it with good will. If those who infringe it are numerous and powerful, it is not applied. And from this fact we derive this lesson: the power of a law depends, not in the sanction or the power of the Government, but in its free and voluntary acceptance by the majority of the collectivity.

The partial non-application of the Munitions Act is also an illustration of the moral inculcated by our great thinker, the worthy fabulist, La Fontaine:

*“Selon que vous serez puissant ou miserable,  
Les jugemens de cour vous rendront blanc ou noir.”*

(“As you are powerful or a beggar, so  
The courts will make you black, or white as snow.”)

The Munitions Act could not exert any beneficial action on the workers, because it was a one-sided law, detrimental to a class, and without any compensation. The political spirit of the working class was too highly developed to allow it to obtain a footing, even had their leaders sanctioned it. To be effectual, this law should

have been bi-lateral—that is, there should have been a counterpart to the present Act, affecting the capitalist class. A partial nationalization of fortunes, of mining property, and of the means of transport, would have deprived the workers of any logical or possible excuse for resisting the Munitions Act. This was not effected because in the conflicts between the capitalist class and the proletariat the State is always on the side of the capitalist. It gives way only when it sees that it cannot do otherwise, on account of the strength of the workers. Sociology once again verified this phenomenon amid the tragic circumstances of the world-war, in which the destinies of civilization are at stake.

Such conflicts, indeed, are always conflicts between forces, and it is only force which decides. No idea of justice presides over the solutions or the compromises arrived at.

Thanks to his intellectual sluggishness, the British citizen is less liable than the Frenchman, for example, to be affected by the trickery of words. On the other hand, as his political spirit is more highly developed, owing to a longer practical acquaintance with political life, the English working man, or, to be more exact, the English, Welsh or Scottish working man, has proved to be as much of a realist, and as careful of his individual and class interests, as any member of the capitalist class. Hence conflicts whose sociological importance should be observed, for they ended in a check to the autocratic forces in their attempt to profit by the war. Democracy was saved from the attempted militarization by which its enemies sought to kill it.

That the democratic parties of Great Britain were able to save democracy from shipwreck, without great prejudice to the Allies and the nation, was due to the insular position of the country. The French democrats could not have done the same under the same conditions, because their country was invaded by the enemy.

You perceive that at every moment we are led to observe the enormous part which geographical conditions play in determining sociological phenomena. This proves once more that all things in this universe are interconnected, interlinked. In time and in space all is indissolubly connected. Every act has consequences which develop to infinity long after the act itself has been accomplished. And in this endless chain of causes engendering effects, which are themselves causes in their turn, the non-existence of one link suffices to modify everything, to change everything. The universe is a whole: it possesses solidarity. Creatures and things are inevitably pre-determined, because they are the necessary product of the multiple pre-existing conditions. Here is yet another lesson taught by the gigantic and sanguinary crisis through which humanity is passing.

## CHAPTER V

### AUTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

The postal, telegraphic, and telephonic censorship—The Press censorship—Subsidizing of newspapers—Pamphlets replacing the newspaper Press, which has become more or less enslaved—Espionage of the police—Psychological and sociological consequences of these methods of government, which are based on ignorance and delusion—Men are easy to govern—Opposition between autocratic methods of government and democratic habits and principles—The possession of power stultifies the mind—The directing influence of minorities—The revolt against the governing classes—Italy and Bulgaria enter the war: the effects of popular revolt and obedience—The power of the State—The beneficent influence of liberty—The loyalty of the British Dominions—The necessity of diminishing the power of the State and increasing liberty—The Conservative parties are everywhere—The existence of a class mentality—Autocracies are inevitably fated to be replaced by democracies.

**E**VEN before the armies had entered upon enemy territory all the Governments were censoring telegraphic despatches; in Germany all correspondence was stopped in the post and held back. As soon as hostilities had commenced the censorship was established everywhere: a postal, telegraphic,\* and telephonic censorship, as well as the censorship of the Press.

In all the belligerent countries, then, the very moderate liberties which were enjoyed became smaller still.

Naturally this censorship differed in different countries. Here it was very strict; there it was very lax; and elsewhere all the intermediate degrees were observable. Just at first it was excessively severe in France: the soldiers—and it must not be forgotten that they were

\* In times of peace the telegraphic censorship exists everywhere, but is discreetly applied, although often in a stupid and harmful fashion.

all men from twenty to forty-six years of age—were able to write postcards only, or open letters. In Germany it was the same. And when, in her turn, Bulgaria entered the world-war she adopted identical measures. She even exaggerated them, no doubt fearing internal disturbances and revolts, for *all* letters had to be posted open. It was very soon observable everywhere that the censorship of all correspondence was a stupendous task, occupying so great a staff that it was impossible to effect it without completely arresting the life of the nations. Then the system of retarding letters by twenty-four or forty-eight hours or even longer was resorted to, and the censorship was applied only from time to time, letters being taken at random.

Time went by, and under the pressure of public opinion, Parliament, and the Press, the postal censorship, in France, showed signs of weakening. The newspapers of neutral countries were able to enter freely. However, according to the circumstances of the war, at the front the censorship was applied with varying severity, and also, according to the censors, in the various postal districts. As a matter of fact, after the first year of the war the letters of the *poilus* were no longer opened, though the *poilu* did not hesitate to call a spade a spade and a Rollet a rascal.

We know that any wielder of power is inevitably impelled to abuse it and to commit arrogant and bullying actions. Our censors did not fail to act thus. According to the French law, there should have been only a military censorship—that is, a censorship relating to the operations of the armies. This was often forgotten by our censors, who cut, mutilated, and held up letters at random and illegally. Thus, in a letter written from England to a French non-commissioned officer, the censor cut out all that concerned the miners' strike in Wales! The inanity of this illegal measure is obvious; but we must at the same time observe that it

is quite characteristic of the censorship. An intelligent censorship has never been and will never be seen.

While in France the censorship grew less strict with the lapse of time, in Great Britain matters worked the other way. Just at first the postal censorship was, for letters entering the country as for those leaving it, almost non-existent. From the British Isles to their Allies, and *vice versa*, letters and newspapers passed unexamined. Correspondence to and from neutral countries more often than not escaped the slightest inspection. But little by little the censorship grew strict, and after a year of warfare one might say that almost all correspondence from neutrals was examined and bore the paper band now well known in the United Kingdom: "Opened by the censor." Even letters from France are opened from time to time.

At the front the English censorship was, and still is, strict. Soldiers and officers were allowed to tell nothing of what they saw. This was a ridiculous demand, for one cannot prevent the light from piercing the darkest fog! All letters from the front are opened. Words are erased, phrases obliterated. The censors have even gone so far as to erase on picture postcards the names of the towns in which the photographs were taken! They imagined that they were thus able to conceal the whereabouts of the sender! Only they forgot, like the monkey in the fable, to light their lantern; they left the name of the church, monument, or place represented, and it was easy enough to find the name of the town. There are things connected with the postal censorship which smack of comic opera. Thus, the sending of printed matter (newspapers, books, etc.) is prohibited between Great Britain and the neutral countries of Europe. It is not prohibited between France and the neutral countries, nor between France and England. Private persons in France may not receive German or Austrian newspapers; but private persons in England

may! The English censorship opens all correspondence from America, but the French censorship does not. I repeat, it is impossible for the censorship to be intelligent. It is contrary to its nature.

It is in Germany that the censorship is most severe and most methodical, and I believe we may say that it has been at practically the same level since August, 1914. Perhaps it may have tended to become more severe than it was at the outset, above all where the correspondence of neutrals is concerned. Thus certain letters, in 1915, took three or four weeks to get from Berlin to Geneva! In Alsace-Lorraine correspondence for the interior of the provinces, as well as for the rest of the Empire, was authorized only on the condition that it was open. This strict censorship, however, does not prevent the truth from becoming known both in the Empire and outside it. No law, no regulation can stop the truth. It always ends by filtering through. The censorship, like all Governmental functions, is exercised by men; it is optional for these men to nullify the decisions of their chiefs by not censoring or by censoring badly the correspondence which passes before their eyes. Thus we find German prisoners in France receiving letters in which their families complain of great poverty, of the lack of food, etc.

However perfect organization and order may be in Germany, there are gaps in the censorship through which a few rays of the light of truth can pass. Could it be otherwise in Austria, whose organization has never been brilliant? Obviously not; indeed, the censorship proved to be very irregular in that country. In Russia, too, all letters were open, those addressed to Allied countries with the rest; perhaps even more than the rest, for the Russian bureaucracy had to hide its light under a bushel. It had no wish that the Allies should learn of the autocratic manner in which it was treating the Poles, Finns, Jews, Letts, and Ruthenians.



In Italy the censorship was very strict; all letters which left the country were censored, even those addressed to Allied countries.

The postal and telegraphic censorship was not content with dealing with all that went from belligerent to neutral countries, or *vice versa*; indeed, the correspondence between one neutral country and another was censored. All trans-oceanic telegraphic cables were in the hands of the Allies, mostly in those of Great Britain. Consequently all telegrams passed before the eyes of the censors, whatever their origin or destination. It was the same with postal correspondence. Switzerland, for example, no longer receives anything from Spain, America, or Rumania, unless it is examined by the French, Italian, or Austrian censorship. The same censorship is exercised in respect of postal correspondence addressed to the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Spain, and correspondence originating from these countries. Switzerland has made official protests to the belligerent Powers respecting this incursion upon her sovereignty, and has requested the other neutrals to join her in these protests.

The evil of the censorship and the holding up of letters is keenly felt in respect of commercial and other relations, which once again shows the harmful nature of authority. The world-war has reduced the liberties of all, even of those who do not belong to the belligerent nations. But happily the axiom of mechanical physics, which states that every action is followed by a reaction, is also true in sociology. This is why we discover everywhere that this reduction of liberties has increased the love of liberty. Men have seen the worth of it, and are seeing it every day.

Moreover, the Press censorship has added itself to the postal censorship, in order to make the value of liberty more plainly perceptible. It varies in its application in different countries, belligerent or otherwise,

for it has been established in neutral countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, Rumania, etc.

In Germany it has been very strict, although it has not always been preventive. It is rare that the newspapers appear with blank spaces. The military authorities, in fact, require that the articles suppressed shall be replaced by others. In these articles lines and even single words are suppressed. But the censorship of the Press is facilitated in Germany by the fact that the Press, for the most part, is completely in the hands of the Government. But we will consider this point later on. The censorship is such that in the Reichstag, in October, 1916, deputies of various political shades complained of it. "The censorship," said one of them, "has in this country become the docile instrument of the political police. The Press is not treated as an instrument of culture, but like a brute beast which is trained with sugar and the whip." Often enough the military authorities prohibit or suspend the publication of newspapers for a longer or shorter space of time. The authorization to reappear is only given after the erring journal has promised to be "very prudent." Consequently, clandestine publications are flourishing, leaflets and pamphlets; and in spite of the censorship and the police they find their way everywhere. The acts of authority in restraint of liberty are always answered by the acts of those that love liberty. In Germany one can as a rule readily buy or receive the newspapers of France or Great Britain. It often happens, however, that these newspapers are seized as they enter the country. The German Government permits this degree of liberty only because it knows that the German people would never believe the statements of its enemies, because it is so accustomed to admire the State, obey its orders, and believe in its statements.

In Great Britain also the Press displays no blank spaces, and if one went by appearances one would not

believe that any censorship existed. Were not questions relating to this subject asked in the Houses of Parliament—questions which the newspapers report and comment upon—the lower classes in town and country would know nothing of the existence of the censorship. Democratic England resorts to the same hypocritical procedure as autocratic Germany. In Germany the censorship is exercised over everything; military operations, the political and economic life of the country, diplomatic relations, news from abroad—all is censored. In the United Kingdom the Press censorship has not attained this perfection, for the economic and political life of the country lies beyond the province of the censorship. But for all the rest—foreign politics, military operations, news from abroad, etc.—the censorship is systematically applied. The British public is kept in ignorance of important articles which appear in neutral newspapers, and of items concerning the internal politics of Russia. The official telegrams of enemy Powers were at one time carefully expurgated before the papers were allowed to print them. To read them in the papers, without any indication of erasures, one might well have supposed that they were published intact. But it is not so. The proverb, “One must not trust to appearances,” is still true.

The newspapers published in England appear, I have remarked, without blank spaces; however, there are at least two exceptions: *L'Independance Belge* and *La Belgique Nouvelle*, which are published in French in London. On several occasions I have seen white blanks in the place of lines or articles which the censorship had suppressed. I suspect also that some English newspapers publish articles without submitting them to the censorship, for weeklies like the *Labour Leader* have given information concerning Russia which was not to be found in the great dailies. The Government has no doubt shrunk from applying the Defence of the Realm

Act, as it shrunk from applying it in connection with the *Evening News*, which published an item of news although the censorship, the Press Bureau, had forbidden its publication. From these facts we learn these lessons: man enjoys only those liberties which he takes. Never has authority willingly diminished itself by granting liberties.

In Austria, France, and Italy the Press leaves blank the spaces in which the prohibited articles or passages were to have appeared. According to the vote of the French Parliament, the Press censorship ought to be applied only in respect of military matters. But we know that every individual or collective body which possesses power tends to abuse it. This is a law of nature. So the censorship has day after day exceeded its legal powers. It has prohibited many and many an article of a purely political nature; it has suppressed, here, there, and everywhere, lines and phrases which were simply critical of the Government. The more independent the writer, the more he was censored, and if he did not obey the censorship the newspaper found that its publication was suspended, or even suppressed. Thus M. Clemenceau's *Homme Libre* was doomed to disappear, only to reappear under a title which was a symbol, *L'Homme Enchaîné*.

In all the belligerent countries the Governmental authority, whether military or civil, has arrogated to itself the right to seize newspapers and forbid their publication. This has happened fairly frequently in Germany and in France; rarely in Great Britain. One single daily newspaper was suspended in London for a few weeks. Prohibitions were most usually temporary. As a rule they affected newspapers of no particular importance. The net of the law stops the little fish, but allows the big fish to pass. Power is a force which is always imposing itself. The British Government, not daring to suppress the *Labour Leader*

and the *U.D.C.*, the organ of the "Union of Democratic Control," whose pacifist policy was prejudicial to its war policy, prohibited its export from the United Kingdom. It thought thereby to localize the poison, if poison there was. I very much doubt, however, whether these methods of stifling opinion have succeeded, for I have since then seen many copies of the *Labour Leader*. Each device of the authorities for restraining the free commerce of thought is met by a device of the opposing side for giving free expression and currency to their thoughts.

In the neutral countries of Europe the direct or indirect censorship has been general, with the object of restraining the expression of opinion, in order to maintain the neutrality of the Press. This is really an arbitrary measure on the part of the Governments; Governmental neutrality does not imply the neutrality of the citizens and the Press. The right of each citizen to judge the facts and to express his feeling or his judgment has nothing to do with the neutrality of a Government. The intimidation resulting from the terrorist policy of Germany has impelled the majority of the neutral Governments of Europe to abuse their power by treating the Press as a Governmental organ. It has to be silent concerning its feelings for the Western Allies because these would displease the Governments of the Central Empires. The Press has to see to it that there is some sort of a balance between the pro-Entente and the pro-Imperial articles. I say a sort of balance, not an exact balance, for, according to what Dr. Kristian Aars, a member of the Christiania Academy of Sciences, writes to me, it was necessary, in order to content the German Government, to publish at least four articles in its favour as against three in favour of the Entente.

In Switzerland the censorship has been more repressive than preventive. There have been prosecu-

tions and seizures which many Swiss jurists declare to be illegal, because unconstitutional. The Romance journals organized an energetic resistance, which found an echo in the Federal Council. The officers who exercised the censorship had to set a limit to their Cæsarean tactics—that is, to their mania for authority.

In those neutral countries of Europe which speak the language of one of the belligerents another kind of censorship was organized: the consular censorship. Those newspapers which hoped to effect sales in the neighbouring belligerent country submitted some of their articles to a consular inspection! And of course the general public knew nothing of this!

Everywhere the journalistic censorship has aroused protests. Everywhere writers have endeavoured to ridicule and to destroy it. Thus, for example, in France, in the *Homme Enchaîné*, M. Clemenceau's article was one day reduced to the signature of the writer, and nothing else!—but all the politicians of Paris, the other journalists, and the subscribers received this article in a sealed envelope, and a few days later the *Berliner Tageblatt* gave it *in extenso*. In England the censors one day excised some lines of Browning! Another day they prohibited the publication of the news of the Ohta munition works, which had been printed in all the Petrograd newspapers! In August, 1914, all the Belgian newspapers announced the arrival of British troops on French and Belgian soil, but the English newspapers were forbidden to divulge this news! In September, 1914, the Swiss newspapers spoke of the landing of Indian troops in Marseilles, which news was not published in London for another fortnight. In France the censorship prohibits the publication of enemy communiqués. But the Frenchman can read them by buying the Swiss or English newspapers!

As the censorship has been exercised in different countries and in different cities by different men—

*tot capita tot sententiæ*—one had the delightful experience of seeing the same article authorized in Paris, prohibited at Carcassonne, and mutilated at Nantes; or the same news, originating from Rome, was permitted in London and prohibited in Paris, or *vice versa*. However, to draw up a balance-sheet of the absurd decisions of the censorship of all countries, to note all the unreasonable excisions which it has effected, would require several volumes. The Press censorship has everywhere made itself ridiculous. And a very little reflection will show that it could not have been otherwise. To exercise it necessarily required an army of employees. Intelligence is not, unhappily, a universal attribute. When unintelligence has unlimited power in its hands, and there is no appeal, which is the case with the censorship, results are obtained which are monstrously stupid and ridiculously grotesque. In Great Britain the censorship of the Press and the postal censorship have always been in civilian hands. In France the postal censorship, which is exercised only at the expense of neutrals and soldiers, has always remained an appanage of the military power. During the first months of the war in France, and during the whole of the war in Germany, the Press censorship has been exercised by soldiers. The special mentality of the professional soldier increases the tyranny of the censors. One may judge of this by the reply of a German General, a regional commander, to whom someone complained of the censorship: "It is we who are the Ministry, the Bundesrath, the Chancellor, and the Reichstag." (Cited in the Reichstag, on May 24, 1916, by Herr Liesching.) It is the common fate of all autocratic organisms to perpetrate more blunders and absurdities than useful actions. The enjoyment of power inevitably leads to tyranny and hypertrophy of the ego.

The censorship, in fact, is everywhere an organism which completes that secret diplomacy of which the

present world-war is one of the great achievements. The aim of the censorship is in reality—and we must not forget it, for this is one of the lessons of the war—to keep the bulk of the population of all countries in ignorance of existing facts. This is one of the methods of lying to the peoples, who, in the conception of their Governments, are flocks of sheep requiring shepherds and dogs. The evil of the censorship, owing to the very ignorance in which it is obliged to maintain the public, is greater than the few military advantages which may result from it, if such advantages do result.

One of the consequences of the Press censorship has been to increase the responsibility of the Government, which has to assume the responsibility of everything which is printed. Nothing, in fact, can appear without its authorization. And it follows that everything which is printed in the newspapers assumes an official, or at least a semi-official, character. But the most serious consequences of the censorship are these: that an atmosphere of ignorance is maintained, and the peoples are habituated to hide the truth from themselves, to delude themselves. It was the Press censorship in England which was partly responsible for the slowness of the English people in realizing the war. It was kept, and is kept, in the ignorance of the facts, of which it is acquainted with a portion only, and those favourable ones. Ignorance is the worst defect of democracies, since in order to govern oneself one must form judgments and decisions. Now one cannot form judgments and decisions without knowledge. Ignorance maintains illusions. It is a profound psychological error to suppose that illusion maintains moral force. This is as great a psychological error as the physiological error which administers alcohol in order to give strength.

The censorship is a cerebral narcotic, just as are alcohol, cocaine, or morphia. It depresses the will by maintaining illusions, by accustoming men to fear the



truth. It is, like secret diplomacy, in opposition to the democratic principles of the Western Governments, and for this very reason it can only lead to blunders and mistakes. The establishment and operation of the censorship bring into prominence a curious facet of the mentality of the rulers. It proves, in fact, that the rulers imagine themselves to be the sole possessors of the truth, and the only persons designed, from all eternity, to guide the people, exactly as parents imagine that they are from all eternity designed for the guidance of children. Both these conceptions are equally false, for they may both be summed up by the conception of the "ruler by right divine." It is impossible, therefore, not to perceive an absolute contradiction between these ideas and the democratic method of government which are based on representation and Parliamentary delegation—that is to say, on the system of mandatories obliged to justify all their acts to constituents.

The rulers actually believe that the people is incapable of ruling itself, incapable of understanding the facts of life and of assimilating the lessons which they teach, incapable of realizing what moral and intellectual nourishment it requires; consequently, "superior beings" are required to select and prepare this nourishment, to the exclusion of any other; and it is these rulers who are these "superior beings." So one sees the censorship suppressing philosophic ideas expressed years or centuries before the war, excising sociological or moral deductions, etc. It is obvious that such a state of affairs is the symptom of an acute condition of Cæsarism, which attacks every person who wields an authority which is more or less unbalanced by opposing forces. Moreover, if we reflect that before the war the censorship did not exist in Occidental countries, and that after the war it will not be able to maintain itself in these countries, we are necessarily led to realize the stupidity of such a system, which makes the publica-

tion of philosophical, social, or moral ideas good or bad according to the date of publication.

The policy of the wielders of authority always recalls the foolishness of the ostrich. They imagine that by suppressing the expression of ideas or feelings they can suppress the ideas and feelings themselves. Whether through ignorance or forgetfulness, they allow this truth to escape them: that ideas and feelings are generated, not by the ideas and feelings of others, nor by their expression, but by the acts which annoy the individual, and cause him more or less prejudice. Words only give a concrete form to the ideas and feelings dispersed through the human brain. It merely plays the part of the pinch of salt dropped into a super-saturated solution, which enables it to form itself into a mass of crystals. To restrain the expression of thought may slightly retard the solidification of the ideas and opinions dispersed throughout the masses, it can never prevent the production of these ideas and opinions, which are the inevitable results of acts which have aggrieved the individual. To restrain the expression of thought ends always by stimulating, in the minds of those who are directly affected, the idea of resorting to violence as a demonstration of opinion. Among the masses, who are indirectly affected, this restriction results in allowing ideas and opinions to develop chaotically, inorganically, and immoderately. It produces in the human race the same phenomenon which is produced when one lights a fire under a hermetically sealed boiler. The water is vaporized, and the pressure increases until, being stronger than the metallic envelope, it causes an explosion. Thus we have seen an intellectual, an advocate and professor, Dr. Friedrich Adler, resorting to a revolver, and killing the Prime Minister of Austria. The censorship, whether Press or postal, is far from achieving the object which the Governmental authorities have proposed to themselves. The slightest ob-

server of human psychology will be inclined to say that it produces the very reverse of the desired effect.

Once again we perceive the truth of the apophthegm of Kant, that the enjoyment of power more or less deprives men of the faculty of reasoning. It is indeed a melancholy fact that in the twentieth century we must still repeat what Milton said in the seventeenth:

“The censorship is not only an insult to human dignity, it is a completely useless invention which has not achieved its object. . . . If contagion be feared so greatly, all criticism must be renounced. . . . No, no, Lords and Commons! Men’s minds must not be imprisoned; the time has come to speak and to write freely concerning all public matters. Should the winds of all the doctrines blow upon the earth together, the truth is in the field: let it contend with error. Who has ever seen the truth vanquished in a free and open battle?” (*Areopagitica*).

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Another means of the policy of untruth of which the censorship forms part is the system of subsidizing newspapers. It has been practised by all the belligerents, and above all by Germany. With admirable method, the German Government has employed every means to attain its ends, which, however, it will not attain. The German Press ceased to express the opinion of political parties and individual writers; it expressed only the desires and aspirations of the Government. Not only news, but even leading articles, were furnished by a Government agency to all sorts of newspapers, even in the smallest towns. It was necessary to mould public opinion, and there was no better method of doing this than to allow none but selected news, commentaries, and estimates to reach the public. This task of stultifying the German mind has been methodically carried out, as is proved by an official and confidential circular which *Vorwärts* pub-

lished in October, 1915. This task has also been carried out abroad and in countries for the time being occupied by the enemy, such as Belgium, Poland, and the north-east of France. Newspapers have been created, others have been purchased or assisted, while journalists and political writers have been subsidized by the Imperial Governments in the Scandinavian countries, Holland, the United States, Greece, Spain, etc.

The same system has been followed by the other belligerents, but on a smaller scale and with less method; and the result everywhere has been that the newspapers have been discredited and are distrusted. Towards the end of 1915 the French bureaucracy created a so-called organization of propaganda. It established it on the same lines as those employed in Germany, but of course in a far less precise and orderly manner; the men employed were not, as in Germany, reared in admiration of the State and passive obedience. In England this propaganda is less the product of Governmental action than of the actions of free individuals and societies; also it is more pliable, more varied, and therefore more influential.

The selection of news, the delayed publication of telegrams, comments whose insertion is paid for, and the absence of independent criticism, have everywhere had the result of destroying all confidence in the Press, which has thus seen its powers of controlling public opinion diminished. Here we perceive an important result of autocratic modes of government. This result would have been still greater had the mass of the people everywhere realized the actual conditions of the Press. However, many people, even among the masses, have had an intuition of the reality, to judge by their conversation and correspondence. Besides, to read one newspaper is to read all, for all are strangely alike—the effect of the censorship on news and commentaries.

The “intellectuals” promptly realized the true state

of affairs, and in order to escape, at least partially, from the Governmental censorship of the Press, and to express their opinions a little more freely, they had recourse to pamphlets. This was the only way in which they could satisfy their need of expressing their thoughts. In some countries there was no preventive censorship of pamphlets, but the writers could be prosecuted if they infringed or appeared to infringe the Defence Acts. Thus we have seen magistrates condemning pamphlets in London, while these same pamphlets were freely circulating in Manchester or Glasgow ! The defence of the kingdom has mysteries which one cannot fathom. But one fact is obvious: the harmful nature of the authority which permits the occurrence of such illogical and irrational actions.

For the rest, the censorship of reviews, pamphlets, and books in the countries in which it existed was less severe than that of the newspapers. Anyone who could spend a few shillings on a book had the right to read things which the reader of a twopenny pamphlet was not allowed to know. The latter, however, had the right to learn of things of which the knowledge was forbidden to the ordinary reader of the halfpenny Press. Knowledge must be in proportion to wealth: such is the policy of Governments, which once again justifies the idea that the rich man always enjoys more liberty than the poor man. Thus, for example, a notice in respect of the war appeared intact in the *Intermédiaire des Chercheurs et des Curieux*, but was deprived of a sentence in *L'Humanité*. In Germany the opposition, whether ultra-reactionary or extreme Socialist, resorted not only to pamphlets, but also to single sheets, printed articles which circulated secretly from hand to hand, as letters, or in the midst of other printed matter, despite the police and the authorities of every species.

The number of pamphlets, and even of books, which

have everywhere seen the light during this period of world-wide crisis is such that one must go back to the time of the English Revolution, or that of the French Revolution, in order to discover an equivalent. Great social crises always engender a need to express ideas and opinions, and when the Press is limited as to its numbers, or is not free, the necessary refuge is the pamphlet. Independently of periods and of nations, the same causes produce identical effects.

This copious publication of pamphlets, expressing men's thoughts almost with freedom, shows the power of the love of liberty in the human heart. Men have been so accustomed to enjoy this liberty that they have little by little forgotten that love. The continued possession of a thing dulls the idea and the sense of its value. Before we can feel its full value we must be deprived of it. This is why one of the lessons of the war is the appreciation of the value of liberty, and an increase of the love of liberty.

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The atmosphere of ignorance created by the policy of actual lying, or lying by omission, which is practised by all the Governments, exerts a democratizing influence over the individual. The Governmental procedure of the moment is far from being a school of morality. This is all the more true in that the use of lying communiqués and the censorship, in the various belligerent and neutral countries, are aggravated by an extraordinary development of espionage and counter-espionage. This is a bold and cunning attempt to purchase men's consciences. Where there are buyers, there the sellers will always be found, even if it is a question of betraying the confidence of friends and acquaintances. The soul of Judas is still living: to tempt it is a devil's work.

The war forces the Governments to offer this temptation. So here we see another side of the school of

crime which is war. But its bloodstained aspect we find in the violence of the repression of so-called espionage. In Brussels, Liége, London, Prague, Agram, etc., on the French and Russian fronts, in the Dardanelles, etc., men and women are shot for spying for love of their country or the love of gain. They are shot even when they are not spies, shot for giving fraternal and humane aid to enemies or fellow-countrymen and co-allies. Death—always death; that is the military code, which is based solely on terrorism. But it must be confessed that this terrorism does not terrify. The love of country, of gain, and of humanity is stronger than fear; and espionage continues, and fraternal aid continues.

From these facts we deduce this result: the uselessness of punishments, which never prevented a crime or any other act whatever. One always hopes to escape the penalty. It is not by means of fear and terror that we must educate men, but by love. The man who desires to be a leader of men and a teacher must always keep in mind these maxims of Jesus: "Love thy neighbour as thyself. . . . Judge not, that ye be not judged. . . . Condemn not, that ye be not condemned."

Humanity, in the twentieth century, has not yet attained comprehension of the wisdom of these words. Thus, men still condemn one another. War has even increased the number of crimes. The expression of certain opinions has become criminal. Men are forbidden, by order of the Governmental authority, to express any opinion that has not received the Governmental impress. We are going back to the customs against which our great-grandfathers revolted in our Western countries. But it is to be noted that the crime is non-existent unless the author of it is of the lower classes. The same opinion is not a crime if expressed by a University professor, a barrister, a politician, or a journalist, while if it is expressed by a

café-keeper, a commercial traveller, or a clerk it is a crime. And this is true of France as of the British Isles. Again we perceive the moral of the great French fabulist in his *Les Animaux Malades de la Peste*.

As for Germany, the liberty of thought, speech, and literary expression has in that country been even more restrained. Many Socialists, Danes, and Alsations have learned this to their cost. All these Governmental procedures—censorship, purchase of newspapers, suppression of liberty of opinion, etc.—have psychological and social results which the sociologist should note.

While temptations and offers of money degrade men's characters, the absence of the elements of judgment, due to the censorship, diminishes the general intelligence. The suppression of criticism leads to the tyranny and infatuation of the rulers, and therefore obscures their understanding. They see the success of their temptations, and the result is a disdain of humanity. And in all, both rulers and ruled, there is a diminution of human dignity and morality. All these Governmental procedures are absolutely opposed to the principles of democracy. Their employment, then, would result in diminishing the democratic forces of the country and augmenting the autocratic forces, if it did not, on the contrary, produce a reaction—that is to say, if it did not provoke, in the best elements of humanity, a spirit of revolt against those systems of government which teach immorality.

The war has caused a revival of bygone methods of government. These were tending to disappear under the influence of human progress and of ever-increasing liberty. By creating conditions analogous to those of barbarous ages, war has caused these ancient methods of governing men to reappear. It is not that they were really necessary, but they were *believed* to be necessary. Misoneism, traditional customs, mental idleness, and the desire for the least possible effort, resulted in



the revival of these ancient methods of government, instead of the continuance of the methods of the times of peace, or a recourse to fresh methods.

The facility with which all the peoples have submitted to these restrictions of liberty shows how easy it is to govern men. A few big words, condescension, and friendly gestures on the part of the rulers, and men readily allow themselves to be killed. They are satisfied with their shepherds, who were unable to preserve them from the present cataclysm. Men too readily forget, as Kant has said, that "the possession of power inevitably corrupts the judgment of the reason."

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The mental stultification of the rulers would be still more perceptible were there not always a minority which resists and rebels with more or less energy and success against the will of the Governments. The latter are forced to reckon with this minority, more or less, according to circumstances.

Among the events of this war we may seize upon the important sociological phenomenon of the action of minorities, whether popular or governmental.

It is certain that the majority of the German and Austro-Hungarian peoples, like the majority of the peoples of France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Serbia, did not in the least desire war. If a popular referendum, masculine and feminine, had been taken in July, 1914, throughout all Europe, on the question of peace or war, an overwhelming majority everywhere greater than 80 per cent., and reaching even 95 per cent. or 97 per cent., would have voted against war. Yet the war took place; a German minority of capitalists, landowners, and manufacturers, who wielded the Governmental power, unloosed this scourge upon the world. Using all the forces which the possession of the Government gave it, it deceived the masses of the people, maintaining them in ignorance and driving

them to the slaughter. And by acting thus this small minority of rulers forced the peoples of France, England, Belgium, and Serbia to make war in turn in order to defend their threatened liberties. They could not do otherwise.

The intervention of Italy in the war has exhibited another aspect of the action of minorities in the determination of the course of events. There is no longer any doubt that at least 95 per cent. of the Italian population desired the maintenance of peace. Nations do not—and it is very natural—care about killing and getting killed. They prefer the works of peace, which are a help to the life of man. The desire of the Italian people to maintain peace resulted for a long time in confining the theatre of war to the actual frontiers of Italy. It succumbed, however, beneath the effort of the stronger, because more active, will of an intellectual minority. Professors, artists, men of letters, barristers, and journalists believed—rightly, as we think—that it was to the interest of civilization and of the Italian nation that Italy should join the Western Allies. And there was also an ardent propaganda, very powerfully assisted by three Belgians, who expounded the fate of their country under the heels of the Imperialists, the violators of their signature. Everything being considered, it seems that if the neutrality of Belgium had not been violated the Italian “intellectuals” would not have been uplifted by the same desire to defend the right, liberty, and justice. Here again we find a consequence of Germany’s action, a logical consequence, and one on which Germany had not counted. The intellectual minority did not confine itself to a passive propaganda, but engaged in street demonstrations, which involved the students and the youth of Italy, always quickly roused to enthusiasm. The Royal Government gave way because it felt the throne rocking. And Italy entered the war on the side chosen by a

minority of the people, a minority conscious of the interests of humanity.

Cast a glance on the other side of the Adriatic, on the Balkan Peninsula. There political evolution is in a backward state, and the civilization which causes the peoples to desire to govern themselves has not penetrated the ignorant masses, although their mentality is democratic. So the Governmental minority, even one single man, the King, was able to check the impulse of the people, as in Greece, or to drive the nation in a direction contrary to its interests, as in Bulgaria. The thousand means which the wielders of power possess for deceiving the people, buying consciences, and maintaining an atmosphere of obscurity, were employed without scruple by the Governmental minority in order to attain its ends. And the opposition minority, even when led by a great statesman such as Venizelos, has been forced to submit to the royal will. It submits because its opposition is purely passive, not active, as was the Italian opposition.

We see here, by living examples, how utterly erroneous is the Tolstoyan and Quaker theory of non-resistance to evil by violence. Just as in mechanics a given action determines a precise and necessary reaction, so in life an act of violence often compels a reaction of violence. It is unhappily impossible that it should be otherwise, unless we wish to support violence and submit to the will of those who employ it. Revolt becomes the first of duties, indicated by the self-respect which each of us should feel for his own dignity. Resistance to evil in a passive form is certainly a method of revolt which has its value. But in the long run those who practise it are always compelled either to obey or to allow the evil to spread. This method of revolt could have no effective value unless practised by the majority of mankind.

The difference between the events which occurred in Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania, in respect of the entrance of these countries into the world-war, shows that the action of the governing classes is always the action of violence supported by the governed classes. It shows also that the only means by which the governed can free themselves from the government which they find maleficent is to employ violence in their turn, in order to show their strength. This lesson is perhaps a depressing one, but it is true. In fact, the control of the conduct of the nations is the appanage of the individuals and collectivities which *dare* and do not fear to translate their desires and aspirations into action. The saying of Danton: "Be bold, be bold, and again be bold!" is still true.

If we regard from this point of view the events which have for months been drenching the world with blood, we see very clearly that the obedience of the peoples is the ruin and destruction of the peoples. Let us for a moment suppose that the German people had refused to obey its leaders in July, 1914. The war would not have taken place. Humanity would not, by January, 1917, have lost more than eight millions of men, would not have numbered five million cripples. The thousands of millions of pounds' worth of things destroyed, swallowed up, or vanished in smoke would not have been lost. No doubt the revolt of the German people would have led to attempts of repression. But however bloody this repression might have been, it could not have cost the German nation more than a million and a half of dead and more than a million disabled men, which loss this people has suffered on account of the war. The German people would not have had to endure the poverty which it has been enduring for months, suffering from lack of food and clothing. Its revolt would have meant, for itself and for the whole world, a stupendous economy in human lives and

property. By obeying its rulers in July, 1914, it was fated once more to prove to the world the truth of La Fontaine's moral:

*" Helas, on voit que de tous temps  
Les petits ont pati des sottises des grands."*

(" We see, alas ! in every age and state  
The humble suffer from the follies of the great.")

We perceive, then, how great would have been the utility of this revolt, and how beneficial to humanity it must have been. And from this we deduce this conclusion: let us cultivate in ourselves and in others the spirit of revolt, in all its various forms. Let us remember the saying of which Benjamin Franklin was so fond: " Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God."

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The great obstacle to the idea of revolt and to revolt itself—which two things are the salt of the earth—is the power of the State. Never, we believe, has this power appeared so vividly as in this war of autocracy against democracy. All the restrictions of liberties, all the censorship, all the seizures of ships and railways, all the militarization of male citizens, all shows how far the powers of the State dominate the whole nation. This domination is so extreme that for long months free peoples such as the British Empire and France have endured, almost without complaint, the disorder, the deceit, and the blunders—the price of which was death and desolation—which the State untiringly piled up. Only after the incessant action of small democratic minorities, and the increase of these mistakes, did the popular forces of control recover a little of the vigour with regard to the powers of the State.

From these events we must deduce this moral: Let us beware of a strong and powerful State. Let us as far as possible diminish this power, which inevitably leads to abuse. Let us always remember these words,

which Jesus spoke to His disciples: "Call no man your master." Once again the moral of our good La Fontaine, "Our enemy is our master," is proved to be true.

The truth of this moral is proved once more by the beneficent influence of liberty. Many facts have demonstrated this during the course of the world-crisis. Thus, during the twenty-four hours which preceded Germany's declaration of war upon France, certain French Ministers, forgetting that they were the servants of the nation, and imagining themselves to be autocrats, wished to have some thousands of Socialists or Syndicalists arrested, in order, so they said, to prevent the wrecking, the *sabotage*, of the mobilization. Happily a man opposed this measure with so much energy that the Ministry abandoned this idea, whose execution, by dividing France in two, by provoking riots and disturbances, would inevitably have led to defeat. The liberty which the advanced elements of French opinion enjoyed permitted them to assert themselves freely. And of this assertion the whole world has heard: the unanimous uprising of the whole, without the slightest opposition, in defence of their liberties, which were threatened by militarist Germany.

Another proof of the beneficent influence of liberty is to be found in the loyalty of the British Dominions. All rose to hasten to the help of Great Britain, because all are autonomous and their own masters. Note what happened in South Africa. Boers, who yesterday were fighting against England, protested their loyalty, excepting a small minority. Liberty has bound them to the Empire more strongly than all the bonds which fear might have created. And the loyalist Boers suppressed the revolt of a few simple-minded Boers who were deceived by the fallacious promises of Germany.

Let us note, on the other hand, the behaviour of

Ireland! In the first place, it did not rise as a single man to assist the Empire of which it formed a part. Its attitude was hesitating; some were for the war, some were against it. The cement of national liberty, which would have joined all Ireland into a single body, ready to defend its liberties, was lacking. England had left the Irish but little liberty during the past centuries, and they had not yet been able to enjoy Home Rule, which had scarcely been passed into law, and which, moreover, could only become operative after the war.

Then, in April, 1916, at Easter, a rebellion broke out in Dublin and a few other places. It was an absolutely childish affair, because of the small numbers of the Sinn Feiners and the revolted Larkinites, the great strength of the Governmental troops, and the loyalism of the very great majority of the Nationalist Home Rulers. It was, in part, a mere matter of buffoonery, a comic opera rebellion, with romantic and melodramatic incidents. Naturally the civil Governmental authority was anxious to show its strength, and gave a free hand to the military authority. The latter, no less naturally, started a series of courts-martial, which liberally distributed sentences of death and penal servitude. Men might well have believed themselves under the rule of the Prussian officers and Junkers, so true is it that authority always yields the same fruits: the mental stupefaction of those who possess it, violence, and injustice.

In some ten years' time the Irishmen shot in 1916—Pearse, Plunkett, MacDonagh, Conolly, and others—will have their statues in Dublin. Even now their portraits are in every house in Ireland, and a little more hatred and discontent divides Ireland and England.

It seems, from the facts published in the *New Statesman*, that the rebellion was provoked by the subterranean conspiracies of Protestant Conservatives and English officers. They wanted a little blood-letting,

to give a lesson to the Nationalist Irish Catholics, the trades union workers (Larkinites), and the intellectual Republicans (Sinn Feiners). They have had it, this blood-letting, not so copious as they would have wished, although men were shot without trial. It appears from the depositions made before the Commission of Inquiry instituted by the British Government that the opposition to recruiting and compulsory service was an important factor of the increase of Sinn Feiners among the peasants and the younger priests. There is here a curious resemblance to the Vendéean rebellion at the time of the great French Revolution.

The repression of this childish revolt displayed class hatred and religious hatred far more than national hatred.

For the impartial observer and investigator the true and responsible author of this pseudo-rebellion is Sir Edward Carson, who, before the war, had openly prepared for rebellion in Ulster, for the purpose of resisting Home Rule. He received cargoes of arms from Hamburg. The Nationalist Home Rulers, the Sinn Feiner Republicans and separatists, and the Larkin Trades Unionists, followed the example given by Sir Edward Carson. The Government, having allowed the Carsonites to do as they chose, was obliged to let others do the same. The result was promiscuous firing, the death of some hundreds of men and women, and the destruction of property. In its repression, the English Government was far less skilful than General Botha in his repression of the real rebellion in South Africa. Pacification never follows bloody repression. The fire burns under the embers. Fear never acts for long upon men.

It seems that the summary and autocratic procedures of the military authorities revolted not only the Irish, but the whole mass of English Liberals, while it greatly embarrassed the Conservatives and the Carsonites. The



violent repression of the revolt (the shooting of men after the rebellion was crushed) has aroused strong feeling in America, especially among the Irish-Americans. It also produced results unfavourable to the Allies, a fact immediately realized by the British Government, which called a halt to the military, who were supported by the Anglican clergy, the Bishop of Dublin, for example, demanding the severest measures. Cæsarism always infects the mind of those who exercise power, until they are unable to perceive the profoundly illogical nature of their acts. Thus the British rulers did not perceive the absurdity of their conduct: the absurdity of crushing the little Irish nation, while they were claiming to have entered the war in defence of the small nations; the abandonment of power to the military authorities, while they claimed to have entered the war in order to destroy German militarism!

The arrest of the sanguinary repression came too late: the more so as in August, 1916, the British Government hanged Sir Roger Casement, who was guilty only of having had a conception of patriotism differing from that of Sir Edward Carson, who became a Minister. All this has profoundly increased the feeling of hatred in the Irish mind. And in the United Kingdom everyone knows, says, and writes that there are now in Ireland more rebels than there were in April, 1916. There are almost as many rebels as Irishmen. This situation, the fruit of an authoritative policy, has had consequences deplorable for the Western Allies. Thus, the British Government cannot establish compulsory service in Ireland, which deprives the Allies of 300,000 to 400,000 good soldiers, because it fears a general rising, like that of the Vendée in 1793, and for the same reasons; a rising, moreover, which would have serious results in Australia, Canada, and the United States. The British Government is the prisoner of those whom it is depriving of their liberties! The master is the slave of

his slaves. Let us note this eternal result of the authoritative policy.

Consider India. There has been practically no rebellion against England, although there is a Nationalist Hindu movement. Its leaders are familiar both with Germany and her passive discipline, and England with her liberties. And they prefer the latter. They would rather retain an endurable master than change him for a worse. Moreover, they hope that the loyalty of India will open the eyes of England, and that after the war a period of autonomy will open for India. And this, moreover, is what interest would counsel, for one of the lessons of the war is this: that the nations can be bound together only by the independence of each. Liberty granted to the vanquished, to the conquered, is the seed of love, while coercion is the seed of disaffection, antagonism, and hatred. The harvest of hatred is an evil harvest. Love only yields a beneficent harvest, and the great sower of love is liberty.

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An examination of events reveals an identity of action on the part of the Conservative parties in all the belligerent and neutral countries. Here we have a very interesting sociological phenomenon. Everywhere in Europe the political parties whose tendencies are authoritative and anti-democratic have sought to utilize the period of the war in order to increase their strength and to sap that of the parties with advanced ideas, whose tendencies are Liberal and democratic. This phenomenon is observable in France, England, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Holland.

Everywhere the Conservative elements, whose tendencies are autocratic, have not for a moment lost sight of their class and individual interests. They immediately thought of profiting by the circumstances created by the war in order to enfeeble their political adversaries, to seize power where they did not already

possess it, to fortify their power where they did already possess it. With a certain skill they strove to exploit the elements of idealism in the mentality of the working class and the lower middle class. They used, for their personal ends, the best aspects of human nature.

The prevailing atmosphere of militarism favoured the promotion of these autocratic and anti-libertarian tendencies. There is always an intimate union between militarism, Conservatism, and reaction. The mental states created by these social systems are very similar. There is nothing surprising in this, as the foundation of all these systems is the same. *All are based on the employment of fear as a means of human control.*

The Conservatives, as a whole, for of course there are exceptions, form a social class already of ancient standing. I mean that they have possessed a class consciousness for centuries, while the mass of the people and the lower middle class are only beginning to acquire this class consciousness. It constitutes a class which is still in its youth. It is a privilege of age to think only of one's material interests, and a privilege of youth to think much more of one's ideals. The Conservatives, then, are narrow realists, without broad views, thinking of the present moment, of their mean and petty material interests. The parties of advanced ideas are idealists, thinking of the future, of their intellectual and moral interests.

These different conceptions of life explain the different attitudes of the Conservatives and the parties of advanced ideas in the present world-war. The spirit of sacrifice for the collectivity, or the spirit of sociality, has in reality been more highly developed in the masses, whose ideas are democratic and advanced, than in the Conservatives. The latter have always regarded their interests first of all and above all. Their enrichment by the manufacture of armaments and munitions, their attempt to restrain liberties and to increase the mili-

tarization of their countries, their intensive religious propaganda and their anxiety to discredit democratic organs, such as Parliaments, their disdain of authority and the laws which were opposed to them (you will remember the activities of the German Conservatives in respect of the submarine war, of the English Conservatives in respect of compulsory service, and of the French Conservatives in respect of the religious propaganda), all shows that their individual and class interests take precedence of collective national interests.

The exercise of power leads gradually to prepotency, the more swiftly and openly when this power is not counterbalanced by any other social force. The war has everywhere awarded the supremacy to military methods of government, and has more or less suppressed the liberties which counterbalanced the exercise of power. Thus the Conservatives everywhere gave way to their craving for authority. The Occidental Conservatives, while they were the most chauvinistic anti-Germans among the Allies, incessantly urged the employment of Germanic methods of government—that is, the methods of military autocracy. The contrast is curious, and has its origin in this fact: by their mental characteristics the Conservatives of every country have very close affinities with the German Government, which is essentially militarist and Conservative; but in the matter of material interest the Occidental Conservatives are the enemies of the German Conservatives. It is in reality a conflict of interests, in the same class, between different clans. Everywhere the Conservatives have exceeded the limits which a faint comprehension of popular psychology must have enabled them to perceive. And everywhere the narrowly egoistical action of the Conservatives has aroused, in the popular mind, a more or less hidden opposition, whose explosion will doubtless occur after the international hostilities are brought to a close. The Con-

servatives and reactionaries have everywhere committed psychological blunders like those of the German Government. The latter misunderstands the psychology of the Western peoples; the Western peoples misunderstand the psychology of the democratic masses.

The international unification of the conduct of the Conservative parties is a flagrant proof of the existence of a class and caste mentality which is independent of national mentality. Here is one of the lessons which we must learn from the present war.

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A curious discovery is made when we analyze the development of this war. We have seen the military forces of Germany doing their utmost, for months at a time, careless of their losses, to crush their Eastern enemy, Russia, whose autocratic principles of government harmonized well with the principles of the German Government. In so doing Germany was exhausting herself without exhausting France and Great Britain, her real political and economic enemies! We thus witnessed a sort of auto-destruction of the autocratic Powers! The principle of autocracy is undermined and destroyed by its very defenders! This is a result of the political stupidity of the militarist mind, which mentally stultifies the individual by depriving him of all critical spirit.

In giving a respite to her Western enemies, in order to protect the properties of the junkers of East Prussia, in August and September, 1914, autocratic Germany was herself her worst enemy. The apparent and immediate interest of the ruling caste made her forget her real and permanent interests. These last demanded that the Western enemy should be crushed, for then the Eastern enemy could easily have been induced to make peace. But it must also be observed that the German rulers were forced to act as they did, not only because of the necessity of protecting the

property of the Junkers, but because they had to justify, in the eyes of the proletariat and the middle classes, what they had said and reiterated in order to render the war popular—namely, that it was forced upon them by Russian barbarism, a prey to a frenzy of conquest. Autocratic Germany had made herself the prisoner of her proletariat. The weapons we use are often two-edged. Thus this war, undertaken to maintain and develop autocratic principles, will end in developing democratic principles and forces.

Taking them as a whole, indeed, the social and political consequences of the war are, up to the present moment, a diminution of the spirit of reaction and the spirit of automatism, and an augmentation of the democratic soul and the forces of democracy. The development of the war will only accentuate these two social phenomena. The triumphs of the democracies over the autocracies is certain, because they possess moral force as well. The democracies are the future: the autocracies are the past. Those which still subsist are the survivals of former ages, endeavouring to maintain themselves by means of such survivals as militarism and war.

From this objective examination of the political and social conditions created by the war, it appears that authority is the seed of death, and liberty a ferment of life.

## CHAPTER VI

### WAR AND THE CREEDS

The war and Christianity—The contradictions of Christian practice—The conduct of the official clergy—The Catholic Church and the attitude of the Catholics in different countries—The fundamental basis of the Catholic Church and Cæsarism is the same: authority—The attitude of the Pope—Judaism—Anti-Semitism is undone by the attitude of the Jews—Mohammedanism—The bankruptcy of the holy war—The pseudo-religious Renaissance—Its causes: material interests and the fear of death—Animistic and polytheistic superstitions.

The war and the internationalism of science, letters, and the arts—The Chauvinism of scientists and literary men—An outburst of hatred—It is only a passing manifestation.

The war and Feminism—The international character of Feminism—The part of women in the war—The social equality of the sexes—Violence is the enemy of Feminism.

**H**UMANITY has always sought to increase the amplitude of groups which unite with one another and form confederations. There is, as it were, a craving for universality in the human mind. It is this craving that gives birth to the efforts of union between philosophical and religious sects, between professional groups, between classes, without recking of the changing frontiers of fatherlands, and independently of so-called races. These unions seek to embrace the whole terrestrial globe, according to the affinities and particular interests of the sect, profession, or class. In this way were formed those organizations which have been called "the Internationals." The war has, of course, profoundly disturbed them.

Christianity, if we regard it from the point of view of the doctrine professed by Christians, is a true international league. All the world over, independently of

all State frontiers, the religion of Christ is the same (save in details which vary according to the sect), at least in its general lines.

The war has shown that Christianity is deeply divided as to the manner in which it ought to regard the sanguinary conflicts of mankind. We perceive the same divisions, the same contradictions, as those which were noted in the first centuries of the Christian Church. All the chapters of that famous book, *The Law of War and of Peace*, in which Grotius, in the seventeenth century, expounded the contradictory opinions of the Apostles and the Fathers of the Church concerning war and the duty of Christians, have recovered an astonishing actuality. It is inevitable that war should always cause a revival of the things of the past. It is itself a survival of barbarous habits, and it necessarily brings in its retinue the things and the ideals of barbarous ages.

The Bible was, in those ages, variously interpreted; it has been variously interpreted in our times, according to the sect interpreting. Some have maintained that the duty of the Christian is to defend his fatherland, even by slaying; others have maintained that his duty is not to resist evil by violence. Some have maintained that the duty of Christians is to pardon; others that it is to chastise without mercy. And words of unheard-of violence have issued from the mouths of ministers—Lutheran, Catholic, Calvinist, and others—both German and English, etc. Texts have been cited by the doctors in support of their contradictory theses. And this once again proves the vanity of a doctrine based on ancient writings, which, in the course of the years, have been interpolated, translated, and retranslated, and are thus altered, modified, and full of contradictions. And as a matter of fact the opinions of the doctors in divinity have had very little publicity beyond the various sects, and little social influence,



even in the British Isles, where the ideal of anti-bellucose Christianity has permeated a certain minority.

However, in all the belligerent countries one saw the official clergy—Lutheran, Anglican, Orthodox—intoning the chants agreeable to God, and invoking Him in prayer for the success of their arms. Among these belligerents there was one exception: France, for irreligious France has no official Church. But the Catholics of France gave themselves up to the same invocations, that their God might favour them and award them the victory. Every Christian clergy nationalized God, making Him its own, forgetting the universality of the Christian God, and unconsciously returning to the religious conceptions of polytheism.

The ties which united among themselves those human beings who professed the same religion were, in fact, non-existent, and we saw Catholic fighting against Catholic, Lutheran against Lutheran, Calvinist against Calvinist, Orthodox Christian against Orthodox Christian. According to doctrine they were brothers; and they killed one another. Thus did the faithful, the sheep of one flock, proving that these religious bonds were only appearances, vanishing upon contact with reality. The priests, the shepherds of these flocks, had no other attitude than that of their sheep. This sociological phenomenon is above all visible in the Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church is an international league, not only because it is a part of Christianity, but also because it is a highly hierarchical institution, which extends, as its name of Catholic expresses, over the whole globe, independently of class, caste, or nation. At the head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is one single chief, the Pope. He and all the priests of divers degrees order and rule the life and the thoughts of millions of the faithful, scattered over the whole earth. The faithful, if they are good and true Catholics, are bound to obey.

That, theoretically, is what should be the case; I say theoretically, for in reality the faithful, and even their shepherds, have neither unity of life nor unity of conception. The present war has revealed this truth in all its nakedness.

In every nation the Catholics, clerics or laymen, have obeyed the temporal power. They have everywhere become soldiers, and everywhere they have killed one another, in conformity with the orders of their civil and military superiors. The French and Belgian Catholics were able to argue, with great justice, that they were defending their invaded soil, their goods, and their threatened liberties. The German and Hungarian Catholics could not argue thus, for they were the aggressors. Their leaders at least knew that they were such, for perhaps the ignorant masses, deceived by the assertions of their rulers, believed that they were only defending their independence and their habits, threatened by the Russian autocracy.

In France the clergy proceeded to explain its patriotism. It did so in a book, *La Guerre Allemande et le Catholicisme*, published under the direction of the Director of the Catholic Institute, and under the patronage of the Cardinal Archbishops of Paris and Reims. The higher clergy, just as the lower clergy, just as the simple faithful, are, in France, definitely anti-German. In Belgium the regular and secular clergy were even persecuted. Numbers of them—priests, monks, nuns—were shot or massacred. The anti-German and patriotic feeling of the Belgian Catholics revealed themselves luminously in the proud attitude of Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines, and other Belgian Bishops.

The same attitude, but naturally in an opposite sense, was exhibited by the Catholic clerics and laymen of the Germanic countries, who affirmed with no less definiteness their Germanic patriotism. But in so doing they

revealed the real cause of their attitude. It was by no means the moral and religious ideal which guided them; it was not the desire to preserve their national independence, which no one threatened; it was simply their concern for material and political interests. They identified the interests of the Catholic Church with those of the German Empire, because, as Professor Karl Muth wrote in *Hochland*, "the soundest and *most conservative powers on earth* are: the Papacy and the Prussian State."

For these clerics and laymen of Germany the danger was the constitutionalism of Western Europe, with its ideal of liberty. And this danger was embodied by Professor Martin Spahn in France, which "has opened the door so widely to pure rationalism." The war, for these Catholics, became a holy war, for its object was the liberation of the world from revolutionary powers and ideals. The enemies were democracy and rationalism.

Catholicism is ceasing to be merely a doctrine and a religious precept; it is becoming pre-eminently a political institution, a hierarchical and Governmental power, based upon obedience to an inscrutable authority. The German Catholics, by this frank avowal, have been more in line with the tradition of the Church than the French and Belgian clerics and laymen, in whom national feeling took precedence of the religious ideal. This is so true that we find a Benedictine monk, of French birth, Dom Germain Morin, who does not fear to speak of the "disgust" which he had experienced on reading the book of the Rector of the Catholic Institute of Paris, "a pamphlet which exploited religion against the Germans, who have given, and are giving daily, proofs of an admirable devotion to the cause of religion."

Because of their nationalism the French, Belgian, and British Catholics are fighting against the German Catholics, the invaders of their country. Because of

their nationalism, the Irish Catholics are divided into two opposing factions. One, the more numerous, maintains that the duty of the Irish is to fight against Germany, to defend the civilization and liberty of the world, imperilled by the Germanic desire for hegemony. The other faction, a minority, but counting in its midst such figures as the Bishop of Limerick, takes its stand upon a rigidly national basis, declaring that the victory or defeat of either belligerents is indifferent to Ireland. The whole argument of this minority would have been without foundation had England given Ireland the autonomy of government which she has been demanding so long. The Home Rule Act has existed in the Statute Book since 1914, but many Irishmen repeat, with the Bishop of Limerick: "Every intelligent Irishman will say that this is only a simulacrum of Home Rule, which will never be put into practice." And the result was that the war, for these Irishmen, was in no wise their war; it was simply England's war, France's war, and they had no concern with it. This was at the time when the British military authority wished to arrest the Bishop (November, 1915).

A narrow and petty nationalism hid from the eyes of these Catholic Irishmen this actual fact: that the world-war surpasses the individual interests of a few nations, and involves the general interests of humanity. We should see in these narrow conceptions a result of the mischievous autocratic policy of England where Ireland is concerned. The absence of liberty diminishes the human intelligence, and prevents it from perceiving sociological phenomena in all their fulness. Authority is always mischievous; liberty, on the contrary, is always beneficent.

Of this minority of Irish Catholics which opposed the participation of Irishmen in the war, some even said "that the victory of the Germans would signify the victory of the Catholic Church." This endorsed the

opinion of the German Catholics, which considers the Church rather as a political institution than as an institution for giving moral and religious education. In these Irish Catholics it was not so much Irish Nationalism which spoke as hatred for atheistical France, which was represented as persecuting the Church. The Catholic and clerical ideal—I do not say the Christian ideal—was opposed, in these men, to the rationalist ideal, the ideal of equality and liberty, symbolized by France. In short, it was not, properly speaking, a religious ideal which led these men, but a political ideal.

We find the same state of mind in the majority of the Catholics of neutral countries. Whether in Holland, in Spain, in German Switzerland, in the United States, or even in Italy—before her entrance into the war—we always find the majority of the Catholics more or less anxious for the victory of the Central Empires. They all have a pro-German tendency, because among the other belligerents there is France, and France is free-thinking, rationalist, de-Catholicized, because the Western belligerents represent democracy and liberty, principles which are absolutely opposed to the principles of authority and hierarchy, which are the corner-stones on which rest the foundations of the Catholic Church, and which are represented by the Central Empires.

The attitude of the Catholic clergy and their faithful flocks is thus full of contradictions, which vary accordingly as they belong to belligerent or neutral nations, and according to the political condition of these belligerents, and the degree of liberty enjoyed by them.

There is, therefore, no unity of view among these clerics and laymen. They refuse to give their approval to or to obey the words of the Bishop of Périgueux, who said: "In our faith, our obedience, and our love, we confound the Pope with Jesus Christ." Moreover, the head of the Catholic Church was powerless to impose unity of opinion upon the Catholics, because he

did not assume the moral and doctrinal point of view, and because, a prey to the conflict of the contrary interests of the Church as a political institution and the Church as a teacher, he did not know which side to take. A mystic and a man of the people like Pius X. would doubtless have decided in favour of the moral doctrine. A political Pope and an aristocrat, Benedict XV. hesitated, not daring to declare himself in favour of the moral doctrine, nor yet of the material interests at stake. As a doctor of the Church he ought to have condemned the flagrant and undeniable crimes of the Imperialists, who killed, massacred, and violated women, children, priests, and Belgian nuns. He was careful not to do so, just as he did not protest against the destruction of cathedrals and the sacrilege committed in his churches. He considered that "it was useless to involve the Pontifical authority in the disputes of the belligerents." Was this out of a desire to be impartial? Evidently not, for impartiality does not mean absence of judgment. He abstained from judging because he knew that the weapon at his disposal, excommunication, was an obsolete weapon, without any reach, and obeyed by no one. He hoped, while abstaining from condemnation, that the world would not perceive that the Catholic Church is, as a moral power, only an appearance, a mere façade, because religion is no longer, if it ever was in the past, a factor determining human action. It is simply, for the human majority, a conglomeration of rites and forms of worship, practised more or less mechanically by the faithful.

If, as head of the doctrinal Church, the Pope ought to have condemned the violators of treaties and the men who ordered the crimes of Louvain and elsewhere, as head of the political Church the Pope ought to be pro-Germanic in tendency. Germany and Austria symbolized, in fact, the principle of authority, of which the Pope ought to be the scrupulous guardian. By

its nature as a political institution, the Catholic Church is obliged to support autocracies and to oppose democracies, the tendency of which, in the long run, is always toward the disappearance of authority. As political organisms the Churches, whatever their doctrine, have always been the faithful allies of militarism. In the course of the ages we always discover the alliance of the priest and the warrior. Leaning the one upon the other, they live as parasites on the labour of the producers. It is therefore logical that in the dawn of the twentieth century we should still perceive the same alliance, for priests and soldiers are both supporters of the principle of authority and destroyers of the principle of liberty.

In this world-wide war economic, political, moral, and intellectual interests are mingled in stupendous collision, so that it is difficult, even impossible, to determine which of these interests the majority of mankind obeys. Still, it seems that if the war was declared with economic aims in view there have been, in the course of time, such modifications that it is probable that the majority of the combatants are now fighting for moral and intellectual ends. But the Catholic Church and its head do not seem to have acted with such ends in view. The political and economic interests appear to have been their guide, and the result is that the Catholic Church has appeared rather as a political organism than as a religious and moral organism. The re-establishment of a species of temporal power always haunts the Papacy: only the victory of the Imperialists could re-establish it. It will therefore be understood how anxiety for economic and political interests has led the Pope and the Church to a pro-Germanism which has, naturally, greatly shocked the opinion of the French, the English, and still more the Belgians. Italy cannot permit of the revival of the temporal power, to which the Pope discreetly alluded in a consistorial

address. The result is a diminution of the authority of the Pope, and even of the Church, among clerics and laymen alike.

Just as we see that the Pope's sympathies are pro-German, so we find that the Kaiser and his Junkers have pro-Papal sympathies. Their alliance is the inevitable result of the common basis of their power: authority, hierarchy, and fear.

Germany's policy presents many affinities with that of the Society of Jesus. Their motto is the same: the end justifies the means. Their basis is the same: passive obedience, *perinde ac cadaver*. Many events have proved this in the course of the war. To judge by the attitude of the Jesuits in Spain and the United States, it would seem that the Black International, the Society of Jesus, is everywhere a solid prop of pro-Germanism. In the United States a writer has observed this fact, which is at least curious: the vessels of the General Transatlantic Company are the only ones which have escaped any attack by submarines, and the greater portion of the shares of this company belong to the Society of Jesus. Be this as it may, from this fact it is certain that the Catholic Church, whether represented by the Pope or by the Society of Jesus, is pro-German in tendency, and is, one may say, the ally of Kaiserism.

This alliance, whose object is to obtain a peace agreeable to Teutonic Junkerism, is futile, because the Papal power does not exist save as an empty show. France, moreover, democratic and without an official religion, cannot permit of the intervention of the hand of an autocratic and political institutional Church. It would be, indeed, a disavowal of its entire Republican and democratic policy. The thing is the less possible in that the pro-Germanic attitude of the Pope has displeased the Catholics of France and other belligerent countries in the West. It will take a long time, for



example, to re-establish the fraternity between the Belgian and German Catholics, to judge by the collective letter of the Belgian Bishops to the German episcopate.

One of the most obvious lessons of this war is therefore the great decline of autocratic powers such as those of the Catholic Church and Kaiserism.

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Judaism, like Christianity, is an international organization, since the Jewish religion counts its adepts scattered over the entire globe. Some have even maintained that the religious ties uniting the Jews were such that they constituted a nation dispersed in the midst of the other nations, while strictly preserving its Judaic nationality. The present war has proved the absolutely mistaken nature of such a view. We see, indeed, that the Jews are fighting one another, for there are Jews in all the various armies: French, British, Russian, German, Austrian, Hungarian. This division of the Jews according to their belligerent nationalities, and the fact of their fighting among themselves, absolutely destroys the basis of anti-Semitism. It is a curious consequence of this war, all the more curious in that those who unloosed the war, the land-owners and professional soldiers of Prussia, are rabid anti-Semites! It is to be noted how the consequences of this war are almost all in absolute contradiction to the aims pursued by those who provoked it.

Everywhere the Jewish soldiers have been immersed in the mass of other soldiers; there has been one exception—an Israelitish legion in the British Army in the East. But that this was so was really because these Jews, belonging to Oriental nationalities which were either neutral or allies of the Central Empires, could only fight against the latter by forming a special corps in order to join the British Army. This exception by no means invalidates the bankruptcy of the anti-

Semite doctrine, by the very fact that the Jews are divided up among the various enemy combatants.

While the Occidental Jews in France, Alsace, Belgium, etc., were all anti-German, we find that the Oriental Jews of Poland, Galicia, etc., were mostly pro-German.

The cause of this was the Russian autocracy, just as it was the cause of the pro-Germanism of many Scandinavian Jews. The memory of the persecutions and pogroms perpetrated by the Russian bureaucracy prevented these Jews from remembering that France was the first European nation which liberated the Jews, and that in the Occident they were politically the equal of all other men. The facts incessantly lead us back to the mischievous nature of authority.

As a religious body, Judaism appears to be divided according to the various nationalities of which the Jews form a part. It is exactly the same as with the Catholic Church. As a doctrine, Judaism appears, in the course of this war, as a greatly diminished force. The Chosen People of God, according to the Jewish Scriptures, are killing one another for the Gentiles, for unbelievers! If this religious faith had been strong and had taken precedence of national and political ideals and interests, it is obvious that the Jews would have refused to do so. We must therefore record a great diminution of the religious faith of Judaism.

The same phenomenon is true of Mohammedanism. The Mussulmans of the British, French, and Russian armies are fighting against the Mussulmans of the Turkish and Bulgarian armies, and this for the benefit of the unbelievers. The Mussulman Holy War was proclaimed in vain. There were a few attempted risings in the West of Egypt and in Morocco. But these were small and unimportant insurrections. No serious uprising occurred among the Mohammedans of Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, India, or the Caucasus. More,

the Arabian Mohammedans have risen against the Turkish Mohammedans. The Mohammedan faith is as enfeebled as the Judaic or the Christian faith.

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The war has thus enabled us to perceive on every hand a considerable diminution of religious faith and of the power of the various Churches. This fact was already known to the observant; the war has made it apparent to all those who do not refuse to see. It is idle to put forward as an objection that sociological phenomenon which the French Catholics have described as a religious Renaissance, a phenomenon which has occurred in all the belligerent countries.

During the first weeks of the war it was seen in France, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, that the public was attending the churches in greater numbers. There seemed in these countries to be a general religious enthusiasm. In reality the explanation was that the clergy and their faithful, believing the occasion favourable for a revival of faith, devoted themselves in all the belligerent countries to an intense propaganda. While in Catholic countries the soldiers were bowed down by the weight of the medals and scapulars which were generously distributed among them, in Protestant countries they staggered under the weight of Bibles no less generously distributed.

In Germany, for example, the booksellers could not at first satisfy all the demands upon them. But this state of things was quickly altered, and they were assailed by letters from soldiers who begged them to take back their Bibles at half price. They preferred, these unbelievers, money to their Bibles! The hospitals and ambulances became the favourite places for the distribution of sacred amulets. In France millions of medals and scapulars were distributed. The soldiers, wounded or not, accepted them religiously. Religious ceremonies were also most assiduously attended by the

soldiers. Men who as civilians did not attend Mass attended it punctually once they had donned the uniform. I was told—and I have every reason to believe that it was true—that Jews communicated, and that Mohammedans were baptized repeatedly. This assiduous attendance at Catholic worship, this acceptance of blessed medals, and all the rest, are undeniable facts, which have been wrongly interpreted by the clergy and by believers. We must not perceive in these facts a revival of faith, but simply the adaptation of men to their environment, with the object of improving their immediate material conditions; it was a matter of psychical mimicry.

The French soldier promptly observed that many officers and many lady nurses were militant Catholics, whether they really were believers or feigned to believe out of class or caste interest. He no less promptly observed that the soldiers who were practising Catholics derived various advantages from the fact, that Ministerial decrees and regulations favoured—more or less legally—soldier-priests and other Catholics. And then the French soldier, indifferent to religion, told himself that it was entirely to his interest to make himself agreeable to the distributors of the daily manna. To escape a hard task, an unpleasant post, to receive cigarettes, chocolate, and other sweetmeats, was well worth a Mass, or a medal of Our Lady of Lourdes, or a scapular of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It was in reality the same state of mind as that expressed by Sully when he told Henri IV.: "Sire, sire, the crown is well worth a Mass." In short, a purely material interest led the bulk of the army to appear religious.

It was more particularly by the sick and wounded in the hospitals that this religious pressure made itself felt, as the majority of the nurses belonged to the wealthy classes. They alone had the leisure and the means to fulfil these functions gratuitously. The

women of the working class and the lower middle class had often to work for their bread, replacing the mobilized husband or father.

Just as the soldiers performed the rites of religion through material interest, so the civilians of the poorer classes did the same. The war increased mutual aid; the Churches everywhere increased their charities. And by a very natural sentiment the clergy and their faithful offered their charities in the service of religion. The beneficence of the rich was distributed everywhere, especially among those of the poor who made a show of religious feeling. There was, in short, a buying of consciences. As a result, the influence of these Christians, instead of tending to elevate human morality, has tended to debase it. We see by this how great is the part played in human affairs by economic conditions. And we see, too, that the disappearance of economic differences between man and man—that is, economic equality—would modify social phenomena by raising the level of human morality.

The prolongation of the war has resulted in a lessening of the intensity of the efforts at relief made by the Churches and individuals. People grow tired of being charitable, if this involves a notable decline from their usual standard of living. And then one perceived a movement of religious reflux. The churches were no longer so well attended. Men imperceptibly returned to their pre-war attitude of religious indifference. The religious revival which was everywhere acclaimed was only an appearance.

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Another cause of this pseudo-religious revival was, in many persons, to be found in the events of the war. The fear of death or suffering, for oneself or others, which continually hung over all, provoked a return to the beliefs of infancy, to the superstitions of childlike peoples. The unfamiliarity of this fear in times of peace

increased its intensity when war broke out. But as the war continued men grew accustomed to suffering and to death in the midst of life. Habit resulted in the disappearance of fear, and this disappearance involved the cessation of religious practices. Religious indifference once more prevailed.

The pseudo-religious revival based on the fear of death was naturally more extreme in people who were steeped in the militarist spirit, and accustomed to passive obedience, under the influence of fear. The dread of temporal powers always brings in its train the fear of supernatural powers, and *vice versa*; and the religious revival which we have lately witnessed was not the awakening of a deistic and philosophic faith, but of superstitions analogous to those which we encounter in savage nations—that is, the childlike nations.

What the individual sought was to know his destiny and that of his dear ones. So the modern prophetesses, the extra-lucid somnambulists, have never made greater profits. What the individual sought was protection from death. So incantations, prayers, whiffs of incense, the smoke of candles, and promises of ex-votos rose toward the heavens to supplicate the Saints, the Virgin, God the Father and God the Son! So millions of medals, blessed scapulars, and other amulets of every species adorned the breasts and the arms of the combatants. Death must be avoided! And these sacred amulets saved one from a horrible death! The amulets were quite as varied as those of our prehistoric ancestors. Thus, in the pocket of a dead German soldier the following letter was found:

“In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost! Amen!

“To him who shall bear this letter on his person no harm shall come, neither by gun-fire, nor by the sword, nor by any other weapon, visible or invisible.

As true as Christ is dead and gone up into Heaven, as true as the earth was shaken, he who carries this letter cannot be touched by bullet nor by sabre, nor wounded in his body. His flesh and his bowels shall be whole. Amen! Let him who does not believe this hang the letter round the neck of a dog and fire upon the dog. He will see whether it is true!

“ I pray our Lord Jesus Christ that no bullet may touch me. It may be of lead, of gold, or of silver, but God in Heaven will preserve me from it. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost! Amen!

“ This letter, sent from Heaven, was found in 1721 in Holland. It was written in letters of gold and hovered above me. Whosoever sought to seize it was reproved, until, in 1791, someone had the idea of copying it and communicating it to the world.”

And here, says *Le Temps* (July 13, 1915) is a letter recommending the observance of the Decalogue, in return for which God will grant “ health, happiness, and peace. Amen!”

“ Whosoever does not believe in this letter will be forsaken by Me and will enjoy neither happiness, nor blessing, nor aid. He who has this letter and does not publish it is accursed by Me and by the Holy Church. He must have this letter copied by one and another, and if he has as many sins as there are grains of sand in the sea, and leaves on the trees, his sins will be forgiven him! In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen!

“ I tell you in truth that Jesus Christ wrote this letter. Respect My commandment which I sent thee by the angel Michael. God the Father is thy hope. God the Son is thine aid.

“ May no bullet be able to overtake me, whether of gold, or silver, or glass, or steel, or zinc, or lead. God

in Heaven will render me invulnerable against all the bullets of the enemy. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Amen!"

Among the French the "Sacred Heart of Jesus," invocations to St. Genevieve, and the medals of Our Lady of Lourdes; among the Russians, the whole series of blessed icons, replace the heavenly letter of this German soldier. These are identical amulets, symptoms of identical animistic and polytheistic superstitions.

Other symptoms of the reappearance of this polytheism are seen in the so-called miracles of the angels, of St. Genevieve, and of the Virgin Mary, at the time of the battles of Mons and the Marne. Angels appeared and protected the retreating British Army! The French armies were victorious on the Marne, not because of their determination, their courage, and the skill of their leaders, but because God and His Saints led them and fought with them! Numerous were those, among the French Catholic clergy, who maintained the reality of this miracle, and described it in addresses and in sermons. Had not the scourge of war fallen upon France to punish her for her sins? Professional soldiers, even general officers, did not hesitate to proclaim, more or less definitely, these same beliefs, even in their official orders of the day! Here again is the alliance of the warrior and the priest; here again the faith of the soldier, whom education and professional training have accustomed to obey, to fear, not to reason and to believe.

Germany being the most methodically militarized of all the belligerent countries, the most profoundly steeped in the military spirit, it was logical that she should be most prominent of all in this revival of the superstitions of the prehistoric peoples. Thus we have seen the reappearance of a modification of the ancient



tree-worship, in the huge wooden statues of von Hindenburg and Admiral von Tirpitz, in which their worshippers were to bury iron nails.

All these animistic and polytheistic customs arose from the depths in which the years had gradually engulfed them. They emerged upon the surface, the vestiges of the beliefs of old, the last flashes of a dying fire. They reappeared under the influence of environing conditions analogous to those which existed when these superstitions flourished, in the ages of savagery and barbarism. There was no revival of religious faith in this.

Religious faith has not recovered its force and vigour in this world-wide war. Far from it; it may be asserted, on the contrary, that it has diminished. It may incontestably be asserted that this decline will become more and more marked as time goes on, following a curve parallel to that of the weakening of the militarist and warlike spirit. The curves of religious faith and the militarist spirit always follow a rigorous parallelism. In the course of the centuries the warrior has always accompanied the priest and the priest the warrior. Their education is the same in its essentials, for its basis is identical: fear and obedience. Just as this war engenders a diminution of the military spirit, so it engenders a decrease of religious faith.

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Just as the influence of the war has been profoundly felt by the international leagues of religion, so it has affected the international leagues of the sciences, letters, and the arts.

The very essence of science is to be international, or even, to be more precise, to be cosmopolitan. The various sciences are indeed identical in themselves, whatever the nationality of the scientist. The chemistry taught in the laboratories of Jena does not differ from the chemistry taught in Paris. Physiology at Bonn

is the same as physiology at Oxford. There is not a Japanese mechanics and a Hungarian mechanics; not an Austrian electricity and an Italian electricity. There is not a Belgian sociology and a Polish sociology. There is one physiology, one mechanics, one sociology, independent of all nationalities. A national science is an absurdity: the expression is nonsensical. By nature and in essence the sciences are cosmopolitan.

By their very nature letters and the arts are national. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, the theatre, fiction, and poetry are but the expression, under various forms, of modes of feeling. It will be understood, then, that letters and the arts are influenced by the various modes of feeling, of which certain determining factors are the customs, language, and manners of living peculiar to the different peoples.

Thought has no country, but the expression of thought varies according to the country in which it is expressed. From the fact of this nationalism of expression and cosmopolitanism of thought results an internationalism of letters, the arts, and the sciences. This internationalism arises from the fact of the intercommunication and interpenetration, without reference to frontiers, of literary and artistic manifestations, and of scientific knowledge. All these manifestations exert a mutual influence upon one another. It is with literatures and the arts as it is with the so-called races: there is no pure art or literature without some foreign addition. This sociological phenomenon has engendered in the brains of artists, scientists, and men of letters a multitude of common customs and ideas and feelings. From this results the existence of a species of international organizations of those who cultivate the arts and sciences and letters.

The present war has violently shattered these international formations. The bonds which united all these men and women have been broken. And the spectator

has witnessed a swift and astonishing growth of feelings of hatred. In all countries everyone who handles a pen, brush, or pencil esteems it an honour to celebrate the beauty of destruction and extermination. Men of the calibre of Maurice Barrès, Frédéric Masson, or Jean Richepin have found worthy emulators in Hauptmann and Richard Dehmel. The imbecility and base chauvinism of the one is equalled by the pitiful megalomania of the other. It is in truth pitiful to see and hear men speak so unreasonably, shouting loudly for the extermination and enslavement of thousands of human beings. In this competition of exacerbated chauvinists, in whom all critical spirit is lacking, the Germans must be awarded the palm. The megalomania of which we have given examples displays itself in all candour to such a degree that one would doubt one's senses were not the proofs before one, signed by an Ostwald or a Sombart.

So virulent was the force which afflicted all these Germans that we saw artists and poets applauding the destruction of the Cathedral of Reims, the Library of Louvain, the belfry of Arras, the Cloth Hall of Ypres, and other gems of art! And because the artists of neutral countries, like the great Swiss poet, Adolf Spitteler, or the musician, Jaques-Delcroze, flagellated the destruction of these monuments, the artistic patrimony of humanity, they were execrated and excommunicated by their German peers. One might have thought that a wind of madness had blown upon the world! We saw the scientists of various countries denying that their enemy colleagues had any scientific worth. The Academies expunged the names of their foreign members, as though the fact of belonging to an enemy nation destroyed the whole scientific or artistic worth of the artists or scientists affected. On the banks of the Seine, the Thames, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Spree, the sense of dignity and respect which

thinkers should feel for one another was lamentably engulfed.

And when Romain Rolland attempted to dam this tide of insane hatred, and Bernard Shaw sought, by a few crude realities, to calm this excessive excitement, they were overwhelmed by opprobrium by all the belligerents. The seed of hatred has been scattered to the winds on every hand, and in profusion. Will it grow? The future alone will show, but we doubt it, for we are witnessing the mere efflorescence of over-excited brains, overworked and intoxicated by the enviroing atmosphere. When the atmosphere is transformed this efflorescence will vanish as the fog vanishes before the equinoctial gales.

All these imprecations, all these appeals to murder and revenge, all these longings to enslave others, all these desires for hegemony, are so much literature. They are not life. And literature, whatever has been said of it, has little influence on life. When the normal course of life resumes its course and the stupendous blood-letting suffered by humanity has cooled its fever, the men of letters and artists and scientists will resume their international relations. They will exchange, as of old, their ideas and their knowledge. They will be subject, as before, to the reciprocal influences of their various modes of feeling. And a few years later, when they review the insanities which they wrote during the delirium of the war, they will all be astonished and will ask if they were indeed the men who wrote such things.

The international formations of the arts and sciences and literature are not therefore destroyed; one cannot destroy the inevitable results of the modes of human life, save by destroying that life itself. These formations are not destroyed; they are merely suffering an eclipse, while humanity is a prey to the fever of war and the fever of hatred.

We may say as much of the international league of Feminism. Before the world-war there were ties between the national groups of women, whose social and political aims were identical. Thus there was an international alliance for female suffrage, and an International Woman's Council. The war has not destroyed the existence of these organisms; but it has profoundly affected them. A gulf has been opened between the women of the different groups of belligerents. In vain have the women of the neutral countries attempted to fill this gulf. Hatred has divided the wives, mothers, sisters, and fiancées of the combatants into hostile groups. Frenchwomen and German women rival one another, fulminating against one another with the greatest violence, recommending the complete rupture of all relations, glorifying vengeance, and advocating an implacable attitude in the hour of peace. Englishwomen have been a prey to less violent sentiments, as the insularity of their country has enabled them to escape the sufferings of invasion, and even, to some extent, grief at the loss of their dear ones. It has not been so with the women of France and Germany, who, in the thirtieth month of the war, numbered more than three million dead and nearly two million disabled! Not a woman but has lost one of her men-folk. This explains the hatred which fills the women of these countries, and obscures for them the true spirit of the British and neutral feminists. These latter have striven in vain to abate excessive passions, and to cool, by a breath of cold reason, the spirits heated by the war, with its inevitable retinue of death, devastation, and suffering.

Peace alone will restore the feminine mind to cold reason, for it will then be withdrawn from the fevered atmosphere of the period of slaughter, and will be subjected to the influences of conditions, economic and political, which will tend to become identical in the different

countries of Europe. International feminism, grievously wounded by the war, will then recover its full health. Full of strength and vigour, it will resume its march onward to obtain the political and economic equality of the sexes.

The world-war, by a host of incidents, will give potent assistance in the attainment of this equality. This war has, in fact, created economic and social conditions which have brought into great prominence the importance of woman's rôle in our modern society.

The diminution of male labour has everywhere necessitated the employment of female labour. I am not speaking only of the work which was commonly regarded as proper to women, as, for example, the care of the sick and wounded, but of work which had been regarded as the sole appanage of man. I will mention here only the manufacture of munitions and agricultural labour. In France, for example, despite the mobilization of the men, during the first year of the war scarcely a thousand hectares\* of land went out of cultivation. All the vast amount of agricultural labour hereby involved—ploughing, sowing, harrowing, harvesting, etc.—was entirely performed by women, men above forty-eight years of age, and children. We perceive by this single example how in the course of this war woman has been called upon to display her intelligence, her physical energy, and her endurance. Her moral energy also has proved equal to the situation. The habitual catch-phrase about woman's weakness has been reduced to dust by the mere consideration of events. In all the belligerent nations the women have maintained the courage and encouraged the tenacity of the men. The Serb woman and the Belgian woman notably have proved admirable guardians of the sacred fire of liberty and of national independence.

Women have replaced men in their labours of peace,

\* About 2,240 acres.

in their task of production, so that men could devote themselves to their work of destruction, to war. This has been in some sort a return to the ages of savagery and barbarism, when the industry of vital production was confided to woman. As we see, the war constantly compels the reappearance of survivals from barbarous ages, because it is itself one of these survivals.

Everywhere women have aided and replaced men, and we may say with justice that the men have been unable to utilize all the energy, the intelligence, and the good-will of the women. Bureaucratic and governmental procrastination and prejudice has on many occasions annihilated or inhibited their individual efforts, which had freely united. Not only has woman shown herself the equal of man, by undertaking hard physical labour; she has also displayed a courage similar and equal to his. Several women have fought and faced death in the trenches; cases have been cited in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and France. How many have been killed in accomplishing the sisterly mission of tending the wounded and comforting the feeble! How many have been tried, sentenced to death, and shot, like their male accomplices, because they had acted the spy for love of their country, or for gain, or because they had, like Miss Cavell, accomplished an act of sisterly charity!

The social equality of the man and the woman has been demonstrated in the eyes of all by this terrible war. Men and women are equal before the courts-martial and military law. Woman enjoys no privilege of sex. This the facts have proved. The German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr Zimmermann, has loudly asserted the same. This equality of sex is one of the results which the war has definitely established. No one can now honestly deny it.

We might even say, all things being considered, that

the tribute paid to war by women is greater than that paid by men. If men have suffered death on the field of battle and in the trenches, the women of the invaded countries have, in their thousands, suffered violation by the invading soldiers, enemies, allies, or fellow-countrymen. And for long years to come they will suffer the agony of this violation of their being. How many thousands of women, too, were led, by sentimental or altruistic motives, to surrender their bodies to soldiers, to give them joy, it might be a last joy, because they were going to face death! How many of these will all their lives suffer the consequences of this act of charity! The facts prove the increase of illegitimate births, as well as the spread of syphilis. In truth, the retinue of war is always a retinue of sorrows, which smite the non-combatants as well as the fighters.

We may therefore derive yet another lesson from this world-wide war: violence is, for woman, only the mother of suffering. And it follows that it is to the interest of woman to make war upon war; to oppose militarism, the principal support of war, and the symbol of violence in the world.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE WAR AND THE SOCIALISTS

The war and the "Internationale"—The attitude of the German, French, Belgian, British, and Russian Socialists—The outbreak of hostilities—Their mentality—The attitude of the neutral Socialists, and its causes—The preponderance of German Social Democracy in international Socialism—The different conceptions of Socialism in France and Germany—State Socialism—The modifications of the Socialist attitude caused by the duration of the war—The conflicts in the midst of the various Socialist parties in Germany and in France—The effect of the centralized organization of the parties, and of participation in the Government.

Socialistic measures taken by the Governments of all countries—The lesson to be learned therefrom—This war is, in one of its aspects, the conflict between two conceptions of Socialism: centralized and authoritative Socialism; federalized and libertarian Socialism—The spread of the Socialist ideal and the growth of the forces of Socialism under the influence of the war.

**T**HE present war naturally affected the Labour and Socialist "International." This "International" was not sufficiently powerful to prevent the war, nor to prevent its members from killing one another. When an ancient international organization such as Christianity had failed, it is not astonishing that a youthful organization such as the Labour International, which counts barely fifty years of life, should fail. The weakness of international Catholicism was due to its age; that of international Socialism to its youth. The first is in its period of decline; the second in its period of growth.

At the outset the various Socialist parties were profoundly surprised by the war. In Berlin as in Paris, in Brussels as in London, all believed in peace. None of the Socialists believed that a group of capitalists—

landowners, manufacturers, and business men—would be sufficiently powerful and sufficiently unintelligent to enforce a war. In the eyes of all the Socialists the material and moral interests of all humanity rose like an impregnable wall against the possibility of war. So the declaration of war surprised them all.

The Social Democratic masses in Germany were certainly deceived by their Government, and also by some of their leaders, who were won over by the militarist and imperialist spirit. These four millions of German Socialists are lacking in the critical spirit, being so accustomed to passive obedience. The idea of discipline has in them replaced all other ideals. Discipline has for them become an end in itself, instead of remaining, as it should be, a means only.

Twenty years ago, in my volume on *Socialism and the London Congress*, I wrote: "The directing Committee is the veritable master of German Social Democracy; it is, moreover, an organism perfectly adapted to the German environment, autocratic and militarist. . . . The party of reform, whose tendencies are simply radical, is highly authoritative, and very jealous of its hegemony over international Socialism. . . . The directing Committee is as a rule obeyed as a general is obeyed by his soldiers."

Such was the situation of German Social Democracy in 1896, and such it still was in July, 1914, when the war was unleashed by the group formed of the Junkers and the industrial magnates. The masses obeyed in a bovine fashion, without having the slightest conception of the lies told by their Government, and by many of their own leaders, who were consciously following the lead of the capitalist rulers. They professed to be Marxists—that is, adepts of the class conflict—and they were acting as supporters of the capitalist class in the war which was then commencing.

This attitude of the Socialist leaders, who knew what

they were doing, was actually anti-Socialist. It was, however, the inevitable result of the centralizing, State-worshipping spirit which pervaded the whole body of Social Democracy, from the roots to the summit. The tree of authority always bears evil fruit.

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In France and Belgium the Socialists were confronted by a situation which was identical with, although different from, that which faced the German Socialists. They were, in fact, confronted by the invasion of their country, and the desire of the German State to do violence to their feelings and their customs, and more or less to diminish their liberties and their autonomy. The French Socialists, up to the last moment, strove most energetically to prevent the war, as, for that matter, did the German Socialists. But the latter were without influence with their Government, which was only in appearance a Parliamentary Government. Their opposition was, and could be, only an academic opposition so long as it remained on the Parliamentary plane. Matters could not have been otherwise, unless their opposition, passing from the Parliamentary environment to the working-class masses, had manifested itself by means of the general strike and labour disturbances. We know that the leaders of the Social Democratic party were always opposed to a propaganda of this kind, as it would have been dangerous to their undisturbed retention of power: dangerous in respect both of the Government and the working-class masses, who would no longer have been passively obedient.

The pacific activities of the German proletariat were therefore doomed to defeat, while those of the French proletariat might have been and were effective, thanks to the fact that the political development of France is nearly fifty years in advance of that of Germany. During the nerve-racking hours of the last days of July, 1914, the French Socialists brought such influence to

bear upon the French Government that: (1) Along the whole Eastern frontier the French troops left a margin of five or six miles in front of them, in order to avoid "incidents"; (2) the French Government pledged itself not to be the first in declaring war upon Germany.

However, the German Army invaded the soil of France and Belgium before any act of war on the part of the French, and of course the Belgians, who were neutrals. There were, then, three possible attitudes for the Socialists of France and Belgium: They could defend their liberties by defending their native soil; they could passively refuse to be soldiers; or they could start a revolution, in order to prevent, or rather to check, the war. The last two attitudes could produce only one result, since the German Social Democrats were marching against them as disciplined soldiers, and this result would have been the certain triumph of autocratic Germany. This would have been absolutely certain, as the French Army would have been more or less disorganized and quite incapable of resisting the stupendous German effort. The French Government would promptly have been forced to make peace, and Germany would have been able to turn back against Russia. She would have defeated Russia in a few battles. A few months—three or four or longer—and the war would have ended in the general victory of Germany, which would have assured her hegemony on the Continent while preparing the way for her struggle with Great Britain, which would take place a few years later. Much death and devastation would have been avoided, but, on the other hand, liberty would have vanished from Continental Europe.

For the French Socialists, as for the Belgian Socialists, who are principally Walloons, Socialism implies liberty. They feel no desire for a centralized State Socialism. In the development of their Socialism the influence of the anarchism of Proudhon, Bakunin, Elisée Reclus,

Kropotkin, and others has resulted in the development of tendencies of an anti-Statist, anti-authoritarian character, which have been magnified by the fact that they correspond with the natural mentality of the French and the Walloons. Thus the French and Belgian Socialists all possessed the instinct or the knowledge that their interest as free men was to rise in defence of their autonomy, their opinions, and their customs, which were threatened. And they did so rise, unanimously, from the reformers of the extreme Right to the anarchists of the extreme Left.

It may be asserted that the behaviour of the French Socialists saved civilization from sinking into Pan-Germanism; so that the sociologist arrives at a conclusion which, to the vulgar mind, will appear strange and paradoxical: that liberty, in the European world, has been saved by the spirit inculcated in the Franco-Belgian proletariat by the propaganda of the anarchists, whom the ruling bourgeoisie persecuted and condemned as criminals during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

This is one of the most curious lessons of the war. Observe how the consequences of human thought and action find their repercussions at a distance and in many directions, and then you will see how idle and how foolish it is to condemn the manifestations of the spirit of revolt, that salt of the earth.

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In Great Britain the Socialists found themselves confronted by a different situation. Their liberty stood in no danger from an invader. But this, in truth, was more in appearance than in reality, for the liberty of British citizens was threatened quite as much as that of French citizens. A small Socialist minority in England understood this, and in August, 1914, was ardent in its support of the participation of the British Empire in the war. But the majority was evidently opposed

to such participation. However, the English Socialists are by no means numerous; their direct political rôle is of little importance. Their influence makes itself felt only indirectly, through the trades unions, which are very numerous and powerful—more powerful than the *syndicats* of France and Germany.

The Labour party in the English Parliament followed the middle-class parties at the moment of the declaration of war, without having any effective influence over the conduct of the Government. Confined to its struggle for the material betterment of the proletariat, taking no interest in foreign policy, the Labour party was at first purely insular, despite its participation in the international Labour organizations. Its leaders had by no means sufficient intellectual pliability or vivacity to permit of their immediately grasping the new situation created by the warlike action of the Germanic rulers.

On the other hand, the evangelical spirit has sunk its roots deeply into a minority of the English Socialists. For them non-resistance to evil by violence is an irrefragable principle. Their duty, therefore, was to oppose Great Britain's participation in the war. For others, to support such participation was to violate the principles of Socialism, for it meant inciting brother Socialists to kill one another. Their duty was therefore to oppose it. These Socialists did not understand that the Socialism of which they were partisans differed greatly in reality from the Socialism professed by the Social Democratic majority in Germany. These Socialists, in fact, desire to realize a non-centralized Socialist world in which each individual would enjoy his full liberty. The Germans are upholders of a centralized State system of Socialism, in which the individual would be an obedient machine.

These English Socialists did not perceive that the Tolstoyan doctrine of non-resistance to evil leads to the

acceptance of evil, to submission to those who commit evil. This doctrine encourages and maintains evil. In this war, for example, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, on account of its weakness, did not resist the German invader. Although it has escaped the slaughter of its citizens, it has not escaped the suppression of liberty of thought, writing, and assembly; it has not escaped commercial and industrial ruin, and its inhabitants have been forced to do that which they did not wish to do. Here is a fact which reveals the consequences of the Tolstoyan doctrine of non-resistance to evil by force.

The British Socialists did not perceive that in opposing Great Britain's participation in the war they were playing the game of the capitalist rulers of Germany; they were assisting them by allowing them to crush the French and Belgian democracies, by not assisting their brother Socialists of France and Belgium when attacked. They did not understand that the victory of the Central Empires would inevitably mean a set-back to Socialism, because this victory would involve a territorial conquest, a Germanization of the nations, and, consequently, the permanent revolt of these peoples, which would involve the substitution, in the future, of conflicts between nationalities instead of class conflicts.

These Socialists had no real comprehension of the Socialist interest, which coincided with their national interest as Englishmen. This is curious, but very reasonable, for Socialism is on a par with democracy, and the interest of Great Britain is to be democratic. This lack of comprehension on the part of the Socialist leaders in England is due, for the most part, in our opinion, to insularity and lack of intellectuality; their intelligence is wanting in pliability, vivacity, and width of grasp. They do not see all the sides of a question, and when it is shown to them they require time to grasp it.

Russian Socialism also was divided, but the great majority declared emphatically for participation in the war against the Central Empires. The anarchist Kropotkin, the revolutionary Socialists Bourtzev and Rubanovich, the Social Democrat Plechanov, and many, many more are witnesses of this fact. They rightly considered that the most powerful support of the Russian autocracy was the German Empire. The destruction of the German Empire would be a deadly blow at the Russian autocracy. The defeat of the Central Powers was, in their opinion, the prelude to the defeat of the Russian bureaucracy, so pervaded by the Germanic spirit and method: the bureaucracy which had enslaved all the peoples of the Russian Empire.

Everywhere among the neutrals the Socialists were opposed to participation in the war. In Italy they were divided, but the majority was incontestably in favour of the maintenance of Italian neutrality.

In Sweden some notable Socialists, such as Professor Gustav Steffen, would even have had the Swedes join the Central Empires. This was true only of a small minority of intellectuals, for the bulk of the Socialist forces was plainly, under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting, in favour of the Allies, while desirous that Sweden should keep out of the conflict. In Denmark, Holland, and Norway the Socialists were in favour of strict neutrality. Their attitude had even, sometimes, a slightly pro-German tendency. They refused to see that the international cataclysm had been released by a caste of the German capitalist class, and they persisted in regarding the war as merely the inevitable result of the policy pursued for years by the capitalist class of *all* countries. Certainly the war was a product of this absurd policy, but it was none the less true that the outbreak of the war was due to the will of the ruling class of Germany. Because a mine is prepared, it does not necessarily follow that it must explode.



The general attitude of the neutral Socialists was due to various causes: the prestige enjoyed by German Social Democracy; the natural desire to keep oneself and one's country out of any conflict; the fact that Socialists and democrats did not realize that it was to their own interest to support the Western Powers. The prestige of German Social Democracy was very great. Its serried battalions of four million electors, its wealth, its newspapers, all impressed the Socialists of other nations, for they did not perceive that it was a colossus with feet of clay. It lacked the inward fire of the revolutionary tradition, of the spirit of revolt and liberty. Discipline had for it become the end, not a means. The fear of Governmental repression was choking it.

The rôle of German Socialism was preponderant. In the Socialist Congresses all the nations of the East and the North of Europe followed in its train. The defeat of France in 1870 was felt even in international Socialism, and prevented Socialists from perceiving the actual strength—which was very great—of French Socialism.

The General Confederation of Labour and the French Socialist party are completely pervaded by the revolutionary doctrine of Blanqui and the anarchism of Bakunin and Proudhon. The world of the worker and the *petit bourgeois*, which forms the solid structure of French Socialism, has been strongly, though often indirectly, influenced by the anarchist propaganda of those thinkers who, from 1885 to 1898, gravitated about *La Révolté*, and then about *Les Temps Nouveaux*, those two newspapers of which Elisée Reclus, Peter Kropotkin, and Jean Grave were the soul.

The French Socialist, then, cannot really conceive of Socialism without liberty. It was for this reason that he was always, in the international Congresses, the opponent of the German Social Democrats. He

even continued to be their opponent in these Congresses after the French *syndicats* had ceased to take part in them, subsequent to the International Congress of London held in 1896. German Social Democracy, "composed of well-disciplined soldiers, veritable automata, having no conception of liberty either for themselves or for others," as I wrote at that period, fearing the libertarian spirit of the *syndicats*, had obtained the voting of a Draconian rule which in practice excluded the *syndicats* from international Socialist Congresses.

Thus in the international Socialist assemblies the first place was always occupied by the German Social Democrats, and this gave rise to an illusion as to their Socialism and their power. Their attitude at the beginning of the war dispersed this illusion, except in the case of the neutrals. The latter, indeed, did not understand that the crushing of France would mean the hegemony of Germany upon the Continent; and then, a few years later, her hegemony in the world. The result of this would be the disappearance of the nations and of democracy, and, consequently, the intensification conflicts based upon nationality and democracy, to the detriment of the struggle for Socialism. The result of the German hegemony would be a State Socialism, recalling in some degree the Socialism of the Incas, the Socialism of the Jesuits of Paraguay: a superior class governing a human mass to which *panem et circenses* are given on the condition that it works for its masters. The German hegemony would turn the European proletariat into a gang of men well nourished, like the dog in the fable, but with their necks in a collar. This is what the majority of neutral Socialists have not understood; this is what all French and Belgian Socialists have very keenly felt and realized.

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The long duration of the war was bound to modify the attitude of the belligerent Socialists. Events did

not correspond with the aspirations and opinions of the Continental proletariat. The wave of enthusiasm which had carried away the German Social Democrats as well as the French Socialists was gradually dissipated, during the course of the war, in useless victories, in the mud and wretchedness of the trenches, in the blood and sufferings of millions of dead and disabled soldiers.

At the outset the German proletariat flew to arms in the belief that it was defending its native soil against the Russian autocracy, and that it was going to liberate the Poles and Finns from the Muscovite yoke. But very soon the facts, if they did not dissipate these most tenacious illusions, did at least pour down upon them a light which diminished their intensity. Some of the Social Democratic leaders grasped the fact that the German rulers had deceived them, and that they were, as a result, proceeding in the wrong direction. Liebknecht at first, followed by Rühle, then by Haase, Kautsky, and Bernstein, began to make protests, and endeavoured to do something towards clearing up the murky atmosphere of untruth and ignorance into which the entire nation had been plunged. However, these leaders of the nascent opposition were only expressing the new opinions which, in a more or less vague and confused shape, were pervading the German masses.

And then, little by little, a minority, which continually increased, sprang up in the midst of the Social Democratic deputies in the Reichstag. While in August, 1914, there were fourteen members of the Social Democratic group who, in the heart of the group, voted against the war credits, although this was not made public, this minority increased to seventeen, then to thirty-two, then to thirty-six, and this publicly. In December, 1915, twenty members dared to break with the party discipline, and to vote in the Reichstag against the war credits.

The force of circumstances inevitably brought about

changes. On March 24, 1916, a scission occurred in the Parliamentary group of Social Democrats. It followed a speech delivered in the Reichstag by Herr Haase, without the authorization of the group. Eighteen members formed the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*. They thereby freed themselves from the majority, and were consequently able to express their opinions freely. They had broken the bonds of discipline, which confined them as in a prison.

It is important to distinguish between the ruling elements of the party and the mass of their party. It must also be noted that the population includes, among its young men, and especially among the young "intellectuals," an active and intelligent element of thinkers, artists, and literary men who are anarchists, anti-militarists, and great admirers of the French democrats.

The majority of the Social Democratic leaders is composed of various elements. One portion, plainly Imperialistic, has nothing to differentiate it from the Liberal or Conservative Pan-Germanists as far as their foreign policy is concerned. Another faction supports the Government in the hope of obtaining a more democratic policy and more democratic laws. Lastly, a third faction supports the Governmental policy in the hope that the Government would, after the war, uphold the economic interests of the syndicates or trades unions. Herr David, Herr Scheidemann, and Herr Legien are the leaders of these factions, which comprise almost two-thirds of the Social Democratic deputies in the Reichstag.

The minority of the leaders is divided into two portions, very unequal as to numbers. The more extreme, whose spirit is definitely revolutionary, consists, for a beginning, of Karl Liebknecht and Rühle. The other portion consists of eighteen members, and is far less violent; its figure-heads are Haase, Kautsky,

and Bernstein, and it is known as the Social Democratic Labour Union. In addition to these, between the majority and the minority, there are fifteen deputies who, while remaining members of the old Parliamentary group, have very strong tendencies toward the minority. To complete my remarks, I should add that there is also a small group, whose principal leader is Julius Borchardt, and whose tendencies are strongly revolutionary, even more so than those of the "Spartacus" (Liebknecht) group.

Such is the situation in the midst of the leaders of German Social Democracy.

The Social Democratic party is thus profoundly divided, and its unity is maintained only by force of habit. As a matter of fact, a profound gulf divides the two great sections of the party, and this gulf will grow yet deeper and wider as events follow their logical and inevitable course. The ruling oligarchy is thus cut in two, because the mass of the party is cut in two. Even the majority of this mass is really on the side of the Parliamentary minority. The deputies who in December, 1915, voted against the war credits represented more electors than those who voted for them. The German proletariat, thanks to its habit of passive obedience, its pacific instincts, and its servile education, still obeys the rulers of the Empire and the leaders of its party. But already one may see the dawn of a new period looming. Here and there signs of revolt flash out, isolated manifestations, the premonitory symptoms of a change of attitude. Certain of the Social Democrats are now venturing to declare that the victory of the Entente will liberate Germany, the source of the world's woes being the triumphant militarism of the Prussian Junkers.

It may be that the economic conditions engendered by the war will in the long run provoke a breakdown of the bovine obedience of the German proletariat.

Hunger and poverty are not always bad counsellors. Will there be a revolution before peace is concluded? It would be rash to affirm it; and as rash to deny it. But one thing is at this moment plain to the sociologist: that the political, economic, and social conditions of Germany are eminently revolutionary.

So it might very well be that one of the motives for the mobilization of the entire male civil population, between the ages of eighteen and sixty, for the purpose of organizing war industries, was the appearance of symptoms of revolt among the people. The German rulers are, by the nature of their mentality, addicted to a belief in the panacea of enregimentation. They believe that all these adults, grouped into battalions of workers, under the eyes of their officers, will feel their ardour of revolt cool within them, and will be transformed into sheep-like masses. I think the effect will be other than this. These agglomerated medleys of working men and men of the lower and middle bourgeoisie will form a perfect medium for the cultivation of the spirit of revolt. And perhaps, with the help of this grouping of the population, and the atmosphere of distress and famine, action will follow.

Just as the unanimity of German Socialism is shattered, so is the unanimity of French Socialism. There has been no scission in the French Socialist party, but a very powerful minority has grown up, which protests against the policy pursued by the majority of the party leaders. Is it even a minority, if we consider the mass of the working classes? One thing is certain: that although the whole party, of a common accord, desires the crushing of international militarism and the establishment of a lasting peace, there is a disagreement as to the means by which these ends are to be attained. One section, very small as to numbers, wishes for immediate peace. It sees the death and devastation and mutilation caused by the war, and thinks of the

wretchedness to come, without perceiving that a peace concluded with German Imperialism would necessarily be a halting peace, permitting the perpetuation of all the causes of national impoverishment, notably parasitic militarism.

An important faction of the party is ill-pleased with the ignorance in which it is kept, and the authoritative manner in which the leaders of the party rule it, though they should be merely the servants of the party, not its masters. It complains of the rupture of relations with the Labour International, and that the objects of the war pursued by the Allied Governments are not publicly and definitely stated. These two sections form more than a third of the Socialist party. The prolongation of the war only increases this strength, because the causes of discontent persist and sometimes increase. At the National Congress of December, 1915, a motion of compromise was voted unanimously. From this we cannot deduce an exact idea of the situation of the Socialist party. Compromise is always a means which serves only to obscure a situation, and the truth into the bargain. Moreover, a unanimous vote upon a motion of this kind is obtained only by means of strategy in the lobby and tactics of obstruction and fatigue, methods which actually lower and degrade those who employ them.\*

The general history of the French Socialist party during the war sheds a vivid light on various characteristics: the formation of clans which fight among themselves to obtain various functions and distinctions; the autocratic tendency of these clans; the absence of men equal to the situation; the intellectual and moral insufficiency of the leaders.

The scaffolding of the party has become so strongly constituted, in the course of the years, thanks to the

\* At the National Congress of December, 1916, the two sections were almost equal.

Democratic party of Germany, that it is impossible for any new-comer to appear under the impulse of circumstances. He must take his place in the queue; must enrol himself in one of the clans which have taken charge of the party. And as each individual, in each clan, looks after the place which he occupies, he takes good care to hold off any individual whom he suspects organization of the party on the model of the Social of standing in his light, or of being likely to do so. This is one of the causes of the mediocrity of the party staff. Men of genius like Jaurès are very rare, for besides their political genius they possess the oratorical genius which impresses their will upon the masses, who force them upon the small oligarchies which exploit the masses.

Every man who fulfils a function or possesses power tends to become an autocrat. It is far easier to command than to obtain by persuasion. Thus a Socialist deputy informed me, during the present war: "We don't ask them their opinion"—he was speaking of the mass of working-class soldiers—"we ask them to obey." This state of mind is developed by the atmosphere in which the elected representative lives, and by the skilful manœuvres which bourgeois Governments and leaders employ to lull the susceptibilities of the Socialist representatives. The phenomenon became still more plainly apparent upon the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministries. The Ministerial atmosphere is deadly to the Socialist spirit, and insensibly these representatives of the proletariat come to see, feel, and judge things as do the representatives of capitalism. Consciously or unconsciously, they betray those who elected them, and the ideals and interests which they represented.

The circumstances created by the war were revolutionary, and a revolutionary spirit sprang up in the mass of the proletariat, asking only to be set in motion



by the attitude and the actions of the leaders. But nothing came of it. The admirable human material ready to hand was not utilized. Not one of the Socialist leaders understood, or dared to understand, that the situation was truly revolutionary, and that revolutionary means necessarily matched a revolutionary situation. The rulers, Ministers and others, let matters drift; they were glad to pass through the storm in as much tranquillity as was possible. And in this connection they are largely responsible for the maintenance of the disorder, the lack of organization, the fraud, the illegalities, the ignorance, and the lying which reached so great a development during this war in the administration of France.

If the leaders were not equal to their task, no new man could make his appearance, because of the strong bureaucratic constitution of the party. The party has become centralized, which has apparently strengthened, but in reality weakened it. It has weakened the party because the attitude of the leaders has not corresponded with the desires of the most active and most militant members of the proletariat, or even with the desires of the proletariat as a whole. A sullen discontent is therefore spreading, little by little gaining all the circles of Socialism, for they hate autocracy. It may therefore be foreseen that the war will have an unfavourable influence over—I do not say Socialism, but the Socialist party, and will give rise to many resignations, diverting many men and women toward a less Parliamentary Socialism, probably toward Syndicalism. However, there again the possession of power has betrayed its deleterious effect; certain Syndicalist officials have rather forgotten their ideals.

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In the course of this war the Governments of all countries have taken measures which were indubitably Socialistic in tendency. The fixing of maximum prices; the requisition of products in the possession of in-

dividuals; the distribution of certain products, as in Germany; the management of the railways by the Governments or the military authorities; the chartering of merchant vessels by the State; the control of existing workshops and the creation of State factories for munitions and arms; the regulation of labour; the advance of capital to manufacturers; the introduction of State insurance of cargoes, or State insurance against the effects of aerial bombardment, as in England; the purchase of merchant vessels for the transport of provisions and other products; the purchase of public-houses in England, with a view to diminishing their number; the State control of slaughter-houses and the building of dwelling-houses for munition-workers, as in Great Britain; the moratorium of rents, as in France, etc., are measures which, one could hardly deny, are Socialistic in form and in tendency. But it would be an error to regard them as truly Socialistic. It is, as a matter of fact, impossible for truly Socialistic measures to exist in a society which is capitalistic in form. They are all, in varying degrees, vitiated by capitalistic influences.

With the prolongation of the war we have seen the Socialistic character of the measures introduced in all the belligerent countries accentuated. It was Germany who began this process of accentuation, under the stress of the blockade, which was starving her, and of her historical tendencies as a God-State. There were travelling kitchens to feed the people. The tendency to equalize—even more, to unify and stereotype—the alimentation of all was plainly visible. The requisition of civilians, of all the male civilians between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, was made after twenty-three months of war, and no doubt this requisition will extend, during the course of 1917, to all the women. This meant compulsory labour for all, and labour according to directions given by the ruling authorities,

with a collective, not an individual aim. This forced labour, exercised under constraint, under the threat of penalties, was hardly to be differentiated from the forced labour imposed by the German rulers on the peoples temporarily conquered: the Belgians, French, Poles, Lithuanians, Serbs, etc. It was slavery for the entire male population, for no one could choose his work nor his place of work. These were settled by the authorities. At the same time the population was divided up in respect of nourishment, according to the importance of this population in respect of the war. Other measures completed this system, which transformed Germany into an immense camp in which everything was done according to rule, where no one was free, where constraint and fear were sovereign rulers.

We are witnessing, in the twentieth century, a revival of the state of affairs existing in Paraguay in the seventeenth century, when that country was governed by the Jesuits, and in the land of the Incas at an earlier period. The principle is the same: the Governmental and administrative authority controls everything; there is no liberty, no individual initiative. Human beings have become pawns, who are moved by a few rulers, with the help of a well-organized hierarchy. Here, again, we discover an affinity between the Germanic methods of government and the Jesuit method.

Under the stress of circumstances, and more particularly on account of the submarine war, which made provisions rather scarce, and the necessity of speeding-up the production of armaments, the other belligerents followed, more or less closely, the example of Germany. But the measures taken were less general and less vexatious to individual liberty. All, however, were of the same Socialistic character.

From all these measures, if we analyze all their consequences, we may deduce a number of lessons. In the first place, they show plainly that when the life and

liberty of a collectivity—that is to say, its dearest possessions—are at stake, necessity enforces the employment of Socialistic measures. Hence it follows that the Socialist doctrines are those which are most conducive to the security and well-being of the collectivity. These measures obviously imply the negation of individual property and assert a right of pre-eminence on behalf of the collectivity. The regulations relating to the restriction or prohibition of the manufacture and sale of alcohol are an open confession of the fact that certain private interests are contrary to individual interests considered as a whole, and to the interests of the collectivity. The conditions of life resulting from all these measures of defence are tending to make the life of the whole nation approximate to the life of the monastery or the barracks. Equality is tending to get the better of liberty.

The obligation to work, under the constraint of extremely heavy penalties, advertises to the whole world the fact that the social necessity of such a step is extreme, and that in consequence the idler is not only useless, but mischievous. This measure is an affirmation of the parasitical nature of idlers, and more, of the parasitical nature of those who perform work which is useless to the collectivity. We see the extreme importance of the deductions arising from this dictatorial measure, which for the conquered populations emanated from the German military authorities, and for the German people from the Reichstag. This is, indeed, a wholly revolutionary measure, in absolute opposition to the principles and the ways of life dear to the upholders of autocracy and capitalism, which, from so many points of view, are purely parasitical. It is curious to observe that during this war the actions of the Imperial Governments have had consequences actually opposed to the interests of the rulers.

These measures, as they were applied in all the bel-

ligerent countries, were more or less related to one conception only of the Socialist doctrine—the State Socialist conception. The Government resorted to compulsion, with penal sanctions, which were often severe. The basis of these Socialistic measures was that of all State Socialism: the authority imposed by constraint based upon fear. Perhaps we may see in this authoritarianism the principal reason why these measures have not in some countries yielded all the good results which were expected of them. If the Governments of Great Britain and (more particularly) of France could have counted more fully on the free will of the proletariat there would have been less disorder and less deceit. They should have applied to the Trades Unions and the *syndicats* and the co-operative societies, and have requested them to organize and execute all that lay within their jurisdiction. But the Governments, actuated by the instinct of conservation, did not do this. They feared, no doubt, that the experience of events would show the world how easy it would be to dispense with a number of Governmental functions.

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When we regard the present war from a Socialistic point of view we see that it is a conflict between two conceptions of Socialism—that of Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle, which is an authoritarian, centralized State Socialism, and that of Bakunin, which is a libertarian, federalist Socialism. Germany's victory in 1870 gave preponderance to the Marxist conception of State Socialism, or, to be more exact, to the conception of his commentators. The defeat of the Imperial Powers will strike a mortal blow at the authoritative conception of Socialism, and will give fresh vigour to the conception based on the principles of liberty and federation.

The Labour International was broken up at the commencement of hostilities, since there were no longer

any relations between the Socialists of the belligerent States; for since July 29, 1914, the International Socialist Bureau has had no further plenary sessions, the majority of the French Socialists refusing to take part in such sessions as long as French soil is occupied by German invaders. But this state of affairs does not imply the death of the International. It does not even imply its eclipse, for although official and collective relations have come to an end, individual relations are still existent. The Labour International is undergoing a crisis of growth and change: that is the truth. It is undergoing transformation; the influence of the democratic peoples of the West is increasing, while the influence of the slavishly disciplined peoples of Germany is diminishing.

Everywhere the Socialist parties are undergoing a process of transformation, which explains the internal conflicts which they reveal to the sociologist. Everywhere we find, in these parties, a chauvinistic wing, and at the other extremity a cosmopolitan wing. The former sets the Nationalist ideal before the Socialist ideal; the latter, on the contrary, sets the Socialist ideal before the Nationalist ideal. Between these two wings is a floating mass which seeks to reconcile the two ideals, inclining more to one side or the other according to individual opinions.

There seems to be no doubt, if we regard matters objectively, that the chauvinistic Socialists are far more Nationalist than Socialist, and that their Socialist ideal has greatly degenerated. Under the circumstances engendered by the war these chauvinists were the only ones who could take full advantage of the little liberty of expression or assembly which existed in Germany, Austria, and France. The situation was rather different in Great Britain, where these liberties were preserved in a greater measure. The Conservatives of all countries turned smiling faces to these prodigal sons who were

returning to the fold. They naturally sought to widen the gulf which was tending to establish itself between the Socialist groups. The one met with nothing but flattery, the other with nothing but threats and insults.

The principle of class conflict even seemed to be abandoned, for Socialists co-operated with the other classes of society for the defence of their country. Class union superseded class conflict, to the great joy of the Conservatives of all shades, who went so far as to say that the war was a good thing, since it brought about such a result. In reality this union was only apparent, and was maintained by the efforts of the leaders.

The class conflict is a social fact, the result of various causes, which have always been appearing in the history of humanity. So long as these causes exist the result will be the same. It is hardly probable that the war will efface these causes; consequently, the class conflict will reappear as plainly as ever after the war.

Has it even suffered an eclipse during the war? The superficial observer may think so, but he who is not deceived by appearances knows very well that this is not the case. If the class conflict has been suspended for the mass of the proletariat, this has by no means been the case with the capitalist minority. We have already hinted at this, when showing that in all the countries affected by the war the Conservative and reactionary elements have endeavoured to make the war serve their class and caste interests.

The crisis of the Socialist parties will probably result in a scission after the war. The most advanced elements, those most pervaded by the spirit of liberty, those most opposed to the militarization of the nation and their party, will separate from the more moderate and authoritative. This will not weaken Socialism; on the contrary. In every centralized party the extreme Right always weakens the force of the propaganda of the thinkers and the militants of the extreme Left. By seceding these

latter will reconquer their liberty and their power of action. It is, indeed, the thinkers of the vanguard who advance both the parties and the peoples. Do not let us forget that, as Ernest Renan said, "the great things accomplished in a nation are usually accomplished by a minority."

Socialism will not be enfeebled by these secessions, for the section of the extreme Right will retain, in spite of all, Socialistic tendencies which will influence Governmental circles, while it will itself be subjected, *volens volens*, to the influence of the extreme Left. But one lesson arises out of this situation—namely, the mischievous nature of centralization, and the necessity of the confederation of the small parties, but with bonds so loose that each group can preserve its full autonomy.

The war has considerably augmented the strength of Socialism—that is, events have won over to the Socialist ideal a host of people who were ignorant of, or indifferent to, Socialism. All Socialists are propagandists, because all are intensely pervaded by an ideal, and they experience an irresistible craving to make others share this ideal. The trenches at the front, and the crowds of men in the camps and barracks, are admirable media for the propagation of Socialism. Every Socialist soldier has scattered the seed of Socialism around him. The task was easy, for the ruin and bloodshed of the war, the absurdities and crimes of military discipline, the enrichment of a few, the restriction of liberties, etc., were all there to serve as examples in his propaganda against autocracy, war, militarism, and capitalism.

Everybody has been affected by the war, and has been more or less injured by it. Death and suffering give pause for thought. So the world was a soil well prepared to receive the seed of Socialism, which every Socialist soldier and civilian threw to the winds in everyday conversation. Frenchmen, Englishmen, Belgians, Germans, etc., have vied with one another in this work.



Thus a neutral, writing of what he had seen in Germany, was able to say: "The German soldiers who have come back from the front to obtain a little rest during the summer or autumn had, without the aid of any propaganda, acquired 'advanced ideas' if they had not had such ideas before, or more advanced ideas if they had already had them." The same phenomenon is apparent everywhere. We shall be astonished, when the war is over, by the subterranean work which has thus been accomplished. And the longer the war lasts the longer this work goes on. The result of this undoubted fact is that from the Socialist point of view the continuance of the war is advantageous. The interest of the capitalist and Conservative would be to stop it as soon as possible, for it creates a Socialistic and revolutionary state of mind and a revolutionary situation. But, curiously enough, it is the Socialists and the democrats who wish to stop the war, while the capitalist Conservatives wish to prolong it. Here we have a very interesting reversal of rôles, contrary to the actual interests of the two parties. It is obviously due to the sentimentalism of the democratic mass, and to the short-sighted views of the Conservatives, who perceive only the interest of the moment.

The war has revealed and developed the influence of Socialism in contemporary society. The hour of peace, whether near at hand or remote, really depends on the German Socialists and not on the Kaiser. Let a breath of revolution blow through their ranks, let them overthrow their militarism, and peace would be immediate, for the Occidental Socialists would refuse to continue the war. The whole world is so well aware of the enormous part played by the Socialists in this world-conflict that the newspapers have never been more full of news relating to Socialism. Never have Governments and capitalists been more uneasy in respect of the decisions arrived at by the labour world. If this

labour world knew its own strength, if its leaders knew it and would utilize it, instead of under-estimating it and showing themselves indifferent to it, war, militarism, and autocracy would be ended for ever. The weakness of the proletariat lies in its ignorance of its strength.

However, we can already foresee the magnitude of the part which international Socialism will play on the conclusion of peace. Thus, a Hungarian Governmental organ, *Az Est*, very justly observed in 1915:

“The destiny of the world is slowly passing into the hands of Socialism. Militarism has finished its work and is on the downward slope. The world has exhausted its military strength, and it is the duty of Socialism to arouse the conscience of the world. Everywhere, in the belligerent countries, the Socialists are beginning to bestir themselves, and we may justly hope that the sound of the guns will soon be suppressed by the awakening of the world’s conscience.”

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE ALLIES AND THE WAR

The relations between the two groups of belligerents, and between the various Allied Powers—The difference of their conduct, and its causes—The hegemony of Germany over her obedient allies—The militarization of the German mind is due to education, not to race—The organization of the great Asiatic Empires—The militarist education results in the industry of war—Victory is necessary to the maintenance of moral force in the Central Powers—In the Quintuple Entente the relations of the Allies are those of equals—The consequences which arise from this fact—The opposition of the interests of the various Allies—How the duration of the war affects the various Allies—The influence of democratic government on the conduct of the war—The opposition between the democratic principle and autocratic methods of government—Its effect upon the conduct of the war.

Friction and discontent among the Allies—Causes: mutual ignorance and fear of the truth—The part played by the various Allies in the war—What might happen in the hypothetical case of a rearrangement of Alliances—The mutual indispensability of the Allies of the Quintuple Entente—Conservative Russia desirous of a separate peace.

The treaty of September 4, 1914, and the separate peace—The advantages and inconveniences of this treaty in the case of each Ally, and in the case of the whole group—Italy and Germany—The necessity of dealing with all the causes of international conflict and the free entente of the Powers in question renders peace exceedingly difficult—The Governments cannot fix the clauses of the peace treaty—The small nationalities hope to be liberated—The other questions to be solved.

A war of exhaustion—Its many points of similarity to the American War of Secession—Germany plays the part of the slave States—The blockade and its results—The end of the war will be due to the blockade, to economic exhaustion—The economic, social, and political consequences of the war of exhaustion for all the belligerents.

**T**HE present war shows the States united into two belligerent groups: on the one hand, the Central or Imperial Powers, or Quadruple Alliance; on the other the Western, Eastern, and Southern Powers of the Quintuple Entente.

If we consider the relations of the Powers among themselves in the interior of each belligerent group, we make certain discoveries which will interest the sociologist—discoveries which involve future consequences, if men are wise enough to profit by the lessons taught by this world-wide war.

In the first place, a consideration of events shows that one of the characteristics visible to all is the boldness and decision of the Central Powers, while the Western Powers display timidity and indecision, and this in the military province as well as in the diplomatic field.

Let us look for the causes of this sociological phenomenon. When we consider the Central Powers we see immediately that their relations are not those of equals, but those of a master and his servants. The master is the German Empire; the servants are the Allies—Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria.

During the course of this long war the hegemony of Germany over her Allies has gradually established itself, almost undisputed. Germanic Austria is almost absorbed by the Teutonic Empire; in Hungary there is an opposition, but it is a minority, and the Government is in agreement with the Kaiser. Turkey is passive in the hands of its rulers: Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha are the playthings of the German policy. As for Bulgaria, it is not completely the vassal of the Kaiser, thanks to the cunning and astuteness of Tsar Ferdinand, who is pushing personal ends as skilfully as he is able.

All these Allies are minors, who obey, almost without grumbling, the orders of the military rulers of Germany. The obedience of the Central Allies is based principally on their recognition of the right of might, the great principle of the German policy. It is the sole right admitted. There is no longer any respect for signatures or promises, if the interest of the moment seems to be opposed to these signatures or promises. There is no conception of freedom of action. There is one object

to be attained, and this object has been fixed; and all means, without exception, are good if they lead to the attainment of this object. In short, the immediate result is everything. There is a deliberate carelessness as to remote results; and the multiple and indirect consequences of actions. Triumph, however temporary, effaces the errors and the deficiencies of this short-sighted policy.

The German Empire commands its Allies, whose function is to obey, and only to obey. This command is exercised through its officers, and decisions are arrived at without any reference to the intentions, desires, or interests of the other belligerents. Everything is considered with reference to Germany and her individual interests, as her rulers conceive them.

This conduct of the war, and of inter-State relations, show how completely the German mind has been militarized, even to its profoundest depths. The essence of this conduct, with regard to Allies and neutrals, is the same as with regard to the enemy: it consists of terrorism and fear. This intense militarization of the German mind is not due to the fact that the Germans belong to a race anthropologically inferior to the Western races. It is simply due to their militarist education, which has retarded the political development of the nation, so that the German people is at least half a century in the rear of the Western peoples.

The latter have liberated themselves from all belief in the god of State, which for the German nation has become the object of general adoration. Education—in the family, the school, the University, and the barracks—has gradually imprinted upon every German brain the habit of obeying the orders and performing the “duties” imposed upon them by their officers and rulers. We are not speaking of the “duty” which each man can and should determine for himself, after a process of critical reasoning; we are speaking of the “duty”

imposed by others by means of fear. All individual spontaneity is destroyed. Never, in fact, is the child accustomed to act for himself or to think for himself; so it follows that the adult, who is still never consulted as to the actions which he shall perform, continues to obey passively, without reasoning. The individual becomes a cog in the stupendous machine of the god-like State. The German people has forgotten what one of its greatest men—Alexander von Humboldt—wrote at the head of one of his works: “This is written against the Governmental mania, the most fatal malady of modern Governments.”

German organization is based on passive obedience, the same principle of organization as was the foundation of all the great Asiatic and American Empires of past ages.

Now if we consider these historic empires we perceive that they were very largely war-like and conquering empires. One may positively assert that war and conquest by brute force were their object, the means by which they lived, and the reasons for which they lived. It is the same to-day with the German Empire, and it is so because in the German Empire the military mind rules as sovereign master. Science, commerce, and industry are its servants. The German system of education was such that warfare was its natural and logical industry. The German Empire was trained for war, and by the inevitable course of events it was doomed to make war; we see here an unavoidable consequence of the militarist education based upon fear.

This militarist education, which has forced the Germans into war, explains, on the other hand, the early successes of the Empire, and the astonishing length of its resistance, although its defeat was sealed on August 4, 1914, when the British Empire declared war upon it. It was this military education which engendered the hegemony of Germany over her Allies. It is this passive obedience of all which is the origin of that rapidity of

decision, that initiative in action, and that creation of events which force the Western belligerents to follow them.

These phenomena may be observed in the diplomatic as well as in the military order. The most recent examples are the victorious campaign in Rumania, the formation of the kingdom of Poland, and the offer of peace. The Entente Powers had taken insufficient precautions in favour of Rumania at the time of her entrance into the war. Then Russia, of whose rulers one party, which was always Germanophile, attempted in those very months of 1916 to conclude a separate peace, went to Rumania's assistance with an ill will whose consequences were the defeat of Rumania and the seizure of half the country. The Imperial Powers did not hesitate. With admirable rapidity their whole military effort was brought to bear upon Rumania, in order to conquer the country, to seize territories rich in wheat and petroleum, and to prove to the world, whether neutral or allied or enemy, that Germany was invincible.

Let us now consider the formation of the kingdom of Poland. Here the German rulers grope and shuffle and hesitate. Some of them refuse to see that it is to their interest to erect Poland into an autonomous but vassal kingdom. Some wish always and in spite of everything to resort to terrorism in order to win the love of the peoples. Then the German Government has to consider the Austrian Government, whose views are different, as there is a certain antagonism of interests between them. The result is a bastard solution, which displeases everybody, above all the Poles, who desire the independence of their country, united, not divided into three fragments—Prussian, Austrian, and Russian. If the German rulers had been skilful they would have united these three fragments in the kingdom which they were founding. This would have been a terrible

moral blow to the Entente. But the Junkers opposed it. Once again the observer may note the opposition of the Conservatives to a measure of progress which would at the same time have been a measure of justice.

The bastard solution which Germany adopted was inoperative where the Poles were concerned. They refused to form an army allied to those of the Central Powers. On the other hand, it influenced the conduct of the Powers of the Entente. There was no longer any possibility of a separate peace between Russia and Germany; the bridges were down. The Russian autocracy, finally yielding to the pressure of its Western Allies, officially proclaimed that "its intentions include the creation of an undivided Poland, comprising all the Polish territories, which upon the termination of the war will enjoy the right to order its national, intellectual, and economic life in freedom on the basis of an autonomy under the sceptre of the Russian Sovereigns, while maintaining the principle of the unity of the State." This Russian promise was endorsed by the Governments of Great Britain and France, which officially declared: "We are happy wholly to identify ourselves with the views the realization of which the Imperial Government intends to guarantee for the benefit of the noble Polish nation." The manœuvre of the German Government had miscarried, but the initiative was Germany's; it was she who traced the path for the Entente Powers to follow. And by this initiative she destroyed in part the moral effect which would have resulted from the declarations of Russia, had these been made in 1914 or 1915. Then these declarations would have been the result of a spirit of justice, while in 1916 they were only the result of the moment's necessities.

Let us now consider the peace proposals. Their cleverness is great, for under any conditions they will exert a varied but more or less powerful influence in favour of the Central Empires. These proposals strew



the germs of dissension among the Powers of the Entente. They may produce division and disagreement, and therefore a loss of power. And in the interior of each of the Entente Powers they strew similar germs of dissension among the citizens of the country, whence the enfeeblement of each individual Power. These propositions, therefore, provoke a diminution of the offensive force of the Western Allies. Moreover, their effect has been to attract the sympathies of neutrals to the side of the Central Powers, which were fully disposed to terminate the massacre of humanity. If it continues, the fault will be that of the Entente. The obstinacy of the Western Allies in continuing the war proves their intention of exterminating Germany, who will be obliged to resort to *all* means of resistance. This means the previous justification, in the eyes of the whole world, of the intensification of the struggle, and of the barbarous methods which are employed. The results of these peace proposals reach yet farther, for they cast upon the Western Allies the responsibility for the continuation of the war, and by this very fact they are forming a public opinion in Germany favourable to the German Government and German militarism. If the population of old men, women, and children is suffering from dearth and hunger, the fault is that of the Allies, who desire the continuation of the war. It is they who should be blamed.

All these results of the German peace proposals would not have occurred if the Governments of the Entente Powers had stated their conditions of peace. They should have done so long ago. Why did they not officially declare: "We are not making war on the German people, but only on the Kaiser and German militarism. We desire no territorial conquests; we do desire the independence of national groups and the end of warfare"? What a light would have been thrown on the situation! How great would have been the

effect on the German people and the neutrals! But the absence of initiative on the part of the Entente Powers deprived them of all the advantages which would have resulted from such a course. Perhaps, in order to deprive the Germans of the moral advantages which ensued from their peace proposals, the Western Governments will retort by the announcement of their conditions of peace.\* Whatever happens, the initiative will have been the appanage of the Central Empires, who will thus have created and provoked events.

However, when we analyze the reasons which lead the German Government to provoke events, we perceive that one among other causes is the *necessity* of maintaining the moral force of the Central nations by means of apparent victories. In reality these are not victories, for they only push back the wall of the cage in which Teutonic militarism and Kaiserism are struggling as prisoners. But in order to grasp this reality one must possess the spirit of criticism and reflection; one must judge matters for oneself, and not according to the statements of a master. Now the education based upon fear has in Germany abolished the critical spirit. The German cannot draw his moral force from his own self; it must be given him by his master, and the master can give it him only by deceiving him with illusions. The master is obliged to do his utmost to pass from victory to victory, in order to maintain the moral force of the people. The rulers of Germany are condemned to compulsory victory, and as they cannot procure victory they are forced to rely on appearances. We see thus how the militarist education, the education based on fear, victimizes those who command as well as those who obey.

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\* The intervention of President Wilson has resulted in the complete failure of the German manœuvre. The Western Allies were enabled to make known their objects in the war.

The relations between the Powers of the Entente are unlike those between the Central Powers. They are, in fact, the mutual relations of equals. There are no masters and no servants. Each Power conducts its war in its own fashion, according to what it believes are its own individual interests. The results of this situation are revealed by lack of decision in council and slowness of action, sometimes even in contradictory actions, and nearly always in compromises and shufflings. These Powers have thus been led to follow the events provoked by the enemy, instead of creating them.

In this respect there has been a real weakness in the conduct of the war, as much in the military field as in the diplomatic sphere. The origin of this weakness may in part be found in the diversity, and often the contradictory character, of the interests of the Allied Powers. Thus it seems probable that on several occasions during the first few months of 1915 Greece offered her help to the Allies, proposing to march on Constantinople, with or without the aid of the Bulgars; then, afterwards, with the Serbs and the other Balkan peoples who would thereby have been released, to march on Budapest. Nothing was done because this would have meant the occupation of Constantinople by the Greeks, which the Russian Government would not have had at any cost. It was the Russian policy of conquest and Pan-Slavism, in short, which prevented Greece and Bulgaria from joining the Entente. It was this which delayed the entry of the Rumanians into the war as late as August, 1916. For the Balkan States the neutrality of the Bosphorus and the Straits is absolutely necessary. Consequently, they cannot with a good grace watch the immense empire of the Tsars lay hands upon Constantinople. Here we may perceive the harm done by the spirit of conquest, even to the Power which displays it, for the abstention of the Balkan Powers, which maintained their neutrality, prolonged

and is yet prolonging the war, without, however, modifying its final result.

The German rulers decide and act with promptitude. But let us consider the conduct of the Entente in respect of Greece! It had every reason for acting, and it remained inactive! France, Great Britain, and Russia are the guarantor Powers of the Greek Constitution. There is no doubt that King Constantine has violated this Constitution, and that he is substituting autocratic for Parliamentary government. The Entente Powers are in a position to speak and act—that is, to force the King either to respect the Constitution or to leave the country, as did King Otto in the last century. They are all the more in a position to speak, in that they have the support of Parliament, led by Venizelos, and a section of public opinion. They remain inactive, leaving events to unfold themselves under the German stimulus. And this ends in the forced inactivity of the Eastern Army, whose rear is threatened; in risings in Greece, and massacres of the Venizelists, and so forth.

This inaction results from the antagonistic interests of the Allies. It is to the interest of Italy that Greece should not enter the war, but should maintain a barely benevolent neutrality. Italy covets the territories of the Turkish Empire, which are also coveted by Greece—justly, for that matter, as the population is principally Greek. The Russian Government, and perhaps even the British Government, have a dynastic interest in protecting the Greek throne, and in not committing acts which might result in a Greek Republic. We here perceive once more how injurious to the Western democracies are the appetite for conquest and the private interests of royalties. The injury inflicted is great, for the war is prolonged.

The prolongation of the war does not affect the Western belligerents equally. The Russian Empire,

although invaded, is not affected as regards its vital activities, as the Germans, although they have penetrated hundreds of miles into the Empire, are not yet upon the territory inhabited by the Russians. They have conquered fragments of the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, but not Great Russia. They have conquered populations which speak Polish, Lithuanian, and Little Russian, but no populations speaking Russian. The Russian Empire, despite its losses in men and in territory, is still all but intact. Its latent wealth is barely diminished. It can, if given economic assistance, continue to fight for years yet.

Great Britain is in the same position for other reasons. Her insularity plays the same part as the territorial immensity of the Russian Empire. One may almost say that Great Britain is indifferent to the duration of the war, although she feels it economically, and will feel it more and more. From certain points of view a long war is almost in her interest, for it means the more certain ruin of German trade and industry, which may be, and are, in part replaced by her own trade and industry. The prolongation of the war is far more injurious to her Allies—to France, for example—than to herself. Germany, in fact, is occupying an industrial region of France, for thirty months after the commencement of the war the Germans are still at Noyon—that is, only fifty miles from Paris. The trade and industry of France are suffering almost as badly as those of Germany, on account of the mobilization of men and the general straining of all energies toward a single end: the victorious completion of the war. From this it follows that the prolongation of the war tends to result in this situation: when the end comes the British Empire will be the Power least ruined by the loss of men and property, and the readiest to gather the spoils of the vanquished in the economic field.

I do not intend the reader to deduce from the fore-

going the conclusion—which I do not accept—that Great Britain desires the prolongation of the war. I am convinced that only a complete misunderstanding of men and events could lead one to entertain such an idea. I merely say that the prolongation of the war is not as unfavourable to Great Britain as to France and Belgium.

The diversity and the contradictory nature of the interests of the allied belligerents have resulted in defects and mistakes in their conduct of the war. A superficial view of matters has led some to attribute these defects and mistakes, both political and military, to the fact that the Western Allies are living under the democratic régime.

“Action is everything in time of war. Deliberative assemblies are but imperfectly adapted for action. Democracies cannot conduct wars as autocracies can. Parliamentarism is unfavourable to victory. In short, the countries in which public opinion governs, precisely because of the contradictory opinions which reveal themselves, are in a condition of inferiority to those States without opinion in which a few masters rule.”

This, in substance, is what even the democrats have written concerning the relative merits of autocracies and democracies in time of war.

This opinion is based on only a superficial view of things, a habit of examining events without probing their causes to the very bottom. Matters are correlated as cause and effect which in reality are not related at all, or only very distantly. If there were an intimate relation between the autocratic principle and the favourable conduct of the war, the Russian Government, which is at least as autocratic as that of Germany, would not have witnessed the defeat of its armies.

The defects and errors displayed by the Western Allies during the course of this war are undeniable and flagrant; but they are not due to the fact that they are

democratically governed. These faults are due to the diversity and, very often, the contradictory nature of the interests of the Allied States, and also to the antagonism existing in the heart of each of the Western nations between the democratic spirit and the autocratic method of government and administration.

This is a very important point. Nowhere, as yet, are these collectivities completely governed and administered according to democratic principles. Everywhere there is a conflict between the democratic and autocratic tendencies; and the administration of affairs and the government of men are only a compromise between these two tendencies. Everywhere the rulers tend to act upon autocratic principles. This they do in virtue of the law of the least effort; it is easier to command than persuade; it is less troublesome to procure passive obedience by means of fear than to obtain the free consent of all.

What is the democratic principle? Government by the consent of the governed, this consent being freely given. None of the Parliamentary Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy, or Belgium have sought to obtain the free consent of all. They endeavour to enforce it by means of laws which restrain or suppress acquired liberties. In this way antagonisms are created in the heart of each State which diminish the national strength, which can only enjoy its full scope by the unanimous agreement of the entire people. But the people taken in the mass possesses the instinct of self-preservation and self-interest in such a degree that it naturally minimizes these antagonisms. Thus, the greatest evil arises, not from the governed, but from the governing minority, which, being invested with autocratic powers, is addicted to arbitrary action and to indolence. A very powerful autocratic organization is needful in order partly to avoid this arbitrary action and this indolence at every degree of the hierarchy.

Now an autocratic organization cannot be powerful in countries whose spirit is democratic by reason of the tendencies of the people.

This arbitrary behaviour and indolence of the rulers led to discontent, and above all to the imperfect utilization of individuals and social organisms. The Press made the rulers nervous, and instead of utilizing it to obtain unanimous agreement, all liberty of expression was suppressed. The rulers, far from resorting to individual initiative, were afraid of it, and sought to discourage and restrain it. It was necessary to maintain the bureaucratic *dolce far niente* which is so essential a fruit of autocracy.

These are the real causes of the relative weakness of the Western Allies as regards their conduct of the war. They should have broken openly with all autocratic habits of government and administration; they should have revealed the reality of things frankly to the peoples; they should have called upon the latter to determine their course of action and so to organize themselves as to cope with this reality; they should have assisted and organized the free initiative of individuals, instead of inhibiting its action. Then the contradiction between the aspirations of the peoples and their administration would have disappeared, and the maximum effect of their total power might have been obtained, both from the military and the diplomatic point of view. Democracy, in short, is not opposed to defensive warfare, but it demands democratic methods of control and administration, not more or less autocratic methods.

In criticizing the conduct of the war as fought by the Western Powers we must blame, not the democracy, but the lack of unity in the aims of these Powers. It is this which prevents unity in the conduct of the war, and from this is derived the policy of "wait and see." This is a defect inherent in all coalitions, whether



autocratic or democratic, when the members of the coalition are on a footing of equality among themselves.

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In the case of all the belligerents a certain discontent and friction are to be observed between allies. In the case of the Central Powers this is due to the hegemony of one Power over the others. Austrians, Hungarians, Turks, and Bulgars do not in reality enjoy feeling and submitting to the Prussian yoke. In the case of the Entente the friction between Allies arises from mutual ignorance of the work performed by each Ally. Each country considers and declares that its task and its front is the most important, and once it begins this sort of thing it is soon tempted to think and to say that it is the only indispensable member of the Entente.

This lack of comprehension and this misunderstanding of reality originate in the nations' profound ignorance of one another as regards their state of mind and their actual political situation. To know a country one must live in it, and be able to observe. The reading of newspapers enlightens one but imperfectly, for everything is more or less distorted in the Press. It would seem as though everybody is afraid of speaking the truth. The Press agencies, whether or not in the direct pay of the Government or the capitalist interests, abstain from communicating certain news, or else in communicating it they alter the spirit of it. The newspapers, moreover, according to the politics and the interests of their proprietors or editors, censor the telegrams from the agencies and those from their correspondents. The latter live in a special world of politicians and financiers, and, consciously or otherwise, fail entirely to reflect the mind of the nation in their correspondence. It follows that even without a Government censorship the public sees things only more or less highly coloured according to the interests of the newspaper proprietors. The public is deceived, whatever newspaper it reads,

for if it escapes the danger of being deceived by the newspapers in bondage to material interests it does not escape the danger of being deceived by the party organs, whose sectarian spirit, however idealistic it may be, minimizes or exaggerates—in short, distorts the facts.

If to this obscuring of the truth we add that which has been provoked, during this war, by the State censorship, we shall understand the profound ignorance of the peoples concerning the military task and the state of mind of each allied belligerent.

This ignorance has prevented the Allies from perceiving the mutual indispensability of each country. In Great Britain, for example, the importance of the work accomplished by the French was not grasped at the outset. After the lapse of some months I believe its full magnitude was understood. However, it seems that general public opinion believes that merely by virtue of their navy the British Isles are safe from any invasion. I believe this view is erroneous. If we suppose, as a hypothetical case, that France had abandoned the Entente with England in order to ally herself with Germany, there is no doubt, it seems to me, that these two Powers united would have been invincible, just as the Entente is now. By what Germany has been able to do while more or less effectually blockaded, and without communications by sea, we may judge what she could have done in alliance with France, with all the ports of the French coast in the Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, and those of her colonies, where she could have built and sheltered powerful fleets. British soil would assuredly not have remained inviolate, to say nothing of the aerial campaign, which would have been conducted from a number of centres close to the English coast, instead of from a few remote centres, as now.

In France the majority of the people certainly has

no conception of the immense importance of the part played by the British Navy. The French people has heard no talk of great naval battles. It has heard only of the work of the German submarines, for ever sinking ships. All it knew was the numbers of the British troops on French soil, numbers which for many months were small compared with the numbers of the French troops. And it did not understand that without the British Navy the coasts of France would have been bombarded, and closed to all overseas traffic. It did not perceive that without the British merchant marine it would have been impossible to obtain coal, metals, munitions, arms, and provisions. In this case France would have been forced to submit to the dominion of Germany, even after the battles of the Marne and the Aisne.

Without the British Empire France and her ally, Russia, would inevitably have been doomed to defeat. France and England, being allies, could not, on the other hand, be vanquished, but they could not themselves have conquered a Germany allied to the Russian Empire. It is true that the empire of the seas would have remained to them, but Germany would have found in Russia an inexhaustible reservoir of men, provisions, and raw materials, which she would methodically have transformed into arms and munitions. It would have been impossible to starve a Russo-German alliance. Thus the objective examination of the situation of the Allies shows that the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente was indispensable if the Central Empires were to be resisted. Each of these Powers is indispensable to the others. Their triumph is certain, and it was certain from the historic day, August 4, 1914, when Great Britain joined France and Russia. The Germanic Governments understood this very well, which is the reason for their attempt to steep the soul of the German people in the hatred of England.

Those who love liberty must therefore congratulate themselves that the German foreign policy was promoted in such a way as to provoke the alliance of France and Russia. If this had not been the case Europe would perhaps have become the prey of the two autocratic Germano-Russian Empires.

Russia, thanks to her autocratic government, offered a soil highly propitious to an alliance with the German Empire. Even during the present war, after the capture of Lemberg in 1915, two Russian Ministers, Maklokov and Tschezlovitov, dared to submit to the Tsar a memorandum showing that there was no division between German and Russian interests, and that the two Empires had only one and the same enemy: the Western democracies. Also a separate peace with Germany would consolidate the Crown.\* Such a pro-Germanic state of mind, which was further revealed by several instances of treason, and by the propaganda of a large section of the Conservatives—the Black Hundreds—proves that Russia has been, and still is, hampered in her endeavour to bring her full effort to bear upon the Germans and Austrians. Nearly a million of trained soldiers, for example, have for a long time been scattered throughout the Empire, in order to prevent popular disturbances due to malcontents who wish the Government to become a true Parliamentary Government, capable of exerting its full energies against the enemy.

The Italian Government, upheld by a portion of the nation, wishes to seize the Austro-Hungarian territories on the shores of the Adriatic. These territories are populated by a minority of Italians and a majority of Yougoslavs who desire union, not with the

\* In the Duma, on November 15, 1916, M. Milioukov openly accused the President of the Council, von Stürmer, of inclining toward a separate peace. The leader of the cadets even had the boldness to incriminate the Tsarina herself (*née* Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt). Far from being prosecuted as a calumniator, M. Milioukov received, on November 18, the public thanks of the Ministers of War and the Navy; and von Stürmer had to resign.

kingdom of Italy, but with the kingdom of Serbia. Hence an antagonism of interests which was powerful enough to make Italy wage *her* war instead of the common war. And hence resulted the possibility of the invasion and crushing of Serbia by the Germans and Bulgars. If we analyze the defects and errors of the Entente during these thirty months of war we always discover that they may be imputed, not to the democratic system, but to the narrow views of antagonistic interests.

The relations of the Allies between themselves, in the two groups of belligerents, have not only given rise to some friction, but they have also produced a mutual interpenetration of the peoples which the future can only develop. Mutual assistance is everywhere apparent, provoked by individual initiative, and often, unhappily, hampered by Governmental regulations. The allied peoples have mutually supported one another, and each nation has supported those of its own inhabitants whom the enemy has driven from their homes. Assuredly humanity has never before witnessed such a wave of mutual assistance, mingling with such a wave of violence and bloodshed.

From this glance at the mutual relations of the groups of belligerents and allied nations the wise man will draw the important lesson which we have drawn already in the course of this study of the war—namely, that the power of a powerful State engenders more ill than good. We may also perceive from these events how harmful is ignorance, and henceforth how important it is that knowledge should be diffused through the masses of humanity. The truth should never be concealed: such is the final moral to be deduced from the whole of this analysis of the causes of the facts.

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In the group of the Entente each of the principal Allies is indispensable to the others, if they are to achieve

a final victory. We accordingly understand the *raison d'être* of the treaty of September 5, 1914, which united Russia, the British Empire, and France, and forbade any one of them to conclude a separate peace. Which was the original author of this treaty? Who first conceived the idea of it? I do not know, but I do know that this treaty was truly a masterly stroke.

Obviously one of the signatories can always ignore its signature, and conclude a separate peace if it wishes to do so. But the treaty none the less created a bond which would very considerably embarrass a Government inclined to repudiate its signature. It would place it in an unpleasant position with regard to its associates and the world in general. It was not, in fact, a treaty signed under the constraint of the other contracting parties, as is usually the case with a treaty of peace; it was the result of free consent.

This treaty revealed in its originator a keen prevision of the future: it presupposed a lengthy war. Moreover, it even necessitated a lengthy war, for if peace could be signed only by common accord it would therefore be rendered more difficult of conclusion: for it is more difficult to content three contracting parties than a single party. This treaty bound Russia more particularly, for the interests of her autocratic government were not intimately merged in those of the Western democratic Powers. It was all the more compulsive upon Russia because it did not, for her, involve merely a signature upon a sheet of paper. For the prolongation of the war involved Russia in the obligation to resort to the financial assistance of her Allies, so that material obligations combined with her moral obligations to hold her indissolubly bound to her Western Allies. The precaution was not unimportant, having regard to the pro-Germanic influences existing in the Governmental circles of Russia.

This treaty gave Great Britain a preponderance in

the concert of the Allies, by the very fact that it prolonged the war, for the longer the war lasts the greater will be the relative strength of the British Empire, in the military as well as in the financial sphere, as compared with the strength of its Allies and its enemies. Great Britain can continue the war even if the Continental Powers make peace. Germany is in no position to force England to leave her the freedom of the seas for her commerce. After thirty months of war British soil is still untouched by any invasion. Her naval and military forces are very much stronger than at the beginning of the war. Only her economic forces have been diminished, and that but slightly as yet, having regard to the wealth of the Empire. Great Britain has not yet suffered all the losses in men and the destruction of property which her Allies and enemies have suffered.

To the three original signatories of the treaty forbidding a separate peace were added Japan, on October 19, 1915, and lastly Italy, on November 30, 1915. The situation of this latter Power was rather curious, for it remained fifteen months without being officially at war with Germany. The Kaiser did not declare war upon Italy, firstly, for economic reasons, and, secondly, for political reasons. There was in Italy more than £100,000,000 owned by Germans and invested in Italian industry, commerce, and finance. There were in the Italian ports a number of large German merchant vessels and liners. It was therefore greatly to the interest of Germany that all this wealth should not be seized; and let us, in passing, note the influence of economic forces on men's actions—on the actions of the rulers of States as well as on those of other men. The political causes of Germany's action were certainly secondary: the desire to retain, in the camp of the Allies, a power not officially hostile, a sort of bridge to be employed in case of negotiations; and to refrain from

alienating the Italian Germanophiles, who were fairly numerous. It was doubtless, too, the existence of these Germanophiles in Italy which for a long time prevented the Italian Government from declaring war on Germany. I do not think, however, that Italy could count upon a defender in Germany were the war to turn out badly for her.

Whatever may be the motives which prevented Italy and Germany from officially making war upon one another, they were, as a matter of fact, partially at war by the very fact of Italy's adhesion to the pact of September 5, 1914. She thereby, in reality, found herself bound to the Western Powers. It is true that her economic, political, and moral interests are identical with those of France and Great Britain, for all three are democratic countries and the enemies of the autocratic principle.

This pact has the great advantage of preventing a premature or defective peace, which would be a stupendous mistake. It is most important, for the tranquillity of the future, that all the questions arising out of this war shall be finally settled. The nations must not be allowed to repeat the mistakes which their rulers and their diplomatists have been committing for centuries, mistakes which have maintained the existence of smouldering fires, in which, under the embers of peace, the flames of war were brooding. The pact of the Entente has the effect of preventing an inconclusive peace. On the other hand, it renders the conclusion of peace more difficult. Men's actions have, like coins, an obverse and a reverse.

Peace is more difficult to conclude because it requires the agreement of all the Powers concerned, freely expressed by each. In France and England numbers of people have demanded that the Governments of these countries should make known their conditions of peace. But this, as a matter of fact, is a demand which cannot



possibly be satisfied, for the Governments are absolutely incapable of settling these conditions, on account of the conflicting interests of the various Governments, and on account of the multitude of political and economic conditions to be taken into account. If the relations between the Western belligerents and the Central Powers were the only ones to be considered, the conditions of peace would be comparatively easy to determine. But in the East and the South of Europe the problems to be solved present great difficulties, on account of their confused and involved nature.

The war has plunged the whole world into activity. All the small nationalities, which aspire to liberty as their dearest possession, are agitating, organizing, and hoping for the realization of their desires. They hope for this because the Western Governments have affirmed that they are fighting against the Germanic hegemony, in the interest of the world's liberty, in order to preserve the right of independent existence for the small nationalities. Not only have the Governments declared as much through the mouths of their Prime Ministers, but the peoples, through the medium of various associations, ethical and political, have followed suit. The Socialist parties of the allied nations have declared that they would oppose any annexation of territory against the will of the inhabitants, and that a referendum must be held so that the peoples should be the sole arbiters of their own future. We can understand what hopes were aroused in the hearts of the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Moravians, the Croats, the Slovenians, the Serbs of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, the Letts and Lithuanians, the Ukrainians, the Finns, the Danes of Schleswig, the Alsatians, the Lorrainers, the Italians of the Trentino, the Rumanians of Transylvania, and others.

The policy of nationalities, and the policy of consulting the peoples as to their destiny, are prevalent every-

where in our Western democracies. This is an affirmation of real human progress. It amounts, in effect, to the discovery that men must respect the imperious craving for independence experienced by other men.

Europe has now become a vast caldron, in which everything is in a condition of confused ebullition. Peace must restore order to all these national desires and aspirations, in which we now observe, mingling and overlapping, opposition and alliance. Remember that many of these peoples, which have been subjugated for centuries, but not assimilated, inhabit provinces of belligerent Powers, such as Russia, which will be among the victors, and you will grasp the difficulty of discovering solutions of the problems at issue. The difficulty is all the greater because efforts are constantly being made, and will be made, in the councils of Governments and among the peoples, to inhibit this nationalist policy, and, above all, the policy of consulting the nationalities themselves. The autocratic method of disposing of peoples without troubling about their consent is still to be found in the heart of the Western Governments. But the only solution which can give a lasting peace is the free consultation of the peoples, who must be allowed in full sovereignty to determine their own destinies.

We see how the intermingling of peoples which has been effected in the course of history throughout the whole of Central and Eastern Europe complicates the problem to be solved. The solution can only be found by resorting to the principle of liberty, by allowing each group to dispose of itself. And this can only be done if the groups are small enough to contain only one nationality apiece. It will be necessary to imitate the Swiss Confederation, with its autonomous cantons, united, although speaking different languages.

In addition to all the problems of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, there is also the question

of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, coveted by the over-voracious Russian Empire, the problems of the dismemberment of Turkey, the wealthy province of Mesopotamia, Persia, the German colonies in Africa, Oceania, and the Far East of Asia. There is, lastly, the question of the pecuniary indemnities to be paid for the reparation of the devastation wrought, and the war taxes levied by the belligerents on the enemy.

From this will be understood both the magnitude of the peace which will conclude this world-wide war, and the impossibility that the Governments should indicate its conditions. The pact of September 5, 1914, by preventing a premature peace, has at the same time imposed on the peoples themselves the heavy task of making peace. Peace must be the work, not of the impotent Governments, but of the peoples as a whole.\*

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This war is a war of exhaustion, which presents the greatest resemblances to the War of Secession in the United States (1861-1865). In both wars we find entrenchments to protect towns, provinces, and the armies in the field; and in both cases the prolongation of the war was so great that even during the war the peoples prepared for the war. We see the same slow but continuous process of exhaustion. We have long-range Continental and maritime blockades. At

\* The sense of this necessity seems to be felt more or less everywhere. *Le Temps*, on July 14, 1916, published a letter which, it stated, was found on a German prisoner. Is it authentic? I do not know, but I think so, for I do not believe this newspaper would knowingly publish a forged letter, especially as the ideas which it expresses are in violent opposition to the social policy of *Le Temps*. The letter is dated June 22, 1916, and comes from Hessen. It says, among other things of less moment:

"I think this will end in a nasty mess. There will certainly be a winter campaign, if the starving population does not dictate peace, for the people cannot hold out much longer. *If the Governments do not employ reason the people will have to force them to be reasonable.* It would be a good thing if the starving people were to make an end of things. In spite of everything, this war will never be decided by the armies. Never in this world by the armies."

first ineffectual, these blockades were continually tightened; they did not starve the Southerners any more than they are starving the Germans, but they resulted in the disappearance of commerce, and produced a state of dearth in the South, as they have in Germany. The position is even more serious for Germany than it was for the South, for the density of population is greater.

As in the war against the Slave States, we see the same circulation of paper money in unlimited quantities. This measure resulted, after two and a half years, in the bankruptcy of the South. Here again the situation is far more serious for Germany than it was for the Southern States. The latter were able to create wealth, because they possessed raw materials, while Germany depends on foreign trade for cotton, copper, rubber, etc. The bankruptcy of Germany is therefore almost certain if the blockade continues. It is a mere question of time. We do not, however, know how much paper money has been created: whether 800, 1,000, or 1,200 millions. We do not know the exact amount of the German gold reserve; the figures published are probably false. Only on the conclusion of peace shall we really know how matters stand, and even were peace to be signed now the mark might fall to zero, or to a few pfennigs, as was the case with the bank notes of the Southern States at the end of 1863, thirty months after the opening of hostilities. The slow but continuous fall of the mark is a threatening indication of the fall of the economic might of Germany.

The similarity between the two wars extends even farther, for while at the outset voluntary service sufficed to provide the combatant armies, it was afterwards necessary to resort to compulsory service, as Great Britain has eventually done. The age-limit for men, in the Slave States, was raised to fifty-five years, as is already said to be the case in Austria, and as it may be

in Germany before the end of the war. We see in these two wars, therefore, the same slow consumption of nervous, moral, and material forces (men and products), ending in the same exhaustion. In these two wars the belligerents are ignorant of their actual losses, and of the actual strength of the enemy, and as the Northerners grossly deceived themselves as to the forces of the South, which they always over-estimated, so perhaps the Entente under-estimate the forces of the Central Powers.

The War of Secession ended without any sanguinary triumph of arms, owing to the extreme exhaustion of the Slave States. It is probable that the world-war will end in the same way. It is doubtful whether victory will be gained on the field of battle, by a triumphant penetration of the enemy's lines, despite the desires of the professional soldiers. This would cost too dearly in men, and it is to be hoped that the Western Governments will realize this. Victory will fall to the Western Powers by reason of the blockade, especially the maritime blockade, whose results are extremely interesting.

The mastery of the sea by Great Britain and France prevents the normal supplies from reaching the Central Powers. These are thereby driven to the necessity of conquering fresh territories, in order to obtain supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, and even of workers. The same phenomenon occurred a century ago, at the time of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon himself experienced the obligation, forced upon him by the British blockade, of continually adding neighbouring kingdoms to his Empire, in order to increase his resources. If Germany has not extended herself northward by seizing Holland and Denmark, it is simply because these Powers are more useful to her as neutrals than as subject States. But if the war continues, and the blockade, being tightened, suppresses Dutch and Danish

contraband, it is very probable that these Powers will find themselves absorbed by Germany, who would thereby gain fresh resources in the shape of gold, food-stuffs, raw materials, and workers, which would enable her to continue the struggle.

To the blockade imposed by the British and French navies, Germany responds by the submarine war upon merchant vessels. And the result is a scarcity, greater or less, of foodstuffs (sugar, grain, eggs, meat, etc.), and all sorts of products throughout all Europe. All the Powers of the Entente and all the neutrals are, in differing degrees, affected, and obliged to restrict their consumption of food, their industry, and their commerce. Europe is slowly and surely approaching a general state of famine. But the Powers to be first affected will be the Central Powers.

The examination of this war of exhaustion, with its similarities—although there is naturally no identical resemblance—to the War of Secession, shows that similar causes always produce analogous results, *mutatis mutandis*, of course.

The war of exhaustion results in the diminution of the relative value of human material while it increases the relative value of economic material: raw materials, manufactured articles, and gold. The possession of the empire of the seas insures the possession of that economic power which will give the victory. The war of exhaustion is destruction of military power, and of the value of the professional soldier, for it gives the engineer, the administrator, and the artisan precedence over the soldier.

The present war of exhaustion has resulted in the formation, in Russia, of a powerful public opinion, which counterbalances the pro-Germanic influence of the Conservative circles of the Court. The same phenomenon has occurred, but in a less degree, because there was less need of it, in the Western nations. Each

day of warfare renders more difficult a peace concluded by rulers and diplomatists, while a peace concluded by the peoples themselves becomes more possible of realization. The war of exhaustion is serving the cause of the democracies and injuring that of the autocracies.

The prolongation of the war has permitted of the creation of relations between enemies on the fronts. At Christmas, 1914, there was a truce between British and Germans, French and Germans, established by the soldiers themselves. Since October, 1915, there have been truces on certain sectors of the French front concluded by the French and German soldiers, with or without the consent of their officers, who are powerless. Tired of killing and being killed to no purpose, they agree among themselves that there shall be no firing. This fact should comfort the thinker, for it proves that, in spite of months and months of slaughter, hatred has not yet invaded every human soul. This is one of the discoveries which the war of exhaustion has enabled us to make.

This war is inevitably leading to the exhaustion of the victors as well as of the vanquished. Its duration is heaping debts upon debts, diminishing the number of men, lowering the birth-rate everywhere, ruining trade and industry, and is tending to substitute one people for another in the production of wealth, and is, in short, creating economic conditions which will profoundly modify the social and political conditions of the whole world. The war of exhaustion is a veritable world-wide revolution in action: such is the general conclusion which emerges from an examination of its effects.

## CHAPTER IX

### FACTORS AFFECTING WARFARE: REPRISALS

The war and the government of soldiers and lawyers—The government of the aged—Wealth is of more value than human lives—The influence of geographical, climatical, and geological conditions on the war: insularity; the sea, rivers, mountains, and deserts; snow, rain, and wind; mimetism in war; the produce of the soil and sub-soil—Mutual aid—The sentiment of sociality is most highly developed in the British—Appearance of a universal moral sentiment—The manifestations of hatred are merely literary.

The problem of reprisals—The policy of "an eye for an eye"—Vengeance is absurd—Reprisals are always useless—Collective responsibility an idea rejected by our codes and our laws—The real objects of aerial raids—War is by nature a tissue of crimes, not a sport—There are no non-combatants—War itself must be execrated, not merely certain methods of warfare—We should not condemn aerial raids and submarine warfare and not the other manifestations of warfare—The only criterion of the employment of weapons in warfare is their military utility.

**T**HE present war, by the quantity of peoples engaged in it, and by its long duration, has really become the life of these peoples. It follows that the sociologist may and should consider it from many different points of view. The same events, the same men, must be examined under various aspects, under different angles of illumination. It is with social phenomena as it is with statues: they must be examined by slowly moving round them, in order to see every side of them, and by shedding upon them an illumination of varying intensity.

It is thus that we should consider the events of the world-war—from the standpoint of the nature of the various Governments, and their influence upon the march of events. We have all been enabled to observe,



for example, and I have already spoken of, the differences to be noted in the conduct of the war by the Central Empires and the Entente. When we look into the causes of these differences we are led to conclude that the rulers of the belligerent nations belong, as a whole, to two very different professions: to the military and the legal professions.

This professional diversity explains in part the differences to be observed in the conduct of the war, accordingly as this conduct is due to the one profession or the other. The professional soldier is full of decision, a man of action, often incapable of reflection. He despises the regulations and conventions established by the jurists. He leans upon his sword, the symbol of might, which, to his mind, stultified by the possession of uncontested authority, is right and creates right. *Sic volo, sic jubeo*. These are the foundations of the policy of the soldier, the policy pursued by the Central Powers.

The jurist is slow to decide, slow to act; he persuades and convinces more than he commands. He reflects much and acts little, precisely because he reflects. He observes laws and regulations, and if his interest urges him to infringe them, he seeks methods of doing so gently and without a shock. He loves compromises and half-measures, which, if they do not completely satisfy anyone, are not in violent opposition to men's desires. The jurist is slow to act because Time is a great master, and often undertakes the solution of embarrassing problems.

The soldier cuts the Gordian knot with his sword, while the jurist unties it, and takes his time about it. If we reflect we shall see that the policy of the jurist is that which has been pursued by the Entente.

The soldier and the jurist both possess the spirit of tradition, and their actions in the course of this war prove this abundantly. The soldier is traditional

because he lacks intelligence, while the jurist is traditional because he respects the established forms which constitute the foundation of his profession. At the bottom of every jurist is a Bridgson. The soldier lacks the scientific spirit, for he lacks the critical spirit owing to his education. The jurist also lacks scientific knowledge. To this we may attribute the absence of innovations, except for trivial details, in the conduct of the war. Science and scientists are utilized, but in a petty spirit, if I may say so, for they are simply the servants of those who rule, and those who rule are professional soldiers and lawyers. This phenomenon would have been much more conspicuous if, by force of circumstances, business men, manufacturers or merchants, and educationalists had not taken part in the administration of affairs.

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Let us now consider the rulers of the nations concerned in the world-war from the point of view of their age. We shall find that everywhere, in the nations of the Entente as in the Central Empires, they are, as regards the great majority, men of advanced age, if not old men. The German, Austrian, British, Russian, French, and Italian Generals and Admirals have reached sixty years of age and upwards. A few only are between fifty-five and sixty. It is the same with the civilians: the Ministers are very rarely under fifty. They are more often from fifty-five to sixty-five years of age and upwards.

There is no doubt that the more or less advanced age of nearly all the leaders of the belligerent nations exerts a notable influence upon the conduct of the war. Age, whether one likes it or not, is a diminution of human vitality. The individual is wearing out, and all his energies are concentrated upon the task of enduring, of living. The young man extends his activities in all directions, spends himself in a thousand ways; the

man of ripe years, and, *a fortiori*, the old man, concentrates and economizes his efforts. Physical strength is diminished; the need of action is less emphatic. The young man is bold and temerarious; the man of ripe years is circumspect and timid in action. Youth only is creative: youth alone possesses sufficient vitality to create. It also tends to abandon the beaten track, to introduce innovations. How different is the spirit of the man of riper years! He loves to follow the familiar path, because the requisite effort is less, and because he needs to conserve his energies in order to hold out as long as possible, in order to live. The closer he approaches the natural term of his life, the more he desires to postpone it, and the more he concentrates all his energies on effecting this postponement, which he does principally by economizing all his physical, moral, and intellectual forces. All his energies, moreover, are comprised in cerebral activities and transformations.

When we consider these essential differences between youth and age, we see plainly that the age of the rulers in general is one of the reasons why the war is conducted without boldness and without innovations as regards armaments and strategy and policy. We perceive this more plainly still if we compare the ruling *personnel* of the present period with that of the French Revolution of 1789-1800, when France held out against the enemies of liberty at home and abroad and triumphed over them. Indeed, if we make this comparison we discover an enormous difference in the age of the rulers of these two periods. The Revolutionists, whether soldiers or civilians, were young men. The oldest were not over forty; the majority were about thirty years of age. And what audacity in decision and execution, what novelty of creation in every sphere these men displayed! Here, certainly, the influence of age is revealed, for these men belonged in general to the same professions as the rulers of to-day; but they had not been nearly

so long in harness, since they were young, and had been less subdued by professional influence.

In our period, the social scaffolding has not been shattered by the war, and it is too powerful and too restrictive to allow youth to attain the functions of government. Such young men as are in the Parliaments have been excluded from the councils of the Governments, and in the military world they are kept in the inferior ranks. They have no influence over the march of events, or, at most, their influence is very small. In short, the belligerents and the neutrals—that is, all the nations—are governed by old men, or men on the downward path, men over fifty years of age.

However, the prolongation of the war increases the general discontent concerning the manner in which it is conducted. The mischievous effect of old men as rulers has been perceived and admitted, and under the pressure of circumstances the social framework has at least partially yielded. Everywhere there has taken place a certain rejuvenation of the Governmental *personnel*, both military and civilian. Men of forty years or even less have taken the place of old men in the higher military commands and civil functions in France, Great Britain, and Germany. The average age of the rulers is diminishing. Nevertheless it is still far above the average age of the rulers of the period of the great French Revolution. The manner in which our rulers have governed the peoples and administered affairs in this war by no means redounds to their credit. Military and diplomatic and political blunders are everywhere frequent. In fact, we cannot, without untruthfulness, state that wisdom dwells under the grey heads of these rulers, whether they be Wilhelm II., Count Tisza, M. Poincaré, M. Briand, M. Goremkin, M. Sasonov, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Count Okuma, Baron Sonnino, Signor Salandra, or Ferdinand of Bulgaria. And when we consider objectively all that

has happened, before and since the outbreak of the war, we are led to believe that if these already aged rulers had been replaced by other and younger men matters could not have turned out worse and might perhaps have turned out better. The wisdom of the young is better than the wisdom of the old, for the latter is a wisdom which is diminishing and expiring, and the other a wisdom which is increasing.

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We have just considered the world at war from the point of view of the age and the professions of the rulers; let us now consider it from the point of view of social classes. What do we at once discover? The importance of wealth. The value of property takes precedence over the value of human life, in the opinion of Governments and the majority of human beings. On the Continent all men accept compulsory service, and none, save a few Socialists, demand the compulsory service of property. Now what is the compulsory service of men but the seizure for the profit of the collectivity of the life and the time of all these men?

This is regarded as just and equitable, and no one contemplates seizing men's fortunes in order to utilize them for the profit of the collectivity. War loans are negotiated, because loans increase the wealth of the possessors of wealth. War taxes are not imposed, or if imposed they are few and not severe, because these taxes diminish the wealth of the owners of property. It was only under the pressure of circumstances, after more than two years of war, that the tendency appeared, if not to mobilize fortunes, at least to impose more or less heavy charges upon them. Laws were passed which suspended the liberties of the individual, and in all countries, even in the freest, as in Great Britain, men were imprisoned without trial, administratively, as they were centuries ago. In the United Kingdom, indeed, these administrative imprisonments were rare, while

in Germany they were numerous—so numerous that on October 28, 1916, the Reichstag dealt with the matter, and all the deputies without distinction of opinions protested against the system of preventive arrests and imprisonment, when there was no offence and no motive. Dictators, whether small or great, are always infected by tyranny. Men are imprisoned, but wealth is not seized.

All this reveals to the observer the fact that wealth is better protected than the life or liberty of men. All this shows that in our modern international society the love of capital is more powerful than the love of men.

Not only do we discover this phenomenon in the actions of Governments, but also in the actions of all classes of the population. The majority of those who have remained in the regions invaded by the enemy have remained to protect their property. Men and women have risked the loss of their lives, women have risked the possibility of violation, in the hope that their presence would prevent the destruction or theft of their possessions! In truth his possessions are more dear to the heart of man than his own life or liberty! This is a discovery which proves that man is short-sighted, for his possessions are of no value to him unless he can enjoy them—that is, unless he is alive and free. It is the living man who gives value to things, as much by their transformation as by their use. So from these facts we should derive this lesson: that the lives of men are of far greater value than all or any things. It is to preserve life and to ameliorate it that all efforts and all things ought to be consecrated.

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Our systems of education accustom men to see things in separate compartments, quite distinct from one another. One learns chemistry, physics, mechanics, geography, etc., and one does not learn how all these sciences are connected one with another, so much so

that they are only divided in imagination, not in reality. After the school or University our custom of the division of labour and specialization maintains the human mind in this belief in the separateness of things. From this results a highly mischievous state of mind, for gradually the habit of regarding only one order of phenomena stultifies the intelligence and stupefies the individual, just as the habit of incessantly repeating the same series of gestures contributes to the hypertrophy of one member and the atrophy of the rest. The intellectual and physical harmony is broken by the separation of subjects in the schools, and the specialization of work in laboratories, workshops, etc.

The war, by upheaving our whole social life, has enabled everyone to see how all things are intermingled and interpenetrated, and that no gulf divides those things which seem most disparate and the farthest removed one from another. This war has recalled to all of us that the foundation upon which everything rests for us human beings is the terraqueous globe, a planet moving in a solar system, which itself is moving in the immensity of interstellar space. And because it is the foundation of all phenomena, no matter what they may be, its astronomical, meteorological, climatic, physical, orographical, hydrographical, and geological conditions are of considerable importance.

Several times in the foregoing pages we have seen what an influence is exerted by the insular position of Great Britain. To this insularity the country owes its freedom from invasion; because of this insularity it was enabled, until the twentieth month of the war, to avoid compulsory service, and for this reason it had time to prepare for the war with comparative deliberation. Insularity, by provoking the splendid isolation of the British citizens, is one of the causes of their traditionalism and their sluggish imagination. To this insularity is due in great part the power of the United Kingdom,

which has been forced by this geographical condition to become the mistress of the seas. But the mastery of the seas has impelled the British to become a nation living and enriching itself by exportation. They have not been conscious of the necessity of demanding from their own soil the products necessary to life. And thus the territorial system of the Middle Ages has survived: the system of great estates, of hunting, and shooting, and field sports. But observe the result: the British Isles cannot feed themselves; they need the products of the whole world. The isolation of these islands is only an appearance, an illusion. They are more bound to the rest of the world than any other territorial Power, and the great tie which unites them with the rest of the world is the sea. The sea is, in fact, a link, a bond of union and reconciliation between men. And this in part explains the desire and intention of the Central Powers to obtain access to the outer seas, and not only to the inner seas, which are like great lakes, and do not permit of a linking-up with the rest of the world. It is because the seas form a link between the peoples that men have sought to pierce isthmuses and to cross peninsulas by means of canals. Consider, for example, the importance of the Kiel and Suez Canals! Consider how the canal from the Forth to the Clyde might have been utilized, had it existed! Think how useful the canal from Bordeaux to the Mediterranean would have been, by shortening the duration of the voyage from England to Turkey, Greece, and Italy. Freights would have been lower, to say nothing of the more rapid concentration of battle fleets, and much friction between the Allies would have been avoided. Remember, too, that in July, 1914, the Kiel Canal was made navigable by the largest Dreadnoughts! This, perhaps, is one of the causes why the world-war broke out at the end of July, 1914.

It is the industry of man which has made the sea a



means of communication; for it is obvious that in the primitive ages it was an almost impassable obstacle to the linking-up of the groups of humanity. Mountains, too, were then an obstacle to this linking-up, but a less serious obstacle. They have remained an obstacle, far more of an obstacle than the sea, for in the present war mountains have figured more particularly as a means of separation. The mountainous character of the regions into which Italy has carried the war is the cause of her slow and restricted progress. The mountainous character of the terrain was also one of the causes of the check suffered by the Dardanelles offensive, of the slow progress of the Russians in the Carpathians, and of the extreme difficulties encountered, and probably of the great losses suffered, by the Austro-German forces in Serbia and Montenegro. Everywhere, in short, mountains have proved an obstacle to the advance of armies; they have risen, and they rise now, like a wall before all offensive activities. Mountains are an organ of defence.

The facts of the present throw a light upon the facts of the past. You may perceive, in the part played by mountains in the present war, an explanation of the historic fact that mountaineers have been conquered rarely and with difficulty; that they have almost always remained free men, in love with liberty, with their hearts full of rebellion against any attempt to deprive them of it. Far more than rivers, mountains are defensive organs. Yet rivers, whether great or small, do to some extent play the same part. It was on the Yser that the Belgians, English, and French arrested the German invaders. Remember the rôle of the waters invading the plains of Flanders when the dykes had been broken down: the Germans were checked in their march upon Calais. It was on the Dvina that the Russians were able to check the Germans in their march upon Riga and Petrograd. Continually, in the

communiqués relating the incidents of this long war, you will find that rivers have served as the base for attacks or for defensive action. The tracts lying between rivers are drenched with blood and sown with corpses, for it is there that battles take place. Consider, for example, the Tigris, serving as the permanent support of the British Army of invasion in Mesopotamia. Battles bear the names of rivers, as the Battles of the Marne, the Aisne, the Somme, the Dnieper, etc. Rivers are thus both organs of attack and organs of defence.

Desert countries, on the other hand, seem to constitute an organ of defence rather than of attack. The desert beside the Suez Canal protects the canal, and the deserts of Arabia, while they forced the British Army to confine its operations to the land lying between the Tigris and the Euphrates, protected its flanks from any enveloping movement.

The physical characteristics of the soil have thus a considerable influence over the events of human life in this world-war. Conditions of climate are no less important. Snow and rain have increased the difficulties of the armies, both in the plains and among the mountains. Mud is a terrible obstacle. One has only to recall the narratives of soldiers from the French or Russian or Serbian fronts. The part played by the wind is no less important. The storms of spring and autumn, the equinoctial gales, prevent the aerial and maritime fleets from putting out, or make navigation difficult. Zeppelins require nights without a moon, and almost without wind. Rain weighs them down, and therefore lessens their destructive power.

Human industry has sought to annihilate the obstacles arising from climatic and geographical conditions. On snow-covered ground men, horses, and guns are plainly visible at great distances, black specks which stand out upon the white carpet of the snow. So men have conceived the idea of covering their horses,

guns, waggons, and even themselves, with white cloth, which merges into the surrounding whiteness.

When the snow has disappeared and the leafage of spring has displaced it, men hide their guns and their convoys under canopies of leaves, in order to conceal them from the view of aeroplanes. Man adopts the mimetism of nature. He imitates the animals, who, by natural selection, have been forced to don the livery of their environment. The necessity of resisting causes of destruction, the necessity of survival, has produced in man the same effect as in the case of the other animals. But the *modus operandi* has been different. In man it has been intentional, in the other animals it was accidental.

You perceive here the influence of conditions of climate on the activities of this war. Quite as great has been the influence of geological conditions. The subsoil of our globe affects the conduct of the war, just as the surface conditions affect it. That trench warfare was possible from the Swiss frontier to the North Sea, and on the Eastern front, is due to the fact that the subsoil was covered by loose movable soil to a considerable depth, or the latter was argillaceous or calcareous—that is, it consisted of soft stone or clay or gravel. Where the subsoil has been granitic or schistous, and consequently hard, trench warfare has been far more difficult—as, for example, in Gallipoli.

The part played by the products of mines has been, and is, very important. Thus the possession of coal has given Great Britain an enormous power, for nearly all the neutral and belligerent States have need of this coal. The possession of the petroleum fields of Galicia, of the region to the east of the Tigris, in Mesopotamia, and of Rumania, is among the causes which underlay the bellicose activities of the Russians, the British, and the Central Powers.

The advance of the Germans, in 1915, upon the

Pripet, in the direction of Kiev, was caused by the desire to seize the coalmines of that region. One of the causes which impelled the Germans to invade France through Belgium and the North was the desire to seize the mineral wealth of these regions, and of the Briey basin. It is probable that one of the causes of the invasion of Serbia, in 1915, by the Germans and Austrians, was the desire to seize Serbia's copper-mines, in order to exploit them, for copper was becoming scarce in the Central Empires, and might fail them altogether, despite the systematic requisition of this metal. The absence of mines of manganese and nickel, and of quarries of nitrates, etc., considerably hampers the activities of the Central Powers.

What is true of the products of the subsoil is also true of the products of the soil. We all know what an important part must be attributed to wheat, cattle, vegetables, etc. It is certain that the desire to increase the supply of alimentary products impelled the Central Empires to seize Poland, Serbia, Rumania, etc. The conquest of bread has involved the conquest of territories and of nations.

If we were to analyze in detail all the events which have occurred in the course of this long war I believe we should find that geographical, climatic, and geological conditions have produced yet other effects. These would but confirm what I have said, would only confirm the proof of the extreme importance of the conditions of our terrestrial environment. All this demonstrates incontestably that man is intimately dependent on the climate, the soil, and the subsoil upon which he lives with the rest of his congeners. He is dependent on them as the plants and the other animals are dependent. He is dependent on all these mesological conditions—that is, there is a solidarity between them. He is, in fact, affected by them while he himself influences them.

This war is therefore a striking manifestation of the fact that everything in the world works together, everything is intermingled and interrelated in a thousand ways. Everything is at once a cause and an effect. The union of man with his environment is profound—far more comprehensive and far more powerful than are the elements of disunion. An intimate and universal solidarity is the lesson of this war, which at first sight seems to teach a lesson of antisolidarity.

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One of the modes in which this universal solidarity has manifested itself is that of mutual aid. Never before this war had it appeared so conspicuously in all parts of the globe. Formerly, in the cataclysms initiated by man or by nature, solidarity revealed itself only in the midst of small groups, either national or class groups. In this war what a different spectacle we have witnessed! Mutual aid is general, without regard to classes or nations. Americans, Asiatics, Australians, Africans, have come to the aid of Europeans. A mighty breath of altruism has passed over the human race. Fraternity has realized itself tangibly and visibly. Belgians, Serbs, Frenchmen of the North and East, Prussians, and Poles can alike bear witness to this. In the tempest of steel and flame, in the midst of the ruins, the heaps of corpses, and the rivers of blood engendered by human cupidity, we have witnessed the development of the greatest movement of solidarity that the world has ever seen. Neutrals and belligerents have emulated one another. And side by side with the work of death, so scientifically and intelligently performed, we see the work of life, no less scientifically, no less intelligently carried out. The organizations for the relief of prisoners, for the care of the wounded, for the succour of those expelled from their homes, and those who have fled before the invaders, are the living witnesses of this wonderful mutual aid.

The Belgians, the French of the northern provinces, and the Poles of the occupied territories are starving. There is an end of industry, for the factories are emptied of their machinery and their raw materials; moreover, fuel and lubricating oils are scarce or unobtainable. There is little agriculture, for manure and labour and horses are lacking. All the products of these countries are requisitioned. The result is famine.

This result of war has been countered by mutual aid. Private initiative, unhindered by the thousand ties of the Governments, was able to attain its full expression, and since October, 1914, it has been feeding and supporting the populations of Belgium and the North of France. Millions of pounds have been collected, the gift of private persons, and millions of pounds have been contributed by the French and Belgian Governments for their compatriots in the invaded territories; for it has been necessary to feed and maintain nine millions of human beings in the West alone. The "American Relief Committee" spends without counting the cost. Business men are at the head of the organization, while an army of 35,000 volunteers is toiling under their orders to repair the evils of the war. It is an army of life, opposed to the army of death. A fleet of transports brings monthly, from American ports to Rotterdam, millions of tons of wheat, maize, rice, haricot beans, peas, bacon, and fats. And all this is sold to the Committee at cost price, without profit! The "American Relief Committee" wished to extend its labours to the Poles, Serbs, and Armenians. But it encountered insurmountable difficulties in respect of the German Government, which would not grant the guarantees which the Allied Governments demanded, so that they might be certain that none of these food-stuffs should be requisitioned by Germany.

The members of the Society of Friends, or Quakers, have distinguished themselves in this work of relief.

Villages on the French front which were destroyed by shell-fire and incendiarism have been rebuilt by their care. Hundreds of volunteers have been working there without payment. The Swiss people has devoted itself to the succour of prisoners, the wounded, and refugees. Millions of postal parcels have passed through Switzerland or started thence, to nourish British, French, or Belgian prisoners. The Swiss have even instituted a special service for the despatch of bread to all prisoners of war, for the alimentary ration provided by the German Government was not sufficient.

How many other manifestations of mutual aid might not be cited? We might mention the hospitality accorded to the Belgians in England; to the Belgians, the French of the northern departments, and the Serbs in France; to the Belgians and Serbs in Switzerland; and to the East Prussians in Germany. We might mention also all the private hospitals and ambulances which sprang up on every side, swiftly and spontaneously. We must not forget the subscription lists opened by the great newspapers; nor the thousands of young girls, women, and children who on given days collect gifts for various organizations, etc. In truth, nothing like this mutual aid has ever been seen.

And a thing which the sociologist should observe, and the thinker reflect upon, is that this admirable mutual aid was the spontaneous fruit of the human mind, of individual initiative. While the work of death was methodically conducted by the shepherds of the human flock, the work of life was no less methodically conducted by the flock itself, without its shepherds, who were absorbed in the other task.

Mutual aid has been conducted not only by means of money and labour, but also at the price of blood. On the side of the Western Allies men of all nations and all races are fighting, and these men came voluntarily and freely to join the British and the French!

One single sentiment of sociality has actuated these Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, North Americans, Russian Jews, Italians, Greeks, Yougoslavs, etc. No doubt in the enrolment of the African negroes, the Hindus, and the Maoris there were other motives than the desire to fight side by side with the peoples who were defending an ideal similar to their own. But it is none the less true that this warfare of men of all races, fighting side by side, displays a humanity which possesses a greater solidarity than it did of old. The combatants themselves are evidence of an extension of human solidarity.

Another form of the manifestation of this solidarity is revealed in the fact that the individual disregards his own burdens and sufferings, and thinks only of the collectivity. The individual labours and sacrifices himself for the collectivity. Such sacrifices have taken place in all ages, but I do not think they have taken place on so great a scale as in this war. I know of nothing finer in this respect than the voluntary enlistment of four millions of British soldiers, of hundreds of thousands of Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders. They could have refrained from enlisting, whatever the pressure which was directly or indirectly brought to bear upon them. They could have stayed at home, but they left home, knowing very well—above all if they were among those who enlisted after the first two or three months of the war—that they were risking death or mutilation. Here is a sociological phenomenon of extreme importance, for it reveals a feeling, a spirit of sociality—that is to say, of solidarity with the rest of the human group—of a highly developed character. And in this respect we may say that the citizens of the British Empire possessed this spirit of sociality in a greater degree than those of the other belligerent nations. They have reached a higher stage of political and moral development than the citizens of



other countries. This is, we believe, a result of their free and democratic government, which is freer and more democratic than the Governments of the other Continental nations, even than those of the Belgians, the French, and the Swiss.

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While mutual aid has been pervading the whole of humanity, we have witnessed the dawning of a universal moral sense. The war has plainly revealed the existence of a world-wide public opinion, independent of nations, classes, and sects—a public opinion which asserts a high morality: respect for the given word, respect for the liberty and independence of the individual and the group, disdain of, and resistance, to terrorism. In all the countries of the world these moral sentiments have been vigorously manifested, and when I say “all” I include the Central Empires. In these countries it was a small minority which gave forcible proof of these sentiments, but this was only because of the atmosphere of terrorism and untruth which enveloped these Powers.

This general mutual aid, this spirit of sociality, this high morality revealed by the present war constitute one of the most valuable lessons which emerge from it. We have here the presage of a better world, a world really free and really international.

There have, to be sure, been manifestations of hatred, and, *a priori*, one might admit that they impair this presage of a better world. This would be a mistake. Between the combatants on the various fronts there is rarely hatred, according to the letters from soldiers which we have seen, whether published or private. We know that the soldiers converse with one another from trench to trench, and arrange truces *proprio motu*. It is more particularly in the writings of literary men and the manifestos of the “intellectuals” that we find manifestations of hatred. Essentially they are nothing but literature, without any social significance as to the

future, a phenomenon only valid in respect of the present, and even so merely the symptom of a febrile condition which has affected the overwrought and therefore intoxicated minds of a number of "intellectuals." What might be more serious than these literary manifestations of hatred is the desire expressed by many manufacturers and business men to perpetuate national antagonisms by means of an economic warfare. But I doubt if this desire will be realized. The material interests of the human masses will be more powerful than the interests of a few groups of the capitalist class. Moreover, the long duration of the war, by exhausting all the peoples, is creating economic conditions which will compel the peoples to expand, unite, federate, and interpenetrate. They will therefore be forced to realize that their welfare depends, not upon antagonism and conflict, but upon union and mutual assistance.

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The war in whose midst we are living has stirred the whole world to its profoundest depths, and the most varied moral problems have arisen, and are arising, daily. Among them is the famous question of reprisals, which crops up with greater emphasis after each sinking of an Atlantic liner by submarines, and after each aeroplane or Zeppelin raid on the British Isles, on Paris, or the cities of Italy. The passions and opinions aroused by the deaths, wounds, and ruins caused by these raids have prevented many persons from coldly examining and sanely judging the problem which arises. The more sensitive the person, the more his altruistic feelings were outraged by the murders committed by submarines and Zeppelins, and the more violent his reaction from them. Such persons clamoured for reprisals.

In reprisals there is always present the idea of punishment. Reprisal is the *lex talionis*, the policy of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, which we see put into

practice throughout the Old Testament. The man who recommends reprisals is, consciously or not, under the influence of the Old Testament, of the religious ideals of Judæa. He is obeying the dead, the little barbarous peoples of thousands of years ago. This influence of the Old Testament explains the fact that we find the Catholic peoples speaking of reprisals far less frequently than the Protestant peoples. They have not been brought up on the Bible.

In reprisals the idea of punishment is combined with the idea of vengeance, which is, by the way, almost always at the root of the idea of chastisement. This idea, and the desire for vengeance, constitute a very serious danger from the ethical point of view. Men possessed by this idea and this desire are upon a slippery slope, down which they slide without power to check themselves. The vengeance of one side involves the vengeance of the other, and so on until the end of time. This is mere stupidity. Bernard Shaw, in two of his excellent *Plays for Puritans*—namely, “Cæsar and Cleopatra,” and “Captain Brassbound”—has displayed this absurdity in the humorous and farcical manner which is dear to him. One too often forgets the fable of the *Horse who would be Revenged on the Stag* :

“Quel que soit le plaisir que cause la vengeance,  
C'est l'acheter trop cher, que l'acheter d'un bien,  
Sans qui, les autres ne sont rien.”

(“Whatever be the pleasure vengeance gives,  
'Tis bought too dear if bought at such a price  
As, being paid, all else is nothing worth.”)

Men who recommend reprisals should remember this moral and draw inspiration from its wisdom. What is reprisal? It is man behaving as a wolf to man. It is the onset of brutalities and crimes without end. It is therefore certain, as was asserted in 1916 by an assembly of Anglican Bishops, that reprisals tend to lower the ethical standard of international relations, just as in

the past, when they were the rule between individuals, they lowered the ethical standard of their relations.

What is the object of reprisals? It is to prevent fresh atrocities by sowing fear in the mind of the people which is to suffer these reprisals. Now is this effect produced? In a general way we may assert that it is not. It is enough to note what happened in Belgium after the shooting of her inhabitants and the burning of their homes; in England after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and after each visit of the Zeppelins; and in Paris after each air raid, to realize that the population is not terrified. There was anger and fury, but not fear. If we wish to be still more exact, we may say that the element of fear, taking the whole of the population, was so slight that it disappeared, submerged in the general feeling of anger. So we may fairly say that reprisals do not terrorize anybody; consequently they are useless and even harmful. This, moreover, is what an examination of the wars of all periods will prove. After the twenty years of the Napoleonic wars, when the policy of reprisals was largely employed, Marshal Marmont was able to write: "Reprisals are always useless." Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood has arrived at the same conclusion, for he writes that the policy of reprisals is based on the ignorance of warfare.

So the object of reprisals is not attained by their employment. On the contrary, their effect has utterly immoral results. Threats of, and demands for, reprisals are made more particularly after the murder of non-combatants, women and children, who are described as the innocent victims of the criminal folly of the enemy. The execution of reprisals would lead one to commit the same crime against other innocent persons. And then we arrive at the idea of collective responsibility, expelled from our codes and our laws in the course of human progress—that conception of collective responsibility which was held by our savage and barbarous

ancestors, and which is to-day upheld by German militarism in its manual, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*. This is a step to the rear, a return to past ages.

We must consider such acts of war as the aerial raids, which injure women and children as well as men, from other points of view than that of passion. The principal object of these raids is certainly the destruction of docks, warehouses, factories, warships or merchant vessels, camps, barracks, railways and railway stations, etc., in short, any species of destruction that may prejudice the enemy, their adventitious object being terrorism. Aeroplanes and Zeppelins are weapons, and to a certain extent blind weapons, just as the gun is a blind weapon which, at a range of from six to twelve miles, bombards a besieged city. Bombs and shells fall at hazard, sometimes on the intended target, more often beside it, if not very far away. *Humanum est errare*. Women and children are killed in these bombardments, and it cannot be otherwise. The conclusion to be drawn is not that we should not bombard cities, but that we should not make war.

Let us always, therefore, bear in mind that war is by its very definition, in its essence, a tissue of crimes and horrors. Let us remember this phrase of Clausewitz: "One could not introduce a principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity." That is the truth concerning war; but not concerning a war which is an affair of gold lace, a species of sport, rather more exciting than war upon the wild creatures of the forest, a game with minute regulations, as though it were a tournament or an assault of arms. Such a war drags on as a game drags on. But a war waged on real foundations, with its train of horrors, of suffering, and devastation, impels men to make peace and inclines them not to make war again. The controlling principle of every war is that which Bismarck has summarized as follows: "To render war so terrible

to the populations that they themselves beg for the conclusion of peace." The more terrible the war is, the more it postpones the succeeding war, the greater chance there is that it will be the last war. It is to be hoped that the horrors of this war will so far enlighten the populations that any further wars will be avoided and prevented in the future.

We have observed, in the course of this war, that the Allies have regarded aerial and submarine raids, and many other acts of war, as *German* cruelties, while the Germans have regarded the blockade of which they have been the victims as an *English* barbarism. This is an interesting psychological phenomenon, for it shows the complete absence of objectivity on the part of all. Obviously these methods of war are cruel and barbarous, but only as all other methods of war are cruel and barbarous. There is, in reality, neither British barbarism nor German cruelty, but merely *military* cruelty and barbarism. The national mentality does not affect these modes of warfare. They are the inevitable result of the military mentality, and of the aim pursued by any war. The vituperation and the violent language provoked by these cruelties are always addressed to the wrong quarter: they are always addressed to the nations instead of to the military profession. Militarism always has been, and always will be, a school of crime.

Aerial and submarine raids are methods of warfare which arouse public opinion, because, it is said, they injure non-combatants. In reality are there any non-combatants? The Bishop of Bangor was right when he maintained that there are not. Women and children are making munitions, others are working on the land, or caring for the sick and wounded, and thereby preserving the lives of combatants. The merchant vessel, the ocean liner sailing from one port to another, the trawler, the train full of civilians travelling from one town to another, are organs of life necessary to the

combatants. To strike at them is to reach the soldier in the trenches. Everything in life is linked together, is inextricably intermingled; separateness is merely a product of the human mind, which in reality does not exist.

It follows that men are wrong to fulminate against *certain* methods of warfare, such as aerial or submarine raids. They should logically protest against *all* methods or warfare, against war itself. If they protest against some methods and not against others, it is because of the novelty of the former. The human mind is slow to admit new things and new ideas; its love of tradition—the result of mental sluggishness—prevents it from perceiving the horror of established things and makes it see the horror of new things, which in reality are not more horrible than the old. When we consider things in their reality we perceive that aeroplanes, Zeppelins, and submarines are weapons of war, just as guns, rifles, sabres, machine-guns, and asphyxiating gases are weapons of war.

If we look these realities in the face, instead of permitting ourselves to be romantic, we are, *being at war*, led to investigate the best means of attack to be employed against the enemy, the best means of resistance to be opposed to his engines of war. Those which are judged to be the best are those which must be employed. The sole criterion of the employment of these new weapons is their *utility* in respect of the end pursued; which is, to compel the enemy to sue for peace. It may be *useful* to send squadrons of aeroplanes or dirigibles to scatter bombs upon certain cities, to burn crops, etc. If so, a nation at war must do these things. It may be *useful* to sink merchant-vessels; if so, it must be done. It is war. But these acts of violence must not be committed in a spirit of reprisal, for this would engender other similar acts of violence which would be *useless*, in respect of the end pursued. Reason condemns the

idea of reprisals, but not the acts which are described as reprisals. In a state of war the justification of acts of war resides simply in their utility in respect of the ends pursued. Such is the ultimate conclusion attained by the objective analysis of the question of reprisals, which has arisen principally from the employment of new engines of warfare.

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Moreover, although this is contrary to the common opinion, which is based upon romantic narratives of warfare, the conduct of war has always and everywhere been based upon utility, and only upon utility. Of course, it may happen that what is regarded as useful may be useless and even prejudicial; but this error of judgment does not alter the fact that the judgment is formed. This basis of the conduct of warfare has led in the past as well as the present to the employment of the most violent means of warfare. This cannot be denied. The events of the Assyrian, Medean, Persian, Egyptian, Roman, Mussulman, and Christian wars up to the end of the Middle Ages, and of the wars fought by Europeans all over the world from 1452 down to our own days, testify to the general employment of terrorism in warfare. *There can be no war without terrorism*, because the object of war is to enforce one's will by violence, and not by argument. In principle war is based upon constraint caused by fear. Those who are responsible for the conduct of war—namely, the professional soldiers—are possessed by the idea that fear is the most potent motive of human action. This conception is for them a dogma, which they necessarily put into practice. Never, then, in the course of time, shall we behold a war unaccompanied by the employment of terrorism. Never has war been waged only by the combatants properly so called; it has always involved the whole people—soldiers, women, children, old men. We have only to refer to the facts



of history; to consider the satirical drawings of Hogarth and Callot; to read the philosophers who, in the course of the ages, have spoken of war. Here are a few quotations:

It is Laotze's opinion that "where the army is, there also is misery and devastation." Seneca declares that "one cannot at the same time behave as a good General and a good man." Tertullian asserts that "deceit, cruelty, and injustice are the appanage of war." Machiavelli writes: "He who follows war as a profession cannot be other than vicious. War makes thieves, and peace builds gibbets for them." For Voltaire "thieves and soldiers are synonymous." Read Condorcet, Kheltchisky, Burbauld, Aikings, etc., and you will find the same opinion. There is nothing surprising in this, for it is merely the expression of innumerable observed facts. War is a medley of crimes of every nature, from assassination to mere deceit, including theft, rape, and reduction to slavery. Those whose profession is warfare—that is, professional soldiers—practise, in short, the art of committing crimes. Enough of the absurdity that the point of honour is the backbone of the conduct of professional soldiers! I will not repeat here the demonstration of the absolute falsity of the belief that the army is the school of honour which I included in one of the chapters of my book on *La Psychologie du Militaire Professionnel*, written in 1893. However, the reader may refer to the memoirs and correspondence of European commanders, and the official reports in the Ministerial archives, relating to the wars of the nineteenth century alone, and he will encounter a countless multitude of facts which prove that war is merely a medley of crimes. The professional soldiers of all nations have been the willing agents of these actions, of whose criminal nature, for that matter, they were often unaware, so great was the psychical deformation which

they had undergone, owing to their professional and caste environment.

War is a mass of crimes, whether it be offensive or defensive. This statement does not at all imply that we must not defend ourselves by all possible means, whether violent or not, against attack. The criminal actions of a collectivity or an individual often *force* other collectivities or individuals to commit similar criminal actions. The defence is to a great extent conditioned by the attack. When a war is offensive, it consists of a succession of crimes committed with the intention of achieving a crime: the enslavement, destruction, and dispossession of another collectivity. When a war is defensive, it consists of a series of crimes committed in order to prevent the realization of a crime—that is, in order to achieve a good object. Because the result of a crime is good it does not follow that the crime is non-existent.

During the long months through which the scourge which is ravaging the world has lasted, all have been able to prove by experience the criminal nature of war. It might have been verified theoretically merely by reading the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*. This book, drawn up by the German Great General Staff, cannot be too highly praised for the masterly manner in which it presents, as a body of doctrine, the procedures and the rules of the conduct of warfare. These procedures and rules will be found in use in the course of all wars, in all ages, and in all countries. They constitute the very essence of warfare, and may be summed up as comprising cunning and violence—that is, assassination, theft, rape, deceit, etc.; or, to put it briefly, crimes of every nature. The *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* is in effect nothing more than an excellent handbook of crime.

The great painter Veretschagin relates, in his *Memoirs*, that Prince George of Saxony and the Crown Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia once told him: "War is

a thing apart, which contradicts the current Christian morality. *Do not touch your neighbour's possessions*, says this morality. *Steal, pillage, take all the plunder you can*, preaches war. *Deceive no one*, says Christian morality. *Deceive and lay ambushes*, replies war, and *the more you kill the greater will be your merit in this world and the next.*" Who can doubt the word of judges so competent as these Princes and Generals, who were reared and educated for war ?

If we regard the realities of warfare in all their nakedness, we cannot fail to perceive the essential criminality of war. We are forced, if we are logical, to condemn, not certain methods of warfare, not the employment of certain weapons, but all methods of warfare and the employment of all weapons—that is, we must condemn war in principle, in its essential self. We must condemn war because it is more injurious than useful to the human species. The human progress which at times results from war might be achieved by pacific methods. In the course of the ages the greatest progress has been effected peacefully. However, war has been useful in bygone periods of human history, but it is no longer useful to-day. Of this fact the present war is a striking proof. As I have demonstrated, the balance-sheet of this war, despite the democratic advance which will certainly be one of the consequences of the war, will show, when completed, a large deficit. We have passed the period when the profits of war equalled the expenses of war in human and other material. It is therefore to be desired, in the interest of humanity, that the terrible experience of the present war may lead mankind to suppress any possibility of its recurrence.

## CHAPTER X

### THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR

The objects of the war—Distinction between the objects of the ruling classes and those of the popular masses—Germany responsible for the war—The aims of her ruling classes—They are economic—Over-population and neo-Malthusianism—The aims of the popular masses—The desire for European and world-wide hegemony—The necessity of destroying the British Empire—The Empire of Central Europe—The aims of the British people—They are political and moral—The aims of Austria-Hungary—The value of treaties between States—Their basis is interest, for they have no other sanction than war—Legal right has no existence in itself—Natural rights are really natural necessities—The aims of Japan—The aims of Italy—The aims of Russia—The aims of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Rumania—The aims of France and Belgium—Predominance of economic aims in the ruling classes—The struggle for the possession of trade routes—The aims of the masses are pre-eminently political and moral—The war is a conflict between the principles of authority and liberty—Its great importance in this respect—The peoples must limit the powers of the State—The great centralized States and the federations of small nations—The bankruptcy of the ruling classes of Germany.

**I**F we analyze, in the case of each belligerent, such matters as political, military, and economic events, declarations, and confessions, we perceive that not only each belligerent, but each State at war, is pursuing different aims. And we are thus led to distinguish between the aims of the rulers and the aims of the popular masses which they rule. More often than not they are very different.

We know from the diplomatic documents published in a series of official books of all colours that this war was incontestably caused by Germany and Austro-Hungary. Obviously all the diplomatic events which preceded the war are not yet known; and it may be

that those which the future will bring to light will to some extent modify the details of the circumstances which obtained before the war. But we may, without risk of error, assert that these modifications will not alter the fact that the responsibility for liberating the war rests on the Central Empires. We know, in fact, from the revelations of statesmen and ex-Ministers—for example, Signor Giolitti and M. Take-Jonescu—that in 1913 Germany checked Austria-Hungary, who wished even then to lay hands upon Serbia. In 1914 Germany did not check her ally, because she did not wish to do so. She wanted war, and had long prepared for it. A case brought in America against the director of the Hamburg America Line furnished a fresh proof of this fact. It showed that Germany had taken all possible measures: thus, before the breaking-off of negotiations between Germany and the Powers of the Entente, while Germany was assuring Sir Edward Grey of her pacific intentions, she was ordering this director of a private navigation company, by cable, to act according to his instructions, and Dr. Bünz acted, before there had been any declaration of war.

So ruling Germany desired the war. What were her objects? There were several, but all were fundamentally of an economic order. We are speaking here of the aims of the ruling classes of Germany—that is, of the landowners or Junkers, and the rich industrial and commercial middle classes. The landowners, represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, wanted to evade the death duties, which were inevitable in the event of a prolonged peace, and the principle of which had been voted by the Reichstag, for these duties would inflict a serious injury upon the interests and privileges of the territorial nobility. The territorial nobility is a military nobility. War alone could maintain its prestige, could enable it to acquire rank and wealth. "Lastly," says an official report to the French

Government written in 1913 and published in the *Yellow Book*, "this social class, which forms a hierarchy of which the King of Prussia is the supreme head, regards with terror the democratization of Germany and the increasing strength of the Socialist party, and considers that its days are numbered." Its material interests were threatened by the movement against agricultural protectionism, which was reaching formidable proportions; and its political representation in the Reichstag was continually diminishing. In the opinion of the landowners, their economic interests, whence their political interests were derived, called for a war.

It was the same with a large section of the wealthy middle class. Its representation in the Reichstag was continually diminishing; and the great manufacturers believed that their disputes with their workers were due to France, the revolutionary centre of ideas of emancipation. "But for France industry would be tranquil," we read in the report published in the *Yellow Book*. The manufacturers of arms and munitions, the great export and import houses, and certain great bankers wished to increase the area of the markets in which they sold their goods, or which yielded them raw materials and capital. War would be a good stroke of business.

These capitalists—landowners, manufacturers, or business men—who desired war in order to satisfy their economic and political interests, were supported by a host of officials and University professors imbued with warlike ideology, but aiming at various objects: colonial conquests, resulting in a vast commercial expansion; an end of the armed peace which was so ruinous, since France would be reduced to impotence, etc. To justify their colonial conquests the German intellectuals relied on the very high birth-rate of the German people. They needed to spread themselves over the earth, because

their population was increasing too quickly for the area of the country.

This point merits our attention for a moment. It shows, in fact, the deleterious effect of a high birth-rate in a human society as chaotic as our modern society. If the doctrine of neo-Malthusianism—that is, of the voluntary restriction of the birth-rate—had been practised, Germany would have had no need of colonial conquests, for she would not have been over-populated. There would have been no war—that is, millions of men would not have been killed or disabled. This over-population—we are speaking of a relative, not of an absolute over-population—due to bad management of the soil and its products, for there are countries in which the density of population is greater—this over-population, I say, has led to war, one of whose effects is to diminish, even to suppress, this over-population. The application of neo-Malthusianism, while producing the same effect, would at least have avoided the immense losses due to the destruction of adult human beings, representing an enormous quantity of labour and of products which were necessarily expended in order to bring to the adult state all the men killed or disabled. The practice of neo-Malthusianism would thus have saved humanity much suffering, many burdens, much waste of energy. Here we have one of the lessons which emerge from the world-war, and to which we must draw attention in passing.

But let us return to the objects of the war. At the bottom of all the warlike aspirations of the governing classes of Germany we find an economic interest. But for many of the governed the objects were political and moral. There was, in fact, a general belief among the lower classes of the German people that the war was purely defensive, for their liberties were threatened by the Russian autocracy. Thus in private letters we find enthusiastic young people writing: "We are

fighting for the liberty of the world: we are going to deliver Poland and Finland!" Assuredly the popular flock was deceived by its shepherds! But it is none the less true that the aim of the flock was clearly idealistic, on the moral and political plane, and not on the economic plane, as were the aims of the rulers of the Empire.

The economic aims pursued by the rulers cannot be mistaken. Germany's offers to Great Britain, to induce her to remain neutral, revealed them as clearly as possible. Germany was aiming at the extension of her colonial Empire, at the possession of territories which would provide spheres of political, commercial, and industrial influence. Germany was aiming at the hegemony of Europe as a first step, then at the hegemony of the world, and this by economic interest. The great majority of her business men, manufacturers, financiers, and merchants believed that business would increase in proportion to the Imperialistic power of the nation. This idea is erroneous, as is proved by the great commercial and industrial expansion of little Belgium and Switzerland. But for them this error was a truth, which was based on the enormous expansion of German trade and industry after the victorious war of 1870. This enormous expansion, however, was more apparent than real. Indeed, if we examine the percentages, per head, of exports and imports, we find that the expansion of trade and industry in Germany has been, for the same period, greatly inferior to that accomplished by Belgium, and about the same as that effected in France and Great Britain.

However, the development of the war, in the course of its long duration, has resulted in the doffing of masks. The war has been conducted by Germany on an industrial basis, the conquered countries being exploited for manufactured products, raw materials, and money. As the jurist Charles Dejong remarked



in a study of *The War and Belgium*, the war is for Germany a veritable industry. This is how the landowners regard it, as well as the industrial and commercial associations. Like every other industry, war must yield a profit.

But of what should this profit consist? Petitions made to the Imperial Chancellor by influential groups of landowners and industrial or commercial magnates, supported by notable "intellectuals," officials, and University professors, answered this question in May, 1915. These men desired the annexation of territories in the West and the East, with the avowed object of gaining possession of regions rich in coalmines, ironmines, maritime ports, etc. They meditated the dispossession of the private owners of factories, mines, agricultural exploitations, etc., and the seizure of all these properties by the State, which would distribute them among its German citizens. The economic interest of castes and classes was openly confessed; the petitioners, however, attempted to hide it under the cloak of the collective political interest, basing their arguments on the necessities of the Empire's military defences. A more remote aim was the conquest of the world-hegemony, and a vast colonial Empire. In this Empire, which would comprise the most varied races, the German, by virtue of the principle of his racial superiority, would reduce the white, yellow, or black populations to slavery. They would work for him, but they would be well cared for and fed by him. Liberty alone would be lacking.

These objects of the ruling Teutonic castes could only be realized if Germany could destroy the British Empire. And this was what she really intended, after the defeat of France and Russia. She hoped that England would so far fail to comprehend her interests as to remain neutral, an impassive spectator of the crushing of France and Russia, who would then be forced to become the

satellites of Germany. Happily for the liberty of the world, Germany was deluded, and England entered the furnace of the war.

This was the cause of the check suffered by the armies, and of the prolongation of the war, which will continue until Germany categorically admits her defeat. The continuance of the war led Germany to modify her plans in order to achieve her ends, and at the same time revealed to the world the ultimate object of the war: the destruction of the British Empire, as a step towards the hegemony of the world. This became plainly apparent when, trench warfare having established an impassable barrier on the West and East, Germany with admirable audacity pushed southwards and eastwards, in order to threaten India and Egypt by way of Belgrade, Nish, Constantinople, and Bagdad. The desire for annexation in the West and the East was diminished or completely eliminated. Indeed, the matter was postponed, while Germany contented herself with political and economic conquests throughout the whole of the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey.

Herr Friedrich Neumann undertook to establish the theory of these aspirations in his *Mittel Europa*. Germany was to form a vast Empire, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea in the east, the Adriatic in the south-west, and the Persian Gulf in the south. Under the hegemony of Germany the regions peopled by the Hungarians, Czechs, Yougoslavs, Serbs, Bulgars, and Turks would be developed and exploited from the industrial and commercial point of view. All nationalities would disappear, absorbed by the Teutonic nationality. And this Central Empire, bounded by the famous trenches which run from the North Sea to the Alps and from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would prepare for the future conflict which should enable it to extend to the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. This conception of an Empire based on violence, analogous

to that of the great Asiatic conquerors, the *Assur-bani-âpli*, is directed only toward economic aims: the acquisition of wealth by means of the acquisition of territories and their methodical exploitation.

We may therefore say with reason that the aims pursued by the governing classes of Germany in this war are almost exclusively economic, for we may neglect the aims of the plebeian flock, which has no voice in the matter.

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The British Empire entered the war without being directly attacked; the war was not, as far as it was concerned, a defensive war. At least, this is seemingly the case. Apparently it was drawn into the war to defend a disregarded right, the threatened liberty of the small nations. Here, above all, if we wish to grasp the reality of things, we must distinguish between certain groups of rulers and the mass of the people. If we consider the general population of Great Britain, the working-class masses and the middle classes, we must admit that it was this violation of the laws of nations which aroused them. If there had been no violation of Belgian territory, it would have been extremely difficult for certain of the leaders of British politics to involve the people in the war. Yet the vital interests of the people, and its interest in remaining autonomous and independent, plainly called for its intervention in the war, so that it might fight in defence of national liberty and independence beside its Continental Allies.

A small section of the ruling class of the British Empire had for a long time been the enemy of Germany, not for moral and political, but for economic reasons. This section had witnessed the rise of German industry and commerce, which everywhere held in check, and often triumphed over, British commerce and industry. Great Britain had, therefore, a certain material interest

in entering the war beside France and Russia. Here, then, we have the spectacle of economic interests making use of a popular sense of justice in order to launch the nation into the war, break with a traditional policy of insular isolation, and, in so doing, serve the moral interests of humanity.

On several occasions during the course of the war the political and moral aims of the British Government have been publicly affirmed. "We shall not return the sword to the scabbard," said Mr. Asquith, more than once, "until Belgium has recovered her full independence and all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against any menace of aggression, until the rights of the smallest nations of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and the military domination of Prussia has been completely and finally destroyed." These words are plain and categorical. They reveal, we shall remark, only political and moral and altruistic aims. And these are, in fact, the aims of the mass of the working-class and middle-class people of the United Kingdom.

But there are other aims in addition to these, economic aims, which are pursued by the manufacturers and merchants and financiers, who form an important section of the ruling class of Great Britain. These economic aims appear in the formation of certain anti-Germanic associations and leagues, and in the open discussion by a few prominent newspapers of tariffs, customs unions, etc. Moreover, the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, Mr. Hughes, confessed this economic object when he declared that this war was a war not for national supremacy alone, but also for commercial supremacy.

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Austria-Hungary and Japan entered the war only from political and economic motives. The murder of the Archduke and his wife was a pretext; the object of

the war was to humiliate Serbia, in order that she should enter the Austrian sphere of influence instead of remaining in that of Russia. It was necessary that Serbia should enter this sphere of influence in order that she might be commercially and industrially exploited by the Austria-Hungarians. Germany—landowning, financial, and industrial—urged Austria-Hungary toward the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe, in order to open up fresh outlets for her own activities and products. After analysis, therefore, we find that the political aims of the Dual Monarchy were in reality pursued for economic purposes.

The case of Japan is similar. Obviously her treaty of alliance with the British Empire obliged her to lend assistance if the latter asked for it. But one can always dispute the interpretation of a treaty; let us recall the case of the Italian treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1914. Let us also remember what came of the Græco-Serb treaty in October, 1915. One can always dispute the interpretation of a treaty; and between States, in our days, a treaty has no other sanction than force—that is, the act of war.

Nearly half a century ago a German jurist, Professor Lasson, wrote in this connection: "There is no law between one State and another. . . . *A law is nothing but a superior force.* Between States, there is only one kind of law, the law of the strongest. A State cannot commit crimes. The fulfilment of its engagements is not, for a State, a question of law, but a question of interest."

Some have seen sophistry in this, whereas there is nothing but the brutal expression of the simple unadulterated truth. If we study the relations between States during the course of the ages, we discover the proof of this at every moment. At any moment, in the life of the nations, we find that nothing exists but a balance of forces, and that no legal right exists unless

it is sanctioned by force. It results from this, and in passing we must note this further consequence of the world-war, that justice has no existence in itself.

Rights are a product of the human imagination. A legal right has no existence unless it has a sanction, and this sanction must be imagined by men. Consequently, it is based upon human force. It is not the same with the sanctions of natural rights, which are really merely needs inherent in the individual. These sanctions of the natural rights are not left to human caprice or judgment; they are the logical reaction of the violation of these natural rights—that is to say, of the non-satisfaction of these natural cravings.

It results from these considerations that man should endeavour to make his legal justice coincide with his natural rights, so that there is no further need of artificially imagined sanctions, such, for example, as the whole series of penalties. It results also that man should endeavour to transform the sanctions based upon force—upon war, the death penalty, flogging, and imprisonment—into sanctions based upon moral force. And where the relations between States are concerned, such an international situation must be created that the interest of each State shall be never to break the conventions which bind it to another State or States. So long as this international situation is lacking, the affirmations of Lasson will be the expression of the truth.

For a State, the execution of a treaty is only a question of interest. Thus, if Japan observed her treaty of alliance, it was only because it was to her economic and political interest to do so. Japan is pursuing a policy of excluding the Occidental Powers from Asia, in order to bring China into her sphere of influence, and this with aims analogous to those which Austria-Hungary entertained in respect of Serbia. The Japanese Government is autocratic, with an appearance of Parliamentarism; it is a class Government; more, it is a caste

and even a clan Government. It is militarist in character, for it has really remained in the Middle Ages as regards its moral civilization. Thanks to the insularity of the country it is extremely strong, and it skilfully seizes every opportunity of increasing its sphere of influence in order to increase the wealth of the ruling clans. And in this connection we must consider the danger to the future if the system of armaments continues after the war—a terrific danger, for it would be in the order of possibilities were this system to resolve itself into a war between Asia on the one hand and Europe with America on the other. However, in this dark vision of the future there is one bright spot—the vast Middle Empire, with ten times the population of Japan, a pacific and industrious population, which has reached a stage of moral civilization far in advance of that of Japan, despite the European polish of the latter.

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Italy entered the war ten months later than her present Allies. She entered the war with aims which were openly egoistic, frankly admitting, by the long series of diplomatic negotiations which preceded the rupture of relations, that she wished to deprive the Austrian Empire of territories which were said to be populated by Italians. As a matter of fact, we must distinguish and analyze the desires and opinions which led Italy to make war upon her previous Allies.

The Italian rulers understood that the present war might solve, perhaps finally, and in any case for many years, the burning questions of the Balkans, and of the spheres of influence in the territories at present possessed by Turkey. Now, it was to the economic interest of these rulers to be concerned in this solution of the Eastern and Balkan problems. In this solution the development of Italian trade and industry would find what it was looking for. It was therefore necessary

to take part in the war. But for this it was necessary to create a popular demand for war. It was impossible, on account of traditional feeling and historical conditions, to render popular a war on the side of the Imperial Powers. Austria-Hungary was still for a part of the population the hereditary enemy. On the other hand, the violation of Belgian neutrality, the bloodthirsty brutality and the terrorism with which Germany was conducting the war, aroused the feelings of justice, pity, and altruism which exist in every human mind. It was therefore easy to arouse and excite these feelings. The "intellectuals" devoted themselves to the task.

The Government and the ruling classes gave them a free hand, and even encouraged them, for this was for them the only means of releasing the forces of war, and ranging themselves on the side which was certain to win. While recognizing Germany's wonderful organization for war, they rightly considered that the power of England, Russia, and France would exceed that of the Central Empires, both in men and in money. Moreover, in view of the development assumed by the war it was impossible that Italy should profit by any dealings with Germany and Austria. The contempt for her signature which Germany had displayed in respect of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg made it impossible to rely on her word or her signature. The guarantee offered by Germany for the territorial concessions made by Austria was of absolutely no value. The principle of German policy is: *Might is Right*.

The Italian rulers and "intellectuals" understood plainly that the triumph of the Central Empires would mean the more or less sudden death of the autonomy and independence of Italy. The economic interests of the country were, in fact, in opposition to those of the Germans. The alliance of Italy with the Western Powers imposed itself by means of various economic, political, and moral factors. During the course of the



war the economic interests have come slightly to the fore. The war, in short, was waged from a purely Italian, and not from a general point of view; there was no declaration of war against Germany until fifteen months had elapsed since the outbreak of the war with Austria-Hungary.

For Italy, as for Great Britain, the aims of the war were therefore a mixture of various factors: economic and political in the case of the ruling classes, moral in the case of the "intellectuals" and the mass of the people. It was almost the same in Russia.

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In 1914 the full resources of the Russian Empire were not prepared for the conflict. They were being organized when the war broke out. The Empire, therefore, was for the moment pacific. It desired peace, but was obliged to submit to war. It was obliged to do so in order to prevent the crushing of Serbia, so that it might retain this nation in its sphere of political influence.

Russia was always seeking expansion, because expansion enabled the bureaucracy and the military nobility to live and enrich themselves. The continual extension of the Russian power was due to the material interests of the ruling class, which is a class of military and bureaucratic landowners, not of merchants and manufacturers. As for those of the people who did more than merely obey the orders of the Government, their affinity to the Serbs—an affinity of race and language—led them to welcome the war with enthusiasm.

At the outset of the war the ruling classes of Russia were pursuing political and economic aims, while the aims of the mass of the people were altruistic: they wished to defend their Slav brothers from attack. In the course of the war these economic and political aims were openly declared, among them being the conquest of Galicia, of Constantinople, etc. The hunger for territory,

which is a hunger peculiar to great autocratic empires, was impudently flaunted by the whole bureaucratic and religious clan which governed Russia. The predominance of economic aims became apparent.

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Let us now consider Turkey. She entered the war in obedience to Germany, although neither the people, nor the commercial middle class, nor the military nobility was consulted, nor were their feelings aroused. This was the work of a few men, a few Young Turks, who certainly had not foreseen all the conditions of the conflict, or they would have seen that they were making for defeat and the disappearance of the Turkish Empire. Germany flashed the lure of victory before their eyes, and for a few victory meant power, honours, and riches. For others it meant the reconstitution of a great Turkish Empire in Asia and Africa. The aims which impelled the Young Turkish clan to follow Germany into the world-war were, therefore, political and economic, whether collective or individual. Germany drew Turkey into the war in order to facilitate her attainment of world-wide hegemony.

But if Turkey went to war the Eastern Question was bound to be solved, in one sense or another, at the end of the war. So it would necessarily follow that all the Balkan Powers would sooner or later be forced to take part in the struggle. Of this Germany was aware, but she reckoned on being able to induce them either to range themselves on her side, or to remain neutral. To obtain these results she employed her policy of terrorism and corruption. She had to deal with the ruling elements of these countries, for the peoples, by interest and opinion, were pro-Russian and pro-French or pro-English.

Bulgaria was dragged into the war by her King, who dreamed of a great Bulgarian Empire. His aims were political and economic. Greece and Rumania at first

remained neutral, partly because they feared Germany, partly because the Entente did not promise them what they asked. In each of these countries there were, moreover, sections of the ruling classes who would, from economic interest, have joined either the Western or the Central Powers. Thus, if in Rumania the class of the great landowners favoured Germany, this was because of their material interests. And the same phenomenon was observable, but this time in favour of England, in the case of the class of wealthy Greek merchants, who would be ruined by a war against the mistress of the seas.

Rumania decided to take part in the war in August, 1916, because she found herself compelled by the Entente to take part in it, and because Russia had at last decided to satisfy the Rumanian demands. These concerned the seizure of territories which, in the possession of Austria-Hungary, are inhabited by a large majority of Rumanians: Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina; and the opening of the Dardanelles to free navigation. The aims of Rumania were therefore at once economic, moral, and political. In the governing circles economic aims predominated; these included the possession of Transylvania, whose mineral and forestal wealth would be exploited, and the freedom of the Dardanelles, permitting of ready exportation and the creation of a large merchant marine. As for the governed, the aims of the bulk of the lower classes of the towns and rural districts involved the realization, more especially, of moral ideals, such as the liberation of their brothers in Transylvania, who were persecuted by the Hungarians. In this national feeling of the rural and urban masses we perceive the origin of the mistake made by the Rumanian Government, when, on the termination of peace, it directed its military effort against the Austro-Germans in Transylvania instead of against Bulgaria.

Serbia was forced into the war. For her it was a defensive war in which her national existence, her independence, and her liberty were at stake. As for Belgium, her situation was even worse; in her case there was no show of pretext. In the view of the German commanders she offered a short-cut between one point and another, and this was enough for them; all her rights, all her liberties were trampled underfoot. With great courage and noble pride, Belgium refused to accept the destruction of her liberties. She fought for them, and is fighting still.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was subjected to the same violation, but was so small that it could not even struggle. It had to bow before the stronger Power. But here again terrorism has not succeeded, for many Luxemburgers left their country to enlist in the French Army in order to fight against Germany, the violator of their liberty. In short, for Serbia, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the interest of the war is a moral interest—the defence of their liberty.

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The same is true of France. The French population, with the exception of a very small minority of chauvinists, who were not influential, was pacific. Its material, moral, and political interest was to maintain peace. There was the treaty of alliance with Russia, a treaty of which the people was as yet ignorant—for secret diplomacy insists upon governing by obsolete methods, which are in opposition to the principles of democracy, although they are in conformity with the principles of autocracy. I am convinced that if this treaty had bound France to an offensive war the majority of the people would have refused to observe it. As Jaurès said: “If appeal is made to a secret treaty with Russia, let us appeal to the public treaty with humanity.”

Rather than accept an offensive war, working-class and Socialist France would have raised the standard

of revolution. The French Government was aware of this, and it honestly pursued a pacific policy in all the negotiations which preceded the cataclysm in which humanity has for more than two years been struggling. The whole French people rose to defend its liberties and its independence when these were threatened by the invader.

Moral interests only were at issue; in 1914 the same social phenomenon was observable which had occurred at the time of the French Revolution. Her moral and political interests were such that even without the treaty with Russia, even without the violation of her territory, France must have fought Germany, in order to prevent her hegemony over Europe, and the resulting suppression of her own liberties and autonomy. But although, at the outset of the war, the aims of the French were unanimously moral aims, as the war dragged on economic aims made their appearance, pursued by certain of the class of industrial, commercial, and financial magnates. Some dreamed of territorial annexations, and, of course, like their fellows in Germany, they made it appear that these were in the interest of the collectivity. The greater number aimed at a sort of customs union of the Allies, which should enable them to seize the German markets.

It would seem that in Portugal, on whom Germany declared war in 1916, there is a predominance of moral over economic factors. Yet the initial factor of the rupture of relations, the acquisition of merchant vessels, was an economic factor. However, it is easy to see that in this war Germany's attitude toward Portugal is different from her attitude toward Italy. She did not declare war upon Italy; she did declare war upon Portugal. This was owing to the economic interests involved in Germany's relations with Italy, while no such interests existed in her relations with Portugal.

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As will be seen by this review of the aims pursued by the various belligerents in this war, it is incontestable that the economic aims predominate. These aims are those of the governing classes of all the countries in question, and especially are they those of the men who caused the war—the governing classes of Germany and Austria-Hungary. So we may fairly remark that the gigantic social phenomenon presented by the present conflict confirms the theory of historic materialism, as Karl Marx named it: a theory which we should prefer to call that of historic economism.

In this war there is certainly a conflict between national fractions of the capitalist class for the exploitation of the world. For this exploitation the possession of trade routes was necessary: the sea routes, which are in the hands of Great Britain, the land routes to the East, from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf (Hamburg to Bagdad), etc. These routes are necessary for the exploitation of the natural wealth of the soil—mines, oil wells, etc. The value of the products of the earth is revealed only when they can be exchanged. And they can be exchanged only by means of roads, rivers, seas, and railways. It was for the possession of these routes that the war was started by the magnates of the metallurgical industry, allied with the magnates of the soil. Thus in a certain measure the war is only a war between two sections of the same social class. We thus perceive the complexity of the phenomena of human society, which involve contrary and multiple interests, individual, professional, religious, political, moral, economic, and national.

Although among the ruling classes economic aims are predominant, this is not the case with the mass of the peoples at war. For them the aims of the war are political and moral. And as in the Western Powers the popular masses play a controlling part, it follows that the aims of these democracies, regarded as a whole, are principally political and moral.

The significance of the aims pursued by the belligerents underwent a change of plane at the beginning of the war. At first, on the declaration of hostilities, evolving on the economic plane, they were removed to the politico-moral plane directly the neutrality of Belgium was violated, directly the Belgians began to defend their liberty, directly the Triple Entente appealed to the principle of nationalities, and demanded the destruction of Prussian militarism. The war ceased to be a war between enemy clans of the same capitalist class, to become a war of nations. It became the conflict of the autocracies against the democracies, of liberty against authority. It has become a struggle between two principles.

The question which now confronts all humanity is this: is the individual to remain free to develop himself fully and freely, as, in differing degrees, the various Western democracies permit him to do, or is he to be the slave of the State, transformed by the latter into a tool, a machine? Is the individual, is the people, made for the Government, or is the Government made for the people, for the individual? We are witnessing the conflict between these two conceptions of life.

It is idle to object that the Russian autocracy was allied to the Western democracies. Circumstances, in provoking this alliance, were stronger than the interests of caste. The Russian autocracy was in reality fighting against itself in fighting the Central Empires. Caste interest would logically have demanded an alliance with Imperial Germany. As a result of the proper comprehension of this interest there was, in the Governmental circles of Russia, a pro-German party of considerable strength. This party was the most conservative and reactionary section of the ruling caste. We have seen Ministers recommending a separate peace. We have even seen Generals and other officers, of superior or subaltern rank, betraying their country to

bring about a German victory; for, as they declared before the court-martial which condemned them to death by hanging, "it is to the interest of Russia to be defeated, since she is the ally of the Western democracies; the defeat of Germany would mean the defeat of autocracy." This view is absolutely correct; and it was not one of the least curious spectacles of this war to witness the two autocratic Powers of Europe mutually exhausting and destroying one another, thereby opposing the will of their governing classes, by favouring the spread and the progress of democracy.

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This conflict between the principles of liberty and authority is of extreme sociological interest. Even in those countries which are fighting for liberty, which invoke the love of liberty, we have observed Governmental manœuvres of an autocratic tendency, and conservative attempts in restraint of liberty. The power of the State is seen to be crushingly great. The individual has disappeared before the collectivity. But the interests of the collectivity are not in the hands of the collectivities themselves. They are looked after by delegates who tend to form regular oligarchies, and this is the great danger incurred by the democracies, whose foundation should be the liberty of the individual.

We must therefore deduce from these facts the following lesson: it is to the interest of the peoples to limit the power of the State, if they wish to guard against the danger of the progressive disappearance of their liberties. To this end the peoples must assume the management of their own affairs, and must settle them for themselves.

"Que si quelque affaire t'importe  
Ne la fais point par procureur."

"If an affair is of importance to you, don't settle it by attorney," says the worthy La Fontaine. This wise moral is not applicable to the great centralized States.



These latter aspire to autocratic and bureaucratic methods of government. The result is a policy of conquest by war. This process tends to the formation of a single homogeneous nation, produced by the absorption of a crowd of small heterogeneous nationalities. In this centralized whole there is a tendency for its organization to be based on the division of labour and a strict specialization. This organization is inevitable, for it alone permits of the maintenance of great empires. But this process is accomplished only to the detriment of individual liberty, and consequently to the detriment of the collectivities, which are deprived of the many beneficent consequences of liberty.

It is to the interest of individuals, and hence of the peoples, to oppose the process of centralization, and to replace it by the process of free federation of small national and ethnical groups. The smaller a political group, the more readily may liberty maintain itself in that group, and increase in all its vigour; and the more readily does material and intellectual impulse follow a free course. If men wish this war to have been of some little service to humanity, they must learn from it the great lesson of liberty, and must derive from it the determination to govern themselves as free men.

There ought, in truth, to be no difficulty in learning this lesson, for this war has revealed, even to the eyes of the most prejudiced, the complete incapacity of the ruling classes of whatever country to rule the people wisely. They claim to be the shepherds of the popular flocks, and they have led their flocks to death and devastation. Indeed, they either prepared, or were incapable of avoiding, the cataclysm which is ravaging the world. They are truly bankrupt. In fact, however imperfectly the human flocks might control themselves without shepherds, they could hardly be more foolishly led than they have been by these shepherds.

The moral which naturally arises from these facts is

this: that the peoples must liberate themselves from the governing classes, in order to govern themselves. They must not do this by means of delegates, for these delegates are more or less liable to form camarillas, which insensibly end by governing in their own personal interest, or in the interest of their clan. What is needed is that every man shall take into his own hands the management of his political affairs, just as he manages his personal affairs. And this is only possible if the imperialistic system of the great Empires is abandoned in favour of the federalist system of small groups and small districts. This is the only political system which permits of the real liberty of the individual and the group, together with the free co-operation of every citizen in the increasing welfare of the collectivity and the individual.

## CHAPTER XI

### RESULTS OF THE WAR: A NATIONAL SETTLEMENT

Biological conditions—Diminution of the male population—Mortality in the civil population—Falling-off of the birth-rate—Increase of infant mortality—Humanity suffers in its biological qualities—The war is an instrument of an inverse natural selection—Nervous tension and mental disequilibrium—Effects of overwork: stupidity of suspending the laws protecting the worker—The effect upon children—The different effect of the war on the two sexes—The superiority of the female sex from the collective point of view—The social and legal consequences of the numerical predominance of the female sex—The necessity for social amelioration: hygiene, education, etc.

Political conditions—Wars result from the blunders of diplomats—Peace must be the work of the peoples—The victory of the Quintuple Alliance is inevitable—Annexations would be acts of madness—The basis of political settlement should be in accordance with the example of liberty and equality set by nature—The nature of national groups—Their essential basis is community of will—The national policy—The State and nationality: their fundamental opposition—The foundations of nationality are liberty and equality—The referendum—Small national groups make for intensity of life—Heterogeneity increases the production of individuals.

The Polish problem is an international problem—The reconstitution of an independent Poland—The Jewish question also is international—The problem of Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig and the popular referendum—The disappearance of the centralized and militarized German Empire—The free federation of the Germanic groups—The disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—The Slav nationalities of the North: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovachia—The Slav nationalities of the South: Croatia, Slavonia, Sylvania, etc.—Referendum and federation—Transylvania and a portion of Banat should go to Rumania—Independent Hungary—The nationalities of the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Finland, and the Russian Empire—Bulgaria—The problems of Macedonia, Thrace, Asia Minor: their solution on the basis of liberty and equality—Constantinople and the Dardanelles neutralized and autonomous—The colonies of the German Empire divided among Great Britain, France, and Belgium on conditions to be determined.

The political consequences of such a territorial settlement on the basis of liberty and equality.

LIKE every phase of the life of living creatures, this war, whatever its duration, will have an end.

Let us, then, ask ourselves what will be the biological, economic, and general conditions of the world at the termination of the world-war. To begin with, let us glance at the biological conditions.

Belligerent humanity, like neutral humanity, will be poorer in human beings of both sexes. The mortality on the field of battle is an important factor. After two and a half years of war more than seven and a half millions of human beings have been killed or have died of sickness—that is, a larger number than the population of Greater London or the whole of Belgium. Nor must we forget the considerable mortality among the prisoners of war, especially in Germany, and the great prevalence of sickness among them. This is due to the manner in which the German rulers treat their British, French, Russian, Belgian, and Serbian prisoners. Their food has been insufficient in quality and quantity; there has been a lack of medical attention and of medicines; and the punishments are barbarous (see the official English report on the camp at Wittenberg, the official report of Dr. Tayler on the Ruhleben camp, etc.). Let us add to these losses the deaths among valetudinarians of both sexes which have occurred during the war; for we find that the death-rate among the civilian population is higher than in time of peace.

The war causes physical suffering to the non-combatants. Whole populations have been subjected to the horrors of invasion and famine, and the epidemics which follow conquests. Other populations are forced to limit their consumption of foodstuffs by reason of the blockade. Everywhere it has been necessary to lower the usual standard of living, even though salaries and wages are high, because of a scarcity of products. Thus, in England, the country least affected of all the

belligerents, the cost of living, as a whole, was in April, 1916, 40 per cent. higher than it was before the war. And if we consider foodstuffs only, the increase in the towns is over 70 per cent. Everywhere it is the professional and lower middle classes that have been forced more particularly to reduce their standard of living; for their salaries or incomes as lawyers, schoolmasters, clerks, tradesmen, small investors, etc., have often been reduced instead of being augmented.

The activities of the submarines, the desire of the governing classes to limit imports in order to diminish the export of gold, the utilization of merchant vessels as transports of war, have forced all Europe to limit the consumption of food, for many products have been lacking. The rise of prices has been general, in neutral countries as well as in the case of the Allies of the Entente. The position of the Central Empires is still more serious; famine is at their door.

There are, therefore, many causes at work to enfeeble the nations. Moreover, we must add to these the pressure of events upon the human mind, which is causing a permanent nervous tension which tends to destroy the weakly and those whose circulatory system is imperfect. The present period is disastrous to all persons with weak hearts. This explains the relative increase of the mortality of both sexes among the civilian population.

To these losses we must add a diminished birth-rate and a high infant mortality. This phenomenon is occurring in all the countries at war, and in neutral countries also. One of the causes of this diminished natality in neutral countries is the departure of foreigners belonging to combatant nations. The males return to their native countries, and therefore cease to exist as progenitors for the neutral countries. The departure of the men for the war is not the only reason for the diminished number of conceptions. Self-

restraint is also a cause. This phenomenon is obviously occurring in those neutral countries in which the births are diminishing, although the males are not called to the war. It would seem as though men and women were refusing to provide fresh fodder for cannon. In all the belligerent countries the natality has greatly diminished. In Germany we have to record an average decrease of 20 per cent. for 1915. In 1916 this percentage increased, on account of the increasing losses of men. In Hungary a statistician has shown that the same thing is happening there. We may affirm with certainty that it is happening also in Great Britain and in France. The ruling classes are uneasy about the matter; they have reared human herds as stock-breeders raise herds of cattle or flocks of sheep. Soldiers have been given leave, so that they might go home in order to accomplish their duties as progenitors, just as they are accomplishing their duty as defenders in the trenches. Reproduction has become a collective duty, a State function. Let us note in passing the tendency to transform the individual into a gregarious beast. The ruling classes in Germany, for example, have already commenced to modify the laws concerning the sexes, in order to check the diminution of the birth-rate. But it does not seem that this can have any influence.

Besides the diminution of the birth-rate, we find an increase of infantile mortality, an increase of still-born children, without speaking of conceptions which come to nothing. The causes of these phenomena are various. The prevailing mental tension necessarily reacts on the mothers, has a disturbing effect on pregnancy, and produces natural abortions. Let us note also that the highest natality is found among the poor, especially among the thriftless labouring classes. Now the women of these classes are all more or less occupied in masculine labour, and are even working overtime, owing to the necessities of production and the lack of hands. Under

these conditions pregnancy cannot reach its full term without accident. The children, once born, receive less care than in ordinary times, and in the countries besieged, such as Germany and Austria-Hungary, or devastated and invaded, such as Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and the north of France, the children do not obtain sufficient milk. For all these reasons the infantile mortality is considerable.

We shall therefore have, at the end of the war, a humanity diminished in numbers. What will this loss amount to? The figures cannot be established with certainty, for we do not know, and doubtless we never shall know, the number of dead in the invaded countries, such as Poland, Serbia, and Montenegro, or the number of Armenians massacred. But we may, without exceeding the truth, estimate these numbers at about thirteen millions in the early months of 1917.

At the end of the war, humanity will therefore have diminished in quantity; but it will also have diminished in biological quality. It is youth which will have paid the greatest tribute to the Moloch of war. Now it is youth which possesses the greatest creative potentiality. It follows that the progenitors left alive will mostly be more or less aged, more or less enfeebled by the fatigues of war or by ill-treatment as prisoners, or even more or less infirm. Among the killed will certainly be the most energetic, and often the best from the moral and intellectual point of view. In fact, those who have the sense of sociality highly developed risk themselves for the collectivity to a greater extent than those who have remained in a plane of narrow egoism and individualistic isolation. Thus, of the male progenitors, the war will have caused the disappearance of the best. It will have caused a selection of an inverse character. The same thing is happening in a less degree in the case of the female genitrix, on account of excessive and intensive labour, the nervous tension caused by the

anxieties of life, and the anguish due to uncertainty as to the fate of the male combatants.

In all the belligerent nations, and even in some neutral countries, there is an extreme nervous tension which results in neurasthenia, and tends to produce mental disequilibrium. Cases of insanity are everywhere becoming more frequent, among soldiers as well as among civilians of both sexes. Nervous hyperexcitation is general—a very unfavourable condition for progenitors.

Not only does the war cause a deterioration of the biological qualities of the adult: it produces the same effect in children, thanks to the ignorance and heedlessness of the governing classes, who have everywhere suspended the laws prohibiting child labour. Here is a piece of stupidity so stupendous that the thinker is at first struck with amazement. This suspension of the laws protecting child labour shows that the governing classes have never grasped the why and wherefore of their existence. They have never grasped the utility of these laws to the collectivity, and this because they have not, in the great majority of cases, any knowledge of the science of life, of hygiene or physiology. They are soldiers, lawyers, very often manufacturers, or business men, or landowners—they are not scientists or thinkers. Humanity pays dearly for its stupidity in allowing the nations to be governed by ignorant men. However this may be, the children of the proletariat, whether urban or rural, are working in the factories and workshops, or in the fields, and the result is the physical enfeeblement, the intellectual and moral impoverishment of the individual child. His time at school is short, hence a loss of knowledge.

Children at this moment are living in an atmosphere of warlike violence. They think, naturally, of nothing but the war; they read, speak, and hear of nothing but the war—that is, of slaughter. The result is a develop-



ment of the spirit of violence. This is inevitable, for the most powerful element of education is example. Whether it be good or bad, example is contagious, because man is an imitative animal. The child tries to imitate the adult; so that in this period of violence we find that the criminal offences committed by children are considerably on the increase everywhere—in Germany, France, and Great Britain. The diminution of family supervision certainly counts for something, but for much less than the jurists would be tempted to suppose. The principal cause is the atmosphere of war which envelops the belligerent countries. There is an actual cerebral intoxication abroad, which will disappear with its cause: the war.

The foregoing analysis of the biological conditions likely to prevail at the end of the war shows that humanity will then be impoverished both in quantity and in quality, as regards both children and adults. This deterioration will not equally affect the two sexes. There will be, among the dead and disabled, far more men than women. The women will predominate over the men in the matter of numbers. This fact will produce curious results. Let us regard the phenomenon from the physiological and philosophical point of view: we are led to perceive in it an argument against the equality of the sexes, and an argument in favour of the superiority of the female sex.

As a matter of fact, it is fortunate for the human collectivity that women are being destroyed in smaller numbers than men, for this permits of a more rapid recuperation of our losses. If male humanity, save a few specimens, were to disappear, the human race would quickly re-establish itself, thanks to an abundance of the female sex. On the other hand, if all the men survived, and all but a few women disappeared, humanity would take a very long time to replenish itself, on account of the scarcity of women. We see

here the importance of the feminine element from the collective point of view: an importance greater than that of the masculine element.

Various social consequences will result from the numerical predominance of women over men. A larger proportion of women will be doomed to celibacy. On the one hand this will result in greater activity on the part of the feminists; because a number of women will expend their energies in such activities who would, if married and mothers, have devoted themselves to their husbands and families. On the other hand, it will result in a more intense sexual conflict for the legitimate satisfaction of physiological needs, and it might very well result in reforms of the legal and social relations between the sexes. No doubt either the marriage laws or morality will be modified in the direction of greater sexual liberty for the woman, and a more or less complete disappearance of the legal differences between legitimate and illegitimate children.

Humanity being impoverished in quantity and quality, it will be of vital importance to remedy this impoverishment. Already some thinkers have turned their attention to the subject. Thus, in Germany a German Repopulation Society has been founded. In France, even before the war, there was a Depopulation Committee. In England the Press is discussing the question.

The diminution of the birth-rate was general in all countries before the war; the latter has only accentuated a general tendency. And one must not reckon that the birth-rate of the different nations will return to what it was before the war. It is in the lower classes that the birth-rate is highest. The higher we ascend in the scale of the classes, the more we perceive a deliberate foresight, a voluntary restriction of conception. This restriction is everywhere tending to continue and increase. It is a result of the spread of knowledge, of

the conditions of well-being and the spirit of reflection, hence of foresight.

The war will be a terrible lesson, and it will no doubt stimulate the voluntary limitation of births. To remedy the impoverishment of the human race we shall have to resort to hygiene; the improvement of sanitary conditions in rural districts, towns, factories, and houses; the improvement of the alimentary habits of the race; the care of mothers and children; and the suppression of alcohol. In short, we must, if men display the least wisdom, seek to prolong life, to diminish the causes of death and sickness. These are the only means by which the nations can in part recuperate from their losses in brains and arms. This aim—the amelioration of the conditions of life from the physical, intellectual, and moral point of view—can only be achieved by means of a greater social expenditure than was devoted to it before the war. Here we come to a point of great importance, for it is intimately connected with the economic conditions which will prevail after the war, of which we shall speak later.

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This long war will come to an end: consequently the conditions of peace must be determined. The essential element which these conditions must present is that they must not contain the seeds of future war. The present butchery is great enough, and ruinous enough, to awaken in the minds of all the nations the desire and the determination that this shall be the last war. Well, if such is the determination of all the belligerents, the peace must not be made by the diplomatists, but by the peoples themselves. As a famous French historian, M. Ernest Lavisse, has written: "The war cannot end in a treaty of peace drawn up by diplomatists, for this would be a miserable ending to a great drama."

The war has revealed the vanity of treaties between

nations, and conventions, and international laws, because these treaties and laws are without sanctions. It is of importance, for the future of humanity, that the conventions which regulate the political status of the world shall have sanctions behind them, or, rather, shall be established on foundations so firm and so true that these very sanctions will be superfluous.

It was the diplomatists who, during the last two centuries, divided Europe into States, and this in so clumsy a fashion that they invariably increased, so to speak, the motives and the causes of conflict. Not to them, then, must the peoples confide the task of establishing the clauses of the peace treaty. This must be the task of the sociologists, geographers, economists, politicians, and thinkers of all the nations of earth. The task is solemn enough to necessitate the employment of the greatest human intelligence and the greatest human knowledge. If the peoples are so ignorant of their interests as to leave this task of determining the conditions of peace to the diplomatists, or even to the jurists, the work will have to be done again in less than half a century.

There is only one logical and inevitable end to the war: the victory of the Western Allies of the Fivefold Entente. However, as a matter of objectivity, let us for a moment admit the hypothesis of the victory of the Central Powers. In this case the conditions of peace would be very simple: they would entail the creation of a vast centralized Empire with small vassal kingdoms gravitating about it. No nation would exist save the conquering nation. It would mean the crushing of all by the stronger party. We will not insist on this hypothesis, for the war cannot end in the victory of Germany. The victory will inevitably fall to the Western Powers. Peace will then become a complex thing; even extremely complex. It will be complex because the Allied Governments have declared that

they wish to establish peace upon an absolute respect for the small nationalities, and because the Western peoples have expressed the same desire. Peace can only be established on the democratic foundations of liberty, and not on autocratic foundations.

Annexations of territory in Europe would constitute veritable acts of madness. There are those, however, who recommend them, for Belgium as well as for France. If we inquire who they are, we find they are the conservative, reactionary, and anti-democratic elements. In their propaganda in favour of annexation they are consistent with themselves, for, being partisans of militarism and international hatred, they naturally want a peace which will allow militarism and the causes of international hatred to survive. Sometimes, too, their desires are related to internal and political aims. Thus, the annexation to Belgium of the German provinces of the Rhine would reinforce the Belgian Catholic party, which would make it possible for that party to maintain the Catholic Government which, as we know, did not before the war represent the majority of Belgian electors. The annexation of the Rhine provinces to Belgium and France would be sheer madness, because it would do violence to the will of the annexed peoples, who would share neither the customs nor the language of the country which annexed them. There would therefore be lasting elements of disturbance, friction, discontent, and hatred, which in the future would resolve themselves into fresh conflicts. But this annexation in the West would also present a serious political danger, since it would authorize similar annexations in the East by Russia.

Like every autocratic empire, the Russian Empire is a vampire State which craves continually to enlarge itself by absorbing the territories and peoples. It is a menace to the democracies,\* and these must take care

\* Written before the Revolution of 1917.

to prevent the realization of its projects. It would be a stupendous political blunder to give autocratic Russia an appearance of justification in her desires for annexation. This blunder must not be committed: consequently neither Great Britain nor France nor Belgium must annex any of the European territories of Germany. The democratic Powers must set an example to Russia, for she would then find it difficult not to follow their example, difficult to demand annexations. Let us never forget that example is the most effective method of teaching.

We hope, then, that the nations will refuse to make annexations, and that they will demand a peace built upon a firm democratic foundation, the only foundation that can give a lasting and even final peace. What shall be the basis of this foundation ?

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In order to discover this basis, let us consider a moment the world of nature, the formation of soils, plants, and animals. We see that everything is composed of individuals—that is to say, of plainly defined aggregates of cells, themselves plainly defined. And we perceive that each element of the aggregate is free. Each individual possesses a liberty which is limited only by the liberties of the neighbouring individuals, all equal among themselves. Nature teaches, to him that observes her, a lesson of equality and a lesson of solidarity and fraternity. The naturalist can find no master in nature; he finds only equal individuals—that is to say, *equivalent* individuals; we do not say identical; having various functions, and being adapted to these functions. Nature teaches democracy—that is, the government of all by all. It is this teaching which men should follow in the establishment of their conditions of peace, if they truly desire a lasting peace. They can follow this essential teaching of nature, because the English and the French, on the cessation of hostilities, will be the real masters of the situation.

If the autocratic Russian Government wished to oppose this policy, its opposition would quickly be annihilated, either by the Russian people itself, or by the financial power of the Western peoples.

For the rest, the political remodelling of the globe could not be accomplished unless the neutral nations as a whole took part in it. It is to the interest of the Western nations to summon them to take part in it, for they are democracies, and in the establishment of the conditions of peace their influence can only be exerted in a democratic sense.

We must therefore follow the teaching of nature, and in the political remodelling of the globe we must take as basis the individual, with his enjoyment of liberty and equality. Equal individuals group themselves freely in free collectivities according to their affinities and similitudes, their languages, manners, customs, religion, and traditions. Thus are formed what are known as nationalities. Very often the dissimilarity of habits, tongues, and religions forms no obstacle to the aggregation of individuals as free groups, if their traditions and aspirations are in common. There is a Swiss nationality, although there are Swiss whose language and habits are German, others whose language and habits are French, others whose language and habits are Italian, while as to religion there are Swiss Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, etc.

Thus the essential characteristic of a nationality is not community of language, habits, and religion. It is rather the community of will, the community of the individual conscience. I am not speaking of race, for anthropologically speaking European humanity no longer reveals any races, so intermingled have men become in the course of thousands of years. The foundation of nationality is the desire of individuals to form themselves into a free, independent, and autonomous group. We shall encounter this desire in all

individuals and in all times. It existed from the free formation of the first human groups, and in the formation of great autocratic States also this desire played its part, but a much less important part than in the formation of the free nations.

Although the idea of nationality dates back far into the past of humanity, the politics of nationality is of much more recent date. Only when liberty had developed in the world could the politics of nationality appear and flourish. It is with the great French Revolution of 1789, with its motto of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Solidarity, that we see it dawning. In the course of the nineteenth century it evolved in practice as well as in doctrine and theory. Gradually those peoples, whom the will of potentates had divided into scattered fragments, and maintained in a political servitude of greater or less severity, recovered the consciousness of their national aspirations, and developed within themselves the desire to form a free and autonomous nation. The ideal matured, following a curve parallel to the curves of the growth of the ideal of liberty and democracy.

Thus, in 1900, at the time of the great series of International Congresses in Paris, the intellectuals of the small nations—Norwegians, Czechs, Georgians, and Lithuanians—conceived the idea of forming a society of small oppressed nationalities and of maintaining an organ in which their claims would be expressed. They thought of the international review, *L'Humanité Nouvelle*, of which I was then the editor, and they made me overtures accordingly. I welcomed these overtures with delight, for this was an effort which could but favour the ideals of liberty, equality, and solidarity which were so dear to me. Circumstances did not permit of the full realization of this attempt, but the facts show how the idea of nationality had gradually pervaded the whole of humanity.



Nationality is in opposition to the State. The basis of the State is force and constraint. The basis of nationality is liberty and the free will of individuals. The State may contain a number of nationalities, as do the autocratic States: the Russian Empire, the German Empire, and the Austrian Empire. In these States the attempt to denationalize is conducted in a violent and incessant manner. The nationalities are not assimilated, but subjected. The State is an artificial organism, produced by the will of a few individuals which imposes itself on masses of other individuals. The nation is a natural organism resulting from the common and freely expressed will of the collectivity of individuals. The State implies centralization and hegemony; nationality implies federation, and equality among the nations, or Internationalism. Switzerland, the United States of America, and to some extent the British Empire, which are all free federations, give us a just idea of the differences between centralized States, which destroy nationalities, and free federations, which conserve and create nationalities.

The national policy inevitably implies Internationalism—that is, a voluntary understanding, on a basis of equality, between the various nations. Just as in a human group the individual can develop himself completely only if all the other members of the group can develop themselves with like equality and freedom, so it is with a group of nations. Oppression always hampers the development of individuals, whether these individuals are plants, animals, men, or nations.

The foundations of nationality are liberty, equality, and solidarity. It follows from this that the determination of nationalities must be effected by the consultation of the individuals who form them—that is, by a referendum. On the other hand, it results from this that each national group must be independent and autonomous. The result of these necessary con-

ditions is that small national groups are preferable to large ones. It is easier, in fact, to obtain a community of interests, habits, language, and will in a small group than in one of considerable dimensions. Democracy is much easier of application in small groups. Life is far more intense in a small group than in a large one. It pervades the whole group, instead of being centralized at one point, as in great States.

An inevitable consequence of the existence of small national groups is an increase in the number of capitals—that is, in the number of centres of intellectual life. The heterogeneous organization of men tends to develop the artistic, scientific, and literary life; homogeneity restrains it. The great tentacular capitals, such as London, Paris, and Berlin, in reality diminish the productive power of the human mind, because they tend to make it uniform instead of tending to differentiate and diversify. Never have the great centralized Empires produced a harvest of artists, thinkers, scientists, and producers in every branch of human activity comparable to that of the small, free, autonomous cities. The process of centralization is a process which makes for homogeneity—that is, a process which weakens and kills the individual. Great men are born of small nationalities, of small cities, proud and free.

Each national group must be able to govern and administer itself in freedom, and to federate with its neighbours, in order to add the benefits of free association to those of individual liberty. It is obvious, in fact, that certain conditions of the life of the peoples reveal a community of interests binding together remote and neighbouring nations. Hence the utility, the necessity of organisms common to the same federation of peoples. Thus coinage, post, telegraphs, telephones, laws relating to copyright, etc., may to great advantage be unified into a larger and larger body of federations. In short, it is possible and even easy, if humanity desires

it, to profit at once by the advantages of small nationalities and those of great States. We can and should combine, on a solid foundation of liberty and equality, the process which makes for heterogeneity and that which makes for homogeneity.

These ideals, and the principle of nationality, should form the basis of territorial settlement on the conclusion of peace.

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The crux of the problem which is to be solved is not to be found in the West, nor even in the Balkans; but in the East, on the confines of the three Empires—Russian, German, and Austrian. It is Poland. A century ago Napoleon I. used to say: “The keystone of the European problem is Poland.” To-day it is truer than ever.

The Polish nationality, divided up between these Empires, has not been destroyed. It is deep-rooted and robust, having victoriously resisted the Russification and the Germanization which its masters have sought to impose upon it. It is important, for the sake of the future tranquillity of the world, that the Polish nationality shall recover its liberty and independence. The point in question is not the reconstitution of the ancient kingdom of Poland, for this kingdom contained conquered populations in Lithuania and the Ukraine; but the formation of the Polish nation as a new organism, freely established by the consent of all the Poles—that is, by popular referendum. But the formation of this new Poland implies the amputation of portions of these Empires—the Russian, German, and Austrian Empires. One of the Allied States—one of the victors—will be obliged to consent to this amputation of territory and population, which it holds by right of conquest—that is, by right of theft, the right of the stronger. Here, obviously, is a delicate situation, the more so as the Russian Government is infected with

officialism. It rules not in the interest of the nation, but in the interest of a caste. It is therefore unable to understand how far the reconstitution of the Polish nation in full autonomy and independence would liberate the Russian nation. It seems that the Russian people, to judge by the Imperial Duma and the Zemstvos, does understand this. Consequently, the bureaucratic Government may be deprived of Russian Poland, either by the will of the delegates elected by the Russian people itself, or by the will of other nations.

The Polish problem is not a Russo-Germanic problem; it is international. It is the part of the other nations—that is, of the British Empire, France, and Italy—to demand the solution of this problem on lines which shall be in conformity with the principles which they have declared they are upholding—that is, in conformity with the principle of nationality. In this way a Polish nation would be formed of some twenty-four millions of inhabitants, which would completely separate the Russian Empire from the German populations, for Poland, including Dantzic, would extend to the Baltic Sea. We must not have an autonomous Poland under the ægis of the Russian Government, but a fully independent Poland; for if Poland and Russia were bound together as superior and inferior, their relations would be a source of continually recurring difficulties. This would be the maggot in the fruit.\*

The complete and actual independence of Poland is the condition *sine qua non* of a final peace. Poland, being fully independent, could federate herself with the other national groups of Slavs which will necessarily

\* I expressed these ideas to my auditors at Birkbeck College on March 4, 1916. In October, 1916, the Governments of Germany and Austria had confirmed the principle of these ideas by constituting their kingdom of Poland. The international nature of the Polish problem became apparent to all when Great Britain, France, and Italy took note of the promise of the Russian Government. I have nothing to withdraw of what I said in March, 1916. The entire independence of Poland is the only solution which will completely liberate Russia.

arise from this war. But the concert of the world's Powers must demand and guarantee the independence of Poland. At the same time it should require of the Polish people guarantees for the non-Polish minorities residing upon the territory of the new nation. Thus, for example, the Jewish problem is quite as international as the Polish question. To make an end of all subjects of dispute or conflict, the political liberty and equality of the Jews must be guaranteed, no matter what nation they dwell among.

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The reconstitution of Poland will mutilate the German Empire and the kingdom of Prussia. The conditions of peace, however, cannot permit the Empire to continue upon its present foundations of centralization and militarism. There are in this Empire countries and populations which have been forcibly wrested from other States. I am speaking of Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine. These populations cannot remain German *if they do not wish to do so*. They must be consulted by means of the referendum.

In France there are very many—perhaps they are even the majority—who refuse this popular consultation. They argue that violence does not create a right, and that Alsace-Lorraine, forcibly wrested from France in 1870, reverts in justice to France. The conclusion of this argument by no means follows from the premises. The administration of a country by a conquering Power might be so excellent that the inhabitants would prefer to remain under their new rulers.

The only safe principle which will insure that the will of the inhabitants is not outraged is that of popular consultation. France was vividly aware of this when Nice and Savoy were consulted in order to discover whether they would accept union with France. It is important that the same procedure should be followed with regard to Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine. This

consultation of the people obviously involves certain difficulties; will immigrants and the sons of immigrants be included in it? This is a detail which can assuredly be settled once the principle of the popular referendum is admitted. It is to the interest of the French democracy to employ the referendum in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, for it will thereby establish a principle of liberty which will force the Allies of France, and Russia in particular, to follow the example set them. The France of the great Revolution owes it to herself to see that the principles included in her glorious device—Liberty, Equality, Solidarity—become part of the political morality of international relations.

The consultation of the populations of Schleswig, Poland, and Alsace-Lorraine will inevitably result in the breaking-up of the German Empire. It does not follow that Germany must be divided into a multitude of little groups, which must be prevented from federating. This would be to do violence to the will of the Germans, and, in consequence, to foster among them the seeds of hatred, which would germinate and, at a later date, result in a harvest of bloodshed. It will simply be necessary to shatter the hegemony of the Prussian State, which was imposed by force of arms in the second half of the nineteenth century, and to leave the peoples of Germany to federate themselves in freedom and according to their needs. The Revolution of 1848, which miscarried, thanks to Prussia, must be continued and consummated. The disappearance of Imperial centralization would give renewed life to the many small centres of intellectual life. Science, art, letters, and philosophy would flourish and expand as they have not done for half a century. The line of the great thinkers and artists, which was interrupted by the Empire—which created only great specialists—would reappear, the inevitable fruit of the liberty which is lacking to the Germany of to-day.

If humanity wishes to prevent wars in the future, it must not degrade and diminish the German people, but must liberate it from the yoke of its masters. We must never forget that men, whether they will or not, are, all the world over, bound together by the ties of solidarity, and that to abase one's neighbour is to abase and diminish oneself.

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The Empire of Austria-Hungary is a State which is absolutely artificial in formation: an aggregate of various nationalities, which are not only not merged into one another, but are still antagonistic. This Empire will inevitably be broken up if, according to reason, the principles of nationality and the popular referendum are applied. The subjugated nationalities will recover their liberty with delight, and already we find them conducting a propaganda of independence in France, England, Switzerland, America, etc.

There is, to begin with, a Slav group in the north-east—the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks; a portion of this group—quite a small portion, certainly—inhabits Prussian Silesia. There is here a population of some twelve millions inhabiting an area of 46,000 square miles. But one factor somewhat complicates the situation. This is the presence of some three and a half millions of Germans, who are scattered amid the eight and a half million Czechs who inhabit Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovenia. Consultation of the population would give a majority of nearly three to one in favour of the Czech nationality. The new nation must be independent; but, as in the case of Poland, the World Concert of Nations which will preside over the birth of this nation will demand guarantees, that the German minority shall enjoy the same rights and liberties as the Slav majority. Here, again, the principles of liberty and equality are imperative. They will be all the more readily applicable in that the basis of the

new nation will be federative, with Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovenia forming autonomous groups. The formation of such a nation does not present such difficulties as might *a priori* be supposed. It would be sufficient to follow the Swiss or Canadian model.

The same remark applies to the Yougoslav groups, in the south-west of the Austrian Empire. There are nearly twenty millions of Serbs living in Slavonia, Croatia, Syrmia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Serbia, and Banat. This Slav population wishes to amalgamate itself with the independent kingdom of Serbia. Unfortunately, in the course of history, as much as a result of economic conditions as of conquest, these populations have become excessively intermingled here with Italians and Germans, there with Magyars, elsewhere with Rumanians. This intermingling greatly complicates the problem to be solved, the more so as differences of religion—Catholicism, Greek Orthodoxy, Mohammedanism, etc.—must be added to differences of language. Certain towns on the shores of the Adriatic contain Italian majorities, while the hinterland is largely populated by Slavs. In Banat, the eastern portion is chiefly Rumanian; Transylvania is wholly Rumanian, with islands of Magyar or German inhabitants.

The interpenetration and admixture of the peoples is such that the formation of a Yougoslav kingdom would certainly lead to the oppression of the German, Magyar, Rumanian, and Italian minorities, unless certain precautions were taken. The foundations of these precautions can only consist of liberty and equality, if we wish the new nation to be solidly established. Each group—Croat, Slavonic, etc.—must be autonomous and independent, with equal social and political rights for all citizens, without distinction of language or religion, under the guarantee of the other nations of the world. A federation would bind all these Yougoslav elements together. We must not permit of the



creation of a centralized Slav Empire, for this, in the near or remote future, would tend to enslave the allogenuous minorities. Only a free federation would permit of the progressive development of all without friction and without shock, for among the groups there are differences of culture. The northern and north-western groups possess a more highly developed culture—scientific, literary, and artistic—than the southern and south-eastern groups (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia). This Yougoslav federation would have its ports on the Adriatic as Poland would have them on the Baltic. The Trentino and the Gorizia district are populated chiefly by Italians. A popular referendum would reveal their desire for unification with the kingdom of Italy. Transylvania, which is wholly Rumanian, and the east of Banat, which is also Rumanian, must be free to unite themselves with the kingdom of Rumania. It is desirable that Bessarabia, inhabited also by a majority of Rumanians, should be restored by Russia to Rumania. This would be to the interest of Russia no less than to the interest of Rumania. But this desire cannot be realized so long as the bureaucratic autocracy governs Russia.

Hungary should be free and independent, while the Germanic region of Austria, the Viennese region, becoming autonomous, would be free to federate with all the rest of the German groups. This would mean the complete disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that artificial aggregate, without reality, of inimical nationalities. We should thus have a free Germanic federation, a federation of the Northern Slavs, a federation of the Southern Slavs, a reconstituted Poland, and an aggrandized Rumania. There would be still other questions to be solved, but they would pertain to Russia rather than to the nations as a whole. I am referring to the problems of Finland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, or White Russia. During the whole

of the nineteenth century Finland was absolutely autonomous under the protectorate of the Tsar—the Grand Duke of Finland. It was by a violation of his formal promise that this autonomy disappeared in the last years of the nineteenth century. We know how injurious this ill-treatment of Finland has been to Russia and to the Allies in the course of this war, since it is the cause of the hostility displayed, only too obviously at times, by neutral Sweden.

So long as there are in the world peoples who are enslaved, subjected against their will to a rule which they abhor, there will remain in the world causes of conflict and destruction. How much more advantageous to the whole of humanity, and therefore to the Russian people, were Finland to recover her autonomy, were Lithuania and White Russia—whose manner, language, religion, and traditions differ from those of Great Russia—to be autonomous under the Muscovite ægis. Is it not possible for the Russian Empire to establish itself on the federative model of the British Empire? It is obviously possible, but the power of the bureaucracy must first be shattered. Perhaps—and it is greatly to be desired—this will be one of the results of the world-war.

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As for the Balkan region, the difficulties of a solution are really even greater than those of which we have been speaking. This arises from the fact that the consultation of the people is rendered difficult by their lack of culture, by their low plane of civilization. It is obvious that the Bulgarian people ought to remain free and independent, for any other arrangement would constitute a ferment of hatred and disturbance. But there is Thrace, and Macedonia! Statistics according to nationality are more or less misleading; and according to the opinions or the nationality of the statistician

the figures vary completely. It would be necessary, we think, for an international commission of geographers, ethnologists, economists, and politicians to effect the partition of these territories, according to the majority of the populations, among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, always making the liberty and equality of the minorities a basis of action, and establishing a constitutional statute guaranteed by the world-concert of Powers.

Perhaps the best solution would be the autonomy and independence of Macedonia, instead of its partition. Each linguistic group enjoying equal rights, a new nationality would gradually be formed, founded on liberty, as Switzerland has been formed during the course of the last five centuries. For Albania, too, the solution is obviously independence, with guarantees that the minorities will enjoy political and social rights equal to those of the majority.

The same situation obtains in Asia Minor, bathed by the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. For certain islands the population may, and should, be consulted. But it is impossible to consult the Continental population—Greek, Jewish, Turkish, Armenian, etc.—mixed as it is, and often so imperfectly civilized. It would be necessary, for these regions, to follow the example set by the United States of America in Cuba and the Philippines—that is to say, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, etc., should be entrusted to such countries, for instance, as England, France, Russia, Italy. It would be their duty to administrate and develop these countries under a régime of autonomy and liberty for a determined period, say of twenty, thirty, or forty years, after which these regions would become independent. The world as a whole would guarantee the execution of the conventions relating to these countries. Neither the peoples nor the territories would become the possession of the ruling Powers. The latter would

merely have a function to fulfil, a mission to accomplish, for the good of the peoples under their rule.

This system, based upon liberty and equality, is the only one which would suppress all causes of discontent and rebellion among the peoples. If, on the contrary, these territories and populations were distributed among the victorious belligerents, the dominated peoples would inevitably suffer injury and annoyance, and the result would be countless centres of hatred and revolt. Each ethnical group must be allowed to preserve its language, its customs, and its religion; only their social and economic conditions must so work upon them as to modify them, and the individual must suffer no constraint.

All these regions are, by force of circumstances, in a backward stage of civilization, whether as regards industry, or trade, or culture, as compared with the Western countries. The best means of developing them from every point of view is to open means of communication—roads, railways, and canals—to exploit the mineral wealth of the country, and finally to industrialize it. These economic changes would necessarily, after the lapse of a little time, bring about political and social modifications which would very greatly consolidate the autonomy of the linguistic groups, and would lead them to federate among themselves, as the States of North America are federated.

As for Constantinople and the Dardanelles, they must be internationalized. Their possession by Russia would be prejudicial to Rumania and Bulgaria, who might be bottled up in the Black Sea, just as Russia is now. Constantinople in the hands of the Greeks or Bulgars would present the same objections. What Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and all the countries of the world require is the free navigation of the Straits, so that their merchant fleets may pass freely from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The only means of realizing

this universal desideratum is to insure that Constantinople and the Dardanelles shall not belong to any great Power, but shall be free and autonomous, under the guarantee of the World Concert of Powers.\*

The German Empire possessed colonies in Africa, the Far East, and Oceania; these it has lost. When peace is concluded, are these colonies to be restored? We think not: in the first place because the German Empire will have ceased to exist as a centralized Empire. But if these colonies are not restored to the German Empire, the German people must at least have free access to them; free trade must be the rule there, and, in a word, the Germans must be able to enter or trade with these countries on the same conditions as any other nation. Here we are dealing principally with economic conditions, of which we shall speak again later. These ex-colonies of Germany should be divided among the nations possessing colonies bordering upon them, but according to a statute established by an international commission of business men, geographers, and politicians, guaranteeing liberty and equality of treatment and of rights for all persons, no matter what their

\* Nine months after I spoke these words in the University of London the Russian Prime Minister, M. Trépov, made public the understanding between the Allies on the subject of Constantinople. The city is to be Russian. But nothing assures us that the British, French, and Italian Parliaments will ratify these secret conventions of the diplomatists, conventions which are valid only after ratification by Parliament. Despite all the engagements which Russia may have concluded in order to guarantee the free navigation of the Dardanelles by merchant vessels to Rumania and other nations, I regard this solution of the question as a bad one. Constantinople is not a city peopled by Russians, nor even by Slavs. It is not the Russian people which demands Constantinople, but the Russian autocracy and bureaucracy. Always the craving for territory, in order to create posts for officials! Moreover, besides Constantinople, there is its hinterland. M. Trépov's statement does not reveal its fate. Constantinople in the hands of Russia would be an element of discord among the nations of Europe; it would imperil the peace of the world. Constantinople free and autonomous would assure the peace of the world. If the Western nations are wise they will not assist in the aggrandizement of the Muscovite Empire, which is already too large.

nationality or religion, and for all products, whatever their origin.

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If the territorial settlement is effected on the bases of which I have given the outline, all causes of war in the future will have been eliminated. More, whole countries will be thrown open to an intensive economic exploitation, while the populations will be invited to enjoy the benefits of political equality and liberty. Such a political settlement, on the conclusion of peace, would for ever shatter the obsolete power of secret diplomacy. Secret diplomacy would cease to be, because the reasons for its existence will have disappeared. Diplomacy exists because external political conflicts have to be prevented or provoked. As the settlement which we have outlined would suppress the possibility of these conflicts, since it would rest on the corner-stones of liberty, equality, and solidarity, there would be no further need of secret diplomacy.

Is it possible to effect such a territorial settlement? Assuredly yes. It is all the more possible in that all nationalities are profoundly stirred, and are directing their activities toward this goal. It will suffice to co-ordinate the rather chaotic confusion of individual and national initiative. The democratic elements of the whole world will uphold and assist in a settlement based on liberty and equality. All the progressive and intelligent forces of belligerents and neutrals are tending toward the realization of this solution, which would bring final peace to a world bled white by years of slaughter. Of course, this territorial settlement must be completed by a settlement of economic conditions and a system of disarmament, which we shall examine later on.

The conditions which the war has created in respect of the relations of the national groups are working vigorously for some such solution as that we have just

been describing. No doubt the conservative and reactionary forces, which are still so vigorous everywhere, will tend to react against these tendencies, and to maintain the artificial States which do violence to the will of the human collectivities. But we hope that these conservative forces will be reduced to impotence by the peoples, as the latter become conscious of their needs and their ability to realize them. We believe that the peace which will follow this war will establish a territorial system in conformity with the policy of the nationalities, and that it will therefore be a final peace, reposing on the three corner-stones of every solid human structure—liberty, equality, and solidarity.

Any other peace would be merely a truce.

If peace between the nations is established on these principles it would seem that these principles must more or less promptly and extensively be applied in the interior of each State. It is probable that the disappearance of the centralized Central Empires will react on the Russian Empire and the British Empire, impelling the former to introduce measures of liberalism and democracy, and the latter to become a simple federal Empire. The autonomy of India cannot be long delayed. As for Irish Home Rule, it must be realized without delay. Very probably from the British point of view we are witnessing two processes which are apparently contradictory and in reality complementary: a tightening of the federative bond, and an increasing autonomy of the federated units. The Dominions will no doubt participate more effectively and more directly in the control of the federation than is at present the case.\*

\* In June, 1916, three months after I spoke these words at the Birkbeck College, the British Prime Minister invited the Irish to accept the immediate realization of Home Rule for all Ireland, save the six counties of Ulster, which would have nothing to do with it. He added that after the war a Federal Parliament, including representatives from England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and all the Dominions,

It seems, then, that the world, and especially Europe, considered as a whole, will see, after the war, an extension of political liberty and of democracy. It will reveal itself by a new political division of the map of Europe, based on the principle of nationality. And thus the artificial States of to-day will be replaced by organic nations, endowed with a real and intense life. We believe, then, that this frightful war will play an enormous part in the history of the world's civilization. We believe a great blessing will spring from a great evil. But do not let us forget that this great blessing would have been attained as surely, and at a much smaller cost, although more slowly, if peace had never been broken. The whole world, indeed, is progressing toward a constant increase of liberty and equality, and nothing can stop its progress. The war will only have accelerated it.

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would determine the political constitution of the Empire and its federated units. Home Rule for Ireland miscarried yet again, on account of the division of Ireland into two parts; but it is possible, and even probable, that before the end of the war Home Rule will at last be realized in Ireland, and this to the great advantage of England, Scotland, and Wales.



## CHAPTER XII

### AFTER THE WAR: ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Economic conditions—State indebtedness will be doubled or trebled—The results of war loans in place of taxation—War indemnities—Germany cannot pay an indemnity, save to Belgium—The budgets of the nations will be doubled or trebled—Changes of assessment for taxation—Income tax—States must economize.

Most people will be poorer—A few will be richer—Displacement of wealth—The industrial and commercial effort—The economic conflict—The policy of customs unions would continue the war—Its international and national results, political and social—The development of machinery—The need of capital: the increase of the rate of interest—The dearth of labour and its deterioration as to quality—Female labour—The economic intersexual conflict—The way to remedy the deficiency of labour: the consequences—Intensification of the class conflict—The demobilization of the armies—How will it be effected?—The psychological effects of the war and of military life—The modifications of mentality to be looked for—A revolutionary state of mind will coincide with revolutionary economic conditions—The results—The idea of revolutionary movements after the war is general—How to avoid them.

The condition of science, letters, and the arts—The scientific "boom"—The tendency of art toward realism—The public is surfeited with the war—In the near future art will be humorous and cheerful, not tragic—International relations and artists.

**P**ERHAPS many readers will be tempted to regard as Utopian the political conditions which I have examined in the preceding chapter. Evidently there is no certainty that the territorial system of Europe will be established on the basis of nationality and the free consent of the peoples. But one thing is certain, without any possibility of dispute. It is this: that if the settlement is not effected on this basis there will remain in the world the seeds of national hatreds, which, sooner or later, will yield a harvest of fratricidal conflict, like that which has for nearly three years been ravaging humanity.

It is, however, highly probable that the new political division of Europe will be established on the basis of the popular referendum, the principle of nationalities, and respect for the rights of minorities, for only this method of division will satisfy the unanimous desire of the peoples to avoid future conflicts. The results of this war are so disastrous from every point of view that the whole of humanity is demanding that this shall be the last war.

If we envisage the conditions which will obtain after the war from the economic point of view, we shall immediately perceive an immense increase of State indebtedness. Each of the five great belligerent nations will have increased its indebtedness by about £4,000,000,000, merely in order to cover the expenses of the war, without reckoning the indemnities for property destroyed, and the pensions for the widows and orphans and disabled soldiers.

It would have been possible to avoid increasing these State debts to such a degree. The Governments might simply have resorted to the taxation of wealth, instead of raising loans at long or short terms. But they preferred loans, because these would mask the devastation created by the war. The truth was concealed. The peoples did not realize the cost of the war. They did not perceive the gulf into which the Imperialistic folly of the few was dragging them, and it was consequently impossible that the determination should be born in them to arrest this frantic rush toward the abyss. However, I must record the fact that Great Britain did partly adopt a financial policy of taxation, raising the tax on income and imposing new taxes. France, at the beginning of the third year of war, seemed inclined to follow suit, but very timidly. I may observe, in passing, that it was the most democratic of all the belligerents which employed this system, the only one which enables the people to realize more or less where it stands.

To the cost of the war properly so-called we must add the indemnities for the properties, factories, and products seized or destroyed by the enemy. I am not speaking of the possible indemnities which in justice should be paid to all those whom the war has more or less completely ruined, whom it has thrown out of their situations, thereby casting them down—them and theirs—into poverty and destitution. I doubt whether this host will ever be indemnified; on the other hand, the property destroyed or seized by the enemy will give rise to indemnities.

Will a defeated Germany pay these indemnities? Their total will exceed £2,000,000,000, for we must not forget that the regions invaded, despoiled, and ruined by Germany are Belgium and the industrial districts of France and Poland—all very wealthy because highly productive. In all equity it is Germany that should pay these indemnities, for it was her ruling classes who loosed the scourge of war upon the world. But could she pay them? Considering everything, I fear not.

When peace closes the era of battles, Germany will be burdened by a new debt of at least £4,000,000,000. She will have to pay pensions to some millions of widows, orphans, and disabled soldiers. Her annual budget will be increased by more than £280,000,000. In short, she will be completely exhausted, on the brink of bankruptcy. The financial world is well aware of this, and a proof may be found in the continual decrease of the value of the mark. Germany, therefore, will be in no position to pay an indemnity of £1,000,000,000 to £2,000,000,000 to cover the destruction and the ruin which she has accomplished. Some say that the Allies might force her to pay it by controlling her customs, by seizing her railways and her mines. True, but this would be of no use unless commerce and industry were vigorously resumed—that is, unless Germany were able to trade freely with the whole world. If the security

in the hands of the Allies is to be of any value, the policy of free trade and the open door must be allowed full play. Moreover, the control exercised by the Allies must be only a very limited control, or the German people would be so completely impoverished that, on the one hand, the security would be valueless, while, on the other, the seeds of hatred would linger in the German people and would eventually germinate and grow to maturity.

Each nation, therefore—excepting, of course, Belgium—must herself repair the losses which the war has inflicted upon it. Each nation, therefore, will see its annual budget increased by at least £240,000,000. For many generations European humanity will be burdened with the consequences of this absurd and insane war.

Each year the peoples will have to pay budgets which will have been doubled, tripled, or even worse, according to the duration of the war. A huge budget means enormous taxes. Everywhere the assessment of taxation will perforce undergo more or less considerable modifications. It is obvious to everybody that excessive indirect taxation levied on alimentary products is impossible. It will be necessary, therefore, to rely upon the various forms of income-tax. Given the size of the budgets, a proportional and progressive income-tax will be required. If the budgetary expenditure is to be met by this expedient this tax will soon reach an average of 40 per cent. to 50 per cent., and even more. No doubt the death duties will also be considerably increased.

However, these duties and taxes will react on the life of the individual and the family; they will have to reduce their ordinary standard of living. Economical habits will be a matter of necessity. But the poorer folk—working men, peasants, small shopkeepers, petty officials—cannot reduce their standard of living, for it is already only too modest, more often than not inferior

to that demanded by a healthy life, considered from the material, intellectual, and moral points of view. It is the rich, then, who must assume the burden of compulsory economy, for they alone can reduce their standard of living without diminishing their welfare below the level of the normal. They possess a surplus, and it is this surplus which must be taxed.

Before the war, on the average, not more than a sixth of the mean income of each bread-winner was applied to meeting the expenditure of the collectivity. After the war half these incomes will have to be thus applied, and, as I was remarking, this is only possible if the incomes are large and permit of a standard of life above the normal type.

In such a condition of the budget it will follow that economy will be as incumbent on the State as on the individual. The State will be forced to decrease its expenditure. It cannot reduce the payment of interest on its loans; it cannot reduce its war pensions; it cannot perceptibly economize in the matter of political administration. It will have to save money in other directions. How? In respect of education, social hygiene, social legislation, the armies and the fleets? We shall consider these possibilities in the following chapter. But however these necessary economies may be affected, we are confronted by an economic situation which borders on exhaustion and general ruin. All the States of Europe are terribly impoverished, and it will require years to efface the last traces of this general ruin. If the war lasts or exceeds three years, the burdens will be so great that we may reasonably doubt whether the peoples will be able to fulfil them. It may very well be that the situation will end in a general liquidation.

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The world-war, then, is more or less effectually ruining the belligerent States, all of whose debts will be doubled or trebled; but still more is it ruining individuals,

although a few of them are growing wealthy. The long duration of the war has rendered more perceptible this progressive impoverishment of manufacturers, merchants clerks, and working men, and members of the Liberal profession. It is only a small minority which is enriching itself in any extreme degree. Thus we find that in England, for example, certain steamship companies, foundries, iron works, munition works, and frozen meat companies increased their profits in 1915, after deducting war taxes, in proportions varying from twofold to sixfold, as the following table shows:

	1914.	1915.
	£	£
Smithfield and Argentine Meat Co. ..	25,732	142,055
Waring and Gillow .. ..	35,217	100,885
Projectile Co. .. ..	30,730	194,136
Lanarkshire Steel .. ..	22,144	45,985
Frederick Leyland Steamship Co. ..	337,188	1,196,683
Sutherland Steamship Co. .. ..	94,600	295,200

In all countries the same phenomenon may be noted. It has been observed in France, Germany, and Russia. Consequently there is a displacement of wealth and a diminution in the number of large fortunes. Germany is certainly the country most impoverished, for her commercial traffic has been enormously reduced.

This general phenomenon of the impoverishment of the greater number and the enrichment of a small number shows how impossible it is to obtain justice in a society based upon individual wealth. Some allow themselves to be killed at the front; others are enriching themselves! This fact proves once again that there can be no justice in a society if there is no economic equality between the individuals who compose it.

But this displacement of wealth results in the impoverishment of a number of persons who are naturally discontented, and their discontent is increased by the fact that they see others enriching themselves, not on account of their efforts or their intelligence, but because of the circumstances of the war.

In the course of this war vast quantities of things will have been destroyed or consumed. They will, of course, have to be replaced. The need will be great and immediate. Therefore, at the end of the war, there will certainly be a considerable industrial and commercial "boom." All the factories and workshops which have been producing the engines of death will without delay be transformed so as to produce the instruments of life. This transformation will probably be effected without difficulty. The industries will rapidly adapt themselves to the new requirements, just as they adapted themselves to the requirements of the war, and all over the world there will be a general competition to resume the ordinary tasks of life as it was before the war—that is, we shall witness, as always, a struggle between groups of capitalists to monopolize the markets.

Already, in the midst of war, the world of finance, industry, and commerce is preparing, in every country, for this economic conflict. The capitalistic aims of the war are thus plainly revealed. Those who are undertaking a propaganda in favour of schemes of customs unions between the Central Powers on the one hand, and the Western Powers on the other, care nothing whatever about liberating the world from the yoke of militarism, or permitting the small nations to live in independence. For them only commercial and industrial interests exist.

In all countries a campaign is being skilfully conducted with the object of convincing the peoples of the value of a customs union between the Allies. The Chambers of Commerce, the heads of the great industrial firms, and the professors of political economy are celebrating the advantages of a policy of protection. In the newspapers there are whispers to the effect that Germany—which seems improbable and almost impossible—is accumulating stocks of merchandise with which to inundate the world when peace is concluded, and that

the only way to parry this blow is to raise a wall of prohibitive customs duties between the Central Powers and all the Allies, in order to prevent imports of German origin. In short, they recommend the continuation of the struggle against Germany once peace is signed. Instead of fighting with guns and rifles we should fight with tariffs. It would still be war, but under a different form—a war without end.

Let us examine for a moment the consequences of such a protectionist policy. From the industrial and scientific point of view, protectionism results in a stabilization of industry and a check on progress. The leaders of industry no longer need to improve their material and their products, for they are protected from competition by import duties. Commercial superiority is no longer due to superiority of equipment and of products, but to the tariff. With the disappearance of the element of liberty the vital principle of emulation disappears. Protectionism is a malady of industry and commerce which ends, sooner or later, in death.

From the political point of view protectionism, so ardently defended by the industrial and commercial magnates, would divide the world into two parties permanently in conflict. The neutrals would be forced to take sides, ranging themselves on one hand or the other, entering one of the two customs unions. Inevitably the United States of America would, with more or less vigour, take the part of the Central Empires, which would thus be strengthened instead of weakened by this economic war. In the case of a customs union the States of North and South America could not enter the union of the Allies, for then the protection of British and French industry, trade, and agriculture would be non-existent. Protection can exist only if America remains outside the protective tariff. The situation would be otherwise in the case of the Central



Powers, which would thus be impelled to draw closer their economic bonds with North and South America.

Such an economic policy would reconstitute a German Empire on a very strong foundation, both economic and moral. The permanent commercial and industrial antagonism would react upon the life of the peoples, would maintain and increase misunderstanding and hatred. Violent and bloodthirsty national conflicts would be inevitable. The only possibility of future peace would reside in the increasing strength of the Socialist parties. But given the differences in the conceptions of Socialism, according as it is centralizing or federative, and the maintenance of national antagonisms, this future peace would be dispelled to a very remote future.

From the point of view of the internal conditions of each State, the protectionist policy would have consequences no less disastrous. The cost of manufactured articles and of the products of the soil would everywhere increase. Life would become dearer, and naturally a desire for an increase of wages would follow. The workers everywhere would feel the need of increased earnings, and the result would be an intensification of the conflicts with employers, who for their part would do their utmost not to increase wages, in order to keep for themselves the benefits of the protective tariff. On the other hand, a protectionist policy tends to increase the autocratic régime of each country, because this policy is adopted to favour a minority of producers against the majority of the people, the consumers. Protectionism is essentially anti-democratic. Therefore, if the nations at war allow their rulers to establish these customs unions, they will allow them to forge chains which will keep them in servitude.

However, it is important to note that a policy of fiscal union, dividing the world into two groups of competing nations, would constitute an improvement over the protectionist systems of separate nations.

In fact, there would not only be an opposition of interests; there would also be a union of interests in the heart of each of the two groups. And then an understanding between the two groups would be more easily obtained than by the protectionist policy applied by separate nations. This sociological phenomenon would be all the more pronounced if the two antagonistic groups were not centralized Empires, but freely confederated States. The aim of Imperialism is to dominate, and its means are force and violence. The aim of federalism is to diminish the intensity of the conflict in the midst of the federated nations, and to increase their mutual aid; its means are reason and demonstration.

However, a policy of customs unions between two hostile groups would be of less advantage than a policy of free exchange for all. It would weaken the democratic and reinforce the autocratic elements; it would diminish the average standard of popular welfare, and would increase the wealth of a small minority to the prejudice of the masses. It would sow hatred between the nations, and would therefore be destructive of life, for only love is productive of life. For the future of humanity and for the good of the individual it is to be hoped that mankind will not commit the folly of raising a wall of more or less prohibitive tariffs between the peoples. If we wish this war to be the last war we must suppress national hatreds, and we can only do this by suppressing the motives of hatred. One of these is economic antagonism. Let us suppress it by a system of free and equalitarian exchange. Human progress can be established upon one basis only: the liberty and equality of individuals and of groups.

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Whatever economic policy the nations may be wise or foolish enough to pursue, we shall witness an extraordinary industrial and commercial activity in all countries as soon as the war is over, and as labour will

everywhere be scarcer and less skilful—for more than 13,000,000 men will be either dead or unfit for industrial production—it will be necessary to develop the use of machinery. The workshops will have to be transformed, with more powerful and more perfect machinery.

From this necessity, resulting from the need of production, a very important consequence will emerge—a great need of capital. On every side there will be an urgent appeal for capital—money—with which to reconstruct all that has been destroyed, and to exploit the countries of the East and the Balkans, which will be open to capitalistic enterprise. There will be a veritable rush for mines, railways, commercial and agricultural exploitations, etc. Now the war will have resulted in a scarcity of European capital, to the profit of American capital, which will find itself in such a position as it has never before attained.

Even during the course of the war the need of capital is making itself felt. Thus in Germany we see the formation of industrial unions, trusts, or syndicates, their aim being to obtain an increase of capital. The mining companies are combining with navigation companies; the electrical industries of the two Central Empires are federating themselves. This is a continuation of the process of capitalistic concentration which existed before the war. It is a sign that after the war economic competition will be intensified, and that the war of classes will be resumed with vigour.

The need of capital after the war will probably exceed the offer; the result will be an increase of the rate of interest paid on money, whence will result a tendency to raise the price of products. The need for labour will also be greater than the offer, which will contribute to produce the same results.

The dearth of labour will be considerable, as a result of the deaths caused by the war (at least eight millions), and the number of men disabled (at least five millions),

and the decrease or increase of emigration. Thus it is certain that after the war there will be fewer Belgians and Italians emigrating to France for seasonal labour. The same will be true of the Slavs. On the other hand, it seems probable that with the increase of fiscal burdens throughout Europe large numbers of young men will emigrate overseas, to America or Australia or Africa. This seems all the more probable in that two or three years of military life will evoke a thirst for liberty and an open-air life, which cannot be satisfied in the workshops, factories, and offices. The for life emigration of the agriculturist and the shepherd will therefore increase when the war is over. In this way the supply of male labour after the war will be greatly diminished. The diminished quality of labour will be no less conspicuous, partly because many skilled men will have been lost, and partly because the manual and intellectual skill of the survivors will be lessened by long want of practice.

To compensate for the dearth of male workers there will obviously be female workers. During the war, as we know, women have in many trades replaced the men called to arms. The habit of work in the factory and office has thus been developed in the female sex. This fact has reacted upon domestic labour, which has become more difficult to obtain. After the war the economic conflict between the two sexes will increase, the more so as the employers are endeavouring to pay lower wages to the women. This economic and sexual conflict may, and assuredly will, become very acute if the women fail to grasp the utility of trades unionism or syndicalism, and the importance of professional solidarity and mass action, and if the men refuse, through an injurious exclusiveness, to receive the women into their unions. Just as the unions unite the workers independently of their national origin or religious beliefs, so they should unite them independently of sex. Pro-

fessional and class interests have nothing to do with the question of sex.

Instead of a proletarian conflict between the sexes we must have an understanding between the sexes, otherwise the capitalist class will profit by this sexual conflict. Here, again, we perceive the harmful nature of conflict and the beneficial nature of understanding.

Whether there be conflict or understanding between the sexes as regards the conditions of labour, we shall find, after the war, that the supply of labour will still be insufficient for the needs of production. It is possible, to judge by tendencies which have revealed themselves during the war, that the employers will attempt to make up for this dearth of labour by a partial repeal of the laws protecting labour (laws respecting the hours of work, and the labour of children and women), and also by resorting to Asiatic and African labour. These two systems of replacing the missing workers will lead to an increased antagonism between employers and employed. And this antagonism will result in strikes to maintain the laws protecting labour, to decrease the hours of work or to prevent their increase, to obtain higher wages, and to prevent the introduction of coloured labour.

It will be to the interest of the human collectivity to maintain and improve the laws protecting labour, which are the only means of preventing the degeneration of the human species by overwork and bad workshop conditions, etc. It will also be to the interest of the collectivity, not to refrain from resorting to Asiatic or African labour, but to give these workers wages equal to those of European workers. This is the only means, in fact, of preventing racial hatred, which would result, sooner or later, in sanguinary conflicts.

We may therefore assert that after the war we shall be confronted by economic conditions, and conditions of labour, which will tend to intensify the conflict

between the classes. Mankind will not be wise enough to diminish this conflict or to cause its disappearance by acquiescing in the economic equality of all men.

This class conflict will even reach the acuteness of a revolutionary situation, as may be foreseen if we study the economic, moral, and intellectual conditions which will obtain after the war.

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A serious problem will present itself on the cessation of hostilities: that of demobilizing the armies and the munition factories—that is, of returning the able-bodied soldiers and the workers to their homes. If it is done suddenly some millions of men will all at once be thrown into the labour market, whence a profound disturbance and a tendency toward lower wages, while the cost of living would tend to increase. If we wish to avoid trouble we must restore the men to their homes progressively, a few at a time, and not too quickly, lest there shall at first be a plethora of labour and a dearth of employment. The organization of the work of finding places for the workmen and clerks returned from the war might be greatly facilitated by the trades unions, if these were enabled to treat with the employers and to furnish them with the necessary workers. Unfortunately, on the one hand, the employers prefer to maintain individual and not collective relations with their employees; on the other hand, many workers entertain a dislike of the collective activity of the unions, failing to understand their real interests, so that there will be difficulties in the way of the organization of the work of placing the released men by the unions. The result will be that the work of demobilizing the armies and munition factories will be made more difficult and more lengthy.

However, the trades unions will, by the force of things, be called upon to assist in the new organization. Their participation in this task will be all the greater where

the unions are powerful—that is, where the working class is most strongly organized; and this factor will vary in different countries, according to their degree of democratic progress. In Great Britain, where the trades unions are extremely powerful, they will play a highly important part, and will thereby prevent social disturbances.

But whatever the facts may be as to the co-operation of the labour organizations, it is most important, for the peace of society, that the Governments shall not release the soldiers and workers without continuing, and for some time, the payment to them and their families of the allowances without which they will not be able to live. On their return to their homes the workers in factories and on the land, and the shop-assistants, clerks, etc., must not find themselves without work and without bread at the same time. They and their families must live while they are waiting for work. Otherwise we should be confronted by a serious—a very serious—situation.

In Great Britain the question has already occupied the thoughts of the world of workers and manufacturers. A committee has been appointed, and after investigating the matter has concluded that the demobilization of six to eight millions of workmen and soldiers—nearly half the wage-earners of the country—will occupy at least two years. It demanded that the workers must, as I suggested, be paid indemnities and allowances for a given term while finding another place.

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The war has reversed the customary moral value of men's actions. Life in the midst of violence and slaughter develops in man an appetite for violence and accustoms him to the idea of resorting to violence in order to obtain the realization of his desires and requirements. The life of war educates men for war, not for peace. It will have given the proletarian

masses a conception of the strength of the masses, and will have made them understand the power of direct action. The period of the war will therefore have developed the spirit of violence in these men.

On the other hand, the military life is a life of comparative idleness. At moments an extraordinary effort is demanded of the men, and then, for some time, their labours are lessened and the effort demanded is mediocre. It is not the continuous labour of the workshop or the office.

From this results an abatement of the love of work, and also the discovery that one can very well live without productive work; and then, inevitably, the man is led to appropriate the goods produced by others. It is this which explains the "prigging" general among the soldiers of all armies. Only in appearance does discipline tend to prevent it. Moreover, discipline is perforce relaxed on account of the circumstances of the war and its duration. The respect for property is diminished.

Open-air life will have created a new appetite for independence, increased by the reaction natural to men who have for months been subjected to military servitude. Men will find it less easy to endure the domination of other men. A phenomenon will occur in the human brain comparable to that which occurs in a boiler when the steam cannot escape. The pressure increases, and finally, when it has passed the point of resistance, an explosion occurs. Similarly the incessant vexations of passive obedience which are endured by inferiors in military uniform accumulate and engender a state of irritability which will inevitably explode when peace enforces the return of every soldier to civil life.

The continual spectacle which the soldier has had before his eyes for months and years is so full of horrors that the human being has been gradually becoming



insensitive. He no longer pities the sufferings of others, and he feels his own less keenly. This explains how men can march for hours even when atrociously wounded. They acquire a contempt for death and suffering. This explains many acts of violence towards women of the same nationality as the violator. This explains the increasing anxiety which the soldier displays in respect of his own possessions and his own life. The human being reverts to primitive animality; a narrow egoism is on the increase, despite what has been said and written, in ignorance or from interest, by those who regard the war as "romanticists" and not as psychologists.

"The war is a school of anarchy," I heard a peasant soldier remark one day. It is perfectly true. The daily experience of these years of warfare has revealed to all the incapacity of our leaders, the fraud and confusion which they maintain; and from this results a contempt for authority. Everybody in France is repeating the words of a deputy: "France has been saved by her soldiers, in spite of her leaders." Moreover, the dangers incurred and the constant presence of death have accustomed men to be unafraid. They are less fearful than of old, so that constraint is no longer effective. Men are becoming freer, more their own masters. The longer the war lasts the more these phenomena become accentuated.

In uniform a man's food is assured. He has no need to think about it, and it is no longer directly dependent on his daily labour. Moreover, he does not know whether he will be alive to-morrow. From this results a more or less absolute indifference as to the morrow; an indifference as to what may happen, whether the future holds death or wounds in store. So men are inclined to apply the maxim: a short life and a merry one. They lose their sense of the value of money, and think of nothing but enjoying life. And their conception of enjoyment is very mean, very low; and this is an effect of the evils of the war. To-morrow, perhaps, they will be dead.

So the spirit of economy takes flight, giving place to the spirit of adventure, even in the most timorous and domestic.

In the military life there is, from certain points of view, more equality than in civilian life, especially in time of war. Men are often better fed, better clothed than in civilian life. They live side by side, intimately mingled—peasants, artisans, clerks, employers large and small, and “intellectuals” of all sorts. They see into one another’s minds, they come to know one another better, both as to their aspirations and their needs. Their minds are opened to new horizons. This process often proceeds unconsciously, and will become apparent only after the war, when peace has caused a return of mental tranquillity.

There is a mutual exchange of ideas among the men in the trenches, the camps, and the barracks. The malcontents, the Socialists and Syndicalists and union men, discuss and explain and instruct. Thus the French prisoners in the camp of Altengrabow publish a sort of newspaper. It is entitled *Les Pensées Libres*. An immense amount of underground propaganda is incessantly carried on, and the longer the war lasts, the more its power increases, under the influence of the suffering and boredom and fatigue and enervation produced by the war itself.

On the other hand, the frequent instances of inequality and injustice which occur in every human collectivity which is not founded on equality are easily and even acutely perceived by all, for all live in the greatest promiscuity, instead of on different planes, as is the case with rich and poor in the civilian world.

From the above analysis of the conditions of life in war-time it follows that the mentality of the men who return from military service will have undergone certain modifications. The intellect will be principally influenced by the conditions of warfare, because the men will

have learned what they did not know before. Their character, too, is undergoing modification, but much more slowly, so that even though it may appear to be changed as a result of the conditions of warfare and the general state of fever which is invading humanity, in reality the human character will not display any permanent modification. Only long years after the war will men be able to establish certain psychological effects of the conflict.

However, there is no doubt that in the period immediately after the war men will be impatient of the yoke; they will conceive a distaste for the domestic life; they will entertain vague aspirations toward equality, and views a little broader than of old; they will display an adventurous habit of mind, and an inclination to resort to violence in order to satisfy their needs, a tendency to work less, and a desire to enjoy life, careless of the morrow. These are the elements which constitute the revolutionary spirit.

In such a spirit these men will return to their homes, where they will find the taxes doubled, if not trebled, while the material difficulties of life will be considerable, although they will see other men who have enriched themselves, and will meet others who are more or less completely ruined or impoverished; they will encounter women who will compete with them in the labour market, women who will themselves be discontented with their social inequality. They will discover that none of those ideals have been realized which the ruling classes dangled in front of the popular masses, in order to secure the more or less voluntary sacrifice of their lives. It must not be forgotten that these ideals are increased comfort, the maintenance and increase of liberties, and the spirit of patriotism—that is, in short, the spirit of solidarity, hence of equality, etc.; and the discontents of all and the aspirations of all will combine with a view to obtaining an increase of well-being and

an abatement of injustice. Mental bitterness and irritation will be prevalent. A revolutionary state of mind will come into being, together with revolutionary economic conditions.

Everybody will be affected—the urban populations and the rural populations, the lower middle classes, and even many of the wealthier middle class: investors whose dividends will be diminished by the increased prices of products and the weight of taxation. This revolutionary mental situation may not result in revolutionary disturbances if the capitalist and conservative elements are in their own interest wise enough to realize the gravity of the situation. But, unhappily, this does not seem to be likely, for we see them, even during the war, attempting to prevent the application of every measure which would distribute the burden of the war more equitably; to curb liberties; to destroy the conquests made by the working-class proletariat during the last fifty years; and to construct an economic, social, and political world pervaded by the spirit of authority and founded, like the German autocracy, on fear and militarism.

Everything, therefore, seems to be working together for the development of a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary mentality. It seems, in consequence, highly probable that after the war there will be revolutionary movements everywhere, in neutral as well as in belligerent countries. Will they be serious or widespread? Will they triumph or miscarry? No one can foretell with certainty. It is probable that the triumphs and the failures will be relative, and will balance one another. When the balance-sheet is drawn up after the period of social conflict which will follow the present period of international conflict, it will doubtless be discovered that there has been a social amelioration in the direction of an increase of liberty, and perhaps of equality. This will be so because the

aspirations toward liberty and equality are the aspirations of the human majority, and because the course of history shows a continual progress of humanity toward a greater liberty and greater equality.

If these probable revolutionary movements do take place the world will be the spectator of a situation analogous, although in an inverse sense, to that of the French Revolution of 1789. Economic and political conditions in the interior of France led Frenchmen to revolt, and their revolution became transformed into a series of foreign wars, and thus, in a sense, it sowed the seed of revolution in the world. To-day a plexus of national wars is probably destined to end in a series of revolutionary social disturbances throughout the world.

The impression that the situation after the war will be revolutionary seems already very general. It has been expressed more or less definitely in the German Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag and the English House of Lords. The deputy Karl Liebknecht, in March, 1916, went so far as openly to invite the masses to revolt: "The workers must settle their affairs themselves. The troops must not merely fight in the trenches; they must lower their arms and turn them against the common enemy." In certain newspapers in France, Great Britain, and even Germany, allusions, which sometimes are by no means discreet, and menaces have frequently appeared during the last few months. Conversations and letters in proletarian circles, both at the front and in the rear, constantly reveal an intense desire to change the existing state of affairs for one better and less unjust. This class is beginning to be haunted by the phantom of revolution. The longer the war lasts, the more general the spirit of revolution becomes, the more it pervades men's minds, the more probable it becomes that the end will be revolution.

To prevent violent revolution the ruling classes must

be wise enough to give ground—that is, they must impose the burden of taxation on inheritances and the incomes of the rich, instead of seeking to let them fall on the mass of the poor. A movement of equalization between the life of the rich and that of the poor must be established; hence a lowering of the standard of living in the one case, and an improvement of it in the other. Various forms of nationalizing or communalizing the land should be introduced, and applied also to certain industries—to railways, canals, the manufacture of sugar and rice, merchant vessels, mines, etc. The thing is quite feasible, without shocks to the proprietors, by means of very heavy death duties and heavy income-taxes, payable not in money, but in land and industrial shares, which would become the national or communal property, and inalienable. This procedure would obviate revolutionary disturbances, which always involve more or less bloodshed and destruction of property. We hope that mankind will be reasonable enough to realize this method of human progress, but truly the sight of the past makes us doubtful of the possibility of such wisdom.

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The trench war on the Western front has lasted more than two years, with the result that from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier the fields, meadows, and woodlands have all been ploughed by the shells. Nothing is left of what existed before the war: neither cultivable soil nor boundaries. For the soil itself has disappeared, so intermingled is it with the earths excavated from the subsoil by the shells. The villages are shapeless heaps of rubble, often with human corpses and fragments buried beneath them. In many places the grass has grown, and there is no longer anything to show that in July, 1914, there stood a flourishing village, a fine farmhouse, or perhaps a magnificent chateau. The destruction of the villages has resulted in the destruction of the registers, which were at the communal offices.

The lawyers' offices, in the market towns, the capitals of cantons, have not escaped the common lot, and have often been set on fire by shells or bombs. No boundaries, no property register, no title-deeds are left!

Consequently the following problem presents itself: How, after the war, can this property be reconstituted and restored to the hands of its owners? The individualistic solution would be difficult or impossible. Families will have disappeared, completely or in part; young children will be left alone. It will be necessary to trust to human testimony. But how fallible this is, even when it is given in good faith! What will it be if given in bad faith, in the hope of obtaining a rood more soil than before the war? And there will be no material proof, no certain point of departure which will afford a basis for the determination of boundaries. The tribunals will be confronted by contradictory affirmations, and it will be impossible to prove the truth of these and the falsity of those, or the falsity of all. There is one neat and simple method of solving this difficult problem, but who will have the courage to adopt it? It would be to give an indemnity to the proprietors for the complete loss of their property, certified to exist by human testimony; then all the land in all the communes thus destroyed would be declared inalienable common property. This system would obviate all discussion as to the boundaries of properties, their situation, and their precise extent. Justice and equity would be satisfied, as the proprietors would have been indemnified for the loss of their property. Apart from this system of communalizing agrarian property, I see no means of equitably solving the problem presented by the complete destruction of the boundaries, registers, and title-deeds of millions of acres of land, and thousands of villages destroyed or ploughed up by shells.

Economic and social conditions will undergo many changes during the period after the war. But this will not be the case with the conditions of the arts, letters, and the sciences. The international relations between men of science will no doubt be resumed almost immediately. Science is on a plane far above the national plane; it is essentially human and cosmopolitan. When the mantle of lead and iron thrown over the world by victorious militarism is raised, science will once more become resplendent; and scientific ideas will be exchanged all the world over, as before the war. There will have been a brief eclipse in scientific life, that is all. No doubt there will be a scientific "boom," due to the necessity of replacing labour by mechanical, physical, and chemical processes. Applied science will play its part in the inevitable commercial and industrial "boom" of which I have spoken. But applied science always promotes pure and abstract science, which in its turn promotes applied science. Scientific theories and researches are inextricably scientific applications. So that science, as a whole, in all its branches, under the impulse of the needs of the period following the war, will visibly assume its place in the world, perhaps a higher place than before the war, above all in Great Britain, where scientific education was rather neglected.

As for the arts and letters, it seems to me probable that they will tend to become more realistic and less sentimental than before the war. People are already saturated in the war, in its heroic actions as well as in its base and criminal actions; they will be even more so in six months', a year's, or two years' time, when peace is concluded. It seems to me that the traditional songs of the heroism of battle, the traditional descriptions of military splendour, will be laid aside, and will give place to realistic works like Tolstoy's masterpiece, *War and Peace*. It seems, even, that people will soon cease to speak of the war, for the public is



already tired of it, and will become more and more so. For instance, we perceive already that classic military dramas are losing their vogue. Soldiers are living the war, and do not care to see it or read of it in a false and idealistic shape. Civilians want to see it as it is in reality.

The physical and moral sufferings of the period of the war is reacting upon humanity, evoking in it the desire to amuse itself, to procure pleasant and cheerful sensations, not melancholy ones. Every period of depression provokes a period of gaiety: it is the natural reaction. So it is probable that the public will demand a gay, cheerful literature, with no dramatic or tragic elements. Comedy, light opera, and vaudeville will no doubt triumph on the stage. These will be restful after the dramas of real life witnessed during the war.

As for the international relations between artists, literary men, and dramatists, they will promptly be resumed, for art lives by the mutual contributions of all its manifestations. An art shut in between national walls is an art frozen into one or several formulæ, condemned to a sickly existence and to death.

The vital force of art, whatever its form, is above national antagonisms, and it will therefore insure that artists will rapidly resume the international relations broken off by the social malady of warfare—for every war is a social malady. The words of hatred and the partial judgments pronounced in the heat of the conflict will soon be forgotten; and after the war life will quickly resume its normal and pacific course.

## CHAPTER XIII

### DISARMAMENT THE ONLY SETTLEMENT

The necessity of budgetary economy—Impossible to economize on hygiene or social legislation—To economize on education is madness—We must economize on our armies, fleets, and armaments—The result of not disarming—The results of partial disarmament—Complete disarmament is the keystone of a final peace—The advantages of disarmament: budgetary economy, increased production, disappearance of military parasitism, disappearance of the military spirit—Political results: international juridical relations, the weakening of autocracies, the strengthening of democracies—The armaments of neutrals are due to the fever of armaments from which the belligerents have been suffering—Naval disarmament—The opponents of disarmament are the professional soldiers and the conservative elements—The whole of humanity longs for the end of wars and armaments—The realization of disarmament depends on the will of the democracies—The conditions resulting from disarmament: the suppression of arsenals and munition factories; an indemnity to the proprietors; international tribunals or courts; the Amphictyonic Council of the nations—Excommunication as a sanction—The police force of the nations—The police army—The federation of the nations—This sociological process continues a process which has been unfolding since the dawn of time—The need of union, disturbed by the German mentality, which is poisoned by the spirit of obedience to authority, has engendered the war—The ruling classes of Germany were the conscious or unconscious agents of the universal determinism—The ultimate end of the war must be disarmament—The final result of all the economic, political, and moral conditions; it is no Utopia, but a necessity.

**A**LL the belligerents will emerge from the world-war drained of men and of money. All the nations will be ruined, and consequently they will have to reduce their annual budgets. In what department of the budget must these economies be made? Let us look into this matter a little.

The States will not be able to economize on the dividends on loans, nor on pensions, nor on the general expenses of the political administration of the country.

The portions of the budget which are compressible are those relating to the creation and upkeep of ways of communication, and the expenditure on social hygiene, social legislation and relief, education, and, lastly, on the army and navy.

Economies made in respect of these various portions of the budget, with the exception of the last (that relating to the army and navy), can only be made to the detriment of the nation. The economic power of each nation depends on its means of communication and the excellence of its social hygiene. Any diminution of such expenditure would impoverish the whole nation. The internal peace of a nation depends in part on measures of social legislation and systems of relief; to suspend these, to weaken them, even to refrain from increasing them, would result in a rupture of the internal peace, and the moral deterioration of each country. It would seem that there is, at least in certain States—for example, in the British Empire—a tendency to economize on the expenditure devoted to education. To diminish the annual expenditure on libraries, laboratories of scientific research, and the primary and secondary schools, seems to some minds an entirely reasonable measure. But if we reflect ever so little we see that it would be the worst of follies.

The interests of the human species, those of the national collectivity and those of the individual, all agree in showing that every effort must be made to uplift the individual ever more and more. And this uplifting can only be effected by an ever greater and greater spread of human knowledge. Any increase of knowledge is a human conquest which aids in a further conquest. The larger the number of men possessing such knowledge, the greater the possibility of its further increase. The higher the quality of the knowledge possessed by men, the greater this same possibility of the further increase of knowledge.

The well-being of the world, and of each individual in particular, depends on the increase of knowledge. All scientific discoveries, all inventions, all the applications of science are the work of human brains developed by a scientific culture. And the greater the number of cultivated minds, the greater the possibility of increased well-being, for there is then an incessant achievement of knowledge and of progress.

If, in the course of thousands of years, man had not acquired a brain which was continually undergoing improvement, he would still be what he was in pre-historic times, when he lived in nudity, sheltering himself in caves and the trunks of trees, living on berries, roots, and small game captured by running it down. To make brains is therefore the most useful task which the collectivity can undertake. Far from limiting the expenditure which this making of brains requires, it must be increased. Every thousand pounds spent on education is in reality an economy, a saving of life and a saving of time effected by humanity in its unflagging and continuous progress toward an increase of material, intellectual, and moral well-being.

Therefore, if men are guided by reason, far from economizing on the expenditure allotted to education, they will, in the interest of the species, the collectivity, and the individual, progressively and continuously increase it. The only department of the budget in which the necessary and indispensable economies could be made is the department concerned with military and naval expenditure. We are thus led to the problem of permanent armies and disarmament.

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Three solutions are possible: (1) No disarmament; (2) a partial general disarmament; (3) a total general disarmament. In the first case, matters would continue after the war as they were before the war. The nations would still compete in the matter of armaments and

enormous armies. This would mean the survival of the ruinous policy of armed peace, with all its disastrous consequences: a stupendous expenditure of wealth in heaping up arms and munitions, with millions of men in the barracks, unproductive consumers; it would result in crushing taxation and the maintenance of the militarist mentality—that is to say, the mentality of autocracy and slavish obedience, with the employment of violence and terrorism—the maintenance of the spirit of conquest. In short, it would mean the certainty that in the near or remote future fresh wars would break out, more terrible than this war, because warfare would be further perfected. It would mean an inevitable return to barbarism, unless, in the course of the years, the forces of peace and reason were to become sufficiently powerful to obtain disarmament before the occurrence of further conflicts. But this would be to revert, after many years' delay—that is, after loss of time—to the second or the third solution. It would be wiser not to wait, but to solve the problem now.

Partial disarmament would permit of the continuance of the greater part of the present errors and misdeeds. If the number of men under arms were diminished, armaments would be maintained at the same level, so that the expenditure would be but slightly decreased. Instead of a strong standing army as before the war, there would be a militia consisting of the whole nation, and a comparatively small permanent army, an army of Prætorians. The military mentality, whose foundations are autocracy, servile obedience, and fear, would continue to exist. And it would necessarily engender its natural and logical product—an appetite for conquest and a tendency to resort to warfare. Moreover, the natural tendency of the Prætorian army would result in its attempting to reduce the rest of the nation to slavery, without speaking of its inevitable employment in social conflicts between employers and employed.

Partial disarmament implies the maintenance of armies whose strength and number would obviously be in proportion to the populations of the different States. Hence this consequence arises: by the mere demographical action of natality and mortality, some States increase more quickly than others. And the less civilized they are, the more rapid is their growth; for as civilization increases the relative natality diminishes, as a result of the voluntary control of conception. Thus Germany, in a quarter of a century, would possess a population of crushing dimensions compared with that of France, and her army, although reduced, would be much stronger in numbers than that of France. The same phenomenon would occur in Russia, whose population and army would greatly exceed those of Germany. The inevitable consequence would be the continuance of offensive and defensive alliances between States—that is, the balance of power. And the result of this would be further wars, as though there had been no disarmament at all.

No doubt a certain amount of time would elapse before the outbreak of these new wars, and perhaps by then the spirit of reason and of peace would have become sufficiently powerful to secure, before the outbreak, a total disarmament, the certain pledge of a policy of peace. But why wait? Why not be wise now, and procure a general and complete disarmament?

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General and complete disarmament is the only remedy which would permit of the necessary economies, and which would suppress all causes and all possibilities of war. Where there are neither weapons nor armies no one can make war, however much they desire to do so. General and complete disarmament is the keystone of a lasting peace. Without it we shall have truces only.

Let us examine the consequences of a total dis-

armament. They are many, and of various kinds. They present many advantages and no disadvantages.

In the first place, from the fact that the States would no longer require to purchase and store munitions, arms, Dreadnoughts, Zeppelins, etc., a budgetary economy would result which in the case of each great Power would result in an annual saving of tens of millions of pounds. This economy would react very favourably on the other economic conditions of the world. The munitions factories and arsenals would make way for factories producing the products of consumption for peaceful usages. The workers who were employed in death-dealing labours would be employed in life-giving labours. All the areas covered by forts, fortifications, barracks, military magazines, etc., would be restored to purposes useful to the human race—agriculture, schools, workshops, etc.

The budgetary economy in respect of the material of war would involve many other economies in respect of the productive utilization of men and things.

Disarmament, by causing the disappearance of armies, would effect a budgetary economy which would amount to tens of millions of pounds for each State. But despite its positive importance, this economy would appear negligible when compared with the enormous social economy which would result from it: for soldiers are consumers, but not producers. When they are employed on their proper task—that is, in time of war—they are not only consumers, but destroyers. Never at any time is the soldier as a soldier a producer. The soldier is a social parasite.

The suppression of armies would mean the suppression of this parasitism. Consequently the men, instead of living in barracks, would be in workshops, laboratories, offices, or the fields, where they would labour physically and intellectually. Agricultural, industrial, commercial, scientific, and artistic production would increase.

Disarmament would throw into the productive torrent of humanity a host of forces of an unproductive nature, or even inhibitive of production. This would be an enormous gain: so great that we cannot estimate it.

Complete disarmament, by suppressing armies, would produce very considerable psychological ameliorations, by effecting the progressive enfeeblement, and at last the disappearance, of the military spirit. Twenty-four years ago, in a scientific work which scandalized a great many people, *La Psychologie du Militaire Professionnel*, I arrived at the conclusion that militarism is a school of crime. This war has unhappily afforded abundant proof that my deductions were correct. Statements which in 1893-94 were disgraceful, the words of an ignorant anarchist, which evoked the thunders of the avenging law, are to-day pronounced by official personages—for instance, by the President of the United States. Mr. Woodrow Wilson, in short, in a speech delivered in June, 1916, declared that "Militarism is a state of mind and an object. The object is the employment of armies for purposes of aggression. The soldier's state of mind is opposed to that of the civilian. In a country where militarism prevails the soldier looks down on the civilian. He regards him as his inferior: he considers that the civilian is created to be of use and assistance to the soldier."

War is by nature a succession of crimes. It is not a sport. Chivalry, in warfare, is a romantic idea which has existed in the minds and the statements of men rather than in the reality of facts. "The religion of the armies," as Charles de Lameth stated in 1790 in the National Assembly, "is to know neither kinsfolk, nor friends, nor fathers: it is to understand only how to obey." Armies are deaf, blind, unconscious brute forces in the hands of their leaders. For the latter, war is a means which makes for a practical object. It is not a game. The plain statement of this, the true



conception of war, is of considerable service to humanity, for thereby men are enlightened as to the actual and criminal nature of war, and are enabled to perceive that it is an inadequate means of attaining the aim pursued. To realize that war is a mode of obtaining wealth and increasing power instead of a chivalrous sport is to decree the death of war. We are obliged, in fact, to record the fact that war does not achieve its object: it no longer enriches, it no longer increases power; on the contrary, it impoverishes and diminishes power. Complete disarmament is therefore the logical consequence of the inefficiency of the war as a means of obtaining wealth and power.

With disarmament there will be no more soldiers—that is, men preparing for war, or, to speak more frankly, preparing to commit crimes. The soldier has always been, and will always be, as Horace represented him, when he wrote of Achilles in his *Epistola ad Pisones* :

“ Impiger, viacundus, inexorabilis, acer  
Jura neget sibi nata, nihil non arroget armis:”

a savage warrior, pretending that the laws and justice are not meant for him, and that everything must give way before the might of his arms.

Disarmament would mean the suppression of this state of mind, and would therefore lead to a notable improvement of the human mentality. We should mention, however, having objective scruples, that the suppression of armies would involve a slight inconvenience. Men would not be so often uprooted from their place of origin; they would mix less with one another. And this uprooting of men is in general an important element, as regards the species and the individual, because it tends to an increase of knowledge. I am thinking, in particular, of peasants and agricultural labourers, for many of whom the call to the barracks means a widening of the horizon, because they undergo

a change of environment, and are brought into contact with men belonging to other environments than their own. This sole benefit of the military life would disappear, but compared with all the bad effects of militarism it is so small that we may regard it as negligible. Moreover, it is possible, and even probable, that the phenomena of uprooting and intermingling will occur just the same under the impulse of economic and intellectual conditions. We may therefore say of disarmament that it would produce nothing but psychological improvement.

The political ameliorations which would follow disarmament are very considerable. Thus, it would be impossible to resort to armed force, as this would not exist, in order to modify international relations or to change the boundaries of States. There would therefore be a certain fixity in the political distribution of the world, which will be established at the end of the war. This territorial distribution could not be further modified save by the popular will expressed by a referendum. Treaties between nations could no longer be regarded as mere scraps of paper, as is the general custom under the system of armaments. This new state of international relations would have an interesting juridical and moral reaction: the compulsory regard of justice and equity in establishing international conventions.

In this way the independent life of the small nations would be assured, without the necessity of the tutelage of the great nations—relatively great, that is, for in the near future the Slav peoples will greatly predominate over the Western peoples in point of numbers, while the yellow races will predominate over the Slavs.

Disarmament would assure the political life of all the nations, and their free normal development, while the maintenance of armies would necessarily lead, sooner or later, first to an exterminating conflict between the

Slavs and the Western peoples, and then to a similar conflict between the yellow races and the Slavs.

Another beneficent result of disarmament would be the assistance thereby lent to the democratization of the world. Militarism is the prop of autocracies. Wherever militarism triumphs, autocracy tends to prevail and democracy to diminish. The present war has proved this in characteristic fashion, by the events whose theatre was a neutral country, Switzerland; yet for centuries Switzerland has been a democracy.

On the day when militarism ceased to be the autocracies would lose their most solid support. And then they would crumble swiftly to pieces, and would disappear, making way for democracies. The suppression of militarism would educate the world for peace; and only in a world so educated could peace prevail.

Everything being considered, we can perceive nothing but advantages in disarmament—economic, psychological, moral, and political advantages. For that matter, few people dare deny these advantages, but in defending the policy of armaments they take refuge behind this assertion: that disarmament is Utopian, the proof being that even democratic and thoroughly unwarlike peoples, as are many of the neutrals, are continuing to arm themselves. The statement is correct, but the deduction drawn from it is erroneous. The armaments of neutral countries are a consequence of the armaments of the other nations. Each counts upon its powers of violence, its armed forces, to make its independence respected. Consequently, each nation arms itself, and unceasingly continues to arm itself. The military fever is general and endemic. This does not prove that disarmament is a Utopia or a dream, in opposition to the natural tendency of the nations.

If one lives in the midst of assassins, one is of course obliged to arm oneself in order to protect one's life against these assassins. But if one lives in the midst

of peaceful, unarmed folk, one has no need to arm oneself in order to protect one's life. Such, in reality is the situation of the peoples of Scandinavia, Switzerland, Holland, the United States, etc. All these nations will be delighted when the day comes for the great nations to disarm, for the burden of militarism is very heavy for the majority of these peoples.

The disarmament which we are considering is a complete disarmament, including naval disarmament as well as the disarming of the land armies. Reliance on great navies must cease with militarism. This is a necessary step, in conformity with justice on the one hand and the interest of each individual nation on the other hand. Battle fleets are no more necessary than are land armies or aerial battle fleets. Battle fleets and aerial fleets are designed either for defence or for offence and conquest. Now complete disarmament will prevent conquest and render defence pointless.

Armed peace must cease to exist, as regards terrestrial as well as aerial and naval armaments. If disarmament were practised in respect of only one of these arms, and not the others, we should have the inconveniences of partial disarmament; there would be no economies, and peace would be merely a truce.

General and complete disarmament will certainly find opponents when the moment comes, after the war, to form a decision. But we may be assured that they will not be very numerous. Everything proves that they will belong to the caste of landowners and professional soldiers, and to the most conservative and reactionary political groups. It is natural that these men should regard with discontent and regret the disappearance of their *raison d'être*, the social organism which is the strongest prop of the system of government which satisfies their ideal. Perhaps, too, among the opponents we shall find the makers of arms and munitions. But it would be easy to destroy their opposition by in-

demnifying them. Everything considered, however, these classes would represent only a small minority, even in militarist Germany. Everywhere the world of peasants, working men, employees, officials, and "intellectuals"—with a few rare exceptions—are restive under the burden of terrestrial and naval militarism. Everywhere the world of commerce, industry, and finance knows by experience and with certainty that war does not pay, and that as militarism is useful only for purposes of war it would be better to get rid of it. So true is this that a little while ago one might have read, in the *Vossische Zeitung*, a plea in favour of total disarmament from the pen of Herr Ballin! This is characteristic, for Herr Ballin was one of the capitalists who urged Governmental Germany to go to war. Again, Count Okuma, the Japanese Prime Minister, in an interview, recommended disarmament. On this subject the Socialists of all countries are mutually agreed, and the greater part of the forces of capital are of the same way of thinking. None of the ecclesiastics of any of the Churches will dare to defend such a massacre and a heaping up of ruins as we behold in this war. If we reflect, we may be sure that the very great majority of people are in favour of disarmament. It will be enough for the British, French, Belgian, and other democracies to resolve that it shall be accomplished, and it must be.

The economic conditions determined by the war have rung the knell of the system of armed peace. And as this system must cease to be, it must necessarily make way for a political State based, not on violence and armed force, but on free and mutual consent. And the consequence of this economic necessity is general and complete disarmament. This is the corner-stone on which rests the whole edifice of final peace, of peace which is something more than a truce. And as the whole of humanity is crying aloud for a final peace,

we must suppose that humanity will be sufficiently wise and intelligent to disarm. From this disarmament will arise a certain number of necessary conditions which we will now examine.

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Disarmament will inevitably involve the suppression of arsenals and munition factories. If there is no more consumption there will be no further manufacture. The disappearance of these manufactures, as a matter of fact, will not be complete, since, as we have just observed, we must still have armed police forces. Neither can the manufacture of sporting weapons be discontinued. But the need of arms and munitions will be enormously reduced in comparison with the needs of the period before the war, with its policy of armed peace.

Most of the workshops and factories for the output of arms and munitions of war must therefore disappear, or be transformed into workshops and factories producing implements and products capable of maintaining life and of overcoming the powers of nature.

Given the capitalistic basis of human society, it is equitable that the proprietors of the workshops and factories thus affected shall receive an indemnity equivalent to their losses. It is perfectly just that the collectivity should indemnify individuals for losses suffered in the interests of the collectivity. The indemnification of the makers of arms and munitions will have the great advantage of suppressing all reason for the opposition which they may offer to the adoption of disarmament. This opposition may be very powerful, for the wealth of these manufacturers is very great. And in our capitalist society the possession of wealth is one of the most important factors of Governmental power.

Disarmament, as we have shown, permanently assures the autonomy of each national group, and the fixity

of the territorial divisions established at the end of this war. No nation will again be enabled to attempt to enslave others, or to seize their wealth or their territory. One cannot make war without weapons, without munitions, and without armies. But from this impossibility of conflict between national groups it does not follow that there will be no further differences between these national collectivities. It therefore becomes most necessary to settle these differences. How? To answer this we must regard the collectivities as so many individuals, and we must deal with these individual collectivities as we should deal with private individuals in the heart of one of these collectivities, in order to settle any differences which might arise between them.

These differences, in the case of individuals, are settled by means of tribunals, by permanent magistrates or juries, who deliver their verdicts or sentences. These are executed by the power of the national collectivity, in some cases after resort to the various courts of appeal which have been created in order that we may, as far as possible, obtain justice, or, if you prefer, in order to diminish the injustice involved in any human judgment. Such are the relations between individual men, and such should be the relations between national collectivities.

General disarmament, then, will necessitate the creation of international courts and tribunals, which will legislate on the causes of dispute which may arise between the nations. The incessant exercise of a function determines a special mentality, which produces, in the end, a deformation of the ordinary vision of things. Therefore the establishment of permanent international judges would end, in course of time, in the creation of individuals living outside the life of the nations and incapable of understanding the conditions of life of these nations, with their sentiments and opinions, and their manifold and complex interests. We must steer clear of this rock, and it is easy to do so if we follow

the example of what has been done in the case of the courts which judge the causes of dispute between individuals. We must have recourse to the jury, not only in the first instance, but also in the court of appeal, with its final decree. We will not here enter into the details of the constitution of these courts and tribunals; I will only remark that they must include permanent members or judges, to maintain a regular procedure, and occasional members, as jurors, to deliver judgment. Judges and jurors, chosen and elected by the governing political body of each nation.

Sentences have no meaning if they have no sanction. The sanction may be moral and material, or moral only, or material only; but a sanction there must be. How shall this sanction be applied, and by whom shall it be applied, to infractions of agreements between nations, and to matters of dispute?

This sanction must be applied by an administrative council of the nations: an Amphictyonic Council, if I may call it so. Composed of delegates appointed by all the nations, for a short term only, in order to avoid the formation of a Governmental caste, it would have to apply the sanctions established by international conventions, and keep watch in order that no nation should violate these conventions. In short, there would be the same task to fulfil, in respect of the nations, which the police administration fulfils in respect of the individuals in each State. As sanctions, fines would be largely sufficient. If a nation refused to obey these sanctions, it would assuredly be neither necessary nor even useful to resort to violence, by means of the international police army, in order to compel obedience to conventions entered into by free consent.

In the Middle Ages, the epoch of Christian faith, excommunication was a terrible weapon. It may still be employed. The nations would excommunicate the offending nation until the latter gave proof of repentance.



Excommunication would mean complete isolation from international life! There would no longer be anything in common between the offending nation and the others—no railway communication, no communication by sea or river, no post, no telegraphs, no telephone, no balloons, no aeroplanes. Complete isolation would be strictly maintained until the moment when the offending people accepted its sentence.

In short, the same treatment would be meted out to the individual nation as is now meted out to the individual man.

The administrative rôle of the Amphictyonic Council of the nations would be pre-eminently one of surveillance in the case of each country—to prevent, for example, the manufacture or collection of secret armaments. An international police, the international army, would be under the orders of this council of the nations—not only a territorial army, but a navy, a fleet entrusted with the policing of the seas. Each nation possessing colonies might maintain in these colonies a small army of colonial police, or these colonial armies might form part of the international army amenable to the Amphictyonic Council. In any case, in order to avoid the formation of a Prætorian army with a military mentality it would be indispensable that the time of service should be short for all, officers and men alike. But these are matters of detail which do not affect the great principle—a council of delegates from the nations administering international relations, and supervising the execution of international conventions, and for this purpose having under its orders a police and a police army.

If this war is to be the last of wars, it absolutely must be terminated by a general and complete disarmament. This is the only means of terminating the barbarous era of brutal and violent conflicts between men. When a child has a toy he amuses himself with

that toy. When a man has a weapon he makes use of it. When rulers possess armies they employ them. Deprive the man of his weapon, the Governments of their armies, and you will have no more wars. As long as you leave matters as they are, humanity may enjoy truces, but never peace.

Disarmament will necessitate the creation of a juridical system embracing collectivities as our existing juridical system embraces individuals. An embryo of federation will come into being among the nations of the entire globe; each nation will continue to live and to evolve in full autonomy and liberty. The sociological process which we have indicated is not merely a mental vision, a baseless imagination. It is merely the continuation of the sociological process which has created the present social world.

In the dawn of humanity the single man, or the man mated to his woman, contended violently with his neighbouring couple. Then mutual aid was born, and associations were formed, and warlike strife broke out between small clans and small tribes. In the course of the ages the clans and tribes grew larger, embracing more and more numerous collectivities, and wars ceased in the interior of the collectivities, but continued between collectivities which were strangers to one another, and therefore enemies. Great empires were founded, which enjoyed internal peace; but they still waged external war. And these great empires fell to pieces, because the base on which they were founded was constraint and fear, never free will and love.

From the fragments of these great empires arose kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and counties, and there were endless alliances and wars between them all. But understandings, on the other hand, tended more and more to embrace groups and individuals, owing to the spread of common interests and their interpenetration. Wars diminished in numbers while embracing

greater numbers of men. The need of union and understanding influenced men because they were conscious that their union favoured their interests; but men still sought to effect this union upon the basis of constraint and fear. They confounded union with unification.

The continuation of this same process leads us to the world-war, in which we perceive a maximum of conflict and a maximum of union. The logical continuation of this process is the general union of the nations, of the peoples of the globe, no longer in an Imperial and centralized organization based on constraint and fear, but in a federative organism based on liberty and love.

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The need of union is so strongly felt by humanity that it is an unconscious cause of this frightful war. The desire of intellectual and Governmental Germany for hegemony, which started the war, was in certain respects merely the manifestation, in the Germanic mind, of the need of union and understanding between men. But the Germanic mind was poisoned by the spirit of obedience and the spirit of authority. Its mode of action consisted of constraint and fear. The result was that the need of union and understanding was manifested among the Germans by a desire to enslave other peoples, in order to unify them and endow them with a superior civilization. The Germanic mind, thus poisoned in its depths, did not understand that the life of the world is based on its diversity and variety, and that a unified world would be a monstrous world, doomed to a speedy death. Nature tends always to develop heterogeneity. The need of union is a natural force of such power that we see its effects even in war, which would seem to be essentially a dividing force. As a matter of fact, we are witnessing, not a war between two peoples, but war between combinations of peoples. On the one side are ten nations,\*

\* Written in 1916.

counting as a single nation all the peoples of the British federation, which is not scientifically correct, and on the other side are four. One of the lessons of this war is that the power of union is greater than the power of disunion.

But it is important never to confound union, unification, and fusion. The conceptions are very different, just as are their effects. Man should assist the work of nature, not oppose it. To oppose it would only provoke a rupture of equilibrium, and therefore disorder. Men should therefore strive incessantly to develop the desire for union which is in them. But they cannot harmonize this need of union with the natural process which makes for heterogeneity save by establishing union on the foundation of liberty and love. This is the only basis which permits both the independent development of groups and individuals, and the formation of free and varied groups.

The process of the world-wide federation of the nations has been proceeding since the dawn of the world. Its realization was only a question of time. The present war, it seems, has precipitated this realization, the inevitable result of the manifold sociological components which have accumulated during the ages. The world-war is only an effect of this universal determinism. The German rulers who unleashed it are its unconscious agents. And all these conditions being given, it was not possible for them to do otherwise. They were like an avalanche rolling down the slope of a mountain, pushing and dragging down trees and houses in its passage. And just as men feel no hatred for the avalanche, so they should feel no hatred for the Germans, those unconscious authors of the butchery which for two and a half years has drenched the world in blood. They could not do otherwise than they have done, all the conditions being what they have been.

The ultimate end of this world-war must be universal

and total disarmament. Everything calls for it—economic conditions, political conditions, and moral conditions.

It is not a Utopia, but were it a Utopia that would not prevent its realization. The Utopia of to-day is the reality of to-morrow. "The history of the human spirit," as Ernest Renan wrote, "shows us all ideas coming to birth outside the law and growing up surreptitiously. Go back to the origin of all reforms: they one and all seem unrealizable." Total and universal disarmament will certainly seem unrealizable to many. It is none the less the goal toward which humanity is marching, with a slow but sure step. And everything gives us reason to believe that this goal will be attained at the end of this war. It is for men to attain it, and, above all, for those who are politically most advanced: the Western peoples—France, Great Britain, Belgium, the United States, etc. If they will, it is in their power to close the era of war between men, which will enable humanity the better to utilize their physical and intellectual forces in order to fight and prevail over the forces of nature.

## CHAPTER XIV

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Russian Revolution—The United States enters the war—The victory of the Entente postponed—The influence of American capitalism—Public opinion is stirred in support of Mr. Wilson—The Central Powers refuse to divulge their aims—Mr. Wilson's Message—The predominance of altruistic aims—The submarine war intensified—America drawn into the war—The Tsar deposed—Mr. Wilson's declaration—The Irish question—Results of America's intervention—Anarchy in Russia—The war becomes a war of democratization: a revolution—Peace will be based on justice, liberty, and equality—The war will result in the general democratic progress of the peoples.

**D**URING the five months which have elapsed since the date when I completed the revision of the foregoing pages, a multitude of events has occurred, some unimportant and others of a serious nature. Two of them, the Russian Revolution and the entrance of the United States into the fiery furnace of the war, are so important that it is impossible to foresee all their consequences. But important or trivial, few of these events have invalidated the lessons which we have derived from the war.

The semi-immobility of the European fronts; the open fighting in the basin of the Euphrates and the Tigris, with the capture of Bagdad and the junction of the British and Russian troops; the campaign for the conquest of Palestine; the blockade of the Central Powers by the Western Powers, and the attempted blockade of the latter by the submarines of the former; the intensification of the submarine war; the methodical destruction of the region between the fronts in the West; the deportations and forcible employment of the inhabitants of the invaded districts; the intervention of

the United States by means of the President's Note to the belligerents, by his Message to the Senate, by the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Imperial Powers, and finally by the declaration of a state of war against the Central Powers; the rupture of diplomatic relations by the Chinese, Brazilian, Bolivian, Haytian, and Liberian Republics, and by Honduras and Nicaragua; the entry into the war of the Republics of Cuba and Guatemala; the Russian Revolution, with its astonishing collapse into anarchy and the signs of an approaching recovery; the occurrences in Greece; the diplomatic attacks upon the United States delivered by the German Government in Mexico and in Central and South America; the events which have occurred in Ireland, Spain, and Rumania; the brutal and insolent policy of the Germans, with the reprobation and hatred which it entails; the policy of postponement and indecision followed by the Western Powers, which has had the effect of delaying the conclusion of the war; the continued waste of lives and of wealth; the continued expense of the war; the scarcity of food-stuffs, resulting in higher prices, and the regulation of distribution and consumption in belligerent and neutral countries; the increasing desire of the peoples for peace, while the Governments find it impossible to conclude peace; the continued increase on every hand of the minority Socialist parties; the dread, openly expressed, of revolutionary movements at no distant date, and in every country; the hunger riots in Germany and Sweden; the refusal of the German Socialists to vote on the Budget; the Socialist scission in Germany; the peace agitation conducted by Socialists in the neutral and belligerent countries; and yet other events which I do not for the moment call to mind—all these confirm the lessons which I expounded sixteen months ago to my audience at the University Extension Lectures which I delivered in the University of London.

Once more the observer will note:

The influence of climatic, orographical, meteorological, hydrographical, geological, and physical conditions; the violent and terrifying manner of waging war, which confirms the check inflicted upon the regulation of warfare; the fact that warfare and militarism are schools of crime; the bankruptcy of militarism, which is unable to obtain a decision; the superiority of voluntary discipline to the discipline based on constraint and fear; the systematic employment of constraint and fear by the Imperial Powers; the increasing hatred of militarism and warfare; the increasing influence of the engineer and the administrator, an undeniable proof that economic power is taking the place of military power; the fact that militarism is the prop of autocracy, and *vice versa*; the mental deformation resulting from the military profession and military training, consequences of which are the psychological blunders committed by the diplomacy of the Imperial Powers, the failure of the Dardanelles campaign, and the dearth of big guns in France; the utility, even the indispensability, of the spirit of revolt as an element of life; the confirmation of the fact that the present war is a war of exhaustion; the enormous increase of war expenditure, making indemnities impossible; the scarcity of raw materials and food-stuffs, and the resulting slow but certain approach of dearth and famine; the enormous importance of the produce of the soil and subsoil; the indispensable character of industrial and agricultural workers, miners, and laboratory experts; the useless and harmful character of non-workers and social parasites; the increasing augmentation of the cost of living; the increase of Socialistic measures relating to production, distribution, and consumption; the accentuation of the revolutionary nature of the economic situation; the predominance of economic aims among the factors which are inducing nations to enter the war; the fact that



property and wealth are more highly valued than human lives; the solidarity existing between all the peoples of the earth, between individuals, and between individuals and their environment; the development of the consequences of acts committed long previously; the importance of the freedom of maritime highways, and accordingly of the part played by the submarine; the atmosphere of obscurity and ignorance fostered by all Governments, democratic or autocratic (excepting that of the United States), by means of censorships, resulting in defects and mistakes and material losses of various kinds; the power of active minorities; the antagonism between the democratic habits of the French and English and their Governments, whose tendencies are autocratic; the Pro-Germanism of the Catholic and Conservative elements in neutral countries; the similarity of the psychological blunders of the Conservative and reactionary elements to those of the German governing classes; the discrepancy between the ends pursued by the reactionary and Conservative governing classes and the results of their actions; the prejudicial character of royalty; the useless and injurious nature of punishment and violent repression; the fact that the long duration of the war is prejudicial to autocracies, but is, on the other hand, of service to democracies; the growth of democracies and the diminution of autocracies; the rejuvenation of the governmental, civil, and military personnel in Russia, Great Britain, and France; the value of audacity; the increasing longing for peace on the part of the peoples, who must themselves conclude peace; the increase of feminism; the increase of Socialism and its social influence; the increasing enfeeblement of the peoples, especially in Europe, both in quantity and in quality, as the result of the increased death-rate and the increasing prevalence of sickness; the fact that the present war is at the same time a conflict of interests between the capitalistic clans, and a conflict between

two principles—authority and liberty—and between two systems—autocracy and democracy—centralism and federalism.

The analysis of events and their causes led me many times, in the course of my lectures at Birkbeck College, to forecast future events. Founded upon logic, most of my forecasts have since then been realized. Thus, on November 20, 1915, stating that the end of the war was not then in sight (Chapter II.), I foretold that other peoples would join the belligerents. Eighteen months have gone by since then, and the war still continues, while four or five more States have joined the belligerents. And others yet will take part in the conflict if the war continues until the end of 1918, which seems to me to be the final date beyond which the war cannot be protracted. The defeat of the Imperial Powers, which to many seemed doubtful before the intervention of the United States, appeared to me to be a certainty as far back as the aforesaid month of November (Chapter III.). To me it seemed so inevitably the consequence of the facts that I repeated my forecast the following month (Chapters IV. and X.). In my lecture on December 4, 1915, I showed that the prolongation of the war is resulting in the creation of a veritably revolutionary situation. The Russian Revolution, the disturbances caused by dearth and famine in Sweden and in Germany, and the general dread of a revolution, publicly expressed in the neutral journals, notably those of Switzerland, prove the correctness of this forecast (Chapters IV. and XII.).

According to my deductions, the war was bound to advance the cause of feminism (Chapters III. and VI.), and it is now announced that women are to have the vote in Great Britain and in Russia, and in France they now have the right to enter the School of Arts and Manufactures—that is, to become engineers.

The logic of the facts led me to declare, in February,

1916, that the present war of exhaustion is a veritable world-wide revolution (Chapter VIII.). And we are now beginning to read this here and there in the Swiss, English, and American newspapers. It will soon be a commonplace of conversation and the Press.

In such times as ours events rush by us, pressing on the skirts of those before them. Those that follow make us forget those that preceded them. It therefore seems fitting that I should, in a few lines, recall the correctness of forecasts made months beforehand. This I have done, not in a spirit of prophetic vanity, but in order to show that a close and exact analysis of events and their causes enables us to reveal an inevitable concatenation in life, which permits us approximately to foretell the lines along which the future will develop. All is rigidly conditioned and determined by the multitude of causes—themselves effects—which precede the effects—themselves causes—to be discovered at a given moment.

Two events of great importance have occurred during the first six months of the present year (1917). I refer to the Russian Revolution and the entry into the war, on the side of the Entente, of the great Republic of the United States. The consequences of these events extend so far in time and in space, and so closely touch the whole of humanity, that it seems only proper to analyze them and inquire into the lessons to be derived from them, which, for that matter, will only confirm those expounded in the foregoing pages.

The world-wide character of the present conflict has been emphasized by the addition to the ranks of the belligerents of the United States, promptly followed by the Republics of Cuba and Guatemala, and soon to be followed by the Republics of Brazil, China, and others. The intervention of the American Republics has made manifest to all the fact which I mentioned to my auditors as far long ago as November and December, 1915—namely, that the present conflict is in reality

a conflict between two principles, two moralities: liberty and authority; between two systems of government: democracy and autocracy. Now no one doubts this, for the Russian Revolution, by transforming the Tsar's Empire into a federalist Republic of a more or less Socialistic nature, has suppressed the last argument of those who sought to regard the war merely as a conflict between Powers pursuing economic ends.

As a matter of fact, since the day when the German Army invaded Belgium the war has changed its character. It was then a war of national liberation. But, as one of the results of the Russian Revolution, it is now by way of becoming a class war, which proves that I was justified in stating (in Chapter VIII.) that "this war of exhaustion is in truth a world-wide revolution."

An analysis of the motives which have led the United States to enter the war reveals, as in the case of other countries, a considerable diversity. As everywhere, we discover economic, intellectual, and moral motives. Considering the matter thoroughly, we find that the first order of motives appear to have made it possible for the American nation to enter the war; but these motives do not appear to be predominant. The American industrial magnates have, since the beginning of the war, been the great purveyors to the Entente of arms, munitions, machinery, tools, raw materials, means of transport, food-stuffs, etc. Under this head they have banked more than £500,000,000, the greater part of which has been lent to the various Governments of the Entente by American financiers. Indeed, the bankers, even those of German origin, who are more or less Russophobe, all participated in these loans. They had, so to speak, banked on the victory of the Entente. They were forced to do so by the fact that as soon as the war broke out American industry as a whole equipped itself for the production of munitions of war. The suspension of their contracts would have resulted in an economic

crisis, and a labour crisis of a very serious character, which would have expressed itself by strikes, lock-outs, and wholesale bankruptcies. Thus it became necessary to issue loans to the Powers of the Entente, guaranteed by the paper of the various States.

But as the war lingered on the victory of the Entente was postponed to a distant date, and the expenses of the war continually increased, so that loans and debts followed the same ascending curve. As a consequence, it became improbable that war indemnities could ever be paid to the victors. In short, the economic and financial situation of the States of the Entente was bound to become increasingly gloomy as the war lasted longer and longer. On the other hand, the belligerents had little by little organized their own war industries. More and more they were tending to limit their imports to mere supplies of raw materials. An industrial crisis was in process of formation. The capitalists perceived this, and were all the more disquieted thereby, because, despite high wages and abundant and intensified labour, there was a certain amount of disorder due to poverty, owing to the rise of prices of food-stuffs and other products, which exceeded the increase of wages. The capitalist world of North America was thus led to desire a modification of the international situation: either peace, or the rupture of neutrality and the participation of the United States in the war. The realization of this latter alternative maintained the whole series of war industries, while at the same time it gave the trusts and the industrial magnates a thoroughly safe client: the American State. This client would take the place of the European States, which were suffering from fatigue, and on the brink of ruin. The speculation would be a fortunate one, for the harvest of gold would continue. The financiers and industrial magnates combined used the Press to influence public opinion in such a way as to impel President Wilson to intervene in the conflict.

In these various sociological phenomena we note the considerable influence of economic interests over human conduct, and the power of action which a powerful minority derives from its economic and financial strength. Lastly, we observe the completest solidarity between individuals and events, the decision of the capitalist magnates being dependent upon the decisions of the proletarian crowd, and *vice versa*. All things are interconnected, are inextricably entangled.

This is so true that the capitalist magnates, in order to set up a current of public opinion, were obliged to have recourse to the world of University professors, clergy, lawyers, men of letters, scientists, journalists, etc.; in short, to that intellectual minority which, from the beginning of the war, had been influencing public opinion in the direction of the intervention of the United States, in the interest of democratic and moral ideals. The violation of Belgian neutrality and of the so-called rules of warfare by the German Government, which had ratified those rules, and the treaty of neutrality, and the long duration of the war, with its crimes and its devastation, had quite naturally aroused the conscience and the rational judgment of the "intellectuals" of North America. Little by little the anti-Germanic wave crept forward, in the name of morality and democracy. Puritans and ideologists agreed with the trusts and the financiers; they were, although for different reasons, of one and the same mind. The mass of the public was roused by the phraseology of democracy, just as the mass of the European public was roused in the year 1914. The directing elements of the country, seeking the realization of economic aims, were obliged to resort to the assistance of the "intellectuals," who were eagerly seeking the realization of ideological aims, in order to influence the mass of the people, who, being actuated by sentiment, serve ideals far more readily than interests. What had happened in Europe happened again in

America. The task of arousing public opinion was all the more easy, as the German Government afforded notable assistance in the shape of its submarine campaign. All citizens of the United States felt the effects of this campaign and perceived its dangers. The freedom of the seas ceased to exist with the advent of the submarine, employed as it was in an utterly unscrupulous manner.

Public opinion having been thus aroused and directed, Mr. Wilson was able to intervene in the conflict, knowing that the whole people would be with him. We know how he did intervene. First, in his Note of December, 1916, he requested the belligerents to state their war aims. He was on the eve of taking a decisive step; so that it was absolutely necessary that the aims of the belligerents should be made public, in order that the American people should approve of his decision. And the world witnessed the commencement of a public diplomacy. A Democrat, Mr. Wilson rejected the obsolete methods of secret diplomacy.

The Central Powers, the prisoners of their governmental methods, which are based upon "bluff" and untruthfulness, held fast on the one hand by Pan-Germanism, and on the other by Social Democracy, were obliged to refrain from revealing their war aims. The Powers of the Entente, embarrassed by the territorial cravings of Italy, the British Empire, and, above all, Russia, were forced to modify their declarations as supporters of the nationalist policy. Here again we perceive the harmful nature of autocracies and of the Imperialistic policy of the reactionary and conservative element. On the other hand, we perceive also the influence of the democratic elements, which in the Western Powers is sufficiently powerful to call for an affirmation of the nationalist policy, but not sufficiently powerful to compel the Governments to assert the right of the referendum, the right of the peoples to dispose in freedom of their own destinies.

The absence of a reply on the part of the Central Powers, and the reply of the Entente, was enough to enlighten public opinion, so that Mr. Wilson was able to define his position by his magnificent Message of January 22, 1917. With an admirable largeness of ideas, a concision and lucidity beyond praise, Mr. Wilson laid down the general outlines of the conditions of a just and stable peace. In passing, the reader will permit me to observe that these general outlines are those which I myself set forth in March, 1916, at the Birkbeck College (Chapters XI. and XIII.). A true monument of international politics, this Message is permeated by the spirit of justice and wisdom. It breathes the love of liberty and equality. It continues the work of the French Constituent Assembly, for it is the declaration of the Rights of the Peoples.

If we consider this Message, we discover:

1. The assertion that the New World is entering the Concert of the Nations, and entering it with its political faith, its morality, its rules of conduct, and the firm intention of concluding peace in its own fashion.

2. The affirmation of the conditions of a *stable* peace, which are: (a) The creation of a force which should guarantee conventions; and this force will not consist of armies, nor of militarism, but of organized humanity, the League of Nations, the Society of Nations. (b) A peace without rivalry, without conditions imposed on the peoples by the conquerors—that is, a peace without victory, concluded between free and equal peoples.

3. The permanent distinction between the governments and the governed.

In short, Mr. Wilson bases the monument of *stable* peace on three columns: Liberty, Equality, and Cooperation (solidarity or fraternity). And in order to make the world clearly understand the immense significance of his proposal, Mr. Wilson gave the concrete example of Poland, and hinted at that of Constantinople



and the Dardanelles. A logician, he drew the inferences contained in his premises, without caring whose interests they clashed with. On the one hand, the right of the peoples to dispose of themselves was affirmed, and also the peoples' need of mutual aid. At the same time, he denied the occupant's right of territorial ownership when he asserted that access to the sea is a necessary right to be enjoyed by every nation. The consequences of this declaration involved the whole world, entailing the neutralization of the Rhine for Switzerland, of the Danube for Germany and Hungary, of the roads to the Amazon and the Pacific for Bolivia, and of the Dardanelles, etc. The freedom of the seas is a need of the peoples, and no one has the right to suppress it. Thus the Message demonstrated the solidarity of the world, embracing the whole world even in the midst of this gigantic war between the nations.

The position publicly assumed by Mr. Wilson established the predominance of ideological and altruistic aims over the economic aims of the capitalist classes of all countries. How far removed is this grandson of an Irish emigrant, this University professor, nourished on ideology, and now the President of a mighty Republic, from the rulers of the European democracies! None of these latter has had the intelligence nor the courageous honesty to break definitely with the Imperialistic aims of the capitalist clans, to announce, categorically, the ideological aims which lay, as a matter of fact, at the back of the mind of every democrat in Europe. So true was this that the rulers, the sworn vassals of economic aims, felt the necessity of veiling these by a vague democratic phraseology.

The ideology of Kant, expressed by the voice of Mr. Wilson, prevailed over the economic aims of the trusts and the financiers. These latter were about to help toward the realization of the League of Nations, of the republicanization of the world. Everywhere the

capitalist, conservative, reactionary elements perceived this fact more or less plainly, and everywhere they rebelled against it, endeavouring to discredit the democratic and pacific ideals of Mr. Wilson. This reaction would have assumed an even greater scope had not the Governments of the European democracies, in the national interest, demanded a little circumspection. The autocratic Governments of the Central Powers and Russia gave little heed to this circumspection; and the Press of these countries definitely assumed a position opposed to the ideals of Mr. Wilson, which it contemptuously described as Utopian. And this is logical, for in desiring a stable peace, in claiming that the peoples have the right to dispose of their own destinies, Mr. Wilson was opposing the designs of the Imperial Governments. He was sapping the principle of autocracy; he was in favour of destroying militarism and the standing army, those props of autocracy.

In short, the Message to the Senate of the United States (January 22, 1917) was a declaration of war upon autocratic procedures and systems of government, such as those which obtained in the Central Empires and in the Russia of that date. The German rulers were not mistaken. They saw that the participation of the United States in the establishment of peace was inevitable; and for months their Press had been protesting against this participation, the result of which would be a democratic peace, a peace of the nations, based on principles, and not an Imperialistic, autocratic peace, consisting of compromises. They saw themselves definitely defeated. They then resorted to the employment of their favourite weapon, terrorism, in the vague hope of inducing their adversaries to consent to a settlement. They intensified the submarine campaign, in order, if possible, to effect the blockade of Great Britain, France, and Italy.

The intensification of the submarine campaign injured

the neutrals more than it injured the belligerents. Without warning, without previous discussion, the German Government broke through the understanding in respect of submarines which it had concluded with the United States in April and May, 1916.

Events bear man forward in the logical and inevitable development of their consequences. Effects in their turn become causes, and so on in unending concatenation. To the rupture of the Convention of May, 1916, Mr. Wilson retorted by breaking off diplomatic relations. But he did not stop there. Deeply convinced of the necessity of a League of Nations, he invited all neutral countries to follow the example of the United States—that is, to place Germany under the ban of the nations. The terrorist policy of the German Junkers was increasing the number of Germany's enemies, and slowly but surely was compassing her ruin. Once again we perceive the harmful effects of the militarist education and the ruling of men by fear.

The neutrals did not respond to President Wilson's appeal by excommunicating the Imperial Powers. The immediate neighbours of the German Empire felt themselves too weak to dare to protest against the Germanic reign of terror. From this fear, which, as a matter of fact, is very natural, we may derive this lesson: the necessity of disarmament, for with nations, as with individuals, there is no true liberty save between equals. Now the nations can only be equal among themselves provided none of them possesses armaments which can be employed to crush the others. The neutral nations which did not border upon the Central Powers did not feel that they were attacked. They did not perceive the inevitable solidarity of the nations. German Kaiserism and Junkerism quickly undeceived them by the activities of their diplomatists and their submarines. The revelation of the secret activities of Germany, of her attempts to intervene in American

affairs, by launching Mexico, aided by Japan, against the United States, and fomenting disturbances in Central and South America, made it obvious to all that an international solidarity exists, whether the nations desire it or no. These attempts also proved once more that the rulers of the autocratic countries were absolutely ignorant of the psychology of the free peoples. Here again is one of the fruits of the militarist education based on fear.

As time went on, and the United States were slowly moving in the direction of war, an event occurred which accelerated their progress. The Russian Revolution, by suppressing Tsarism, banished awhile the fear that the defeat of the Central Powers would serve to reinforce the Russian autocracy. This fear, which was fairly general in democratic countries, prevented many democrats from recommending union with the adversaries of the Central Powers. Very soon the facts showed that the Russian Revolution might really prove to be a great liberating force, which would free the nations. Equal rights were conferred upon all Russian citizens, without distinction of race, religion, or nationality. And the people of the United States, whether they were poor artisans or rich financiers, suddenly ceased to be Germanophile, to become Russophile. The hatred of Russian Tsarism gave way to love for the Russian Republic. Lithuanians, Letts, Poles, Armenians, Georgians, Finns, and other allogeneous peoples who had emigrated to America in order to escape the autocratic yoke of the Tsar were instantaneously transformed into ardent Russophiles. From this resulted an increased tendency to support the Entente and to oppose the Central Powers. The seed of autocracy and terrorism was yielding its fruit of hatred. Once again the thinker was able to perceive that liberty is the seed of love, the parent of well-doing, while authority, based on fear and constraint, is the seed of hatred, the

parent of crime. Let us note that these social phenomena demonstrate what we have already stated concerning the remote repercussion of men's acts in time and space, and the unbreakable ties which unite men, though seas and mountains divide them.

Thus when on April 3, 1917, Mr. Wilson declared "that the Imperial German Government was making war upon the Government and the people of the United States," and "counselled Congress to signify its formal acceptance of the state of war which was forced upon it," he had behind him, approving of his action, almost the entire American people, without distinction of origin or religion.

For the first time in history the world beheld a great State responding to a war of attack by a war of offence without formally declaring war. There was here a breaking away from the traditional methods of diplomacy, deliberately effected, in order to assert the absolute desire of the American people to refrain from going to war. The symbolic value of this absence of any declaration of war is considerable. This is what it means: "We are attacked, and we are defending ourselves by all the means in our power; but we have no love of war, and we do not make war under any conditions whatever. By principle the Democrat is a pacifist, and the pacifist does not make war. But to be a pacifist does not by any means imply that one should submit to any act of violence, to any attack upon one's liberty, without protesting, without reacting, without defending oneself, even by violence. The pacifist is not necessarily a Tolstoyan."

The United States are participating in the war against the Imperial Powers without forming an alliance with the Powers of the Entente, and without signing the Pact of London (September 5, 1914). This attitude, unique among the belligerents, is explained by the distrust of the Imperialistic aims pursued by certain

of these belligerents. These aims are undoubtedly Imperialistic as well as secret. But it was not in order to promote such ends that the United States intervened. Mr. Wilson warned the world of this fact in his Declaration of April 3:

“Peace must be based upon the tried foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish aim to serve. We desire no conquest; we seek no indemnity for ourselves, no material sacrifices for the sacrifices to which we shall freely consent; we are merely the upholders of the rights of humanity. We shall be satisfied when these rights have been assured.”

With such altruistic aims it was impossible to form alliances with governments which were aiming at the satisfaction of narrow and selfish interests. Another important consequence of this absence of alliances is this: Mr. Wilson is free to act as he chooses; he can continue the war or terminate it without reference to the other belligerents. These latter depend upon him, but he does not depend upon them. He thus becomes the arbiter of the conflict, for accordingly as he continues or terminates it he forces the Powers of the Entente to continue or terminate it. He is the arbiter of the conflict, because he has behind him the whole gigantic financial, economic, and human power of the United States. The complete liberty which Mr. Wilson has assured for himself is a certain guarantee that the peace which is concluded will be a just and stable peace, without victors or vanquished, based on the liberty of the peoples to dispose of their own destinies.

The ideology of the war aims of Mr. Wilson, combined with the entire liberty of action which he has skilfully reserved for himself, has forced him, and is forcing him, to bring pressure to bear upon the Powers of the Entente and on the neutrals in the direction of realizing his ideal aims. Thus he is influencing the British Government with a view to impelling it to solve the Irish

problem in conformity with the principles of national freedom, the principles which the British Government claimed to be defending when it declared war on Germany. The Irish problem, from being particular to Great Britain, has become Imperial, and even international. The Dominions, which took part in the war, suffered, like the other Allies of the Entente, the consequences of the enmity which prevailed between Irish and English: the absence of compulsory service, etc. Peopled partially by Irishmen (the Prime Ministers of certain Dominions were Irish), and bound to Great Britain only by the ties of free consent, the Dominions naturally felt the necessity of bringing all their influence to bear, in the Council of Empire which the needs of the war had forced upon the British Government, with a view to effecting the liberation of Ireland. In so doing they seconded the pressure exerted by Mr. Wilson, who was himself acting under the impulse of the purely logical principles which had led him to intervene in the war, and influence of the political and economic power of the American Irish. To the pressure exerted by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and North America, was added that resulting from the example of the Russian Revolution, which declared Poland independent, Finland autonomous, etc., and officially declared the right of national groups to dispose in freedom of their own destinies. The British Government understood that it must solve the Irish Question, and that it could no longer obey the small, wealthy, Conservative minority of Ulster, led by the Minister, Sir Edward Carson. Let us once more, in passing, note the influence of active minorities, and the continual attempts of the elements of conservation and regression to check the onward progress of the world. The present British Government is democratic and Parliamentary only in appearance: this is a point of great interest to the sociologist, to which we shall return again. It is actually autocratic,

and is directed by the Conservatives. Moreover, it attempted to satisfy the Conservative Ulstermen, by separating them from the rest of Ireland, to which Home Rule was granted. The reason given for this partitioning of Ireland was that the British Government refused, by any means whatever, to force a law upon a minority which did not accept it. Let us note, moreover, that this reason belongs to the doctrine elaborated by the Anarchist thinkers, who maintain that the right of a minority is as worthy of respect as the right of a majority, and, therefore, that a government must never be imposed by force, but must, by persuasion, insure its voluntary acceptance. It was a strange scruple in a Government which had imposed compulsory service on a small minority of "conscientious objectors" who did not accept it. Moreover, when we examine the manner in which democratic Governments perform their functions in the present state of our civilization we see that they always depend on the submission of the opposition minority to the decisions imposed by the majority, or what seems to be the majority. As a matter of fact, the reason given by the British Government was only a pretext, an apparent reason, designed to conceal the actual motive: obedience to Conservative and capitalist influence. But the time had gone by when this influence, however powerfully exerted, could check the inevitable course of events. The partitioning of Ireland was impossible, the more so as the Protestant clergy combined in part with the Catholic clergy to protest against it. Moreover, since the revolt of the Sinn Feiners the situation which we outlined in Chapter V. had been confirmed: the spirit of rebellion had gained the whole island, and each Parliamentary election recorded a victory for the republican Sinn Feiners over the Home Rulers pure and simple. The British Government was gathering the fruit of the seed it had planted during the course of the last century;



and the fruits of authoritative rule are always bitter and unwholesome.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, proposed Home Rule with the exclusion of the six counties of Ulster, and, if this was refused, the convocation of an Irish Convention, in which all classes and all interests should be represented, which should discuss and examine all sorts of ideas, formulate conclusions, and finally arrive at a settlement, with all guarantees for the autonomous government of Ireland. Naturally the Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons were in favour of the Convention, while the Ulster representatives preferred partition, and joined the Convention only with reservations. Eventually the Convention was decided upon. What will it yield? This we cannot foresee in detail, for the result will be a compromise, whose nature will depend on the respective tenacity and strength of the opposing parties. However this may be, the self-government of Ireland is now assured, excepting for a longer or shorter period of delay. Before the cessation of hostilities Ireland will have conquered her liberty, and thus, as Lord Curzon stated in the House of Lords, "the reconciliation of Ireland with Great Britain will assure to the latter the sympathy and collaboration of all sections of public opinion in America, and will give her an enormous advantage at the Peace Conference." This admission on the part of the Conservative English Government shows that the international nature of the Irish problem is recognized, as well as the power of principles in the government of democracies, and the solidarity which binds all peoples and all men together. The pressure which the Dominions and the United States have exerted upon the British Government is also manifested by the measures of self-government which were granted in India. These do not yet amount to the realization of the desires of the Hindu Nationalists, but they constitute an advance

toward their complete realization. The present war will have contributed toward the liberation of India: a fresh proof of the influence of active minorities, of the increasing democratization of the world, and of the solidarity of mankind, notwithstanding seas and continents.

Compelled by his pacific ideology to enter the turmoil of the war, Mr. Wilson is further constrained thereby to exert pressure upon the neutrals of Europe, America, and Asia, in order to induce them, if not to enter the conflict, at all events to break off all relations with the Imperial Powers. And he must so exert this pressure as to create, during the course of the war itself, that League of Nations of which Kant dreamed, and which he wishes to realize. Another effect of the rupture of relations between the neutrals and the Central Powers is the impossibility, when peace is concluded, of a Protectionist policy shared by a group of nations. The entry into the war of the Republics of the United States, Cuba, Guatemala, and to-morrow of Brazil, etc., insures that when peace is concluded no Protectionist policy can be established for the group of Western belligerents, as it would include all America, all Asia, all Africa, and all Australia—in short, the whole world. By the very size of the group the Protectionist ties which might in some extraordinary way be created would lose their Protectionist character. So the thinking reader may note this as a certain consequence of the intervention of the United States: A policy of free exchange is obligatory on the conclusion of peace. Attempts at economic warfare, in the form of Protectionism, are doomed to certain failure. The democratization of the world promoted by this war, which was entered upon for the sake of autocratic aims, is in process of accomplishment, politically as well as economically speaking.

Among the neutrals figured the Chinese Republic. Its rulers very clearly comprehended that it was to the national interest to yield to American pressure. Diplo-

matic relations with the Central Powers were therefore broken off. By this act the Chinese Republic entered the world-concert of nations: it inscribed itself a member of the League of Nations. It became the equal of the Powers of Europe and America. This act had yet another important repercussion, for it meant, where Japan was concerned, an understanding between China and the United States, and the end of Japan's pretensions to hegemony over Chinese Asia. This was a terrible blow to the Imperialist policy of Japan; all the more terrible in that the Russian Revolution had rendered obsolete the convention concluded during the war, between the Japanese and Russian Empires, by which the Chinese Republic was divided into spheres of influence. The Russian Revolution, democratic and Socialist, repudiated all those aims of conquest which are the inevitable product of autocratic empires. Imperialistic Japan, of course, disconcerted by the American intervention, and even more disappointed by the attitude of the Chinese Republic, appeared likely to react by exciting the military reaction which is taking place at the moment of writing these lines. What will come of this? Possibly disturbances which will spread through the whole of Central and Eastern Asia, and which will last for many months; but they will not succeed in re-establishing the situation which obtained before the war, or the hegemony of Imperial Japan. This hegemony received a serious blow in January-April, 1917, from the Russian Revolution, and above all from the intervention of the United States in the war.

The pressure which the United States are exerting on the neutrals of Europe is more economic than political. The group of Entente Powers is tending more and more to increase the stringency of the blockade of the Central Powers, and this it can do only by limiting the introduction of products into neutral countries. A closer

blockade is called for by the check suffered by military action in the Western front. To pierce the defensive line of trenches running from Switzerland to the North Sea is impossible, save by sacrificing millions of men—that is to say, by completely exhausting the supply of human material. The last offensives have proved this. And from this we derive this lesson: that in our age, with our ways and means of warfare, military action and the use of armed force yield no useful result. No decision can be obtained by force of arms. The economic power is replacing the power of armaments.

This war, in fact, constitutes the bankruptcy of French and English militarism, which are incapable of piercing the Hindenburg line, and of German militarism, which is incapable of forcing its enemies to treat for peace. The decision in the world-war will be given by the economic forces. Humanity has passed the period of armed force, which belonged to the age of barbarism.

The limitation of the introduction of food-stuffs and raw materials into the neutral countries results in increasing the difficulties of living. The rise of prices, the growing scarcity of food and raw materials, and the dearth of labour in the workshops and factories are, in the neutral countries of Europe, the consequences of a tightening of the blockade. These consequences find their repercussion in the Central Powers, as the neutrals are forced to limit their exports to those countries, however sorely they may need to make such exports in order that they may, in exchange, obtain coal and steel.

The intervention of the United States in the world-war is producing economic effects of no less importance in the Western nations of the Entente. The calling-up, for military service, of nearly two million men inevitably reduces the available supply of labour, and thereby diminishes production. The result will be an increase of the prices of food-stuffs and other products all the

world over, and the necessity of rationing, of a methodical and ordered distribution of products, according to the needs of the consumers. This situation can only become yet further aggravated if other neutral American nations take part in the conflict, for everywhere men will be removed from production in order that they may be employed as soldiers—that is, as destroyers of the things produced. Militarism is the parent of famine, since it diminishes the number of producers. Everywhere there will be an intensification of the Socialistic measures to which the Governments have been compelled to resort during the war. The process of Socializing the world appears also to be on the way to realization, and it is worthy of note that this is happening under capitalist Governments whose principles are absolutely opposed to the measures which they are proposing and applying. Once more we perceive that men are controlled by events, and that the logic of events compels men to do that which they would not wish to do. The conditioning of men and things is universal and absolute.

While a system of rationing is imposing itself upon all the European belligerents and neutral countries of Europe, it is becoming necessary to control the export of products to Europe in a more methodical manner, owing to the diminished tonnage available for purposes of transport, due to the activities of the submarines. The export of raw materials has therefore been diminished in favour of the export of manufactured goods. In this way the transport of materials which would be lost in the workshops, in the process of manufacture, is avoided. But the consequence of this is that the industrial workers, in France, Great Britain, and Germany, are being dismissed, the men to barracks and the front, and the women to their own homes. The result is intense discontent. On the one hand, the workers are ceasing to draw high wages; on the other hand, they are cast back into the turmoil of the conflict, with all its dangers.

Each worker thus remobilized as a soldier is an actual element of dissociation and revolution in the midst of other soldiers who are already filled with discontent as a result of three years of continuous fighting. Here is one of the consequences of the submarine war undertaken at the desire of the Pan-Germanist Junkers and manufacturers.

In this way a genuinely revolutionary situation is arising, persisting, and undergoing development. It is creating a revolutionary mentality, the effect of which will inevitably make itself felt either after the war or in the course of the war; for it seems highly probable that this situation and mentality are the consequences of the activities of the policy pursued by the world's capitalists, and more especially by the Junkers and industrial magnates of Germany. They are digging with their own hands the tomb in which they are about to bury themselves. Yet they were aware of the possibility of these consequences. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, had warned them of it in his telegram of July 23, 1914, to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna. He said, in effect:

“If as many as four great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.”

The acts of men have remote consequences, often very different from those which they desired. This revolutionary situation and state of mind, whose beginnings might be perceived as early as August, 1914, as we have stated on several occasions in the course of

the foregoing chapters, have been intensified as well as more widely propagated by the example of the Russian Revolution. The educative force of example is considerable, because man is naturally imitative; and for this reason revolutions, like reactions, are contagious. The same conditions naturally engender the same effects. Already we have seen that the events of the Russian Revolution were one of the factors of the disturbances and strikes in Germany in April last, in Sweden, in Spain, in France, and in Great Britain. The Governments checked these disturbances either by yielding to all the demands of the strikers (as in France and England), or by yielding with threats (as in Germany, Sweden, and Spain). At the same time, the Governments realized that they would be obliged to satisfy some of the demands of the popular masses. In Great Britain they have done this by introducing universal suffrage, and by granting six million women the right to vote; in Rumania, by introducing universal suffrage, dividing the soil among the peasants, and establishing equality of rights irrespective of religious distinctions; in Germany and Austria-Hungary, by promising democratic reform after the war. These are the fruits of the Russian Revolution, whose effects are felt beyond the Russian frontiers; for the nations possess a mutual solidarity, even when they are divided by the trenches of the fronts on which men are killing one another. Solidarity is, in reality, far stronger and of more effect in the world than the forces of conflict. Mutual aid prevails over mutual conflict.

The pressure of events is bringing about the democratization of the peoples; and according to circumstances this is occurring slowly, and by successive stages, or in a speedier fashion. It is enough for some chance incident—the scarcity of provisions, a slight dearth of bread—to anger the crowds, and movements of revolt are unleashed which are quickly transformed into

revolutions. Hunger is the greatest maker of revolutions that has ever existed. Thus was born the Russian Revolution. The Germanophile bureaucracy of Russia took measures to cause a famine, in order to provoke disturbances, that they might repress these, and so demonstrate to Russia's Western Allies the fact that she must needs conclude peace in order to prevent an internal revolution. Tsarism could not agree to the democratic formulæ of President Wilson's Message, for to do so would have been to sign its own death warrant. It was necessary, therefore, to break with its Western Allies. Riot and insurrection were the best pretext. Unfortunately, the Russian bureaucracy forgot that it is easier to unloose the forces of the populace than to check them once they are unchained. It is with them as with a torrent that has burst its banks. The Tsar's Government could not repress the rioting, which became a revolution, whose course is only beginning, so that the world has as yet felt only some of its effects.

The rioting was transformed into a revolution because the army, on which the Government was relying, joined the rioters. The army had ceased to be a professional army, commanded by professional officers: it had become a nation in arms, an army of citizens, commanded by other citizens. The simple consideration of this phenomenon would have shown the Russian rulers that they could not count on the army to recall the crowds to obedience. But they could not realize this change, because of their military and autocratic mentality, which prevented them from perceiving the reality, distorted facts, and concealed their inevitable consequences. This transformation of the professional army into an army of citizens has occurred everywhere during the course of this war. It renders illusory any possibility of repressing revolution when the unknown hour strikes in each country. There is no doubt that the hour will strike, for everywhere, in the neutral as in the



belligerent countries, everyone is haunted by the idea of revolution. The poorer classes of the towns and rural districts speak of it as an inevitable event. In the newspapers, the Parliaments, the Socialist and Trade Union Congresses, the threat of revolution looms ahead. Rulers and ruled are agreed on this point, although the former often refuse to admit the fact. Men like to close their eyes to the precipice toward which they are hastening, fancying that they thereby suppress its existence. This haunting fear of revolution is a curious psychological and sociological phenomenon, and as such must be recorded.

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Moreover, this fear of revolution is provoked by many factors, well known though not publicly mentioned, and often exaggerated by the very existence of the veil in which the Governments and their censors seek to envelop them. Among the soldiers at the front and in the rear there are frequent instances of insubordination, of refusal to enter the trenches, of threats to march against the Government, of appeals to peace. The red flag which flew at the head of the revolutionary Russian soldiers has many times been raised by the soldiers on the Western front. The famous hymn, the *Internationale*, is heard everywhere on the fronts. Committees of soldiers and workmen are spontaneously being created, like those which cover Russia with a close and powerful network. Everywhere demands of a democratic and libertarian nature are being made; the discipline based on fear has completely disappeared. Will the discipline based on reason and the consciousness of collective interests replace it? This is the terrible problem of the hour. And its solution is rendered more difficult by the atmosphere of ignorance and obscurity which covers everything, thanks to the censorship and the policy of untruthfulness and silence adopted by the Governments. The gravity of the present situation, the

noxious character of such a policy, and of the obsolete methods of controlling the peoples by means of untruth and ignorance, and the dangers of foolish shepherds, appear strangely obvious.

Chaos is everywhere, and the co-ordination of individual and collective efforts is almost impossible, for the Press is stifled by the censorship; free speech is rendered dumb by the violence of the autocratic laws passed at the commencement of the war, which have not yet been abrogated. From this seething chaos, which is swelled by amplified and often falsified news, which circulates with incredible rapidity, what will result? No one can say with certainty, except that revolutionary movements are sure to occur, for fear no longer exists in the minds of the combatants.

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All are longing eagerly for peace, and under present conditions no nation can make peace. Generally speaking, the public has supposed that the intervention of the United States and other neutral republics, and the Russian Revolution, would shorten the duration of this lengthy war. This is an obvious error. The more the number of belligerents increases the more complex becomes the problem of concluding peace. Moreover, it is all the more difficult to make peace if it is to be established on ideological rather than on material and economic foundations. An understanding may be entered into by enemy States as regards the cession of territories and populations, and the payment of war contributions; a compromise based on mutual concessions is always possible in such a case. But things are otherwise when ideological principles are involved. All compromise is impossible, as being the very negation of the ideal principle for whose realization men are fighting.

It is impossible for the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments to accept a peace based on the principle that the peoples shall be free to dispose of their own

destinies, a principle which is the condition *sine qua non* of the peace desired by Mr. Wilson, and by the Provisional Government of Russia in revolution. Kaiserism and Junkerism, German and Hungarian, cannot agree to such a condition, for they would be signing their own death warrant: it would be suicide.

The Russian people revolted in order to obtain peace, and expelled a Government which was on the eve of concluding the peace which the people so desired! Here we have yet another proof of the fact that events are stronger than men, and that this logic draws men far away from the immediate aims which they proposed to attain, toward the realization of remote aims which are unknown to the majority, but are perceived by a few thinkers. It was in the logic of things that the Russian revolutionaries should be forced to assume a bellicose attitude, for a peace without the realization of their ideals might be the death sentence of their revolution. A reaction would be inevitable, and it would lead Russia to a Parliamentary or Monarchical or Republican form of Government, which would have nothing Socialistic about it. The Russian Socialists were prepared to continue the war until the day when the German people should force its rulers to accept the ideological conditions of the democratic peace laid down by themselves and by Mr. Wilson. A logical result of the Russian Revolution and the intervention of the United States and other neutral republics was the transformation of the war of material conquest initiated in August, 1914, into a war of democratic and moral conquests; in short, a revolution.

This transformation of the war, perceptible now to all, explains how it was that the more perspicacious of the Conservative elements among the Western belligerents looked askance at both the Russian Revolution and the intervention of Mr. Wilson. The comments of those newspapers which are the organs of the capitalist and Conservative clans afford a proof of this.

There is no doubt that, contrary to the will and the aspirations of the Western peoples, the Governments of these peoples, acting in the interest of the capitalist groups, have passed secret treaties, partitioning the peoples—mere human cattle—and the territories which, however, had first to be conquered by the gold and the blood of the peoples. Officially, they replied to Mr. Wilson that they repudiated all conquests, and secretly they were distributing their future conquests! The fact is certain. On seizing the power of the State the Russian revolutionaries became aware of these secret treaties, these revelations of the capitalistic megalomania of the West, as harmful as the Pan-Germanist megalomania of the Central capitalists. Of course, this policy of deceit and untruth, practised by the autocratic rulers of the Western democracies, bears fruit and produces its natural consequences, one of which is the absence of confidence between the Allied nations. How should the Russian revolutionists have believed in the word of Governments whose duplicity was known to them? From these facts we derive these lessons: the politics of autocracy, based on duplicity and the use of the lie, engenders death, suffering, and devastation; the consequences of action always develop, though it may be late or soon; they are inevitable. Only a politics based on the franchise, on honesty, on the truth, yields results whose effects, whether immediate or remote, are good and useful.

When we consider the proved existence of secret treaties, dividing territories and peoples, for the sake of capitalistic ends, we understand the demand of the revolutionary Russian Government for a plain, unambiguous declaration of war objectives.

We understand also that the Western Governments must perforce repudiate these political methods, and plainly declare their war aims. The necessity of so doing explains the reply of the French and British

Governments to their Russian Allies: "We are ready to revise and affirm by common agreement the objects of the war."

This change of policy is certain to come. We have another manifestation of the change in the action undertaken against Greece, or rather against King Constantine. Governmental Italy protected him, for Italy has need of a divided Greece, in order that she may accomplish her aims of conquest in the archipelago and in Asia Minor. However, Italy was forced to yield to her Allies, for Italian public opinion, desiring peace, is opposed to an Imperialistic policy, considering the fact that Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, acting in agreement, would have been all-powerful. To be sure, the Italian leaders did not completely yield, since they contrived to insure the maintenance of the monarchy in Greece. Events have their logic, which is stronger than human desires; and the abdication of Constantine in favour of his second son is only the first step on the road which is inevitably leading to a free Greece, republican, and completely united.

The dishonest and really clumsy policy of the Western Governments, which publicly act in one manner and secretly in another, is one of the factors which caused the Russian Socialists to insist so strongly on a Congress of the "International" at Stockholm. They wished, at this congress, to call upon the peoples of France and Great Britain to bring pressure to bear on their Governments with a view to forcing them to act publicly, with complete candour and honesty. They wished the Governments publicly to repudiate all annexations and all war contributions, and to demand the realization of the principle that the nations shall freely dispose of their own destinies. In this respect the revolutionary Russian Government was in agreement with the war aims so clearly and precisely defined by Mr. Wilson, and also with the Socialist parties of the Western Allies.

The change from servitude to liberty, when it is sudden, is necessarily accompanied by disorder and violence and bloodshed, and by the varied manifestations of diverse and contradictory ideologies. The Russian people by no means escaped these inevitable consequences of such crises of social transformation. And when all is considered, we should rather be astonished that these disorders began so late, that violence and bloodshed were at first so rare. The causes of these sociological phenomena appear to be the state of rotteness into which Tsarism and its bureaucracy had fallen; the temporary absence of alcoholic drinks; and the gentle and kindly nature of the Russian people. Varied and contradictory ideologies ran their course unchecked, in a veritable fury of free propaganda—a natural effect of reaction from the old fettering of thought. The mystic quality of the Revolution and the literal doctrinairism of the Socialists led many “intellectuals,” however intelligent, into a complete incomprehension of the international situation, and of the national and revolutionary situation of Russia. Perhaps we should regard this fact as the effect of a certain mental disequilibrium, due to the cerebral erethism engendered in these men and women during the long years of their life under the empire of the fear of death, penal servitude, and exile.

This incomprehension on the part of sincere and intelligent Socialists and revolutionaries is to be noted as one of the maleficent products of the policy which is based upon authority and fear. For the time being it complicated the international situation; from the first some were able to believe in the probability of a separate peace. This might have meant the death of the Revolution, and it might also have forced the Western Allies to make peace without further sacrifice, for as matters then stood they might possibly have found themselves unable to enforce the surrender of the German autocracy and junkerism; certainly, had Russia become Germany's

ally (see Chapter VIII.). Nor was this fear without foundation, as has been demonstrated by the events, which, with their mighty logic, draw men along with them as wisps of straw are borne by a torrent.

The rulers of revolutionary Russia, the leaders of the Councils (Soviets) of Workers' and Soldiers' delegates, the peasant Councils, and the Provisional Government, quickly understood how completely prejudicial a separate peace would assuredly prove to the establishment of their Revolution. To save the Revolution the Russian Socialists were inevitably compelled to support the continuation of the war until the German autocracy should be destroyed. Here human solidarity was plainly to be seen beyond the frontiers, even though the frontiers were trenches peopled by men who were killing one another. And this human solidarity was further manifested in another way, for the propagandist mission of the French and English Socialists to the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Petrograd was no negligible factor in the Russian leaders' understanding of the present situation. Just as the French and English Socialists influenced the Russians, so the Russian Socialists and the revolutionary atmosphere of Russia influenced them, awakening in them ideas and tendencies which are finding their repercussion in the Socialist world of the West. The unanimous decision of the French Socialist party to take part in the International Conference at Stockholm was one of the effects produced by the Russian Revolution. Once again we perceive how all things are connected, how all cohere together.

- The Russian revolutionaries were condemned to fight, and, consequently, they had to resort to the offensive. This necessity, pressing upon millions of human beings in the full ferment of revolution, whose aspirations were pacific, and who sought to resolve the internal social problems of Russia in a Socialistic spirit, compelled them to undertake an active propa-

ganda. They had, indeed, to make the masses see or feel the unavoidable necessity of continuing the war. Among many others, one man, Kerensky, yoked himself to the task. He proved to be indefatigable, because he was burning with the vivifying flame of a great and lofty ideal. And this spectacle assumed the greater magnitude in that no one, in the West, was equal to a similar task. Neither in Great Britain nor in France were the leaders capable of uplifting the masses, of utilizing and maintaining the magnificent spirit which filled the peoples of France and England during the first months of the world-war (see Chapter II.).

This difference was due to the fact of the Revolution. It shattered the bureaucratic framework, and allowed men to rise up and prove themselves equal to the situation. The observer notes, in this connection, this important sociological phenomenon: that bureaucracy, the necessary outcome of the centralization of powers and of authority based upon fear, is by its very nature destructive. It killed Tsarism; it is on the way to killing Kaiserism, and, unhappily, at the same time, it is leading the German people to the brink of death, so wholly has it penetrated the people's soul. It has weakened Great Britain and France. Lastly, it has prolonged the war, with its train of death and bloodshed and ruin.

The splendid energy expended by these men of the Russian Revolution in sweeping the masses along with them recalled that of the heroes of the English Revolution of the seventeenth, and the French Revolution of the eighteenth, century. In all these cases, despite the difference of period, despite the difference of social and national environment, an identical spirit of revolt is seen at work, arousing energies, quickening understandings, and calling forth initiative. Once again we may derive from these facts the lesson that the spirit of true revolution is beneficial in its action, and that man



cannot, for this reason, too assiduously cultivate it in all its different forms.

Read the proclamations of the Soviet of Petrograd, the speeches of Tseretelli, of Skobelev, and above all of Kerensky, made in Congress or to the soldiers, in the abridged reports of the newspapers, and you will realize their greatness, the mighty inspiration which animates them, the beauty which radiates from them! Only the admirable message of President Wilson can be compared with them. There has been nothing like them in France or England. We must go back to 1792-93 to find appeals which breathe such a love of liberty, such a spirit of solidarity. In the Western peoples narrow-mindedness, misoneism, traditionalism, and the lethargy of civil and military rulers prevent the development of the revolutionary and impassioned state of mind which the Russian leaders victoriously strove to invoke.

This difference of attitude, whose consequences are so serious for humanity, is due to two causes, which are intimately connected: the youth of these revolutionists, and the idealism in which they are steeped. One must be young to be active, enthusiastic, self-confident, and confident of success; above all must one be young to have faith in the realization of the ideals which are dear to one. The Russian revolutionary leaders are young men. Where they have reached or passed their fiftieth year they have remained young in the spirit of proselytism, in ardent passion, in the longing to remake the world; young in their anti-traditional conceptions, their contempt for the beaten track, and their philoneism. Age may perhaps have whitened the hair or beard, have wrinkled the countenance; but theirs is still the spirit of youth. Do they not belong, by virtue of their Socialist and anarchist ideals, to the vanguard of humanity? They confirm what is said in Chapter IX.—that youth alone is creative, that youth alone dares

to innovate. Youth thinks more of ideals than of material interests, as we said in Chapter V., and the fact is verified afresh by the leaders of the Russian Revolution. Men of principle, steeped in ideology, they have acted with far greater energy, because they had faith, than the Western rulers, without principles, occupied wholly in conciliating everybody, in establishing the so-called sacred union, in arriving at compromises which permit of the satisfaction of material interests.

The warlike propaganda of the Russian Socialist leaders was assisted by the stupidities of the German rulers, who, by means of the two Swiss, Grimm and Haufmann, prematurely attempted to induce the Russian Government to conclude a separate peace. This fresh blunder on the part of German diplomacy was due to the military education and the specific mental condition which results from it. The professional soldier is incapable of understanding the mentality of free peoples, and it always follows that he is guilty, where they are concerned, of the grossest psychological mistakes.

The proselytizing activity of the Socialist rulers of Russia led to the creation of a warlike frame of mind, resplendent with the love of liberty and the willing acceptance of voluntary sacrifice for the preservation of that liberty. Thus a voluntary discipline replaced the automatic discipline based on fear of the mechanical soldiers of the Tsarist period. The world observed the unaccustomed spectacle of an army with soldiers' committees which caused discipline to be respected, distributed decorations, and participated, more or less, in the nomination of their officers. What this army was worth the world learned from the offensive of the first days of July. It revealed the might which resides in an ideal which has fired men's minds; it proved the superiority of the free individual, obedient to a high ideal, over the individual in a state of servitude, obedient to the authority of others.

The victorious offensive of the Russian armies should have given the Russian Government an incalculable influence over its Western Allies. Of this it was completely aware, as we may judge from these lines, which are taken from a Note in which it convokes the allied Governments to a conference designed to consider the problems arising in the Balkan Peninsula: "*It is indispensable to note that the military operations of our troops add weight to our voice in international affairs, and that the word of the Russian democracy, supported by the deeds of the revolutionary army, is acquiring a special weight. This is very important in view of the projected conference.*"

By the publication of its Note to the Allies the Provisional Government broke away from secret diplomacy and definitely entered upon a course of public diplomacy, involving the settlement of external affairs by the light of day. In this the Russian democracy and the American democracy acted alike. And they will both force the British and French Governments, which are still so imbued with the methods of autocracy, to act as they do. Note the proud and assured tone of these few lines. It is that of men who knew their power, who know that it was based upon millions of men, upon a soil and subsoil of immense wealth, and upon an ideal which was deeply rooted in the mind. They knew that they were almost the arbiters of the situation, and that the capitalist Governments of Great Britain and France must reckon with them; more, that they partly depended upon them for the termination or continuation of the war.

The power of the Russian revolutionists in the Concert of the Entente Nations seemed a guarantee of a democratic peace; especially as the ideals of these revolutionists were those which led Mr. Wilson to intervene against the Central Powers, while the democrats of Great Britain and France were in agreement with the Russian people. If even yet Russia has her part in the peace it will at least be stable, because it will be based

upon justice, liberty, and equality, and because it will result in the solidarity of the nations. It will be a peace such as that whose conditions I defined as long ago as March, 1916, in my eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth lectures (Chapters XI. to XIII.).

\* \* \* \* \*

To check the bloodshed and the devastation of the war lies in the hands of the peoples, not of their rulers. It lies, above all, in the hands of the German people. Let it at last dare, by a revolution, to affirm its repudiation of the aims of its rulers, and of the hegemony of Germany; let it resolve to work for a world in which the peoples, by free consultation, shall, in freedom, dispose of themselves, as the Russian, French, and British democracies demand they shall do; and peace will come swiftly, even immediately, for the Western Governments, if they sought to oppose it, would be swept away like a leaf on the autumn gales. It is enough to know what is happening and what is being said by the peoples themselves in order to affirm this in very truth. The destiny of the world is gradually falling into the hands of the Socialists, as we saw in Chapter VII. of this book. Already, in Russia, they succeeded awhile in assuming the power of the State, and the responsibilities of power. Will they be able to do as much elsewhere? It is probable: the circumstances will compel them to do so, and the men will reveal themselves, for men are largely the result of circumstances. The peace which the peoples themselves will make, without the intervention of the diplomatists, will be a peace in which there will be neither conquering peoples nor vanquished peoples. And yet there will be those who will be vanquished, for there are those who are vanquished already, during the course of the war: they are the autocracies and their supporters, the Emperors and the Kings, the professional soldiers, the clergy and the castes imbued with the spirit of reaction;

in short, all the autocratic elements which ruled the world, and which have led it to the stupendous bloodshed of the present day: to devastation so enormous that the human mind cannot form an adequate conception of it.

If it is possible to say precisely what political and social progress will result from the cataclysm which has ravaged the world since August, 1914, we may with certainty assert that its general consequence will be an advance in the direction of democracy, and to some extent of Socialism. After the war the world will enjoy more liberty, more equality, and more solidarity between men and the groups in which they live.

PARIS,

*July 15, 1917.*

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
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
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