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From Nomura to Tōgō
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At 3 P.M. today, the 12th, I called on Hull with Wakasugi (Ballantine being present) and talked for about an hour and a half. As I requested their reply to our proposal, Hull offered Document "A", telegram No. 1083, and Document "B", telegram No. 1084. With respect to Document "A", Hull requested me to refer it to Tokyo to learn whether the new Cabinet also acknowledges it. With respect to Document "B", he said that it was the explanation of the suggestion regarding the Japanese-Chinese peace to which he had referred at the previous conversation. He added that the China problem can be settled if those principles be applied in China which could be applied to all other matters, and that the problem of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is now being studied in this connection, and a plan thereof can be worked out by day after tomorrow. I said that, if the relation between the suggestion and the present negotiations was such that the latter could not be concluded in case Japan and China failed to come to an agreement because of some difficult problems such as stationing of troops, it would in essence leave the key to Japanese-American relations in the hand of China, which we consider quite improper. I inquired if it was meant that problems between Japan and China be left to Japan and China, and agreement be reached between Japan and the United States with respect to other matters. Hull vaguely replied that agreement could be reached if we applied general principles to China, and went on to state that though he had not disclosed the contents of the talks to China, Britain and the Netherlands had been informed of the general outlines and that he believed it possible to get their signature simultaneously with the United States once the basis of the negotiations was established (he added that he could not, however, make any guarantee of this). Ballantine intervened and said that it was stated in the American proposal of 21 June that the United States could not take part in enforcing conditions contradictory to the principles to which she has subscribed. Wakasugi said that we welcomed the idea of the suggestion in Document "B", but that we desired to know more about the concrete measures which would be taken to obtain China's pledge; and asked whether Secretary Hull meant to leave it to direct negotiation between Japan and China, or that the United States would obtain an assurance from China to that effect and convey it to Japan, or that the matter would be carried out through a tripartite conference of Japan, America and China. Hull, however, seemed to have no definite program therefor, but stated that so long as the Japanese-American negotiations are carried on in accordance with peaceful principles a stage will, without fail, be reached when the suggestion will be realized. Wakasugi further asking whether Hull meant to let China join the negotiations at such a stage and to have her give a pledge, he did not make a clear answer but merely stated allegorically that it is often the case that a controversy between two persons is solved through the mediation of a third person, thereby implying that the United States has an intention of tendering its good offices for Japan and China.

As I pointed out, with regard to the problem of stationing of troops, that we fixed in our new proposal the area and duration of the stationing and that it was no longer an indefinite stationing that we propose, Hull said that interference in domestic affairs of other countries is against a general program for peace, that he is against permanent stationing, and that he appreciates the clarification that Japan does not intend indefinite stationing.

Hull stated with respect to the general peace policy that he can hardly offer a satisfactory explanation to the political leaders as well as to the general public in the United States of her stand on

the Tripartite Pact when it is explained on the one hand that the object of the Pact is peaceful, yet at the same time there is a strong contention that Japan is bound by it and is tied up with Germany, that the project of Hitler is extremely difficult of realization and the peoples of Europe are suffering from it; that such a difficult undertaking cannot last long so that we have sooner or later to work on the post-war program; that the united efforts of all countries are necessary in such work, and Japan and the United States must cooperate in the realization of the peace program as good leaders; and that if in this way an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States and including the countries concerned such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, over a general peace plan for the entire Pacific, it will no longer be necessary for Japan to stay in the Tripartite Pact and the reason for the existence of the Pact will have disappeared. I said that the significance of a treaty changes with the surrounding circumstances--for instance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been very useful at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, was abrogated at the time of the Washington Conference; that the existence of a treaty of alliance is not necessarily in conflict with a peace plan; that Japan does not favor the use of force, but wants only to secure a supply of oil and other materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies; and that we consider that the United States has no objection to our proposal concerning the problem of non-discriminatory treatment in trade. Hull said in the end that the United States is fully appreciative of the seriousness of the situation and is making an urgent study of our proposal concerning the three pending issues; and while it is impossible to settle over-night problems of more than ten years' standing, he expects to be able to offer a reply day after tomorrow. Wakasugi repeated that the Diet is to be in session on the 15th, and the situation is very pressing, and that therefore we had expected to get a definite reply today concerning our proposal, and emphasized our desire to obtain clear and concrete reply to all the problems by the day after tomorrow.

In fine, the United States restricted today's conversation to her request for our acknowledgement of the 28 August statement (Document "A") and the explanation of the suggestion of the other day concerning Japanese-Chinese peace. As to the three pending issues and our proposal of 25 September, she merely informed us that they are under examination but that she is making haste to offer a reply. As the progress of the negotiations is not satisfactory I will have Wakasugi tomorrow morning request a speedy settlement of Hull.