

Dec. File

Box #

3812-A



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 760050

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/12-145 -- 12-31-45





DEPARTMENT OF STATE 175

DC/R

**Memorandum of Conversation**  
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

**TOP SECRET**

DATE: December 1, 1945

SUBJECT: Control Machinery for Japan

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Wei Tao-ming, Chinese Ambassador,  
U - Mr. Acheson  
FE- Mr. Vincent

COPIES TO: U - Mr. Acheson  
EE- Mr. Durbrow

**TOP SECRET**

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-145

GPO 1-1403

The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei, called at 11 a.m. at the request of the Under Secretary. Mr. Acheson went over with Dr. Wei the developments that had led up to the present situation in our discussion with the Russians with regard to terms of reference for an Allied Council in Tokyo and a Far Eastern Commission in Washington. He said that, although he understood that Mr. Vincent had kept the Ambassador currently informed of our negotiations with the Russians he thought it well to summarize the situation and state what our present position was. We had conducted informal discussions with the Soviet Government in regard to these matters to see to what extent we could ascertain their views and, if possible, meet them. We had now reached the point where we felt that we had probably come to the end of profitable discussion. We knew the Soviet point of view but we did not know to what extent the British and Chinese Governments felt able to accept the views which we had expressed to the Russians. One of the principal obstacles to further discussion with the Russians was their view that a change in the Japanese Cabinet, including the Premier, should be made only by unanimous agreement of the 4 principal powers, plus whatever other powers it took to make for a majority. We could not accede to this Russian position because it might result in a serious curtailment of General MacArthur's control over the Japanese Government. Failure of the 4 powers to agree might (1) result in the continuance of a Japanese Government which was not carrying out General MacArthur's orders or (2) make impossible the formation of a Japanese Government in the event the Cabinet resigned and the 4 powers could not agree on the formation of a new Cabinet.

Anal	
Rev	
Cat	Ambassador Wei
Dist	

DEC 4 - 1945

**FILED**



-2-

176

Ambassador Wei was handed copies of two papers which were drawn up to show the changes that had been made in the originally proposed terms of reference for the Allied Council in Tokyo and the Far Eastern Commission in Washington -- changes that had resulted from our discussions with the Russians. Mr. Acheson told the Ambassador that we would appreciate having the views of his Government as soon as he could conveniently obtain them with regard to the changes indicated.

J.C.V.

FE:Vincent:ALM



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

**ACTION COPY**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 117  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ECW-W  
No paraphrase necessary

725

Tokyo via War

Dated December 2nd, 1945

Rec'd 3:12 P.M., 3rd

**SECRET**

ACTION: ILH

INTO: Secretary of State

S  
U Washington

A-C

FE **PRIORITY**

DC/L-1

ITP 180, First


LA

SPD

FC

DC/R-1

Reference October 25 draft EMSCC 92/D concerning treatment Japanese workers organizations received by pouch. We perceive no objection. Draft discussed with appropriate military authorities. To large extent action already initiated by SCAP looking to implementation policies contemplated.



*MRB*  
*12/5/45*  
*SMS*  
**SECRET**

ATCHESON

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-145

DEC 28 1945

FILED

Confidential File



ACTION COPY

CA  
JA

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: CA  
INFO  
S  
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A-R  
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FC

EG W  
Paraphrase before com-  
municating except to  
Government Agencies

415

Chungking via War DC/R  
Dated December 2, 1945 File  
Rec'd 8:05 a.m., 2nd 22-46

RESTRICTED

Secretary of State  
Washington

*Tel Chungking  
12/28/45*

DIVISION OF CHINESE  
AFFAIRS  
DEPT. OF STATE  
*to Dept. of State  
12/28/45*



2079, December 2, 11 a.m.

Below is substance of Foreign Office note  
just received:

As there are many Chinese nationals in Japan  
and as interests concerned are important, it would  
be desirable to dispose of great confusion of  
matters relating thereto. Numerous telegrams have  
been received from liaison officer Wang Chih attached  
to HQ Allied Forces Pacific requesting assignment  
of additional personnel to assist him. It is now  
proposed to assign immediately following persons  
to assist him: Liu Tsen Hua, specialist; accompanied  
by specialist Ling Man Shou; Attache Chung Wu Hsiung;  
and Clerk Tai Kuo Hui. It is requested that  
General MacArthur be approached by telegraph and  
asked to extend them necessary transport and entrance

facilities

RESTRICTED

DCR NE Unit  
Rev. \_\_\_\_\_  
Cat. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dist. \_\_\_\_\_

JAN 2 - 1946

FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-245

8/12-2



RESTRICTED

-2-#2079, December 2, 11 a.m., from Chungking via War facilities in order that they may proceed to Japan at early date. A reply would be appreciated. End substance note.

Embassy requests that above be communicated to General MacArthur and that we be informed of action taken in order that Foreign Office may be advised.

SMYTH


LMS

RESTRICTED



1020

NO  
By



TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

RESTRICTED

DEC - 6 1945

*4 pm*

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS,  
TOKYO

186

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER

Following from Chungking:

QUOTE (Code Room: Please insert here Chungking's  
2079, December 2, 11 a.m.) UNQUOTE

*Proposed assignment of personnel  
to 24 Allied Forces Pacific*

*Byrnes  
(JCP)*

*ST*

SENT

FE:JKPenfield:hst  
12-5-45

DCR - <i>Unit</i>
Anal. <i>MS</i>
Rev. <i>MS</i>
Cat. <i>MS</i>
Dist. <i>MS</i>

DEC 6 1945 P.M.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-245

*740.00119 Control*



*zh*

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

**TELEGRAM SENT**

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF THE  
MESSAGE: **5542**

Collect


Charge Department:

Charge to

**Department of State**

*Washington*

**RESTRICTED**



**DEC 29 1945**  
*5 P.M.*

*740.00119 Control (Japan) / 12-245*

*2A 740.00119 Control (P)*

CINCAFPAC has telegraphed that his hqrs has no (repeat no) objection to increase of staff of Chinese Liaison officer Wang Chih by three additional officers and one clerk. (URTEL 2079 Dec 2, 11 a.m.)

Dept assumes transportation can be arranged in China.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-245  
245  
740.00119 Control  
ICS/LE

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

DEC 29 1945 PM

DCR Per Unit  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Signature]*  
Acting  
(472)

**SENT**

CA:EFDrumright:MS  
12-28-45

*JA* RB  
FE  
*[Handwritten initials]*



25

*original handed to  
J. Hittner 12/6/45  
File JED*

December 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff  
Operations Division  
War Department

FROM: Director  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs  
State Department

*740.00119 Central  
(Japan) / 12-245  
CA*

There is enclosed the substance of a note addressed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy at Chungking, China, which was transmitted to the Department of State by way of a telegram dated December 2, 1945, in regard to the desire of the Chinese Government to augment the staff personnel of Chinese liaison officer Wang Chih, who is attached to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. The Department is of the view that the proposal of the Chinese Government in this respect is reasonable and approves, in principle, the request set forth in the note under reference.

It is requested that appropriate action be initiated to bring about implementation of the proposal advanced by the Chinese Government, and that the Department be informed of the results of such action in order that an appropriate reply may be made to the Chinese Foreign Office.

Enclosure

DCR NE Unit	
Incl.	<i>md</i>
Ex.	<i>dy</i>
Out.	<i>md</i>
Dist.	

CA:EPDrunright:MEP

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-245  
245  
*740.00119 Central  
(Japan) / 12-245*



Substance of telegram from Chungking, December 2, 1945

Below is substance of Foreign Office note just received:

As there are many Chinese nationals in Japan and as interests concerned are important, it would be desirable to dispose of great confusion of matters relating thereto. Numerous telegrams have been received from liaison officer Wang Chih attached to HQ Allied Forces Pacific requesting assignment of additional personnel to assist him. It is now proposed to assign immediately following persons to assist him: Liu Tsen Hua, specialist; accompanied by specialist Ling Man Shou; Attache Chung Wu Hsiung; and Clerk Tai Kuohui. It is requested that General MacArthur be approached by telegram and asked to extend them necessary transport and entrance facilities in order that they may proceed to Japan at early date. A reply would be appreciated.



MEMORANDUM

In accordance with the request made by the Swiss Legation, there is enclosed a copy of the directive issued by General MacArthur to the Imperial Japanese Government relating to the control of Japanese property abroad.

**Enclosure:**

Copy of directive issued by General MacArthur.

Department of State,

Washington, December 3, 1945

JK:JM MacDonald:emh:nlw

11-28-45

DCR - NE Unit

GR JVD  
DEC 3 1945 P.M.

inal.	✓
Re	✓
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Dist.	

A true copy of the original copy.

*[Handwritten signature]*

WE *[Handwritten initials]*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-345

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 12-345



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

118

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION-FE

INFO:

S EES-DP 1253  
U No paraphrase necessary.

C

Tokyo via War

A-C

A-D

SECRET

Undated

A-R

A-R/W

Rec'd December 4, 1945

SA

SA/GN

SA/M

LE Secretary of State

SPA

DC/L-C Washington

ITP

OFD

ESP 176, Undated

JK

SPD November 23 to 29 political summary.

FC

OIC The principle activity of the Diet was the Opposition's

INI

OPI political maneuvering to discredit by war guilt charges the

PL

DC/R "Progressive Party" majority. The Cabinet was criticized

the press for lack of initiative necessitating a SCAP directive on taxation, pensions, and indemnities but this was offset somewhat by the optimistic relief over food imports being allowed.

The Diet, after organizing on the 26th, was opened on the 27th by the Emperor in the traditional manner. The Emperor wore the new "imperial uniform" and was accompanied by princes wearing military dress and in the gallery uniformed navy and army officers were present. The "House of Representatives election law" was the only legislation mentioned specifically. On the 28th the address of the Prime Minister (the only Minister reporting to the Diet) was criticized by the press as being unimpressive and weak but on the whole seemed a reasonable statement of the

Dante

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Handwritten initials and signatures, including "HB" and "12-6-45".

Handwritten notes: "Wms", "12-6-45", "no dust".

740.00119CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12 - 445

Confidential File



119

SECRET

-2- #176, Undated, from Tokyo via War.

basic legislative needs and the existing situation. Rival groups (Independents with 92 seats, Social Democrats with 15 and Liberals with 45) in vigorous interpellation appeared determined to exploit war responsibility charges to the discredit of the Progressive Party majority (27 seats) before going on to legislative consideration. Because of dickering before the session the Social Democrats had modified somewhat their original demands and it was expected they would join the Liberal Party in a resolution that "responsibility should be assumed" by members of the House who took an active role in the war or who were Imperial Rule Assistance Association and related bodies officials. The vulnerable Progressive Party's tactics (holds chairman and speakership of 5 out of 6 committees) were to in principle agree but try to narrow the scope to Tojo's "important henchmen" by offering an independent resolution. Takao, the Progressive Party interpellator's aid, having an exceptional record of anti-militarism, caused a sensation and stole a march on the opposition by making charges that along with Tojo, Konoye was the most responsible. It was expected in general that it would be a stormy session with the parties mainly interested in gaining popular support for the elections which are forthcoming and the extension of these elections beyond the 18 days which had been considered necessary. A moral victory was won by the press when SCAP intervened and forced the peers to admit the press to all the sessions, a reversal of the old rule.

Legislation.

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60



120

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-3-#176, Undated, from Tokyo via War

Legislation. The Emperor's mention of the election law was expected to insure that the law would be passed with no substantial changes unless it were a change toward straight proportions' representation which most parties are reported to desire. The support by the Social Democrats for the proposed land adjustment law was withdrawn chiefly because the maximum holding was changed to 12.5 from 7.5 acres. There are greater differences among the parties on this legislation than on any of the other proposed basic bills (labor and election) and even in its present modified form its passage is considered difficult. The recommendations of Konoye concerning the revision of the constitution was submitted on 22 November and the next action to be taken is in the hands of the Cabinet Committee whose chairman has indicated the parties will probably be limited in nature. It is reported that the activity among the various splinter right-wing nationalist groups resulted in the "Council for Common Struggle Against Hunger" being formed, with slight importance at present but during economic stress having a potential rabble-rousing appeal. Appearing as representative of landowning interests was an announced Central League of Farmers' Parties under Miyata Mutsuo's leadership (a peer and former director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association). Among the middle class groups the Social Democratic Party continued to gain, having control of the new Union of Salaried Men and strong representation

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-4-#176, Undated from Tokyo via War

representation in the Union of Educationalists. The Social Democrat and Liberal Parties were extending their organizations aggressively to other cities but most of the population had as yet not brought into relationship the primary subsistence interest to the campaign promises of the various political parties. Actual campaigning, however, had not started as yet. "Does the Emperor system have a place in the new Japan" was the subject of a radio round table discussion between representatives of Communists, Liberals, and Conservatives, being first started as an intended series semi-weekly political discussions:

Government. Fresh criticism was brought on the cabinet by a directive issued by SCAP which ordered that pensions to discharged officials, soldiers, and others cease, which required plans for property taxes and war profits, and which instructed that insurance payment and war contract cancellation be stopped (and payments recovered which have been made since 15 August), since the Cabinet had to be directed to take these steps which were widely recognized as highly desirable. The Minister of Finance was particularly vulnerable for only recently having defended indemnities against the criticism of the press. It was announced by the Government that it was now necessary to study some plan for unemployment and social insurance and the rumors of the new currency which will be issued in connection with the levy of property taxes and profits was confirmed. In spite of many predictions that the Cabinet was tottering, in general it was at least expected to last through the session of the Diet. The approval in

principle

SECRET



122

SECRET

-5-#176, Undated from Tokyo via War

principle of the Supreme Commander of the food imports stimulated optimism in general which very likely did not give sufficient weight to the difficulties involved. A Centralized Board of Trade was created with representatives of the interested ministries to handle necessary exports and imports. SCAP ordered the Government to report on the relief supplies available and to set up suitable agencies for distribution. It was announced that the discriminatory regulations were revised regarding foreigners. It was reported that the reduction in personnel and the reorganization plans of the government was making very little headway. The Ministry of Education fined a bureau chief one month's salary for continuing to publish text books which SCAP had banned. A purge of ministry officials similar to that of teachers was demanded by the Union of Educationalists. It was announced by the Ministry of Education that there would be a wholesale reshuffling which would affect 118 out of 180 heads of higher institutions of education.

Throne. There have been abolished the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and several other minor court positions, and most responsibilities have been turned over to the Court Chamberlain. In order to study the reform of the peerage system a 12 man commission was established under the Household Ministry, headed by the former Home Minister, Viscount Kodama Hideo. It was indicated there would only be moderate reforms.

ATCHESON

JMS

SECRET

NOTE: Retransmission of War Department cable.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Files

FROM : LA - Walter B. Kahn *WK*

SUBJECT: Current Management of Japanese Affairs in JK

DATE: December 4, 1945

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RM/R OFFICIAL FILED

- (1) Practically no surveys or reports have been received from SCAP, although many have been asked for.
- (2) JCS is now largely a fiction; ID does not seem to operate in Japan. The two active divisions are CAD, with Colonels Davis and Foehl, and OPD, under General Schullgen, Colonel McCormick and Colonel Bonesteel.
- (3) SCAP lacks research and analysis people, and he is depending largely on Japanese reports, which the Japanese have been slow in preparing.
- (4) Willoughby is on his way back; the State Department Mission under Glasser has been held up. Apparently SCAP objects to civilian missions unless they are integrated into his line of command.
- (5) McCloy and Hilldring have recently made surveys.
- (6) SCAP, theoretically, is under JCS and operates on behalf of the Allied Powers. CINCAFPAC is a strictly US outfit and operates under direct instructions from the War Department on such matters as surplus property. McArthur holds both titles and occasionally has to correspond with himself.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 112-445-445  
*Control*  
*WMS*

*State Dept  
 War Areas  
 Economic Division  
 From Kahn*

RM/R
Anal <i>7</i>
Rev <i>[Signature]</i>
Cat <i>[Signature]</i>


(Information obtained from Barnet, JK, November 23rd, 1945)





TOP SECRET

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Authority JCS memo 1/4/74  
By DR 10 Z NARS, Date 10/20/78

177

SWN-3593  
5 December 1945

DCR  
File  
12-10-45  
740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-545

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Use of British Commonwealth Forces  
in the Occupation of Japan.

Reference: SWNCC 70/13.

Reference is made to the note from the Australian Minister, dated 20 October 1945, concerning participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the procedure in completing arrangements for participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan should be as follows:

a. Agreement between the State Department and the Australian representatives on certain general principles. From a military standpoint, it is considered that those general principles contained in the Enclosure should be an adequate basis on which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers can initiate detailed discussions with the Australians.

b. Agreement with the Australian representatives that the details will be worked out in Tokyo in consultation with General MacArthur and Australian representatives and on the basis of the general principles agreed here in Washington.

c. If the discussions in Tokyo indicate a need for further consideration on the political level, of matters in extension of the general principles set forth in the Enclosure, such matters could be subsequently discussed in Washington.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concurs in the above views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Form with fields: Final, Rev., Dat., Dist., Enclosure. Includes handwritten initials.

*John D. Hickerson*  
JOHN D. HICKERSON  
Acting Chairman

TOP SECRET

DEC 10 1945

FILED

Confidential



TOP SECRET

178

EnclosureGENERAL POINTS TO BE AGREED AS A BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND  
AS A BASIS FOR DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN  
GENERAL MacARTHUR AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES  
IN TOKYO

1. The ground elements will consist of a composite British Commonwealth land force of approximately four brigades with necessary supporting units and services; the exact composition of the force to be determined on the basis of deployment and employment ascertained as a result of discussions in Tokyo. This force will be integrated into the occupation forces under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
2. The participation of air forces is accepted in principle. The strength of the air component will be determined after conversations in Tokyo on the basis of the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
3. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be free to locate and move the British Commonwealth forces within the Japanese Home Islands as he sees fit to accomplish the missions assigned him, with due regard to the problem of supply and maintenance, in so far as the operational situation permits.
4. No area will be assigned the British Commonwealth forces as an exclusive area of control. All areas occupied by these forces will additionally be subordinate to the appropriate higher corps, army, or other commander.
5. These forces will be withdrawn, entirely or in part, upon agreement between the U.S. and the Commonwealth of Australia, or at the expiration of six months after formal notification by either party in the event of no agreement.
6. The manner of integration of ground, air and naval forces of the British Commonwealth in the occupation of Japan will be as agreed between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the commander of the British Commonwealth forces.
7. British Commonwealth force commanders will be free to communicate with their governments. Other channels of

- 2 -

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET**

179

communication will be as follows:

- a. For policy, from the Australian Government as representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations through the United States Government and United States Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and thence through the occupation force command organization. Appropriate representation will be accorded on the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and intermediate echelons.
  - b. For administration within the British forces, such as supply, from the force commanders to, under general coordination of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any agency designated by the Commonwealth Governments.
  - c. Details of supply administration and communications such as provision of port facilities and airfields, are matters for local arrangement between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the British Commonwealth force representatives.
8. The Commonwealth Governments concerned will be responsible for supply and maintenance of their forces.
9. Details as to timing of movements of the parts of the Commonwealth force to Japan and their debarkation will be arranged directly with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by the British Commonwealth representatives. The force or portions thereof will pass to command of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on arrival at the port of debarkation. It is understood informally that the Australian Government wishes to begin movement of the brigade now at Morotai and a Royal Australian Air Force component about 15 December 1945.
10. Upon agreement with the general arrangements outlined above, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and advise him that an advance party of the British Commonwealth forces will arrive shortly in Japan to make the detailed arrangements indicated above. If it develops that any further agreement on a governmental level is necessary, it should await results of consultation between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and representatives of the British Commonwealth forces.

- 3 -

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

180

SWN-3593  
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The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concurs in the above views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

COPY FOR THE ASST  
SECY OF STATE

JOHN D. HICKERSON  
Acting Chairman

Enclosure.

**TOP SECRET**

*F.W. 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-5-45*



**TOP SECRET**EnclosureGENERAL POINTS TO BE AGREED AS A BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND  
AS A BASIS FOR DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN  
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES  
IN TOKYO

1. The ground elements will consist of a composite British Commonwealth land force of approximately four brigades with necessary supporting units and services; the exact composition of the force to be determined on the basis of deployment and employment ascertained as a result of discussions in Tokyo. This force will be integrated into the occupation forces under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
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4. No area will be assigned the British Commonwealth forces as an exclusive area of control. All areas occupied by these forces will additionally be subordinate to the appropriate higher corps, army, or other commander.
5. These forces will be withdrawn, entirely or in part, upon agreement between the U.S. and the Commonwealth of Australia, or at the expiration of six months after formal notification by either party in the event of no agreement.
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7. British Commonwealth force commanders will be free to communicate with their governments. Other channels of

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

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b. For administration within the British forces, such as supply, from the force commanders to, under general coordination of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any agency designated by the Commonwealth Governments.

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- 3 -

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET**

JCV

TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 32SWNCC 70/157 December 1945Pages 63 - 69, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEUSE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES  
IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN*Copy to Tokyo  
Inst. drafted  
XII-11-45  
No. 32, XII-11-45.*Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a proposed reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Appendix "B", was approved by the Committee on 5 December 1945, and the information contained therein, together with Appendix "A", was forwarded to the Secretary of State on 5 December.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

**TOP SECRET**SWNCC 70/15



TOP SECRETE N C L O S U R ETHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.SM-4371  
5 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Use of British Commonwealth Forces  
in the Occupation of Japan

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be advised as follows with reference to the note from the Australian Minister (Appendix "B"), dated 20 October 1945, concerning participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the procedure in completing arrangements for participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan should be as follows:

a. Agreement between the State Department and the Australian representatives on certain general principles. From a military standpoint, it is considered that those general principles contained in the Enclosure (Appendix "A") should be an adequate basis on which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers can initiate detailed discussions with the Australians.

b. Agreement with the Australian representatives that the details will be worked out in Tokyo in consultation with General MacArthur and Australian representatives and on the basis of the general principles agreed here in Washington.

c. If the discussions in Tokyo indicate a need for further consideration on the political level, of matters in extension of the general principles set forth in the Enclosure (Appendix "A"), such matters could be subsequently discussed in Washington.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Sgd) A. J. McFARLAND,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Secretary



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

GENERAL POINTS TO BE AGREED AS A BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND  
AS A BASIS FOR DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN  
GENERAL MacARTHUR AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES  
IN TOKYO

1. The ground elements will consist of a composite British Commonwealth land force of approximately four brigades with necessary supporting units and services; the exact composition of the force to be determined on the basis of deployment and employment ascertained as a result of discussions in Tokyo. This force will be integrated into the occupation forces under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
2. The participation of air forces is accepted in principle. The strength of the air component will be determined after conversations in Tokyo on the basis of the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
3. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be free to locate and move the British Commonwealth forces within the Japanese Home Islands as he sees fit to accomplish the missions assigned him, with due regard to the problem of supply and maintenance, in so far as the operational situation permits.
4. No area will be assigned the British Commonwealth forces as an exclusive area of control. All areas occupied by these forces will additionally be subordinate to the appropriate higher corps, army, or other commander.
5. These forces will be withdrawn, entirely or in part, upon agreement between the U.S. and the Commonwealth of Australia, or at the expiration of six months after formal notification by either party in the event of no agreement.
6. The manner of integration of ground, air and naval forces of the British Commonwealth in the occupation of Japan will be as agreed between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Commander of the British Commonwealth forces.



TOP SECRET

7. British Commonwealth force commanders will be free to communicate with their governments. Other channels of communication will be as follows:

a. For policy, from the Australian Government as representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations through the United States Government and United States Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and thence through the occupation force command organization. Appropriate representation will be accorded on the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and intermediate echelons.

b. For administration within the British forces, such as supply, from the force commanders to, under general coordination of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any agency designated by the Commonwealth Governments.

c. Details of supply administration and communications such as provision of port facilities and airfields, are matters for local arrangement between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the British Commonwealth force representatives.

8. The Commonwealth Governments concerned will be responsible for supply and maintenance of their forces.

9. Details as to timing of movements of the parts of the Commonwealth force to Japan and their debarkation will be arranged directly with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by the British Commonwealth representatives. The force or portions thereof will pass to command of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on arrival at the port of debarkation. It is understood informally that the Australian Government wishes to begin movement of the brigade now at Morotai and a Royal Australian Air Force component about 15 December 1945.



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10. Upon agreement with the general arrangements outlined above, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and advise him that an advance party of the British Commonwealth forces will arrive shortly in Japan to make the detailed arrangements indicated above. If it develops that any further agreement on a governmental level is necessary, it should await results of consultation between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and representatives of the British Commonwealth forces.



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APPENDIX "B"

NOTE FROM AUSTRALIAN MINISTER

No. 473/45

20th October, 1945.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit, on instructions from my Government, the following proposal regarding the use of British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan.

(1) The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, acting on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, desires to submit the following proposal to the United States Government.

(2) Arrangements have been made by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India for the organization of a British Commonwealth Force under an Australian Commander to participate in the occupation of Japan. The Force will be representative of the fighting forces of each of those countries and will comprise

- (a) Land Forces - one British and one British/Indian Brigade with proportion of supporting arms and administrative troops organised as a group under an Indian Army Commander. One Australian Brigade and one New Zealand Brigade similarly organised as a group under an Australian or New Zealand Commander. It is proposed to consider later whether a second Australian Brigade be raised.
- (b) Air Forces - an Air contingent organised as a tactical group under an integrated group headquarters. This would be composed as follows -  
British: one fighter wing, two Mosquito squadrons, one Transport squadron; Australian:

The Honourable  
James F. Byrnes,  
Secretary of State of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.



TOP SECRET

three Mustang fighter squadrons; New Zealand:  
one squadron of type unknown.

(3) Lt. Gen. John Northcott, Chief of the General Staff, Australian Military Forces, has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Force and he will be served by an integrated British Commonwealth staff. For operational matters the Commander-in-Chief of the force will be under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and it is desired that he should have direct access to General MacArthur for this purpose. On policy and administrative matters affecting the force the Commander-in-Chief will be jointly responsible to the British Commonwealth Governments concerned through a British Commonwealth organisation to be known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia and through Australian Government machinery with both of which representatives of the United Kingdom and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be associated.

(4) It is proposed that British Commonwealth Naval Forces will also participate in the occupation of Japan and the United Kingdom Government will be communicating direct with the United States Government in regard to this matter.

(5) Approval of the United States Government is sought for participation in the occupation of Japan of a British Commonwealth Force organised and controlled as shown in paragraphs 2 and 3. Authority is also requested for details regarding the role of the Force, its location in Japan and its command and administrative arrangements in relation to the United States occupational layout, to be completed direct between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Commander-in-Chief of the Force.

(6) In this connection the British Commonwealth Governments concerned do not wish to be made responsible for a zone of occupation in Japan. They would wish that, apart from any other occupational task that may be allotted to the Force,



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the British Commonwealth Forces should participate in occupation of the Tokyo prefecture. It is considered that for administrative convenience the area to be allotted to the British Commonwealth Force should include port facilities. It would also be convenient for the air contingent to be located alongside landforces and three airfields would be required for squadrons taking part.

(7) The British Commonwealth Governments concerned trust that the United States Government will signify its early approval to these proposals, which will be a further practical manifestation to Japan and the world at large of that cooperation between the British and American peoples and their forces which have marked their common war effort as members of the United Nations.

(8) An early reply would be appreciated in order that organisation and movement of forces to Japan may be proceeded with as soon as possible.

My Government desires that arrangements should be made for a simultaneous announcement in Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and London of the formation of the above-mentioned British Commonwealth Force as soon as the reply of the United States Government is received. It would be appreciated therefore if any necessary steps could be taken with a view to ensuring that publication of the arrangements proposed above could be synchronized both in the above-mentioned Capitals and in Washington.

I have the honour to be,  
with the highest consideration,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: TRC

INFO:

S RMS -K  
U Paraphrase before com-  
C municating to anyone.  
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EUR  
FE SECRET  
FC  
JK  
DC/R Secretary of State

2057

Tokyo via War

Dated December 5, 1945

Rec'd 3:15 p.m., 6th

Washington

189, December 5,

REDEPTEL 63, October 30 and 170, November 30.

Corrected data on Japanese submarine cables mailed today.

ATCHESON

RB

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVISION  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 DEC 6 PM 2 37

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No. 604

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RECORDS BRANCH

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compli-

ments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that Mr. Bevin was informed by Mr. Byrnes when he was in London that General MacArthur had a Japanese battleship, two Japanese cruisers, and some Japanese submarines which he was proposing to sink. General MacArthur intended to delay a decision as to whether to sink them until the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the French Government, and the Soviet Government had been obtained.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have consulted His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and they agree in the following expression of views:-

(a) They consider that the United States Government is entitled to determine the policy for the disposal of the Japanese fleet.

(b) Their chief desire is to have the opportunity for making a technical investigation of some of the Japanese ships and to have access to technical and other naval intelligence.

(c) They strongly support the proposal to scrap the submarines.

(d) They are equally in favour of scrapping the surface fleet.

(e) They consider however that if the United States Government consults the Russian and other Allied Governments they are likely to meet with pressure for the fleet to be divided between them. His Majesty's

/Government

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DISTRIBUTION  
FEB 1 8 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*memo of source  
12/12/45  
JEP*

*Note to Mr. Smith  
drafted 1/20  
JEP*

*DC/R*

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(Japan) / 12-545*

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-2-

Government in the United Kingdom would greatly prefer that all the ships should be sunk but if it is necessary to divide them, whether the surface fleet alone or both the surface fleet and the submarines, they would wish, after consultation with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, to claim their due share.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

December 5th, 1945. *MB*







STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12-7-45

TO : JA - Mr. Borton ✓  
FROM : FE - Mr. Vincent  
SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter to Congressman Flood, my reply, and a memorandum with regard to Magagna. I imagine that the memorandum is sent in connection with Magagna's desire to go to Japan. I would suggest that you discuss this with Ed Martin and the appropriate people in the War Department to see if we can do something to get Magagna to Japan.

JCV



FE:Vincent:AIM



DANIEL J. FLOOD  
11TH DIST. PENNSYLVANIA

HOME OFFICE:  
1015 MINERS NATIONAL BANK  
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE: *✓*  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

*pl*  
DC/R

December 6th., 1945.



Mr. John Carter Vincent,  
Assistant Secretary,  
State Department,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vincent:

*Jm*

Mr. Peter F. Magagna has asked me to place  
in your hands the sketch attached as suggested by you.

I am sure that you will find it of value.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

*Daniel J Flood*

Daniel J. Flood, M.C.

DJF/g  
Encl (L-file)

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(Japan) / 12-645  
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In reply refer to  
FE

December 7, 1945.

My dear Mr. Flood:

Thank you for your letter of December 6 enclosing a memorandum in regard to Mr. Magagna. I have asked Dr. Borton of our Japan Division, with whom Mr. Magagna has talked, to handle the matter.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

John Carter Vincent  
Director  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs

The Honorable  
Daniel J. Flood,  
House of Representatives.

FE:JCVincent:ALM  
12-7-45

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(Japan) / 12-645



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DEC 13 1945

In reply refer to  
JA

My dear Mr. Flood:

As Mr. Vincent has already informed you, I have been asked to handle the matter of sending Mr. Magagna's name to the proper authorities in connection with the possibility of his going to Japan. I am enclosing a copy of a letter to Mr. Darnell, who, I understand, is in charge of procurement of personnel for the War Department for such assignments. You will note that I have asked Mr. Darnell to keep you informed of any developments and will notify you myself if I hear anything further.

Thank you for forwarding us the material on Mr. Magagna.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh Borton  
Acting Assistant Chief  
Division of Japanese Affairs

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to  
Mr. Darnell.

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*ms* ✓

The Honorable  
Daniel J. Flood,  
House of Representatives.

*HB*  
JA:HBorton:mp

12-12-45

FE *gcp*

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*740.00119 Control (Japan) / 12-645*

DEC 12 1945 P.M.



JA

# INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA  
 SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU CONGO  
 CONFEDERAÇÃO EVANGÉLICA DO BRASIL  
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA  
 CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO  
 DANSK MISSIONSRAAD  
 DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSTAG  
 SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS EVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS  
 CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA AND CEYLON  
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN  
 COMMITTEE ON COÖPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA  
 CONCILIO NACIONAL EVANGÉLICO DE MÉXICO  
 NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
 NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGSRaad  
 NETHERLANDS INDIA  
 NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND  
 NORSK MISJONSRAAD

FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA (UNITED STATES AND CANADA)  
 PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES  
 CONFEDERACIÓN DE IGLESIAS EVANGÉLICAS DEL RIO DE LA PLATA  
 CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 SUOMEN LAHETYSNEUVOSTO  
 SVENSKA MISSIONSRÅDET  
 NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF SWITZERLAND  
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THAILAND

DC/A

CABLEGRAMS:  
 INTMISSION, NEW YORK  
 MISSIONS CODE  
 TELEPHONE: CHelsea 2-3233

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 Chairman: Bishop JAMES C. BAKER, New York  
 Treasurer: S. FREDERICK YELLEN, New York  
 Secretaries: JOHN W. DECKER, New York  
 NORMAN GOODALL, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W.1  
 Assistants: LELAND S. ALBRIGHT, New York  
 Miss BETTY D. GIBSON, London  
 Miss DORIS H. STANDLEY, London

156 FIFTH AVENUE  
 NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

December 6, 1945

ans'd 12/27/45  
JA: WT

Mr. William Turner  
 Division of Japanese Affairs  
 Department of State  
 Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. Turner:

LR 894.404  
800.404

This letter is being written in pursuance of a conversation which the Chairman of the International Missionary Council, Bishop James C. Baker, had with you in Washington on November 30. You will recall that Bishop Baker was a member of the four-man deputation which has recently returned from a visit to Japan.

The International Missionary Council is planning a meeting of its Ad Interim Committee at Geneva, Switzerland, February 16-23 next and is very anxious to secure the attendance of a representative of the churches in Japan. When Bishop Baker was in Japan in consultation with the church leaders the name of Rev. Michio Kozaki was suggested as a suitable person to attend. I am writing today formally to request the State Department and other necessary American authorities to make it possible for Mr. Kozaki to attend, and I understand that such a request might properly be submitted through you.

The International Missionary Council is the world organization which links up the Protestant foreign mission enterprise in some 40 countries the world around. The National Christian Council of Japan is one of our member organizations. The meeting in Geneva will be the first official meeting which has been possible because of war conditions since 1939. Attendance on the meeting will serve to restore the links of Japanese Christianity with the Christian movement in other countries. We believe that the participation of Japanese Christians will definitely help to promote the democratic and humane ideals the growth of which we are seeking to promote in Japan as well as

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assist in supplanting the extreme nationalism with a genuine and proper internationalism. We believe therefore that the attendance of Mr. Kozaki at this meeting will not be without its significance in promoting the high purposes which are our objectives in the present American control of Japan.


Mr. Kozaki is a prominent Japanese pastor and for many years has served the Reinanzaka Church in Tokio, a church which grew out of the work of the American Congregationalists. He was a member of the Japanese church delegation which visited the United States in the first half of 1941. He is a man with a broad international view point and of the highest Christian character. We can think of no one more suitable to represent Japanese Christianity in a world meeting.

I regret very much that this formal application comes so late but it was not possible for us to make it before the return of the recent four-man deputation from Japan and until there had been opportunity to consult with them. If we are to secure the necessary visas for Mr. Kozaki's travel in Europe it will be necessary for him to reach New York not later than January 15. It is perfectly obvious that under existing circumstances this cannot be achieved without the active interest and assistance of the American authorities in Washington and in Japan not only with respect to the necessary permission and documents but also in the matter of the immediate transportation from Japan to the mainland of the United States. If this interest and assistance cannot be had it would be fruitless to pursue the matter further. I would appreciate your frank opinion with regard to this aspect of the problem. If there appears to be any substantial chance of success we would wish you to go ahead with the matter.

I should add that of course the International Missionary Council would be prepared to see that Mr. Kozaki's traveling and maintenance expenses are met during his absence from Japan and that he will not become in any way a public charge. We assume that if permission is given him to leave Japan and enter the United States, likewise the requisite permission will be had for his exit from the United States to go to Switzerland, and for his re-entry to the United States and exit to Japan should he return from Switzerland to Japan via the United States when his mission is complete. We are also ready to assume the cost and the risk of securing the required permits and transportation for the remainder of his itinerary.

I am asking Rev. Ralph M. White of Washington to present this letter to you in a personal interview if possible. I would appreciate the benefit of any early informal advice which you might give me through Mr. White. I am

Yours sincerely

  
J. W. Decker

JWD:emh



JAN 5 1946

In reply refer to  
JA

My dear Dr. Decker:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 6, 1945 in regard to a proposal that a Japanese representative, the Reverend Michio Kozaki, attend a meeting in February at Geneva of the International Missionary Council.

The Department views with sympathy proposals looking toward the restoring of links between religious organizations in this country and affiliated bodies in Japan. There are, however, certain considerations which must be taken into account in connection with this proposal. One such consideration is the shipping situation, now very difficult on account of the great number of returning American troops. Another is the attitude likely to be encountered by an enemy alien traveling on military transports and planes and on public conveyances in this country, en route from Japan to Europe via the United States. Other considerations are the legal and administrative obstacles growing out of the state of war existing between this country and Japan, which would have to be surmounted in a very short space of time in order to make it possible for a Japanese to obtain permits for the proposed travel.

These considerations have been discussed in detail with officers of this Department and of other agencies of the Government. The consensus is that it would not be advisable to attempt to carry this project into effect at the present time.

I regret

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TO	The Reverend
FROM	John W. Decker, D.D.,
SUBJECT	International Missionary Council,
	156 Fifth Avenue,
	New York 10, New York.
Anal	
Rev	
Col	B.R.T.
Dist	



- 2 -

I regret the negative character of this letter, and hope that it may not be long until conditions will be such as to make possible meetings between Christian leaders of this country and their colleagues in Japan.

Sincerely yours,

William T. Turner  
Chief  
Division of Japanese Affairs

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
MALCOLM PIRNIE  
CIVIL ENGINEER  
25 WEST 43<sup>RD</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

MALCOLM PIRNIE  
ROBERT W. SAWYER  
ERNEST W. WHITLOCK  
RICHARD HAZEN  
G. G. WERNER, JR.

TELEPHONE: BRYANT 9-5037

IRENE A. VAIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Ref: J.J.K.



*JJ-1-5-46  
file. JJ*

December 7, 1945

The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Attention of Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Chief  
Division of Japanese and  
Korean Economic Affairs

Dear Mr. Martin:

Mr. Pirnie has requested me to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of December fifth. Mr. Pirnie will telephone your office at 9:00 A.M., December tenth to arrange an appointment for Col. Proctor and him to meet with you Monday morning.

Sincerely yours,  
MALCOLM PIRNIE

*Irene A. Vail*  
Executive Secretary

IAV/nb

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**RESTRICTED**

O.P.D., G.S.

**WAR DEPARTMENT**  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OPD 336 Gr Britain (3 Dec 45)

8 December 1945

**MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:**  
**ATTENTION: Office of Far Eastern Affairs**

**SUBJECT: Augmentation of Personnel in the British Staff Section**  
**Attached to the Headquarters of Supreme Commander for**  
**the Allied Powers in Japan**

*20 [Signature]*  
DEC 11 1945  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

1. Receipt is acknowledged of memorandum from the Department of State, Office of Far Eastern Affairs dated 3 December 1945 concerning the augmentation of personnel in the British Staff Section attached to Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan.

2. General MacArthur has advised that he concurs in the proposal of the British Embassy.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

*[Signature]*  
R. L. VITTRUP  
Colonel, GSC

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The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and refers to the Embassy's note of November 24, 1945, in regard to a proposal to augment personnel in the British Staff Section under General Gairdner, the British Prime Minister's personal representative with General MacArthur.

The matter was promptly referred to the authorities concerned from whom a reply has now been received to the effect that the proposal has the approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

DCR NE Unit  
 [Handwritten signature]

Department of State,

Washington,

December 11, 1945

DEC 13 3:45 P.M.  
 DEC 17 1945

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DEC 28 1945

JA

# WORLD STUDENT RELIEF

Geneva, Switzerland

Constituent Organizations

International Student Service

Pax Romana

World's Student Christian Federation


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NORTH AMERICAN AFFILIATED COMMITTEE

Robert C. Mackie, *Chairman*  
Roland Elliott, *Executive Secretary*

December  
Tenth,  
1945

Temporary address:  
8 West 40th Street  
Room 203  
New York 18, N. Y.  
Telephone: CHickering 4-5890



Mr. William Turner,  
Department of State,  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Turner:-

Dr. Leland Albright of the International Missionary Committee suggested that I write you for advice in connection with a request I had from a young man who wishes to obtain a post with the American Control Commission in Japan. He wrote to Mr. Roland Elliott, Executive Secretary of World Student Relief, for advice as to whom he should apply. I am dealing with Mr. Elliott's correspondence while he is away on a trip to China.

The man's name is Alexander Seigel, BM/EUKY, London W.C. 1, England. He was evidently a refugee from Germany who studied in England and while in England was interned and brought to Canada. However, the fact that he is back in England proves that he was able to demonstrate his allegiance to the Allied cause. He writes as follows:-

"While I was a prisoner of war in Canada I heard about you and your work, but it was impossible to get in touch with you then, although I expressed my desire to enter the United States early in the war.

"At present I am living in England where I took an economics degree in 1936. When the war broke out I was interned and sent to Canada where I spent nearly four years studying Japanese. In fact I had spent some years in Japan as a youth and I possess at the moment a solid foundation of the Japanese language, and of their way of printing. I can read most popular Japanese magazines. But what above all I desire, is to spend two or three years in Japan now in order to expand and test my knowledge. In this connection I thought of taking steps in order to inquire about the possibility of obtaining some sort of a post with the American control commission in Japan. I am sure that you could give me some advice in the matter. I am prepared to emigrate to the United States with my wife who is an Englishwoman. My age is 33. At present I am on the Turkish quota (No. 16) as I was by some accident born in Turkey, although my father was German.

"As I have spent so much time and energy on the study of Japanese I am reluctant to let it fall into decay before I have not had a chance to use it for a little while. While the occupation of Japan continues people with some training such as mine should fit in somewhere. I suppose it is just a case of seeking in the right direction. If you could help me in that matter, I should be very grateful to you."

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## WORLD STUDENT RELIEF

Geneva, Switzerland

*Constituent Organizations*

International Student Service

Pax Romana

World's Student Christian Federation

## NORTH AMERICAN AFFILIATED COMMITTEE

Robert C. Mackie, *Chairman*Roland Elliott, *Executive Secretary*

-2-

Temporary address:  
8 West 40th Street  
Room 203  
New York 18, N. Y.  
Telephone: CHickering 4-5890

I would greatly appreciate your advice as to what I might suggest to Mr. Seigel.

Yours very truly,

*A. J. Coleman.*

A. John Coleman, Ph.D.

M



DEC 28 1945

25

In reply refer to  
JA

My dear Dr. Coleman:

With reference to your letter of December 10, 1945, in regard to the desire of Mr. Alexander Seigel, a German national now in England, to obtain a post on the "American Control Commission in Japan", it is suggested that you apply on his behalf to the Overseas Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., which is understood to be recruiting civilian personnel for service with the Allied occupation forces in Japan.

Sincerely yours,

William T. Turner  
Chief  
Division of Japanese Affairs

*W.T.T.* ✓

DE 27

A. John Coleman, Ph.D.,

World Student Relief,

8 West Fortieth Street,

New York 18, New York.

*W.T.T.*  
JA:WTTurner:mp  
12-26-45

FE  
RB

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal.

*F.W. 740.00119 Control Commission Japan/12-10-45*





THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LEGAL ADVISER  
JAN - 9 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*JA*  
*LE*  
*RP*  
*GA*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 17 1946  
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION  
No. 89

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 10, 1945

121

*file n7c*  
JAN 21 1946

*DC/R*

SUBJECT: Bill for Abrogation of National General Mobilization Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law.

945 DEC 28 4 10 34

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DEC 29 1945

*NJA*  
*IRIS*  
*IFER*

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, in translation, the text of a "Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilization Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law". This was submitted by the Government to the House of Peers on December 3, 1945, as Bill No. V.

*TR 894.20*

It will be noted that there is provision for maintaining in effect for a period of six months certain Imperial Ordinances issued under the old law but with terminology referring to the war changed to read: "when it is especially necessary to cope with the state of affairs following upon the termination of war and for the maintenance and stabilization of national life".

740.00119 CONTROL  
(JAPAN)/12-1045

Respectfully yours,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 18 1946  
RP  
TREATY SECTION

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 14 1946  
RP  
TREATY SECTION

Enclosures:

- 1. Translation of a "Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilization Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law".

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to the Department

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JSService: jwb

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 14 1946  
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION

JAN 30 1946

*FILED*  
*CS/WJ*  
*740.00119 Control*  
*(Japan)/12-1045*



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 89 of December 10, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject of "Bill for Abrogation of National General Mobilization Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law".

NO. V (A)

Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilization Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law

The National General Mobilization Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law are hereby abrogated.

Supplementary Provisions:

The day of the coming into force of the present Law shall be fixed by an Imperial Ordinance.

In respect of such Imperial Ordinances issued under the old Laws as are in force at the time of the coming into force of the present Law, the old Laws (exception Articles 1 to 3 of the National General Mobilization Law) shall remain in force for a period of six months, from the time when the present Law is put into operation. During the same period, the terms "when it is necessary for national general mobilization in time of war" and "when it is necessary for national general mobilization" in the National General Mobilization Law, and the terms "when it is urgently necessary in order to extricate the country from an imminent danger in the War of Greater East Asia" in the War-Time Emergency Measures Law, shall be read "when it is especially necessary in order to cope with the state of affairs following upon the termination of war and for the maintenance and stabilization of national life". The terms "national general mobilization business" in the National General Mobilization Law shall be read "such business as is especially necessary for the maintenance and stabilization of national life", and the terms "goods to be mobilized in the national general mobilization" in the same law shall be read "such goods as are especially necessary for the maintenance and stabilization of national life".

Such Imperial Ordinances as shall remain in force by virtue of the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be amended within the scope of the matters prescribed in them.

As regards all such orders, disposals, or acts as were issued or executed prior to the enforcement of the present Law (or, where Paragraph 2 of these Supplementary Provisions are applicable, during the period prescribed therein) - in particular, preferential purchases, exceptions in the calculation of the standard of taxation, exemption from taxes and compensations for loss, liquidations commenced before the enforcement of the present Law of associations or companies established under the old Laws, and the application of penal clauses against offences committed prior to the enforcement of the present Law, - the old Laws shall remain in force even after the enforcement of the present Law (or, where Paragraph 2 of these Supplementary Provisions is applicable, after the expiration of the period prescribed therein).



**OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER**

Tokyo, Japan, December 10, 1945

No. 89

**SUBJECT: Bill for Abrogation of National General Mobilisation Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law.****The Honorable****The Secretary of State,****Washington.****Sir:**

I have the honor to transmit, in translation, the text of a "Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilisation Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law". This was submitted by the Government to the House of Peers on December 3, 1945, as Bill No. VI.

It will be noted that there is provision for maintaining in effect for a period of six months certain Imperial Ordinances issued under the old law but with terminology referring to the war changed to read: "when it is especially necessary to cope with the state of affairs following upon the termination of war and for the maintenance and stabilization of national life".

**Respectfully yours,****George Atcheson, Jr.****Enclosures:**

1. Translation of a "Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilisation Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law".

**Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to the Department**

820

JSService: jwb



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 89 of December 10, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject of "Bill for Abrogation of National General Mobilization Law and War-Time Emergency Measures Law".

NO. V (A)

Bill for the Abrogation of the National General Mobilization Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law

The National General Mobilization Law and the War-Time Emergency Measures Law are hereby abrogated.

Supplementary Provisions:

The day of the coming into force of the present Law shall be fixed by an Imperial Ordinance.

In respect of such Imperial Ordinances issued under the old Laws as are in force at the time of the coming into force of the present Law, the old Laws (exception Articles 1 to 3 of the National General Mobilization Law) shall remain in force for a period of six months, from the time when the present Law is put into operation. During the same period, the terms "when it is necessary for national general mobilization in time of war" and "when it is necessary for national general mobilization" in the National General Mobilization Law, and the terms "when it is urgently necessary in order to extricate the country from an imminent danger in the War of Greater East Asia" in the War-Time Emergency Measures Law, shall be read "when it is especially necessary in order to cope with the state of affairs following upon the termination of war and for the maintenance and stabilization of national life". The terms "national general mobilization business" in the National General Mobilization Law shall be read "such business as is especially necessary for the maintenance and stabilization of national life", and the terms "goods to be mobilized in the national general mobilization" in the same law shall be read "such goods as are especially necessary for the maintenance and stabilization of national life".

Such Imperial Ordinances as shall remain in force by virtue of the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be amended within the scope of the matters prescribed in them.

As regards all such orders, disposals, or acts as were issued or executed prior to the enforcement of the present Law (or, where Paragraph 2 of these Supplementary Provisions are applicable, during the period prescribed therein) - in particular, preferential purchases, exceptions in the calculation of the standard of taxation, exemption from taxes and compensations for loss, liquidations commenced before the enforcement of the present Law of associations or companies established under the old Laws, and the application of penal clauses against offences committed prior to the enforcement of the present Law, - the old Laws shall remain in force even after the enforcement of the present Law (or, where Paragraph 2 of these Supplementary Provisions is applicable, after the expiration of the period prescribed therein).



DEC 11 1945

DEC 11 1945

TOP SECRET

No. *32*

To the  
Acting United States Political Adviser to  
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
American Embassy Building,  
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information  
of the Acting Political Adviser copies of SWNCC papers,  
as listed below.

Enclosures:

- 1. SWNCC 70/15, copy no. 45.
- 2. SWNCC 213/3, copy no. 45.
- 3. Status of Papers, SFE,  
6 December 1945, copy no.  
23.

*no enclosures attached to file*

*copy - 12/11/45*

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*(Japan) / 12-1145*



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JAN 7 1946  
DC/R

Yokohama Branch of the Office  
of the U.S. Political Adviser  
% Hdqrs. Eighth Army, APO 343  
Yokohama, Japan  
December 11, 1945

Unrestricted

Subject: Request for Copies of Mimeographed Instructions

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL FILES

1945 DEC 18 AM 10 4

RECORDS  
BRANCH

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington  
Sir:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Inst. to Yokohama  
DEC 14 1945  
drafted 1/5/46  
Chief, Division of  
Foreign Service Administration

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/12-1145

The Foreign Service Officer in charge has the honor to request that there be transmitted to this office a single copy of each of such mimeographed instructions issued by the Department to the field subsequent to Diplomatic Serial 3393 of September 16, 1941 as are considered to be in effect at the present time.

U.A. Johnson:kah

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Distribution

Original and ozalid copy to Department  
One copy for files

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Rev. *AM*  
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JAN 10 1946

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(Japan) /12-1145



740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-1145

JAN 7 1946

UNRESTRICTED

To the  
Officer in Charge of the Yokohama Branch Office  
of the United States Political Adviser,  
Yokohama, Japan

The Secretary of State refers to your unnumbered despatch of December 11, 1945, requesting copies of each mimeographed circular instructions issued by the Department to the field subsequent to Diplomatic Serial No. 3393 of September 16, 1941 as are considered to be in effect at the present time.

The Department wishes to inform you that copies of all such circular instructions for the period July 1, 1943 to date has been sent to Shanghai and should be forwarded from that office to your office as soon as received.

Referring to circular instructions previous to above period, the Department shall endeavor to send you as complete a set as is possible from the files in the near future.

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PREPARING OFFICE  
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**TELEGRAM SENT**

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF THE  
MESSAGE: 1983

**Department of State**

**PLAIN**

Charge Department:

*Washington*

Charge to

**SUPREME COMMANDER**

**FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,**

**TOKYO, (JAPAN).**

**FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER**

Under new regulations the handling in the Dept of materials classified as secret or higher has been hedged about with additional safeguards. In order to insure prompt and useful disposition of reports and despatches from your office it is recommended that you make every effort consistent with security to avoid over-classification of materials sent to the Dept.

DEC 11 1945

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*Byrnes*  
*(JAP)*

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

123

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 12, 1945

REC 20 1945  
HKB  
HR

DC/K

No. 93

SUBJECT: Transmitting Texts of Directives to the Japanese Government Regarding Cessation of Direct Relations Between Japan and Foreign Countries.

~~KJA~~  
~~1055 (11/15)~~  
~~1/FEAR~~

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
GENERAL SERVICES

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 56, November 14, 1945, transmitting copies of directives to the Japanese Government in regard to the termination of conduct of direct relations between Japan and foreign countries, and to enclose a copy of a directive from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government dated December 10, 1945, on the subject of cessation of communications between the Japanese Government and its former diplomatic and consular representatives abroad. There is also enclosed a copy of a directive to the Japanese Government dated December 8, 1945, on the subject of the relations of the Japanese Government with foreign diplomats in Japan.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures: *att 4*

- 1. Copy of directive from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government dated December 10, 1945.
- 2. Copy of directive from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government dated December 8, 1945.

DEPT. OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION  
JAN 14 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department

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CS / (Japan) / 12-1245



124

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 93 dated December 12, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., Acting Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Transmitting Texts of Directives to the Japanese Government Regarding Cessation of Direct Relations Between Japan and Foreign Countries.

C O P Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091.1 (10 Dec 45) GS

10 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Cessation of Communications Between Japanese Government and Its Former Diplomatic and Consular Representatives Abroad.

1. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Japanese Government will, from the receipt of this Memorandum, discontinue all communication between itself and former Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives abroad for any purpose other than to effect compliance with the provisions of the Memorandum dated 25 October 1945 from this Headquarters, subject "Transfer of Custody of Diplomatic and Consular Archives and Property," and for the purpose of informing such representatives of the provisions of this Memorandum.

2. Receipt of this Directive will be acknowledged.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

(Signed) H. W. Allen  
H. W. ALLEN  
Colonel, A. G. D.  
Asst Adjutant General.

Copied by: jwb



Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 93 dated December 12, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., Acting Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Transmitting Texts of Directives to the Japanese Government Regarding Cessation of Direct Relations Between Japan and Foreign Countries.

C O P Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091.1 (8 Dec 45)GS

8 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Relations of Japanese Government with  
Foreign Diplomats in Japan.

With reference to the two questions raised in the memorandum dated 29 November 1945 received from Mr. S. Matsushima, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his call at this headquarters on 29 November 1945, you are directed as follows:

1. Official communications dealing with pending questions or with routine functions of protection of Japanese nationals in neutral countries, which the Japanese Government wishes to transmit to neutral governments or the representatives thereof, will be delivered to this headquarters through the usual channel, for transmittal to the governments or representatives concerned, in sufficient copies to permit necessary distribution.

2. Compliance with memorandum from this headquarters subject: Official Relations Between Japanese Government and Representatives of Neutral Nations, file AG 091.1 (4 Nov 45)GS, will not relieve the Japanese Government of its responsibility to provide suitable quarters, fuel, subsistence, medical and other care to foreign diplomats on the standard scale and in accord with international custom as announced in memorandum from this headquarters, subject: Treatment of Foreign Diplomats in Japan, file AG 091.112 (21 Oct 45)GD.

3. Such contacts will be maintained with foreign diplomats as may be necessary to provide them with food and other facilities in accord with paragraph 2 above. Official matters\* such as covered in paragraph 1 above will not be discussed.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

(Signed) H. W. Allen  
H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A.G.D.  
Asst Adjutant General

Copied by: jwb





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

125

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 13, 1945.

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JAN 24 1946  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

DCR

NO. 96

SUBJECT: Observations on Conditions in Rural Japan.

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

The Honorable

1946 JAN 3 PM 2 59

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JAN 4 1946

IJA  
IFEIR  
IRIS

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of interest to the Department, a memorandum prepared by Mr. MATSUO Matsuhei, a Japanese employee of this Mission, reporting his observations while on a trip to several small towns in northeast Japan.

SUMMARY. Railroad transportation is deplorably congested due primarily to large numbers of people going to the country to purchase food. Relations between the American occupation forces and local populace were very good in the small towns visited, after some slight initial difficulties through lack of suitable interpreters and other intermediaries and the unfamiliarity of Japanese with American requirements in such matters as housing. There appears to be no shortage of food in country districts and relatively little disruption as a result of the war. Accordingly, there has been little political development and there is a great gap in this respect between the countryside and the cities. Growing misunderstanding and bitterness between the people in the country and the cities is resulting in a lack of balance, both economic and political, which may not be favorable for the orderly democratic development of Japan. End of Summary.

JAN 23 1946  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MATSUO's observations confirm reports from other sources (generally less detailed) by other recent travelers. This office believes them to be of some validity as those of a Japanese who has had extensive training in journalistic and research work, particularly in the economic field, and who is probably able to look at the situation in Japan with reasonably objective eyes. Mr. MATSUO has worked for some years with the Institute of Pacific Relations and is employed with the

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JAN 23 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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


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126

the Institute's International Secretariat in the United States at the outbreak of the Pacific war. For the Institute he has written various studies on economic subjects connected with Japan and Manchukuo.

Respectfully yours,

  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum by  
Mr. MATSUC Matsuhei  
dated December 8, 1945.

Copy to General Headquarters,  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Original and duplicate, with reverse  
carbon, to Department.

800  
JSService:dm



127

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 96 of December 13, 1945, from the Office of the Acting Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject: "Observations on Conditions in Rural Japan."

## MEMORANDUM

December 8, 1945.

A Report on a Trip to Tohoku

For the first time since the end of the war, I made a short trip to Tohoku or north-eastern Japan, visiting Shinjo, a small town of about 20,000 population in Yamagata Prefecture and a village near Sannuma in northern Miyagi Prefecture. From the beginning to the end the trip was full of new experiences to me even though I used to make frequent trips to the countryside during wartime. I am making this report in the belief that some of the observations in it, although strictly personal and purely casual in nature, may throw some side-lights on the current trends in the country districts and may for that reason be of interest to observers on the present Japanese situation.

As I look back, the trip was interesting and informative on three scores. In the first place a long distance train ride has afforded me a chance to look into the impossible state of congestion in the country's railway traffic as well as an excellent opportunity of coming in close contact with the people in their most unguarded moment. In the second place in Shinjo I could observe at close range the situation of a small country town under the occupation of a detachment of Allied forces, an entirely unprecedented phenomenon in Japanese country life, while in the last place a few days' stay in a typical Tohoku village in Miyagi Prefecture has given me a chance to observe the trends in rural areas.

What startled me at the very beginning of the trip was the abominable sight I witnessed in and out of the Ueno Station, from which I had to board the train for Tohoku. Although I had previous experiences of congestion in the Ueno Station during wartime, never before had I seen the size of the crowd and the extent of the congestion as I did at the night of my departure in the present trip. Not only the station premises were found literally packed with waiting passengers invariably loaded with heavy baggages, but several columns of them lined up for over a 100 meters in the open space in front of the station. Elsewhere in the station premises waiting travellers were seen either squatting down or lying on the concrete floor to spend the night in order to catch the morning trains.

Absolute lack of courtesy on the part of station employees, a wicked legacy of the wartime, on one part, and the impatience of weary passengers, on the other, added to the din and confusion of the station. The conditions were utterly far worse now than at wartime, when at least some semblance of order was maintained so as to enable even women and children to board the train in safety. Now, however, everyone is for himself and the waiting crowd of passengers simply make a head-on dash to the platform and scramble into the train through windows once the entrance wicket is opened. As things stand now, the travellers going as far as Aomori or Hokkaido must think it good luck if they catch the intended train even though they have to finish the entire trip standing in the train passage. I heard some of the fellow travellers whispering in the train that people bribe station employees nowadays to get seats in the train, while not a few travellers simply slip in to get free rides on the train. Such irregularities only

serve



- 2 -

serve to show the depth to which the once excellently disciplined railway service of Japan has lately degenerated.

As to the types of travellers, whereas most of them during the wartime were naturally composed of soldiers and persons on war duty as well as those who were either evacuating from towns or visiting evacuated families in the country, the majority of them at present are those who go out into the country to seek foodstuff either for their own use or for sale. Judging from the manner and talk of the fellow travellers in the same train, I could tell that at least one-third of them, including many Koreans, were petty dealers in black market. Most of them are travelling back and forth to Tohoku in order to sell rice and apples in Tokyo since these are the staple products in northern Japan and are the commodities most sought for in Tokyo black market.

Train windows are now the only regular entrance and exit for passengers in the train and, consequently, waiting travellers at intermediate station have no chance to get in the train unless there is someone to get off the train through windows. In spite of extreme hardship of train travel, the one thing which amazed me in my present trip was the total lack of ill-will or envy toward the Allied soldiers who were seen travelling in a comfortable second or first class car attached to the train for their exclusive use. This may have come partly from their tacit acceptance of the country's defeat but partly from the revival of their traditional respect for foreigners and things foreign as well. Moreover, I overheard people frequently commenting on occupation forces in very favourable terms, quite in contrast to the almost unanimous bitter comments with which Japanese militarists' behaviour both during and at the end of the war were spoken of. The question of food was invariably the main topic of conversation among fellow travellers in the train, the discussion mostly ending in the expression of anxiety as to the future food prospect of the nation. Talks on politics such as on political parties, women's suffrage and coming elections were conspicuous by their absence in the course of conversations in the train, a phenomenon which to my greatest surprise I have subsequently found prevailing in most of the rural points I visited during the present trip.

Shinjo is a typical small town in northern part of Yamagata Prefecture. Traffic center of some importance, the town is also known as a collecting point of rice, the staple product of the neighbouring region. A friend of mine, who had evacuated to the town during wartime, used to tell me that even this far away point in Tohoku was toward the end of the war strongly coloured by military atmosphere due to increasing number of soldiers and naval personnel, who had built military establishments of varied sorts in interior parts in preparation for the possible invasion of Allied Forces.

As soon as I reached the town, my friend, an old classmate of mine, who greeted me at the station and whom I had imagined must be finding it difficult in killing time in a remote country town, informed me that a great deal of change had come to the town as well as to his life since the arrival of a small detachment of American forces in the town for garrisoning purpose several weeks ago. Subsequent talks with my friend revealed that since the entry of the US troops my friend, who speaks good English, has become a chief intermediary between the local community and the American garrison.

According



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According to my friend, the whole development has been literally a revolution to a small town like Shinjo. The people of the town, who rarely saw foreigners even in pre-war days, had been simply frightened when they had been notified that a detachment of US garrison would be stationed in the town, said my friend. The local county office, which was to serve as a liaison office, the township office and the police had none who knew the language or the manner of the Americans. This is an amazing fact to me since I had always imagined that the Government Liaison Office, being a formidable body under the direct control of the Foreign Ministry, was in a position to supply at least one or two men who could act as intermediaries as between the local community and the American occupation forces at spots where such forces are garrisoned.

The officials of the locality, composed of the chief of the county office, the mayor of the town and the local chief of police, on instruction from the governor of the prefecture, were more than ready to cooperate with the Americans but the trouble was that they did not know how to approach the Americans, who, on their part, found it difficult to have their wishes known to the local officials. Through the good offices of my friend, who volunteered to act as interpreter, however, both parties have gradually come to see each other's intentions and wishes.

The first work of the American garrison in the town was naturally to establish their billeting quarters and for this purpose a local public school building was requisitioned. It was necessary, however, to refurnish the building to make it adequate for living quarters of the American soldiers. Building an American style latrine, a kitchen, a recreation hall and what not was entirely beyond the imagination of the local authorities as well as the people of the community, not to say of the carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers and others directly concerned in the refurnishing of the building. Furthermore, what with the age-old Tohoku habit to do things slowly and the corrupt practice of local workers of having received some kind of foodstuff as bonuses in addition to their pay during wartime, it took the greatest amount of effort on the part of the local authorities to mobilize the local workers to do the work required by the occupation forces. The slow progress of the work resulting from these circumstances was at first regarded by the commander of the American forces as a lack of sincerity on the part of the local authorities to cooperate with the garrison and it was with the greatest difficulty that they were brought to understand the situation as it really was, said my friend.

He told me another typical instance of such misunderstanding. The local American commander some time ago requested the officials of the town to supply the garrison with about 70 electric bulbs for lighting purpose. The mayor and local chief of police tried their best to locate the required bulbs but failed to get them in town. They also tried to get them in near-by towns but to no avail. The officials complained to my friend that for troubles of this kind they had no means of knowing for which superior authorities they had to make appeal, adding that eventually they had to resort to requisitioning the necessary amount of bulbs from private homes. The question of electric bulbs was still pending when I left the town.

The local chief of police, a rather intelligent man for a country policeman, who seemed to be capable of understanding the situation well, told me that while he had been doing his best to cooperate with the

occupation



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occupation forces, he has found it difficult some time to comply with the demand of the garrison due to the shortage of labor and limited supply of local materials, which, he hoped, the American occupation officers take fully into consideration. One instance of such difficulties, he explained, is the problem of looking after the construction of temporary quarters for war sufferers before winter sets in while majority of competent carpenters are mobilized for work of the occupation forces. Meanwhile, he also complained that since the arrival of the occupation forces he has been so fully occupied with matters relating to the garrison that he has had little time left to look after regular police work.

In the meantime, however, contrary to original anxiety, the town people have gradually become familiar with the sight of American soldiers and their friendly manners, and they are now feeling quite at ease with the American garrison. Thanks to the suggestion of my friend, several souvenir shops have already been opened, while rest houses for soldiers have also been established. Some of the town folk with whom I talked sufficiently testified to my friend's statement that Americans were being commented on in the best of terms in Shinjo. My friend added that no pressure has been brought to bear on the local food situation and that the arrival of the soldiers was marked by the total absence of incidents and this has had a great influence in the favourable reaction of the local people to the Americans in town.

Excepting the slowness of refurnishing work, the American officers seem to be quite satisfied with the cooperation of the local officials and friendliness of the people. Some of the GIs admitted to me that they liked the life in Shinjo better than larger bombed out towns because the life there is more normal and people more friendly than in larger places.

On the whole, observing the occupation garrison in a remote country town for the first time, I am rather amazed at the rapid speed with which the occupation work has been progressing with precision and thoroughness, with practically no friction with the local community. The one thing I regret in the whole occupation problem is the absence of regular intermediaries between the local community and the occupation forces, the fault for which must rest entirely with the Japanese Government. The fact that American garrison commanders have no precise knowledge of local administrative systems and practices and that the local officials are not acquainted with the language and custom of Americans is likely to produce frequent sources of misunderstandings between the two parties. As things stand at present, judging from what I have observed, all forms of contact between the occupation forces and the local community in country places are left to chance presence of capable interpreters, either voluntary or temporarily employed. In my opinion, two remedies must be carried out at once to improve the contact between the occupation forces and the local community in the country district at once as far as the Japanese end is concerned. The first is that the executive power of the Liaison Office must be strengthened and the second is that instead of the organization being concentrated in Tokyo capable personnel with adequate executive power should be spread out to terminal offices in the country districts.

The future of Japan is said to depend on rural areas. It is of supreme importance for this reason that both Japanese and Americans should have better contact in those areas than in the metropolitan region. From what I have observed in the present trip, I feel sure that if properly guided, the contact between the occupation forces and

the country



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the country people would be of a more sincere and enduring nature than in the metropolitan region and would go a long way toward the enlightenment and progress of the Japanese rural district.

Shinjo is in the center of a rice producing area and perhaps for that reason as far as I could gather there seemed to be no sign of acuteness of food situation. My friend told me, however, that even in this town it is almost impossible to buy even a small amount of rice unless the money is accompanied by some commodities preferably clothing, while only meagre vegetables are available to the town inhabitants although it is surrounded by farming villages. No beggars nor crowd of idlers are out in the street such as is the common sight in the metropolitan area, while no sign of common restlessness as revealed in violently worded posters is visible anywhere in town. Indeed, my friend told me that the town is politically void as there has been no sign of political movement of any sort both during wartime or since. Whereas metropolitan dailies used to be distributed widely in country district before the war, prefectural papers are now the only reading matters for rural population. With the food situation relatively easy as compared with big towns and with no organs of public opinion to enlighten or excite their political imagination, there is no wonder that people in country towns or rural areas have practically little interest in political trends. This is however, a revelation to a town man like myself, who is used to seeing the up-surge of political storm all around us.

The same atmosphere of political vacuum greeted me when I visited a typical farming village near Sanuma, about 40 miles north-east of Sendai. The neighbourhood of the village is also known as the rice producing area. Talks with a friend of mine, whom I visited, and a few village folk revealed the virtual lack of political interest among the local people. According to my friend, while villagers show no interest in the trend of national politics, they have quite an interest in local politics of their immediate concern. In respect to the latter, my friend intimated, the sentiment of the time is well revealed in the recent organization of the local tenant farmers' union. No sooner than the union was organized, it immediately started a movement for the radical reduction of tenancy rent, while union leaders have some time ago demanded the officials of the local nokai or agricultural cooperative association, which is controlled by rich farmers and which was utilized as the only regulatory organ in agricultural areas during wartime, to vacate office since the organ has already outlasted its use.

Commenting on the current situation in their district, some of the elders of the village told me that the village has quite a number of young men either demobilized from the armed forces or dismissed from factories as well as girls returned from town factories and that they constitute one of the most troublesome problems in the rural district. Having been disillusioned by the defeat and feeling themselves degraded by it, while still possessing a certain amount of money which they had obtained as retirement bonuses, they do not feel like returning to farming work, which is certainly harder than their life in barracks and factories. Naturally, most of them simply spend their time in idleness. Such degenerate tendency of young men and women in the rural area is undoubtedly shared in some respect by the younger generation in big towns, since they had grown up together during the height of Japanese nationalism and they had been disillusioned to the same extent by the country's defeat. But this degenerate trend is more difficult, perhaps,

to cure



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to cure in rural areas owing to the fact that these areas, having suffered few actual damages from the war, are not acutely feeling the sense of defeat nor realizing the process of violent political transformation which Japan is now passing through. At the same time, this lack of appetite for work by the younger people in rural areas is more serious than the case of younger generation in town since the future of Japan depends on radical, political and economic reforms in the country districts.

In the face of this difficult situation, some of the intelligent elders of the village are now trying their best to adapt the village to the new situation. They feel, however, that they have already lost the leadership among the younger generation of the village and they see practically nobody capable of leading the young people on a healthy road of progress. My friend observed in this connection that nothing is more important now in the rural areas than the immediate appearance of powerful and healthy leaders replacing the older ones to put a new life in the younger people in the rural areas along truly democratic lines.

Summing up my casual observations of the rural district in my short trip, I should say that the gap in sentiment between the people in rural areas and those of the metropolitan region is appallingly great. The rural people, while undoubtedly having shared heavy burdens of war, have not suffered in the same degree as the people in bigger bombed-out towns. Many farmers have enriched themselves and are still enriching themselves by selling foodstuffs to town people at exorbitant prices unimaginable in pre-war time. And, they have been asserting that since they had suffered for long in pre-war days, it is about time the town people should be suffering. This sentiment is still strong in rural areas in spite of the talk of imminent famine in big towns. Such a frame of mind of the rural people is reflected in the comparatively easy atmosphere and the consequent lack of interest in politics in rural areas, while in bigger towns the acute food situation together with the keen sense of defeat tend to cultivate the intense political interest of the people. Whether such unbalanced state of affairs both economic and political as between the rural and metropolitan region is for the good for democratization of Japan is a matter requiring serious study for observers of future Japanese politics.

M. Matsuo



## OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 13, 1945.

NO. 96

SUBJECT: Observations on Conditions in Rural Japan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of interest to the Department, a memorandum prepared by Mr. MATSUO Matsuhei, a Japanese employee of this Mission, reporting his observations while on a trip to several small towns in northeast Japan.

SUMMARY. Railroad transportation is deplorably congested due primarily to large numbers of people going to the country to purchase food. Relations between the American occupation forces and local populace were very good in the small towns visited, after some slight initial difficulties through lack of suitable interpreters and other intermediaries and the unfamiliarity of Japanese with American requirements in such matters as housing. There appears to be no shortage of food in country districts and relatively little disruption as a result of the war. Accordingly, there has been little political development and there is a great gap in this respect between the countryside and the cities. Growing misunderstanding and bitterness between the people in the country and the cities is resulting in a lack of balance, both economic and political, which may not be favorable for the orderly democratic development of Japan. End of Summary.

Mr. MATSUO's observations confirm reports from other sources (generally less detailed) by other recent travelers. This office believes them to be of some validity as those of a Japanese who has had extensive training in journalistic and research work, particularly in the economic field, and who is probably able to look at the situation in Japan with reasonably objective eyes. Mr. MATSUO has worked for some years with the Institute of Pacific Relations and was employed with

the



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the Institute's International Secretariat in the United States at the outbreak of the Pacific war. For the Institute he has written various studies on economic subjects connected with Japan and Manchukuo.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum by  
Mr. MATSUO Matsuhei  
dated December 8, 1945.

Copy to General Headquarters,  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Original and duplicate, with reverse  
carbon, to Department.

800  
JSService:dm



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 96 of December 13, 1945, from the Office of the Acting Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject: "Observations on Conditions in Rural Japan."

MEMORANDUM

December 8, 1945.

A Report on a Trip to Tohoku

For the first time since the end of the war, I made a short trip to Tohoku or north-eastern Japan, visiting Shinjo, a small town of about 20,000 population in Yamagata Prefecture and a village near Sannuma in northern Miyagi Prefecture. From the beginning to the end the trip was full of new experiences to me even though I used to make frequent trips to the countryside during wartime. I am making this report in the belief that some of the observations in it, although strictly personal and purely casual in nature, may throw some side-lights on the current trends in the country districts and may for that reason be of interest to observers on the present Japanese situation.

As I look back, the trip was interesting and informative on three scores. In the first place a long distance train ride has afforded me a chance to look into the impossible state of congestion in the country's railway traffic as well as an excellent opportunity of coming in close contact with the people in their most unguarded moment. In the second place in Shinjo I could observe at close range the situation of a small country town under the occupation of a detachment of Allied forces, an entirely unprecedented phenomenon in Japanese country life, while in the last place a few days' stay in a typical Tohoku village in Miyagi Prefecture has given me a chance to observe the trends in rural areas.

What startled me at the very beginning of the trip was the abominable sight I witnessed in and out of the Ueno Station, from which I had to board the train for Tohoku. Although I had previous experiences of congestion in the Ueno Station during wartime, never before had I seen the size of the crowd and the extent of the congestion as I did at the night of my departure in the present trip. Not only the station premises were found literally packed with waiting passengers invariably loaded with heavy baggages, but several columns of them lined up for over a 100 meters in the open space in front of the station. Elsewhere in the station premises waiting travellers were seen either squatting down or lying on the concrete floor to spend the night in order to catch the morning trains.

Absolute lack of courtesy on the part of station employees, a wicked legacy of the wartime, on one part, and the impatience of weary passengers, on the other, added to the din and confusion of the station. The conditions were utterly far worse now than at wartime, when at least some semblance of order was maintained so as to enable even women and children to board the train in safety. Now, however, everyone is for himself and the waiting crowd of passengers simply make a head-on dash to the platform and scramble into the train through windows once the entrance wicket is opened. As things stand now, the travellers going as far as Aomori or Hokkaido must think it good luck if they catch the intended train even though they have to finish the entire trip standing in the train passage. I heard some of the fellow travellers whispering in the train that people bribe station employees nowadays to get seats in the train, while not a few travellers simply slip in to get free rides on the train. Such irregularities only

serve



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serve to show the depth to which the once excellently disciplined railway service of Japan has lately degenerated.

As to the types of travellers, whereas most of them during the wartime were naturally composed of soldiers and persons on war duty as well as those who were either evacuating from towns or visiting evacuated families in the country, the majority of them at present are those who go out into the country to seek foodstuff either for their own use or for sale. Judging from the manner and talk of the fellow travellers in the same train, I could tell that at least one-third of them, including many Koreans, were petty dealers in black market. Most of them are travelling back and forth to Tohoku in order to sell rice and apples in Tokyo since these are the staple products in northern Japan and are the commodities most sought for in Tokyo black market.

Train windows are now the only regular entrance and exit for passengers in the train and, consequently, waiting travellers at intermediate station have no chance to get in the train unless there is someone to get off the train through windows. In spite of extreme hardship of train travel, the one thing which amazed me in my present trip was the total lack of ill-will or envy toward the Allied soldiers who were seen travelling in a comfortable second or first class car attached to the train for their exclusive use. This may have come partly from their tacit acceptance of the country's defeat but partly from the revival of their traditional respect for foreigners and things foreign as well. Moreover, I overheard people frequently commenting on occupation forces in very favourable terms, quite in contrast to the almost unanimous bitter comments with which Japanese militarists' behaviour both during and at the end of the war were spoken of. The question of food was invariably the main topic of conversation among fellow travellers in the train, the discussion mostly ending in the expression of anxiety as to the future food prospect of the nation. Talks on politics such as on political parties, women's suffrage and coming elections were conspicuous by their absence in the course of conversations in the train, a phenomenon which to my greatest surprise I have subsequently found prevailing in most of the rural points I visited during the present trip.

Shinjo is a typical small town in northern part of Yamagata Prefecture. Traffic center of some importance, the town is also known as a collecting point of rice, the staple product of the neighbouring region. A friend of mine, who had evacuated to the town during wartime, used to tell me that even this far away point in Tohoku was toward the end of the war strongly coloured by military atmosphere due to increasing number of soldiers and naval personnel, who had built military establishments of varied sorts in interior parts in preparation for the possible invasion of Allied Forces.

As soon as I reached the town, my friend, an old classmate of mine, who greeted me at the station and whom I had imagined must be finding it difficult in killing time in a remote country town, informed me that a great deal of change had come to the town as well as to his life since the arrival of a small detachment of American forces in the town for garrisoning purpose several weeks ago. Subsequent talks with my friend revealed that since the entry of the US troops my friend, who speaks good English, has become a chief intermediary between the local community and the American garrison.

According



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According to my friend, the whole development has been literally a revolution to a small town like Shinjo. The people of the town, who rarely saw foreigners even in pre-war days, had been simply frightened when they had been notified that a detachment of US garrison would be stationed in the town, said my friend. The local county office, which was to serve as a liaison office, the township office and the police had none who knew the language or the manner of the Americans. This is an amazing fact to me since I had always imagined that the Government Liaison Office, being a formidable body under the direct control of the Foreign Ministry, was in a position to supply at least one or two men who could act as intermediaries as between the local community and the American occupation forces at spots where such forces are garrisoned.

The officials of the locality, composed of the chief of the county office, the mayor of the town and the local chief of police, on instruction from the governor of the prefecture, were more than ready to cooperate with the Americans but the trouble was that they did not know how to approach the Americans, who, on their part, found it difficult to have their wishes known to the local officials. Through the good offices of my friend, who volunteered to act as interpreter, however, both parties have gradually come to see each other's intentions and wishes.

The first work of the American garrison in the town was naturally to establish their billeting quarters and for this purpose a local public school building was requisitioned. It was necessary, however, to refurnish the building to make it adequate for living quarters of the American soldiers. Building an American style latrine, a kitchen, a recreation hall and what not was entirely beyond the imagination of the local authorities as well as the people of the community, not to say of the carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers and others directly concerned in the refurnishing of the building. Furthermore, what with the age-old Tohoku habit to do things slowly and the corrupt practice of local workers of having received some kind of foodstuff as bonuses in addition to their pay during wartime, it took the greatest amount of effort on the part of the local authorities to mobilize the local workers to do the work required by the occupation forces. The slow progress of the work resulting from these circumstances was at first regarded by the commander of the American forces as a lack of sincerity on the part of the local authorities to cooperate with the garrison and it was with the greatest difficulty that they were brought to understand the situation as it really was, said my friend.

He told me another typical instance of such misunderstanding. The local American commander some time ago requested the officials of the town to supply the garrison with about 70 electric bulbs for lighting purpose. The mayor and local chief of police tried their best to locate the required bulbs but failed to get them in town. They also tried to get them in near-by towns but to no avail. The officials complained to my friend that for troubles of this kind they had no means of knowing for which superior authorities they had to make appeal, adding that eventually they had to resort to requisitioning the necessary amount of bulbs from private homes. The question of electric bulbs was still pending when I left the town.

The local chief of police, a rather intelligent man for a country policeman, who seemed to be capable of understanding the situation well, told me that while he had been doing his best to cooperate with the

occupation



- 4 -

occupation forces, he has found it difficult some time to comply with the demand of the garrison due to the shortage of labor and limited supply of local materials, which, he hoped, the American occupation officers take fully into consideration. One instance of such difficulties, he explained, is the problem of looking after the construction of temporary quarters for war sufferers before winter sets in while majority of competent carpenters are mobilized for work of the occupation forces. Meanwhile, he also complained that since the arrival of the occupation forces he has been so fully occupied with matters relating to the garrison that he has had little time left to look after regular police work.

In the meantime, however, contrary to original anxiety, the town people have gradually become familiar with the sight of American soldiers and their friendly manners, and they are now felling quite at ease with the American garrison. Thanks to the suggestion of my friend, several souvenir shops have already been opened, while rest houses for soldiers have also been established. Some of the town folk with whom I talked sufficiently testified to my friend's statement that Americans were being commented on in the best of terms in Shinjo. My friend added that no pressure has been brought to bear on the local food situation and that the arrival of the soldiers was marked by the total absence of incidents and this has had a great influence in the favourable reaction of the local people to the Americans in town.

Excepting the slowness of refurnishing work, the American officers seem to be quite satisfied with the cooperation of the local officials and friendliness of the people. Some of the GIs admitted to me that they liked the life in Shinjo better than larger bombed out towns because the life there is more normal and people more friendly than in larger places.

On the whole, observing the occupation garrison in a remote country town for the first time, I am rather amazed at the rapid speed with which the occupation work has been progressing with precision and thoroughness, with practically no friction with the local community. The one thing I regret in the whole occupation problem is the absence of regular intermediaries between the local community and the occupation forces, the fault for which must rest entirely with the Japanese Government. The fact that American garrison commanders have no precise knowledge of local administrative systems and practices and that the local officials are not acquainted with the language and custom of Americans is likely to produce frequent sources of misunderstandings between the two parties. As things stand at present, judging from what I have observed, all forms of contact between the occupation forces and the local community in country places are left to chance presence of capable interpreters, either voluntary or temporarily employed. In my opinion, two remedies must be carried out at once to improve the contact between the occupation forces and the local community in the country district at once as far as the Japanese end is concerned. The first is that the executive power of the Liaison Office must be strengthened and the second is that instead of the organization being concentrated in Tokyo capable personnel with adequate executive power should be spread out to terminal offices in the country districts.

The future of Japan is said to depend on rural areas. It is of supreme importance for this reason that both Japanese and Americans should have better contact in those areas than in the metropolitan region. From what I have observed in the present trip, I feel sure that if properly guided, the contact between the occupation forces and

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- 5 -

the country people would be of a more sincere and enduring nature than in the metropolitan region and would go a long way toward the enlightenment and progress of the Japanese rural district.

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The same atmosphere of political vacuum greeted me when I visited a typical farming village near Sanuma, about 40 miles north-east of Sendai. The neighbourhood of the village is also known as the rice producing area. Talks with a friend of mine, whom I visited, and a few village folk revealed the virtual lack of political interest among the local people. According to my friend, while villagers show no interest in the trend of national politics, they have quite an interest in local politics of their immediate concern. In respect to the latter, my friend intimated, the sentiment of the time is well revealed in the recent organization of the local tenant farmers' union. No sooner than the union was organized, it immediately started a movement for the radical reduction of tenancy rent, while union leaders have some time ago demanded the officials of the local nokai or agricultural cooperative association, which is controlled by rich farmers and which was utilized as the only regulatory organ in agricultural areas during wartime, to vacate office since the organ has already outlasted its use.

Commenting on the current situation in their district, some of the elders of the village told me that the village has quite a number of young men either demobilized from the armed forces or dismissed from factories as well as girls returned from town factories and that they constitute one of the most troublesome problems in the rural district. Having been disillusioned by the defeat and feeling themselves degraded by it, while still possessing a certain amount of money which they had obtained as retirement bonuses, they do not feel like returning to farming work, which is certainly harder than their life in barracks and factories. Naturally, most of them simply spend their time in idleness. Such degenerate tendency of young men and women in the rural area is undoubtedly shared in some respect by the younger generation in big towns, since they had grown up together during the height of Japanese nationalism and they had been disillusioned to the same extent by the country's defeat. But this degenerate trend is more difficult, perhaps,

to cure



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
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PLAIN

Moscow via Army

Dated December 13, 1945

Rec'd 3:39 a.m., 14th



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Secretary of State,  
Washington

1354, Thirteenth

Uspolad Frankfort SCAP for Acheson Acting Political  
Adviser Tokyo.

There follows summary of one column Tass despatch from Toyohara on situation in Japan published Soviet press Dec 13. According to reports from Tokyo session of Japanese Parliament now in progress week and half clearly shows inability to deal with problems facing it. Attention of Deputies has been concentrated on evading responsibility for war and assuring personal success at coming elections. MacArthur's order for arrest of Japanese leaders has alarmed Parliament since list includes 6 members Lower House and 18 of Upper. Plenary meetings are being attended by only 25 to 30 percent of Deputies. Not one bill has been passed

PLAIN

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*Vertical stamp:* DEC 19 1945



PLAIN

-2-74254, Thirteenth from Moscow via Army

passed. Debates are being obstinately avoided on democratic bills forced on govt by present situation and Parliaments' efforts are directed toward burying these bills with least possible farce. Parliament is unanimously supporting Imperial regime and questions have not yet been settled regarding reorganization of Upper House, dissolution of Privy Council and review of constitution. Under pressure of circumstances, press is criticizing govt for having no serious intentions of making these bills into law through Parliament. Parties are in state of decay, particularly Progressives. So-called Liberal Party is little distinguished from reactionaries since its efforts are aimed at absolving its members from war responsibility. Socialist Party leaders have defended Imperial system and declined Communist proposal for united front. Socialist Party is refuge for Progressive Party deserters and frequently joins up with Liberal Party in Parliament.

Communist Party is enjoying increasing influence and Communist League of Youth has been formed. At first Congress of Communist Party attended by over 500

delegates

PLAIN



PLAIN

-3-4154, Thirteenth from Moscow via Army

delegates Tokuda (repeat Tokuda) gave report on party tasks, stressing importance of stabilizing standards of living expanding production and establishing republican regime in place of Imperial system. Sharp demarcation of political forces is taking place in Japan. Masses are striving to democratize regime as shown by great enthusiasm with which meetings convoked Dec. 8 by Communists and 5 Leftist organizations set about compiling lists of war criminals. Tokyo meeting hall could not accommodate all who wished to attend and list containing thousand names was met with great applause. Japanese press hardly mention situation in country. Judging from fragmentary reports both central govt and local authorities have lost all authority in eyes of peasantry. Peasants do not expect present govt to be able or to desire to solve agrarian problem. Article concludes by quoting statistics on progress of repatriation of Japanese citizens from abroad.

Sent Dept 4154; repeated Frankfurt and Tokyo.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

EEC

PLAIN



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM  
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London

Dated December 13, 1945

Rec'd 9:30 p.m.

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PRESS SECSTATE WASHINGTON

13082 THIRTEENTH BRIEF MANCHESTER GUARDIAN EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE PROGRESS IN JAPAN UNQUOTE STATES COLON QUOTE AMERICAN CONTROL IN JAPAN HAS PROVED TO BE BOLDER AND MORE PROGRESSIVE THAN WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED PERIOD GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS NOW STRUCK AT THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF LAND TENURE WHICH MANY EXPERTS BELIEVE TO BE THE CHIEF OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM UNQUOTE PERIOD POINTING OUT THAT JAPAN IS STILL PREDOMINANTLY AN AGRICULTURAL NATION COMA AND THAT RECENT REPORTS SHOW THAT MORE THAN TWOFIFTHS OF OCCUPIED POPULATION ARE ENGAGED SOLELY IN AGRICULTURE COMMA EDITORIAL STATES THAT ON OTHER HAND ALMOST HALF THE ARABLE LAND IS OWNED BY ABSENTEE LANDLORDS AND THAT FARMERS ARE WORKED BY SHARECROPPING PEASANTS WHO PAY UP TO 50 OR 60 PERCENT OF CROPS IN RENT PERIOD REST OF LAND IW OWNED BY SMALLHOLDERS WHO ARE LITTLE BETTER OFF AND ARE OFTEN STRUGGLING AGAINST BURDEN OF DEBT PERIOD JAPANESE POLICY HAS BETH- ERTG BEEN TO PRESERVE THESE CONDITONS COMMA WHICH PROVIDED A CONSTANT SUPPLY OF CHEAP LABOR FOR INDUSTRY AND ARMED RECRUITS COMMA BUT GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS NOW ORDERED GOVERNMENT TO ELPLAIN

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/12-1345

DEC 1 1945



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13 DECEMBER 1945

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 14, 1945

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RESTRICTED

No. 101

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Baron HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, President of the Privy Council, and a member of this Mission in Regard to Position of Japanese Emperor.

MAR 1 - 1946

DCR

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
FEB 28 1946  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

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DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation of November 11, 1945 between Baron HIRANUMA Kiichiro and a member of the staff of this office regarding the former's view of the position of the Emperor.

Baron HIRANUMA devoted considerable time to his interpretation of so-called Imperial rule and his arguments for preservation of the position of the Emperor. Toward the end of the interview he mentioned a suggestion which he said he had made as Prime Minister in 1939 that the President of the United States should call a "world peace conference" before the outbreak of a "second world war". Baron HIRANUMA argued strongly that he would have been able to place before such a world conference, Japan's conflict with China, for the reason that doing so would not have constituted mediation between Japan and China by a third Power but would have been merely the consideration of one particular problem along with other similar problems in other parts of the world and between other countries. He asserted that the "militarists" would not have been able to resist a proposal to place Japan's conflict with China before a world conference because of the moral force or prestige of such a conference. In concluding, Baron HIRANUMA expressed the view that if world peace is to be maintained in the future, it must be based upon the principle of good of all humanity and on a world-wide rather than on a "sectional" or regional basis.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

MAR 7 1946

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DCR - NE Unit

Enclosure: *[Signature]*

- 1. Memorandum of conversation dated November 11, 1945.

Original and ozalid to Department  
Copy to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers

711  
MWBishop:jwb

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-1445

740.00119



Enclosure No. to despatch No. 101 dated December 14, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan.

RESTRICTED

129

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 11, 1945

Participants: Baron HIRANUMA Kiichiro;  
M. W. Bishop

The following is a resume of remarks made by Baron HIRANUMA to Mr. Bishop during an informal personal interview lasting 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  hours.

If Japan is to develop into a peaceful and prosperous country in the future, it is up to the Japanese people to make sure that direct contact between themselves and the Emperor is maintained. No group must be allowed to place itself between the Emperor and the people. Similarly, no individual can be allowed to interpose himself between the Emperor and the Japanese people. The usurpation by the "military clique" (Gumbatsu) of a place between the Emperor and the people and the participation of the military in politics were primary causes of Japan's mistakes in the past.

During the periods of Japan's history when the Emperor participated directly in politics, peace was maintained and the people were happy. The Emperor in his direction of politics, used his power and influence for the benefit of the people and maintained his position with the assistance of the people. For this reason participation of the Emperor in politics is not at all like so-called absolute government or "despotic" administration found in the past in western countries. This situation is made clear through a careful study of Japanese history.

The so-called Imperial will and the peoples' will and the true political objectives of government are all in accord. Therefore, in Japan, by harmonizing the vertical relationship existing between the Emperor and the people and by full realization of the peoples' assistance to the Emperor, "who is at the center", "true democracy" can be realized.\*

As an example we observe from Japanese history that when there were political deviations from the Japanese idea of the "one-ness" of the people and the Emperor, these

deviations

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\*Baron HIRANUMA, who is well known as a strong feudalistic supporter of the Emperor, was attempting to explain his concept of the position of the Emperor in Japanese society and the body politic. This explanation was given in extremely complicated Japanese and is most difficult to translate. An effort has been made, however, to adhere as closely as possible to his expressed ideas.



deviations resulted from intervention by some group--usually a military group. For example, the Kamakura, Hojo, and Tokugawa Shogunates usurped power and exercised governmental authority through military might. They interfered with "Emperor rule" just as the Gumbatsu in recent years obstructed Emperor rule. In the future, the Japanese must exert every effort to prevent the rise of any cliques, whether military or political, which would seek to break up the direct relationship existing between the Emperor and the people.

Imperial rule is not based upon power but upon morality in the true sense of the term. For this reason, Imperial rule can and will contribute in great measure to the cause of future world peace. It is unique in world history that a sovereign should be able to bring about peace in the manner in which it was accomplished by Japan. The smooth operation of Japan's surrender is without precedent and was brought about by the Emperor himself, although in opposition to certain sections of the Gumbatsu.

The only group in Japan today calling for the abolition of the Emperor is the Communist Party. Communists constitute an exceedingly small minority; but because it is apparent that Communistic ideas infiltrated into certain sections of the military, it cannot be denied that some of the demobilized soldiers will join the ranks of Communism. Because of insufficient food supplies and the unstable living conditions in Japan, some Japanese may favor Communism not on the basis of its ideology but on the basis of their personal situation.

In the early summer of 1939 it was proposed to the President of the United States that a world peace conference should be called before the calamitous outbreak of a second world war. It was asserted that such a war would be disastrous to humanity. Conditions at that time indicated that a war between Great Britain and Germany was highly probable. If such a world peace conference were called by the President of the United States, it was agreed to place Japan's war with China before that conference. It would have been impossible during the "China Incident" for the President of the United States to have mediated the difficulties between Japan and China alone because of opposition on the part of the Japanese militarists. However, if instead of attempting to solve world problems "in a sectional manner" an effort had been made to place all pending world problems before a world conference, the "moral force" of such a conference would have been so great that the Japanese militarists could not have refused to place Japan's problems with China on a world conference table. There were at least two instances in which there had been worked out with Chiang Kai-shek a "settlement of the China Incident". Both settlements were thwarted by Japanese militarists. Nevertheless, the Japanese militarists could not have held out against placing Japan's problems, along with other world problems, before a world conference. In the original proposal emphasis was placed upon great destruction and disaster to humanity which would follow the outbreak of second world war.

If in the future efforts for the prevention of war and for the cause of world peace are made on the basis of universality and not upon the basis of various sectional problems, world


peace



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peace can be attained. The greatest responsibility of world statesmen and religious leaders is to prevent wars for the sake of all mankind. No one will be able to oppose efforts to prevent war if those efforts stem from the high moral purpose of the good of all mankind.



M.W.B.

MWB:jwb



132

## OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 14, 1945

RESTRICTED

No. 101

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Baron HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, President of the Privy Council, and a Member of this Mission in Regard to Position of Japanese Emperor.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

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Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

## Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of conversation dated November 11, 1945.

Original and esalid to Department  
Copy to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers

711

NMBishop:jwb



Enclosure No. to despatch No. 101 dated December 14, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan.

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 11, 1945

Participants: Baron HIRANUMA Kiichiro;  
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-2-

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If in the future efforts for the prevention of war and for the cause of world peace are made on the basis of universality and not upon the basis of various sectional problems, world

peace



-3-

peace can be attained. The greatest responsibility of world statesmen and religious leaders is to prevent wars for the sake of all mankind. No one will be able to oppose efforts to prevent war if these efforts stem from the high moral purpose of the good of all mankind.

M.V.B.

KWB:jvb





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

181

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*DCIR*

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 15, 1945

TOP SECRET  
No. 105

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JAN 3 - 1946  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Constitutional Revision.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to our telegram No. 171, November 29, 1945, reporting certain general conclusions announced by the Japanese Cabinet Constitutional Revision Committee on November 24, 1945, and to enclose a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum dated December 13, 1945 to the Supreme Commander recommending the establishment of a working level liaison with Dr. MATSUMOTO Joji, Chairman of the above mentioned Committee, in order that he may have a clear conception of American governmental thinking on the details of revision.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *Enc. att. gum*

- 1. Copy of Memorandum to the Supreme Commander, December 13, 1945.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-1545

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 105 dated December 15, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Constitutional Revision".

C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 13, 1945

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff

This Mission has just received from the Department of State copies of (1) a preliminary report "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System", October 22, 1945, prepared by the Department for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East; and (2) a revision of the "Conclusions" of the above report prepared in the Department at the Subcommittee's request and submitted for its consideration on November 13, 1945.

While the recommendations in both documents, the latter being a revision in form rather than in substance, are generally the same as set forth in the Department's telegram of October 17 (War SVC 5477, State Serial No. 38), two recommendations of substance and one of procedure have been added, as follows:

"5. The Supreme Commander should also suggest:

(a) That modification of Articles 1, 3, and 4 of the Constitution, defining the special prerogatives of the Emperor, may be necessary if a democratic government responsible to the will of the people is to be established;

(b) That the political power of the Home Minister would be lessened and the Japanese people would have more direction over local affairs if the governors of the prefectures were elected by popular vote.

"6. Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future."

Dr. MATSUMOTO Joji, officially charged with the responsibility for drawing up a draft revision of the Constitution, has twice stated, the first time at a press conference on August 25 and the second in response to an interpellation in the Diet on December 8, that Articles 1 through 4 of the Constitution would probably remain unaffected in the Government's

proposed



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-2-

proposed revision, and that, in his opinion, "there will be no change in the fundamental principle of the sovereignty and control of state affairs of the Emperor." While Home Minister HORIKIRI has on several occasions stated that the Government plans to introduce a bill for the election of prefectural governors, he has indicated that it has not yet been decided whether it will propose election by popular vote or by indirect election by the prefectural assemblies.

Since the discontinuation in early November of this Office's informal conversations with KONOYE, there have been no further discussions to our knowledge of constitutional revision by American and Japanese officials at a working level. There would seem real danger, if an effective liaison at this level is not reestablished, that the Japanese Government, working in ignorance of specific American desires and requirements, may arrive at an advanced stage in the preparation of a draft revision which fails signally to satisfy those desires and requirements. There would then arise the need which the preliminary State-War-Navy documents warn against, of formally ordering the necessary changes, reducing the possibility of their long-range acceptance and support by the Japanese people.

For your consideration I should accordingly wish to suggest that, in order that Dr. MATSUMOTO's committee may have a clear conception of American governmental thinking in regard to details, some working level liaison be established with him for this purpose, possibly by the Government Section of General Headquarters. For purposes of ready reference there is attached a copy of the "Amended Conclusions" of SFE 142/1, November 14, 1945. This paper is not, of course, final but from our understanding of the matter we believe that it closely reflects the Government's thinking and that the final paper will not be substantially modified.

George Atcheson, Jr.  
American Minister  
Acting U. S. Political Adviser

?

Enclosure:

SFE 142/1

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RAFearey:vs

Copied: jwb



DO NOT DETACH FROM WHITE COPY

RECORD COPY

123

The attached white copy of a telegram or airgram has been designated the record copy to replace the yellow action copy which was not returned to the central records by the action office.

This copy must be returned to DC/R for filing.

FILE NO. 740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-1745

Confidential File

APR 9 1963



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELETYPE UNIT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INFORMATION  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

CENTRAL SERVICES

Tokyo via War

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1945 DEC 28 AM 9 25

Dated December 17, 1945

Rec'd 10:11 a.m., 26th

SA

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DC/R

Secretary of State,

DC/R  
RECORDS BRANCH

Washington.

212, December 17

We have received SWNCC 192/3 November 28, exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction over United Nations nationals, and find a number of matters which might merit clarification.

1. We assume that Formosans are now to be considered as Chinese and therefore as United Nations nationals.

2. The status of Koreans as regards the purposes of Army directive is not mentioned. We feel that for political reasons they should be accorded the same general treatment as is accorded United Nations nationals under appropriate police controls as suggested below. As the Department is aware, a considerable portion of the Korean population in Japan is composed of rough and sometimes truculent elements, including coolies and coal miners, who require police control for the sake of the maintenance of ordinary civil order.

No mention is made of the question of Japanese police

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740.00119 Central (Japanese) / 12-1745

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**SECRET**

-2-#212, December 17, from Tokyo via War

police jurisdiction over neutral foreigners and we wonder whether it is intended that neutrals are to be discriminated against in this respect as compared to United Nations nationals. In addition to the matter of discrimination (which we regard as inadvisable), differences in treatment would require.

(A) The constant carrying by individual foreigners of identification cards or passports and

(B) Instruction of each individual Japanese policeman as to the names of the more than 50 United Nations as well as the names of neutral nations and nations of other categories. This would seem to be impracticable.

4. The limitation in appendix B Paragraph 21 the authority of Japanese police to take any United Nations national into custody raises a number of practical questions in regard to what we consider useful and necessary Japanese police functions for the maintenance of ordinary civil order. A concrete problem arose recently in Tokyo when a Formosan group forcibly, and without Japanese police interference, took over offices previously occupied by a Japanese Governmental office dealing with Formosan affairs.

It will be

**SECRET**



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-3-#212, December 17, from Tokyo via War.

It will be recalled that under extra territoriality in China, Chinese police were authorized to take American citizens into temporary custody under appropriate circumstances for immediate delivery to the nearest American Consul and were on occasion called upon by our consuls to effect the arrest of Americans. When the foreign commercial population increased in Japan there will undoubtedly occur instances in which United Nations nationals are involved in traffic accidents, in brawls, especially in seaports where merchant vessels dock, and possibly in more serious crimes. To prohibit Japanese police from appropriately restraining or temporarily detaining United Nations nationals so involved would provide disorderly foreigners a license which would undoubtedly encourage the commission of offenses, as danger of apprehension and punishment would be at a minimum, and would place upon our military police an unwarranted responsibility which could only be discharged by the maintenance of a very large military police force in every port or area where foreigners are residents or visitors. It seems to me that as a practical matter there are only two alternatives:

Either

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127

SECRET

-4-#212, December 17, from Tokyo via War.

Either the Japanese police must be given the responsibility (properly supervised) for the maintenance of ordinary civil order, or American military police must be organized to take over that task. We believe that both as a matter of policy and as a matter of practicability it is preferable to utilize the Japanese police.

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RB

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**Department of State**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Charge Department:

*Washington*

Charge to

DEC 17 1945

NO PARAPHRASE  
NECESSARY

*Confidential*

AMEMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

2545

Action left your discretion on following message from General MacArthur to War Dept. State Dept concurs in view that maximizing Jap food supplies important but recognizes other considerations <sup>may</sup> make it inadvisable raise this particular issue present time.

Quote Subject is repatriation of Japanese fishermen detained in Russian held territories and return of their gear and catch.

Information from Japanese indicated that fishermen from several companies in Hokkaido are interned in territory now occupied by Russia. There has been no communication with subject fishermen since 9 August. They had insufficient stocks of provisions and clothing to survive the northern winter since they were equipped only for normal fishing season from June to November.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1745

SENT (Japan) 12-1745

Anal. <i>nd</i>	DCR - NE Unit	The Nichiro Fishing Company Ltd has: 1383 men, 108,000
Rev. <i>mt</i>		cubic feet by products and 27,500 cubic feet fishing nets
Cat. <i>g</i>		and other gear at Paramshiro, near Kuriles; 373 men Unutka
Dist.		district



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**TELEGRAM SENT**

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MESSAGE:CONFIDENTIAL**Department of State***Washington*

- 2 -

district and 407 men Yekefta district (both districts on west coast of Kamchatka) with 155,340 cubic feet canned and salted fish; 220 men at Shimushiro, Kuriles, and Maoka, Karafuto.

Etorofu Fishing Company Ltd has 776 men and 2,650,000 kilograms canned and salted salmon and trout on Etorofu Island.

Fishing gear and equipment are badly needed in Japan. The fish catch would augment food stocks in Japan. Interned fishermen are farmers in the off season, and production of food is a grave problem facing Japan at this time.

Recommend that representations be made to Russian Government concerning:

- A. Repatriation of subject Japanese fishermen;
- B. Return of fishing gear;
- C. Shipment of catch to Japan;
- D. Utilization of ships recovered from control of Japanese for return of fishermen, gear and catch, as provided in Joint Chiefs of Staff radio WX 64268, dated 14 September.

If Russian



PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

**TELEGRAM SENT**

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
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Collect

**Department of State**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Charge Department:

*Washington*

139

Charge to

- 3 -

If Russian Government will not release this shipping,  
this Headquarters will provide the necessary transporta-  
tion in this instance. Unquote.

*Bynes*  
ACLESON, ACTING

Quoted section compared in JK *lot*.

CR *WTF* ✓  
DE 14 1045 P.M.

Cleared with  
Mr. Stevens EE  
by telephone  
12-12-45.

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