

# AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED  
(Reclassify when filled out)

## I. GENERAL

**SECRET**

(a) Unit Reporting VT-45 (b) Based on or at U.S.S. SAN JACINTO (c) Report No. 42  
 (d) Take off: Date 5 April 1945 Time (LZT) 0955 (Zone); Lat. 26 - 30 N Long. 129 - 23 E  
 (e) Mission Support Ground Forces, Okinawa (f) Time of Return 0925 (Zone)  
Support 1 Able

## II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
<u>BT-3</u>	<u>VT-45</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>Four 500 G.P.</u>	<u>None - Instantaneous Tail - .025</u>

## III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
<u>BT</u>	<u>VT-45</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>USS SAN JACINTO</u>				

## IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
<u>None</u>			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Did Any Part of \_\_\_\_\_  
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, Describe Clouds \_\_\_\_\_  
(YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)  
 Time of Day and Brilliance \_\_\_\_\_  
 (j) of Sun or Moon \_\_\_\_\_ (k) Visibility \_\_\_\_\_  
(NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

## V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER		
<u>None</u>					



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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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## XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) **Dual Purpose Guns SE Tip of Takuu Shima** (b) Time Over Target(s) **0830** (Zone) **9**  
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)
- (c) Clouds Over Target **10/10 at 2000 feet**  
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target **None** (e) Visibility **10 Miles**  
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type **GLIDE** Bomb Sight Used **Mark 8**  
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run **Four** Spacing **Selected** Altitude of Bomb Release **1200**  
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed **None** Probably Destroyed **None** Damaged **None**

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 <b>Dual purpose gun positions.</b>	<b>200 Yds. X 200 Yds.</b>	<b>6 VT-45</b>	<b>21 500# G.P.</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>Serious</b>
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

**Air Coordinator directed this strike to expend all its armament on camouflaged dual gun positions in a 200 yard square area at the SE tip of Takuu Shima. This area was located and thoroughly blanketed with 21 500# G.P. bombs. Four concrete gun emplacements were seen and hit in the target area although no guns could be discerned in them. If camouflaged guns were in these emplacements, they were seriously damaged.**

(p) Were Photographs Taken? **No.** Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

**XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA.** (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

**ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY**

**OWN AIRCRAFT**

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

**ENEMY AIRCRAFT**

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

**ATTACK**

**OWN TACTICS**

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

**DEFENSE, ENEMY**

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

**OPERATIONAL**

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

This strike was in support of ground forces on Okinawa and mine sweeping operations off shore. Lieutenants Osborne, Klock and Riley, Lieutenants (j.g.) Laughlin and Mason and Ensign Robertson participated in the strike. These planes reported on station 10 miles off the west coast of Okinawa and were first ordered by Commander Air Support Control Units to bomb and strafe a 200 yard square area on Katchin Point, the tongue like peninsula extending out from the central part of the eastern coast of Okinawa. All pilots had been briefed on the location of the front lines to the extent of the information available on their carrier. This information had been obtained by monitoring the Air Observers circuit the previous day and, while incomplete, had clearly indicated that Katchin Point was substantially controlled by friendly ground troops. Therefore the flight leader notified CASCU that he believed the area indicated, which was grid square 0083 R was friendly and asked for a repeat of the orders. They were again ordered to attack the same area and the flight leader repeated the orders and asked CASCU if they were correct. CASCU stated they were correct and to make the attack. The accompanying fighters then went down and made a brief test strafing of the area. They saw troops and trucks although they could not identify them. Thereupon the flight leader again asked CASCU to repeat the orders. This time CASCU told the flight leader to wait and a few minutes later he directed the planes to clear the area. The planes immediately complied, the target plane having made no attack and the fighters having made only the brief test strafing described above. It is to be noted that in spite of the fact that official front line information had not begun to be furnished at this time, each pilot on the strike thought on the basis of information furnished him that the indicated area was friendly territory and was most reluctant to attack it. Only after repeated orders was even a test strafing made.

Later at 0810 this strike bombed dual purpose gun emplacements on the SW tip of Tasken Shima, blanketing the 200 yard square target area with 21 500# G.P. bomb hits. Exact results could not be seen, though all 4 concrete gun emplacements that were seen were hit. This bombing was done in a shallow 20° glide with push over at 2000 feet and the drop at 1200 feet.

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OPNAV-16-V-#537  
Form ACA 5  
Sheet

**XIII. MATERIAL DATA.** (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.  
Use additional sheets if necessary).

## ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights  
Turrets  
Ammunition  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Bomb Sights  
Bomb Releases

## COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar  
Homing Devices  
Visual Signals  
Codes, Ciphers

## RECOGNITION

IFF  
Signals  
Battle Lights  
Procedures

## PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles  
of Fire Needing Further  
Protection  
Leak Proofing

## EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes  
Life Belts, Life Rafts  
Safety Belts  
Emergency Kits  
Rations, First Aid

## NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses  
Driftsights  
Octants  
Automatic Pilots  
Charts  
Field Lighting

## INSTRUMENTS

Flight  
Power Plant

## OXYGEN SYSTEM

## CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

## STRUCTURE

Airframe  
Control Surfaces  
Control System  
Dive Flaps  
Landing Gear  
Heating System  
Flight Characteristics  
At Various Loadings

## POWER PLANT

Engines  
Engine Accessories  
Propellers  
Lubricating System  
Starters  
Exhaust Dampers

## HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

## ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant  
Lights

## FUEL SYSTEM

## FLIGHT CLOTHING

## MAINTENANCE

## BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment  
Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

**22 April 1945.**

SIGNATURE

**Malcolm J. BURROCK, Lieut., USNR,**  
**U.S.N. Officer,** RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

**J. G. BISHOP, Lieut., USNR,**  
**Commanding Officer,** RANK AND DUTY

DATE