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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTEROGATION NO. 249

PLACE: Tokyo  
DATE: 27 October 1945  
28 October 1945  
1 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: Japanese Army Air Force and the Philippine Campaign

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Colonel MATSUMAE, M., a regular officer of the Japanese Army, was Senior Staff Officer, 4th Air Army, Manila, from May, 1944, to January 1945; Staff Officer, Air Hq, Training Section, Tokyo, from January 1945, to March, 1945; Staff Officer, Air General Army, Training Section, Tokyo, from March 1945, to August, 1945; Secretary of War Ministry, Tokyo, from August, 1945 to date.

Major MARUTA, F., a regular officer of the Japanese Army, Tokorozawa (trainee) from February, 1933 to January, 1934; 1st FR, Instructor at Military Academy, Instructor at Akeno Air school, Squadron Commander of 6th FR, Instructor again at Akeno from 1934 to 1942; Staff Officers School, from December, 1942 to August, 1943; Training Section, Koku Hombu, from August, 1943 to April, 1945; Akeno Hikotai, from April, 1945 to June, 1945; Staff Officer, 20th F.C., July and August 1945.

Where interviewed: MEIJI Building, Room 722.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. Aikin, Major McElwain, and Lt. Comdr. Field.

Allied Interpreters: Lt Comdr. Nichols, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Huggins, Major Shively, Lt. (J.G.) Brown, Mr. Saaki.

Allied Officers Present: Major Braucher, Captain Logan, Captain Haskins, Lt. Dalfrey.

SUMMARY

Colonel matsumae was interrogated upon the following subjects:

1. Japanese Army aircraft losses in the 2nd Philippines Campaign.
2. Japanese plans and strategy in the 2nd Philippines Campaign.
3. The Japanese Pilot Training Program.
4. The Singapore Campaign.

Colonel Matsumae's statements with respect to losses were made largely from memory and further interrogation may be necessary in order to reconcile them with other information. In addition, Colonel Matsumae is assisting in preparing the answers to the Military Analysis Division questionnaires relative to the Singapore and the Philippines campaigns and will supplement the information given in this interrogation.

Major Maruta assisted Colonel Matsumae in answering questions about the Japanese training program.

REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPANESE

LOSSES IN THE PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN

Col. Matsumae reconstructed from memory the following tables of Japanese Army aircraft strength, losses, reinforcements and replacements from 20 October to the end of the Philippines Campaign:

STRENGTH

<u>Strength</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Total Fighters</u>	<u>Operational Fighters</u>
Mid-Summer 1944	350	250		
Early Sept (prior to 9th)	300	200		
10 October	400	200		
20 October	300	150		
1 December	300	150	100	75
15 December	200	100		
1 January	120	60		
15 March	10-12	5-6		

LOSSES

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total Fighters</u>	<u>Suicides</u>
October	800		20
November	800/1000	600	150
December	600	400	100
January	175	140	120

Note: Col. Matsumae stated that throughout the campaign, about one-third of the losses represented aircraft shot down, one-third those destroyed on the ground, and one-third those lost for other reasons. Suicide planes were classified as planes lost in combat.

ALLOCATIONS AND REPLACEMENTS

	<u>Planes(1) Allocated</u>	<u>Planes Arrived</u>	<u>Planes Arrived from Japan</u>	<u>Planes Arrived from outside Japan</u>	<u>Replacement Planes Arrived</u>	<u>New Units(2) Arrived</u>
Oct. 20-31	100	800	100	700	100(3)	700 (4)
November	1000	800	750	50/60(5)	500/600	200/300
December	800	600	600		200/300	300/400
January	120	100	100		40	60

- (1) Except in October, this figure includes planes assigned to units moving for the first time into the Philippines as well as planes allocated as replacements for units already in the Philippines.
- (2) i.e. Planes assigned to units which had not previously operated in the Philippines.
- (3) From Japan.
- (4) Half from Malaya, Netherlands East Indies.
- (5) New units from Malaya, Sumatra.

(First Session)

AIRCRAFT LOSSES

Colonel Matsumae made the following statements by way of explanation of the above tables:

- Q. When was the decision made to bring air reinforcements into the Philippines?
  - A. On 21 October, by General TOMINAGA, Commanding General of the 4th Air Army. He ordered in 800 planes.
- Q. Where did these planes come from?
  - A. They were brought in from Shanghai, Formosa, Malaya and Borneo.

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- Q. Did these 800 planes come all at once?
- A. Two thirds came at once, others drifted in later, having been delayed by engine failure, weather, etc.
- Q. Were these planes replacements for units already operating in the Philippines or were they entirely new units brought into the Philippines?
- A. About 700 of them were in units. For example 7 Flying Brigade (heavy bombers) came from Sungei Patani, Malaya, via Labuan, Borneo, to Clark Field. They left Malaya on 23 October with about 40 aircraft.
- Q. Did any reinforcements come from Manchuria?
- A. Manchurian units had come down in August.
- Q. Were any special arrangements made for the reinforcement of Japanese Army Air units in the Philippines?
- A. At the end of October Lt. Col. Murata, then a Staff Officer in the Southern army under Field Marshal Terauchi, went to Tokyo to see about getting planes from Army Air Headquarters. He requested 1,200 to 1,500 fighter planes a month for the Philippines. Of course he knew the production figures and it would have been useless for him to request more. My understanding is that this request was based on having 300 serviceable fighter planes available daily and it was felt this could be accomplished by the allocation of 1,200 planes monthly. Losses of 100% a month were expected. In November, Tokyo allocated 1,000 of which 800 arrived, so that perhaps 200 were lost en route. Some of these were subsequently repaired and sent on down to Luzon.
- Q. When was it decided to send no more planes to the Philippines?
- A. About 20 January 1945. Actually none were sent in after about 9 January 1945 because there were no serviceable air fields.

B-24 STRIKES ON CLARK FIELD

- Q. What was the effect of the mid-December strikes on Clark Field?
- A. Serviceability was not actually reduced very much. The planes were thoroughly dispersed and there was little need for maintenance. On the other hand, of course, dispersal vitally hindered operations.
- Q. When did this dispersal begin?
- A. Mostly after the B-24 strikes.
- Q. Did the B-24s destroy many aircraft on the ground?
- A. Far more than the carrier strikes.

ATTACKS ON LINGAYEN

- Q. What planes were involved in the attack on the U.S. Forces en route to Lingayen the first week of January, 1945?
- A. Both Army and Navy planes were employed in about equal proportions. About 120 Army planes from Clark Field were involved - all suicide. In view of the very heavy Allied fighter cover afforded along the coast, between the convoy and the Cagayan Valley airfields, our planes could not penetrate to the convoy and had to go around—either to the north over Cape Balinao or to the south over Corregidor—and attack the convoy from the west. Meanwhile, despite the Allied cover, there were very few attacks on the Clark Field area. These attacks were carried out over a period of several days and during that time 120 planes were committed and lost.

ARMY-NAVY LIAISON

- Q. What liaison was there between 4 Air Army and the Navy Air commands in the Philippines?

Interrogation #249 Cont'd

- Q. What losses did the JAAF incur as a result of the 9 September carrier strike?
- A. The first attack caused a loss of 200 Army planes - mostly on the ground.
- Q. What losses did you sustain from the second carrier strike against Luzon about 21 September?
- A. We lost less than 100 planes, about half in the air and half on the ground.
- Q. What revisions did you make in your estimate of Allied plans after the 15 September landing on Palau and Morotai?
- A. We still felt the Allies capable of landing at Davoa, Leyte or Iamon Bay. The area north of Mindanao seemed more probable in view of the Palau landing. At this time we felt the landing could not take place until November since we thought at least two months would be necessary for Allied preparations.
- Q. Was the Army or Navy Air Force responsible for the defense of Mindanao?
- A. There were only Navy planes at Mindanao, but the Army planes were to move down if necessary.
- Q. Did the Navy Air Force agree with the Army estimate of Allied intentions?
- A. I am not sure. The Navy was putting special emphasis on the defense of Mindanao.
- Q. When the carrier force struck the Ryukyus and Formosa in the period 10-16 October were any 4th Air Army planes committed?
- A. No, except for 7 and 98 Flying Regiments which were under Navy command. When the carrier force was withdrawing northeast of the Philippines, a few 4th Air Army planes were committed.
- Q. What was the Japanese estimate of Allied plans after the 10 October carrier strike on the Ryukyus?
- A. We felt that the purpose of this strike was to cut off the supply of planes coming down to the Philippines from Japan and to isolate the Philippines. This confirmed our feeling that the landing would take place north of Mindanao, possibly at Leyte, Iamon Bay, Aparri or on Formosa.
- Q. Did you regard the Ryukyus-Formosa carrier strike of 10-16 October as an immediate prelude to invasion of the Philippines?
- A. No, since we still felt that a landing would not be made until November.
- Q. What were your plans for the air defense of Leyte?
- A. We planned to operate heavy bombers from the Manila-Clark Field area and fighters and light bombers from the Visayas. We actually practised this defense plan in late August and early September 1944.
- Q. What were to be the principal targets of the heavy bombers?
- A. Transports.
- Q. Were attacks to be by day or by night?
- A. At dawn and dusk.
- Q. What bomber strength was to be available?
- A. A strength of 4 Flying Regiments of the 7th and 9th Flying Brigades. I recall three of the four regiments: the 12th, 14th and 62nd Flying Regiments.
- Q. Were those 4 Flying Regiments actually in the Philippines at the time of the Leyte landings?
- A. No, the September carrier strikes had forced the withdrawal of our bombers to Palawan, Malaya, and China. The 7th Flying Brigade was in Malaya.

A. There was a complete interchange of copies of plans. Moreover on each staff there was a member of the other service.

Q. When did this interchange begin?

A. At least by June 1944. The interchange was between the 4 Air Army and the 1st Air Fleet and later with Combined Base Air Force.

#### SUICIDE ATTACKS

Q. When was the first suicide attack by a Japanese Army unit in the Philippines Campaign?

A. 25 October, by a plane from the 24th Flying Regiment.

Q. When was the first suicide attack by a Japanese Army plane in the entire war?

A. A suicide attack on a torpedo was made by an Army plane protecting a convoy in May of 1944 in the Java sea. In June of 1944, a suicide attack was made in the Andaman Islands, with very successful results, and the idea that this was the best way to destroy ships quickly spread throughout the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces. Later in the summer of 1944, a plane of the 5th Flying Regiment made a suicide attack at Biak (New Guinea).

Q. What was the first unit specifically organized as a suicide unit?

A. The Fugaku Special Attack unit.

Q. When was it organized?

A. In early October 1944.

Q. Where was it organized?

A. At the Hamamatsu Air School at Hamamatsu in Japan.

Q. How was it formed?

A. Student pilots volunteered for the duty.

Q. When was it given its name?

A. On arrival in the Philippines at the end of October by General TOMINAGA, the Commanding General of the 4th Air Army.

#### PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF PHILIPPINES

Q. What was your estimate of Allied intentions as of May 1944?

A. We thought the Allies would do one of two things:

(1) Invade Palau Islands and from there invade the Philippines at either Leyte or Lamon Bay.

or

(2) Invade Morotai and from there invade the Philippines at Davao. We thought that the Philippine landings would occur in September or early October. After the Allied landing at Sansapor (30 July) we considered the second alternative the more probable.

Q. What was your plan for the defense of Morotai and Palau?

A. We had no plan for the defense of Palau, but Morotai was to be defended by Army planes staging through Davao, attacking Morotai and landing at Manado. Likewise planes from Kendari and Makassar were to move to Ambon, whence they were to attack Morotai and land at Manado. We started to put the plan into operation, moving headquarters of 2nd Flying Division from Negros to Manado and 7th Flying Division from Ambon to Manado. The day before the first carrier strike on the Philippines (i.e. 8 September) a naval lookout in Davao harbor issued a false report that the Americans were landing in Davao Bay. Thereupon we abandoned our plans and withdrew all our planes from Manado back to Negros.

(Second Session)

PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

Q. At the start of the PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN, what was the geographical distribution of Army and Navy planes?

A. The main fighter force of the Fourth Air Army was in the MANILA and CLARK AREA and NEGROS. The medium bombers were at KUDAT, PUERTO PRINCESA, LIPA; heavy bombers at MANILA, SHANGHAI and FORMOSA in general.

Q. Did the Army have any strength at MINDANAO?

A. No.

Q. Was the location of Army and Navy Air Units based on the differences in function or on assignment to the defense of different geographical areas?

A. The Navy and Army had built their own air fields. The Navy air fields at DAVAO, CEBU, ZAMBOANGA, TACLOBAN and NICHOLS FIELD. The Navy fields or bases were considered the front line base in which they could carry out patrol and searches for the enemy and the Army bases were considered secondary. If necessary of course, the Navy could fall back to the Army's fields.

Q. Were the 200 planes lost in the first carrier strike, that you mentioned yesterday were they Army planes?

A. All Army planes.

Q. Where were those planes lost, what area?

A. NEGROS, PANAY, TANGAO, TANJAY AND CAGAYAN.

Q. Was this attack a surprise or had you expected it?

A. Just two hours warning.

Q. Was that the first time the Fourth Air Army experienced an attack by our carrier Task Force?

A. Yes, this is the first time.

Q. Did they have previous information as to the tactics and instructions as to effective counter measures?

A. Some information had been received from the Navy of this type of attack; and an attempt was made to disperse the planes, but they could not satisfactorily accomplish this due to lack of strength and air field facilities.

Q. Were you acquainted with the planes for the SHO-GO Operation?

A. That plan was for both the Navy and the Army, a joint operation. We were acquainted with the plans.

Q. In the plan for the SHO-GO Operation, what mission was assigned the Fourth Air Army?

A. The Army and the Navy had separate functions in this plan. The Navy was to attack the Task Force and the Army to attack the transports; in the second stage, after the U.S. Forces had approached closely, both the Army and Navy were to attack transports. It was the responsibility of the Navy to carry out searches for the American Task Force.

Q. Did the Fourth Air Army have knowledge of the movements of the Japanese fleet?

A. Only two days before the battle did they have this news.

Q. Was there any attempt to coordinate the Fourth Air Army planes with the Japanese Fleet?

Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

A. There was no attempt to coordinate with the Navy Surface Force. All Army planes were attacking the transports.

Q. Roughly at that time, what was the balance of the strength of the Army and Navy in the PHILIPPINES?

A. Roughly, they were about the same.

Q. What was the reason for the division of effort between the Army and the Navy planes; tradition, plane design or pilot training?

A. It was due to the type of planes and type of training.

Q. In what way did the Army and Navy training differ?

A. Due to the fact that the Navy planes had a longer range, they were trained in search. However, when there was a shortage of Navy planes; the Army planes would assist in searching.

Q. Were the pilots instructed to attack only transports or could they attack battle ships, cruisers, etc., that were with the transports?

A. Army pilots were instructed to attack transports first, but if there were none present; they could attack other types. The reason for this was that the Army's bombs were not suitable for attacking armored ships.

Q. At this time were they still carrying out conventional attacks or was it entirely KAMIKAZE attacks?

A. Conventional attacks at this time.

Q. When did the Army begin KAMIKAZE attacks?

A. The beginning was by the end of October. It was known as the FUGAKU FORCE.

Q. During the progress of the sea battle, on the 25th, did the Fourth Air Army have information as to how those battles were progressing; or did they only hear about it after it was all over?

A. No, I was in NEGROS at the time and got partial reports from the pilots and from the Liaison Officer of the Second Air Fleet. There was not detailed information and consequently no assistance from the Army planes was requested.

Q. In November; there were attacks on our position in LEYTE by parachute troops, where did this attack come from and what strength was there?

A. They came from JAPAN. We called them the Second Parachute Brigade. They came to Clark and Lipe. The attack strength dropped LEYTE was nearly 300 troops.

Q. What did they expect that raid to accomplish?

A. The main purpose was to occupy several air fields South of TACLOBAN, in coordination with a JAPANESE ground attack.

Q. Did they have any report on the success of that operation?

A. No direct information came from them, but the Army planes confirmed that two air fields were occupied by themselves for two or three days. The second purpose was to cause a diversion under cover of which reinforcements might approach and land at ORMOC.

Q. In November and early December, several convoys were brought in ORMOC, what was the name of that operation?

A. No particular name.

Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

Q. Who planned the operation?

A. General YAMASHITA.

Q. Was the operation controlled by the Army?

A. As far as the air defense of convoys was concerned, the Army and Navy operated jointly.

Q. Was anyone in control of the joint operations?

A. There was no one person assigned to either Navy or Army. It was carried out by cooperation and constant liaison.

Q. Did you feel that the air protection, given to these convoys, was sufficient?

A. Extremely unsatisfactory and the loss was very high. The scarcity of planes was most serious at that time and if I remember correctly; only four or five vessels out of some 50 arrived safely at ORMOG and unloaded.

Q. At what time did they abandon the idea of defending LEYTE?

A. I'm not sure; the decision was given at about the same time your troops landed at SAN JOSE.

Q. Had you expected us to make our next landing at SAN JOSE?

A. They expected at NEGROS or PANAY; or at the same time, or later at LEGASPI. There was some thought of an attack on NORTH BORNEO and on PALAWAN. Land to land movements were expected after the LEYTE landing in all directions. A jump as long as that to MINDORO was not expected.

Q. When our convoy was sighted heading for SAN JOSE, what was your estimate of our intent?

A. The Convoy was sighted at the SULU SEA, but its objective was not known until the landing.

Q. What forces did you send against this convoy, with what results?

A. About 250 Army and Navy Planes were sent against this convoy.

Q. What results did they get from that attack?

A. The result of this attack was not very clear. All planes attacked, but no information was received back. Most of our planes did not return. The only reports were by wireless from the planes saying, "NOW WE ARE GOING TO CRASH." I imagine that over 30 American vessels were sunk. There was a barrier of American fighter planes stationed over BATAGAS STRAITS; which made it very difficult to pass except, of course, at dawn or at dusk. American planes in small groups were over the air field on LUZON. We were able to take off at such times as they went away, but there was another difficulty in that the Filipinos had some method of signaling the American fighter planes when we were preparing to take off which made it very difficult.

Q. About the first of January, what was your estimate of our intentions?

A. Landings were expected simultaneously at APARRI, LINGAYEN, BATANGAS.

Q. What particular operational difficulties did you have by the end of the year?

A. We could not have any time to repair the planes because in the day time, American planes were above them and the time for repairs was limited to the night time; we had no good mechanics because most of them were at NEGROS and we had been unable to evacuate them; also the lack of spare parts.



Q. When our convoy, in early January, approached LINGAYEN GULF, how many planes did you send against that convoy?

A. About 100 to 150 Navy planes which was a little more than Army planes.

Q. What targets were assigned to the pilots at this time?

A. They were ordered to attack the leading convoy with cooperation of Navy planes.

Q. Were the attacks on the bombardment and mine sweeper groups inside of the gulf made principally by Army planes?

A. First day it was mostly Navy planes; this reason was because the Navy planes could reach the convoy. The Army planes made a mistake and attacked a transport convoy. After the second day, they attacked all together.

Q. Did they have any assistance from planes based at FORMOSA

A. No assistance at all from FORMOSA.

Q. I would like to check the figures you gave yesterday, you said Fourth Air Army had 300 aircraft in the Philippines in early October and received total of approximately 2300 reinforcements during the campaign. Is this correct?

A. I think that's about right, not more than 2300 reinforcements, perhaps a little less.

Q. How many planes did you evacuate from the PHILIPPINES?

A. Less than 30.

Q. That comes out roughly at 2500 Army planes lost in the PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN, do you think it is a reasonable accurate guess?

A. That is about right.

Q. What was the most important cause of these losses covering the whole campaign?

A. In the first stage; the most important cause was the air raids and the bad condition of air fields, so the loss in the first stage was about 2/3. The first stage is considered from October to the middle of November and the latter stage the 2/3 came down to 1/2.

Q. What other cause was there in latter stage that was important?

A. Fight in the air and crashes.

Q. What type of air raid did they fear most?

A. At the beginning the serious damage was done by carrier air raids; toward the end the more serious damage was from B-24 carpet bombers.

Q. In general, do you believe that the U.S. planes were better or just that there were more of them?

A. Yes, better.

Q. Which do you think was the best?

A. In bombers, of course, the B-29 outstanding; as for fighter planes, the F6F was the best although possibly that is the training. Navy fighter pilots were much better trained than the Army fighter pilots.

Q. Among the Army fighter planes; which type did he think was the best?

A. P-51 and P-38. We took the P-38 more seriously since NEW GUINEA. Where we had so much difficulty with P-38.

Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

Q. When, in your opinion, did the war swing against the JAPANESE?

A. I think that from the beginning of 1943 American attacks started. The source of this information is from the Naval Officers with whom I had frequent discussions.

Q. As the war went on, which did they consider the most serious threat? The move from Solomons and New Guinea or the Central Pacific campaign?

A. Personally I thought that the movement from the South, which threatened to cut off our supplies and resources, was the most serious threat.

Q. Before our landing on LEYTE, did you at that time believe that you could successfully defend the PHILIPPINES?

A. We thought that it was a 50 - 50 proposition except that probably you could succeed in some landings, but we could also continue to fight in various points. At the time of your attack on LEYTE, we were astonished that you came so soon as our preparation was not completed and so the condition became worse than 50 - 50.

Q. When was it decided to reinforce the PHILIPPINES from MANCHURIA?

A. At the beginning of May. On 26 April 1944, the Sixth Flying Division suffered very heavy losses at HOLLANDIA and for this reason it was decided that the Philippines must be reinforced from MANCHURIA.

TRAINING PROGRAM

(Third Session)

Q. Before we come to the training, I would like to ask you (Col Matsumae) a couple of questions on what you said the other day about the Philippines Campaign. You said the last time I talked to you that on the 9th of January the Japanese Army Air Forces had 120 aircraft in the Philippines. I wonder if you meant 120 on 9 January or 120 on the first of January. You also said that between the 6th of January and the 9th of January, 120 planes approximately attacked the task force approaching Leyte and that many of them were lost before the 9th, so that, therefore, it's hard to see how there were 120 on the 9th. I wonder if you could clear that up?

A. On the 4th and 5th of January, planes attacked the Mindoro airfield, and on the 6th started the attack on shipping in Lingayen Gulf. At that time we had 120 planes including the replacements that came in. For the month of January, I would estimate the losses at 170 planes. That figure of 120 planes was for the first of January.

Q. Another question has arisen in talking about your last week's answers to our questions in respect to what were the Japanese plans on the 30th of May and what were the Japanese estimates of Allied intentions on the 30th of May. I wonder if you could repeat approximately what you said last week about Allied intentions in respect to the Philippines on the 30th of May?

A. On the 30th of May the U. S. forces had just landed at Biak; therefore we thought that either they would strike North toward Palau, then over to Samar or Leyte, or proceed from Biak up to Halmahara, Morotai, or to Manado and thence up to Davao. However, the prevailing opinion was that they would take the latter route.

Q. Thank you. Now what was the Japanese estimate of Allied intentions after the carrier strikes on the Ryukyus which took place on 10 October?

A. On October 10, Palau had already been invaded; in addition, Morotai had been occupied, but the fact that American forces had gone to Palau made us feel that the attack on the Philippines would take place somewhere in the Central Philippine area. However, after the Taiwan (Formosa) sea battle, because of the American losses in aircraft carriers that we had heard about, we felt that the invasion of the Philippines was not imminent.

Q. Did you actually believe the report that the Japanese Imperial Headquarters had put out about the so-called Sea Battle of Formosa, and base your estimate of the sea battle on that?

A. In a sense we did. While we did not take the regular communique as being the truth, our reports indicated that losses had been fairly heavy. However, after the battle of Formosa, the American forces retired towards the Philippines, and because of the intensity of their air attacks, we did feel that their losses had not been too great.

Q. What was your next duty after you left the 4th Air Army - your next assignment?

A. Officer in Charge of Training at Air Headquarters.

Q. Pilot training?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had supervision then over all the Japanese Army Pilot Training Schools, both in Japan and outside of the country? Is that right?

A. I had no actual jurisdiction over training at the various airfields. My duty was to supervise the training program. After seeing action in the Philippines Campaign, I was called back to Tokyo to Air Headquarters in order to prepare training programs whereby we would benefit from the lessons learned in the Philippines Campaign.

Interrogation # 249 (contd)

Q. About what day did you take up these duties - what time?

A. February 20, 1945.

Q. And how long did you hold that position?

A. Untill the end of March. I shall now explain something about the chain of command in this training program: My bureau had direct control over the activities of the various Kyodo Hikoshidan; in addition, it controlled the activities of the various technical air depots (Kenkyujo). In addition we supervised the training program for the various Kokushidan under the Koku-gun.

Q. So that in substance you controlled the flight training program which was maintained in the Kyodo Hikoshidan and you supervised the flight training program which was maintained in the Kyoiku Hikotai and the Rensei Hikotai and the Renshu Hikotai?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you cease to have any connection with the training program after the end of March 1945?

A. After the end of March an organization was set up which was known as Koku Sogun and I took over the same duties as formerly in this new organizational set-up.

Q. How long did you continue to be connected with the training bureau of Koku Sogun?

A. Until the 24th of August, 1945.

Q. So that from the 20th of February, 1945 until the end of the war you had control of the flight training program of the Kyodo Hikoshidan and general supervision over the flight training program of the Kyoiku Hikotai, the Renshu Hikotai, and the Rensei Hikotai?

A. That is correct.

Q. This included training units in the southern area?

A. No

Q. It included only training units subordinate to the Koku Sogun?

A. That is correct.

Q. In other words, training units in Japan proper, Manchuria, Korea, and China?

A. That is correct.

Q. You never had jurisdiction over the training units in Formosa?

A. No.

Q. Were there any training units in Formosa during this period?

A. Prior to the formation of the Koku Sogun, there were units in Formosa, but subsequent to that they were dissolved. These units were under the control of the Formosa Air Headquarters.

Q. Were they under the control of 8th Hikoshidan?

A. Yes.

Q. How many aircraft were assigned to the training units under Koku Sogun at the time of the organization of the Koku Sogun?

Interrogation #249 (contd)

A. Actually, the number designated for training purposes was about 2000 planes, but those that were actually operational were about a thousand or less.

Q. Of the 2000 planes assigned to the Koku Sogun training organization, how many were combat type planes?

A. I would say approximately a thousand planes, but this included many, many, old types and those that were actually capable of fighting were extremely few.

Q. What was the principal elementary trainer?

A. The KI-86 (Jungmann trainer) and the type 95 Mark I trainer.

Q. The KI-9?

A. I don't remember.

Q. How many elementary trainers?

A. Approximately 800 planes in both types.

Q. Those 800 included in the 2000?

A. Yes; a thousand planes were combat types and about 800 elementary trainers.

Q. How many KI-79?

A. Around 100.

Q. How many KI-54?

A. About a hundred and fifty or sixty planes, I believe.

Q. Do you have any records of those figures or are you reconstructing them from memory?

A. What I am now telling you is from memory.

Q. Did you have any idea of the number of training planes not under the jurisdiction of the Koku Sogun in the southern area?

A. The quota was 528. We were unable to send replacements from the Empire, hence as a rough estimate I would say there were not more than 300 planes.

Q. These are just training planes, or do they include combat types assigned to training units?

A. Up to and including the type 97 fighter only.

(Col Matsumae stated that he would consult with Col Matsuzawa and if possible would obtain more accurate figures on the aircraft training units.)

Q. How many aircraft were assigned - taken - from training units under your jurisdiction or under the jurisdiction of Koku Sogun and assigned to special attack units between the time of the organization of Koku Sogun and the end of the war?

A. Out of these 2000 planes, I would say approximately 500 planes were sent from the training units of Koku Sogun to special attack units.

Q. So that at the end of the war there remained something in the neighborhood of 1500 aircraft assigned to Koku Sogun?

A. That is correct.

Interrogation # 249 (contd)

Q. How many planes did you receive? These 2000 planes were ones you had when you took over; how many additional combat planes were assigned to Koku Sogun between the time you took over the organization and the end of the war by the way of replacement?

A. We do not have the exact figures on that because that is in Col. Matsuzawa's possession, but we will inquire of him and get you the figures. While I do not remember the figures, my assumption is that there were very few replacements.

Q. In other words, ordinary wastage which took place in the training units was just about replaced by new aircraft or aircraft from depots?

A. I believe that taking the entire organization of the Koku Sogun that we did have 1500 planes, but it must be realized that maybe only 500 of these were actually in operation.

Q. How many planes assigned to the training units of the Koku Sogun were destroyed by Allied air attack between the time of its organization and the end of the war?

A. I believe it to be under 50 planes.

Q. How many operational and other losses - accidents, etc?

A. I am able only to make a rough estimate of this because our figures on operational losses include those in the southern regions and all operational losses in combat units also, but I would estimate our training planes losses to be approximately 50 planes a month of which a portion were repairable.

Q. In what stage of training and with what types of aircraft did you suffer the most difficulties?

A. I would say that the type 97 fighter losses were the greatest.

Q. You said that fewer than 50 planes were destroyed by Allied air attacks. Was that over the whole period or just for a month?

A. The whole period.

Q. At the beginning of the war, how many flying hours did a pilot have when he left a training unit and was assigned to a tactical unit?

A. Three hundred hours.

Q. That is when he enters a tactical unit after having left a training unit?

A. At the beginning of the war fighter pilots would be sent to tactical units with about 200 hours of flight time and then would have approximately 100 extra hours before sent out on combat.

Q. So that the minimum level of experience of a Japanese fighter pilot in, let us say, the 5th Hikoshidan at the time of the early Philippines Campaign in 1942, was about 300 hours?

A. That is correct.

Q. If the minimum was 300 hours what would be about the average flying hours?

A. A chutaicho would have about 800 hours and a sentaicho about 3000 hours.

Q. How about the ordinary fighter pilot?

A. We figured that was about 600 hours.

Q. What was the situation in respect to bomber pilots? Was it about the same as the fighter pilots? What was the difference, if any?

A. It was about the same, I believe, but because of dual controls on a bomber it was hard to estimate what their actual flight time would be.

Q. Are you a fighter pilot or a bomber pilot (asked of Col. Matsumae)?

A. A bomber pilot; Major Maruta is a fighter pilot.

Q. How about reconnaissance pilots?

A. About the same.

Q. Now at the time you entered the Koku Sogun, in charge of training, what were the average figures for minimum flight time by fighter pilots assigned to tactical units?

A. When they graduated from this school the sentaicho had about 1400 hours, the chutaicho had about 400 hours, while a fighter pilot had about a hundred hours.

Q. Do I understand that at the time a fighter pilot was assigned to a tactical unit from a training unit in March 1945 he had had only 100 hours flying time?

A. That is correct.

Q. And before he entered combat did he have any more flying time?

A. Perhaps 20 or 30 hours but that would be all. I might add that because of this fact we picked only those pilots whom we believed to have possibilities and gave them further training in interception tactics whereas the ones that did not seem to be particularly good we shifted around to special attack units.

Q. Why was it that the time given pilots in the training program before they were assigned to tactical units dropped during the war?

A. Three factors entered into this: First was the fuel problem; secondly, the lack of planes; and third, the necessity of producing pilots rapidly.

Q. When did the fuel problem first become acute?

A. October 1944.

Q. When did the shortage of airplanes become acute?

A. About the same time; in other words, after the Philippines Campaign started.

Q. And when was it decided that pilots had to be trained with great rapidity?

A. The need was felt first about October 1943.

Q. So that between the beginning of the war and October 1943 the general level of pilot experience remained about the same?

A. Approximately the same level.

Q. The caliber of pilots remained at approximately the same level until the time Rabaul was hemmed in which would be about autumn of 1943, and at that time you suffered heavy losses of trained pilots?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there any change in the training program at that time?

A. There was no sudden drop but little by little we cut down the flying hours.

Q. Now, what was the general level of pilot experience at the time of the beginning of the second Philippines Campaign about the first of September 1944? How many flying hours were given a pilot when he left the training

Interrogation #249 (contd)

unit and entered the tactical units?

A. I would say that the average run of officer pilots had about 170 hours and petty-officer pilots about 130 hours, which would give us average about 150.

Q. And they received training in tactical units before they were actually sent to combat? If so, how much?

A. No, this figure that I have given you is the one that they have immediately prior to going into combat.

Q. Pilots then were sent into combat directly after having left training units in the Philippines?

A. That is so.

Q. Before this time, were pilots ever sent into combat directly from training units?

A. Never before the Philippines Campaign.

Q. Before the Philippines Campaign - immediately before - how much additional training would a fighter pilot have before he entered combat after he left a training unit?

A. Yes, they received flight training.

Q. How much before going into combat?

A. About 50 hours.

Q. When you went back first to Koku Nambu and then to Koku Sogun after the dissolution of the 4th Air Army, what changes did you inaugurate in the training program?

A. We stressed attacks on shipping.

Q. Before this time what particular tactic had been stressed by the training command?

A. After the experiences of the Philippines Campaign, I stressed the fact that all planes, including fighter, bombers, etc, should be used for attacking shipping rather than fly their particular roles in the scheme of things. In other words, we planned to make all types of planes into special attack planes.

Q. In effect, then, you stopped training fighter pilots to intercept Allied bombers and fighters and turned your training program into a program for training pilots to attack ships?

A. As I mentioned before, this does not necessarily mean that we did not train fighter pilots but that we spent the first portion of the training program in training them to attack shipping and went into attack, interception etc, in the later stages of the training program.

Q. But in fact, you were interested in building a counter-shipping air force rather than a counter-air-force air force?

A. That is correct.

Q. Outline the course of the flight training prescribed for the average fighter pilot at the time of the end of the Philippines Campaign and at the time you took over supervision and control?

A. Before I left the 4th Air Army and took over supervision of the training program, 20% of a bomber pilot's training time was devoted to landing and take-offs, 28% to acrobatics, and formation flying, 12% to navigation and cross-country flights, and 40% to regular bombing practice. After I took over supervision of the training program, only 15% of a bomber pilot's train-



ing time was taken up with landings and take-offs, 20% was devoted to acrobatics and formation flying, only 8% to cross-country, and navigation training, and 57% to the practice of attacks on shipping, principally by "Hell-Diving". Preparation for bombing attacks, or the orthodox level bombing attack, came at the very end of the course and occupied only a very short part of the time. One reason for the emphasis on dive-bombing was the inadequacy of the Japanese bomb-sight which did not allow any precision in level bombing. Another reason was that dive-bombing tactics lend themselves to special attacks or suicide attacks, and about that time the Commanding General of the Koku Sogun announced that all pilots, without exception, must consider themselves members of Kamikaze units.

Q. What changes did you make in the training program for fighter pilots?

A. When I took over the training program, 25% of a fighter pilot's time was devoted to landing and take-offs; 55% to interception practice; 8% to navigation and cross country flying; and 12% to bombing and strafing.

Q. Did the bombing and strafing training which took place before you took over supervision of the training program include dive-bombing practice?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. When did you first introduce any training at all on dive-bombing with fighter planes?

A. Just before the Philippine Campaign - about June 1944.

Q. Will you continue your statement of how you changed the training program when you took over in February 1945?

A. When I took over the training program I directed that 25% of a fighter pilot's time should be devoted to the practice of landings and take-offs; 32% to interception, 8% to navigation and cross-country flying, and 35% to the practice of bombing and strafing, with particular emphasis upon dive-bombing. The reason for this increase in the percent of flight time devoted to dive-bombing was the same as has been stated in respect to a similar increase in the dive-bombing time of a bomber pilot. Because of the shortage of bombers it was necessary for fighters to attack shipping as well.

Q. Now, I believe you stated that at the time you came to Koku Sogun, the average time given a fighter pilot in training schools before joining a tactical unit was approximately 100 hours. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Was it necessary to shorten that time during the period between the end of February 1945 and the end of the war?

A. Yes, there was such a necessity.

Q. How much was it shortened?

A. After July 1945 they began a study as to whether they could shorten this hundred hours down to 80 hours which means a 20% decrease. They studied but didn't carry out their plan.

Q. In other words, they never did it?

A. No, they never did it.

Q. Why was it necessary to further reduce the number of hours given in training units?

A. Gasoline problem.

Q. That outweighed all the other reasons? That was the most important factor?

A. Only gasoline.

Q. Did you ever use alcohol as an aviation fuel in training during this period?

A. They used plenty.

Q. When did you begin using alcohol for aviation fuel in training?

A. Since after April 1945--beginning in April 1945.

Q. Was alcohol ever used in combat aircraft?

A. They had such a plan to use alcohol in combat aircraft beginning August of this year but they never carried it out.

Q. In what types of aircraft was alcohol used as a fuel?

A. Alcohol was used in training in all types of trainer aircraft and in the KI-27 and KI-36. It was not used in any other types of combat aircraft although there was a plan for such use.

(Interview at 1215 was adjourned to 1330 hours. Additionally present after resuming at 1330 hours: For the U.S.A., Major JOHN SHIVELY USMC, Interpreter.)

Q. There are a couple of things I'd like to ask you about what you said this morning just to clear the record--things that bothered me a little as I was thinking about them: You said that there were three factors which limited the Japanese training program, one of which was fuel, one was a shortage of trained pilots, and the third was a shortage of airplanes. Now when you said that there was a shortage of airplanes which limited the training program, did you mean combat airplanes or training airplanes?

A. The production of airplanes in this (program) was to cover the loss of operational units--not to supply the loss in training units but only to cover the loss in the theatre of war.

Q. In other words, production of combat aircraft was sufficient to cover combat losses and not sufficient to replace training losses?

A. That is right.

Q. So that the shortage was in combat planes and not in training ones?

A. There was a shortage of combat aircraft.

Q. In other words there was a shortage of combat aircraft for training purposes?

A. Because of the necessity of turning over as many planes to operations as possible, it was in the operational aircraft that we found a shortage for training.

Q. Now another question that I had in mind which arose from what you said this morning: You said that at the end of the war you had about 1500 planes assigned to the training units of the Koku Sogun of which only 500 were operational. I wonder what was the reason for that low rate of serviceability?

A. They had 2000 and of those 500 were sent to special attack units. The 1500 were the remainder, and the condition of those planes were not so good so there were only 500 aircraft serviceable.

Q. In other words the best planes were sent to the Special Attack Units?

A. Of the 2000 planes they had, they took the 500 best planes and turned them over to operational units. That left the 1500 worst planes, and of those only 500 were useable. That is just 25%, but had they figured the whole thing there would have been 1000 planes out of the 2000 or only 50%.

Q. Now, I'd like to go back to a different sort of subject and talk about the number of pilots you had during the war and whether they were of a limiting

factor in your operations. Do you have any idea how many pilots Japanese Army Air Force had on the 7th of December 1941--the beginning of the war?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember whether there were enough pilots to man all the planes that the Japanese Army Air Force had at that time?

A. Just enough for the planes.

Q. You had no more pilots than you had planes?

A. No surplus.

Q. About the same number of pilots as planes?

A. About the same.

Q. You don't remember how many planes you had?

A. Approximately 1500 aircraft.

Q. And you say you had just about then 1500 pilots--or 1500 air crews probably?

A. I would say the pilots in the theatre of the war approximately 2000 and the pilots in various training schools and groups, 1000, so altogether approximately 3000.

Q. 2000 pilots in combat units and approximately 1000 pilots in training?

A. 1000 pilots in training means instructors and pilots in training schools.

Q. How many trainees were there--how many student pilots?

A. The whole course lasted one year: six months for primary course and another six months for advanced course. New trainees entered the group or unit twice in a year. There would be about 1500 in a class, or about 3000 graduates in a year.

Q. In other words the training program put out 3000 pilots in 1942 so that on 1 January 1942 you had about 2000 pilots in tactical units ready to fly, about 1000 instructors, etc., in the training organization, and about 3000 trainees of whom 1500 were in advanced training units and would graduate as fully trained pilots at the end of the first six months of the year and the remaining 1500 would graduate at the end of the year?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. That is the way it was on 1 January 1942?

(At this point Col MATSUMAE consulted with Maj MARUTA and constructed a table showing the number of graduates from the advanced flying schools on the following dates:)

Date	Number of Pilot Graduates
31 March 1941	1000
30 Sept 1941	1500
31 March 1942	1500
30 Sept 1942	1500
31 March 1943	1500
30 Sept 1943	1500
31 March 1944	4500
31 July 1944	6000
30 Nov 1944	4000*
31 March 1945	5000
31 July 1945	3000

\*Note: Out of a class of 6500 only 4000 graduated because of the gasoline problem and shortage of training planes.

Q. How many pilots was it planned to train in the class which would normally have graduated on 30 November 1945?

A. Three thousand.

Q. As we understand these figures, they represent the number of pilots which actually graduated in training units. Undoubtedly more pilots entered the training units. What was the percentage of pilots who entered the training units and who, for some reason or other, were never qualified?

A. Those who entered the training school were 1500 so 10% out of 1500 were not suitable to become pilots.

Q. In other words the figures which you have just given us are not figures of pilot graduates from training school but of pilots entering the training school?

A. The graduates are 1350 instead of 1500.

Q. In 1941 then on 31 March, 90% of 1000--in other words, 900--pilots graduated?

A. That is right.

Q. Now did the percentage of pilots who were not qualified vary from the beginning to the end of the war?

A. There was no change; but in general the ability or suitability to be a pilot for those 3000 at the end of the war was lower than at the beginning of the war. Ten percent only were eliminated as in the beginning of the war; so that the average ability was lower than in the beginning.

Q. But, nevertheless, you were forced to accept 90%?

A. Yes, although the quality of the material diminished toward the end of the war, we continued to graduate 90% of those who entered.

Q. Are those people who entered the elementary flying schools or the people entering advanced flying schools?

A. They cut 10% in the primary course, not in the advanced course.

Q. In the advanced course, they qualified everybody that entered it?

A. As a rule they didn't cut any, but there was some exception, in the advanced training course.

Q. In the advanced training course there were substantially no washouts?

A. That is right.

Q. Now one other thing that we haven't covered. Were there any losses for other reasons such as accidents, sickness, etc?

A. The ten percent includes all causes.

Q. Physical condition, disability, accidents? Everything?

A. The ten percent divides into categories: accidents or sickness, less than one percent; over nine percent, unsuitability. Accidents during the primary period were practically nil, during the advanced training we lost one or two per class.

Q. One or two per class--a class of 1500?

A. We would have one accident per unit within the class--ten units within the class--so that there would be ten or 15 in a class of 1500.

Q. In the latter stages through the Kyoiku Hikotai and prior to the stage of the Rensei Hikotai, is that it?

A. Up to the end of 1943, the system of training included first the primary course and the second course in the Kyoiku Hikotai. They changed the system in the beginning of 1944 to classify into three: the first, primary training; second, so-called Kyoiku Hikotai, and the third called Reusei Kikotai.

Q. Now, was the accident rate in the Reusei Hikotai toward the end of the war higher than it was in the Kyoiku Hikotai during the same period?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Approximately what was the accident rate in the Reusei Hikotai in 1944 to 1945 during the time they were operating?

A. Here is an example: In 1944 there were 1500 cases of accident, including all types, even the very minute defects—for example, a wheel—including minor damage to a plane where there was no injury—including all accidents. This is in 1944, and in Japan proper and Southern Asia; in all of the Japanese Air Forces it was 1500. Out of 1500, they had 300 cases in the primary course and Kyoiku Hikotai and Reusei Hikotai of which 50 were in the primary, 100 in the Kyoiku Hikotai and 150 in the Reusei Hikotai.

Q. Was there any change in those accident rates—the percent of accidents in training either in the primary or the Kyoiku Hikotai or the Reusei Hikotai between the beginning of the war and the end of the war?

A. Yes, there was a tremendous change.

(Col MATSUMAE and Maj MARUTA at this point consulted and prepared a graph indicating that the total reported accidents suffered by aircraft in the Japanese Army Air Forces from 1940 to 1945, including minor accidents, was as follows:

1940	300
1941	400
1942	500
1943	870
1944	1500
1945	1300 (up to 12 August 1945)

(Col MATSUMAE explained that the figures included accidents reported to Koku Hombu only and that ordinarily an accident would be reported only if a replacement was required or the airplane had to be sent to a shop for repair.)

Q. You said, as I understand it, that the Japanese Army Air Force, at the beginning of the war, had 2000 trained pilots attached to tactical units and 1000 trained pilots serving as instructors in the training organization. You also said that in October of 1943 the pilots situation became critical; that it was therefore necessary to reorganize the training program and to cut down the number of hours which were given to student pilots. Approximately how many pilots did you have assigned to tactical units in October 1943?

A. At the time of October 1943 there were 2500 pilots in the units and in training schools—that means instructors and assistants—one thousand. The 2500 figure met only 80% of the demand for pilots by all air units. The number of units was becoming bigger and bigger so that we could only supply up to 80%; the demand was bigger than the supply.

Q. Was the reason for the demand an increase in aircraft production or was it losses which had been sustained in the Solomons campaign?

A. The most important reason was the scale of operations as a whole—Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, all theatres of war—the scale of operations was becoming bigger and bigger. That was of most importance and second, after the Solomons battle the Army Air Forces cooperated with the Navy Air Forces.

Q. In other words, in October of 1943 the Japanese Army Air Force contemplated expanding its operations and cooperating with the Navy in the Solomons campaign?

A. Yes.

Q. Were operations of the Japanese Army Air Force during the first year of the war---this is the year 1942---ever curtailed because of a shortage of pilots?

A. Yes, because of the shortage of pilots as well as planes. Not only the pilots, but shortages in both pilots and planes. For example, we had such an experience in 1942: we had planned to send Army Air Force units to the Solomons area, but because of the shortage of pilots and planes we didn't carry out this plan, until after October 1942, so that it was delayed. Another experience was that of Calcutta, India: the plan to attack Calcutta in the middle of October 1942 was prohibited---not permitted by General Headquarters---only because of the shortage of pilots and planes. That is one of the plans which wasn't carried out.

Q. When did you first hit Calcutta?

A. The plan was originally on a big scale. As the result of detaching most of the pilots and planes for the campaign in the Solomons, the remainder in Burma was very small. We did carry out, only once, a small attack, far from the original plan.

Q. Was the shortage of planes considered more serious than the shortage of pilots, or was the shortage of pilots considered more serious than the shortage of planes? What was the limiting factor?

A. Planes were more serious than pilots.

Q. As I understand it, after October 1943 you expanded your training program in view of the shortage of pilots. At about the same time, as I understand it, the production of aircraft was also expanded--is that correct?

A. Yes, you are right. In addition, the loss in New Guinea was very, very big.

Q. Loss of planes or pilots?

A. Planes.

Q. You lost more planes than pilots in New Guinea?

A. Yes, and it was a vital problem at that time.

Q. So that in April of 1944; at the time of the loss of Hollandia, you had more pilots than you had planes?

A. Yes, you are right; there was a shortage of planes. Especially after April 1944, it became most serious. The airplane problem became more serious, more and more, than pilots, especially after April 1944.

Q. At this time, however, you were concerned because you had had to cut down the time in training given to pilots, is that correct? You had plenty of pilots, but their quality was falling off, is that the correct situation?

A. Your understanding is right. In addition we expected more production of planes so we had big plans for supplying more pilots---say about 6000 but afterwards we found that plane production became worse and worse, and we cut the number of trainees. The last of the three classes in 1944 was cut from a proposed 6500 to 4000.

(Col MATSUMAE drew a pencil graph indicating that the actual production of aircraft fell substantially below the planned production of aircraft; whereas the actual production of pilots more nearly kept pace with the planned production of pilots.)

Q. In other words, you have previously given two reasons for the reduction in the number of pilots trained in 1944: shortage of fuel and shortage of training aircraft. Now you are adding a third reason: The existence of more pilots than combat planes?

A. Yes, and the shortage of trainers as a result of the shortage of production so that numbers 2 and 3 run into the same reason.

Q. Did the air attacks on the Philippines which began about the first of September 1944 have any effect upon the training units which were operating in the Philippines?

A. There were four changes in our tactics: first, to attack the Allied Task Force with the cooperation of the Japanese Navy Air Forces. Second, Japanese bombers, which are not so powerful against carriers, had to be located--- or relocated---in Borneo, Sumatra, Malaya, etc, beyond the range of carriers. Third, dispersal had to be carried out; and Fourth, mass employment of fighter planes, not by single groups, had to be carried out against carriers.

Q. Those were the lessons, I take it, which you learned as a result of those carrier strikes. Now what I really meant rather than that was: there were certain training units in the Philippines and I thought that they were either compelled to move or they stopped their training, or they suffered losses, and I wanted to know what effect that had upon the training units and upon the Japanese training program in general?

A. First of all, those training units in the Philippines were forced to move to Malaya, Java, and to French Indo-China. Secondly, special training was given in the lessons learned in the carrier attacks. After August 1944 we expected attack by Allied carriers and began to move the training units.

Q. After the invasion of Leyte which took place on 20-21 October 1944, were any pilots who had been trained in the Philippines or in the area south of the Philippines ever brought back to Japan or brought north of the area in which they were training and attached to units in the Japan based Air Force? In other words, after the invasion of Leyte, did the training ever produce pilots who flew for the Japanese Air Forces in other than the southern area?

A. There was no idea to transfer or to replace those pilots from the Philippines and other southern areas to Japan, even after the invasion of Leyte.

Q. In other words, the invasion of Leyte cut those units off from the north?

A. No, plainly not. We intended to use them in operations in the south, always.

Q. Before the invasion of Leyte, was it ever intended to use pilots who were being trained in the Philippines and in the southern area any place outside the southern area?

A. As a rule they had a set policy to train the pilots in the area to which they were going to be assigned. Only a few exceptions---that is, the best pilots---were sent to Japan as instructors. The reason for having the training units in the south was that they were close to the source of fuel.

Q. Was there ever any policy in the Japanese Air Force to rotate pilots and bring those who had fought for a long while back to Japan for rest?

A. Yes, we had such a plan, but it was not carried out. In other words, pilots were sent back to Japan in case they lost their plane or the type of plane had changed, to bring back new types of plane or new planes. About one month's leave was given to those pilots when they came back to Japan.

Q. Was there ever any limitation placed by the Japanese army upon the length of service in combat that the pilots should have?

A. They had no regulation at all. Of course we thought that it might be better to have such a regulation, with authority to carry out such necessary rest or leave.

Q. But there never was such a regulation?

A. They had no regulation at all. They wanted such a plan but had never been able to put it into effect.

Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

Q. "They"--meaning the pilots--wanted it, or the 4th Air Army, or what?

A. The Staff officers of Koku Hombu as well as the Southern Army and I had such ideas.

Major MARUTA: The Commander and senior officers at Koku Hombu also had such ideas.

Q. Why didn't they put the idea into effect?

A. No replacements. In addition the Japanese Air Forces were so busy and were constantly being driven all the time from the very beginning to the end and even after the war.

Q. You said that in 1945, at the end of March, 3000 qualified pilots--or rather, 90% of 3000 approximately, or about 2700 pilots--completed their flight training and were ready to be assigned to units for combat. How many of those 2700 pilots were assigned to regular tactical units and how many to the special attack units?

A. 30% of 2700 were assigned to special attack units. The others, 70% went to other units--air defense units and ordinary operative units.

Q. Another group of pilots graduated from flying school on approximately 31 July; is that correct--say 2700 of them. Actually how many of them were assigned to special attack units and how many to tactical units?

A. The same proportion.

Q. We can add these figures together and find out how many pilots the Japanese forces had at the end of the war, but all these figures are approximate, and we wonder if you can state the number of pilots that they had at the end of the war--how many in tactical units, how many in special attack units, how many instructors, at the end of the war?

A. After all, there were some casualties. The grand total of pilots, including even General pilots; 8800 grand total: The Kamikaze, 2000; tactical units and others, 5000; in training groups and schools, including instructors and assistant instructors, 1000; 800 in hospitals. The 5000 pilots in tactical and other units were also trained for special attack; so if you call the 2000 pilots Special Attack pilots, you must also call those 5000 pilots in special attack units. The pilots in special attack units were those trained only for special attack. I might say those 2000 pilots in so-called special attack units were trained only as far as primary training for diving and no more; in general, further training was to have been given to all pilots; but in certain cases when we were suffering from scarcity of petrol and planes, they were only trained for the primary diving and no more.

Q. How many hours of training were given to the pilots in the special attack units?

A. Minimum, 70 hours; average, 100; maximum, 300, for the leaders in the special attack units.

Q. This morning we asked you how many hours you gave to pilots near the end of the war before they were assigned to tactical units, and the answer, I believe you gave, was 100 hours; is that correct?

A. Yes, -- 120 or 130 hours.

Q. There is one more thing: What were the total casualties of JAAF pilots from the beginning to the end?

A. Total casualties during the period is 11,200.

Q. How many would you have to add if you took into consideration the members of air crews: Navigators, Bombardiers, Gunners, etc?

A. A large number. (Col MATSUMAE agreed to furnish these figures at a later date when he had time to accurately compile same).



Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

Q. We'd like to ask the Colonel a little more about his career: When did you learn to fly?

A. In 1937 at Tokorozawa, then Hamamatsu. I started training in December 1937.

Q. When did you graduate?

A. November 1938.

Q. Where were you assigned for duty in November after you finished flight training?

A. Fourth Sentai at Tachiarai.

Q. What type of aircraft did you fly when you were attached to the Fourth?

A. Type 97 Light Bomber.

Q. When did the Fourth Hikosentai get KI-48s?

A. 1939.

Q. How long were you with the Fourth Hikosentai?

A. Seven months.

Q. And then where did you go?

A. General Staff Office, Staff Headquarters, in Tokyo.

Q. During what period were you at the General Staff Headquarters?

A. Until October 1941. Then I went to General Army Headquarters, southern region.

Q. Where was that?

A. Saigon; afterwards moved to Singapore.

Q. What were your duties when you went to Saigon?

A. Air Operations Section.

Q. At that time did you have any plans for operations in Malaya?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you formulate the plans--at what time--when you were in Tokyo or when you were down there?

A. Before I left Tokyo.

Q. That would be in the summer of 1941?

A. The determination of the plan was given in November 1941. The plan was formulated by September 1941 but was not put into effect until December. The first time I heard of it was at the end of October 1941. Of course the studies were going on before that date.

Q. But the first time you heard the studies were to be put into effect was in October?

A. I heard about the plan by the end of October. It was rather an official study started in July. I myself went to Malaya to study the area the area the middle of August.

Interrogation #249 (Cont'd)

Q. Whereabouts in Malaya did you go?

A. First of all I inspected the Malay peninsula and French Indo-China and Thailand to inspect the airfields and determine their capacity for Japanese Air Units; to the Saigon area, Bangkok area. The Japanese Army Air Forces were located in French Indo-China, but not in Thailand.