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THE EMOTIONS

BY

JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL. D.

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON COLLEGE; AUTHOR OF "METHOD OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT," "INTUITIONS OF THE MIND," ETC.

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PREFACE.

I AM not satisfied with the account which has been given of the feelings and emotions in our books of mental science, and thence transferred into the common thought and literature of modern times.

The word "feeling" in English, and the word "sensibility" in French, with their cognate phrases "feel," "sentiment," and "sentir," are very vague and ambiguous. They may embrace two such different mental properties, as sensation on the one hand, and emotions, as of fear, hope, grief, and anger, on the other. Some writers lose themselves and confuse their readers by speaking of all our mental states, even our intellectual exercises, as feelings. The word "Gefühl" in German is scarcely less ambiguous, sometimes designating mere affections of the senses, at other times our higher faiths.

Those who translate English, French, and German into Latin and Greek, have always experienced a difficulty in getting words in these classical languages to correspond to those I have named in the modern tongues. It is a curious circumstance that we have no such loose phrase in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures as our "feelings."

In these circumstances it is surely desirable to have

the emotions separated from the feelings, and to have a renewed attempt to give an analysis, a description, and classification of them, as distinguished from other mental qualities.

The vagueness of the idea entertained favors the tendency on the part of the prevailing physiological psychology of the day to resolve all feeling, and our very emotions, into nervous action, and thus gain an important province of our nature to materialism.

In this work I treat of the emotions as psychical acts, but I do not overlook their physiological concomitants and effects. I enter little into controversy. My aim has been to expound the truth, and leave it to shine in its own light.

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INTRODUCTION.

ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN EMOTIONS.

FOUR persons of very much the same age and temperament are traveling in the same vehicle. At a particular stopping-place it is announced to them that a certain individual has just died suddenly and unexpectedly. One of the company looks perfectly stolid; a second comprehends what has taken place, but is in no way affected; the third looks and evidently feels sad; the fourth is overwhelmed with grief, which finds expression in tears, sobs, and exclamations. Whence the difference of the four individuals before us? In one respect they are all alike, — an announcement has been made to them. The first is a foreigner, and has not understood the communication. The second had never met with the deceased, and could have no special regard for him. The third had often met with him in social intercourse and business transactions, and been led to cherish a great esteem for him. The fourth was the brother of the departed, and was bound to him by native affection and a thousand interesting ties, earlier and later. From such a case we may notice that in order to emotion there is need, first, of some understanding or apprehension. The foreigner had no feeling, because he had no idea or belief. We may observe further that there must be, secondly, an affection of some kind, for the stranger was not interested in the occurrence. The emotion flows forth

from a well, and it is strong in proportion to the waters, — is stronger in the brother than in the friend. It is evident, thirdly, that the persons affected are in a moved or excited state. A fourth peculiarity has appeared in the sadness of the countenance and the agitations of the bodily frame. Four elements have thus come forth to view.

First, there is the affection, or what I prefer calling the motive principle, or the appetence. In the illustrative case, there are the love of a friend and the love of a brother. But the appetence, to use the most unexceptionable phrase, may consist of an immense number and variety of other motive principles, such as the love of pleasure, the love of wealth, or revenge, or moral approbation. These appetences may be original, such as the love of happiness; or they may be acquired, such as the love of money, or of retirement, or of paintings, or of articles of *vertu*, or of dress. These moving powers are at the basis of all emotion. Without the fountain there can be no flow of waters. The passenger who had no regard for the person whose death was reported to him was not affected with grief. The two who loved him felt sorrow, each according to the depth of his affection.

Secondly, there is an idea of something, of some object or occurrence, as fitted to gratify or disappoint a motive principle or appetence. When the friend and brother of the departed did not know of the occurrence they were not moved. But as soon as the intelligence was conveyed to them and they realized the death, they were filled with sorrow. The idea is thus an essential element in all emotion. But ideas of every kind do not raise emotion. The stranger had a notion of a death having occurred, but was not moved. The idea excited

emotion in the breasts of those who had the affection, because the event apprehended disappointed one of the cherished appetences of their minds.

Thirdly, there is the conscious feeling. The soul is in a moved or excited state, — hence the phrase emotion. Along with this there is an attraction or repulsion: we are drawn toward the objects that we love, that is, for which we have an appetence, and driven away from those which thwart the appetence. To use looser phraseology, we cling to the good, and we turn away from the evil. This excitement, with the attractions and repulsions, is the conscious element in the emotion. Yet it all depends on the two other elements, on the affection and the idea of something fitted to gratify or disappoint it. The felt excitement or passion differs according to the nature of the appetence and the depth of it, and according to what the idea that evokes it contains. A smaller gain or loss does not affect us so much as a greater, and the greatness or smallness of the gain or loss is determined by the cherished affection. What is a loss to one is not felt to be so by another, because the ruling passions of the two men differ.

Fourthly, there is an organic affection. The seat of it seems to be somewhere in the cerebrum, whence it influences the nervous centres, producing soothing or exciting and at times exasperating results. This differs widely in the case of different individuals. Some are hurried irresistibly into violent expressions or convulsions. Others, feeling no less keenly, may appear outwardly calm, because restrained by a strong will; or they may feel repressed and oppressed till they have an outlet in some natural flow or outburst. But it is to be observed that this organic affection is not the primary nor the main element in anything that deserves the name of

emotion, such as hope and fear, joy and sorrow, reproach and despair. A sentence of a few words announces to a man the death of his brother, and reaches his mental apprehension by the sense of hearing. First he understands it, then he feels it by reason of his cherished affection, and then there is the nervous agitation. Emotion is not what it has often been represented by physiologists, a mere nervous reaction from a bodily stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is pricked. It begins with a mental act, and throughout is essentially an operation of the mind.

He who can unfold these four elements and allot to them their relative place and connection will clear up a subject which is only imperfectly understood at present, and show what emotion is in itself, and what its place in the human constitution. Each of these aspects has been noticed in works written both in ancient and modern times. The Scottish school of metaphysicians, and especially Dugald Stewart, have sought, but not in a very searching manner, to determine man's springs of action. It will be shown that Aristotle and the Stoics knew that in all emotion there is a phantasm or opinion involved. Dr. Thomas Brown has given us an eloquent description of the mental excitement, which, however, is chiefly left to novelists, who often make mistakes. Physiologists have had to take up the organic action, hitherto with not much success. But so far as is known to me, the four elements have not been exhibited in their combination and their mutual relation by any one.

BOOK FIRST.

THE FOUR ELEMENTS IN EMOTION.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST ELEMENT: APPETENCES.

SECTION I.

WHAT APPETENCES ARE.

By the word appetence I understand what is commonly but vaguely designated by "motive," "spring of action," "disposition," "inclination," "affection." But all these have larger and more indefinite, not to say ambiguous, significations, and have more or less of the element of will. It is necessary to remark thus early that appetence has nothing in it of the nature of voluntary action, which belongs to a very different department of the mind. It is simply a tendency in the mind to crave for an object for its own sake. It is not desire; it precedes desire and leads to it. It is not action, but a spring of action. The phrase I prefer is a convenient one, as the noun has cognate adjectives, appetible and inappetible. It has often been incidentally noticed, though it has seldom been formally announced, that, as the basis of all emotion, there is a mental principle determining its nature and its intensity; this I call an appetence.

It would be of great service to every branch of mental science to have an approximately good classification of the appetences by which mankind are swayed. This is a difficult work, more so than a classification of plants or animals, the determining motives being so many and so varied in appearance and in reality. Some seem to

act under no guiding principle, as if on an unaccountable impulse; but if we reflect, we shall find that they must have been pursuing some end, indulging a lust or passion, or restlessly seeking a change of state or position. In many cases the man himself could not tell us, and we could never discover, what swayed him, but we may be sure that there was a glittering object attracting him. Every man we meet with, hurrying to and fro on the streets of a great city, dancing in a ball-room, or idling in a summer saunter, has, after all, an end which he is seeking. "For every man hath business and desire, such as it is." It may be possible to form, if not a perfect, a good provisional arrangement of man's springs of action.

It is obvious that men cannot be swayed by every conceivable motive. No man can be made to choose pain as pain. He may choose pain, but it is supposed to promote some other end which has power with him, because it may secure pleasure, or reputation, or moral good. There are motives swaying some which have little or no power over others. Multitudes are led by the love of property or of reputation, while others scarcely feel these inclinations. Of some, we are sure that they are incapable of doing a mean or dishonorable deed. Of others, we believe that they will never perform an act of benevolence or of self-sacrifice. When a crime is committed, there may be certain persons suspected; there are others of whom all are sure that they have had no participation in it. Let us try to ascertain the motives by which all mankind are swayed, and which we call: —

SECTION II.

PRIMARY APPETENCES.

I. Every man is swayed by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain. This is not the result of deliberation, or an exercise of choice; it is instinctive. We shrink from suffering as suffering; we lay hold of enjoyment as enjoyment. Through a great part of our waking moments we are influenced by these ends, — seizing this, and avoiding that. Even when we resist these motive powers, — as when we stretch forth our hand to ward off a blow intended for our neighbor, — we feel them, and have to counteract them by some higher considerations.

Little more need be said on this subject; indeed, little more can be said. "Pain" and "pleasure" cannot be defined; this, not because of their complexity, but of their simplicity, there is nothing simpler into which to resolve them. They do not need to be defined, for all sensitive beings know what they are. I rather think that all pain originates in a derangement of our organism. But it is not felt as pain till perceived by the conscious soul.

The question arises, Is this the only consideration by which man can be influenced? The language used by many leaves upon us the impression that this is so, — it is so in their estimation. Some theorists derive all our motives from this one. This, however, is not the view which presents itself at first sight, which shows such an infinite variety of other attractions, such as kindness, sympathy, the desire for power and for society. But they tell us that we have found power and social intercourse leading to enjoyment, and they argue that the very idea of these, as associated with pleasure, raises

appetence. While the principle doubtless has its modifying influence, it cannot account for the whole phenomena as exhibited in human nature. There are appetences other than those looking to pleasure and pain, such as the love of children for parents and for brothers and sisters, arising so early, abiding so steadfastly, and so marked in individuals and in families, that they are evidently in the very nature and tendency of the soul.[1]

II. Man is inclined to promote the happiness and avert the unhappiness of his fellow-men. No doubt he may be able to restrain this disposition by a cherished selfishness. But there will be times when, in spite of all attempts to repress it, it will come forth in some kind deed or word. So far as the great body of men and women and children are concerned, there is a disposition to oblige, to help a fellow-creature, if this can be done without injuring their own interests; and, in the case of not a few, it is a benevolence which prompts to self-sacrifice and labors for the good of others. Besides the instincts which lead us to seek our own good, there are evidently others which incline us to find for our fellow-men the things which we regard as good for ourselves.

III. There are the attachments to relatives, as of parents to children, and of children to parents, of brothers and sisters to one another, and, I may add, of grandmothers and grandfathers to their grandchildren, and often of more distant kindred. In all such cases there is a natural appetency, and this is called forth by the idea of the person and of the relationship of that person. Take the case of a mother. There is a fountain within ready to flow out. It does not appear till there is a child, though it seems to manifest itself at times in an irregu-

[1] As to the theory which draws them by evolution from pleasure and pain, see Section III.

lar manner in the attachment of a childless woman to animals or other pets, or in the craving for an adopted son or daughter. Let there be an idea of the relation in which the child stands to the mother, of the child being her offspring, and being dependent on her, and associated with her now and for life, and the stream begins to flow. It is the same with all other relative attachments, say paternal, filial, sisterly, or brotherly. First there is a predisposition, and then an idea of the intimate connection. Along with this there are frequently natural affinities, or common tastes and tendencies, which draw the related parties closer to each other. We have all read tales in which a mother is represented as recognizing her long-lost child, and a sister falling into the arms of a brother whom she never saw, simply on meeting. But there is no ground for making such a representation. The natural likenesses in mind, body, and feature may predispose relatives towards one other; but, after all, there must be ground to lead to and justify the discovery. The affection thus called forth by the appetence and apprehension is made livelier and stronger by frequent intercourse, by exchanges of affection, by offices of kindness, by common ends and pursuits, and may be lessened, and in some instances all but destroyed, by clashing interests, — say, about money, — by quarrels, and even by long separations. The affection of friends is gendered in the first instance by affinities of tastes, dispositions, and motives, probably favored by circumstances, and is kept up by frequent association and mutual kindness.

IV. The native tastes and talents, and our very acquired ones when they become part of our nature, prompt to action, and excite emotion when gratified or disappointed, and this independent of pleasure, or pain, or any other end. This seems true of our organic activity.

The lamb frisks, the colt gambols, impelled by a life in their frames; the child solves the problem of perpetual motion; and all our lives, till the vital energy is dried up, and aged men and women are satisfied with their couch and their chimney-corner, we are impelled to movement and change of movement, owing to the organs of our frame demanding action. We see this strikingly in the musical talent, which often comes out in very early life. Our intellectual powers, our memory, our reasoning, all tend to act, and will act, unless restrained. Talents, arithmetical, mathematical, mechanical, artistic, poetical, historical, metaphysical, fitted for the study of objects in nature, inanimate and animate, sun, moon, and stars, plant and animal, will all find a field to work in, even in the most unfavorable circumstances. These may show themselves in childhood, and continue dominant throughout the whole life, determining, it may be, in spite of difficulties, the man's trade or profession, and, indeed, his whole earthly destiny, and possibly prompting him, though engrossed with earthly business, to devote the few leisure hours he has to writing a work on natural history, a poem, or a philosophical treatise. Not only are there intellectual, there are emotional and, it may be added, moral powers, seeking out their appropriate objects, and making the possessors search for lovely landscapes or beautiful paintings, or leading them to visit the house of mourning, and relieve distress. All these, when gratified, stir up pleasing emotions, and when disappointed unpleasing. Intimately connected with these —

V. There are the appetites, as of hunger, thirst, rest, of motion, or sex. They originate in the body, but they become mental. They crave for their objects, and this for their own sakes, not merely for the pleasure they

give, or the pain from which their gratification delivers us. It is not the pleasure that gives rise to the appetite; it is rather the action of the appetite that gives rise to the pleasure, — though doubtless the two move in the same direction, and each gives an impetus to the other.

VI. There is the love of society. This propensity appears among the lower animals, some tribes of which are gregarious. It comes forth in very early life among children, who draw towards others of about the same age. With some, as they advance in life, it becomes a strong and confirmed passion, so that they cannot live without the excitement produced by running round the circle of society, till they become giddy and fall. Solitude, except for a time to soothe the mind, is felt to be irksome by most people. Solitary confinement is one of the severest of punishments, and when carried out rigidly has been known to end in lunacy. It is to be observed that persons associate most pleasantly together when their trains of mental association run in the same direction, or parallel to each other. Hence it is that people of the same craft or profession, tradesmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, preachers, students, teachers, are apt to meet with each other in larger or smaller companies. I have noticed that the most popular men and women in society are those whose trains of thought and of conversation, and whose opinions and sentiments, are in thorough accordance with the circles in which they move. The best liked people are those whose whole manner and style of remark is a sort of flattery to those they meet.

VII. There is a love of esteem, commendation, praise, glory, appearing also in early life, and capable of becoming a dominant passion. It is apt to associate itself with the motive last mentioned; and the young delight in a

smile, an approving word, or a gift from those whom they love, or with whom they associate, from father, mother, teacher, and sometimes stronger than any others, from companions. This principle, the desire to keep or retain the good opinion of others, often makes the tyranny exercised over boys by their companions, in workshop, in school, and college, more formidable than any wielded by the harshest masters or rulers. As persons advance in life it becomes a desire to stand well with the circle in which they move, their professional circle, or the gay circle, or the fashionable circle, or the respectable circle, or the good moral circle, or their religious circle, say, their congregation or the denomination of which they are members. The fear of losing the esteem or incurring the censure of their social set or party is sometimes a means of sustaining good resolutions, and of keeping people in the straight course; quite as frequently it tempts to cowardice, as they have not the courage to do the right and oppose the evil, since it would make them unpopular. In the case of many the desire becomes a craving for reputation, a passion for fame, burning and flaming, and it may be consuming the soul. This often leads to great deeds in war and in peace, in the common arts and in the fine arts, in literature and science. But being ill regulated or carried to excess it is often soured into jealousy, or envy, or issues in terrible disappointment. Being thwarted, it may become a love of notoriety, which commonly springs up in the breasts of persons who, having met with opposition, or failed to secure from the good the applause which they expected, perhaps by honorable means, or having incurred odium, possibly undeserved, are bent on having reputation by any kind of means, or from any sort of people. The passion may become so strong as to need no aid from the pleasure derived from

it, — nay, may lead the man to injure his health and incur suffering, in order to secure posthumous fame of which he can never be conscious.

VIII. There is the love of power. It is conceivable that this motive might be generated by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain, for in ordinary circumstances power enables us to multiply our enjoyments and to avoid suffering. But then it appears in so marked a form in individuals and in families that we are forced to conclude that it is native; we discover that it is often inherited from ancestors. It is the grasping of power combined with the thirst for fame which constitutes ambition, the character of the ambition depending on the relative strength of the two elements: the former leading to the performance of more brilliant feats, but the other leading to the more determined action, the two united producing the men whom the world calls great, but who have often been the servants, or rather the very slaves, of their passions. The love of dominion is the most unrelenting of all the passions by which man can be swayed, being the power which gives its strength and persistence to tyranny under all its forms.

IX. There is the love of property, what is called acquisitiveness. This is often represented as springing from the love of power, always combined with the love of pleasure. Wealth gives us means of securing many kinds of enjoyment, and no doubt is commonly coveted because it is so associated in our minds. But there are cases in which the passion appears in very early life, and in which it is handed down from father to son, and runs in families. We see it in an instinctive form in the lower animals, as when the dog hides his bones for future use.

It is necessary, in order to make our enumeration of

primary springs of action complete, to mention two others; but it will not be necessary to dwell upon them, as they will fall to be noticed more appropriately elsewhere.

X. There is the æsthetic sentiment, making us seek and delight in the beautiful, the picturesque, the humorous, and the sublime.

XI. There is the moral sentiment, prompting us to seek and to do what is good.[1]

From these leading forms as they mingle with each other and are influenced by circumstances, there proceed others, which are called: —

SECTION III.

SECONDARY APPETENCES.

From the time of Hobbes of Malmesbury, in the middle of the seventeenth century, there has been a tendency among metaphysicians to make the original inlets of knowledge as few as possible. Locke made them only two, sensation and reflection, and Condillac, with his followers in France, reduced them to one, sensation. For two centuries ingenuity strained itself to the utmost to derive all our ideas, even those of God and necessary truth and duty, from the two sources, or more frequently from one. I make this historical remark simply as introductory to another: that during the same period there was a like determination to diminish the original motive principles of the mind. Hobbes by a summary process referred all men's activities to motives drawn from pleasure and pain. During the last century and the beginning

[1] See Dugald Stewart's Desires, in *Active and Moral Powers*, vol. i. I treat of the Æsthetic Emotions in book second, chap. ii. I hope to treat of the Conscience and Will in another little volume.

of this, wasted labor was spent in showing that, given only one or a very few springs of action, the whole of man's conduct can be explained by the association of ideas.

There has been a change in all that theorizing since Darwinism has become a power. All along thinkers not carried away by the dominant philosophy were slow to believe that there were no special intellectual powers, that there were no special propensities native to mankind generally, to races or individuals (Robert Burns doubted whether all sense of beauty could be explained by the association of ideas) ; for they thought they saw traces of these appearing at a very early age and going down in families. Since the doctrines of evolution and heredity have come into prominence, the current of opinion has entirely changed. Now the number of powers and propensities in human nature is supposed to have become so great by differentiation and specialization that it is impossible to enumerate them and difficult to classify them. Having tried to give a provisionally good arrangement of the primary appetences, let us now look at the others.

One general principle will be acknowledged by all: The secondary appetences imply primary, and grow upon them as the mistletoe does upon the oak. We can understand, in a general way, how this is effected. Undoubtedly cerebral and nervous action are implied, but this is not the only nor the main power at work. Materialists talk confidently of being able to explain the whole of mental action by brain structure. But there is an impassable gulf between a disposition of the cerebro-spinal mass and a desire of some kind, say, to attain a high ideal, or to reach communion with God. It is by mental rather than material laws that secondary affections are fashioned. Association of ideas plays an important part,

which has been carefully unfolded by the Scottish school from the days of Turnbull and Hume down to the time of Mr. J. S. Mill. Money may be coveted, first, as procuring pleasure, and then, perhaps, by gratifying the desire for power or applause; but by being associated with them it becomes identified with them, and carries all these with it, and in the end seems to be desired for its own sake. The processes are first mental, but they produce an effect on the cerebral structure (what Carpenter calls unconscious cerebral affection), and the mind now works in accordance with it; and the whole becomes hereditary, and may go down from father or mother, or quite as frequently in some of the peculiarities, from grandfather and grandmother to their grandchildren.

It is a property of our nature, however we may explain it, that these derived principles may become primary, and seek, apparently for their own sake, objects which were at first desired, because they tended to promote farther ends. We have all heard of persons clinging to their money after they were fully aware that they could draw no enjoyment from it, — say, when they knew they were dying. The ruling passion is often strong in death, and this passion may be a derivative one.[1]

The derivative appetences may and do assume an immense number and variety of forms, which run into and are mixed up with each other. Some are appropriately called secondary, being derived immediately from a primary. Others might be called tertiary or quaternary, as they may be derived from principles of action which are themselves derived, very frequently from a number of principles, original and derivative, woven together in all sorts of ways, so that it is difficult to unravel the web. From

[1] There is a well-authenticated story of a miser sending, before he died, for an undertaker, and cheating him in the bargain made for his funeral.

childhood up to full maturity (when the process is apt to cease), the actuating principles are apt to become more numerous and special; in declining life they become fewer and more centralized. A like process may be seen in the advance of mankind: in the primitive ages the aims and pursuits are limited; as a people become more civilized they have more varied wants, and, by differentiation and specialization (acts so well known to biologists), the tastes become more diversified and minute. Among the more wide-spread appetences is the love of freedom, spurning at restraint, and feeling a buoyant enjoyment in walking at liberty; it is one of the incentives which prompt a people to resist a tyrant and fight for independence. Older than this is the bowing to authority, learned in the family, and acknowledging the authority of a father, and learning allegiance and loyalty to a sovereign. There is the love of country, fed by common feelings and common interests, and which may and ought to lead us to be interested in all that relates to its welfare, and ready (Will has entered here) to undertake labor and sacrifice for its good. There is the taste for a particular work, a particular profession, a special art, or a special science. Some are devoted to farming, with open field and fresh air; some to a trade which requires ingenuity, such as mechanics, building, or painting; some to sea-faring, with its adventures; some to merchandise, with its speculations. As the division of labor (which Adam Smith shows to be so intimately connected with the progress of a people) advances, there are generated corresponding aptitudes and employments. As mental activity is called forth, some devote their whole soul and life to the fine arts, or to literature, or to science. Good arises from this division and subdivision of labor and taste. It is a happy thing for himself and for his race when a man's tastes

are for his professional work; but there is a danger that his soul becomes centred in it, so that he cannot be made to feel an interest in anything else. That man's mind is apt to become small as a pin point who is employed all his life in making a pin point. Even when his field of labor is richer, his mind is narrowed if it is confined exclusively to it, and does not look around on other fields and upward to heaven. The physicist is apt to get a downward look by his bending forever towards the earth, while the metaphysician, in mounting up so far, but not far enough, is apt to lose himself in the clouds which are above the earth, but have not the clearness of the heavens. The specializing often gives great intensity of force, and advances a department of science and art; but by looking forever through a microscope our eyes may be injured, our view of objects made very narrow, and the mind be without the means of judiciously generalizing. It is a great relief to a man, hard pressed by his professional work or his studies, to have a side enjoyment, say, in miscellaneous reading, or in an easy, pleasant art, and in riding or walking, in shooting and fishing. The mind is possessed of qualities, often lying latent, which, if not restrained, will lead it to take the very deepest interest in particular, what may appear very minute, objects,—in a particular place, in a very special artifice or trick, in favorite animals, or in favorite plants.[1] These tastes should be restrained only so far as to keep us from being absorbed with them, and thereby being tempted into eccentricity and caprices. As men make progress in intelligence, they will thereby become conformed to a common standard; but they should take care, meanwhile, not to lose their individuality, which is a powerful support of

[1] I knew a man who had an intense love for toads, which he kept carefully in his garden and summer houses.

their independence. By all means let us have wide-spread and fertile plains, but let us not pare down our hills and mountains, to which we may retreat for free and fresher air.

SECTION IV.

Supplementary.

EVOLUTION OF EMOTIONS.

The supporters of the evolution hypothesis will not be satisfied with the account given above. They tell us that the only original motive of the mind is a desire of happiness and an aversion to pain. From this they draw all the others, even those usually supposed to be primary. Society is felt first to be pleasant, and then is sought for its own sake. It is the same with the love of property and the love of power. Attempts were made an age or two ago to show how this process might be accomplished in the breast of the individual during the few years of the formation of his character. This theory has been abandoned. It is now argued that the motives by which mankind are swayed are the growth of many and long ages, have come down from animal to man, and go down from one generation of man to another.

There are difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this hypothesis. It supposes that man is descended from the brutes, in the end from an ascidian, or a cell, or an aggregate of molecules. It may be safely said that no one has been able to show how that is done. The gap between the inanimate and the animate has not yet been filled up. No bridge has yet been found to connect extended matter with sensitive and intelligent mind. Coming to the springs of action, it has not been shown how a love of pleasure for ourselves can become a love for pleasure to others, or how sensations can generate a per-

ception of duty. If this can be done, it must be by a very peculiar and remarkable process, which for the ends of science will require to be enunciated, and its exact nature, laws, and limits specified. Being generated, it is supposed to become hereditary. But while we know that there is such a process as heredity, its evident complexity has not been unraveled, nor its precise potencies enunciated. Heredity is essentially an organic, that is, a bodily, process, and it has not been shown how the transmission of a bodily organization should produce a mental appetency.

With these doubts hanging over the nature and limits of evolution and heredity, I have thought it wise not to connect my exposition of human motives with the development hypothesis. Should that doctrine come to be established and be successfully applied to the generation of human motives, it might throw light on the origin of human appetences, but would scarcely affect our account of the appetences themselves. Assuming the one original appetence of pleasure and pain, the hypothesis would have to show how all the derivative ones, such as the social and moral ones, take their particular shapes. I wish it to be distinctly understood that in this treatise I undertake not to determine the origin of motives in the ages past and among the lower animals; I am satisfied if I give an approximately correct account of them as they now act in the human mind. In all inquiry into the origin of things, when we have not historical proof, we must commence with ascertaining the nature of the objects themselves, and then we may seek to devise an hypothesis which will explain all the facts. If a true exposition is given in this treatise of the springs of action actually working, it will enable inquirers to determine as to any proposed hypothesis, say, that of evolution,

whether it meets all the phenomena. For myself, if ever I enter into this controversy, it will be in a separate work, so as not to distract the view presented in this treatise of man as he is.

SECTION V.

Supplementary.

DO THE DERIVATIVE APPETENCES BEAR A CONSCIOUS REFERENCE TO THE ORIGINAL ONES?

A very nice and difficult question is here started. Does the mind, in following a derived impulse, have any reference to those from which it is derived? The secondary one, let us suppose, is the love of money, derived from the primary one, the love of pleasure. In grasping the coin does the man think merely of the money, or is there some idea — it may be very vague — of the enjoyment expected to be derived from it? Or, to put the question in a more general form, has the money come to be loved for its own sake, or for the pleasure which has come to be associated with it?

It is commonly stated in books on this subject that the secondary spring of action becomes a primary one. It certainly does look at first sight as if the object, say the food, or the fame, is seized for its own sake. If so, it must be by some principle into whose nature we should inquire, and which we should seek to enunciate. When does a secondary rise to the rank of a primary motive? I believe an answer to this question might settle the general one.

But is it necessary to call in a new principle? Might it not all be accounted for by the principle of association, acting till the product becomes organic and hereditary? Let us suppose that, actuated by the love of pleasure, the man finds that wealth is the means of imparting

and increasing enjoyment. Henceforth enjoyment is associated with wealth, and the wealth is coveted because of the felicity. Money bringing enjoyment is the idea that stirs up the desire. It is not necessary to suppose that we are distinctly conscious of the contemplated enjoyment entering into the act. The object, say the wealth, may bulk so largely in our view that the other element is not specially noticed. The man may not deliberately choose the pleasure; on the contrary, if there were time and disposition to think, it might be seen that the object, say ill-gotten wealth, is sure to land us in misery; but the object has associated itself with a primary impulse, and draws him on if some other motive does not oppose.

There is a circumstance that imparts force to this latter view. We find that when the secondary appetence ceases to gratify the primary one, it is apt to be weakened, and may in the end all but disappear, or appear only as the result of an old habit. It is thus that so many become disgusted with the objects which once they desired so eagerly. The woman formerly loved is found, or imagined to be, unworthy, mean, selfish, or corrupt, may have ceased to afford the pleasure she at one time did, or has wounded the vanity or thwarted some of the favorite ends of her lover, and is henceforth avoided or repelled. In this way all persons with correct moral principle, or indeed with good sense, become wearied with sensual indulgences, which are associated with remorse and filth. Fame and property may become burdensome, because of the cares and anxieties which they bring.

Whichever of these theories we adopt, it must ever be admitted that there are in the breasts of every individual natural appetences; these not merely the love of

happiness, which is acknowledged to be universal, but various social instincts and sympathies. These tend to act, in spite of the most adverse circumstances, and show themselves in disappointed feelings when the means of gratification are denied. In conducting this discussion, we have come to discover a most important practical principle; this is the most effective way of removing or counteracting an evil appetence, or one we wish to be rid of. Let us gather a set of associations round another object of an opposite tendency. Let us cure a low ambition by cultivating a high one; and this may be done by connecting it in our thoughts with some primary appetence of a high character, such as the love of good to ourselves or others. Lust is best corrected by cherishing a pure love. Idleness or listlessness may be overcome by determining to pursue a noble end. As we do so, our associations will cluster round the object, to which we will be drawn by all the force of a primary affection.

SECTION VI.

MOTIVES.

In whatever way we may classify them or account for their origin, the appetences are the motives which stir up desire and lead to action. It is a hindrance in the way of constructing a science of the mind that we have no standard of measurement and no instruments, as they have in physics (such as the barometer and thermometer), for determining the force of the swaying powers of the mind. Provided we had such a test, we might be able to express definitely the respective relative strength of the motives, and the result, when they combine with and oppose each other. Without such measuring instrument, all we can do is to observe and estimate in a gen-

eral way the tendencies and paths of the appetences, and notice how they act with and against each other. In doing so psychical has a counterbalancing advantage over physical science, as all the facts are within the mind and immediately under the eye of consciousness.

It has often been said that if we had sufficient intellectual ability and knew all the forces of nature we might predict the course of things through all futurity. It may be declared, in like manner, that if we were thoroughly conversant with the original springs of action in every man, and of the circumstances in which he is placed, we might foretell his coming career, barring any question that may spring from the freedom of the will. If we knew all the motives (as God doubtless knows them) acting at every given time, we might account for the most capricious conduct of men and women, even as we can explain the movements of the wandering meteors and eccentric comets.

But in fact the problem is far too complicated for human sagacity to solve. The "problem of the three bodies" is a very simple one compared with it; it is the problem of a thousand bodies, crossing and recrossing, some of them very close to, and crowding and jostling each other. The considerations come in at all sorts of angles to help or hinder each other, and to produce all manner of paths, straight or curved or crooked. The course of every man and his place at any given moment are determined by attractions and repulsions, now drawing this way and now drawing that way, acting with and against each other in an indefinite and indefinable variety of ways. But to ascertain and measure these would require a higher calculus than quaternions or quantics, or the latest discovered mathematical instruments. The path of some, and these often the most influential, men

is determined by one or a few strong passions acting in very varied circumstances, such as the love of power or of fame, which carry them along in an onward progress, in which they move through opposition as the vessel does through the waves. That of others is settled by a vast variety of influences, balancing each other, but held in by outward circumstances and by prudence, and is like that of a planet, regular and orderly. That of a third class is more like that of a comet, attracted, indeed, towards a centre, but driven away into remote distances. It ought not to be forgotten that man has after all a power to choose among competitors and complainants by the will — the rudder which after all guides the course of the vessel, even when it is impelled by sails or by oars, inclining now to the one side and now to the other.

SECTION VII.

DIFFERENCES OF APPETENCES IN DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS.

Some of these, such as the love of happiness and t[illegible] reverse, operate in the hearts of all men; others, such [illegible] the love of polite society and refinement, are confine[illegible] a few. There are persons who are incapable of [illegible] moved by ends which powerfully attract others [illegible] their worldly substance so engrosses some that th[illegible] not understand how any one should set a high [illegible] knowledge; while with others the thirst for [illegible] overpowers the love of gold and every other [illegible] position. Some inclinations seem to be perso[illegible] culiar to the individual, as you see in that [illegible] dency to solitary musing not known amo[illegible] kindred. Others are hereditary, and run [illegible]t may be penuriousness, or vanity, or the [illegible]e-ment or of strong drink; or are charac[illegible]es,

as the love of war or of conquest. Some are strong in youth, and become weaker in old age, as the appetites and the amorous affections with all their concomitants, and very often also the love of gayety and small ambitions. Some are apt to be strong in the female character, such as the love of dress and of admiration, and sympathy with joy and sorrow; others are, usually, stronger in the male sex, as pride, courage, and the love of adventure and speculation. Some of the motives are fixed, like a stationary engine drawing up freighted carriages day and night, such as the love of power, and ambition generally; others, as the love of excitement and amusements, move on with circumstances, like the locomotive advancing with its accompanying train.

In commonplace minds, indeed with a large body of mankind, the main motives are simply the desire to secure the ordinary gratification and avoid the common annoyances of life, along with the gratification of the appetites and some domestic affections. They eat, they drink, they sleep; they do their necessary business; they lay hold of the easily available enjoyments of society, and avoid, more or less carefully, the pains inflicted by natural laws; and they thus pass through life doing little evil and no good. Still, even in the breasts of such, there will, at times, be deeper impulses making themselves felt, as a fit of passion, sorrow for the loss of a friend, a generous affection, a high aspiration, a reproach of conscience, an awe from a supernatural power,— showing that man has the remains of a higher nature in him, but kept under by the lower appetences, as seeds are by the snows and frosts of winter. It is the office of religion, like the returning spring, to melt the ice and awaken the seeds into life, and nourish them aright.

In some the passions are few and weak. In these

cases the temperament is apt to be dull, and the character feeble, though it is possible that there may be much good sense and solid judgment, not liable to aberrations from prejudice. These people act wisely, but are not able to give impulse to others. Most men and women are under a number of motives, no one of them being very strong. The result is a mediocre character, which may be good or evil, as it is directed. In some the moving powers are so balanced that an equilibrium is established, and you feel confident that the man will be guilty of no extravagance or absurdity; and this not because of any moral quality, but simply because of an equipoise of instincts. Some are moved by a few strong passions, such as self-sufficiency, self-righteousness, pride, and hold their place in society. Others are moved by benevolence, with its fountains and streams of tenderness and alms-giving, and by generous impulses of various kinds, and they spread a happy influence in society. Some are under the dominion of a few petty partialities with enmities and friendships, and the result is an eccentric character, with whims, oddities, foibles, and caprices. Others are impelled by a number of strong tendencies the passions are vehement, and there are attachmen[illegible] sympathies, lusts, spites, hatreds, revenges, all act[illegible] with or contrary to each other. Such a combina[illegible] when the capacities are weak, produces a weak an[illegible] illating character; but if the intellectual talents b[illegible] a strong character for good or for evil, for frien[illegible] enmity, for defense or attack, for building or fo[illegible] ing, for elevating or for disturbing a commu[illegible] the man himself lives in a region of storm[illegible] plains of the opposition he is ever meeting [illegible] are a few of the forms which natural chara[illegible]

SECTION VIII.

CONSPIRING APPETENCES.

Sometimes the cords all draw in one and the same direction. The man is healthy; he has all the comforts of life; his business is prosperous; his family are united; he is respected in the community; he is not troubled with ambitious aims; and he feels happy, — why should he not? There are times when prodigious violence is the result of a confluence of winds and waves. Henry VIII. so determinedly persevered in his purpose of procuring a divorce, because wearied of his bigoted wife, in doubt as to the lawfulness of his marriage, and in love with Anne Boleyn. A man fleeing for his life, with death in pursuit, will bound over a stream into which in less stimulating circumstances he would fall and perish. I have known students, at a competitive examination, by a gathering and concentration of force doing as much intellectual work in a few hours as they could have done in as many days without the combined stimulus of fame, rivalry, and expected profit. From like combined causes have proceeded, on great emergencies, bursts of extemporaneous eloquence, as that of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, such as could not have been produced by the most labored preparation. It is not that the grand result in such cases is the product of the moment; there is a concentration of powers which have long been collecting, a long gathering of the winds now bursting out in the hurricane, a deposition for years which now falls on the instant in the avalanche. It was thus that the love of intellectual employment, of fame, and power, and a desire to promote the glory of their country, all allured on an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Napoleon, to brilliant feats of con-

quest. After a like manner, the man of a devout nature, like Mohammed and Cromwell, is carried along as by a trade-wind; the power is within, but he feels as if it were something without him and above him, and calls it the inspiration of the Almighty. Or, under very different impulses, finding that a long-coveted honor is denied him, and roused into ungovernable rage, he curses as bitterly as Shimei did and may threaten blows or murder. Or, after long dreaming of some expected elysium, he "wakes, and finds his only hope lost." Or the conscience is roused from its lethargy by an unexpected calamity, and brings vividly before him divers aspects of one sin after another, or of that one sin which haunts him like a ghost, and a hell is created before the time, and he feels as if torn by furies gnawing at his vitals.

SECTION IX.

CONFLICTING APPETENCES.

We have just seen that the motives may join their streams and give great impetus and momentum to the action. In other cases they cross each other, and this in all sorts of ways. Sometimes they directly oppose and thus arrest each other. Sometimes they clash, and produce distractions. So the issue may be inaction, or it may be a compromise, or it may be a terrible fight.

Passions may contend in two ways. First there may be the operation at one and the same time of two inconsistent propensities: there may be, on the one hand, ambition or a love of money prompting to action, and on the other a love of ease and of immediate pleasure, inclining to repose; or there may be a sense of duty resisting a desire to please or a lust for sensual gratification. Were the two equally balanced, they might counteract

each other, and inaction be the statical result.[1] We see this in so many who would like to gain a certain end but are hindered by a fear of difficulties or by conscience, and who have to content themselves with doing nothing, except perhaps cherishing sullenness, or who become distracted by reason of the striving of winds and waves, there being all the while no onward movement.

But more frequently both passions act. On the principle of the parallelogram of the forces, the man follows an intermediate course. This is apt to be the case with your prudent man, who takes as much of pleasure as he can have without injuring his health or reputation. Or, the man gives in now to one motive, and now to another, and he goes by fits and starts, or is known as a man of shifts and expedients. When the motives are not strong, his conduct is tremulous, like the sea when rippled by the breezes. When they are more powerful, the character seems eccentric or untrustworthy, or inconsistent to the world. "He that wavereth is like a wave of the sea." "A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." We feel that we cannot confide in him, for the motives which swayed him to-day do not influence him to-morrow. His course is a zigzag one, perhaps an interrupted one, and regarded by all as a contradictory one. In most cases the forces are not equal, and the path pursued is curved, perhaps crooked. Sometimes a number of affections are in activity at one and the same time, producing an orbit more difficult to determine than that of the solar system among the stars. The result is apt to be a constant variation, or an unstable equilibrium se-

[1] "Did you ever see a blacksmith shoe a restless horse? If you have, you have seen him take a small cord and tie the upper lip. Ask him what he does it for, he will tell you it gives the beast something to think about." Wendell Phillips's *Speeches and Lectures*.

cured by multiplied balancings ever liable to be deranged.

Or, secondly, the conflict may arise from the regurgitations of one and the same appetence, as now the stream flows on and is gratified, and again is beat back by circumstances, as by a rock, and is disappointed. The affection is the same, but the circumstances and the idea differ, as now there is the appetible to attract, but forthwith the inappetible to repel. Thus love may lead the man to dote on the person loved, or be jealous of her; now it looks as if he were ready to lay down his life for her, and anon as if he were resolved to take away her life, according as he regards her as returning his affection or favoring a rival.

The conflicts may be keen and long continued between the flesh and the spirit, between passion and prudence, between the love of earthly enjoyment and the attainment of a high ideal. Often do these conflicting passions produce a fearful agitation, like that of the Bay of Biscay, by the meeting of several tides or currents. The source and the power are deep down in the heart, but they appear on the surface in lashings, crestings, and foam. The person feels his state to be intolerable, but cannot stay it. We see it strikingly exhibited in times of suspense, in which, let it be observed, while there is a suspense of the judgment, there is no suspense of the appetences. A critical event is at hand, which is to determine for good or for evil our destiny for life. An office for which we are a candidate is to be settled, or an important offer has been made, which has to be accepted or rejected. What elevations and depressions, what hopes and fears, as the person looks now at the one side, and now at the other, and as chances seem favorable or unfavorable! If in the mean time steps have to

be taken to secure the issue, the exertion may so brace the frame as to keep it from brooding on the results. But if the person has simply to wait, then what alternations of heights and hollows! What agony on the part of the prisoner when the jury has retired and has not returned to announce the verdict! What tumultuous waves move through the bosom of the mother, as she sits watching by the sick-bed of her child through that dismal night which she knows to be the crisis of the fever. Or information reaches her that the vessel in which she knows her son was has been shipwrecked; she is so situated that weeks must elapse before she can learn whether he was actually drowned. And what weeks! How long they are! And what terrible tremors by day and visions at night! the very hopes which she momentarily cherishes revealing, what the lightning flash does, only the circumambient darkness. What ups and downs, what exaltations and sinkings of heart, as the lover waits for the answer to his proposal. Some have felt the anxiety to be so intense that they wish for the answer to come, even though it should be adverse, rather than continue longer in this state of crucifying apprehension.

In many cases the combination is chemical rather than mechanical, and there is a boiling and a fermentation. A mother hears of her son being slain on the field of battle, fighting bravely for his country, and having only time, ere he expired, to send one message, and that of undying love to her. There is necessarily a terrible outburst of grief, as she thinks how he died, far away from her, with none to stanch his wounds, and that she will never see him again in this world. But then that son was generous and brave, and he remembered me in his last conscious moments, and I would rather be the

mother of that son than of a king or an emperor. But all this only intensifies her sorrow, when she reflects that this son is now torn from her. In all such cases each natural feeling works its proper effect in so far relieving, or it may be intensifying, those combined with it. What a horror of thick darkness, when the mother has to brood over the grave of a son who died in a fit of drunkenness!

SECTION X.

DOMINANT APPETENCES.

There are some in whom there are a few dominant passions; some in whom there is only one, — the love of the miser for his gold, of the ambitious man for power, of a lover for his mistress, of a mother for her children. To this last class may be referred the man of one idea, that is, of a favorite project, which may make him a somewhat troublesome member of society; but if the idea be good, may so concentrate his thoughts and intensify his energies, which others waste, as to enable him to accomplish an important end. In cases where the intellect is weak and the views narrow, you have the angular man, the man of crotchets and hobbies. The primary appetence genders others, which feed and support it. The one passion becomes the centre round which other agencies circulate, — associated ideas, plans and projects, private and public interests with daily activities, — as planets do round the sun, and satellites round the planets. It may come to be the impelling and the guiding power of the whole life, of the affections which cherish it, and of the actions which are the execution of it. The product is commonly an energetic character, which pursues a path of its own, and moves along like a steam-engine upon the rails set for it, with irresist-

ible power and great speed. Weaker natures have to bend before it, as trees do before the tempest. Men thus moved and moving often come to have sway over their districts, over their states, over continents, and over ages to come. It has to be added that they often meet with opposition from men as determined as themselves, and fire is struck by the collision, and they have to rattle on over flinty rocks; or they are arrested in their course, and perhaps are burned as martyrs. Which of these issues is to follow may depend on their intellectual force, or on the preparedness of the age to receive them.

The ruling passion differs, of course, in different individuals. In some cases it leads to deeds of self-sacrifice and devotion which may be regarded as sublime, as when Horatius of old kept the bridge, and Leonidas withstood the Persians at Thermopylæ; as when the mother hesitates not to risk her life in defense of her child, and the sister nurses a brother in a raging fever breathing infection all around, and the martyr dies for the faith. In many cases it is partly for good and partly for evil, as the love of fame when it leads to dashing feats, but may be accompanied with sour jealousy and biting envy, which attacks reputations and disturbs the peace of the community. When the actor is of weak capacity, he is driven along by his passion, as the ship with full-spread sail, but without ballast, or rudder, or compass, is by the winds and waves. When the motive is totally self-regarding, as it is in the case of the miserly, the ambitious, the intemperate, the licentious, it burns within like a fire, absorbing all things into itself, even the powers that oppose it, and devouring them in its flame, which may spread all around and become the bane of the community. When it is thwarted, as it is constantly liable to be, very possibly by the very obstacles it has

raised up, its agitations become as noisy and restless as those of the ocean upon an opposing precipice. When it is totally and finally disappointed, as it must often be, then the bearer and the cherisher of it, Napoleon Bonaparte for instance, at St. Helena, is like an imprisoned vulture nibbling restlessly at its cage.

In all cases the heavy weight is apt to disturb the equilibrium of the soul, which becomes misshapen and would be the better of being balanced by some other affections. It fortunately happens that certain minor tastes and kindly dispositions often come in to soften the hardness and selfishness of the character. Macaulay, absorbed in literature, was willing at any time to turn aside from it to write for the amusement of the relatives he loved. What a relief to the business man to unbosom himself in the evening in his family, who may regale him with pleasant games, or reading, or music! The fanatic Robespierre had a redeeming feature in his love for his dog and for the lower animals. I knew the mother of an illegitimate child, who, for fear of exposure, murdered her infant, but labored through long, wearisome days to support her mother. Tradition reports that Robin Hood and Rob Roy gave large portions of their plunder to the poor.

SECTION XI.

UNDEVELOPED APPETENCES.

We have seen that there are native tendencies to action in all men. All of these do not have an outlet at every given time; some of them may never find a channel. In the breast of every child there is a whole host of such appetences, ready to come forth like buds in spring. The constant activity of youth arises partly from organic life, but it is excited mainly by the mental

cravings. It is said that there is as much energy laid up in a dew-drop as would make a thunder-storm; there is certainly power in the breast of that infant sufficient to produce immortal results. There is force pressing in all directions, laid up and ready to burst out when an opening is made. The appetences are the varied sources of the life of youth; as the rain which has fallen into the ground, and runs there in gathered rills, is the feeder of our fountains. The expression of the desires of the young is, "Who will show us any good?" and they are grateful to any one who will give them employment in accordance with their longings; and you see them running to every pretentious spectacle, and dancing round the blaze of crackling thorns. If a lawful means of expending their energy is not allowed, it will break out in lawless ways; making it so important to keep youth busy, if we would keep them out of evil.

Some boys and girls do not show a particular tendency towards any one kind of activity, but seem ready for any kind of work. Others early begin to run along certain marked lines: towards their father's occupation, or towards merchandise, or towards books; towards music, or painting, or mechanics, or travel, or science, or philosophy, or practical beneficence. Sometimes it is a long time, and only after repeated failures in roads on which he has entered, that the young man falls in with or finds his appropriate sphere and work. One who expected to be a scholar has to go to business; and one, like Hugh Miller, who has tried a trade rises to be a man of science. I felt myself, and I believe others have felt, in the state between youth and manhood, an indefinable longing, coming out like the sighing of a stream in the quiet of the evening, and asking for a settled work in the morning. It is the unuttered prayer of a spirit, which has

unused capacities, craving for an object and for employment.

When they are not allowed to come out, the appetences smoulder like a suppressed fire. There may be such in the breasts of persons advanced in life. The virgin may never meet with one to whom she chooses to unite herself, but she has all the sensibilities which would make her happy with one she loved. There is an affection in the mother, ready to clasp her infant as soon as it is born. Many a boy has fine impulses which his teacher has not the skill to call forth. There are men and women who have capacities for friendships and benevolences which they have restrained from timidity or from selfishness, and which, therefore, have become gradually dried up. We must all have met with middle-aged or old men, possessed of great talents and wide aspirations, but who have never found their proper field to work in, and who feel unhappy in consequence, as they expend their strength on insignificant objects. They remind me of Napoleon in Elba, devoting the intellect which used to combine armies to small farming operations. At times a conjuncture will call forth a capacity which has hitherto lain dormant, as the seed which had been in the mummy for thousands of years will burst forth in open air and a congenial soil. Thus, the death of a father has called forth energies of a hitherto inactive son, and the death of the husband has revealed hitherto unknown capacities of exertion and management in his widow.

Any one looking into the mind of a child may discover capabilities there which are to fit it for a sphere in this world. But may we not discover in the soul endowments and aspirations, which do not find their fitting action in this, but seem to be intended for another and a higher sphere? How many cuttings are trained in a

nursery here, only to be torn up, but in such a way and with such gifts as to show that they are to be transplanted into a better soil. There are longings in man which can be satisfied with nothing less than with God.

SECTION XII.

THE MOTIVELESS MAN.

The phrase might be applied to those who have no very strong appetences of any kind. They may have good intellectual abilities; when a work is forced upon them by circumstances, they may do it thoroughly and effectively; and from the very fact that they have no predilections, they may pass a very sound judgment on a case submitted to them. But their temperament, it is said, is sluggish, and they undertake no great work.

But the phrase seems rather to be applicable to one who has lost a motive which he at one time had. A wife (I have known many such) has tried for a long time to win back the affection of a husband, or to save him from intemperance. But all her efforts have failed, and when she comes to the conclusion that they must fail for the future she ceases to exert herself. Her whole character and manner are now marked by listlessness. She feels that it is vain to try to please, and her person and her household come to be neglected. The only means of saving her is to furnish to her a ground of hope by the reformation of her husband, or, we have to add, by his death. Much the same state of feeling is apt to be superinduced when one who has long toiled at business finds in old age that his plans have utterly broken down. He feels that there is nothing left him but to give himself to apathy, from which there is no means of rousing him. Happy, surely, are those who in such a position have motive and hope to start for a better world!

The most painful cases are those in which the man has lost motive of every kind. He has failed, or he imagines that he has failed, in so many things that his habitual sentiment is that nothing will succeed with him. It is of no use laying any proposed line of action before him ; he will scarcely listen to it, or, if he does so for a moment, it is only to sink back into indifference. But meanwhile he is not in the negative and blank position of one who is utterly devoid of incentives. For there may be ambitious inclinations lying within, in a smouldering state, which he keeps down simply because he feels that they cannot be gratified, and which have a suffocating effect upon him. With fine capacities of thought and action, he may give himself up to a life of useless lassitude. Or, making one other ecstatic effort issuing in failure, he may abandon himself to despair, or terminate an intolerable existence by suicide.

CHAPTER II.

SECOND ELEMENT: THE IDEA (PHANTASM).

SECTION I.

NATURE OF THE IDEA WHICH CALLS FORTH EMOTION.

It is of an object fitted to gratify or to disappoint an appetence of the mind. The mere existence of the appetence as a tendency or disposition is not sufficient to call forth feeling, though I have no doubt it is ever prompting it, or rather by the law of association stirring up the idea which gives it a body. There must always be an idea carrying out the appetence to call the emotion into actual exercise. If the object be before us, of course we have a perception of it by the senses or we are conscious of it within our minds. If it be not present we have a remembrance of it, or we have formed an imagination of it. That object may be mental or material, may be real or imaginary, may be in the past, the present, or the future; but there must always be a representation of it in the mind. Let a man stop himself at the time when passion is rolling like a river, he will find that the idea is the channel in which it flows. An idea is as much needed as a pipe is to conduct gas and enable it to flame; shut up the conduit and the feeling will be extinguished.

Other things being equal, the emotion rises and falls according as the idea takes in more or less of the appetible. I am told that a dear relative of mine has fallen

from a great height and is dangerously injured. I have a vivid image of that friend as in deep distress, and I am affected with sorrow and with pity. But I am told soon after that the account brought me is so far mistaken: a person had fallen, but he is no friend of mine, and the peculiar tenderness of my feeling is removed. On making further inquiry, I find that though he fell from a height he is not seriously hurt, and my pity ceases. Examine any other case of emotion and you will always discover an idea as the substratum of the whole, bearing it up as the stake does the living vine. I have come to see that a favorite and long-cherished project of mine may possibly succeed, and I have a faint hope. As events move on, I find that it will probably succeed, and my hope, thus supplied with fuel, kindles into a flame. After a time it becomes certain that I will attain my end, and I have now a settled expectation. My scheme is at last crowned with success, and I have joy. But the crown of green branches placed on my brow begins to wither, I am exposed to blighting cares, envy, and trouble, and there remains nothing but the dead stock of disappointment. Emotion has thus as its body an idea, which determines the life and growth, the decay and death, of the inner spirit.

The idea which thus awakens feeling is not an abstract or general notion. Pity is called forth by the contemplation, not of humanity in the abstract, but of sentient beings, ourselves or others, exposed to suffering. The dread which moves us is not of evil in general, but of some individual evil or evils, such as pain, bereavement, ill usage, insult, contempt, contumely; emotion is excited when we have an idea of ourselves or others exposed to these or such as these. The mental state is best expressed by an apt Aristotelian phrase which some of us

are seeking to revive, *phantasm*,[1] the faculty from which it proceeds being the phantasy. The phantasy presents a picture of ourselves or others, of a man, woman, or child in sorrow, and our commiseration flows forth apace, all this because we have a fountain within, which however needs an outlet.

The phantasm must be of an object which addresses the appetence in the way of gratifying or disappointing it. It must appeal to our desire for pleasure or applause, to our friendship, or to some one or other of the motives which draw mankind. There are some springs of action which seem to sway all men, such as the love of happiness and the desire to please. There are others which are confined to classes or individuals, as the love of money, the love of dress, or of a mother for her boy. The considerations which sway the people of one age, sex, or condition, do not necessarily influence all others or any others. The savage is not apt to be interested in refinements, nor the boy in abstract science; both require to have the taste created. Nobody in the company may feel an interest in that girl except her lover, who watches her every motion. Appeals which powerfully affect certain persons have no influence on others. The tale of distress which brings tears and alms from this man, meets with no response from that miser whose soul is bound up in his money bags. Even Peter the Hermit could not stir up a crusade of modern armies to recover the Holy Sepulchre. Protestants cannot be made to enter into the enthusiasm of pilgrimages to holy shrines. Modern science has undermined not a few superstitious faiths, which led to practices now regarded as degrading or cruel. One of the grand ends aimed at by education

[1] Aristotle announced the doctrine I am expounding, in the language I am using. Ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας. *De Anima*, iii. 30.

and by the church should be to implant and cherish high tastes and aspirations.

In looking more particularly at the nature of the ideas which raise emotion, it will be found, I believe, that they are singular, that is of individual objects. I have not seen this position laid down anywhere; but I am prepared to defend it, always with the proper explanations and limitations. It is the phantasm that awakens sentiment. But all phantasms are singular. The phantasm of a lily is of one lily. The general notion or concept of lily, that is lily in general, is of an indefinite number of lilies, joined by their common type. There is commonly a phantasm involved in the general notion, but it is of a single one, stripped of as many peculiarities as possible, of the individuals which constitute the class, and the phantasm does not constitute the class, but is merely a sign or representative to enable us to think of it. There are various intellectual operations involved in the concept "man," that is man in general, but the image before the mind is of one man, with the things that distinguish one man from another left out as much as possible. Now the idea that evokes feeling is not of humankind in the general, or of humanity in the abstract, but of a man, woman, or child in a state of happiness or of distress.

But this truth, which is a very important one, requires to be restricted and properly understood; otherwise it will evidently be false. Under singular ideas are evidently to be included collective ones, in which we have an aggregate of individuals, as a congregation, an army. In the ideas are to be comprehended their associations, as those which collect around our birthplace and our home. A man loves his family, his village, his school, his college, his shop, his regiment, his farm, his work-

shop, his country, and his church. Clubs and societies often gather round them an intense interest. There is a sense in which even abstractions and generalizations may call forth feeling, by reason of the individuals embraced in them and their associations, which may convey their sentiment to that which combines them. The appeals by orators to liberty, to order, to love, or to religion, may have a stimulating influence, and rouse to action. But the feeling is called forth by the associated ideas of persons, many or few, in whom we feel an interest. It is always the objects, and not our intellectual separations and combinations of them, which call forth emotion.[1] Whenever abstractions become very refined, or generalizations very wide, so as to be utterly separate from the objects, they cease to evoke feeling, which always comes forth most vividly and strongly when the living beings are set before us personally, as gratifying, or frustrating an affection of our nature.

We talk of mankind loving the beautiful and the good, of their delighting in nature, and being awed with the sublime. If we understand these declarations simply as general expressions of individual truths, they may be allowed to pass. But if we interpret them as meaning that there is emotion raised by the beautiful, the grand, the good, in the general or in the abstract, they leave an erroneous impression. No man ever had his heart kindled by the abstract idea of loveliness, or sublimity, or moral excellence, or any other abstraction. That which calls forth our admiration is a lovely scene, that which raises wonder and awe is a grand scene, that which calls forth love is not loveliness, in the abstract, but a lovely and loving person. That which evokes

[1] Aristotle has remarked that common notions (*Νοήματα*) are not without phantasms (*ούκ ἄνευ φαντάσματων*). *De Anim.* iii. 7.

moral approbation is not virtue in the abstract, but a virtuous agent performing a virtuous act. In short, it is not the abstract but the concrete, not the generalizations of the comparative power, but objects animate and inanimate, perceived or imaged, which awaken our emotional nature.

If those views be correct they furnish certain important practical results.

(1.) We see how feeling is to be raised, either in our own breasts or in those of others. Feeling, it is evident, cannot be compelled. It will not flow at our bidding, or simply in consequence of a voluntary determination on our part; we may resolve and resolve again, but no commands, threats, or terrors will make it unlock its fountains. And if it will not come from our own bosom in obedience to an order, still less can we expect it to flow from those of others because we require it. Nor is it sufficient to address the conscience, and to show that emotion ought to flow, for it will rather delight at times to rebel against an imposed authority. Are our feelings, then, as some would maintain, beyond our control? Do they rise and fall like the winds, how and when they list? Do they flow and ebb like the tides, in obedience to impulses, which we can no more rule than Canute could command the waves of the ocean? Were this so, man would indeed be in a most helpless condition, more so than the sailor without a rudder in his ship, or the slave obliged to submit to the caprice of his master. But though a man may not be able to command his sensibilities directly, he has complete power over them indirectly. He can guide and control, if not the feeling itself, at least the idea, which is the channel in which it flows. He may not be able to move his heart to pity by an act of the will, but he can call up

a representation of a sufferer, and the compassion will burst out. Or better still, he can visit the house of mourning, he can enter the abode of the poor, the sick, the forlorn, the outcast, and as he witnesses their misery, or listens to their tale of sorrow, his heart — if heart he has — will swell and heave with emotion. He can thus call up laudable sentiments, and thus too he can restrain desires, which would degrade, trouble, carnalize, or pollute the soul. Were he simply to resolve to conquer them by a strong act of will, he might fail. But he may be able to banish the unholy idea by calling in a more elevating one; he may remove the object out of the way, or remove out of the way of the object, and the flame left without its feeder will die out. As man can thus control his feelings, he is responsible for them, for their perversion, for their excess, and defect.[1]

(2.) We see how powerless all those systems, whether of professed religion or morality, must be, which do not set before us a living and a loving God, to call forth toward Him our feelings of admiration and affection. Pantheism would substitute the love of the good for the love of God. We do not purpose, its advocates say, to do away with piety and adoration, we would rather purify and exalt them; let men be taught to admire the grand, the perfect, the infinite, to love the fair, the beautiful, the good. We might meet this on the ground

[1] It was a favorite maxim of the Stoics that passion, *πάθος*, depended on opinion, *δόξη*, or judgment, *κρίσις* (see Cicero, *Tusc. Dis.* iv. 6), and hence they drew the practical conclusion, that by judgment people could reach the *ἀπάθεια* which the sect so commended. The doctrine contained a truth, only it was better expressed by Aristotle, who said affection implied *φάντασμα*. The conclusion of the Stoics did not follow, for there are appetences in our nature independent of judgment, and the ideas which generate affections are governed by associations which can only be counteracted by other associations.

that it is setting aside the living and the true God, in favor of a creature, or rather fiction, of the human mind. But it concerns us rather at present to show that it contradicts some of the essential principles of human nature. The contemplation of the beautiful and the good, apart from a beautiful and good object, cannot evoke deep or lively emotion. Unless we place before the mind a personal, a living, acting, benevolent God, the affections will not be drawn towards Him. On the same principle, the injunction or the recommendation of virtue in the abstract, as was done in so many of the pulpits, and by so many of the ethical writers of Great Britain in the middle of the last century, is found to be utterly powerless upon the heart, character, and conduct, inasmuch as it is in no way fitted to move, to interest, or engage the affections or any of the deeper principles of our nature. It is after a very different, and I maintain a much more philosophic manner, that the inspired writers proceed, in interesting the heart and swaying the conduct of mankind. They present to our faith a living God and a loving Saviour, and would thus attract the affections and form the character and influence the life.

(3.) Our doctrine admits an application to the art of rhetoric, as showing how feeling is to be excited. We are never, indeed, to neglect the more important task of enlightening and convincing the understanding in the view of impressing the sensibility. If the judgment is not convinced, feeling will be merely like the fire fed by straw, blazing for a time, it may be, to be speedily extinguished, with only ashes remaining. But in order to secure consideration by the understanding, or when the understanding has been gained, it may be of advantage or it may be necessary to interest the heart. Now we have seen in what way the feelings are to be gained. No

man ever stirred up feeling by simply showing that we ought to feel. Still less will it be roused by high sounding exclamations, such as "how lovely," "how good," "how sublime." Commonplace orators shout and rave in this way, without exciting in the breast of those who listen to them any feeling, except it be one of wonder, how they should seem to be so warm when they are saying nothing fitted to warm us. A steady tide will be raised only where there is a body like the moon attracting the waters. He who would create admiration for goodness must exhibit a good being performing a good action. He who would draw out compassion must bring before us a person in distress. He who would rouse indignation must expose to us a deed of cowardice, deceit, or cruelty. Or if he would stir up gratitude he must show us favors conferred upon us. The most moving orators have always dealt with incidents, tales, pictures, parables, furnishing living exhibitions of life. The Evangelists call forth deeper feeling by their simple narratives than they could have done by the most high-flown rhetoric. They never interpose between us and the object to which they call our attention, so as to obstruct the light that comes from it, by remarks of their own; but standing out of the way and keeping themselves out of sight, they allow us to look on Him and see "the king in his beauty." It is thus that the greatest of all teachers speaks. Proceeding on some deep spiritual or moral principle, he troubles with no dry and mummied abstractions, with no complicated ratiocination. Sir W. Hamilton said that the most satisfactory reasoning is that in which there is only one link between the premises and conclusion. Our Lord fixes, by means of a picture, a truth in our mind which at once recommends itself to our convictions and calls forth feeling. He spoke as one who had command of the deepest springs of our nature, and "not as the scribes."

(4.) We see what is the language best fitted to raise feeling. For scientific purposes we are obliged to take terms from the Greek and Latin tongues. But these are not fitted to raise emotion, they always have the stiff bearing of a foreign language; and should be used in poetry, moving oratory, and narrative only when necessary to give clearness and accuracy of thinking.

I can conceive a language, like the manners of some men, becoming too artificial. I have sometimes felt that the French tongue, unmatched for its *clarté*, for its clean-cut forms, its transparency, and its capacity for reducing abstruse truth to simplicity, is not so well adapted for eloquence and poetry that touches the heart. Happily our own tongue — and the same may be said of the German — has retained amid all its improvements the words that are life-like and home-like. The great body of them have descended — as our freshest streams do from the mountains — from a simple state of life, and they come to us with the character and the impress of the condition of society in which they originated. They resemble in this respect the man who has risen in the world from the lower ranks, and who is now admitted, because of his talents and integrity, into the most polite circles; and this though he has not been able to shake himself altogether free from the manners of his youth. This may to some extent be a disadvantage in scientific thought, which needs an accurate nomenclature. But it is to a far larger extent a benefit that language has come down to us from a more natural state of things, just as the most refined circles are all the better at times for the infusion of fresh elements. The best language is that which has both kinds of phrases, — which retains the freshness of youth in the midst of the maturity of age. I have observed that the words that have descended from a

more primitive state of things are those which occur to us most readily when we are expressing deep and heartfelt feeling. It is recorded of Burke, and is said of Carlyle, that though both used very complex forms in their writings, they were apt in familiar intercourse with their friends to return, the one to the simple Irish, and the other to the Scotch idiom of their boyhood. I have noticed that some of our greatest orators, in their most moving passages, use the old Saxon phrases which are redolent of genuine feeling.

(5.) Let us guard the fountains of the affections, or, in better words, "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life." It is of vast moment, it should always be proclaimed, to have the mind widened by the refined analyses and grand generalizations of philosophy and science. These give an extended view of the world in which we live, and so enlarge the comprehension and elevate the soul. But there is a risk that in being carried to these heights the warm current of life within be frozen, and in this case the loss is immeasurably greater than the gain. There are metaphysicians who have injured the health and the very color of the soul, by dwelling exclusively in the region of the abstract; and scientists who feel no interest in the individual because of their enthusiasm about the universal. But there is no real inconsistency between the two: it is not fatally necessary when the head is being cleared that the heart should be rendered colder. While our knowledge of the general laws which regulate man and nature is expanded, let us take great care that we do not lose our interest in individual scenes and persons. This double advantage can be had only by our retaining our natural tastes alongside of our attainments, and by our returning from these excursions into remote regions with

renewed zest to what we should feel to be the most endeared of all spots, — the home of the affections.

SECTION II.

WORKS OF FICTION.

Every one knows that the feelings are capable of being moved by imaginary as well as by real scenes. People weep over the distresses of the heroine of a novel, as they do over actual sorrow; they glory in the success of a hero on the stage as they do in the exploits of one who once lived on the earth. How are we to account for this? Do we believe for the instant that the scenes are real? The common theory is that we do so. But is it necessary to resort to such a supposition? It is not judgment or belief which stirs up emotion, but the phantasm of an object fitted to gratify or disappoint an affection. It is the very idea of a human being in trouble, that raises pity; of a virtuous man triumphing, that excites admiration. If we have a tender or sympathetic nature we cannot contemplate a sensitive being as exposed to suffering, without being moved. What the novelist does is to present the picture, and the feeling goes toward the object. He often makes the representation so vivid that it evokes keener excitement than the common scenes of life. The effect of the stage scenery and the acting is to make the whole more lively. In order to emotion, there does not seem to be any need of a belief in a positive existence. All that is required is that unbelief do not interpose to keep us from taking in the scene. Hence it is needful for the novelist, the author, and the actor, to make all the accompaniments as probable and plausible as possible, lest unbelief scatter the idea and with it the feeling. I do not know that

belief, the result of judgment, ever raises feeling, but when it is superinduced upon an appetible idea it secures its continuance. I acknowledge the need of a belief in the reality of the vision, to keep the eye steady and prevent it from being distracted by the other objects constantly pressing themselves on the attention.

It is to gratify the appetences of our nature by means of ideas, calling forth feeling with its excitements and attachments, that tales have been invented, first recited, then written, and then printed. This invention is usually ascribed to the imagination by critics, who do not tell us what the imagination is. No doubt the tales do gratify the imagination, which (like every other power of the mind) delights to be exercised both in its imaging and its compounding powers, by compounding meaning, putting materials into new forms and dispositions. But the pictures will not please unless they possess a human interest, and call forth the emotions which are the powers specially exercised and gratified. It has always appeared to me that Shelley's poetry is addressed to the imagination rather than the feelings, and hence will never exercise a powerful popular influence, like that of Burns, of Goldsmith, and Longfellow.

People at all ages of life and of all times delight in such creations. Infants have dolls, which perform a part in a drama which they are weaving. How eagerly do children listen to stories by their mothers and nurses, and are specially moved by scenes of adventure, like Robinson Crusoe, or the Pilgrim's Progress, or of unmerited suffering, as the Babes in the Wood. In later years, people are apt not only to have night dreams but day dreams; and many indulge in building aerial castles. The rudest nations have their myths, expressing their prejudices, their prides, and their revenges. The Ara-

bians have had their "thousand and one tales" recited at their camp-fires. As nations advance a stage farther, their imaginations, still emotional, become enshrined in poetry, which in most cases comes before written prose. At a later stage we have romances, which at first are apt to deal with the monstrous and the supernatural, and which, as they are sobered down by the critical judgment, become the modern novel, which professes to exhibit actual life always in its emotional aspects.

It cannot be doubted that dramatists and novelists have added considerably to our knowledge of human nature, in some respects more than metaphysicians or historians, or even biographers. Metaphysicians can give us only the principles which operate at all times and are the same in all men, but do not let us into the springs which influence individual men, women, and children, at particular times. Historians give us events and exhibit actors; but there is no window by which they can look into the souls of the actors, and we can only guess at the motives by which they are swayed. It is the same, to some extent, with biographers: they may have no means by which to ascertain the motives leading to the acts which they detail; even when they have a diary, it may not aid them very much, for the person whose life is written may be as ignorant of what has swayed him as the person who writes his life. In saying so, I do not mean to undervalue those sources of information, which, imperfect as they are, are often the only ones at our command. But our knowledge of mankind is to be obtained after all from the inspection of ourselves, and from mingling with mankind in family and social intercourse, and in the transactions of business. In plays and tales the writers take up peculiarities of character, which we may not meet with every day, and exhibit them in infinitely diver-

sified circumstances. Shakespeare is not always quite accurate in his history; nor does he always give the right account of the queen, king, warrior, or statesman; but he is ever true to human nature, and the characters described, if not invariably real, might have been real. Some think we may get a deeper acquaintance with human nature from the study of Shakespeare than from the reading of any historical work on the periods which he has sketched. There are other authors, such as Scott, and, I may add, George Eliot, who have seized on certain peculiarities of human character and exhibited them with amazing skill. But, on the other hand, no class of writers are so apt to mislead us, or do in fact mislead so many readers in the present day, when novels are so devoured. Interesting tales have been written by persons who have had no acquaintance, no means of acquaintance, with mankind generally, who commit the most extraordinary blunders in their every-day conduct, and to whom we would not intrust the practical management of the most insignificant matter. There are novel writers who, without any enlarged or deep knowledge of mankind, such as the author of John Halifax, have yet, by a very appreciative observation of what has passed under their notice, given us true and very valuable delineations of character. This perception is most likely to be possessed by women, who by native disposition and training are led more than the other sex to observe and understand the strength and weakness, the nicer feelings, and the foibles of men and women. But others, from the narrowness of their sympathies and of their means of observation, have given us only caricatures of humanity; this is often the case with Dickens, who could faithfully portray only such characters as he had met with in police courts and in his peculiar circle, and utterly fails in his pictures of mankind in

general. No one of our novelists has been able to appreciate and to describe every variety of human nature. Some have represented their heroes and heroines as swayed by all sorts of impossible motives. Many of the figures which pass before us are felt to be unrealities by all who know mankind. We certainly should not like to have such characters as the Vicar of Wakefield, Rasselas, and the Cheeryble Brothers to disappear from our literature; but they are not found and cannot be found with all their peculiarities in actual life. The consequence is that a large portion of the life portrayed in our works of fiction is fantastic and deceptive. Of all people, our habitual novel readers are the most ignorant of human nature, and the most likely to make mistakes in their intercourse with mankind. This may arise in part from the artificial situations in which the figures in works of fiction have to be placed for the sake of effect, but it proceeds mainly from the unreal characters conjured up.

It is a curious question, What is to be the effect on character of the excessive novel reading of the age in which all read novels, in which most young persons devour them in large quantities, and in which many read little else? It is too wide a question to be discussed in a work like this. The scenes gratify the imaging power of the mind, they move us out of our habitual torpor, and take us away from our petty troubles. The ideal pictures help to raise men above themselves and above the gross selfishness of the world. To those who have other means of knowledge and who have good sense to guide them, the pictures disclose peculiarities of character which they are not likely to meet with in society. On the other hand, unless there be a proper, and this should be a preponderating proportion, of the reading of

works dealing with realities, there is a risk that the minds thus nurtured take a very erroneous view of their fellow men and of the world. The tendency will be to create an imaginary world, of persons clothed with attributes, good or evil, which they do not possess, and in expectation or in fear of extraordinary good fortunes or reverses. This will be especially the case with those who are of a nervous temperament, or whose imagination is stronger than their judgment. In some instances excessive indulgence in the practice leads to frivolity, in others to sulkiness. In all cases the reading, except in a moderate degree, of works of fiction, is apt to produce moodiness, or dreaminess of spirit, or an irritation of temper, going out towards inmates of the family, or a discontent with the world, with its business, and its quiet enjoyments. The abode for a lengthened time in this imaginary world unfits us for the real one, which is felt to be chill after being in so heated an atmosphere. Actual life seems dull and prosaic after mingling in so much more stimulating scenes; and its society is felt to be vulgar after associating with heroes and heroines. As in the use of bodily stimulants, the demand will be for a stronger and yet a stronger draught, with new and more spicy ingredients. Nor is it a sufficient reply to say that the tales can work no mischief, as we do not believe them while we read them. For the influence they exert does not arise from our believing them, but from the phantasies with the corresponding feelings, silently and unconsciously leaving their impression on the mind.

A poem is less likely than a novel to lead to such results, because it is commonly denser in thought, and diverts by a great many harmonies of sentiment and expression. Poetry pleases not only by its narratives, but by its rhythm of language, embodying what is far more

important, a rhythm of thought. The question has often been asked, What constitutes poetry? The answers have commonly been very confused and confusing. The question would admit of a more satisfactory answer, if put in this form, "What sort of ideas should be enshrined in verse?" All kinds may be expressed appropriately in prose, but only certain ranks are entitled to be clothed in the courtly garb of poetry. It may be safely said that all that is fitted to stir and gratify the imagination, and to move the feelings, may be — I do not say it always should be — put in poetical form. In using this language I do not mean it to include eloquence, which may rouse both the imagination and the feelings; but this all towards a particular end, to lead to action which would often be impeded by too glowing pictures — as we have in Burke's speeches — or formed into measured lines. Poetry attains its purpose when its excitement gratifies and pleases; it promotes a high purpose when its pictures elevate the mind; it serves a moral purpose when it molds the character for excellence.

It has often been remarked that poetry is the product, and thus one of the characteristics of the age. Homer and Scott represent the period, not of war, but of the romance which in an age or two after gathers round military exploits. Æschylus and Goethe and Shelley are the expression of ages in which reflective thought, and with it doubting thought, have appeared. Horace lives in the age in which men are losing their faith in the superstitions and the moral saws of their forefathers. Virgil expresses the faith that still remains, and the hope that anticipates a better state of things. Dante comes forth with terrible earnestness when religious reformation is called for, and he has, like spring, to break up the winter. Chaucer pictures the times when men

have seen the evils around them, but are still practicing them. Shakespeare bursts forth when there is a universal upheaving of thought, like the sprouting of all sorts of life in the seed-time. Milton is the embodiment of the later puritanism, which is losing its stern doctrine, but holding by its high ethical ideal. Butler and Burns represent the times in which there was a recoil from the old faith, and an antiquated morality. Cowper's poems are the breathing of the evangelical life rising from the dead.

It has been noticed that there is often, no one would say always, a relation between the poetry of an age and the philosophic thought of the times immediately preceding. Æschylus and the Greek tragedians follow the earlier, and are contemporaneous with the later, pre-Socratic schools of philosophy. Aristophanes comes forth with his mirth and his dance, on the stage prepared by the Sophists. Lucretius follows the introduction into Italy of the philosophy of Epicurus, which was breaking up the old Roman beliefs and morals. Ovid and Horace wrote when the New Academy was discussing everything, but believing in nothing, and a fully expanded Epicureanism had called in philosophy to the defense of pleasure. Racine represents the age when Catholicism, defended by Bossuet, was patronized by the court, and had taken its most imposing form. Voltaire gave expression to the sneers which the detection of the hypocrisy of the church called forth. Pope put into elegant verse the philosophy of Bolingbroke in the age of rationalism and deism. Thomson was the first to express the rising admiration of nature called forth by Sir Isaac Newton and the culture of physical science. The subjective philosophy of Kant and his school gave an ideal direction to Goethe and Schiller, and, it may be added,

Coleridge and Wordsworth, the last being further swayed by a genuine love of nature. Tennyson has undoubtedly felt the Broad Church influence which began to walk abroad in his time, as opposed to the ritualism which stimulated Keble. To correspond with the materialism of the present day we have Swinburne and others, forming a sensuous, tending to become a sensual, school.

The rationale of this can be given. Poetry is not philosophy, but the poet is swayed by the ideas of the age in which he has been educated, so far as it has had an influence rained down upon it, and a perfume scattered by the higher thoughts of the country. Some poets, it is true, like Shakespeare and Burns, speak from the heart, and to all times; but others, the product of the times, address the times, and can get a hearing from the times because they do so. Some, like Wordsworth, are before their time, and can get readers only after readers have been prepared for them. Poetry, which is the expression of emotion, is as it were the color and the odor of the deepest thought and sentiment of the age. But as the hues and perfume of a plant take their character, coarse and fetid, or lovely and pure, from the nature of the plant, and the soil in which it grows, so the poetry of an age, or a country, takes its quality, no doubt, from the predilections of the poets, but these determined by the prevailing modes of belief and feeling in the society in which they have been reared.

SECTION III.

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS IN EMOTION.

It does not devolve on me in this work to unfold the laws of the association of ideas: the discussion of this subject rather falls within the department of the cogni-

tive powers. Still it is necessary to look at it as bearing on the rise and the flow of the emotions.

A question which has never been satisfactorily answered is here started: Is there an association among our feelings, or is the association solely among our ideas? It is admitted on all hands that our ideas are associated according to certain laws; that, for instance, when things have been together in the mind and one comes up, the others are apt to come up also, and that like suggests like. But do our emotions, say of hope and fear, of sorrow and joy, of sympathy and anger, also suggest each other, and if so, according to what laws. This is a much more perplexing inquiry, and has been made so mainly by the want of a proper analysis of emotion and of a true apprehension of the relation of feeling to the intellect and of the place which the idea has in emotion.

One thing is very clear: an emotional state tends to propagate itself. It suffuses like thaw throughout our whole nature and softens it; it diffuses through all our faculties. This may arise to some extent from the organic affection. It should always be noticed that all emotion, properly speaking, begins within; but all our stronger mental feelings are accompanied with an excited state of the brain. When this is roused it continues for a time according to physiological laws. If the organism is affected by any one emotion the wave is propagated throughout the whole. The roused brain and nervous organism react on the mental train, and the combined body and mind are for a time in a state of excitement,—wave succeeds wave. Take the case of a man in a passion. He has been insulted; his honor is impugned. Ideas rise up of reputation damaged, of injury done him; these address a nature sensitive about character, and the corresponding organism is disturbed; there is a visi-

ble flush on the face, the eyes emit fire, and the whole frame is agitated. The consciousness of the man shows that a series of emotional ideas is moving on in his mind, all directed to one point by the deep lying appetence. There are ideas with the corresponding feelings of humiliation, of ill usage received, of anger, of resentment; and plans of defence, of resistance, and revenge, are suggested, and arguments to repel the attack are prepared; or, in the case of persons who lay no moral restraint on themselves, blows are resorted to, or a challenge is sent. Or look at this mother who has just had the intelligence brought her that her son has perished at sea. There is, first, the occurrence realized with the vivid picture of the dear son sinking in the waters, gone from this world to be seen no more, pleasant memories of the past coming up cruelly to torment the present and to darken the future. Along with all this, and continuing all this, is an excited nervous state, venting itself in sobs, in tears, possibly in writhings of the body, or in frantic tearing of the hair or clothes, and ending, it may be, in prostration, or in fainting.

It requires a very nice analysis to separate the parts, the impulses and the ideas, from the cerebral affections of the body, in such cases as these. But there is evidently, first of all, a deep appetence, then an idea appealing to it, then an organic affection, then a mingled excitement, both of body and mind. The appetence and the affected organism together keep up the excited state, and one idea comes up after another, all emotional. In the course of time, in some cases a longer and in others a shorter, according to the temperament of the individual, the organic storm blows itself out, and there is a lull and an aversion to have high feeling prolonged. If the affection — if the fire — be weak, it will be very much weak-

ened or extinguished nearly, or altogether. But if there be a deep internal heat it will still burn, though it may be in a subdued and smothered form for a season, and will in due time burst forth once more on fuel being heaped on it.

It is clear, then, that there is a sense in which emotions are associated. When the mind and organism are in an emotional state, there is a predisposition towards feeling. The feelings raised are of a certain type, which is determined by the appetence aroused, possibly to some extent by a special cerebral organ allotted to it. If the appetence be love of children, and a son be drowned, the tumult all bears on the lost one. There will first be a flowing and then an ebbing tide. But in all these cases we must distinguish between the idea and the feeling, between both and the affected organism, and not fail to notice how the origination of the whole is to be traced to the appetence. To clear up the subject, it will be expedient first to look at the laws of the association of ideas, independent of their connection with emotion, and then we shall be in a better position to determine the influence of emotion in directing the train of thought, and of emotion in influencing the association.

The Primary Laws of association, those which regulate the succession of our thoughts, have been, it is acknowledged, approximately determined, sufficiently so for our present purpose; they may be represented as Contiguity and Correlation.

(1.) When ideas have been in the mind together, on one of them coming up the others are apt to follow. This law may take two forms, that of Succession and of Coexistence. When ideas have followed each other a number of times, on one casting up it brings the whole train with it. Taking advantage of this law, the boy, when he

would commit to memory a passage in prose or poetry, repeats it a number of times. This is the law of succession. Again, when things have been together in the mind once, twice, ten times, a hundred times, — on any one of them coming up it is apt to recall another, or all the others. Having seen several persons in one company, when I again meet with one of them I am apt to think of the others. It is the law of coexistence. One peculiarity of the law of contiguity in both forms has a very special bearing on our subject. Associated ideas are apt to come up in groups. A mother in opening a drawer meets unexpectedly with a favorite toy of a departed child. What a rush of emotion, of scenes never to be forgotten, with the occurrences following each other and of associated circumstances, the central figure being still the beloved one. We are thus able to explain one very marked feature of passion and affection, the gathering of ideas around the object, to prolong and intensify the feeling.

(2.) When we have discovered a relation between things, the one is apt to recall the other. Thus, like recalls like. I see a portrait and it brings up the original. The father is recalled every time the widowed mother sees her boy. Resemblance is only one of many relations that may connect things. Means and end, cause and effect, equalities and proportions, may all associate things in our mind and make the one reproduce the other. This law is a mighty aid to science, as it brings up things according to their relations of class and cause. It has not such an influence on emotion. Hence, the thought-trains of the man of science and the man of sensibility are commonly found to be very different. The association by correlation tends to keep feeling within proper bounds, by suggesting cautious dangers incurred,

maxims of prudence and of common sense, all to guard against excess. Hence, children, savages, persons of untrained intellect, whose suggestions rise up mainly according to the laws of contiguity, are apt to yield to the impulse of the moment and allow it to carry them whithersoever it will, whereas to those who have *preparata et digesta mens*, to use a phrase of Bacon's, associations present themselves which lead them to bank in the stream and allow it to flow in its proper and restricted channel.

But there are others, what are called Secondary Laws of association, which have a much closer relation with emotion. The primary laws are those which regulate the succession of our thoughts at all times, so that no thought can spring up spontaneously, except in accordance with them. But at any given moment of our existence there may be a number of objects, half a dozen, twenty, a hundred, so associated with the present idea that they could come up according to the primary laws. In passing through the British Museum, or the Gallery of Paintings at Dresden, I may have noticed for the moment hundreds of objects; and it is possible that any one of these might present itself to my phantasy; but on these places being mentioned, only a few come up, probably first one and then others in succession. Why does this one and then these others come to the front, while the rest keep in the background? The answer to this question brings us to secondary laws, modifying the primary, to what Hamilton calls laws of preference, — an appropriate enough phrase, provided it be not understood that preference implies choice or exercise of will — the secondary laws work quite as involuntarily as the primary. The question is, Can we discover and express these secondary laws? I believe we can do so approxi-

mately with quite as much certainty as we can the primary. First, there is a law of Native Taste and Talent. This exists, like all other laws, in the form of a tendency to act in a certain way. It consists, to a greater or less extent, of a disposition of the cerebral and nervous organism. Our mental operations are continually producing what Carpenter calls "a mental cerebration," that is, they produce a certain state and arrangement of the cells of the gray matter of the brain. When the infant begins to speak or to walk, it finds every act laborious, irksome, and awkward. Attempt after attempt is made, successful and unsuccessful. But by perseverance a particular structure is given to the brain and the ganglia and the nerves, and action becomes easy. The action never becomes, as some physiologists seem to think, automatic. It is always necessary to have some act of the will to originate the whole, to start the speech or the step. But whereas at the first there had to be a series of tentative volitions, many of them failures, now by a beautiful provision of nature, or rather of Him who gave to nature its laws and dispositions, there is an adapted organic structure which needs only one simple act of the will to start it, when it acts automatically. How difficult does the child find it, how easy do we now find it to utter that word "automatically," all because there is no arranged mechanism in the one case, while there is in the other.

Secondly, there is the law of Mental Energy. Those ideas come up most frequently and readily, on which we have bestowed the greatest amount of mental force.

It may be an energy of Intellect. We have thought much on a particular subject, we have turned it round and round in our mind, it will henceforth be apt to present itself, and bring with it the objects with which it has been associated. Hence a man's business, that which

has been occupying him for hours every day, ever comes up before him, even when he does not wish it, and when he would rather be relieved from its pressure. Intellectual activity and industry thus bring with them their proper reward, in a mind trained and predisposed toward the work that has been pursued.

It may be an energy of Will, especially of attention, which is an exercise of will. When we fix our minds on an object, and continue to do so for a greater or less length of time, and revert to it once and again, it will be inclined to come to us whenever an opportunity allows. By this means we have the current of our thoughts more at our command than we are apt to imagine. As we habitually will, so will be the habitual tenor of our frames of mind.

It may also be an energy of Feeling. This is the law which falls more particularly under our notice in this work. Whatever has been associated with emotion is apt to come up before the mind. We have seen that the idea determines the emotion; we now see that the emotion may determine the frequency of the occurrence of the idea. The two together must have a mighty influence on the train of thought and on the character. The man of strong sensibility will ever have emotional ideas springing up in his mind, and these ideas will tend to recur and bring the sentiment with them. As the basis of the feeling, there will always be the appetence; but it is the idea that awakens the appetence, and in the case before us the feeling experienced has made the idea to appear.

This seems to me to be the rationale of the association of emotions. Organically, emotion puts us into a state of sensibility, and when in this state every feeling stirred up produces a greater perturbation. The feeling,

in proportion to its intensity, tends to bring back the idea at its basis once and again, all to renew the feeling and the organic affection. Take the case of the sorrow of a widow who has just lost her husband. At the root of the whole is the deep affection, then an idea of the separation and the loss, and then intense mental excitement with organic disturbance. This is the immediate sorrow. As a consequence, the idea of the loss comes up again and again, to renew the sorrow. After a season there is apt to be an abatement: first, from the organic wave expending itself, so that the mental emotion does not so agitate it; and secondly, from new associations springing up, possibly new affections formed, or old affections strengthened, say a more intense devotedness of the widow to the children of the departed. If the affection has never been deep, the sorrow evaporates in this way, leaving nothing but a dry indifference, capable, like ashes, only of an occasional and momentary kindling. If the affection has been strong, the grief will abide with the widow for life, but it will be less violent, and will be relieved by pleasant reminiscences and by useful occupations.

We have here a picture of every other violent passion, such as anger, or disappointment, or shame, or remorse. The nervous affection is excited, and then it subsides. Crowds of thoughts, all tending to feed the passion, come up according to that primary law of coexistence which brings up associations in groups, but are in the course of time varied, and, it may be, dissipated and scattered by new experiences. We thus see the advantage, if we would abate passion, of keeping away from scenes which might provoke it, and going — traveling, if need be — into new scenes which raise new associations. We are accustomed to say that time has wrought the change,

but in fact it has been by these mental and physical agencies having had time to work.

Proceeding on this analysis, we can explain certain mental phenomena often commented on. Some are violently affected with grief or passion at the time, and soon lose all feeling; while others, not, it may be, so ruffled on the surface, are as strongly moved in the depths of their hearts for long years after. Again, some are all feeling at all times, and have perpetual smiles of benignity on their countenance, and expressions of sympathy ever flowing from their lips, and at times tears trickling from their eyes — all, it may be, perfectly sincere at the time; but then you cannot make them take an abiding interest in any one person, or in the best of causes. Whence the difference? It may arise so far from a mere organic mobility in the one class of persons, and an inorganic immobility in the other class. But the essential difference lies in the circumstance, that in the former there is merely a surface rill of excitement, acting on an organic impressibility, which soon runs dry, whereas in the other there is a deep fountain of affection or hatred, ready to burst out, and forcing, when it does not find, a channel.

These laws may enable us to explain a well-known mental action. A man promises to do a certain act at a certain hour. The wonder is, not that he should at times forget it, but that in ordinary circumstances he should remember it, and perform what he intended. How does it happen that in the multitude of the thoughts within him, he should think of the act at the proper moment and proceed to do it? The answer to this question will bring before us a general fact of our mental nature which has very much escaped the notice of psychologists. It is that a determination to do a particular act may

reach forward in its influence through a considerable period. The determination to awake at a particular hour during the night may run through our half conscious thoughts and enable us to rise about the time we wish. How are we to explain this?

It is clear that we must bring in first the law of mental energy, according to which, what we have bestowed a great deal of force on is sure to come up more frequently and readily. If our resolution is formed loosely, without any thought or earnestness, it is very apt never to come up again, or come up only after the time for action is over. It may be noticed, too, that if we form a purpose or give a promise in the midst of distractions, or when we are eagerly bent on some other end, the whole is apt to pass away from the mind, or to recur when it is too late. We are most apt to remember when our resolution relates to something towards which we have a strong natural or acquired appetence. It is almost certain to come up when it falls in with our habits, or when it is associated with something that must come before us, say with a particular place, or hour, or occurrence. The lover is not likely to forget the appointment he has made with the loved one, and should he fail to remember it it would be taken as an evidence that his affection was not very deep. In these cases all the laws of association combine to recall the resolution or the promises. When these do not assist us our only resource is to fix the determination very deeply in our minds and bring it up from time to time, that it may become more deeply rooted and be made to come up more certainly. All such processes are themselves mental, but leave an unconscious impress on the brain, and thus favor the recollection, in a way which physiology should try to explain, but which it cannot explain at this moment.

SECTION IV.

SPONTANEOUS FLOW OF THOUGHT.

There is a train of idea and emotion which we are disposed to follow every given instant, impelled unconsciously by deep underlying appetences, natural and acquired, and flowing in the channels opened by the laws of association, intellectual and emotive.

Our floating ideas, not determined by outward circumstances or by some fixed purpose, move like clouds in the sky. Sometimes they are light and fleecy, and we walk or rest pleasantly under them. Sometimes they are bright and cheerful like the morning dawn, and we are inspired by hope and incited to activity. Sometimes they are glowing and radiant like the evening sky, and we gaze upon them with delight and linger in their splendors. At other times they are as chill as mists, and our sensations are uncomfortable and our prospects dismal. Or they are dark and scowling, foreboding rain and tempest, or are ready to burst out in thunder and lightning. Quite as frequently — indeed it is the common experience of many — they are dull and uninteresting, like a gray stream of clouds, such as I have seen in Ireland, floating whole days in one direction, concealing the blue sky and darkening the earth; and we wish to have the exciting storm rather than this monotony. Much of human happiness and misery, much of human character is determined by this flowing stream, just as the lines of ancient civilization were determined by the great rivers, the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Ganges. When the train is pleasant we commit ourselves to it and go on with it. But then we are liable to be annoyed at any moment by intruders interrupting it. Much of that fretfulness which we call temper may be traced to

this source. No doubt there may be other causes operating. There may be pains, more or less keen, arising from disease or accident; there may be the loss of objects on which we set a value; but even the annoyances thus produced may derive their force from their disturbing a train of earnest, or vain, or proud, or lustful ideas, all pursuing their courses. A person, eagerly bent on a favorite end, finds an untoward event coming across his path, and he bursts into a passion. Or he is happy in cherishing a sense of his own ability, or courage, or worth, and there is a remark made, which ruffles his self-complacency, and his manner is changed on the instant. How unwilling are the gay and the frivolous to be constrained to turn to study, or to the business of life, with its habitual dullness and its frequent disappointments. The harshest sounds do not so grate on the ears listening to the finest music, as these interruptions do upon the easy flow of association. In this way we can account for the sensitive aversion to certain scenes and persons; their appearance calls up unpleasant scenes in the past to disturb the complacent humor of the present. "I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but only evil."

When outward circumstances do not harmonize with the inward train, there is apt to be a strain and a struggle. The girl, the boy, even the man, who has been engrossed with play and amusement, is reluctant to turn to work which requires a constant effort. Much of the complaint of discontent in this world proceeds from persons not being suited to their surroundings, from their being placed in positions which have an entirely unconformable shape, so that they jar on each other as they turn. Hence the propriety of so far studying the dispositions, as well as the capacities of boys in the

choice of a profession; if there be a strong taste there will be the risk of a collision if it is thwarted. Chatterton, with a strong poetical predilection, could not be contented in the shop of a druggist; and David Hume, with a love for literature and reflection, found the study of law to be irksome in Edinburgh; and feeling mercantile pursuits to be still more irksome in Bristol, betook himself to France and to philosophy. We can account in this way for the incompatibilities of temper which often manifest themselves soon after marriage. There are not only the different tastes of those thus thrown so closely together, there are the different and colliding lines in which their trains of association run. The husband starts a topic in which he is intensely interested, but is surprised to find that it jars on the cherished ideas of his wife, who becomes irritated, and an expression escapes her which kindles the ire of her partner, or sinks him into moody silence, or ferments his dissatisfaction into sourness. In all such cases, it will be found that by firm moral principle and forbearance the two can have their forms so bent as to fit into each other, — as two somewhat discordant time-pieces can be made to keep the same time by being placed on the same wall. Still it is better when from the first there is a correspondence of taste, — which may not imply an identity, for they may conform all the more when a prominence in the one fits into a deficiency of the other, when light-heartedness buoys up gravity, by which it is balanced and kept from leaving the earth and floating in the air.

It has to be added that there are some so selfish, and have so yielded to capricious temper, that they cannot be adjusted to any ordinary state of things, and they must take to themselves the blame of those incompatibilities which they throw on others, or on their situation. The

genus irritabile vatum have often shown themselves unwilling to submit to the restraints of the family and of society. The sea-shore pebble has been rounded and smoothed by its being rolled by the waters; and it is part of the wholesome discipline to which we are subjected in this world, that in the frictions of business and professional competition, of the family and the social circle, we are made to learn the charity which "suffereth long and is kind."

Even when the train is indifferent, or so far painful, we are apt to follow it, rather than keep up a constant fight with it. It is true that the train can so far be influenced by the will detaining a present thought, which may collect other thoughts, and in time wear a new channel. But in all this we have to resist the stream, and the exertion is felt to be laborious, and wastes the energy, and is apt to be given up because of the irksomeness. Even the sluggish monastic life comes to have its attractions to many as permitting an accustomed train which is seldom disturbed, and is encouraged by the self-righteous spirit engendered; though I rather think there are cases in which, after the depression which may have led the persons to devote themselves to such a life has passed away, the old and worldly spirit awakes to take a life-long vengeance. The idle and the vagrant cannot resist the temptations presented by the freedom they enjoy in following their own ways. We can thus explain what has been called the indulgence in melancholy. The old habit can be thoroughly conquered only by the formation of new habits, that is, by channels cut out by the currents coming in from new quarters. Let it be observed, that in all this there are dominant appetences leading on a train of ideas of an emotional character.

Very different effects follow when the appetences tend

towards the unpleasant, and the ideas in the train are painful. With some, especially those laboring under a diseased nervous temperament, the stream conducts from one unpleasant topic to another: the faces of lost friends present themselves, they think only of injuries done them, of insults offered them, of misfortunes that have befallen, or they picture coming woes. The endeavor will now be, to be delivered from these associations. To relieve themselves from such pain, some betake themselves to scenes of boisterous mirth, or mad excitement. In the depression that follows a period of excitement, persons are driven to return to their old scenes of folly. It is thus that the afflicted have to leave the scenes where the misfortune occurred; thus that the wife has to abandon the home where her husband was murdered and the youth to forsake the locality where his father disgraced himself; thus that husbands have murdered their wives, to be rid of the memorials of domestic cruelty or of broken vows.

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD ELEMENT: THE EXCITEMENT WITH ATTACHMENT AND REPUGNANCE.

SECTION I.

THEIR GENERAL NATURE.

WE have seen that as the reservoir of all emotion there is an affection or an appetence, and that the waters flow out in a channel supplied by the idea. Let us now view the inward impulse as actually bursting forth. The soul is now to a greater or less extent in a moved or excited state. There is a current, smooth, leaping, or troubled, moving on with more or less rapidity. There is more than excitement; there is a feeling of pleasure in, or aversion to, the object of which we have an idea, and which is supposed to gratify, or thwart, the motive power of the mind. When the object is contemplated as good, or as bringing good, that is as appetible, we are drawn towards it, we feel an attachment to it; there is a glow of heart, a pleasurable elevation, and we feel attracted towards that which interests us. On the other hand, when it is regarded as evil, or about to bring evil, there is also an excitement, but it is painful excitement, chafing and irritating the spirit, and we draw away from the object, or we drive it away from us. There is an inclination towards the object in all those emotions which contemplate the desirable, such as affection, hope, expectation, and a disinclination towards all things that frustrate our wishes, in fear, anger, disappointment.

It is when it thus bursts out that the affection falls under the eye of consciousness. We are not conscious of the appetence, as an appetence, of the swaying motive, which lies deep down in the soul, as the root does in the ground. Just as we do not perceive by the senses the attraction of the moon, but notice it as raising the tides, so we do not discover the power of a motive till it raises a wave of feeling. We become conscious, first, of the idea, and along with this, of the excitement arising from the attractions and repulsions. We feel in a moved, often in an irritated, or agitated, state, and are impelled to action which we may allow or restrain as we will.

The excitement is produced, in the first instance, by the gratification, or disappointment, real or expected, of an appetence. But when it has once been enjoyed it may come to be desired for its own sake. Some feel as if they could not live without excitement. Hence they seek out for scenes fitted to produce it. They may search for it in a variety of quarters: some in the theatre, some in novel reading, some in the dance, some in hunting or traveling, some in the competitions of trade or ambition, some by resorting to wine or other bodily stimulants. Kept within proper bounds, and when directed to proper objects, this love of stimulus may be allowed; it adds to our enjoyment and it may dispel lassitude, torpor, and *ennui*, and promote habits of activity and enterprise. On the other hand, when directed to wrong ends, or when carried to excess, even in cases in which the employments are lawful, the taste may be very injurious, wasting the time of youth when knowledge and habits of virtue should be acquired; and when declining life arrives, appearing in an unseemly and ridiculous frivolity, or issuing in discontent and restlessness.

The repulsions are as powerful, often as peculiar, as the attractions. As men and women have personal affections and predilections, so they have also prejudices and antipathies, often bitter and incurable. They avoid certain places, persons, and societies; they shrink from certain pursuits and proposals; they cherish envy, malignity, revenge, because afraid of their pride being humbled, and their favorite ends being thwarted. Some have doubted whether the malignant passions, or the benevolent, have stirred up the larger amount of activity in our world. Even as courage impels some to fight against threatened evil, so cowardice prompts others to make great exertion to avoid it. If duty has, like the bee, its sweets, it also has its stings, and many are thereby kept from pursuing it. On the other hand, the hatred of evil in a world where sin is so prevalent, and has wrought such mischief, has called forth an incalculable amount of energy in noble minds, and kept our world from becoming an offensive and intolerable lazar house.

The inappetible may be of two sorts. It may be the disappointment of a strong impulse, say ambition, or love. This is in one sense negative; it arises from the absence of an object, but of an object for which there may still be a craving felt to be painful, because it cannot be gratified. But in other cases there may be a positive aversion to a certain end or object, to certain places, or persons, or animals. These two forms are closely related and run into each other. Take revenge: a favorite scheme has been interfered with, and we take up an antipathy to the person who has thwarted us. The sensation is a mixed one. There is gratification in indulging the appetence, but the gratification is painful as looking to evil and not to good. There is a pleasure in wreaking vengeance, but it is counteracted by pain.

How different from the gratification of benevolence, which is blessed in the exercise, and blessed in the beneficent result.

We can now understand the nature of that restlessness to which we are all liable, and which some seem to labor under perpetually. It arises from a variety of inconsistent impulses moving us at the same time, or, more frequently, from a succession of alternating hopes and disappointments. We see it in the vain man, when both praise and abuse are heaped upon him; in the ambitious man, now vaulting high and again thrown back; in the youth waiting the award of the judge in a competition, and the lover, now rejoicing in the sunshine, and now languishing in the shade. These feelings are promoted by a nervous temperament, and almost always lead to nervousness. In all cases there are active molecular attractions and repulsions which raise a distressingly heated atmosphere.

We see how "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." The heir feels it when the owner of the property lives so long. The adventurer feels it when the long planned scheme does not succeed. The maiden feels it oppressively when the long expected proposal of her lover is not made. Why all this? Because the appetence craves without being gratified; and there arises a discontent with what is occurring because it does not bring the expected good. There is a rumor of the owner of the coveted property dying, followed by his recovery; the prospect of success is darkened by a rising cloud; the wooer calls but goes away without proposing. The continuance may breed a settled depression unwholesome as a pestilential swamp. When it is seen that the object cannot possibly be gained, the heart becomes sickened by the desire still clamoring like the appetite of hunger when yet there is no food.

We see how *Ennui* is produced. Happiness, as every one knows, is greatly promoted by every one having a competent amount of work in which he is interested; when every waking hour calls forth a motive, affords room for a habit to take its course, and exercises an energy. But when there is no such labor enjoined or required, there come seasons more or less frequent, longer or shorter, in which there is no incentive, or, more frequently, in which there are motives confined like waters in a pool from which there is no outlet. The result is *ennui*, which is apt to seize on those who are without a profession or any pressing active employment, and which is the penalty which idleness has to pay for its indulgence. All persons thus situated may not fall into this humor, because they have strong tastes which carry them into amateur amusements, such as reading, hunting, music, or painting.[1] The person under *ennui*, while feeling his misery, is unwilling to be roused out of his somnolence: he has not motive enough to overcome the *vis inertiæ*. It is a blessed thing for such a man, when some unexpected circumstance, it may be a dire calamity, comes to startle him like a thunder-clap, to awake him from his lethargy, and make him himself again.

Much the same experience, but with important differences, is apt to be realized by old people who have given up the active pursuits in which they engaged for so many years. For a time they feel the relaxation to be pleasant. But very soon their habits impel them in their old ways, only to make them feel the weakness laid upon them. The old farmer, the old merchant, the old

[1] "When I am assailed," says Luther, "with heavy tribulation, I rush out among my pigs rather than remain alone by myself. The human heart is like a mill-stone in a mill; when you put wheat under it it turns and grinds, and bruises the wheat to flour; if you put in no wheat then it grinds on, but then it is itself it grinds and wears away."

lawyer, having given up their business, in the expectation of enjoying an evening of peace after a busy day, are apt to feel chagrined — if they have not been cultivating tastes which may still be gratified, or if they have not heavenly light to irradiate their evening hours with the hope of a coming day.

There are various agencies at work in the ordinary experience of old age. There is the constant opposition offered to the mental energy by the lethargy of the body, especially by the immobility of the brain action, which is a necessary concurrent in all mental action. This produces other effects. There is a repression of the motives and habits, which have been in operation for many long years. Then there is the inability to acquire new habits and springs of action, owing to the mind being altogether preëngaged and fixed. The old man is like the ship left high and dry upon the beach, when the waters have left it. He sits in his chimney corner because not able to exert himself, or has no motive to exert himself, and he becomes peevish and crabbed when proposals are made which he knows he cannot execute. He lets the flow of association go on in his mind, and he goes back on the past till it becomes wearisome, and would indulge old tastes, till he finds that the objects are rotting; and he cherishes a sense of merit till he is made to see that his very righteousnesses are as filthy rags which will not keep him comfortable. All that is now occurring produces only a momentary interest, flickering like a dying candle. The light that is fitted to brighten his countenance must come not from behind, but in front, opening to him a better world.

As the feeling raised by the idea of the inappetible is painful, so we learn to avoid what would excite it. There are persons who studiously keep out of the way of

every painful scene, who never visit the house of mourning, and who turn away from distress of every kind. This love of ease, this determination to avoid all that would humiliate, produces a character of intense selfishness. It is one of our highest duties in this world to visit the fatherless and the widow in their affliction, to seek out distress in order to relieve it. The Persian king gave orders that no one clothed in sackcloth, that is, the dress of mourning, should enter his palace. But while he could thus shut out those who were sorrowing for the dead, he could not shut out death itself; and no better preparation can be made for that event than by sympathizing with it in others, in familiarizing ourselves with it, and comforting those oppressed with it.

The excitement of which I am writing is to a large extent an organic sensation, which will be considered under another head. As such, it follows the laws of the organism. In particular, it is apt, after continuing for a time, to subside; the storm is changed into a calm, the flow becomes an ebb; all this from much the same causes as give fevers their allotted time, four days, or ten days, or fourteen days, for rising and falling; that is, there is first a combination of agencies attracted to a point, and then a dissipation of them, as they lose their force. Every one has experienced this. On the back of the height there is a hollow which is deep in proportion to the previous height. It arises not so much from any special mental laws as from the wasting of the nervous energy, whose concurrence is necessary to emotive action. This makes our life, so far as it depends on feeling, to be a series of undulations, with rising and falling waves.

It has to be added, that while the mental excitement and the organic affection are closely connected, they are not identical. Our emotions, say of grief for the death

of a friend, are first in the mind and then they affect the nerves. In this chapter we consider the state of the conscious soul, and in the next its influence on the body.

SECTION II.

ACTION AND REACTION OF FEELING.

There is undoubtedly a law of action and reaction in human nature as well as in physical nature. The one phenomenon is analogous to the other, but they cannot be regarded as the same. We have seen (pp. 11, 12) that every power of the mind craves for activity. But in order to activity, or rather accompanying activity, there must be change. When one faculty has been busy for a time, others will be apt to demand their share of employment. When the same set of ideas have been engrossing the mind it likes to have something new and fresh. The merchant, after his day's toils are over, wishes music or pleasant reading in the evening. The hard student craves for a novel, or for a game of bowls or cricket. The pent-up citizen rejoices when he can from time to time breathe and think freely on the mountain or by the sea. So far we have mental laws. But the reaction, though in the mind, proceeds to a large extent from organic affections, to be treated of in the next chapter. When the concurring nervous force is becoming spent in the brain, mental actions are performed with difficulty, and when it is all expended mind cannot exert itself. I have felt so exhausted by mental straining directed to a point, that I could scarcely count so far as five, or name my dearest friends. Whatever be the causes, the facts are well known. The waters laid up in the reservoir run out, and the machinery will not go till a new store collects, supplied by gentle rain or pouring

flood. In the subsidence, the soul feels indisposed to exertion. The lull after the storm is felt to be a relief. Quite as frequently the sensation is one of lassitude, of languor, and depression. The vessel has no wind to bear it on and it is kept back by its own inertia. After a night of somnolence there will be an awaking in the morning, and fresh activity, provided always that there is any strength of intellectual or motive power. But the time of exhaustion may be a time of trial and temptation. The courage which was so keen in the time of passion has sunk into indifference and apathy, and the man has scarcely enough of spirit left to defend or save himself. In the season of relaxation, after victory, armies have lost all that they gained in the previous fight. In the weakness succeeding an active struggle, men and women have ceased to resist evil, have yielded to temptation, and abandoned virtue as a hopeless acquisition. As it is with individuals so is it with communities, with nations. After a time of great excitement, religious or political, or even mercantile or literary, there is apt to be a revulsion, and people are indisposed to exert themselves for any high end. But the reaction of public sentiment is a complex subject, which will be more expediently considered in a later part of this treatise.

SECTION III.

NATURE RESTORING ITSELF.

This is a familiar fact. We see it in the spirits, recovering after a fall. The widow who has just lost her husband is overwhelmed with grief, and feels as if she could never again experience a moment's joy in this world; and in all this she may be perfectly sincere, though the world will not give her credit for it, when it

observes what follows. For in a few months, perhaps in a few weeks, other feelings rise, perhaps new attachments spring up, and she contemplates her loss with nothing more than a sober sadness, and could not, if she wished, renew the poignancy of her first grief. In what way are we to account for this? It is clear that the explanation, if the true one, must take into account those safety valves that provide an outlet for crowded feeling, which, when it rises to a certain height, has a means of flowing out.

It is to be accounted for partly by the exhaustion of the nervous organism, to which I have so often referred as being the issue of excited feeling. This explains how the persons fall into a relaxed state after the period of agitation. But this cause would not hinder the return of the great sorrow again and again, after the prostration is over. In order to understand the process, we must take along with us two other laws. One is the natural shrinking from pain, and therefore from those overwhelming bursts which do so agitate and distract the mind. Then, secondly, the association of ideas calls in a number of other feelings tending to divert the mind. The very departed friend comes to be associated with ideas different from the loss, and these, if they do not remove the grief, tend to alleviate it, by mixing it with other emotions, so that the widow, who in the first instance could not speak of her departed husband without a burst of sorrow, can now talk of his kindness and of his virtues. In matters fitted to awaken feelings of shame, the person studiously banishes the humiliating thoughts as effectively as possible, and seeks, encourages, and cherishes ideas of a different kind, fitted to restore the self-esteem. It is astonishing how speedily persons with no very acute moral sense will outlive their deeds of dishonor, and mingle once more in society with the utmost self-complacency and assurance.

Let us look at the case of a man who has hitherto sustained a high business reputation becoming unexpectedly bankrupt, or of a woman hitherto of pure character committing an act which brings her into disgrace. At first the feeling of mortification is intense, and is rendered more so when there is a sense of guilt. The spirit is so wounded that it feels it cannot bear it (Prov. xviii. 14), and the torture must be got rid of at all hazards. There are means of effecting this. Time brings along with it new avocations and new associations of ideas, and the painful occurrence is remembered as seldom as possible. Excuses will present themselves and be welcomed: there are others as bad as they are, there were palliating circumstances, or the acknowledged faults should be lost sight of amidst the many virtues which are possessed. Or the person may determine unblushingly to face the reproach and defy the world, and will find grounds for fighting with old friends, or with the community generally, and this may be persevered in till the spirit is cauterized by the searing process and becomes insensible. In the course of time new companionships will be formed, and lines of defense set up to stand the assaults of conscience. In the end the guilty man or woman may walk unabashed through the world, mortified only on rare occasions, when the moral monitor is awakened for a brief space from its torpor, or when society lashes with its scorpion stings.

CHAPTER IV.

FOURTH ELEMENT: THE ORGANIC AFFECTION.

It is of importance to place the discussion as to the organic affection at this place rather than in an earlier chapter. The mental emotions are not the effect, they are rather the cause, of the bodily movements. Some physiologists write as if emotion were a sort of reflex act, like the sneezing which follows the tickling of the nostrils. This is a very apposite example of Bacon's *idolum specus*, in which the student of the nerves applies a law which he notices in his own province, to an entirely different class of phenomena. They speak as if, when a mother faints on hearing that her son has been drowned, that it is simply a reaction of the mind evoked by the intelligence from without. But the intelligence of the death as reaching the ear is merely the mean — Malebranche would call it the occasion — of calling into action the mental activity; the idea of the son as dead, and the disappointment of a deep and long cherished affection, these constitute the true cause of the bodily effects of the tremor and agitation. In all cases the emotion begins within, in an appetence or affection of some kind, and in the idea of something to favor or to thwart it. In many cases there is no external occasion to call it forth, as when the mother in the midst of the night awakes, thinks of her drowned son and weeps, or when a man sitting in his room suddenly recalls a past deed of folly,

and is overwhelmed with regret, which causes his whole frame to writhe.

It is much more difficult to treat of the bodily affections produced by the emotions, than of the emotions considered as mental acts revealed to consciousness. The reason is, that we have now to deal with two very different sets of agencies, with extended body and sensitive mind, and with their mutual action. For the present, it is of importance that psychologists should pursue their observations with consciousness as agent, and that physiologists should conduct their experiments with all the appliances they can command, each party being under obligations not to speculate beyond his own province. As they do so, judicious men will rise up to combine the results in a consistent system, in which light will be thrown both on mind and body. So far as the emotions are concerned, all we can do at present is to enunciate and employ a few laws of an empirical character that have been ascertained.

The desirable thing would be to determine what bodily effect each kind of affection or emotion is fitted to produce, what influence is exercised by grief and by joy, by fear and by hope, by regret and by complacency. This cannot be done very specifically at present, but mental science may promote this end by giving a good description and classification of the feelings, to which physiology can accommodate its researches. At present, psychologists are often ignorant of the empirical laws which have been discovered by physiologists who have studied the brain and nerves, and more frequently physiologists imagine that all emotion can be explained by nervous action, and confound the different departments of the mind.

I. There is a general law as to the soothing or irritat-

ing effects of emotion on the body. When the idea contemplates the good, that is, the appetible, both the psychical and the organic affections are pleasant, less or more. This is the case with contentment, cheerfulness, hope, and joy. On the other hand, when it regards what is supposed to be evil, the sensibility is to a less or greater extent disagreeable. It is so with anger, remorse, fear, and grief, under all their forms. Generally it may be held that a moderate degree of emotion is favorable to the health, both of mind and body. It should be observed, however, of all intense and vehement feeling, whether it be painful or pleasant in a moderate degree, that it wearies and exhausts the frame and is apt to issue in listlessness and apathy. Our feelings are meant to be breezes to waft us along on the voyage of life, but we are ever to guard against allowing them to rise into gales and hurricanes, to overwhelm us in depths from which we cannot be extricated. By the causes now indicated we can account for the reaction which commonly succeeds a period of high excitement, whether among individuals or communities — the tide has run its course and the ebb sets in. It has not been so frequently observed, though it is equally true, that among persons of life and spirit there is apt, after a period of lassitude, to be a reawakening, and a craving for enterprise which searches for a channel in which to flow, and will find an outlet. The hungry lion will not more certainly go forth in search of prey than the man who has any force of character will, after a period of relaxation, be impelled to set out on new activities.

Hygiene takes advantage of this law, and will profit by it more and more as science advances. The physician should, in the first place, seek to put and keep in a healthy state those organs of the body whose derange-

ment affects the mind, such as the heart, which tends to make us excitable, the stomach, which produces irritation, and the liver, which inclines to melancholy. This may often be done by appropriate medicines. In healing these organs we soothe the temper and prevent the rise of other diseases. When children are cross-tempered the nurse gives them a dose of medicine. But secondly, and more especially, the physician should endeavor to raise those feelings which give stimulus to the frame, such as hope, which casts sunshine on the landscape and stirs up motives which lead to exertion and activity; and take all pains to remove those affections which tend to depress and to sink the soul into despondency and inactivity. The wisest physicians do this at present, being led by good sense and common observation, but they will do it more regularly and efficiently when they have before them a thorough exhibition of the motives which stimulate and exhilarate, and those that restrain and repress. In carrying out this method it is necessary that they should know not only the bodily constitution and habits of the patient, but also his temperament and the aims he sets before him in life.

II. While we cannot at present specify scientifically the precise influence exercised on the body by the various kinds of emotion, we can enumerate a few laws, chiefly of an empirical character but full of interest and importance.

The emotions through the nerves act particularly on the heart and lungs, and thence on the organs of breathing, the nerves of which spread over the face, which may thus reveal the play of feeling. Every sudden emotion quickens the action of the heart and consequently the respiration, which may produce involuntary motions. If our organs of respiration and circulation had been dif-

ferent our expression would also have been different. "Dr. Beaumont had the opportunity of experimenting for many months on a person whose stomach was exposed to inspection by accident, and he states that mental emotion invariably produced indigestion and disease of the lining membrane of the stomach — a sufficient demonstration of the direct manner in which the mind may disorder the blood."[1] Certain emotions, such as sudden fear, increase the peristaltic action, whereas anxiety and grief diminish it. Sorrow of every kind, sympathy, and pity act on the bowels. All strong passions are apt to make the muscles tremble; this is especially the case with all aggravated forms of fear, with terror and rage, but is also so with anger, and even joy. The action of the heart is increased by anger. In fear, the blood is not transferred with the usual force. Settled malice and envy give rise to jaundice, it is said, by causing the matter secreted to be reabsorbed into the capillary blood-vessels of the liver, instead of being carried out by the branches of the bile-duct. The idea of the ludicrous raises a mental emotion which bursts out in laughter; grief finds an outlet in tears. Complacency with those we converse with is manifested in smiles. We read, in various languages, of lightness of heart, of the paleness of fear, of the breathlessness of surprise, of the trembling with passion, of bowels of compassion, of the jaundiced eye of envy, and all these figures embody truths recognized in universal experience. It is a curious circumstance that young infants do not shed tears, though they utter screams and fall into convulsions. These last are the effects of pain, but they do not shed tears till they have an emotion, with its idea of the appetible and inappetible.

[1] Moore on *The Power of the Soul over the Body*, p. iii. ch. viii.

III. Sir Charles Bell has shown, in the "Anatomy of Expression," how close and extensive is the connection of the organs that sustain life and the muscular system of the face, neck, and chest. The heart and lungs are united by nerves, and work in unison. They have no feeling when we touch them, yet they are alive to the proper stimulus and they suffer from the slightest change of position or exertion. They are also affected by the changes, and especially the emotions, of the mind. They act on the re-spiratory organs, which have numerous nerves in the throat, windpipe, tongue, lips, and nostrils. There is a class of nerves appropriated to "respiration." These nerves arise in the same part of the brain. The great nerve descends into the chest to be distributed to the heart and lungs, and the others extend to the exterior muscles of the chest, neck, and face. "Thus the frame of the body, constituted for the support of the vital functions, becomes the instrument of expression; and an extensive class of passions, by influencing the heart, by affecting that sensibility which governs the muscles of respiration, calls them into operation so that they become an undeviating mark of certain states or conditions of the mind. They are the organs of expression."

He then shows that emotions by the action of the muscles chiefly affect "the angles of the mouth and the inner extremity of the eyebrow; and to these points we must principally attend in all our observations concerning the expression of passion. They are the most movable parts of the face; in them the muscles concentre, and upon the changes which they undergo expression is acknowledged chiefly to depend. To demonstrate their importance we have only to repeat the experiment made by Peter of Cortona: to sketch a placid countenance and touch lightly with the pencil the angle of the lips and the inner ex-

tremity of the eyebrows. By elevating or depressing these we shall quickly convey the expression of grief or of laughter."

At this point Darwin takes up the subject in his "Expression of the Emotions": "We have all of us as infants repeatedly contracted our orbicular corrugator and pyramidal muscles, in order to protect our eyes while screaming; our progenitors have done the same during many generations; and though with advancing years we easily prevent, when feeling distressed, the utterance of screams, we cannot from long habit always prevent a slight contraction of the above-named muscles; nor indeed do we observe the contraction in ourselves, or attempt to stop it, if slight. But the pyramidal muscles seem to be less under the command of the will than the other related muscles; and if they be well developed their contraction can be checked only by the antagonistic contraction of the central fasciæ of the frontal muscle. The result which necessarily follows, if these fasciæ contract energetically, is the oblique drawing up of the eyebrows, the puckering of their inner ends, and the formation of rectangular furrows on the middle of the forehead." He goes on to say that the depression of the corners of the mouth is effected by the *depressores anguli oris.* "The fibres of this muscle diverge downwards, with the upper convergent ends attached round the angles of the mouth and to the lower lip, a little way within the angles." "Through steps such as these we can understand how it is that as soon as some melancholy thought passes through the brain there occurs a just perceptible drawing down of the corners of the mouth, or a slight raising up of the inner ends of the eyebrows, or both movements combined, and immediately afterwards a slight suffusion of tears." [1]

[1] *Expression of Emotions,* ch. vii.

IV. Mr. Darwin, by his own observations, and by the answers given to queries which he issued as to the various races of mankind, especially those who have associated but little with Europeans, seems to have established the following points, some of them, perhaps, only provisionally and partially. Astonishment is expressed by the eyes and mouth being opened wide, and by the eyebrows being raised. Shame excites a blush when the color of the skin allows it to be visible. When a man is indignant or defiant he frowns, holds his body and head erect, squares his shoulders, and clinches his fists. When considering deeply on any subject, or trying to understand any puzzle, he is apt to frown and wrinkle the skin beneath the lower eyelids. When in low spirits the corners of the mouth are depressed, and the inner corner of the eyebrows are raised by that muscle which the French call the "grief muscle." The eyebrow in this state becomes slightly oblique, with a little swelling at the inner end; and the forehead is transversely wrinkled in the middle part, but not across the whole breadth, as when the eyebrows are raised in surprise. When persons are in good spirits the eyes sparkle, the skin is a little wrinkled round and under them, and the mouth a little drawn back at the corners. When a man sneers or snarls at another the corner of the upper lip over the canine or eye tooth is raised on the side facing the man whom he addresses. A dogged or obstinate expression may often be recognized, being chiefly shown by the mouth being firmly closed, by a lowering brow, and a slight frown. Contempt is expressed by a slight protrusion of the lips and by turning up the nose with a slight expiration. Disgust is shown by the lower lip being turned down, the upper lip slightly raised, with a sudden expiration something like incipient vomiting, or like something spit out

of the mouth. Laughter may be carried to such an extreme as to bring tears into the eyes. When a man wishes to show that he cannot prevent something being done, or cannot himself do something, he is apt to shrug his shoulders, turn inwards his elbows, extend outwards his hands, and open the palms, with the eyebrows raised. Children when sulky are disposed to pout, or greatly protrude the lips. The head is nodded vertically in affirmation, and shaken laterally in negation.

V. The expressions have commonly been produced, in the first instance, by the emotions of which they are the effect, and commonly the sign; and whenever the like feeling arises, the expression will follow, by the law of association. In the first instance, and it may be for a time, the action of the emotion had a purpose, it may be to protect or ward off danger, or meet opposition, now it is continued after the meaning has gone. A man walking along the edge of a precipice leans away from it lest he fall; and he will be apt to take the same posture when the precipice is so guarded that there is no longer danger. The screams of terror may first have been uttered to call in assistance, now they come forth when no assistance is at hand, or none is needed. The shout on the occasion of a happy occurrence may at first have been intended to convey the glad tidings to others, now it is the natural expression of a crowd when it is gratified. Anger and rage in children, and in primitive states of society, agitated the whole frame and led to blows; it still rouses the body and reddens the countenance, though it does not culminate in fighting. These expressions may become hereditary; this, however, because they have formed certain lines in which nervous energy flows. There are acts done, and attitudes assumed, which may have come down from a remote ancestry, and telling of primitive

manners. But it should be observed that there is mental as well as organic action in all this; in the expression, actions were first called forth by emotions of the mind, and are now called forth by a like emotion. As Darwin expresses it, "whenever *the same state of mind* is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency, through the force of habit and association, for the same movements to be performed." [1]

VI. We see what truth there is in physiognomy. It does not appear that the dispositions and character can be known by the shape or size of any muscle or bone, say, as has been vulgarly supposed, by the lines on the palms of the hand, or the form of the nose, or the curlings of the ear. But the emotions affect the nerves which leave their mark on the face and gait. According to Bell, "In all the exhilarating emotions, the eyebrows, eyelids, the nostrils, and the angles of the mouth are raised. In the depressing passions it is the reverse." Darwin adds, "under the influence of the latter the brow is heavy, the eyelids, cheeks, mouth, and whole head droop; the eyes are dull, the countenance pallid, and the respiration slow. In joy the face expands, in grief it lengthens." There are other signs which are natural, and, unless repressed, universal. The leaning forward of the body denotes interest in the person or object. The nodding of the head is understood as assent. On the other hand, the turning of the body or of the head expresses aversion or denial. The frown on the brow indicates displeasure. Fire in the eye, color in the cheek, agitation in the frame, with the clinched fists, are signs of anger. Blushing on the face and neck arise from shame, that is, from a sensitiveness about the opinions of others, particularly as regards one's person, and in regard to decency. A suffused eye

[1] *Expression of the Emotions*, ch. i.

is a sign of pity. A softened eye, with a swelling bosom, is a mark of love. A stiff, upright head and figure is often an indication of pride. Relaxed features are the issue of weariness, inclined to sleep. The drawing up or snuffing of the nostrils exhibits disgust, the same as is produced by an offensive smell. The smooth countenance implies contentment, except the person be a hypocrite. Kneeling is an appropriate attitude of submission to a superior. The upturned eye is the symbol of a soul looking to heaven in adoration. By such causes as these there are persons "whose heart is in their face." The prevailing passions, say benevolence, or good-nature, or malignity, or sourness, or dejection, or sorrow, or timidity, or self-humiliation, or lust, or haughtiness, produce an impression and expression which can be noticed and read by the practiced eye. Persons gifted with shrewdness, and who have mingled much with the world, are thus able, with amazing accuracy, and at first sight, as if by instinct, but really by lengthened observation, to guess at the character or present mental frame of those they meet with.

VII. It should be noticed that while pleasure and pain are very different from emotions, yet they may, and often do, mingle with each other. I have remarked that the emotions looking to the good are pleasant, and the pleasure intensifies the emotion, say of hope and joy, and we enjoy and seek to prolong it. On the other hand, the emotions that contemplate the evil are always more or less painful, and the pain may mix with and increase the affection. We have a vivid picture of bodily pain by Sir C. Bell: "The jaws are fixed and the teeth grind; the lips are drawn laterally, and the nostrils dilated; the eyes are largely uncovered, and the lips raised; the face is surged with blood, and the veins of the temple and

forehead distended; the breath being checked, and the descent of blood from the head impeded by the agony of the chest, the cutaneous muscle of the neck acts strongly, and draws down the angles of the mouth. But when joined to this the man cries out, the lips are retracted, and the mouth open; and we find the muscles of his body rigid, straining, struggling." Now, as all the affections that arise from the idea of evil, especially all the malign affections, produce pain, we find the sensation mingling and acting with the passion, and the result may be a terrible struggle, such as we see in Laocoon, and often in the wounded or murdered man. The fight with the suffering often adds intense violence, such as writhing and blows, to the proper action of the passion.

VIII. But bodily effects may be produced not only by real, but by imaginary objects. We have seen that every emotion implies an idea. This idea is very often of a sensible object, that is, of an object made known to us by the senses. Now it seems to be pretty well established that there are organs of the brain necessary in order to the perception of material objects. Smell, as a psychical act, is not in the nostrils, nor hearing in the ear, nor touch in the nerves, nor vision in the eye. There is need of a cerebral action in order to a conscious sensation, and in order to a perception of the objects. It is very generally acknowledged that the senses may have a common centre of sensation, a sensorium in the brain, or more probably, that each sense has a local centre. Physiologists are not quite agreed as to what these centres are. It is enough for our present purpose that there is either a general centre, or that there are special centres.

But this is not the point which it is necessary for us to establish. There is a further truth approximately and provisionally determined. It is that the organ of the

brain necessary to our having a perception of the object is also necessary to our reproducing it as a phantasm, in memory or imagination. Thus: suppose that there is an organ of vision in the *thalami optici*, or more probably, farther up in the cerebrum, this organ is needed not only to give us the original figure, say the form of our mother, but is needed in order to our being able to call up her image and to think of her when she is absent. The same remark applies to all the other senses; we need the auditory organ to recall a sound, and the organ of taste and smell to recall flavors, and of feeling to image tactual impressions, and of the muscular sense to think of objects in motion.[1] But we have seen that when ideas are of objects appetible or inappetible they stir up emotion. We have here a glimpse of the way in which the feelings work in the brain. The idea which evokes the feeling, and is its substratum, works in the cerebrum; and the excitement produced, like the original sensation, may

[1] Professor Ferrier, in *Functions of the Brain*, has been successful in showing that there are organs of the brain which are the centres of, or at least are somehow concerned with, the sensations and perceptions given by the different senses. The organic or visceral sensations are felt in the occipital lobes, towards the lower periphery. Smell and taste need the *subiculum cornu ammonis*. Touch is felt in the *hippocampal* region. Sight has an organ in the *gyrus angularis*. Hearing has its centre in the *superior temporo-sphenoidal convolution*. All these centres are rather in the back part of the brain, which seems the organ of sensation. The centres of motion seem to be in the frontal regions, which are the organs of intelligence and will. I think we have evidence that when we are recalling or imaging any object originally perceived by the senses we need the concurrence of the corresponding centres of the brain: of the visceral centre before we can conceive of an object of appetite; of the taste and smell centres before we can conceive of an odor; of the centre of touch in order to conceive of the feeling objects; of the centre of seeing in order to our conceiving colors and visible forms; and of the centre of hearing in order to our conceiving bodies as sounding. I may refer to an article on Mind and Brain, in which I have discussed these subjects, in the *Princeton Review*, March, 1878.

be partly mental and partly bodily. The bodily excitement, often rising to agitation, is very manifest, and is seen in nervous movements, in changes of color, in paleness and redness of countenance, in blushing and in trembling, in laughter and in tears. It is the office of psychology to unfold the emotions; it is the business of physiology to trace the bodily affections from the brain downwards to the nerves and fibres.

It is possible that when a sensible object raises emotion the action proceeds from the cerebral centres of perception down upon the motor nerves, and thence upon the bodily frame generally. It seems almost certain that this is so when the object raising the emotion is not present, and when we have merely an idea of it. The idea, let me suppose, is of an appetible object. The mother is eagerly expecting the return of a son, after an absence of years. The son, at a distance, knows that his mother is dying and may expire any instant. The widow is thinking of her lately departed husband. We recall the spot in which we saw a dear friend killed. We cannot forget the shriek which came from a man in agony. Or, using a very different sense organ, we have a remembrance of a pool with offensive odor. The murderer has a vivid image before him of the murdered man, of his writhing, and of his wounds. In many such cases the mental idea seems to have much the same effect on the organ of perception as the very presence of the object would have.

The idea of an emotional object, that is, of an object raising emotion, may become visible in the bodily frame and on the countenance. A smile appears on the mother's face when she sees her child playing, and there will be a tendency to a like smile when she merely imagines him to be happy. A sadness will gather and settle on the countenance of a father grieving over the loss of a son.

Cherished lust will come forth in a bloated countenance. You may often discover the nature of the feelings by the play upon the features of one who is walking or seated in a room without being conscious of any eye being fixed upon him. You may often know whether business is prospering or not by the expression on the merchant's countenance. You may discover whether the news conveyed by a letter received is good or bad, by the look of the reader.

As with real so with imaginary scenes. We often see pleasure or terror expressed on the countenance when persons are dreaming. As with night-dreams so with day-dreams, the face and the whole frame may be affected by them. There may be sighs drawn forth, or tears shed, or laughter bursting out, by the pictures in a novel, or the creations of the imagination. There may be marked depression, gendered by the fear of evil. Terror, arising from danger, has turned the hair from black to white, and Sir H. Holland tells us of a young man on whom the same effect was produced simply by illusory images. There may be writhings of body, produced by the remembrance of sin.

IX. "I have often remarked," says Burke, "that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry or placid, or frightened or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appearance I endeavored to imitate." Here is an important fact, but it is not correctly stated; that which comes first is put last. The only effective way of mimicking a passion is to call up by the fancy an object or scene fitted to awaken the feeling.

I rather think that sympathetic action is to be accounted for very much in this way: we put ourselves in the position of others, by calling up by the idea the

same feelings, which go out in the same manifestations. Tears shed are apt to call forth tears in the beholder, or quite as readily in the listener to the tale told which makes us realize the position. It is the same with laughter, which is apt to be echoed back till the noise rings throughout a large assembly. When a company as a whole is moved it is difficult for any person to keep his composure. An alarm of fire will spread through a vast congregation, the greater number of whom are actually cognizant of no cause of fear. A panic started by a few soldiers who believe that they see danger will often seize a whole army, the great body of whom know no ground for the terror. It is easier for an orator, say a preacher, if only he can get up feeling, to move a large audience than a thin one. There is a reflection of emotion from every person upon every other. We call this contagion, but it is contagion produced by people's being led to cherish the same feelings producing the same outward manifestation. The very contagion of disease is made more powerful by persons being afraid of, and so dwelling much on, the infection.

If this be so, then imitation, or at least sympathetic imitation, is to be explained in this way: If we have a feeling of trust in certain persons, say our neighbors, or our friends, or our party, or our associates, or our special companions, then we are inclined to act as they act, but by our coming to share their feelings, their affections, and antipathies. When we have a great admiration towards any one for his courage, or his magnanimity, we are especially led to copy him. A brave commander, by going before, may be able to lead his troops into certain death. We have all seen a noble gift, on the part of an individual, calling forth the plaudits and the liberality of many others. The same principle may

overcome the sense of right and lead us to "follow a multitude to do evil."

In this way we can so far account for those violent convulsions which have been produced sympathetically by religious and other forms of excitement. We have a melancholy record of these in Hecker's "The Epidemics of the Middle Ages." Such was the dancing mania which spread over so many countries in the fourteenth century. We have a number of cases collected in Moore's "Power of the Soul over the Body." He mentions the strange delusion that "seized the minds of men in Germany, immediately after the effects of the Black Death had subsided. The delusion took the form of a wild dance, known as that of St. John or St. Vitus. It was propagated like a demoniacal epidemic over the whole of Germany and the neighboring countries to the northwest. The sufferers formed circles, hand in hand, and continued dancing for hours together, in wild delirium, until they fell to the ground from exhaustion." We have instances of the same kind in the convulsionaires who appeared in France in the last century. We have like examples in the present day in the dancing dervishes of the East, in the contortions of the Jumpers, and in the prostrations which are encouraged in misguided religious revivals. These affections seem to be produced by persons entering into the feelings of those with whom they sympathize, and thus bringing on the like bodily expressions. They can be subdued, not by reasoning or by commands, or even directly by threats, but by a counter irritation, that is, an idea raising a very different feeling. "The great Boerhaave had a number of patients seized with epileptic fits in a hospital from sympathy with a person who fell down in convulsions before them. This physician was puzzled how to act, for the sympathetic

fits were as violent as those arising from bodily disease; but reflecting that they were produced by an impression on the mind, he resolved to eradicate them by a still stronger impression, and so directed hot irons to be prepared and applied to the first person who subsequently had a fit: the consequence was that not one was seized afterwards." "A French medical practitioner of great merit relates that in a convent of nuns one of the fair inmates was seized with a strange impulse, and soon the whole sisterhood followed her example and mewed regularly every day for hours together." This continued until "the nuns were informed that a company of soldiers were to surround the convent, and to whip all the holy sisterhood with rods, till they promised to mew no more." "Cardan relates that in another nunnery a sister was impelled to bite her companions, and this disposition also spread among the sisterhood; but, instead of being confined to one nunnery, it spread from cloister to cloister throughout the whole of Europe."

X. We are here in the heart of a subject which cannot be cleared up at present, — the reaction of mind and body. If it be true that emotion produces a certain bodily state, it is also true that some bodily states tend to produce the corresponding feelings. Dr. Braid, in his very curious experiments as to hypnotism, found that a person put in the attitude of devotion became devout. I am not disposed to speak dogmatically about this mysterious phenomenon, but I believe that association of ideas has to do with it. The act of kneeling will naturally suggest the feelings we cherished when we knelt. If we take the attitude of striking the idea of fighting will be suggested. If the expression of affection, or of pity, is assumed, it will call up the feeling associated with it. In the very act of bringing a cloud on the brow the idea of care will be brought up.

XI. When an emotion has an accompanying expression it will always crave for that expression. If the tendency is repressed by circumstances, or by an act of the will, there is produced a restrained and uncomfortable sensation. At times it is distressing when the sense of the ludicrous, raised by an awkward occurrence, is kept in, as it must often be when we are in a grave company, or in the house of God. What a luxury, when the position is changed, to have an opportunity of indulging in ringing laughter. How pained are we when grief cannot find an outlet. What a relief when it outflows in tears.

XII. The question arises, What effect has the expression, or the restraining of it, upon the emotion? In some cases the expression seems to lessen, and in others to increase, the feeling. In like manner, the repression in some circumstances seems to cool the affection, and in other cases to warm it. This difference so far depends on the nature of the underlying appetence, according as it contemplates a good to be desired, or an evil to be avoided. If it contemplates the good, the sensation will be pleasurable, and will allure us to prolong and renew the emotion. If it looks to the evil, the feeling is painful, and the recurrence will be avoided. But more depends on the strength of the affection. The case is like that of a wind blowing on a fire: if it is weak it may extinguish it, if it is strong it may fan it into a conflagration. To vary our comparison, if the passion has not fixed itself it may be overturned; if it is rooted the storm may only make its roots strike deeper into the heart; if it is feeble its waters will be expended in the outflow; if it is powerful then it will bear down all opposition, and flow more violently than before. In the one case the repression will put out the flame, and in the

other the fire will burn in a smoldering state, and be ready to burst out.

XIII. Our physiological psychologists, especially Herbert Spencer, are forever using language which seems to imply that emotions are mere nervous actions excited by disturbances or "shocks," and flowing out either in diffused or in restricted channels. By all means let them examine the nature and laws of the nerves, and they may enunciate them less vaguely and more scientifically than they have yet been able to do. But even when they have accomplished this they will not thereby have come to the conscious elements, the ideas and attachments, which are the essential properties of emotion as we experience it. The fear of bankruptcy is one thing, and the nervous agitation which accompanies it is another thing. They may act and react on each other; but still they have and keep their separate properties, the one set made known by consciousness and the other by the senses. The remembrance on the part of a mother of a child lately deceased may liberate forces, which will flow in their accustomed channels of tears and agitations, as they did when the misfortune happened; but the first grief and the second grief are both mental. When the mother thinks of that son, of his affection for her, and of his interesting ways, always with the conviction that she shall see him no more, this is not a product of the nervous ebullition but rather its cause, in truth its concause. We can account for all this flow of idea and feeling by the association of ideas. The burst of nervous force does not constitute the emotion, but is its result and expression.

I defy any man to explain or even describe what we experience without bringing in the mental element. I quote the summary given by Spencer of his views:[1]

[1] *Psychology*, part VIII. 501.

"Every *feeling* has for its primary concomitant a diffused nervous discharge which excites the muscles at large, including those that move the vital organs, in a degree proportionate to the strength of the *feeling*." "A secondary concomitant of *feeling* in general, as it rises in intensity, is an excitement by the diffused discharge first of the small muscles attached to easily moved parts, such as the face, afterwards of more numerous and larger muscles moving heavier parts, and eventually of the whole body." "Passing from the diffused to the restricted discharges, there has been established in the course of evolution a connection between the nervous plexuses in which any *feeling* is localized and the sets of muscles habitually brought into play for the satisfaction of the *feeling*. Whence it happens that the rise of this *feeling* shows itself by a partial contraction of these muscles, causing those external appearances called the natural language of the *feeling*." According to this showing the *feeling* (I have put it in Italics) is the primary element and the others concomitants.

There is no propriety in calling the nervous affection a correlate of the emotion, or representing the two, after the fashion of the school, as the sides of one thing. They are two things, each with its properties, but acting and reacting on each other, and both should have a place in a full account of the phenomenon.

But instead of pursuing these general observations at this place, I postpone the further consideration of the organic effects to the next book, where I will place them under the heads of the several emotions as I classify them.

BOOK SECOND.

CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

DIVISION OF THE EMOTIONS.

The emotions are so numerous that it is necessary to classify them. This is by no means an easy work; still a map may be drawn to indicate the boundaries and the several provinces. Our careful survey, with an analysis, will enable us to accomplish this.

There is, as we have seen, an idea involved in all emotion. Let us fix on this as the ground of the distribution. Our divisions and subdivisions will be determined and given by the nature of the objects of which we have an idea.

The circumstance that in all feeling we have an idea of objects as APPETIBLE or INAPPETIBLE furnishes a line which divides our emotional nature, like the human body, into two parallel and symmetrical sides. And here it may be proper to state that instead of the somewhat technical phrases "appetible" and "inappetible" we may often employ the words "good" and "evil." It must be distinctly understood, however, that in doing so we do not mean to designate by the terms anything morally good or the opposite. The appetible, which we call the good because our nature clings to it, may in fact be morally evil, and what we turn away from as inappetible may be morally good. Using the phrases in the sense now explained, we find that to every emotion contemplating the good there is a corresponding emotion con-

templating the evil. These have been called by Hartley the Grateful and the Ungrateful. Thus, if there be hope arising from the idea of an object as about to bring happiness, there is also fear springing from the apprehension of an object as likely to be followed by pain. If there be joy derived from the possession of good, there is likewise sorrow from the presence of ill. Every feeling looking to the light has thus a shadow arising from the obstruction of the light. These constitute the attractions and repulsions, the centripetal and centrifugal forces which keep the feelings in motion in their spheres in our emotional system, which is more wonderful than the planetary one.

But this dichotomy does not so distribute the emotions as to enable us to discover the peculiarities of each. It is like the division in natural history into the two sexes, separating the things which are most intimately connected in their nature and which ought to be viewed in their mutual relation. So we must look out for some other ground or grounds of classification. Let us consider the idea as directed to ANIMATE or to INANIMATE objects, say on the one hand to our fellow-men or the lower animals, and on the other hand to objects of nature, or of art, supposed to be beautiful, picturesque, ludicrous, sublime, or the opposite. This gives another bifid cleavage of a convenient kind.

Another distinction will require to be attended to. It is acknowledged by all that feelings are called forth when we contemplate the good and evil as bearing on ourselves. These, being self-regarding, may be called EGOISTIC. But I have been maintaining in this work that man has a native affection which leads him to feel an interest in his fellow-men, and is capable of being moved by whatever affects them. These affections have

been called ALTRUISTIC. We are naturally inclined to wish that others may possess whatever we regard as appetible, and that they may be preserved from all that we regard as evil. This is the kindliness towards a brother man which will flow out like a fountain unless it is restrained by selfishness, and which we should seek to have so elevated and sanctified that it may become the grace of benevolence, leading us to do unto others even as we would that they should do unto us. Nor should it be forgotten that among others we should give the highest place to God as our great benefactor and as possessed of perfect excellence.

But these dividing lines do not distribute the whole wide province into sufficiently minute and specific fields. So we may further consider the ideas as directed to the past, the present, or the future; this gives what Dr. Thomas Brown calls the RETROSPECTIVE, IMMEDIATE, and PROSPECTIVE emotions.

These separations will analyze the emotions for us as the prism does the light. There is a difficulty in finding phrases to express the various kinds, shades, and degrees of feeling. But there will be none in spreading out the components of any given emotion and arranging them in their orders. The divisions in fixing on the *differentia* of the class will always enable us to give a good definition of any emotion. Thus, "fear is the emotion (or prospective emotion) arising when we have an idea of evil about to come upon us."

In now proceeding to give an analysis and description of the various classes of emotions, I wish to be understood that I profess to treat chiefly of the mental, which is indeed the main, the essential element. The grand defect of the account given of the emotions in the present day, by the physiological psychologists, is that they dwell

exclusively on the organic affections and leave upon us the impression that these constitute the feelings, and have overlooked the more important characteristics of this department of our nature. While they give us many valuable physiological phenomena which so far account for the rise of the feelings, or which are the product of the feelings, and therefore their expression and their sign, they utterly fail to bring us into immediate contact with the emotions themselves, as these are experienced by us, and fall under the eye of consciousness, and as they influence the conduct and sway the destiny of mankind.

But while I regard the emotions as psychical and not physical, I have not overlooked the organic products. In the chapter that follows this I give some account of the influence exercised on the body by the feelings of the mind. In doing so I make free use of the careful observations of Sir Charles Bell, and of Darwin, and the more popular descriptions given by some others, such as Cogan on "The Passions."

I have not been able to give an account of the bodily effects of all the various classes of emotions. In particular I have found a difficulty in finding the signs of the feelings contemplating the good. I rather think that these do not leave so distinct a mark on the countenance, and on the frame generally, as the affections which look to the evil. The former class, especially the benign affections, produce a pleasant sensation, and work in harmony with our organism, and the only marks of them are a healthy body and a happy expression, which can be observed by all but can scarcely be described. The other class, especially the malign affections, are always so far painful, and produce deranging effects which physiology should observe.

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS AS DIRECTED TO ANIMATE OBJECTS.

SECTION I.

RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

These arise from the contemplation of good or evil in the past, and this either to ourselves or others. They are the feelings gendered by the ideas brought up directly or indirectly by the memory.

Self-Satisfaction or Regret is the general form of this class of emotions which, however, may appear in several modes, and may differ in intensity.

Complacency or *Displicency*. Here we do not look very minutely or searchingly into special deeds. Upon the whole, we are satisfied with the past, with what we have done, and with its results. Or we are not pleased with what we have accomplished, with our conduct, our success, or the position we have reached. These sentiments may be for good or for evil. The former, if it does not gender *Self-Righteousness*, which is a sin, may take the form of *Self-Esteem*, to sustain us and keep us from doing an unworthy deed. The latter, if a sense of sin, may lead to *Humility*, which, however, is a grace, and not a mere feeling; but, if directed exclusively to the dark side of our experience, may become a *Self-Dissatisfaction*, which hinders courageous action.

Self-Congratulation or *Self-Reproach*. It may be a passing sentiment of self-approval, because we have done

the brave deed, or offered the smart remark that we did, or it may be a momentary dissatisfaction with ourselves, because we were so thoughtless, so foolish, or because we neglected a precious opportunity of adding to our wealth, or influence, or of doing and receiving good. It may be a habitual dwelling on our own supposed good deeds, generating *Self-Sufficiency*, which may be inoffensive (except to ourselves) if we do not boast of our superiority to others, but very offensive when it leads us to deny the merits, or grieve at the success, of others. Or it may be a habitual *Self-Depreciation*, caused by the persons brooding forever on their mistakes, and looking as if they were making an apology for themselves. It may rise to a feeling of *Self-Satisfaction* and *Self-Adulation*, by thinking of our achievements, of our abilities, of our courage, or superiority to others. Or it may sink into a spirit of *Self-Accusation* or *Self-Chiding*, which chafes the spirit and prostrates the energies.

The feeling varies according to the nature of the good or evil contemplated. It is a curious circumstance that every one seems to have something of which he is apt to be vain; it looks as if no one could live comfortably without some supposed excellence. It may be his talents, his shrewdness, his tact, his eminence in some particular branch of study or trade or trick, or it may be simply his personal appearance, his manners, his dress, his equipage, his agility in walking, in dancing, or riding. If he fails in this the feeling engendered is *Mortification*. If he is shorn of everything of which he used to be proud, the disappointment may sink deep into the heart, and the habitual mood is that of emptiness, relieved only by a gnawing at the vitals, and going on towards *Bitterness*, and a Timon-like hatred of women as women, or of men as men. The sentiment of regret may have a beneficial

tendency, or the opposite, according as it is used or is abused. On the one hand, it may rebuke and humble us, and so lead us to avoid past mistakes and pursue a wiser course for the future. On the other hand, it may ferment and sour into vinegar, and become *Chagrin*. Disappointed lovers, authors, artists, politicians, and speculators are apt to fall into this humor. If they are young they may be able to pass through this chill, and yet recover their hope and activity. But when the grand climacteric of life has been reached, and the animal spirits have been drunk up by repeated disappointments, the man may be tempted to give up all effort, and abandon himself to a satisfied or dissatisfied helplessness, accompanied with a bitterness against individuals, or the world at large, going out probably in spiteful remarks. We must all have met with disappointed men or disappointed maidens yielding to this feeling; still retaining a genuine benevolence in the depths of their hearts, but maintaining an attitude of suspicion even of proffered kindness, and shrinking from every proposal to fight the battle of life anew, after having failed. Of all people, I have found these to be the most difficult to gain ; no sunshine will thaw the eternal snows upon these high and unapproachable mountain-tops.

The contemplation of the past may communicate pleasures. How delightful, with a brother, or sister, or old acquaintance, to revive and, as it were, live over again the scenes of our childhood and youth ; in imagination to revisit old spots, and to converse with old acquaintances, it may be about old friends, now gone from this world. The eye gives a color to distant objects, makes mountains blue which are not blue in themselves, and clouds purple and gold which, if we were in them, would be felt as dull and dripping mist ; so the imagination, especially when

we are in a good humor, gives a rich color to the scenes of the past which in themselves were tame or irksome or troubled. In particular, suffering, unpleasant in the prospect and when present, may become pleasant in the remembrance, as we think of trials through which we have passed, and dangers overcome, and victories gained in hard fights. Emotions for which we have not special names may thus be gendered by the contemplation of the past, and may be called the *Emotions of Pleasant Memories.*

It is proper that we should look on the past, for it is from the experience of the past, both from our success and our failures, that we are to gather lessons for the future. But it is foolish to dwell forever on past joys, past sorrows, or past sins. Some would extract a continued and perpetual delight from contemplating the past. But as we do so the flavor will be found to have lost its power, the sweetness to have become insipid while we roll it as a sweet morsel under our tongue. Instead of sucking, on when we have drawn out the moisture, we had better throw away the rind and go forth to seek other and fresh objects of interest. As to our sufferings, we need not look back forever on the darkness; and we are especially to be on our guard against cherishing a perpetual malignity towards those who are supposed to have inflicted them. As to our sins, our first and imperative duty is to have them blotted out, and our second to remember them only so far as to keep us humble and watchful; any further mastication may only distract and sink us, or perhaps even ferment the old passions by calling up the tempting objects anew and anew.

Self-Approbation or *Self-Condemnation*, in which we contemplate our past conduct as being commendable or faulty. This may be a mere passing ebullition of *Self-*

Gratulation, that we have accomplished some feat, or of *Self-Humiliation*, because we have fallen into some imprudence. Or it may become a habitual feeling of *Self-Satisfaction* and *Self-Adulation*, in which we are ever thinking of our imagined virtues, and, if of a communicative temper, ever speaking of them, — more, perhaps, to our own gratification than that of others, who would rather hear their own praises proclaimed. Or it may, as it is indulged in, become a constant complaint and a *Repining*, wasting the energy which might be devoted to a good purpose.

MORAL APPROBATION and DISAPPROBATION. Here a peculiar and very powerful and keen element is introduced; it is the power of conscience. This I cannot treat of in the present work; I refer to it simply as having an Appetence, which, when gratified or frustrated, raises an emotion. When we can look upon a certain conduct of ours as being right, we have a feeling of *Self-Approval* which may soothe or cheer us, provided it does not become a sense of merit which leads us to justify ourselves before God. On the other hand, when we do that which is morally evil; when we cherish a licentious, malignant, or unholy feeling, or do a deed condemned by the moral law, the inward judge condemns and proceeds to punish.

There may be the *Testimony of a Good Conscience.* This may be a source of comfort to some, of unspeakable comfort which bears them up under calumny and persecution. When an innocent man is charged with guilt, his main support must arise from the assurance that he has not done the deed charged, or that the deed, as he is ready to maintain, is not evil. He specially needs this when public opinion is against him, when enemies are stirred up to malign him, and his very friends believe him to be guilty and abandon him.

Remorse. I fear that in the great body of mankind the conscience is in a slumbering state, not dead but dormant. There is a secret feeling that all is not right, and men are afraid to look into the state of the heart lest dark disclosures should be made; just as the murderer would visit any spot on this world's surface rather than that at which the deed was committed, just as the criminal would avoid the bar of the judge, so would the sinner avoid all those thoughts that would remind him of his sin. But there is a power in conscience which will compel us, in spite of all repression, to notice the neglects of duty of which we are guilty from day to day. The reproaches, though individually transient, do yet, by their recurrence, exercise a powerful influence, — they resemble those noxious ephemera which make up in number what they want in strength; and while the individual perishes the genus survives. People are to a large extent unconscious of it, and if the charge were made upon them they would repel it; but I believe a large portion of human dissatisfaction springs from these constantly rising and suppressed accusations, which have much the same influence on our peace as a diseased nervous system or deranged digestive organs. And, in spite of all efforts to check them, there will be times when convulsive assaults of conscience will break in upon the satisfaction of the most self-satisfied, and start "like a guilty thing upon a fearful summons." Man's peace is in this respect like the sultry heat of a summer's day, close and disagreeable at the time, and ever liable to be broken in upon by thunders and lightnings.

Among the Retrospective emotions are those which arise from the idea of good or evil supposed to have been inflicted by our fellow-men. I am not sure that we have expressions in our language to designate all these feelings with their boundary lines and shades of difference.

BENIGNANCY, *Thankfulness, Gratitude.* The feeling may be little more than a mere lively interest in those who have shown some interest in us, or bestowed a favor, or done us a good service. In such cases it is a mere complacency leading us to delight in the society of those who have been kind to us. But it may rise to a thankful and grateful spirit. It should be noticed that gratitude in its highest forms is an exercise of love which implies well-wishing or benevolence, and is more than emotion, — it implies an act of the will, and is a virtue or grace of a high order.

ANGER, *Irritation, Temper, Indignation.* The passions falling under this head arise from the idea of ill usage received. When the appetence is feeble, or the offense a small one, an annoyance is given which produces an irritation like the bite of a mosquito. These disturbances may come like gnats, in streams or swarms, and produce temper ever liable to be ruffled by neighbors, by members of our families, or those we meet with in the business and society of the world. Very often the offenses which raise the keenest feeling may seem very small to mankind generally, but they have wounded the individual in the tenderest part, — his sense of honor or his ruling spring of action, and his passion boils; an attack is made, or a challenge is sent. We call the emotion indignation, when the feeling is of a lofty kind, stirred up by baseness or injustice. An indignation against evil is an element in all truly noble character. A complacency towards sin, with a constant apology for it, or palliation of it, or excusing it, is a weakness, or rather it is an iniquity, and may make us partakers of the offense.

Rage, Wrath, Malignancy, Resentment, Vengeance, Vindictiveness. We may be angry and sin not; but this

disposition may become sinful, and this in the highest degree. It is so when it is excessive, when it is rage, and makes us lose control of ourselves. It is so, and may become a vice, when it leads us to wish evil to others. It is wrath when it is deep, long-continued, and unforgiving. It is malevolence or malignancy when it leads us to wish evil to those who have offended us. It is resentment when it prompts us to meet and repay evil by evil. It is vengeance when it impels us to crush those who have injured us. It is vindictiveness when it is seeking out ingeniously and laboriously means and instruments to give pain to those who have thwarted us. Already sin has entered: we have crossed the line that separates vice from virtue, and are taking upon ourselves one of the prerogatives of God, who claims "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

As anger arises from an idea of evil having been inflicted or threatened, the attitudes taken are those we would assume to ward off the evil. "The corporeal system immediately assumes attitudes and appearances calculated to inspire the offender with terror, and preparatory to the infliction of the chastisement he is supposed to have deserved. The countenance reddens, the eyes flash indignant fire, and the aspect speaks horror; muscular strength is abundantly increased, and powers of exertion are acquired unknown to cooler moments." (Cogan, c. ii. class I.) "Under moderate anger the action of the heart is a little increased, the color heightened, and the eyes become bright. The respiration is likewise a little hurried; and as all the muscles serving for this purpose act in association, the wings of the nostrils are somewhat raised to allow of a free draught of air; and this is a highly characteristic sign of indignation. The mouth is commonly compressed, and there is almost always a frown on the brow. Instead of the frantic gestures of extreme rage, an indignant man unconsciously throws himself into an attitude ready for attacking or striking his enemy, whom he will, perhaps, scan from head to foot in defiance. He carries his head erect, with his chest well expanded and the feet planted firmly on the ground. He holds his arms in various positions, with one or both elbows squared, or

with arms rigidly suspended by his sides. With Europeans the fists are commonly clinched." (Darwin, c. x.)

> "When the blast of war blows in our ears,
> Then imitate the action of the tiger;
> Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,
> . . . .
> Then lend the eye a terrible aspect;
> . . . .
> Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide,
> Hold hard the breath and bend up every spirit
> To his full height."
>
> SHAKESPEARE, *Henry V.*

"In rage the features are unsteady; the eyeballs are seen largely; they roll and are inflamed. The front is alternately knit and raised in furrows by the motion of the eyebrows, the nostrils are inflated to the utmost. The lips are swelled, and, being drawn by the muscles, open the corners of the mouth. The whole visage is sometimes pale, sometimes turgid, dark, and almost livid; the words are delivered strongly through the fixed teeth." (Bell, Essay vii.)

"Under rage the action of the heart is much accelerated, or it may be much disturbed. The face reddens or it becomes purple from the impeded return of the blood, or may turn deadly pale. The respiration is labored, the chest heaves, and the dilated nostrils quiver. The whole body often trembles. The voice is affected. The teeth are clinched or ground together, and the muscular system is commonly stimulated to violent, almost frantic, action. But the gestures of a man in this state usually differ from the purposeless writhings and struggles of one suffering from an agony of pain; for they represent more or less plainly the act of striking or fighting with an enemy." (Darwin, c. iii.)

SECTION II.

IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS.

JOY and SORROW. These arise from the contemplation of a good or evil possessed. The emotions are intensified when the good has been attained by labor, or by a contest with evil. The good and evil will be as the appetences, original or acquired, and the consequent feelings may have a like diversity. They may possibly con-

sist of a mere sensation, pleasant or unpleasant, and the feeling in this case scarcely rises to the dignity of an emotion. But being intellectualized it may lead on to an idea which generates an emotion, say that of beauty. "Grief," says Cogan, "is sometimes considered as synonymous with sorrow. At other times it expresses more silent, deep, and painful affections; such as are inspired by domestic calamities; particularly by the loss of friends and relatives, or by the distress, either of body or mind, experienced by those whom we love and value." The extent of the feeling depends in all cases on the strength of the appetence, and on the degree to which it is gratified or thwarted. The phrases, joyful and sorrowful, may be applied to all the feelings falling under the head of the immediate. Let us follow them from their weaker to their stronger forms.

"In joy the eyebrow is raised moderately but without any angularity, the forehead is smooth, the eye full, lively, and sparkling, the nostril is moderately inflated, and a smile is on the lips. In all the exhilarating emotions, the eyelid, the nostril, and the angle of the mouth are raised. In the depressing passions it is the reverse. For example, in discontent, the brow is clouded, the nose is peculiarly arched, and the angle of the mouth drawn in." (Bell, Essay vii.) "Laura Bridgman from her blindness and deafness could not have acquired any expression through imitation, yet when a letter from a beloved friend was communicated to her by gesture language, she laughed and clapped her hands, and the color mounted to her cheeks. On other occasions she has been seen to stamp for joy." (Darwin, c. viii.) "Joy quickens the circulation of the blood, and in its first impulse it frequently excites violent palpitations of the heart. It renders the eyes peculiarly lively and animated, and sometimes, when the mind has been previously in a state of anxious fear, it stimulates the lachrymal gland to the secretion of tears, accompanied with redness and a sensation of warmth in the countenance." "Unusual vivacity in the eyes and smiles upon the countenance are accompanied by joyful acclamations, clapping of hands, and various other lively gestures. Where the mind is strongly agitated,

and under no restraint from a sense of decorum or solicitude for character, loud laughter, jumping, dancing, and the most wild and extravagant gestures indicate the frolicksomeness of the heart." (Cogan.) Darwin (c. iii.) quotes a case reported by Crichton Browne: "A young man of strongly nervous temperament, on hearing by a telegram that a fortune had been bequeathed him, first became pale, then exhilarated, but soon in the highest spirits, but flushed and very restless. He then took a walk with a friend for the sake of tranquillizing himself, but returned staggering in his gait, uproariously laughing, yet irritable in temper, incessantly talking, and singing loudly in the public streets." "He then slept heavily, and on awaking was well, except that he suffered from headache, nausea, and prostration of strength."

In sorrow or grief the symptoms are "violent agitations and restless positions of the body, extension of the arms, clapping of the hands, beating the breast, tearing the hair, loud sobs and sighs." "Sometimes a flood of tears relieves these pathognomonic symptoms. Universal lassitude and a sense of debility succeed, with deep dejection of countenance, and languor in the eyes, which seem to look around and solicit in vain for assistance and relief." (Cogan, c. ii. class I.) "In fear or in grief the movements of the nostrils, the uncontrollable tremor of the lips, the convulsions of the neck and chest, and the audible sobbing, prove that the influence of the mind extends over the organs of respiration, so that the difference is slight between the action of the frame in a paroxysm of the passions and in the agony of a drowning man." (Bell, Essay viii.) The same author describes the overwhelming influence of grief on woman. "The object in her mind has absorbed all the powers of the frame, the body is no more regarded, the spirits have left it, it reclines, and the limbs gravitate, they are nerveless and relaxed, and she scarcely breathes; but why comes at intervals the long-drawn sigh? why are the neck and throat convulsed? what causes the swelling and quivering of the lips, and the deadly paleness of the face? or why is the hand so pale and earthly cold? and why, at intervals, as the agony returns, does the convulsion spread over the frame like a paroxysm of suffocation?" (Essay iii.) Darwin (c. vii.) describes the grief of a young woman from Nagpore, nursing her baby who was at the point of death. His reporter "saw the eyebrows raised at the inner corners, the eyelids drooping, the forehead wrinkled in the middle, the mouth slightly open, with the corners much depressed. He then came from behind a screen of plants and spoke to the poor woman, who started,

burst into a bitter flood of tears, and besought him to cure her baby." The same author tells (c. vii.) that when the suffering is somewhat mitigated, yet prolonged, they no longer wish for action, but remain motionless and passive, or may occasionally rock themselves to and fro. The circulation becomes languid, the face pale, the muscles flaccid, the eyelids droop, the head hangs on the contracted chest, the lips, cheeks, and lower jaw all sink downward from their own weight. Hence all the features are lengthened, and the face of a person who hears bad news is said to fall."

As weeping is an especial expression of grief, this may be the proper place for the physiological account of it. "The lachrymal glands are the first to be affected; then the eyelids, and finally the whole converging muscles of the cheeks." The lips are drawn aside from their being forcibly retracted by the superior influence of their antagonist muscles, and the angle of the mouth (*triangularis oris*) is depressed. "The cheeks are thus drawn between two adverse powers: the muscles which surround the eyelids, and that which depresses the lower lip." "The diaphragm is spasmodically and irregularly affected, the chest and throat are influenced, the breathing is cut by sobbing, and the expiration is slow, with a melancholy note. In the violence of weeping, accompanied with lamentation, the face is flushed, or rather suffused by stagnant blood, and the veins of the forehead are distended." (Bell, Essay vi.) The muscles round the eyes are strongly contracted during screaming, loud laughter, and analogous acts.

Content and *Discontent*, or, to use phrases of much the same meaning, *Satisfaction* and *Dissatisfaction*. The prevailing appetences have had enough of gratification to soothe them, but not, it may be, to excite them. A great portion of a healthy and happy man's life may be spent in this state, neither much exalted nor much depressed. On the other hand, there may be dissatisfaction, general or occasional, arising from affections being disturbed in a small way more or less frequently, by annoyances of various kinds, by ill health, by the anxieties of business, domestic differences, or the rivalries of rank. It is apt to manifest itself in a discontent painted on the

countenance, in a depression of the bodily frame, or in a habitual restlessness or occasional irritation of manner. The feeling is apt to settle down into a state of *Good* or *Bad Humor*.

Gladness and *Depression*. When these are prolonged and become continuous, they constitute *Cheerfulness* and *Dejection*. These are merely deeper manifestations of those last considered. The appetences are stronger, or they are steadily or more fully gratified. The one feeling may be that of a man who has a happy home, or a pleasant social circle, who likes his work, and whose business is prospering. The counterpart may be the temper of one who is in ill health, who has domestic unhappiness, who has quarreled with the circle in which he moves, whose business does not suit his taste, or is continually going wrong. It should be noticed that feelings belonging to other divisions are apt to mingle with those under consideration, such as pride, regrets as to the past, hopes and fears as to the future. These feelings, according as they dwell on the good or the evil, are often called *Good* and *Bad Spirits*, and may promote or injure the health.

Rapture and *Melancholy*. These are the highest forms of joy and the lowest forms of sorrow. They arise when the good and evil are supposed to be very great, and touch the deepest affections of our nature. There is the ecstacy of the lover when his or her love is reciprocated, of the soldier when he has gained a decisive victory, of the scientific investigator when the long looked-for discovery bursts upon his view, of the saint when he has the beatific vision. There is the prostration of spirit which sinks man and woman, when every effort to secure their favorite ends has failed. Old men are specially apt to feel in this way when they lose the reputation, the honor, the

fortune which they had passed a life-time in earning, and feel that they cannot start anew. We have striking instances in the poet Beattie and in Edmund Burke, when they lost promising sons on whom their hopes were centered, and could never be made to lift up their heads after. The cloud has come down upon the mountain top, and descends lower and lower, till at last all is wrapt in impenetrable gloom; and in this, the winter season, which has come upon them, there is no hope of its rising. They now give themselves over to melancholy, "indulge in melancholy," as the expression is, finding that it is easier for them to do so than make the exertion to be rid of it, which they feel to be hopeless and useless. (*Supra*, p. 75.)

"From his observations on melancholic patients, Mr. Nicol concludes that the inner ends of the eyebrows are almost always more or less raised, with the wrinkles on the forehead more or less plainly marked. In the case of one young woman, these wrinkles were observed to be in constant slight play or movement. In some cases the corners of the mouth are depressed, but often only in a slight degree." "The eyelids generally droop, and the skin near their outer corners and beneath them is wrinkled. The naso-labial fold, which runs from the wings of the nostrils to the corners of the mouth, and which is so conspicuous in blubbering children, is often plainly marked in these patients." (Darwin, c. vii.) "Melancholy manifests itself by dejection of spirits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and insuperable love of solitude, universal apathy, and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the corporeal system, and, not unfrequently, trouble the brain. (Cogan, c. ii.)

PRIDE and SELF-HUMILIATION. In the former, we form and cherish and entertain a high and self-satisfied opinion of ourselves, of our abilities, of our conduct, or of certain qualities supposed to be possessed by us, or of certain acts we have done. In the latter, we are not satisfied with ourselves, we do not believe we have quali-

fications for certain offices, and we depreciate what we have done. The one state, when it is self-righteous, may become a sin offensive to God and *Self-Conceit* denounced by man; the other, if it is yielded to, and not counteracted by a sense of duty, may become a *Poorness of Spirit* which prevents us from engaging in anything which requires courage and perseverance. The one, if we dwell only on the good qualities we possess, may become *Self-Respect* to keep us from what is mean and unworthy; the other, when it leads us to take a lowly attitude before God and our fellow-men, may become the grace of *Humility*.

"A proud man exhibits his sense of superiority over others by holding his head and body erect. He is haughty (haut) or high, and makes himself appear as large as possible, so that metaphorically he is said to be swollen or puffed up with pride. A peacock, or turkey-cock strutting about with puffed-up feathers, is sometimes said to be an emblem of pride. The arrogant man looks down on others and with lowered eyelids hardly condescends to see them; or he may show his contempt by slight movements about the nostrils or lips. Hence the muscle which everts the lower lip has been called the *musculus superbus*. It is added that the mouth is closed, 'from the proud man feeling perfect self-confidence in himself.'" (Darwin, c. xi.)

Vanity differs from pride, inasmuch as in it people imagine that they stand high in public esteem, and are led to put themselves in positions in which they may dazzle the eyes of their fellow-men. He who cherishes it is flattered by attention paid to him, by applause, perhaps even by notoriety, and is mortified by neglect, by blame, and abuse. Opposed is the *Shrinking from public gaze*, commonly from fear of being found fault with.

Haughtiness implies not only a high opinion of ourselves but a sense of superiority to others, often shown in mien and air. In *Contempt* we express by words or by

manner that we have a low opinion of others. In *Disdain* we indicate that they are inferior to us in such qualities as worth, ability, and rank, and that we have no regard for them or no use for them. In *Scorn* we declare that they are unworthy of our notice. In *Sneering* we notice them, but only to point to their low qualities. In *Disgust* we view them as we would an offensive object, say a mal-odor. Opposed to all these is a spirit of *Meekness*, which "seeketh not its own," and does not think of its superiority to others.

"Contempt and disdain are often accompanied with a satirical smile which strongly insinuates that baseness and meanness are also intermixed with large portions of folly." (Cogan, p. I. c. ii.) "Contrasted with joy is the testy, pettish, peevish countenance bred of melancholy; as of one who is incapable of receiving satisfaction from whatever source it may be offered; who cannot endure any man to look steadily upon him, or even speak to him, or laugh, or jest, or be familiar, or hem, or point, without thinking himself contemned, insulted, or neglected. The arching of the mouth, and peculiar form of the wings of the nose, are produced by the conjoint action of the triangular muscle which depresses the angles of the mouth and the superbus, whose individual action protrudes the lower lip. The very peevish turn given to the eyebrows, the acute upward inflection of their inner extremities, and the meeting of the perpendicular and transverse furrows in the middle of the forehead, are produced by the opposed action of part of the frontal muscle and of the corrugator." (Bell, Essay vii.) "The lips are retracted and the grinning teeth exposed. The upper lip is retracted in such a manner that the canine tooth on one side of the face alone is shown; the face itself being generally a little upturned and half averted from the person causing offense." "The expression of a half-playful sneer graduates into one of great ferocity when, together with a heavily frowning brow and fierce eye, the canine tooth is exposed." (Darwin, c. x.) In sulkiness, as seen for instance in children, there is a protrusion or pouting of the lips. (c. v.) "The most common method of expressing contempt is by movements about the nose or round the mouth; but the latter movements, when strongly pronounced, indicate disgust. The nose may be slightly turned up, which apparently fol-

lows from the turning up of the upper lip ; or the movement may be abbreviated into the mere wrinkling of the nose. The nose is often slightly contracted so as partly to close the passage, and is commonly accompanied by a slight snort or expiration. All these actions are the same with those we employ when we perceive an offensive odor. We seem thus to say to the despised person that he smells offensively ; in nearly the same manner as we express to him by half closing our eyelids or turning away our faces, that he is not worth looking at." (c. xi.)

SUBMISSION, RESIGNATION, PATIENCE. Under these emotions we know and feel that we are exposed to evil imposed by circumstances, or by the intention of an agent. We might be tempted to rebellion and to fighting, and the issue would be irritation, as when the rock opposes the waves. But we choose to submit to the inevitable, or we resign ourselves to what is our lot. We may rise to a far higher state, — to the grace of patience which submits implicitly to the will of God and believes that all is for good.

Resistance, *Repining*, *Peevishness*, *Sulkiness*, *Disgust*. We oppose and resent the evil to which we are exposed, or we habitually dwell on the evils of our lot; we throw the blame on our position or on our fellow-men, and complain of fortune, of fate, or of God. Often the sense of injury done is allowed to sink into the heart, breeding discontent and issuing in murmuring or in disobliging acts indicating the peevish temper within. Some yield to sulkiness, and retreat, as into a cave, from their fellow-men as unworthy of their confidence and regard.

In the look and mien of resignation there is a resistance to the impulses which would lead to rebellion and retaliation, such as anger and revenge; and this gives a suppressed and a subdued look, with possibly the hands lying over the body and the eyes cast downward.

Good and *Bad Humor*. These are habitual states. They may depend very much on the bodily tempera-

ment. Good humor often proceeds simply from good health, favored, it may be, by prosperity. Quite as frequently, however, it is produced by mental appetences cherished from day to day. In all cases it consists in a flow of grateful feelings running towards what is pleasing and viewing all things on the sunny side. In the opposite humor all things are clothed, as it were, in the dress of mourning. Possibly under the influence of a disordered stomach, or a diseased frame, or cherished ill-temper, the mind flits from one ungrateful topic towards another: in the past remembering only misfortunes or ill usage; in the present thinking only of deprivations, and in the future picturing only woes. It may become a *Sourness of Temper* painted visibly on the countenance, and exhibited in the manner, and rejecting all kind proposals, even those of genuine love.

"A man in high spirits, though he may not actually smile, commonly exhibits some tendency to the retractions of the corners of his mouth. From the excitement of pleasure the circulation becomes more rapid, the eyes are bright, and the color of the face rises. The brain, being stimulated by the increased flow of blood, reacts on the mental powers; lively ideas pass still more rapidly through the mind, and the affections are warmed. I heard a child a little under four years, when asked what was meant by being in good spirits, answer 'it is laughing, talking, and kissing.'" (Darwin, c. viii.)

Already some of these feelings relate to supposed good or evil to others as well as ourselves. We may now look exclusively to the emotions bearing on others.

PITY is produced by the idea of a person subjected to pain or to any form of evil. When it is continuous it is compassion towards those who suffer, and it may be those that sin. Opposed is *Hardness of Heart*, which is insensible to the wail of misery, and steels itself against the claims of poverty and suffering.

Sympathy, with *Joys* or *Sorrows*. This is a fine element of human character. It originates in the affection which we naturally have towards others. All this, however, may be a mere surface sensibility, as fleeting as the play of features on the countenance, or as the chasing of sunshine and shadow on the mountain sides, very pleasant, but evanescent, — as one observed of a sensitive person ever in smiles and tears, that he was a man of tenderness of nerve rather than of heart. Such persons feel for us, but they do not stand by us; they do not help us. In genuine feeling sympathy is rooted and grounded in love, and is a branch of love, and a grace of a high order. We are commanded to "rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep."

In it our heart beats responsive to the hearts of others. We enter into their feelings; we identify ourselves with them. Our very countenance is apt to take the expression of the feeling into which we enter. When we see others laugh we are apt to laugh also. We weep with those that weep. We are disposed to run with those that run. We flee with those that flee. When others are striking a blow we are inclined to lift our arm as if to do the same. It is usually said that all this arises from the principle of imitation. The correct account rather is, that we place ourselves in the position of others, and are thus led to act as they act.

Envy. Here we have an idea of others being superior to us, and instead of rejoicing in it we feel as if we were thereby lowered and injured, and are tempted to lower and injure them. Envy is one prompting cause of our depreciation of others, of slander, and of the efforts we make to oppose and keep down our rivals.

Trust or *Confidence* in a fellow-creature, or *Suspicion*. We look on an individual as to be relied on or not to be

relied on, and a feeling of trust or mistrust arises. This feeling is apt to become especially strong when we view him as having a relation to us; and as likely to stand by us in an emergency, or to abandon us and turn against us. Some are confiding to the extent of weakness, and so are likely to be taken in; others are unreasonably and cruelly suspicious, and construe every appearance as a proof of guilt. These extremes are manifestations of a temper inclined to look on mankind with kindly or with unkindly feelings, but not stopping to weigh evidence.

Suspicion is described in the "Faery Queen:" —

> "Foul, ill-favored, and grim,
> Under his eyebrows looking still askance,
> And ever as Dissemblance laughed on him
> He lower'd on her with dangerous eye glance,
> Showing his nature in his countenance,
> His rollings eyes did never rest in place,
> But walked each where, for fear of hid mischance
> Holding a lattice still before his face,
> Though he still did peep as forward he did pace."

Suspicion, while keeping the body unmoved to avoid notice, may be turning the eye in a peering manner.

Rejoicing in or *Jealousy* of the success of others. We have been brought into a relation more or less close with certain of our fellow-men. We are led in consequence of the social instinct to feel an interest in them and in their prosperity; we feel as if their success is our success; we are almost as much delighted with it as they are, and we are prompted to further it from interested or disinterested motives. Or, a person has come between us and those whom we love, or those on whom we suppose that we have some claim, or he is hindering our favorite ends or schemes, and we become jealous of him. When his name is mentioned, when we meet

him or we are led to think of him, especially when we are brought into collision with him, painful associations come up, and we wish that he may be disappointed. This disposition shows itself among the lower animals. The pet dog indicates its dislike of any other creature — dog or cat or child — that threatens to usurp its place. That girl is very much offended when any other child gets more attention than she does from nurse or mother. Jealousies arise in the rivalries of school, and appear in every future stage of life, and are seen in the competitions of trade, of dress, of social dignity, of popularity, of honor and reputation. It is more common in certain walks of life than in others, and is apt to come out to notice in all those professions in which the members come in collision with each other: as, for instance, among doctors, who have to consult about delicate cases; among actors and actresses, who have to live on popular applause, which is apt to be capricious; among authors, who have to be sustained by public opinion; and even among popular preachers, who feel that they have a reputation to keep up, and are not awed by the responsibility of their office. Women are more disposed to feel it than men, because of their numerous small attachments, and because there is not as much opportunity of having their angles and points rubbed off and smoothed by intercourse with the world. It has to be added that when men are frustrated in a ruling passion they are apt to keep up the bitterness longer and express it more loudly than the opposite sex.

Jealousy is more specially felt when there has been an affection of some kind between the parties. It is most apt to be felt by lovers, and may disturb the intercourse of husband and wife. Lovers are so dependent on the smile of the loved one that they feel as if left in darkness

when the sunshine is withdrawn, and they attribute the withdrawal to a rival coming between. Husband and wife feel that they have a right to the pledged affection of one to the other, and are indignant at the one who has enticed it away and grieved with the one who has unlawfully bartered it.

"In jealousy the eyelid is fully lifted and the eyebrows strongly knit, so that the eyelid almost entirely disappears and the eyeball glares from under the bushy eyebrow. There is a general tension on the muscles which concentrate round the mouth; and the lips are drawn so as to show the teeth with an expression of cruelty, depending in a great measure, perhaps, on the turn of the nostrils which accompanies the drawing of the lips." (Cogan.) "In jealousy the eyebrows are knit, and the eyelid so fully lifted as almost to disappear, while the eyeball glares from under the bushy eyebrow. There is a general tension of the muscles which concentre round the mouth and the lips, and show the teeth with a fierce expression. This depends partly on the turn of the nostril which accompanies the retraction of the lips." (Bell, Essay vii.)

SECTION III.

PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

The emotions looking to the future are the main stimulants of activity. As we fix our eyes on the past we may be kept from going forward; we may be satisfied, and so cease to exert ourselves, or so dissatisfied as to give ourselves up to unbelief or despair. The present may induce us to linger in it; the present good may satisfy us or the present evil may bow us down to the earth. In the emotions now under consideration we look on the land before us, and are allured to go on to possess it. "We are saved by hope." Without it we would lie down and perish; with it we rise as Mungo Park did, when, being prostrated and ready to die, his eyes fell on the "blue-bell" of Scotland, and he arose with the pur-

pose of yet seeing his native land. It is a common saying that more of human happiness may proceed from hope than realization ; the enjoyment is in the hunt rather than in the game caught. It is fortunate, it is providential that it is so. Men are not expected, after having gained some petty end, to retire from the heat of the day and give themselves over to indolence. To those who would linger too long in the shade God may send a gadfly to rouse them from their torpor and send them forth to new activities.

The prospective emotions, like all the others, may be divided into those that look to the appetible and those that look to the inappetible, in other words into the grateful and ungrateful. But there is an important class which lies in an intermediate region.

SURPRISE, *Astonishment.* An event occurs very suddenly or contrary to the usual course of things, or the expectations which we were led to entertain. It is of such a character that it must have momentous consequences. But we know not at first whether it is to be for good or for evil. It thus raises feeling ; for the mind dwells on the possible or probable evil, and becomes excited, perhaps restless, hoping or fearing, or flitting from the one to the other. This may continue for a time, till we see what the nature of the event is to be, what are its causes and its consequences ; and then the miracle comes to be regarded as a natural occurrence. The feeling is apt to be strongest among the young who more frequently meet with unexpected occurrences and are more uncertain about the issues. As they advance in life they are less liable to meet with incidents out of the course of their ordinary experience, and better able to calculate the results. The young run to every blazing fire expecting pleasure which the old know is not likely to fol-

low. The consequence is that the aged are apt to cease to feel an interest in what is passing; because their experience does not justify them in expecting from it much good or much evil.

"The first impulse of surprise deprives the subject of the power of utterance, and the first exertion of this returning power consists in loud exclamations adapted both to the nature of the emotion itself and to its confusion and wonder in relation to the object." "The eyes are sometimes fastened upon the author or narrator of something wonderful; sometimes they are directed upwards to be more detached from every surrounding object which might distract the attention; sometimes they roll about as if they were in search of an object that may be equal to the explanation, and the half-opened mouth seems eager to receive the desired information." (Cogan c. ii.) "The eyes and mouth being widely open is an expression universally recognized as one of surprise or astonishment. Thus, Shakespeare says: 'I saw a smith stand with open mouth swallowing a tailor's news.' And again, 'They seemed almost with staring on one another to tear the cases of their eyes; there was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they looked as they had heard of a world destroyed.'" "That the eyebrows are raised by an innate or instinctive impulse may be inferred from the fact that Laura Bridgman invariably acts thus when astonished, as I have been assured by the lady who has lately had charge of her. As surprise is excited by something unexpected or unknown, we naturally desire, when startled, to perceive the cause as quickly as possible; and we consequently open our eyes fully; so that the field of vision may be increased and the eyeballs moved easily in any direction. But this hardly accounts for the eyebrows being so greatly raised as is the case, and for the wild staring of the open eyes. The explanation of this lies, I believe, in the impossibility of opening the eyes with great rapidity by merely raising the upper lids. To effect this the eyebrows must be lifted energetically. Any one who will try to open his eyes as quickly as possible before a mirror will find that he acts thus; and the energetic lifting up of the eyebrows opens the eyes so widely that they stare the while, being exposed all round the iris. Moreover, the elevation of the eyebrows is an advantage in looking upwards; for as long as they are lowered they impede our vision in this di-

rection." "The habit of raising the eyebrows having once been gained in order to see as quickly as possible all around us, the movement would follow from the force of association whenever astonishment was felt from any cause, even from a sudden sound or idea." "The cause of the mouth being opened when astonishment is felt is a much more complex affair and several causes apparently concur in leading to this movement." "We can breathe much more quietly through the open mouth than through the nostrils, therefore when we wish to listen intently to any sound we either stop breathing or breathe as quietly as possible by opening our mouths, at the same time keeping our bodies motionless." When the attention is directed forcibly to an object, the organs of the body not engaged are neglected, and so in astonishment many of the muscles become relaxed, and hence the open dropping of the jaw and open mouth of a man stupefied with amazement. Another cause operates. "We can draw a full and deep inspiration much more easily through the widely open mouth than through the nostrils. Now when we start at any sudden sound or sight, almost all the muscles of the body are involuntarily and momentarily thrown into strong action for the sake of guarding ourselves against or jumping away from the danger which we habitually associate with anything unexpected. But we always unconsciously prepare ourselves for any great exertion by first taking a deep and full inspiration, and we consequently open our mouths." "Thus several causes concur towards this same, whether surprise, astonishment, or amazement is felt." (Darwin, c. xii.)

ADMIRATION, *Wonder*, and *Veneration*. We are struck with something supposed to be great in power, in intellect, or in goodness. We anticipate important effects to follow; as we do so corresponding feelings rise and surge and swell. When the objects or consequences are good, admiration and wonder may become moral in their nature. They may become a veneration for all that is excellent towards the aged, the ancient, the grand. The *nil admirari* school may seem very wise, and may boast that they are never deceived, but as they have no *beau ideal* they never accomplish anything truly great. Wonder

opens our eyes and fixes them on something high to which it would elevate us. It is an essential element in all truly exalted character, and leads on to *Reverence* and *Awe*. It enters largely into the *Adoration* and worship which we pay to God.

"In admiration the faculty of sight is enjoyed to the utmost and all else is forgotten. The brow is expanded and unruffled, the eyebrows gently raised, the eye lifted so as to expose the colored surface of the eye, while the lower part of the face is relaxed in a gentle smile. The mouth is open, the jaw a little fallen, and by the relaxation of the lower lip we must perceive the edge of the lower teeth and tongue. The posture of the body is most expressive when it seems arrested in some familiar action." (Bell, Essay vii.) "When subject to particular influences the natural position of the eyeball is to be directed upward. In sleep, languor, and depression, or when affected with strong emotions, the eyes naturally and insensibly roll upwards. The action is not a voluntary one; it is irresistible. Hence in reverence, in devotion, in agony of mind, in all sentiments of pity, in bodily pain with fear of death, the eyes assume that position." "We thus see that when wrapt in devotional feelings, and when outward impressions are unheeded, the eyes are raised by an action neither taught nor acquired. It is by this instinctive motion we are led to bow with humility, to look upward in prayer, and to regard the visible heavens as the seat of God." (Bell, Essay iv.)

"Prayer is the upward glancing of the eye
When none but God is near."

The Prospective Emotions proper are all of the nature of —

HOPE and FEAR. The former of these arises from the contemplation of good, the latter from the apprehension of evil as about to come. The feeling varies with the nature and extent of the good or evil conceived, and of the probability of its coming.

The tendency of hope is to enliven, to cheer, to stimulate action. But it is also true that ill-grounded hopes, fostering in the first instance a false security, and so lead-

ing to disappointment, may make us despair of accomplishing any good end. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." The tendency and the final cause of fear is to hold back and repress, when we might be tempted to rush into danger. But some are so terror-stricken that they are incapable of taking any action to ward off the evil. It has to be added, that fear has sometimes called forth and intensified dormant energies. There are occasions when man acquires courage from despair. A man fleeing for his life has performed feats of ingenuity and strength which he would not have attempted in calmer hours. In all cases there should be judgment and principle exercised in seeing that we hope for proper objects, that we be afraid only of what is evil, and are ready to resist the evil when duty calls.

Hope seems to give a life and a spring to our whole nervous system so far as it is influenced by the gray matter of the brain. It is especially seen in the keen eye. It leads us to look forward as if to see, and lean forward as if to reach, the object. We elevate the eyebrow that the view may be clear. But "Fear produces an agony and anxiety about the heart not to be described; and it may be said to paralyze the soul in such a manner as to render it insensible to everything but its own misery. Inertness and torpor pervade the whole system, united with a constriction of the integuments of the body, and also a certain sense of being fettered, or of being rendered incapable of motion. The eyes are pallid, wild, and sunk in their sockets; the countenance is contracted and wan, the hair stands erect, or at least this sensation is excited, which every child experiences so often as he is terrified by stories of ghosts, witches, etc. The bowels are strongly affected, the heart palpitates, respiration labors, the lips tremble, the tongue falters, the limbs are unable to obey the will or support the frame. Dreadful shrieks denote the inward anguish. These are often succeeded by syncopes, which while they manifest that the sufferings are greater than nature can sustain, afford a temporary relief." (Cogan c. ii. class I.) "Fear came upon me and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up. It

stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof; an image was before mine eyes; there was silence and I heard a voice." (Job iv. 14–16.)

Anticipation, *Expectation*, *Assurance of Hope*, are fainter and stronger forms, growing on the idea of good, as possibly, probably, or certainly coming. Sometimes it is a feeble light, pleasing, but not moving, the soul. Or, it may become lively and exciting, a source of happiness, and an incentive to activity. Or it may rise to a full assurance in which it has all the stability of realization: such is the hope of the return of the seasons or of a good man's fulfillment of promise; such is hope in God, in his Word and Providence. It should be noticed that the practical result depends not only on the probability of the good, but on the character of the appetence. The hope which sways one person powerfully may have no charms to another. There are people in ecstacy at being invited to a fashionable party which has no attractions whatever to others, who would rather have a day's fishing or hunting. One man is buoyed up all his life with the expectation of his reaching a high position of power or fame; another looks down on all this because he aims at securing mental cultivation or spiritual excellence. Hope has a purifying effect when properly directed; it purifies us even as the objects to which it looks, say God and heaven, are pure.

Apprehension, *Dread*, *Terror*, *Horror*, *Despair*. These are different degrees of the same feeling, determined by the greatness of the evil and the probability of its reaching us. The extent of the evil is estimated not by any absolute standard, but by the strength of the appetence which has been thwarted. To one man the loss of money is scarcely felt to be a loss, for he has not set his affections on wealth; to another it is like tearing out his heart.

To many the loss of a near relative stirs the soul to its lowest depths; in others it only ruffles the surface, like a passing breeze. When the threatened storm is very distant, or very doubtful, there is only a slight tremor, enough to give a warning; but as it comes near and descends with a hurricane power there are awful howlings and yawning gulfs. When the evil is steadily pressing on us like death, it is dread. When it comes suddenly upon us, say the news of a lost battle, it is terror. When all hope of being delivered from it is gone, it is despair, which is the darkness left when all the lights have been extinguished, and the man feels that he is lost, and is tempted to give up exertion and lie down and perish.

"Terror causes the blood suddenly to leave the extreme parts of the frame; the countenance becomes livid, the brain excited, the large arteries distended; the heart swells, the eyes start, the muscles become rigid or convulsed, and faintness, or perhaps sudden death, ensues." (Moore, part III.) In terror the man stands with eyes intently fixed on the object of his fears, the eyebrows elevated to the utmost, and the eye largely uncovered; or with hesitating and bewildered steps, his eyes are rapidly and wildly in search of something. "Observe him farther: There is a spasm on his breast; he cannot breathe freely; the chest is elevated; the muscles of his neck and shoulders are in action; his breathing is short and rapid; there is a gasping and convulsive motion of his lips, a tremor on his hollow cheek, a gulping and catching of his throat; his heart is knocking at his ribs, while yet his lips and cheeks are ashy pale." "The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the ribs: but it is very doubtful whether it then works more efficiently than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all parts of the body; for the skin instantly becomes pale, as during incipient faintness. The paleness of the surface, however, is probably, in large part or exclusively, due to the vaso-motor centre being affected in such a manner as to cause the contraction of the small arteries of the skin. That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in the marvelous and inexplicable manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. This

exudation is all the more remarkable as the surface is then cold, and hence the term a 'cold sweat;' whereas the sudorific glands are properly excited into action when the surface is heated. The hairs also on the skin stand erect, and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with the disturbed action of the heart, the breathing is hurried, the salivary glands act imperfectly, the mouth becomes dry, and is often opened and shut. I have also noticed that under slight fear there is a strong tendency to yawn. One of the best marked symptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is often first seen in the lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes husky or indistinct, or may altogether fail. *Obstupui, steteruntque comæ et vox faucibus hausit.*" There are other symptoms: "The pupils are said to be enormously dilated, or may be thrown into convulsive movements. The hands are alternately clinched and opened, often with a twitching movement. The arms may be protruded as if to avert some dreadful danger, or may be thrown wildly over the head." (Darwin, c. xii.)

"Horror differs from both fear and terror, although more nearly allied to the last than to the first. It is more full of sympathy with the sufferings of others than engaged with our own. We are struck with horror even at the spectacle of artificial distress; but it is peculiarly excited by the real danger or pain of another. We see a child in the hazard of being crushed by an enormous weight, with sensations of extreme horror. Horror is full of energy: the body is in the utmost tension, not unnerved by fear. The flesh creeps, and a sensation of cold seems to chill the blood; the term is applicable of 'damp horror.'" (Bell, Essay vii.)

"Despair is a mingled emotion. While terror is in some measure the balancing and distraction of a mind occupied with an uncertainty of danger, despair is the total wreck of hope, the terrible assurance of ruin having closed around beyond all power of escape. The expression of despair must vary with the nature of the distress of which it is the acme. In certain circumstances it will assume a bewildered, distracted air, as if madness were likely to afford the only relief from the mental agony. Sometimes there is at once a wildness in the looks, and total relaxation as if falling into insensibility, or there is upon the countenance of the desperate man a horrid gloom; the eye is fixed, yet he neither sees nor hears aught, nor is sensible of what surrounds him; the features are shrunk and pale and livid, and convulsions and tremors affect the muscles of the face." (Bell, Essay vii.)

Shyness is a feeling arising from a sensitive apprehension as to the opinion that may be formed of us by others. It leads us to retire into the shade and hide ourselves from the public gaze; like Viola,

> "Who never told her love;
> But let concealment, like a worm in the bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek."

Shame is a modification of the same feeling in which we shrink from exposing our person, or it may be our guilt, for fear of reproach. *Modesty* and *Impudence* belong to the same class. In the former we shrink from displaying our excellences, or, it may be, from asserting our rights. It is not so much an emotion as a virtue. In *Impudence* we pay no regard to propriety and we defy the opinion of others.

"Some persons flush up at any sudden and disagreeable recollection." In regard to Blushing, "The theory which appears to me most probable, though it may at first seem rash, is that attention closely directed to any part of the body tends to interfere with the ordinary and tonic contraction of the small arteries of that part. These vessels, in consequence, become at such times more or less relaxed, and are constantly filled with arterial blood. This tendency will have been much strengthened if frequent attention has been paid during many generations to the same part, owing to nerve force readily flowing along accustomed channels, and by the power of inheritance. Whenever we believe that others are depreciating or even considering our personal appearance our attention is vividly directed to the outer and visible parts of our bodies; and of all such parts we are most sensitive about our faces, as no doubt has been the case during many past generations." (Darwin, c. xiii.)

Anxiety. It presupposes an object in which we are interested and a threatened obstacle in the way of the attainment of it. The interest in it keeps the eye fixed on the object, and fears spring up as we discover hindrances standing, like the angel seen by the prophet's ass with the drawn sword, in the way. When the impell-

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ing passion is a tempest, the soul may be in an agitated state, like a ship in a storm, now dizzy and trembling on the ridge of the wave, and forthwith down in the depths. How tremulous the hand of the youth as he presents a letter to a patron who has the means of befriending him, and of a mother presenting a petition for the reprieve of her son. How fluttered is the lover who has sent off a proposal to a loved one and is waiting for an answer. What risings and fallings, what elevations and depressions, what ebbs and flows. How terrible the agony of the mother as she watches by the sick-bed of her son on the night of the crisis of the fever. Some have felt the anxiety so keenly that they have almost wished that the decision were against them, rather than that they should be thus tossed. In such cases the hopes only make the fears more horrific, as the lightnings reveal the density of the surrounding darkness.

Disappointment. The phrase may be used in a more general or a more specific sense. It may be applied to every case in which an appetence has been frustrated, that is, has not gained its object. I have been using it in this sense, in this treatise, in strict conformity, I believe, with the usage of our tongue. But it is employed in this place in a more specific sense, as the counterpart of expectation. A good has been hoped for and has not come. Disappointment as an emotion arises when the expected blessing is not realized. This feeling is strong in proportion to the previously entertained hope. What a darkness when a light to which we have long been looking is quenched: say when a lover finds that the person beloved has been amusing herself with him, or has jilted him; or when a man, after toiling for years or a life-time, discovers that his life plan has been wrecked and dashed helplessly in pieces. A peculiar bit-

terness is engendered when there has been a betrayal of us by those whom we loved and trusted, or to whom we committed our confidence and our money. On the other side, what a relief when a threatening cloud long hanging over us is dispelled, and we find ourselves in light and comfort, with friends whom we mistrusted standing by us.

A peculiarity is imparted to these prospective feelings when our hopes and fears have arisen from the acts of others. There is the *Hope of Approbation* of smiles and favors from friends to whom, in consequence, we become attached. There is the fear of enmity from those who are prejudiced against us, or of revenge on the part of those whom we have offended. There is *Horror* at atrocious conduct, as, for example, when we hear of an unnatural son striking or killing a father.

CHAPTER III.

EMOTIONS CALLED FORTH BY INANIMATE OBJECTS. THE ÆSTHETIC.

SECTION I.

ÆSTHETICAL THEORIES.

This introduces us to the feelings called forth by those objects which are called Beautiful, Picturesque, Ludicrous, and Sublime. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson reckoned these as constituting Senses, such as the sense of Beauty, the Sense of the Ludicrous. The French writers spoke of them as *Gôut*, which English and Scotch writers translated Taste, and discussed the nature and pleasures of Taste ; and the phrase is still habitually employed in our language — as when we talk of persons of taste. Of a later date, following Kant and the Germans, the feelings to which I refer have been called æsthetic, and the science which treats of the corresponding objects, æsthetics. None of these phrases is unexceptional. They all seem to refer to bodily senses, emotions which certainly proceed from a higher department of our nature. Ruskin has proposed to call the mental power from which they proceed the Theoretical, from θεωρία, vision, but there are many and obvious objections against turning to this use a phrase which had been otherwise applied, and Mr. Ruskin's recommendation has not been followed. The phrase æsthetics may be employed till another and a better be devised and generally accepted. I am inclined

to think that the best term to denote the science would be Kalology, that is, the science of the τὸ καλόν, or the Beautiful.

The opinions which have been entertained by eminent men as to the Beautiful may be represented as three in number.

(1.) *There are those who hold that it consists of some mental quality perceived by the mind, as existing in objects.* Whatever objects possess this quality are to be reckoned as beautiful, those without it are to be held as non-beautiful. This theory was started by the oldest thinker who has speculated on this subject: I refer to Plato, who may be regarded as the founder of the science of æsthetics. According to him there had been an Idea in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity; which idea is so far impressed on objects on the earth and in the heavens. So far as objects partake of this Divine Idea they are beautiful; and the mind of man, being formed at first in the image of God, is capable of rising, by means of philosophic contemplation, to a Pure Love (called ever since Platonic Love), which discerns and appreciates the beauty. This beauty consists essentially in order opposed to disorder, in harmony and proportion. It is not sensation nor utility; it is mind, king of heaven and earth, bringing forms, sounds, and colors under limitation. He treats of the subject in the "Phædrus," the "Banquet," the "Philebus," and the "Greater Hippias." He makes Socrates say, "For the Celestial Aphrodite herself, the goddess of all beauty, being well aware that mere pleasure and all sorts of sensuous gratification have no element of limit in themselves, introduced LAW and ORDER, to which limitation necessarily belongs." He is greatly struck with the properties of certain mathematical figures. "When I talk of the beauty of forms, I do

not understand, as most people might, certain shapes of living animals, or of painted animals, but my argument refers to lines, straight or curved generally, and to whatever figures, plain or solid, are made with a straight or a curved outline, by rules and plumb-lines, or by compasses and the turner's lathe, — things quite familiar to you. Now, with regard to all these things, I say that they are beautiful, not relatively, as so many other things are, but that by their very nature they are essentially and eternally beautiful, and that they are accompanied by certain peculiar pleasures which have no affinity whatsoever with the pleasurable affection produced by common irritants and stimulants. And of colors also, and the pleasures connected with them, the same thing may be predicated." He perceives a peculiar beauty in certain triangles which have remarkable properties in themselves or are capable of producing new figures by juxtaposition. He instances the right-angled isosceles triangle, which has the two angles at the base, each equal to half a right angle; the ratio, being of 2 to 1, always presents one unvarying type of great beauty.[1] With all the Greeks the *τὸ καλόν* consisted in that on which order has been imposed, as opposed to matter (*ὕλη*), which is waste and formless.

Since the time of Plato this theory, which in a general way we may call Platonic, has appeared and reappeared in the speculations of profound thinkers. Aristotle views the beautiful under various forms, but represents it in his "Metaphysics" as being essentially order (*τάξις*), and this, in that which is bounded (*ὡρισμένον*). The great philosophic divine, Augustine, represents beauty as consisting in order and design. Francis Hutcheson, who has written much on this subject, maintains that it consists

[1] See *On Beauty*, by Professor Blackie.

in unity with variety. Give us mere unity or uniformity and we have no beauty; but give us variety also, and there is beauty in proportion to the variety. Give us variety merely, and there is no beauty ; but let there be unity to combine the variety, and there is beauty in proportion to the unity. The same theory has been adopted and defended by M. Victor Cousin. High Platonic views have been illustrated with great beauty by Dr. McVicar, in various works on the Beautiful; and by Mr. Ruskin, in his "Modern Painters," and his "Seven Lamps of Architecture," works of extraordinary eloquence.

There is an elevation and a grandeur about these views which recommends them to our higher nature. They place beauty in certain noble qualities as perceived by the mind in objects. I have no doubt they contain a vast amount of truth. It may be doubted whether they embrace the whole truth.

(2.) *There are those who are seeking to show that beauty consists in certain objective qualities in the things themselves.* This theory is not inconsistent with the last but appears in a somewhat different form. According to the Platonic view, there is beauty only so far as the high quality is perceived by the mind, say proportion, harmony, or unity with variety. According to the second theory, the beauty is in the object itself, whether the mind perceives it or not. Not a few in our day are striving to express the qualities of the beautiful in mathematical formulæ. Mr. Hay of Edinburgh first traces a correspondence between the vibrations which produce sound and the vibrations which produce vision ; and then shows "that the definite ratios and known proportions which in the vibrations of a musical string produce harmony to the ear, if transferred to the eye, will produce the feeling of a pleasing proportion in that sense ; spec-

ially, that if musical strings whose length is in the ratio of 1, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, produce by their vibrations fixed harmonies in the ear, the same relations, applied to visual spaces, will produce corresponding æsthetic pleasure to the eye."

(3.) *There are those who maintain that beauty is produced by Association of Ideas.* The influence of association engendering feelings of the beautiful was pointed out clearly and judiciously by Francis Hutcheson, in his works "On Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue" (1725) and "On the Passions." The same line of remark was followed by Beattie, the well known Scotch poet and metaphysician. The author who has carried out these views to the greatest (indeed to an extravagant) extent is the Rev. Archibald Alison, in his "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste." I shall endeavor to give a summary of his views. He says: "In the course of this investigation I shall endeavor to show, first, that there is no single emotion into which these varied effects can be resolved; that, on the contrary, every simple emotion, and therefore every object which is capable of producing any simple emotion, *may* be the foundation of the complex emotion of Beauty or Sublimity. But, in the second place, that this complex emotion of Beauty or Sublimity is never produced unless, beside the excitement of some simple emotion, the imagination also is excited, and the exercise of the two faculties combined in the general effect." To illustrate this, he says, let us look upon a wide, extended plain, covered with waving grain, whitening unto the harvest. We are not to suppose that there is anything beautiful in this scene, considered in itself; or that it calls forth any separate feeling to be regarded as a feeling of the beautiful. But the field raises the idea of fertility and riches; we think of the animated beings to be fed and sustained by the exuberant

grain, of the happiness, plenty, and peace thereby accruing, and the whole flow of feeling constitutes the sentiment of the beautiful. We look upon a time-worn tower; there is nothing more beautiful in it than in any other aggregation of stone and lime, but our minds are carried back to long past days and deeds of chivalry and prowess, and the whole feeling constitutes a sense of the Venerable. We gaze on a water-fall; it is only a collection of rock and water, but it raises a feeling of power which branches out into varied ideas and feelings, constituting our sentiment of the Sublime.

Now this theory does account for certain of the phenomena, for certain of the accompaniments, specially the prolonging of the sentiment, of the beautiful. But it does not explain the whole facts, nor the main facts. It can be shown that there are qualities, physical and mental, which, of themselves, call forth a peculiar class of æsthetic feelings.

In order to determine what truth there is in each of these three leading theories, let us look at the emotions raised.

SECTION II.

THE PLACE OF SENSATION IN ÆSTHETICS.

I am prepared to admit that many of our æsthetic emotions start from sensation. There is commonly, if not always, a pleasant sentient feeling presupposed and existing throughout, as a condition of, that is, a concomitant in, the agencies acting as the cause of our emotion of beauty. But the peculiar æsthetic sentiment is always something above and beyond mere sensibility. It may be useful, in clearing up the subject, to look at the preparations made by the various senses for the rise of the idea and the feeling of beauty.

Our muscular energies are employed, first, in work, and secondly, where there is not work sufficient to exercise them, in play. There is often much excitement, much pleasure, in various kinds of play, as in running, leaping, gymnastics, fishing, and hunting; but these have nothing æsthetic in their nature. The organic sensations and the lower senses, such as taste and smell, may give us many pleasant, and some unpleasant, sensations, but we do not regard these as implying beauty or the opposite. The feeling of a healthy body, breathing fresh air and enjoying it, may be very stimulating; the food and viands at a table may be very luscious and grateful; and the odors from a bed of violets, or roses, or even from a field of beans (described by Thomson), may be very elysian, but it does not rise to the region of the *τὸ καλόν*, or beautiful. We distinguish between a kitchen, a cookery, a perfumery on the one hand, and a palace of art on the other. It is one of the excellences of Kant's elaborate but artificial theory of the beautiful in his "Critique of the Judgment," which mediates between the Judgment and the Reason, that beauty is that which pleases without interest or pleasure taken in the object. In touch proper, or feeling, we are pleasantly affected by smooth, and offended by rough, surfaces. This is the one truth in Burke's very inadequate theory of beauty. It has to be added that all these may be woven into scenes deservedly called beautiful. In pictorial narratives meat and drink are given to weary travelers; painters often set before us rich banquets, glossy foliage, and living streams; and poets may bring in floating perfumes, and bracing breezes, and soft lawns on which we would wish to recline and be at rest. In all such cases there is beauty, but beauty raised by association, by interesting connections, and suggested feelings.

We seem to be rising toward the æsthetic in sweet sounds and rich colors which may, as it were, constitute an earthly paradise, but we have not mounted into the ethereal in which beauty and love have their habitation. These are, after all, merely sweet sensations which prepare a soil in which the plant may grow; but there is no garden till living seed is thrown in and begins to grow. Even in gazing with delight on lovely forms, such as those of well proportioned buildings, and of plants and animals, of man and woman, there may be merely a pleasant sentient feeling arising from the ways in which the undulations of light affect the optic organism.

But already we are rising, as on wings, into a higher sphere. We have mounted, it may be without knowing it, into the region of proportions and adaptations, with all their correlations and concomitants more wonderful than the harmonies of the spheres. It has been acknowledged, since the days of Pythagoras, that there are numerical relations in music felt in the organism and pleasantly recognized by the mind. There are colors that are melodious, and others which are harmonious, which first affect the ocular sense in a stimulating way and produce vibrations in the sensorium, which are perceived in a sort of unconscious way in the mind, and raise an idea of adaptation of design and of mind, which may be the ultimate idea, and are the true basis, of the æsthetic emotion. It is believed that in forms recognized as beautiful there are proportions and ratios which may be expressed in mathematical formulæ. These raise a rhythm in the sentient organism, and ideas are raised up, felt to be stimulating because of their suggestions. The instrument is now tuned, and is ready to give us the music.

Mr. Grant Allen [1] has been successful in showing that much of the pleasant, sentient feeling arises from the alternate stimulation and repose of the nerves. "For it is a common experience that continued stimulation of a nerve deadens it, after a short time, to the action of the stimulus, while intermission of the stimulation gives time for the renewal of the nervous excitability and a consequent liability to fresh stimulation." "There is reason," he tells us, "to believe that the optic fibres and terminal organs are repaired in ordinary cases seventeen times per second, and those of the auditory nerves thirty-three times per second." In applying this law, he says "the nervous system has put itself into a position of expectancy and is ready for the appropriate discharge at the right moment." The correct statement is that the *mind*, not the *nervous system*, is put into a state of expectancy. The intellect would be disappointed if the stimulus did not come at its time. It anticipates the coming and it is gratified when it keeps its promise. It delights to notice the beats in the time. The intellect is, to a large extent, a comparative or correlative power: observing relations and delighting in the exercise as widening its sphere of vision. Here it is observing the relations of time and follows the beats; it feels that there is a jar and is offended when they do not appear in their order. This, it will be acknowledged, has an important place in the pleasure derived from music, and furnishes the intellectual element which, as we shall see, goes on to produce the æsthetic emotions. This, no doubt, is the origin of the sentiment produced by rhythm in poetry, and the higher kinds of prose. As the ear and the thought fall in with the swing we are stimulated, and the emotion becomes æsthetic. I have no doubt there is something of

[1] *Physiological Æsthetics.*

the same process in the sense of beauty produced by harmonious colors.[1]

SECTION III.

PHYSICAL BEAUTY.

The feeling of beauty, I have no doubt, commences in bodily sensation. There are sounds, colors, odors, tastes, touches, forms, which pleasantly affect the organism. These are the beginnings, and I rather think they go up, as an element, into our higher æsthetic affections. It is certain that if an object be felt as harsh by our sensory organs it will not be appreciated as beautiful. In the case of some of the senses, with taste, smell, and feeling,

[1] Mr. Grant Allen, in his *Physiological Æsthetics*, has done more than any author before him to unfold the nature of the sensations which precede the rise of the æsthetic emotions. He defines the æsthetically beautiful as "that which affords the maximum of stimulation, with the minimum of fatigue, or waste, in processes not directly connected with vital functions." The language is sufficiently vague. We are not told what sort of stimulation is referred to? of body? or of mind? There may be stimulation of body as in violent exercise; and of mind as in fear, anger, where there is nothing æsthetic. He restricts the definition: "The processes are not to be directly connected with vital functions," that is, are not to be utilitarian. I am sure that mere utilitarian ideas will not awaken the æsthetic emotion. But as little will it hinder it, provided all the essential elements are present. A lovely field will not be less admired by me because it is my own, and furnishes me with fruit and grain, and contributes to my health as I walk in it. Mere sentient stimulation, however restricted or enlarged, never constitutes the beautiful. We must have other and higher elements added. Professor Bain seems at times to have a glimpse of this. He tells us that "the objects of the fine arts, and all objects called æsthetic, are exempt from the fatal taint of rivalry and contest attaching to other agreeables; they draw men together in mutual sympathy and are thus eminently social and humanizing." But this is an effect of the æsthetic sentiment, and not an element in it. In short, this earth-philosophy gives us a mere chemical analysis of the soil in which the plant grows, but does not show us the plant itself. Mr Allen often speaks of the "thrill of emotion." He should have gone on to unfold the mental elements in this thrill.

the special animal senses, there are only pleasant sensations, and nothing that can be described as æsthetic. But in the higher senses, in sounds, colors, and forms, there are harmonious relations in the forces operating upon and in the organism, and these, being perceived spontaneously, though very obscurely it may be, raise higher classes of feeling which constitute the sense of beauty.

Musical Sounds. Those who have the peculiar gift feel themselves, as they listen to the strains of music, to be in a state of pleasurable excitement. From the time of Pythagoras it has been known that the sounds are characterized by definite mathematical relations. "Two sets of vibrations, regular each in itself, and bearing a relation to each other by uniting together, form a vibration which is also regular, and the whole impression is regular, whereas two vibrations which bear no commensurate ratio to each other, however regular each may be in itself, will not, by their union, produce a regular vibration, and the result is not music, but a noise. So, also, when the nerve has been affected with a particular vibration, it will necessarily accommodate itself with more ease to a new vibration, the more simple the ratios that this vibration bears to the former, so that those which bear the simplest ratios to each are most in harmony with each." Some such law as this, it is said, generalizes all the phenomena of harmony and discord. Hence it is, when two notes are in harmony the lengths and tensions of the strings producing the sound bear certain ratios to each other, and that when the notes are discordant the ratios are incommensurable. "Music," says Mr. Sully, "affords three distinct orders of gratification. First of all, in its discrete, in its melodic and harmonic combinations, it satisfies, seemingly, simple sensibilities of the ear." Helmholtz supposes that the coöperation of several

continuous nervous processes in distinct fibres is an adequate cause of the pleasures of harmony. Mr. Sully continues, "Further, in its arrangement of these tonic elements, under certain forms of tune, accepted rhythm, key, and undulation of key, it presents numerous beauties of symmetry and unity, which gratefully employ the intellectual faculties. Finally, it exercises a mysterious spell on the soul, stirring up deep currents of emotion, and awaking vague ideas of the Infinite, the Tragic, and the Serene."[1] This is all I am able to say of the beauty of music, in which, be it observed, we have the concurrence of three distinct classes of agencies, first, the ratios in the vibrations of sound, secondly, the adapted state of the organism, and thirdly, the ideational and emotional mental state produced.

Beauty in Forms. From the days of Plato, or rather of Pythagoras, attempts have been made to find out a law of the forms felt to be beautiful, founded on mathematical principles, and capable of being expressed quantitatively. Some are laboring to discover the guiding rule of those curves which we admire so much in the gothic window. It has been asserted that certain mathematical forms, with modifications, are the bases of the beautiful proportions in Grecian architecture. Hogarth's line of beauty was a serpentine, formed by drawing a line round from the apex to the base of a tall cone, a figure which suggests design and grace. But this is only one of a number of lines of beauty. I confidently cherish the belief that sooner or later we may have a mathematical expression of the laws of form discerned as beautiful.

But even when this is successfully accomplished, we have not touched the more important problem, How do these mathematical forms raise the feeling of beauty?

[1] *Sensation and Intuition*, p. 220.

Nor have we explained everything when we show that the measured undulations which enable us to see them produce a pleasant sensation on the eye and optic organism. For the question arises, How should this sensation produce an æsthetic feeling in the mind?

Our analysis has shown that there is an idea, or a perception, as the nucleus of all emotion. May we not find a competent idea in the contemplation of harmonious sounds and well proportioned forms? I am inclined to think that in all æsthetic feeling there is a perception, or rather a succession of rapid perceptions, of relation, order, and harmony, indicating mind or purpose. It is certain that the feeling of beauty will not rise if there be an evident want of unity, symmetry, and proportion: if there be a limb torn from the body, or a side from the tree, or a prominent hulk in one part of a building without a corresponding prominence in another to balance it. The perception of the harmony is derived from the orderly affection of the sensory organism, which, again, is produced by the orderly vibrations of the air or light. As the regular affections are noticed there is an idea of order, and of mind producing the order. This idea gives rise to a feeling which attaches us to the object which we declare to be beautiful; we are drawn towards it, and come to delight in it and love it.

Beauty of Color. "Light is pleasant to the eyes" always when it is not excessive. I believe that all the various hues into which it can be decomposed are also agreeable. A bright light attracts the eyes of infants, as also of certain insects which whirl round the candle. Children delight in bonfires, illuminations, and rockets. Red attracts the eyes of young people, and of savages, as does also yellow, to a less degree. Green, the most prevalent color in nature, has a more soothing influence, as

it comes from leafage, and sky, and shallow sea. While these colors gratify the organism, I do not regard the sensations as æsthetic, any more than the pleasures of taste and smell.

The æsthetic feelings proper do not arise till we have two colors in a relation to each other. There may be a low form of beauty in what have been called melodious colors, that is, colors which glide into others that are contiguous in the scale, as when blue runs gracefully into green, as we often see in pigeons, and yellow into red, as we see in geraniums. There is a higher form of beauty, attracting the eye and stimulating the mind, in harmony of colors. Two colors are said to be in harmony when together they make up the white beam.

In the last age the accepted doctrine was that of Brewster, that the three primary colors in the beam were red, yellow, and blue, which by their mixtures give us all other colors; thus blue and yellow mixed give us green. The accepted doctrine of the present day is that of Young, accepted by Helmholtz, that the primary colors are red, green, and violet; thus yellow is made of red and green. There is a correspondence between these colors and the organism. "Dr. Young supposes that there are in the eye three kinds of nerve-fibres, the first of which, when irritated in any way, produces the sensation of red, the second the sensation of green, and the third that of violet. He further assumes that the first are excited most strongly by the waves of ether of greatest length; the second, which are sensitive to green light, by the waves of middle length; while those which convey impressions of violet are acted upon only by the shortest vibrations of ether. Accordingly, at the red end of the spectrum, the excitation of those fibres which are sensitive to that color predominates; hence the appearance of this part

as red. Further on there is added an impression upon the fibres sensitive to green light, and thus results the mixed sensation of yellow. In the middle of the spectrum the nerves sensitive to green become much more excited than the other two kinds, and accordingly green is the predominant impression. As soon as this becomes mixed with violet the result is the color known as blue, while at the most highly refracted end of the spectrum, the impression produced on the fibres which are sensitive to violet light overcomes every other."[1]

It is universally admitted that complementary colors are felt to be beautiful when they fall simultaneously under the eye. But the white beam, when it falls upon our atmosphere, and upon objects on our earth, is often divided into two parts, which are complementary of each other; and these presented to the eye raise an æsthetic feeling. We may notice these harmonies in the evening sky, and they allure our eye towards them and call forth emotion. We have a like division of rays when the beam falls on plants. It falls upon the leaf and the green rays are reflected by the chlorophyl, and the others are said to be absorbed according to laws which have not yet been determined. But these absorbed rays are not extinguished or lost. I believe they tend to come forth in some part of the plants as colors which will be complementary to the green and take the hue of red. The eye delights to see the fruit of the cherry, the rose, and the thorn, and the berry of the holly, the yew, and the common barberry, the mountain ash, and unnumbered others peeping forth from the green leaves. In like manner, when the white beam falls on the petals of flowers, the

[1] Helmholtz, *Popular Scientific Lectures,* translated by Atkinson, p. 250. I may express the opinion that these theories will require to be examined and readjusted before they can conform to, or explain, all the phenomena.

blue-red, which is the most common color of the corolla, will be reflected, and the other rays will come out in some sort of yellow.

A like harmony may be detected in the plumage of birds which often have a tawny hue, being a red-yellow, with other portions of a dark blue. In more ornamented birds we have a yellow-red with a blue-green. Many shells of mollusca are characterized by an orange-yellow ground with bluish-purple spots. It has been noticed that attention has been paid to harmony of colors in the finer specimens of stained glass, and this commonly from a delicate taste, and not from a knowledge of the scientific laws of color.

The general result reached is, that in lovely colors there is, first, a relation of the rays of light; second, an adaptation of the rays to the organ of vision; and thirdly, a pleasurably excited state which deserves to be called æsthetic.

SECTION IV.

INTELLECTUAL BEAUTY.

Profound thinkers in various ages and countries have been in wonderful agreement with each other in maintaining that there is a beauty arising from harmony and proportion. Plato evidently regarded the τὸ καλόν as consisting in bringing order out of chaos, in taking in objects from the waste, in setting bounds to the limitless, in giving forms to the formless, in imposing the idea on matter. Augustine described beauty as consisting in order and design. Francis Hutcheson represented it as unity with variety. Diderot spoke of beauty as consisting in relations; a theory which may contain a fundamental truth, but is miserably bald till it is robed in richer colors. Hegel regards the form of beauty as unity of

the manifold, and traces in nature (especially organic) and in art a dependence, that is, unity, along with liberty in the parts. There must be some truth in these views. They err, as it appears to me, in being too narrow, and overlooking other principles which should be joined with them.

It may be maintained that the spontaneous perception of a number of relations among objects has a tendency to raise up feelings of beauty always when it is associated with mind, with order, design, benevolence, or moral excellence. We may find proofs and illustrations of this in all the relations which the mind of man can discover.

(1.) The mind feels a pleasure in observing *sameness* and *differences*. The mind demands a unity in the beautiful object, but this does not indicate a meaning unless there be also variety. There is a satisfaction in noticing the variety of our mental states, of our ideas, feelings, moods, while the self abideth. We like to see the repetition with infinite diversities of prevailing forms in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Every part of the plant, the whole tree, the branch, the leaf, is after one model, while every part is diversified to suit its function. A great uniformity is given to the higher animals by the skeleton being formed of vertebræ, constructed of like pieces, while every part is adapted to its function. There is an individuality in the plant and animal, and the oneness is most strikingly evidenced in the variety being made to conform to the unity. When we look at all this we spontaneously, without an effort and without reflection, discover mind and purpose, and this is fitted to raise feeling, and unless it is hindered by other ideas will raise feeling, not, it may be, very intense, but still sufficient to draw us toward the objects, and make us feel an interest in them as if they were companions or

friends. We shrink from the bare desert where there are no such objects, and are reconciled to it only by another feeling being awakened, a sense of freedom.

(2.) The mind is pleased in noticing the relation of *whole and parts, particularly of means and ends.* On a concrete or a complex whole being presented to us we are anxious, for the sake of comprehending it, to have it resolved into parts, and as scattered objects fall under our eye we wonder if they cannot be combined. We are gratified when the complicated whole can be broken into comprehensible pieces, and when the pieces can be made to fit into each other to make up a regular whole. A feeling of delight is apt to be called forth when we discover a number of independent circumstances combining to the production of one end, as we notice all the parts of a machine coöperating to effect its purpose, and all parts of the bodily frame, bones, ligaments, and muscles, to promote the easy movement of a joint and the comfort of the animal. When this combination seems to take place by chance we simply wonder, but when we are made to believe that it is the issue of a purpose and plan a feeling of interest arises, and we are apt to say, "How beautiful." We have here feelings of beauty raised by design, design evidenced by a combination.

(3.) We are impelled to seek and to notice *resemblances*, and are delighted when we can coördinate objects and gather them into *classes*. The mind feels burdened when it is obliged to carry with it innumerable particulars. It is relieved when it can put these under heads. It is delighted when it discovers, either in art or in nature, that order is established, and has evidently been intended, say in the arrangement and distribution of objects in a room or in a garden, or in the forms of plants and animals. A feeling of a high order is gradually gen-

dered as we discover and contemplate species, genera, orders, and kingdoms in animate nature, and trace a progression from man to angel, archangel, and God Himself. It is better that this arrangement should not be too formal, for this might look mechanical, and as if it proceeded from unconscious law or blind force; it raises the idea of purpose more certainly where there is variety with the uniformity, and freedom is seen subordinated to government.

(4.) There is a kind of æsthetic feeling excited even by the perception of the relations of *space:* there is a sort of beauty, as Plato proclaimed, and as all mathematicians maintain, in certain mathematical figures; we feel it to be so, as we discover their properties. We have seen that there is pleasing sensation excited in our ocular organism by certain forms caused by the regular vibrations of the rays of light. But this bodily sensation can scarcely be described as æsthetic till there is some sort of spontaneous, and almost unconscious, perception of the harmonies by the mind. These harmonies, being noticed, will produce a feeling of a very lofty character. Our minds are filled with grandeur when we contemplate the movements of the moon, the earth, the sun, and the constellations in their spheres. How interesting to notice the same shape in the tree and its leaf: to trace the spiral tendency of all the appendages of the plant, of buds, leaves, scales, branches; and to discover in pines and firs every part taking a conical shape — the whole contour of the tree is a cone, cut off any portion and the part cut off is a cone, the fruit organs are cones, and the very amenta are conical. Fechner has brought into notice, defended, and illustrated a theory of Zeiser as to the beauty of the golden section, which in the division of a line, say in a cross, makes the smaller division bear

the same proportion to the larger as the larger to the whole.

(5.) The relations of *time* may raise a feeling of beauty. The alternation of day and night, the periodical return of the seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the mighty cycles or æons of eternity, all elevate the mind as we contemplate them.

(6.) The contemplation of the relations of *quantity* is an intellectual rather than an emotional exercise. But symmetry, balances and counterbalances, equipoises, compensations, and harmonies, all of which are quantitative, have always been supposed to have a place in the sentiment of the beautiful. They are always required, and are noticed in architecture. They enter, in the way I have described, as ideas to stir up feeling.

(7.) Is it not because we delight to follow the relations of *active property* that we feel such pleasure in the activity which everywhere falls under our eye? We delight to see the moving cloud, the waving foliage, the driving wind, the leaping stream, and to watch the restless ocean; we experience a higher emotion when we gaze, not only on activity, but on life, on the flying bird, the frisking lamb, the gamboling colt, the romping girl, the frolicksome boy. Through the law of association everything that suggests action and life is apt to be felt as interesting and lovely. Ruskin represents vital beauty as consisting in the felicitous fulfillment of function in living things.

(8.) There is greater difficulty in showing how *causation* raises any æsthetic feeling. Yet, surely, we are pleased when we can trace an effect to its cause and notice a cause producing its effect. We are offended when we have to look on a mighty apparatus of means

set agoing and no corresponding effect following, as when a mountain opens to let out a mouse. We are gratified when we see a concurrence of agencies evidently established and designed for accomplishing a series of beneficent effects. What is causation but power? and our minds are enlivened by noticing power everywhere in exercise, and a sense of propriety, rising to beauty, is in constant exercise when we see power put forth for good.

There is an incipient feeling of beauty raised by ingenious machinery, in which we have a number of forces uniting to accomplish an end. But the æsthetic sentiment is apt to be swallowed up in the utilitarian, which is the stronger in our nature, that is, we contemplate the useful end secured by the engines. A like remark may be made in regard to final cause as discoverable everywhere in nature. Final cause is not the same as efficient cause. Final cause is the effect of a number of different causes being made to combine to accomplish an evident, it may be a benevolent, end. There is a feeling of beauty called forth as we notice a conspiracy of means to produce a good end: say nerves, muscles, and joints combining to enable us to move our arm in a variety of directions; or rays of light from the sun millions of miles away, and coats and humors of the eye and the sensitive retina, and the color cones, coöperating so that we see the objects of nature with their hues and tints. But as we examine these processes our thoughts are apt to be absorbed by them, and the æsthetic feeling fades into dimness.

I might here introduce and dwell upon moral beauty, which consists in a harmony of good, in character and conduct. But this would imply an inquiry into the office of conscience, which I decline entering upon in this treatise.

SECTION V.

THE IDEA RAISING THE ÆSTHETIC FEELING.

We are not to understand, from what has been said, that the sentiment of beauty consists in a pleasant sensation or in a perception of relations. These may constitute the root and stalk, but they are not the flower ; rising out of the sensations and relations there must be a feeling. This feeling, if there be any truth in our analysis of emotions, must proceed from an idea. The question is, What is the idea ?

There must, I think, be some perception of relations. But such a perception does not of itself call forth the emotion. Indeed, if we look merely to the relation, and dwell upon it, no feeling will come forth. Suppose, for instance, that we study the relations of quantity in arithmetic, and inquire into complex and recondite causes in philosophic speculation, the whole mental energy will be expended in the intellectual exercise and there will be no appreciation of beauty. In order to the feeling being raised there must, so it appears to me, be some idea of adaptation, harmony, or end, in short, of some mental quality, such as order or design. It is only when the perception of relations goes on to this that the æsthetic feeling properly so called is evoked. If it stop short of this there may be pleasant impressions, profound thought, and high admiration, but these do not amount to a sense of beauty. It is when the relations are regarded as signs of some high quality of intelligence that the feeling is called forth ; and the precise nature of the feeling is determined by the nature of the idea.

Ruskin has seized on a great truth in his works on the Beautiful and has unfolded it in a grand but mystical manner. His typical beauty consists of qualities of objects

typifying a divine attribute. There is Infinity, the type of the divine incomprehensibility ; Unity, the type of the divine comprehensibility ; Repose, the type of the divine permanence ; Symmetry, the type of the divine justice ; Purity, the type of the divine energy ; Moderation, the type of government by law. He should, I think, have represented Purity as the type of the divine holiness, and brought in Life as a type of the divine energy. Altogether the account is symbolic rather than real. It is doubtful if this be an accurate classification and arrangement of the mental qualities which, perceived in objects, call forth the æsthetic feeling. These are, in fact, so many and so varied that it is difficult to classify them. But Ruskin's symbols bring before us a number of their leading characteristics. It has to be added, what Kant so emphatically taught, that the highest beauty consists in the symbolization of moral good.

It might be difficult to specify all that this idea contemplates. It may be said, generally, that it is mind displayed in an infinite variety of ways. The more prominent manifestations have been mentioned and dwelt upon by profound thinkers, from Plato downwards, who discover in nature and in art symmetry, balancings, counterpoises, proportions, harmonies, beneficences. Ruskin, in his richly-colored though somewhat fanciful works, has discovered other forms, such as sacrifice, truth, power, life, obedience. The idea of these, not in their abstract shape, but in objects, raises emotions which differ and vary according to the objects contemplated, or rather the quality discerned in the objects.

It is of moment to notice one very important element commonly entering into the emotional idea. We are apt to clothe with personality and with feeling the inanimate objects in which we are interested. In consequence

these objects gather round them the feelings — which we have described in the last chapter — directed to animate objects. The feelings arising from the contemplation of living beings, ourselves or others, are the first to arise in the mind, and they are almost always stronger than those evoked by things without life or feeling. But they will go on by association to attach themselves to objects in nature and in art which seem to show mental qualities, such as power, complacency, and beneficence. We are apt to personify such objects. We even give them a sex : the stronger we think of and represent as a male, as a man, and the more delicate and tender as a female, a woman, and we call them he and she, as if they were human ; thus most nations give the sun masculine, and the moon feminine qualities. We seem to believe momentarily that the objects must have life and feeling and intention. We feel as if they possess the power they display, and mean the good they confer. We come to regard nature as rejoicing or as grieving with us. We feel as if the stormy ocean were indignant and raving ; as if the tempest were offended and howling at us ; as if the sea birds were chiding at us ; as if the odors were enjoying their own richness ; and the fruits relishing their own sweetness ; and the flowers gazing on their own forms and colors ; and the woods resting in their solitudes ; and the streams expressing their feelings in their leapings, and in their sighings. "They drop upon the pastures of the wilderness : and the little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures are clothed with flocks ; the valleys also are covered over with corn ; they shout for joy, they also sing." Adorning them with such qualities we love them, or are awed by them, and all the feelings primarily called up by loving objects flow forth toward and collect around them. In

civilized societies, and among people possessed of culture, there is a large amount of this personifying representative and sympathetic feeling entering into our contemplation of natural and artistic objects. What is art, what are painting, sculpture, and architecture (so far as it rises above mere building for shelter) but signs made by the brush or the hammer, of objects or things, fitted to awaken feeling towards them as if they were living realities?

We have thus got a starting-point for the sentiment. The mental activity is stirred up by the sensation and the correlations, and an idea of a high kind is produced, accompanied with emotion. This idea raises up other ideas according to the laws of association, especially by the high law of correlation, bringing in resemblances, contrasts, means and ends, causes and consequents, and many others, all connected with one another, and tending to raise up like feelings. This accounts for the train of images all of a sort which Alison brings into such prominence, and which swells the river by new streams ever flowing in.

There is, therefore, a truth in the doctrine that all beauty arises from association. But it is not just the association of ideas spoken of by Hutcheson, Beattie, Alison, Jeffrey, and the Scottish school of metaphysicians. The idea raised by the correlations perceived is a very lofty idea, it is specially the Idea of Plato, of mind in objects, of intelligence or beneficence; and it is this idea, and not the train of images, that calls forth the true emotion of beauty. When this idea with its feeling has been evoked it will be followed by a whole train of thoughts and fancies, in the manner described by Alison, thus continuing and enhancing the emotive state, and, in fact, making it very complex, and often very intense.

There is a sense, then, in which it may be said that there are beautiful objects, and that there is beauty in the object: there is a proportion, harmony, or benignancy, and it is the business of science to discover what this is. But there is a sense in which the beauty is in the mind; for it is when these high qualities are perceived that the feeling is evoked. There is a sense in which the æsthetic taste is a derivative and a complex one, implying intellectual and emotive powers, and a process. There is a sense in which it is simple and original, for the idea is suggested spontaneously, and calls forth the feeling naturally in all men.

By this theory we can account for the sameness and yet diversities of æsthetic taste among mankind. There are faculties in all men which tend toward the production of a sense of beauty, a pleasure felt in certain sounds, shapes, and colors, the disposition to observe relations, and to discover mind in them, and an emotion ready to rise. These things give an æsthetic capacity to all men, and lead to a certain community of taste. But, on the other hand, each of these implied elements may differ in the case of different individuals. Some, for instance, have little or no ear for music, some seem to take no interest in forms or colors of any kind, and people with such defective organizations cannot notice the harmonies involved, or have the æsthetic idea and feeling thus derived. In some the intellectual capacity and activity are so feeble that they do not notice the correlations, or observe them very sluggishly, and the same, or others, may have little emotive impressibility. Some, again, have a very sensitive organism, capable of reporting the nicest distinctions, say of sound. Or they have a quickness in noticing relations. Or they ever mount up in their thoughts to the contemplation of mind manifested

in matter. Or they are susceptible of deep emotion when high ideas are presented to them. When there are such differences in constitution we see how there must be differences in the strength of the æsthetic sense.

There will thus be a diversity in the tastes. This arises from the absence or presence of the various elements, and from their relative measure of strength. A man without a musical ear can have no relish for tunes, but may have a strong passion for colors. The man of dull capacity may not be able to discern the harmonies that enter into the higher forms of beauty in art and nature. The man of low moral tone may not be capable of forming elevating ideas. The man of heavy temperament may never rise to rapture on any subject. Then, different individuals have, fortunately, a taste for different objects. Some can enjoy beauty of art but not beauty of scenery. Some love flower painting but have no pleasure in gazing on historical paintings. Some discover a beauty in this man or that woman which others cannot discern. This difference of taste arises mainly from the relative strength of the elements which produce the sentiment, from the nature of the organism in some cases, and the aptitude to observe or not to observe certain relations, or to rise or not to rise to noble ideas.

The sense of beauty differs at different periods of the age of the individual, and of the race. The fact is, the mind requires to be educated up to the perception of the higher kinds of beauty. Mere physical beauty may be felt by all who have the appropriate bodily organ, by the child, the boor, the savage. But the recognition of nobler forms of loveliness implies intelligence and, possibly, a careful training. The child, the peasant, can enter thoroughly into the spirit of the simple Scotch, or Irish, or Negro melodies, but, while he may wonder at them,

has no appreciation of the grand Italian and German oratorios. He may have a pleasure in looking on a rich plain or a grassy bank, but he is astonished when he hears persons raving so about mountain peaks or passes; for himself he would rather be safe on the level ground below. Our rapturous lovers of nature in these times are astonished to find how little there is of rapt admiration of scenery in the classical writers. Homer, speaking of rich plains, represents them as good for feeding asses. There is a poetry, such as that of Robert Burns, which comes home to the hearts of all; it is the same to some extent with the poetry of Homer, Shakespeare, Goldsmith, Scott, and Longfellow. It is different with some other poetry, such as that of Spenser and Milton, which can be enjoyed only by the educated; and still more so with the poetry of Wordsworth, and Keats, and Tennyson, and Hawthorne, and Browning, which can be thoroughly relished only by minds addicted to reflection and capable of following more refined and recondite analogies. As a nation becomes more highly educated there will be a greater number of persons in it capable of relishing the higher forms of beauty. This will be greatly promoted by the establishment of schools of art and design, open to all; and by the habit of traveling annually among the grander scenes of nature, and visiting galleries of painting and sculpture; and it will be furthered most effectively by diffusing a higher education among the great mass of the people, who will thereby have a greater number of ideas, and be prepared to discover those rapidly discerned relations which are implied in the exercise of the æsthetic sense.

SECTION VI.

WHAT IS THE TRUE THEORY OF BEAUTY?

There are some agreements and many differences among those who have speculated on this subject. The sentiment is so delicate, is often so fugitive, arises in such different circumstances, and is so complex in its associations that it is difficult to determine its precise nature. Some hold that it is, or at least that at the basis of the whole there is, a simple, unresolvable feeling. Others argue that it differs so widely in different persons, ages, and nations that it must be derived from other principles, or be the result of circumstances. Let us combine the results that have been reached in the course of our observation and reflection, and see if they correspond and come up to our actual experience.

In certain cases our sensitive organism is affected, but in a way that indicates relations and harmonies which are perceived, often in an occult way, by the mind; such is the case with colors, sounds, forms. In other cases the order is noticed without there being any organic or extra-organic act or affection, say an order of unity with difference, or a concurrence of powers. Still, all this does not amount to beauty, or the emotion of beauty. But this prepares the way for an idea which calls forth the emotion. Spontaneously we discover the result of mind, of intelligence, of design, perhaps of benevolence, in these adapted relations. This idea raises up emotion, which constitutes the true æsthetic feeling.

Regarded in this light, the sentiment of beauty may vary infinitely by reason of the mixture of the elements. The smoke curling from the cottage, in the sweet vales, say, of county Wicklow or Kilkenny, in Ireland, deepens the sentiment of quiet and peacefulness as we cherish

the idea of happy dwellers within. The Scotch and Swiss lakes are seen to sleep so quietly in scenes of terror. The deep gorges in the fiords of Norway, and of the Saginaw in Canada, guarded so strongly on both sides, are relieved by the living streams in their bosom. The awfulness of the cataract is often illuminated by the sheen and sparkle of the waters, which may be irradiated, as at Niagara and the Staubbach, by the rainbow on its spray, compared by Byron to love and madness. Often is there life communicated to a scene in nature, which would otherwise be hard or dull, by a tree, or a plant, or a little flower clinging to the rocks, or coming out of the crevices modestly to show its beauties and timidly to look for a brief season upon the day and the scene around it. These fleecy clouds lying on our hills and dales add to their loveliness as our day-dreams give a freshness to our dull habitual life. Scenes of terror are often softened by the leafy foliage in which they are embosomed. The beauties of the Rhine are greatly enhanced by the antiquated towers associated with adventure, and the vineyards on its banks. In all such cases the sentiment is intensified by the unexpectedness of the object, by the dissimilarity and contrast. In other cases all the objects conspire to produce one effect; the mountains in deep shadow, the steep precipice, the turreted rock may all be before us and in one view. The howling wind, the agitated wave, the ship driven helplessly, all enhance our idea of the power of these moving elements. It has to be added that there may be associations which completely counteract and suppress the æsthetic feeling. The man weighed down with earthly cares, or with sorrow, cannot appreciate beauty. Solomon tells us how vain it is to sing songs to a heavy heart.

SECTION VII.

INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON TASTE.

There is truth in the doctrine which resolves beauty into association of idea. Alison maintains that the sentiment of beauty is not "a simple but a complex emotion; that it involves in all cases the production of some simple, or the exercise of some moral, affection; and, secondly, the consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination;" and that "the peculiar pleasure of the beautiful or sublime is only felt when these two effects are conjoined, and the complex emotions produced." It is thus that "the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean give rise to a variety of images, and the sentiment of beauty is composed of the pleasures of emotion and the pleasures of imagination." There is truth in this theory, but it is not the whole truth. It accounts for so much of the mental phenomenon. It shows how the feeling is prolonged and intensified by the image after image that is raised up. But it does not seem to me to embrace the whole. It does not show very clearly how the feeling is started at first, nor how the images pursue a certain train, all fitted to call forth emotions of one character. We have to find something in the object to evoke the feeling, and to continue the images, all of a certain kind. This we find in the sensation in the case of music, color, and form, and in the perception of relations indicative of mind in all cases. We thus reach the idea which raises the feeling, and which calls up by association other ideas of a like kind to produce their special feelings, and thus carry on the mental affection indefinitely.

Every one knows that association may give an artificial beauty to objects. I knew a girl who was acquainted with only one lady of high rank, and as she was affected with palsy the girl learned to associate lady-like manners with shaking, and so indulged in it. An unpleasant association may overcome a very decided taste. I know that a powerful relish for a certain kind of food may be counteracted by its being painful in the digestion, so that the food is now regarded with aversion. It is often remarked that familiarity may remove the first impressions left by ugliness. People offensive to the bodily sense may come to be delighted in because of their amiable or noble qualities. It is the same with scenes of nature; a man's birth-place may have no beauty in itself, but his heart, if he have a heart, ever warms towards it.

In such associations we transfer our feelings to the objects.

> "Sweet bird! thy bower is ever green,
> Thy sky is ever clear;
> Thou hast no sorrow in thy song,
> No winter in thy year."

Such would be *our* feelings in the bower; we transfer them even to inanimate objects.

> "His very foot has music in 't
> As he comes up the stair."

SECTION VIII.

COMPLEXITY OF THE ÆSTHETIC AFFECTION.

Viewed in a wide sense the sentiment of beauty is a very complex one, embracing such elements as sensations, intellectual perceptions, ideas, memories, associations, feelings. There may be more or fewer of these in any æsthetic state. When they combine and concur the senti-

ment is a very powerful one, and the object is regarded as very beautiful. Thus there are scenes in which every sensation is pleasant, balmy air, blue sky, lovely flowers, where we see power working in that water-fall, and conspiring agents, and ideas of plenty and happiness suggested, as that river, rising in ruggedness, is seen running into fertile plains. There are paintings in which the coloring is rich, the scenes illustrative of highest character, and associated with great historical events. Such scenes and pictures draw all eyes, and attract all hearts, and are constantly visited by persons capable of the æsthetic sentiment.

Very frequently some of the elements only are in exercise, or some of them are strong, and others are weak. As the feeling is determined by the idea, and the idea gets its force from the appetence, to which it corresponds, the sentiment takes the special color of the ideas. It is the aim of some authors, and of some artists, to furnish a set of pictures, all which raise only one kind of idea, say of sorrow, or sympathy, as by Sterne, in his "Sentimental Journey," and Mackenzie, in his "Man of Feeling," and the emotion is often made very intense. But if it is not relieved in some way the mind is led, from the very stretching and tension to which it is subjected, to break away from it. Our most successful painters furnish some kind of escape from dismal or painful scenes, as Rembrandt, by the light being made to shine in, as he used to see when a boy, in his father's mill, or as others do, by introducing an innocent, smiling child, or a bright-eyed plant, into scenes of blood or terror. A judicious introduction of such relief is often the mark of a high artist. Shakespeare is true to nature when he places so near each other dignity and buffoonery, the king and the clown, crying and laughing, though I think he often so mingles them as to become grotesque.

In some cases the sensation, say of gorgeous color in a landscape or a painting, or of luscious sound in music, may overwhelm the more intellectual elements. Quite as frequently the intellectual exercise, the perception of relations, may be carried too far and rest in itself, and arrest the higher idea and feeling; it is thus that a critical spirit may lessen the enjoyment, and the connoisseur may have less pleasure than the common observer in looking at a work of art. On the other hand, new, and often higher, beauties may be discovered in a building, or a landscape, by a more careful inspection, which detects farther harmonies. In some the idea of mental qualities bulks so largely that it fills the eye to the exclusion of everything else, and they gaze on order and on love. In others the feeling, say that raised by music, puts the whole soul in a state of excitement, and very much stops contemplation. In very many cases the train of association runs in so strong a current that it carries all before it.

SECTION IX.

THE PICTURESQUE.

This is not the same as the beautiful. That bevy of young ladies standing on one of the promontories of the Antrim coast, or of the Isle of Skye, and breaking into raptures, and crying, "How lovely, how lovely!" that company of mercantile youths, who have reached the Tell Country, at the upper end of the Lake Lucerne, and are looking up to the horrid overhanging masses of rock and snow, and exclaim, "How beautiful, how beautiful!" have certainly not been instructed (in whatever else they may have been) in the science of taste. The peculiarity of such scenes does not consist in their beauty, which always soothes and softens the mind, but in their being picturesque or sublime, and so rousing and stimulating it.

The picturesque may best be explained by describing it as picture-like. Everything that the mind can vividly picture is picturesque. The scenes which possess this quality are specially addressed to the phantasy or imaging power of the mind. They stand before us with a marked form or a vivid outline. The mass of objects on the earth are not of this exciting character. Just as the ground colors of nature are soft or neutral, so the earth's common scenes are irregular, or simply rounded in their outline. Yet here and there arise picture-like objects from the midst of them, to arrest the eye and print themselves on the fancy. It may be noticed that the grass and grain of the earth raise up their sharp points from the surface to catch our eye. A still larger proportion of objects above us, and standing between us and the sky, have a clear outline or vivid points. This is the case with the leaves, and the coma of trees, and with not a few rocks and mountains. Rising out from quieter scenes, they enliven, without exciting the mind, and tend to raise that earthward look of ours and direct it to heaven, to which they point.

The wide extending English lawn and the American prairie are very lovely, but are not picturesque, for they want rising points and sharp outlines. For the same cause the boundless forests of Germany and America, though they have a sort of sublimity, cannot be described as having the quality of which I am speaking. Mountains, such as we have in Ireland and Scotland, will become sublime merely by their huge bulk or towering height, but are not picturesque unless they be peaked, jagged, or precipitous. All that has a sharp point, or a sharp edge; all that has a ridge, or is rugged; all that is steep or perpendicular, is especially fitted to leave its sharply defined image in the mind. The very Lombardy

poplar helps to relieve the tame plain. The church-tower or spire fixes the whole village in the memory. The wind-mill, though not the most improved piece of machinery, and though the movements of its outstretched arms, as they forever pursue without overtaking each other, are somewhat awkward, is, notwithstanding, a most picturesque object as seen between us and the sky. The ship, with its pointed masts and its white sails stretched out to the breeze, makes the bay on which it sails look more lively and interesting. More imposing, there are the bold mountains which cleave the sky, and the sea-worn rocks which have faced a thousand storms and are as defiant as ever. How placid does the lake sleep in the midst of them, sheltered by their overhanging eminences and guarded by their turreted towers: heaven above looks down on it with a smile and is seen reflected from its bosom.

There are narratives, there are tales, there are poems which may be happily characterized as picturesque. Of this description is the vivid account of the patriarchal life in the book of Genesis: we see, as it were, the persons and the scenes before us. Such, too, are the narratives of Herodotus, in which he makes the condition and the history of ancient Egypt and other eastern countries stand so picture-like before us. In our own language we have many picturesque writers. Defoe makes every scene so lively that we feel as if we were looking upon it, and every incident so life-like that we feel as if we were mingling in it. Sir Walter Scott, too, sets before us his old castles and dungeon-keeps, his heroes and heroines, so graphically that we cannot help feeling as if we were spectators and actors in the scenes, and not mere listeners to a tale conjured up by the imagination of the author. It may be observed of all such picturesque descriptions

that they are extremely simple, both in manner and and style; the authors make the persons and events stand out clearly and distinctly before us, like a statue upon a column seen between us and a bright sky.

SECTION X.

THE LUDICROUS.

Hutcheson says that it is difficult to speak gravely of laughter, yet the gravest writers have discoursed of it and with amazing gravity. Aristotle, so fond of bringing all subjects within the grasp of his definitions, has defined it, with some truth but certainly not with the full truth, as "some error in truth or propriety, but at the same time neither painful nor pernicious." Cicero describes it as "that which without impropriety notes and exposes an impropriety," and "a sudden conversion into nothing of a long-raised and highly-wrought expectation." This definition may fitly apply to some kinds of wit, but certainly not to all. The same remark applies to the definition of Hobbes, who gives the ludicrous a very selfish origin, and makes it always imply pride, whereas wit and humor have often a very innocent and kindly origin. According to him "it is a sudden glory or a sense of eminency above others or our former selves." Upon the whole, I am best pleased with the definition given by Samuel Johnson in his "Life of Cowley:" "Wit, abstracted from its effects upon the hearer, may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of *discordia concors*, a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike." It certainly often arises from the discovery of some unexpected resemblance or relation between things in every other respect dissimilar. But it

might be equally well defined as a *discors concordia*, and arises from the discovery of unseen differences in things which seem identical. A poor, weak man in rags falls into a ditch and we commiserate him and hasten to help him. A vain fool extravagantly dressed tumbles into the same ditch and we are amused and allow him to escape from the mire as best he can. In the former case there was no incongruity between the person and his plight, in the other case there is, and the sense of the ludicrous is awakened. Punning, which is not the highest kind of wit, consists in giving a word a new and unexpected application. Parody, as, for instance, that on the "Burial of Sir John Moore," entertains us because we are ever comparing the parody with the original piece and noting their incongruity. An incident which would in no way affect us in ordinary circumstances will often raise irrepressible laughter in solemn or sacred positions. A very small event occurring in a church will raise a titter, while the same occurrence happening outside would never be noticed. The only way of securing the return of composure in such cases is to allow the laugh to get its proper utterance and to return to our proper business immediately after. I have seen a minister and a thousand grave people greatly discomposed by a little bird coming into a church and hopping from pew to pew, and pew to pulpit, with a solemn beadle chasing it and ever failing to catch it; the same bird hopping outside would have raised no such laughter. It is owing to the circumstance that wit arises from the perception of incongruity that it is so easy to raise laughter by a familiar or low treatment of sacred subjects. All such wit has in it the essence of profanity, and should be instantly restrained. Laughter is raised when a mighty cause produces a weak effect, when great pretension

issues in utter failure, when loud boasting ends in a public humiliation. Kant speaks of the ridiculous being called forth by the sudden transformation of a tense expectation into nothing.

It may be doubted whether philosophers have succeeded in giving a thoroughly adequate definition of wit, but there is a preacher who once succeeded, in the pulpit, in giving a perfect description of it, though I do not see how he could have done so without exciting the laughter as well as the admiration of his congregation. The following, from one of Isaac Barrow's sermons, is, in respect both of thought and language, one of the most comprehensive passages in the English language: "First it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth import. To which question I might reply as Democritus did to him who asked the definition of a man. 'T is that which we all see and know; any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance than I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale; sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound; sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude; sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection;

sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense; sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it; sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being; sometimes it riseth only from a lucky hitting upon what is strange, sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose; often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless rovings of fancy and windings of language. It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way (such as reason teacheth and proveth things by), which, by a pretty surprising uncouthness in conceit or expression, doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of wit more than vulgar; it seeming to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him; together with a lively briskness of humor not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination."[1]

[1] Will any one after reading this passage allow that all these exercises of mind can be accounted for by a nervous energy? Spencer accounts for the ludicrous thus: "A large amount of nervous energy, instead of being allowed to expend itself in producing an equivalent amount of the new thoughts and emotions, which are nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow." "The excess must discharge itself in some other direction, and there results an afflux through the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive actions we term laughter." *Univ. Prog.*

Every one perceives that there is a difference between wit and humor. Can the difference be pointed out and expressed? I believe that it can. Both arise from perceived incongruities, but in the case of humor the incongruity has some relation to human character, whereas wit may arise from incongruities in thought, in word, in action. In humor we find, or place, or conceive persons in ridiculous situations or attitudes. Humor, therefore, implies some appreciation of human feeling. Hence it is that humor, however strange it may seem, is very commonly associated with sympathy. It was remarked by Sir Walter Scott of Robert Burns, when he appeared in Edinburgh, that in his conversation there was a strange combination of pathos and humor. I am sure that these two often go together, humor and sympathy. The man who never laughs, or who cannot laugh heartily, I suspect is deficient in tenderness of heart, while he may be characterized by many virtues. Certain it is that in the writings of many of our great authors pathos and humor are found in the closest connection. I believe that the fountains of smiles and tears lie nearer each other than most people imagine.

"We have seen that the muscles which operate upon the mouth are distinguishable into two classes, — those which surround and control the lips, and those which oppose them, and draw the mouth widely open. The effect of a ludicrous idea is to relax the former, and to contract the latter; hence, by a lateral stretching of the mouth and a raising of the cheek to the lower eyelid, a smile is produced. The lips are, of all the features, the most susceptible of action, and the most direct index of the feelings. If the idea be exceedingly ridiculous, it is in vain that we endeavor to restrain this relaxation, and to compress the lips. The muscles concentring to the mouth prevail; they become more and more influenced; they retract the lips, and display the teeth. The cheeks are more powerfully drawn up, the eyes wrinkled, and the eye almost concealed. The lachrymal gland within the orbit is compressed by the pressure on the eyeball,

and the eye is suffused with tears." (Bell, Essay vi.) "During excessive laughter the whole body is often thrown backward and shakes, or is almost convulsed; the respiration is much disturbed; the head and face become gorged with blood, with the veins distended; and the orbicular muscles are spasmodically contracted in order to protect the eyes. Tears are freely shed. Hence, as formerly remarked, it is scarcely possible to point out any difference between the tear-stained face of a person after a paroxysm of excessive laughter and after a bitter crying fit. It is probably due to the close similarity of the spasmodic movements caused by these widely different emotions that hysteric patients alternately cry and laugh with violence, and that young children sometimes pass suddenly from the one to the other state." (Darwin, c. viii.) "When the angles of the mouth are depressed in grief the eyebrows are not elevated at the outer angles as in laughter. When a smile plays around the mouth, or the cheek is raised in laughter, the brows are not ruffled as in grief." (Bell, Essay vi.)

SECTION XI.

THE SUBLIME.

Every one feels that the sentiment of the sublime differs from that of the beautiful. The one pleases and delights, the other overawes and yet elevates.

It seems to me that whatever tends to carry away the mind into the Infinite raises that idea and feeling which are called the sublime. The idea embraces two elements, or, rather, has two sides. First the infinite is conceived as something beyond our largest phantasm, that is, image, and beyond our widest concept or general notion. We exert our imaging and conceiving power to the utmost; but as we do so we are led to perceive that there is vastly more beyond. Whatever calls forth this exercise is sublime, that is, excites that special feeling which we have all experienced, and which we call sublime.

It is not all that I see of the British that so impresses me, said Hyder Ali, but what I do not see, the power beyond the seas, the power in reserve. It was his belief

in a power beyond, in a power unseen, which so struck the mind of the Mahratta chief. The feeling of sublimity is always called forth in this way, that is, by whatever fills its imaging power and yet suggests something farther, something greater and higher. A great height, such as a great mountain, Mont Blanc, Monte Rosa, Chimborazo, raises the idea, and with it the corresponding feeling. The discoveries of astronomy stir up the emotion, because they carry the mind into the immeasurable depths of space while yet we feel that we are not at its verge. The discoveries of geology exalt the mind in much the same way, by the long vistas opened of ages of which we cannot detect the beginning. Every vast display of power calls forth the overawing sentiment; we notice agencies which are great, arguing a power which is greater. It is thus that we are moved by the howl of the tempest and the raging of the sea, both, it may be, producing terrible havoc, in the prostration of the trees of the forest or in the wreck of vessels. The roar of the water-fall, the musical crash of the avalanche, the muttering and the prolonged growl of the thunder, the sudden shaking of the stable ground when the earth quakes, all these fill our minds, in our endeavor to realize them, and raise apprehension of unknown effects to follow. The forked lightning raises the thought of a bolt shot by an almighty hand. Thick masses of cloud or of darkness may become sublime by suggesting depths which we cannot sound. The vault of heaven is always a grand object when serene; as we look into it we feel that we are looking into the boundless. A clear, bright space in the sky, whether in a natural scene or in a painting, is an outlet, by which the mind may go out into the limitless. We are exhilarated by the streaks of light in the morning sky, partly, no doubt, from the associated hope

of the coming day, but still more because of the suggested region beyond, from which the luminary of day comes. I explain in much the same way the feeling of grandeur awakened by the sun setting in splendor in the evening sky, our souls go after him into the region to which he is going. In much the same way there is always a profound feeling of awe associated with the serious contemplation of the death of a fellow man; it is, if we view it aright, the departure of a soul into an unending eternity.

There are still grander scenes presented in the moral world, raising the feeling of sublimity, because revealing an immense power and suggesting an immeasurable power. We are affected with a feeling of wonder and awe when we contemplate Abraham lifting the knife to slay his son, and the old Roman delivering his son to death because guilty of a crime; we think of, and yet cannot estimate, the strong moral purpose needed to overcome the natural affection which was burning all the while in the bosoms of the fathers. The commander burning his ships that he may have no retreat, tells of a will and a purpose which cannot be conquered. We feel overawed, and yet exalted, when we read of the Hollanders being ready to open the sluices which guard their country and let in the ocean to overflood it, and of the Russians setting fire to their capital, rather than have their liberties trampled on. Who can read the account in Plato's "Phædo" of the death of Socrates without saying, How grand, how sublime! and we do so because we would estimate, and yet cannot estimate, the grand purpose which enabled him to retain such composure amidst scenes so much fitted to agitate and to overwhelm. History discloses a yet more sublime scene in Jesus, patient and benignant under the fearful and mysterious load laid

upon Him. "Socrates died as a hero, but Jesus Christ died as a God."

But there is a second element in infinity. It is such that nothing can be added to it, and nothing taken from it; in other words, incapable of augmentation or diminution. Under this aspect it is the Perfect. As an example we have "the law of the Lord, which is perfect." Kant's language has often been quoted, as to the two things which impressed him with sublimity, the starry heavens and the law of God. If Kant had ever seen the ocean he would have added it to the others, because of its extending beyond our vision. But neither the starry heavens nor the expanded ocean present both aspects of infinity, which are combined in only one object, and that is God, all whose attributes are perfections, which as we attempt to compass them we are lost, because of the infinitude of Him who is "high throned above all height."

SECTION XII.

BEAUTY IN NATURAL OBJECTS.

Every object in nature, every man and woman, every scene, bare sand or stagnant marsh, is not to be regarded as beautiful. It is in the midst of the commonplace that interesting objects come forth to please us, here and there, and everywhere. Let us look at those natural scenes which are entitled to be regarded as beautiful, picturesque, or sublime.

In the grassy slope, in the rich plain waving with grain, there is first a pleasant sensation and then the idea is raised of plenty, of fertility, and of the comfort of living beings; and we are inclined to stand still, or sit down, and contemplate it, allowing the thoughts to flow on complacently. We like to see a road through it, not

straight, but winding, suggesting that one might follow it at his own free or, if he list, capricious will. In river scenery the flowing of the stream, the sheen and sparkling of the waters, give the idea of action and of life. The picture may be greatly enlivened by the pellucidness of the water, by the purling and leaping of the streams, as in the hill country of Scotland and New England, or by retired bays and wooded islets in the great American rivers. In the broad stream or ocean bay, as, for instance, in the St. Lawrence, there is often a great beauty in the flitting lights and shadows, in the beams lying visibly on the waters, and in the varying colors, silvern and golden, of the surface, and the whole rendered more picturesque by the white sail moving across it. The sky, when clear, and of its own blue color, is always lovely; it is a sheltering canopy over us. The clouds hang over our world like drapery, and interest us by their levity, by their movableness, by their varied shapes or colors, often splendidly in harmony, as dividing the beam between them. These same clouds may awe us as in thick masses they forebode tempests, crashing and destructive. As the sun sets there is often a pleasant glow, and the scene is associated in our minds with rest after labor, repose after a journey, and his retinue of clouds, so richly dressed, raises the thought of splendor and magnificence, and our soul goes after him when he sinks, as it goes after the dying Christian into the better world.

In the quiet valley, especially when, as in Switzerland, it is defended by lofty mountains, the feeling is of rest, protection, security from danger, peace without, emblem of peace within. Much the same sentiment is called forth as an echo by the sweet lake, like Loch Katrine, sleeping in the midst of guardian rocks. The bold, hard rock which has withstood the elements for a thousand

years, and is as defiant as ever, is associated with endurance and power of resistance, like the man of strong moral purpose who has withstood the winds and waves of temptation and the attacks of foes. The scars upon its face, like those of the warrior received in battle, the water-worn channels, the torn detritus at its base, all go to raise the idea and deepen the feeling. The twisted structure shows what torture it has come through, and yet been preserved. The ravine is the evident result of some terrible disruption of nature, and looks like a mysterious hiding-place provided for a refuge. The precipice gives the idea of height unapproachable and the danger of falling into the depth below, from which, however, we are safe because of our position ; if we are not, the sublimity vanishes in the sense of fear. An inspiring interest is often awakened by the way being seemingly shut in by forbidding heights, which, however, open as we advance, and exciting our curiosity as to what is to be disclosed. In the same way the mountain pass allures us on by promising the view of a region beyond, which seemed to be shut out from us. In river rapids the idea is of impelling force, and of the cataract of awful and irresistible power and determination, as exhibited, for instance, in, what seems to me the most impressive point at the Niagara Falls, the terrible rush towards the ledge issuing in the inevitable fall. The breaking of the cold and ice of winter in the freshet, and the rush and the boiling of the relieved waters, is symbolic of the bursting forth of the caged spirit into freedom and action.

Beauty of Trees. A boy gets hold of a fir cone ; he reckons it a prize and feels a pleasure in contemplating it. He cannot tell how it should interest him, but the scientific man should be able to say. He handles it and turns it round and round, and preserves it among his toys,

and brings it out from time to time to gaze on it. The scientific observer may easily notice that around its surface are two sets of spiral whorls, one going to the right and the other to the left, each to carry the eye round the cone, and that they cross each other and produce regular rhomboidal figures, which differ in each species of plant. The boy does not observe all this, but he is impressed with the general regularity, and with the special forms, with the unity and variety, and with the proportions and harmony, and an incipient æsthetic feeling is started.

The order seen so easily and clearly in the fir cone also appears, though less obviously and with greater complexity, on the tree, and is meant to be noticed by full-grown boys. Every fir-tree, indeed every coniferous plant, tends to take a definite form, and that form is the same as that of its cone, that is, conical, with the branches lengthening till they produce a graceful swell and then shortening till they come to a point. The carefully observant eye will notice that the leaves go round the stem and the branches round the trunk, as the scales do round the cones, in two sets of spirals crossing each other. But in order to our being impressed with the beauty of the tree it is not necessary to notice all this scientifically, it is enough that we have a general perception of the harmony.

Coming now to the leafy trees we will at once notice that every tree bears a leaf after its kind; and you cannot by any artifice make any tree bear a leaf of a different kind,—make an elm bear the leaf of an oak. All these have a beauty of some kind, a graceful curvature of outline, and a correspondence of side to side, even when the two sides are not alike, there being a counterpoise to the inequality. Then it can be shown that every tree is apt, if not interfered with, to take the form of its leaf.

Thus some leaves have leaf stalks shorter or longer while others have none; and it will be found that the trees on which the first class grow have an unbranched trunk shorter or longer, whereas the others have none, but are bushy from the base. It can be shown that the angle at which the branches go off from the stems is the same as that at which the veins go off from the leaf, and that the curvilinear outline of the tree and of every branch is much the same as that of the leaf. I mention these things to show that there is an observable order in the shape and structure of every tree, in the arrangement of its branches and its contour, which at once impresses the observer, and calls forth an impression which deserves to be called æsthetic. A normally formed tree in winter covered with frostwork, and with the outline fully exposed, is felt by all to be a beautiful object. The exact order is not so observable in the tree in summer because of the leafy covering; still it strikes us insensibly without our being able to detect the elements, and the graceful covering of foliage is felt to be its crowning ornament. It is to be allowed that while every tree takes its special form this may be interfered with in a number of ways, — by its being crowded by other trees, by its being bent or broken by the wind, eaten by animals, or cut untastefully by men. Still it shows its native tendency even when it is obstructed, and it is beautiful as a tree when it is left to grow into its natural shape. The beauty of the tree may be much embellished by its blossoms in spring and its fruit in autumn, adding beauty of coloring to beauty of outline.

Even where it is not an artificial — which is a false — taste, there is far too little attention paid in most of our parks or demesnes to the planting of trees so as to show their full amount of beauty. Every tree in a lawn should

be placed sufficiently far apart from every other to show its separate form, and allow the eye to repose on the lawn between. In a large park trees of every shape should have a place: some tall and some short, some tapering others swelling, some rising up high and straight and pointing to the sky, others wide spreading and bending over the earth to shelter us from exposure to heat or storm, and furnishing a quiet retreat for meditation; some with a pale, others with a dark green color, all arranged with such uniformity as to show it has been effected by art though not by artifice. And whenever a tree appears of an abnormal shape, made by brute or by man, or by a neighboring tree through our neglect being allowed to restrain it, let it be mercilessly cut down, except, indeed, it be a gnarled oak, or an elm scathed by lightning, or a branch broken by the tempest, when it should certainly be allowed to remain as an indication of the strife which it has come through. We are not to understand from what has been said that there is beauty only in regularity; where there is only uniformity there is no beauty. The eye is not offended when it sees the tree somewhat bent with the wind or by gravity. The gnarled oak looks like a man of independence and firmness, who has had his character formed by the resistance he has offered to evil. Let us preserve Wordsworth's Yew-tree where

> "Each particular trunk 's a growth
> Of intertwined fibres serpentine,
> Up coiling and inveterately convolved,
> Nor uninformed with Phantasy's looks,
> That threaten the profane."

A different kind of beauty is secured by the clump of trees, where we have the trunks standing side by side, like the soldiers in an army, and the branches, like friends, intermingling with each other, and all to furnish defense and shelter.

> "And ye are strong to shelter. All meek things,
> All that need home and covert, love your shade,
> Birds of shy song, and low-voiced quiet things,
> And nun-like violets by the wind betrayed."

The wide extended forest has all these elements of beauty and it has many more; it raises an idea of the exuberance of nature and of immensity. As we wander in it we have to find our way among difficulties, and we are rewarded by the graceful or grotesque forms casting up on the right hand and the left, and find a pleasure in penetrating into the gloom and losing ourselves there. But the interest is immeasurably increased when we fall in here and there with glades into which air and sunshine are let for our relief, and dells into which no human interruption can intrude, where we feel as if we heard the silence which is broken only by the cry of the startled bird and the rushing of the deer.

Mountains. These, as we look up to them, elevate the mind as well as the eye. Some cannot gaze on a mountain top without an almost irrepressible ambition to ascend it. As we mount we are ever turning round to get glimpses of the scene below, and when we reach the summit we do not care to repress the inclination to shout. How interesting now to look round and behold the brotherhood of mountains and the multitudinous hills, each standing boldly in its place and eager to show its special shape and maintain its position! We are awed as we look down the precipices, and yet we feel all the while how stable these rocks on which we stand are, and how deep their foundations. We peer into the crevices wondering what is concealed in them, and penetrate the ravines not knowing what we may meet with. We follow the windings of the valleys as they sweep down, each one gathering a stream to form a river. How pleasant

to notice the plains below, and the scattered dwellings, evidently with living men and women within them. The dwellers in mountain regions have a more vivid remembrance of their country than those who have been brought up in commonplace plains, think of it more frequently, and have a greater desire to return to it. The shepherds, such as those of ancient Judea and of Scotland, are often addicted to reflection. The hunters have a spirit of enterprise called forth by their employments. Mountain tops are felt to be places for adoration: God's law is fitly proclaimed there, and He comes down there to meet with the worshipers.

Waterfalls. If you visit a waterfall do it leisurely that association of ideas may have full play. It is usually in a broken, wild scene, and we may let our thoughts run wild, as a boy let loose on a holiday excursion. We hear the roar of the falling water: let it guide us. The first view of the scene gives us the idea of a mysterious convulsion which has taken place, we know not how or when, but of which we see the effects indicating vast power. Let us approach the cataract from below that it may overawe us. But in surveying it minutely let us go at once to where it is rushing on to its destination, and let us observe it taking the leap so determinedly — as if it must take it, as if it took it with a purpose, and mark that as it does so it glories in its courage and strength. We may then survey it from beneath. We see that it thrashes on the rock with a power which we cannot resist, and vainly try to estimate. Having performed its feat you observe how it calms itself in the pool it has formed, and then glides away so peacefully. You now look up and around. The scene is horrific, but it is relieved by scenes of beauty, by the spray sparkling in the sunshine, or gilded by the rainbow colors, and by

these flowers and ferns getting nourishment in the crevices and furnishing drapery of exquisite beauty. We may now sit down, and we feel secure as we see the whole guarded by these turreted towers evidently set as battlements to defend it, and we allow our thoughts to run on, and as they do so fill the mind with ideas of power and feelings of wonder.

The Ocean as seen from the shore is characterized by restlessness; "it cannot rest." It is in perpetual motion, and casts forth as wrecks the objects that have intruded into its domain. As we sail upon it we are impressed with its immensity. At times it is the very image of rest and placidity. Yet we feel that it may awake at any time from its slumbers and raise its mountain waves to overwhelm, and show its yawning gulfs to swallow us. It has its beauties in the dark hue of its deep, and the cerulean of its shallow waters, in its crested foam and its spray. It has an infinite variety in its moods and in its expressions, as now it plays and smiles and laughs, and again is dark and sullen, angry and chafing. We are constrained to look upon it with a feeling of awe. The ideas it raises are of boundlessness and irresistible power, rousing the feeling of the sublime from the lowest depth of our nature.

The Human Frame. The highest style of beauty is to be found in man and woman. A beauty may be discerned in the forms of the human body, in its symmetry, its proportions, in its angles, and in its curves. There are tints and hues which are felt to be pleasant by the optic organism. But these are, after all, the lowest elements in the beauty of the human frame. There may be a grace in the attitude assumed, in the walk, and in the manner. But the highest æsthetic power is to be found in the Expression. This may be seen in the mo-

tion and action, as showing activity, life, and strength. But it is displayed most fully in the countenance, as indicating mind or disposition, as indicating force or resolution, or refinement, or intelligence, or fire, or spirit, or gentleness and love. We gaze on certain countenances with delight, and feel as if we could gaze on them forever. The beauty appreciated will depend on the mental association of the race, the country, or the individual. The beauty of the Negro or the Indian will not be regarded so favorably by the white man. There is truth in the idea of Sir Charles Bell, that the typical form of a race is the model beauty in the estimation of that race. In all cases the emotion is made more intense when the tender passion suffuses through the whole. In many cases there may be no inward disposition corresponding to the outward signs as we have interpreted them. "Fair but false" has been the complaint of lovers in all ages. Still we cannot thereby be rid of the association even though we know on reflection that there is no moral quality; we still look with admiring interest on that countenance which is so full of mirth, joyousness, quickness, love, or tenderness.

SECTION XIII.

SCENERY OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

It may be interesting to close the general subject of the æsthetic emotions by showing how the beautiful, the picturesque, and sublime are exhibited in the well-known scenery of different countries. To begin with England. Well may she be called "Merry England." No country that I have seen exhibits such pictures of plenty and peace as she does in her wide-extended, fertile, and well-cultivated plains, her fields clothed with

hedgerows and scattered trees, and dotted all over with well-fed kine, which need only to bend their necks to find the herbage ready to meet them, and rivers winding through the midst of them, and lively villages with village churches on either bank. She is preëminent for that kind of beauty produced by association, that is, by a prolonged train of thought and feeling raised by the happiness of the scene. She has also spots of great attractiveness in the creeks and bays of the sea that girds her, and the loveliest of lakes embosomed among the green hills of Cumberland and Westmoreland. But very much of her fair surface is blackened by the smoke of factories which yield so much of her wealth. Except in the wild rocks on the coasts of Devonshire and Cornwall, and in the grand mountains and rocks of Wales, she has little that may be called sublime.

The Lowlands of Scotland are characterized by their improved agriculture, but have everywhere clear and sweetly-flowing streams, such as the Doon, the Ayr, and the Irvine, mentioned so often by Burns, and the Tweed and Teviot, the favorites of Scott, and their sweeps forming dells and holms of romantic beauty. Much of the Highlands of Scotland is simply wild; but as you travel on you meet with leaping and buoyant rivers and charming secluded lochs, or gaze on the shining faces of broad lakes, guarded by craggy hills and lofty mountains, apt to be a little too rounded at the top, but with horrid ravines intersecting them in Arran and in Skye. Travelers from other countries when they visit Scotland should choose the month from the first week in August to the first week in September, when the heather is in bloom and throws a glow of beauty over the wildness and the grandeur.

Much of Ireland is bare and uninteresting, owing to

the extent of what was or is "bog" country; but everywhere you see a soft green of grass, or of leafage, which cheers and enlivens the soul. County Antrim, as a whole, is tame and bare, but then it is girdled by a coast marked by the picturesque and sublime; these I reckon the distinguishing characteristics of Fair Head and the Pleskins, though when the sea is smooth and the sunshine is playing on it, there is among these creeks which indent among the rocks a romantic loveliness to relieve the savage character of the horrid precipices. The vales farther south in Ireland, such as those of Wicklow and the Golden Valley, have been admired by all travelers of taste, because of their fine sweep and their sweetness. In the Western Coast there are bays in which one could wish to linger for days or weeks, with awful gullies penetrating to great depths, and wild mountains with picturesque and imposing forms.

Crossing the channel we find France, as a whole, rather flat and tame. But in all parts of it there are rivers rolling along magnificently with fruit trees and vineyards, with smiling villages and old historic towns, on either bank. In the south and west it has magnificent bays, and in the Pyrenees mountains worthy of standing alongside of the Alps. North Germany, for hundreds of miles, is one flat plain with scarcely an eminence in it; and after living in it for a time I literally shouted when on leaving it I came in sight of the Saxon Switzerland. That country and the Hartz Mountains show us towering heights of a most singular shape, which look as if they were the workmanship and the abode of goblins, and the German students relieve the severity of their studies by forming companies, and taking summer excursions among these romantic grandeurs. Germany, too, has her grandly sweeping rivers, such as the Elbe, the Rhine, and the

Danube, with lovely hills and hoary castles and terraced vineyards on their banks.

For pure beauty Italy is unsurpassed, perhaps unequaled. Her pure atmosphere, through which everything looks resplendent, her hills covered with umbrageous trees, her architectural cities with their magnificent churches and palaces, the treasures of art contained in them, and, above all, her sunny bays, together constitute a scene of loveliness from which there is nothing to detract. Lake Como, as it smiles in the sunshine, with its borders covered with the richest fruit and grain and trees, and overtopped with snow-covered mountains, has always appeared to me to be the perfection of beauty. But for scenery which calls forth all the æsthetic feelings we must look to Switzerland, which attracts all people because everyone finds there something fitted to gratify his higher nature. As we travel through it we know not whether to admire most its valleys of softest green variegated by flowers of every hue, or its resplendent glaciers filling its hollows, or its horrid precipices from which we look down tremblingly into the yawning gulf below, or its snow-capped mountains mingling with the sky and reflecting the light of heaven. Every deep feeling is moved as we gaze on the huge bulk of the Jungfrau with its deep gullies, as we listen to the sound of the avalanche with its voice like thunder mingled with tinkling music, or as we sail on the placid bosom of Lake Lucerne, and look up with awe on the overhanging mountains of ice and snow.

If we now cross the broad Atlantic we meet with grandeur and beauties of a new type which make us feel that we are in a new world, which yet we recognize as the same with the old. The natural scenes have there a vastness which they cannot have in the more confined or cultivated countries of Europe; and as we float down

their mighty rivers, or wander in their interminable forests, or gaze on their waterfalls, or sail on their vast lakes, or scamper over their prairies, we have a feeling of extent and freedom and boundlessness which borders on the sublime. The eastern sea-board, as a whole, lacks character, though there are pleasant eminences and scattered forests and broad rivers within accessible reach of the great cities, and all along the coast there are lovely bays guarded by rough and, in some spots, picturesque rocks, as at Newport and along the New England shores. When you penetrate farther in you may meet with both grandeurs and beauties. Many of her rivers have too much of the clay of the soil floating in them, but in the mountain countries of New England, especially in Vermont, you have as fresh and leaping streams as those of Scotland. The Green Mountains, the Franconian, and the White Mountains are equal to any mountains in Europe, the Alps being always excepted; and there are hills and valleys half-way between mountain and dale, as at Lenox, alluring us not only to visit them, but to dwell in them, as being places where you have visible peace and yet variety. The extensive Alleghany range, stretching far south to Virginia and North Carolina, is made rich by its clothing of boundless green forest, and by the long vales running parallel to it, at a lower level, or running off from it, also wooded, but with cultivated grain and human habitations creeping up into it.

The Hudson valley, beginning with its villas and green slopes, and, as you ascend, disclosing the Highlands, the Shawangunk mountains, and the Catskills, is, with its windings and recesses, as beautiful as the Rhine. Within an accessible distance you have the Adirondacks with its enjoyable wildness; in one region bold and free mountains, and in the other pleasant lakes and streams em-

bosomed in impenetrable forests; and in all places bare and stubborn rocks facing the sky, and ready to encounter the storms now as they have done for unnumbered ages, The Falls of Niagara when first seen at a distance are disappointing; they look dumpy from an excess of breadth when compared with their height; but as you go above them, and follow the magnificent river hurrying down these rapids with such determination to its fall, and when you go below, and mark the irresistible plunge of waters and the mysterious gloom, you are made to feel that they have a grandeur and sublimity far transcending your highest expectations, and the feeling is not lessened but is enlivened when the sun shines out, and calls forth a beauty in the rainbow hue of the spray. The great lakes of America are like seas, and have not the sublimity of the ocean, but it is delightful to sail for days upon their fresh waters, and acquire health from their breezes. The smaller but still large lakes, such as the Winnipiseogee, and Champlain, and, above all Lake George, have, beside their broad sheets of water, lovely bays and delightsome wooded islands in which one would wish to dwell all the sunshine summer; and they lie among lofty mountains adorned with the richest leafage.

The region beyond the Alleghany range for hundreds of miles is flat, and its rivers are sluggish, but then it is rich and pleasantly wooded, and its streams have often cut out picturesque banks. It is a most delightful feeling which one experiences in floating for days on the Upper Mississippi, round lovely wooded islands, or bold promontories which look at first as if they would bar all progress, and showing openings only as we put trust in them and advance, and all along between lofty and in many places precipitous banks hundreds of feet in height,

with jagged ledge covered with fresh green grass, or more frequently by dense forest, at times coming down to the river's edge, and at times receding miles away, opening glens of singular beauty, or letting in the dark waters of rivers famed in Indian story. The prairies with their ocean of green verdure in May enlivened by wild flowers are exquisitely lovely, and I enjoyed them excessively in a visit to Iowa; but I confess I should not like to live all my days in the finest of them, which would come to be monotonous with nothing but the green level below and the blue concave above.

SECTION XIV.

THE FINE ARTS.

Music. I have asserted that the æsthetic feeling often begins with a pleasant sensation, which by its regularity sets the mind working, and raises a train of thought, particularly of harmony, and this conducts to ideas of activity, life, and soul, gendering the sentiment. Music furnishes a good example. It is felt first as an elysian sensation, but is appreciated mainly because of the series of ideas which it excites. The words are, or ought to be, the expression of the ideas which the music would naturally excite, and when there are no words audible our musicians can interpret the sounds in their own way.

Architecture. I am inclined to think that there may be some mathematical law of the vibrations producing an organic impression which rouses the intellect to notice in a vague way, in the first instance, and afterwards in a more precise way, the proportions of the building which are seen to indicate skill, design, purpose. The attention being called and intelligence awakened, a series and succession of proportions and adaptations and uses are

discovered, calling forth appropriate feelings, and it may be accompanying associations, carried on as long as the building is under the view. As a negative condition it is necessary that there should not be presented in any part uselessness, which is folly, disproportion, unsymmetrical sides, unbalanced appendages, heavy parts unsustained, bulky columns which support nothing, weak foundations, overwhelming crushing roofs; for these would disturb the proper flow of the ideas and feelings. But then it is necessary that there should be positive excellences in skillful arrangements, and in ideas expressed in stone, elevating the mind to high contemplation. The elements of strength, massiveness, resistance, endurance, stability, may all have their place fittingly in architecture, by raising deep ideas, as may also shade and retreat and protection. But in other buildings we are more pleased to see lightness, airiness, pointedness, heavenwardness. Of a still higher order are those buildings which show us curves of great sweep, and go out as it were into infinity. In Grecian architecture the idea is solidity, shelter, covering, cool shade, with elegant proportions on which we fondly gaze. In the Gothic cathedral it is sweep, avenues, like those of trees, towering sky-ward and with heavenly tendency. In the old English architecture it is home, peace, comfort, with life and variety and affection.

Sculpture. The essential idea is form and expression, of the man or woman if it be a copy, or of the thoughts and feelings of the personage represented if the figure be ideal, whether of contentment, placidity, curiosity, anxiety, of hope, joy, or love, or may be determination, eagerness, courage, ambition, jealousy, hatred, and revenge. These must be marked by the posture of the body, or they must beam or flash or scowl from the ex-

pression of the countenance. When there is a group, there must be a unity in the variety, a central form to which all eyes turn with approbation or disapprobation, with a common sentiment, but with diversities of character and aims.

Landscape Gardening. We now hate to see trees clipped into the forms of beasts or birds or any other artificial shape ; we shrink from rectilinear Dutch walks hemmed in by hedges, we doubt even of Italian statues of mythological persons, as somehow not in their proper place (at least when winter comes they should be sheltered in a building) ; and we love to have curves and sweeps, and paths that may ever lead into something new, and glimpses of distant objects, and vistas that seem to have no end. There should be trees of various kinds and shapes, planted at a respectful distance from each other, and each showing its separate form and character. There should also be clumps of trees for shelter, and to show their leafage. In flower gardening we strive to have beds of varied forms, suggestive of fertility and invention, and flowers of harmonious colors growing alongside of each, to quicken our sensitive power. But care must be taken in imitating the variety of nature to conceal the imitation ; here as in poetry, *artis est celare artem.* In many modern gardens there are so many artifices in ingenious cut beds, and meaningless dells, that we turn away from the pretty conceits with a feeling of irrepressible contempt.

Landscape Painting. Here, the first thing is to have a verisimilitude of the actual or possible scene. We are offended when called to look on a sky which, though beautiful in itself, is unlike anything we have seen in nature. But the painting will not fulfill the highest ends unless it goes farther than mere imitation, and raises

within us the same feelings as the landscape itself would do, whether of peace or power or grandeur, whether it be of plain or valley or river or ocean, of hopeful spring, of rich summer, of plenteous autumn, or stern winter. The grand aim of the artist should be, not so much to make an exact picture as to raise the very sentiments we should experience, were we in the very heart of the scene, say a desert in Arabia or Sahara, or a gorge in the Sierra Nevadas or Himalayas.

Historical Painting. Here, faithfulness to time, place, and person is essential to gain our confidence; and the absence of it causes distrust and makes our nature rebel. We cannot, and should not, tolerate a modern lady, or a Scotch or Swiss girl, made to appear in an ancient or cartoon scene, say in a Bible painting. There is always a special zest when the artist is in thorough sympathy with those whom he places before us, as we feel when gazing on the homely Scottish scenes of Sir David Wilkie, and which we do not feel when he sought to give us grander scenes, as Knox preaching before the Lords of the Congregation. But the grand aim of the painter of character should be to give us expression, true to nature in the first instance, but also portraying the thoughts, impulses, and passions of men and women. He should carry those who view the painting into the very heart of the scenes he represents, and make them experience something of the feelings which should have passed through their breasts had they mingled in the scenes, — they all the while knowing that this is a representation, for it is only when they do so that the sentiment of admiration, and other æsthetic feelings, are called forth. The painter may have a nobler aspiration; he may aim at elevating our sentiments by the exhibition of great and noble character and deeds, and in doing so show himself

the higher artist. There is a genuine portrayal of human nature in the paintings of low life, of drinking and sensuality and vulgar humor, by the Dutch painters; but surely there is something vastly higher shown in the pure virgin, the noble apostles, and the holy angels of Raphael and the great Italian painters. Each class of paintings raises a genuine æsthetic feeling; but surely there is something immeasurably higher in the latter than in the former.[1]

[1] I acknowledge that the above discussion of the Fine Arts is very meagre. Though I am fond of gazing on paintings, and have looked on vast numbers, I am not competent to describe them as a connoisseur. What is given is sufficient for my purpose.

BOOK THIRD.

CONTINUOUS AND COMPLEX EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

CONTINUOUS EMOTIONS.

SECTION I.

AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.

DOWN to this point we have been looking at single emotions. But we cannot comprehend our nature till we view the feelings operating continuously, or in combination. This will be felt by many as a more interesting study, for it brings us into actual contact with human life, — into the society of men and women, where the motives are always mixed, often very complex. Shakespeare is true to human nature when he brings apparently incongruous moods and passions, say gravity and levity, so close together. Scott is drawing from life when he places on the same person, and at the same time, the smile on the lips and the tear in the eye. The continued emotions are commonly called Affections and Passions.

These phrases are used somewhat vaguely. Affection is the word used when we speak of a disposition benignant and commendable, and going forth towards living beings. It often signifies the same as love; thus we speak of the affection of a mother for her son. Passion is the word used when the disposition is more doubtful in its nature, and may be towards unconscious objects. We talk of people being in a passion when they are angry, and having a passion for gambling or for hunting. Both embrace more than a single emotion, or even than a repe-

tition of the emotion. They imply an abiding principle, that is, a deeply seated appetence, which ever tends to act. They are of the nature of a river with many streams flowing into it. How many brooks join in the affection of a mother for her child, or the passion of a gambler for play.

In the combination implied in affection and passion, association of ideas prompted by the abiding appetence always plays an important part, and collects a host of concomitants and consequences. When a man is in a passion, what a flight of thoughts, like that of wild beasts pursuing their prey, of the indignity that has been heaped upon him, of the loss he has sustained, of the injustice or meanness of the one who has perpetrated all this, and the necessity of resisting or resenting, or of punishing the offender. When a mother hears of the death of her son, what a concourse of gloomy images, like that of birds gathering to the carcass. When we learn of a favorite project of ours being successful, what a fluttering like that of doves to their windows. What a quiver, full of keen instruments, of the greed of gain, of the determination not to be beaten, the craving for excitement to drown reflection, in the power that is driving on the man, who is all the while conscious that he is doing wrong, to the gambling table with the hoards of money spread out upon it, and his competitors ready for the contest.

SECTION II.

LOVE.

I have not placed love among the simple emotions. In a loose sense it may take in all the emotions. We may be said in a general way to love, that is, we have an attachment to all the persons and objects towards which

we have an appetence. The miser loves his wealth, and the tyrant his power, and the vain man the applause that is offered him. Taken in this sense love is not a separate appetence, but a term designating a characteristic of all the grateful appetences of our nature. But we denote something much more peculiar when we speak of that love that is a virtue, or rather a grace, and this the very highest grace.

In this love, love to living beings, to God or to man, there is always more than mere emotion, there is an act of the will. And here it is of importance to distinguish between emotion and will. In the former there is, we have seen, excitement, with attachment or repugnance. But in will there is choice, or the opposite of choice, rejection. Two objects are before us, and we choose the one and reject the other. Or there may be will where there is only one object before us; we may, as it were, adopt it at once. The will may assume lower or higher forms. It may exist in the simple form of wish; we wish to attain this pleasure, or this honor, which may or may not be attainable. Or we may form a determination to attain it; this is volition, the consummating exercise of the will.

Now in all love considered as a virtue or grace there is will. There will, it is true, be an appetence or emotion commonly, or always. But affection does not deserve the name of love which mounts no higher than mere feeling. In all genuine love there is well-wishing, there is benevolence. We wish well, what we believe to be good, towards the person beloved. In love, we would do good to our neighbor, we would promote the glory of God. To bring out this, we may distinguish between love considered as mere attachment, which we may call the love of complacency, and love considered as well wish-

ing, that is benevolence. The former is a mere emotion, which may or may not be virtuous. The latter is an act of our voluntary nature, and is a virtue, is the very highest virtue, "the greatest of these is charity." But the full discussion of this subject should fall under the subject of Will, and not of Emotion.

SECTION III.

LOVE OF THE SEXES.

Here there is emotion, or rather affection, with its various elements. There is always an excitement with an attachment. Here, there may also be wish or will — we should wish all that is good to the person beloved. But this is not the speciality of the affection which we are now contemplating. We may have all this towards a sister. In the affection of those whom we describe as lovers there is always a sexual appetence working to a greater or less extent, consciously or unconsciously, allowed or restrained. In a well regulated mind the bodily appetite should always be subordinated to the mental emotion and to the well wishing. When it is so it may become an element in a very exalted affection. It appears earlier, but comes forth fully at puberty, when it helps to give full form to the body, and to call forth many affections, to impart new motives, and to evoke varied energies. All along it leads us to delight in the presence and cherish the image of the loved one, and to devise and engage in many efforts to please and to gratify. As fusing body and mind it may become one of the strongest, deepest, and most influential of the passions of our nature. The continuance of the bodily inclination helps to give a permanence to the affection which prompts to activity to secure affection in return ; or when

this is not to be had, ending in wasting of body, in disappointment and irritation of soul, and, at times, in death or even in self-destruction, — in such cases love travels like the simoom, heated, colored, and destructive.

Neither psychologists nor physiologists have been able to tell us what it is precisely which leads a man and woman to cherish a special love for one another. They have left this very much to novelists, to whom it has furnished their richest stock in trade, but who are not competent to analyze for us the varied and subtle elements at work. It may be allowed to physiologists that there is a bodily appetence underneath, calling forth and working with specially mental powers. But in all that deserves the hallowed name of love, there are far nobler appetences than those sensual and selfish ones, which attract a man to a paramour or to a harlot. What are these?

This a difficult question to answer. We may, however, safely answer that the perception of beauty in man or woman on the part of the opposite sex is undoubtedly one of the most potent prompters of love. There is a beauty of person, expression, and manner, which is apt to impress all, and the possessor of it draws the eyes and the admiration of all of the opposite sex. These, when of the male sex, are apt to become vain, and when of the female sex to become coquettes, loving to gain hearts only to crush them. Then there are men and women who have an attraction only to certain persons, and, it may be, to no others; these, if they fall in with those whom they can love in return, and respect, may be more fortunate than those who are universal favorites, and are distracted by the attention paid them. There are some who never could love any but one person, who happily may, or unfortunately may not, love them in return.

Love is often kindled by love; we are apt to love those who first love us. This can easily be explained. The idea of a person cherishing an affection for us makes us feel the person attractive. It has to be added that when this love is shown on the part of those whom we cannot love, it is apt to produce aversion, as we are afraid of being troubled with them. In all cases love is increased when it is reciprocated; the person loved has now a farther attraction, and the mutual affection may bind the parties by links that cannot be broken, may bind husband and wife in a union which death only can dissolve, nay, which even death cannot dissolve. There are instances of the love continuing and increasing even when it has met with no response, leading to sorrow which refuses to be comforted, and to pining and wasting of body. These affections, while they furnish some of the very highest enjoyments of life, may be the means of inflicting the direst disappointment, when the persons do not fall in with those whom they could love and who would love them in return, when they cannot love those who love them, or be loved of those whom they love.

Our question is not yet answered, What draws lovers together? There is often a likeness between the parties. But quite as frequently there is a marked difference. The tall man chooses the little woman, or the short woman falls in love with the tall man. The restless man selects a quiet partner, and the timid woman puts herself under a bold protector. Yet it would be an error on the opposite side to say that love, like polar force, attracts the unlike. There must be something in the parties that draws them towards each other. There are tastes and predilections natural, often hereditary, which find their correlates, and a gratified satisfaction in persons of the opposite sex. It may not be a similarity, or a dissimi-

larity, but it is, as it is commonly called, an affinity of some kind. This may often be like the correspondence of tallies, by which they fit into each other. The protuberance fills the cavity, the hook goes into the eye ; the passivity is roused by the activity, which again finds repose in the passivity, and the forward impulse is met by the receptivity. The dull man often likes to have a lively wife, who has music, or amusements, or a cheerful remark to entertain him when he comes home from his toils; and a woman of a calm or sluggish temperament is pleased to be roused by a playful husband, who brings home to her the incidents of the day, the news, or the scandal. But there are limits to this fitness of opposites to blend with each other. The woman's liveliness, while at proper seasons it relieves the husband, must not be so constant as to disturb his habitual soberness ; and the man's bantering must not be made, like a perpetual firing of rockets, to disturb the woman's complacency, or the wit to oppress her with a sense of her inferiority. I have noticed that affection is apt to be kindled, and is always strengthened, when the train of ideas in the two minds are consonant, — this makes the strings to harmonize ; and on the other hand, disturbance is apt to be produced when the association of ideas in the one jars upon that of the other. In all cases the love is apt to be more permanent when the tastes of the persons, when the courses they pursue, and the ends they keep in view are alike, or, rather, when they correspond and coöperate, as one workman does with another in a factory.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that the tendency of mutual love, in all cases, is to draw the persons together in mind and in body ; in conversation and in embrace when they are together, and in correspondence when they are separated ; in communion of thought and

in tokens and expressions of affection, till they become, as it were, merged in one another, and almost feel as if they were one.

SECTION IV.

EMOTIONS COMING UP IN GROUPS.

I have already noticed the fact that ideas become associated in clusters (p. 65). An idea may have become the attracting centre of a whole body of others, each of which is emotional. When that idea starts up the whole train comes with it. We often wonder to find some one breaking out into a burst of passion without any cause or occasion known to us. But if we were acquainted with the history of the man we could account for the whole; the idea has gathered round it a whole body of feelings which come in with it, and it is thus ready as a spark to kindle a conflagration. There are emotional ideas which raise excitement as readily as substances covered with pitch take fire. We have had an unfortunate collision with a man, and when he suddenly comes in contact with us the pent-up feeling bursts out, as liquor does from a vessel when it is tapped. Or, he has offended us in one of our ruling passions, and henceforth when we think of him we have the memory of his acts of supposed ill-usage, and of our mortifications and disappointments. A disappointment or a triumph, a loss or a gain, a reproach, a compliment, a success, or a humiliation may thus have become glued to a place, or an event, which will introduce its concomitant, it may be inopportunely, and in spite of our efforts to prevent it. Some have anniversaries of fortunes or misfortunes, of marriages or of deaths, which bring with them crowded feelings sweet as clusters of grapes, or agitated as waves struggling in a creek.

We are all liable to bursts of feeling, such as that which moves the breast of the mother as she comes upon a memorial of her departed son, say the prize won by him in his opening youth ere he was taken from her, or the sword which he wielded so bravely in the battle in which he was slain. Such are the thoughts, mirthful and melancholy, which rise up and chase each other like a flock of birds, as the engrossed man visits the scenes of childhood, from which he has been so long separated. Such is the mountain torrent which bursts out when the sailor's wife is told that she is a widow. There is the cataract, when a prize of honor, or power, or wealth, long looked for, goes to a rival ; or when the merchant has suffered a loss which he knows must make him bankrupt. Thus are we liable not only to moments of feeling, but to moods, continuing for longer or shorter time, of hope or of fear, of joy or of sorrow.

Every one must have noticed persons who have been for hours in a state of cheerfulness or even hilarity, disposed to be pleased with everything, suddenly becoming silent or morose, or cross-tempered, or contradictory, without a cause being discovered by a neighbor, or by the man himself. People say it is a change of temper, and so it is ; but we must look deeper. It may so far proceed from a stomachic or some other organic derangement, but there is a deeper element. It proceeds from the intrusion of an idea with a gangrene of feelings, and this has given a new turn to the flow of thought which generates a mood which may continue for hours.

SECTION V.

TEMPERAMENT.

This is to a large extent organic, and implies nervous action. But mental action mingles. Many great men have been liable to fits of despondency, to moods of melancholy. Such men have commonly had some high or deep aim. This may be theoretical or it may be practical; it may be benevolent or it may be selfish; it may contemplate a present or remote good. One man would build up a large fortune, another a lasting reputation, another would climb a height of ambition. One has his mind filled with what is to live forever, another expects to make a great scientific discovery, a third is rearing a new system of philosophy. This one is to be a merchant who will trade with all quarters of the globe, this other is to be a great lawyer and sit on the bench of the supreme court, a third is to be a great statesman and determine the destinies of a country, that fourth is to be a brilliant orator to sway masses of men, and the fifth a gallant soldier and a mighty conqueror. But then things in this world do not always fall out according to the wishes and expectations even of the most far-sighted. Accidents will occur to stop them, and opposition will come from quarters from which aid was expected. Under such circumstances weak minds will be apt to give up the effort. Stronger spirits will persevere. But as they do so they may have their prostrations, occasional or periodical. Mohammed will have his fits and retire into a cave, not to abandon the project but to brood over it. In such a position the eager man feels like the eagle in its cage; like the prisoner in the dungeon beating upon the walls that restrain him, and anxious to break them. Aristotle has remarked that men of genius are often of

a melancholy temperament. We can understand this. They do not find their high ideal realized in the world, and they retire within themselves, or retreat to some shade

> "Whose melancholy gloom accords with their soul's sadness."

In some cases of this description the cloud comes down lower and lower upon the mountain, and at last wraps the whole soul in thickest mist or dismal gloom. But when there is buoyancy, the man comes forth from his retreat to some great work, as David did from the cave of Adullam, as Luther did after his depression the night before he had to face the great emperor and the Diet of Worms. As one of the incongruities, but not contradictions, of human character, it often happens that the man under gloom is liable in the reaction to fits of merriment, which come out from him like electric sparks, to give a grim light in the darkness. It was thus that John Knox, that Oliver Cromwell, that Abraham Lincoln had their outbursts of levity in the midst of their habitual seriousness.

From much the same causes we find at times our depressed and melancholy men to be very kind, sympathetic, and benevolent. They may wear a downcast look, they may dwell in a gloomy atmosphere, they may rather repel the young and frighten the frivolous, but underneath the encrusting ice is a flowing stream which cannot be frozen. Their benevolence has so often been received with ingratitude, their attempts to do good have so often failed, that their look has become somewhat forbidding, but beyond and within there is a loving and generous heart.

SECTION VI.

TEMPER.

Our key opens other secrets of character. We can explain what is meant by temper. This may arise in part from bodily irritation, from a disordered alimentary canal or stomach. A diseased organism is sure to have seeds in it which breed ephemera. The attacks may individually be exceedingly small, but, like those of the gnat, may be exceedingly uncomfortable. The person may be under its influence without knowing it. Incipient disease in children is often detected by a restlessness of temper. The mother knows that her boy needs the visit of a doctor when he is fretful, and relief comes, and the spirit rises, when the irritating cause is removed. It is the same all our lives. The dyspeptic feels depressed and easily disturbed ; the woman of bilious temperament and liable to nervous headaches is restless, and yet indisposed to action, and is apt to get angry when compelled to make exertion. Much of commonplace human happiness springs from the vital organs acting healthily, and encouraging a pleasant flow of spirits ; and much of our wretchedness from the same organs, interrupted in their natural action. The uneasiness is partly pathological, but is greatly intensified by the interference with the pleasant flow of association. Your disagreeable, unpopular people are often those who have annoyances in their own frame, which make them as disagreeable to themselves as they are to others.

Temper springs fundamentally from disappointed appetences. It is most apt to be displayed by those who have come under the sway of a great many small attachments, ever liable to be ruffled ; especially when they cling round near objects, round their children, or personal

ease, or aggrandizement, or social rank and status, or dress, or furniture, or equipage, all liable to be disturbed from day to day, or from hour to hour. The person is prepared to sit down to a pleasant meal, or enjoy a quiet hour with his family, or commit himself to rest at night, when an unexpected event breaks in upon him, like a burglar, to make him flee or fight. Or he has a favorite opinion, and some one contradicts him ; or he meets with opposition where he expected assistance ; or the exertions he makes and the favors he bestows are received with ingratitude, and the man is put into a state of irritation which makes him disagreeable to himself and all who come in contact with him. The temper once kindled will be apt to throw out sparks towards all who are near, towards children and servants and neighbors, towards all who come across the man, though they may have had no connection with the original disturbance.

> "But ever after the small violence done
> Rankled in him, and ruffled all his heart
> As the sharp wind that ruffles all day long
> A little bitter pool about a stone
> On the bare coast." [1]

Such is the experience when the appetences are numerous and small. The character is weak and may become contemptible. The energy is wasted in the heat of small molecular motion, or expresses itself in spitting sparks.

SECTION VII.

PREPOSSESSIONS.

A strong affection creates a prepossession in favor of whatever promotes it. We have had pleasure in the presence of certain objects, they have gratified our tastes

[1] Tennyson's Idylls of the King.

and fallen in with our predilections, and associations gather around them; and when they come before us we are prepared to welcome them, and at all times we think and expect favorably of them. We have a warm heart towards our birthplace, towards the scenes in which we have passed our younger years, and towards our home. The affectionate husband and wife will delight to visit the spot in which they spent their honeymoon. We are apt to delight in those who have a pleasant countenance, a genial temper, or a lively, a deferential, or a flattering manner. Some have a preference for those who have a frank or brusque address, or who are candid in their opinions, or have an honest way of expressing themselves. Others are rather drawn to those who are affectionate and tender in their feelings. All delight in the society of those for whom they have such predilections, do not willingly believe evil of them, and are inclined to copy them.

The father and mother are disposed to think favorably of the character of their sons and daughters, do not readily listen to an evil report of them, and will believe what they say when they would not credit the same tale told by a stranger. It is proverbial that love has a blinding influence, and the woman under its power trusts the vows of her lover who may thereby become her seducer. We willingly attend to the arguments urged in behalf of causes which seem to promote our pleasures or flatter our self-esteem. He is likely to be a favorite in private and in public, to be in fact the popular man (more so than a great and good man, who may rather excite envy, as interfering with our inordinate self-esteem), whose manner and style of address are such that those whom he meets go away better pleased with themselves. It is said that those who got a refusal from

Charles II. of England went away better pleased than were those who had their requests granted by his father, and no doubt this helped to make the one die in prosperity while the other perished on a scaffold. The flatterer gains his end by speaking to us of our real or imagined good qualities; but it may happen unfortunately, or rather I should say fortunately, that we come to discover that he pays the like compliments to others, and we turn away with disgust as from one who has been trying to deceive us. The courtier studies the weaknesses of those whose favor he would gain, and addresses himself to them, but may find that the caprices of the pampered man of power become in the end intolerable. That man is not likely to be a successful agent in a good cause who sends away those whom he would gain in a humbled and repining humor. The ardent man stimulates others because he imparts to them some of the magnetic power which is in himself. There is sure to be a terrible disappointment, and perhaps even a disposition towards revenge and retaliation, when those whom our imaginations have clothed with such excellent qualities, or whom we supposed to be our friends, are seen to be unworthy, or have turned out to be foes.

SECTION VIII.

PREJUDICE.

It presupposes certain tendencies, convictions, affections, or purposes which have been thwarted, and then all that is associated with the disappointments raises malign feelings which often lead to unjustifiable conduct. There are scenes at which we have suffered a humiliation, or experienced a sorrow, and we ever afterwards avoid them. Or there are people who have knowingly

or unknowingly, justly or unjustly, offended us; who have made us see their superiority and our inferiority; who have lowered us in our own estimation; who have wounded us in a tender part; who have crossed our favorite ends; who have injured or maligned us; or beat us in the rivalries of trade, or the competitions social or literary of life; and henceforth we look askance upon them, are apt to feel uncomfortable in their presence, and to imagine them to be actuated by ugly motives towards us. This feeling is especially apt to rise in the breasts of those who have injured any one in his good name or estate; they fear that he may take revenge and do them mischief. In these ways prejudice is excited against not only individuals, but classes, against trades, professions, grades of society, — the rich fearing the poor, and the poor envying the rich, — against political parties, religious sects, against races white or colored, against states and nations — "the Jews had no dealings with the Samaritans."

This prejudice, wrong in itself, is sure to lead to evil conduct. These antipathies are one of the principal sources of quarrels, feuds, and wars; men clothe their enemies with evil qualities, as Nero clothed the early Christians with the skins of wild beasts, or covered them with pitch, and then destroyed them. We see the feeling working in more common cases. We do not listen patiently to the arguments urged by those who, for any cause, say by their misconduct or our misapprehension of it, have given us offense. We become predisposed against causes which have injured our prospects. The publican is not likely to feel an interest in the cause of temperance, nor the protectionist in free trade, nor the licentious man in the correction of vice, nor the infidel in the defenses of religion, nor the calumniator in the re-

cital of the excellent deeds of one whom he has reviled. Herod readily granted the request of the damsel who danced before him, and her mother prompted her to ask the head of John the Baptist, who had audaciously declared that "it is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife." The perverse boy comes to detest the faithful teacher who has admonished him so often. Politicians are apt to speak against the party which hinders them in their schemes of patriotic or personal aggrandizement. Or, what is to be explained on much the same principles, they turn with a strong revulsion against the party which they have long favored, but which, as they think, has overlooked them, or kept them down, or ill-used them. We can thus explain the mistaken zeal, often the antipathies, of the convert or pervert. We have here the key to open the secrets of some of the contradictions, so called, of human nature, in persons bitterly reviling and persecuting the causes which at one time they clamorously supported. We have a still more lamentable issue, when the man comes to quarrel with his own conscience, and learns to hate the duty which it would lead him to do, but which he refuses to do. Not willing to listen to the reprover he would hasten to tear out his tongue that it may no longer rebuke him.

SECTION IX.

FICKLENESS OF FEELING.

Every one must have come in contact with people who have feelings of a certain kind strong and lively, but who soon lose them and become apathetic, or fall under emotions of a different, perhaps of an opposite kind. To-day they seem to be full of affection for us, and load us with expressions of regard; to-morrow they are turned

away from us, and meet us with opposition or enmity, and are perhaps lavishing their friendship on others, for whom they had no regard before. There are people of whom this chameleon liability to change of affection is characteristic. They will be found to be persons with no very decided or deep motive principle, and whose emotions are very much determined by outward circumstances. Commonly, they are swayed by a number of not very strong appetences, taking the direction which external events working on an irrepressible nervous temperament give them. At this present time they are deeply interested in some person or end, great or small; but the seed is sown in stony places, and, having no depth of earth, it speedily withers away. New circumstances appear, unexpected difficulties spring up, as they prosecute the cause; or the person beloved gives offense, and the interest is ready to collect round some other objects. Such people appear very inconsistent, and so they are, and they do not gain our permanent confidence; but they are, after all, acting consistently with their character, which goes by impulses and jerks, and not by steady principle.

SECTION X.

RULING PASSIONS.

The young are apt to live under the influence of a considerable number of lighter impulses, moving the spirit as the ocean is rippled into wavelets by zephyrs. Now it is affection to father, mother, sister, brother, companion; now it is some sense of duty; now it is a desire to win esteem and to dazzle; now it is a sheer love of activity and excitement, as in play, in leaping, and dancing. As they advance in years they become soberer, partly from

the less lively flow of the animal spirits, but mainly from the streams being collected into a few formed and settled channels. The fountains and streamlets that originally start and feed our streams are beyond calculation in number, but as they flow they meet, and unite in great rivers. So the numberless impulses of youth settle into a few habitual modes of action. In middle age, the earning of one's bread, the cares of a household, the business of life, the common services and civilities due to neighbors and friends demand and engross the greater portion of the motive energy. In declining life, the grave man and woman commonly centre their regards on a few ends which they pursue, having seen the vanity of many of those which captivated them in their younger years — though some of those which they cling to may turn out to be as unsatisfactory as those which they have abandoned.

Youth might be painted as with the question ever in their mouths, "Who will show us any good?" and you see them running to every spot where others are collected, and gathering round every fire of crackling wood that is kindled. But there are many exceptions to this general account. There are boys and girls who have sobriety in their character and manner from the beginning, either because they are governed by some serious principle or principles, or because they have no very strong passions. They are your boys with aged faces, which recommend them to grave seniors but keep them from being popular with their coevals, who prefer the lively, the gay, and the roystering. In like manner there are old men and women who retain their interest in occupations which enable them to retain their youthful character, and bring them into sympathy with children.

There are cases in which one passion is strong, or a

few passions are strong, in themselves or relatively to others, and they claim and gain a governing potency, and reign without a rival, or with a rival which they keep down. It is the devotion of a boy to his play; or of a girl to her father — it may be in poverty, or in wretched health; or of a mother to her son — it may be helplessly invalid, or deformed; or of the merchant to his business, or of a farmer to his land, or of a physician to his profession, or of a scientist to his researches, or of a philosopher to his speculations, or of the painter, sculptor, or architect to his art, or of the patriot to his country, or of the politician to his party, or of the successful soldier to military aggrandizement, or of the ecclesiastic to his church, or of the Christian to the glory of God. The passion, as a centre, aggregates a crowd of associations, and it moves on like a marshaled host, with the combined strength of the whole, bearing down the obstacles which oppose. Those thus impelled are often distinguished by their energy — for good or for evil, according to the nature of the affection. Among them are to be found your strong lovers and your good haters. They often accomplish ends, in heaping up wealth, in doing brilliant feats, in making scientific discoveries, which could not have been effected by men of equal intellectual ability, but without the concentrated energy. They strike out a path for themselves; like Lochinvar, they swim the river "where ford there is none." The man with one clear line before him has much the same advantages as a railway carriage has over one on a common road, and he moves along with the determination of a steam train on the rails set for it. Sometimes the ruling power imparts a sublimity to things that are not grand in themselves; thus the love of the mother, as she forgets her personal safety in defending her children, makes the

weak woman strong and heroic. In other cases, the strong ambition being attached to weak capacities makes the person ridiculous, as the ambition of Charles XII. of Sweden did. But when there is any corresponding intellectual power strong characters are produced, such as those of Alexander, Julius Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, or belonging to a different order, Paul, or Knox, or Milton, or among females, as Semiramis, Cleopatra, Queen Elizabeth, and Catherine of Russia. These affections, like the great rivers of the world, the Nile, the Ganges, the Mississippi, the Amazon, drain vast regions and draw their waters into one great stream, which moves along with irresistible power.

This ruling passion may become terrible in its power; carrying all before it like a swollen river with torturing eddies, sucking all things as into a whirlpool, or devouring all around like the conflagration of a city. Hidden it may be from the eye, but when an object strikes it or a spark is applied to it, it bursts forth into an explosion of passion like that of a powder magazine. In other cases the dynamic is compressed towards a point which it strikes like a bullet. Those impelled by this dominant power are commonly the men and women who have had the largest share in swaying the destinies of the world. When it is evil, or when it is exclusive and not restrained by other powers meant to limit it, it may work intolerable evil, wasting households and provinces and nations, and spreading rapine and misery. When it is a selfish passion it may wither or consume the natural affections, lead parents who are superstitious to make their children pass through sacrificial fires, and persons naturally kind-hearted to become relentless persecutors, and conquerors when resisted to order the murders of myriads of innocent women and children. On the other hand, when

it is good, benevolence will flow from it as rays do from the sun, and scatter a beneficent influence over a wide region, whereby vices are restrained, means are provided for healing the sick, outcasts are reclaimed, and the poor have their wants supplied.

It has to be added that few are so deeply under the dominion of one passion as to prevent others from occasionally coming in and giving a so-called personality, a supposed incongruity or contradiction, to the character: as we have seen the miser doing a generous deed to a child or neighbor for whom he has taken a fancy, and the thief giving his money to persons in distress, and the murderer saving the lives of individuals in whom he has become interested. These peculiarities act merely as the abutting rocks at the ledges of a river, raising a ruffling here and there, but allowing the stream all the while to flow on with uncontrollable power.

CHAPTER II.

MOTIVES SWAYING MASSES.

SECTION I.

COMMUNITY OF FEELING.

It is a familiar fact that feeling is apt to be increased when it is shared by others. How are we to account for this? It is customary to refer it to sympathy, to an attraction or a contagion of feeling. But these are loose metaphors, expressions pointing to an important fact, but failing to untwine the cords that make the rope, and possibly misleading us by vague resemblances which are apt to be regarded as identities. I am not sure that there is a direct attraction of one man's feelings to those of another like that of gravitation, or that there is a literal contagion like that which takes place in fever. Whatever be our explanation of the undoubted circumstance, that men, women, and children are apt to move in masses, it must proceed on the principle that each man has after all an appetence swaying himself. The attraction that moves molar bodies must be a power which reaches every individual molecule. This is a circumstance commonly overlooked by historians, who write in a loose way of people being moved by sympathy without explaining what sympathy means.

It may be posited in a general way, I think, that as it is an idea of an object appetible or inappetible that raises feeling, so it is an idea, it is a common idea, that raises

the common feeling. If this be so it is essential, in constructing a theory of the movement of masses, that we show how the common idea of objects appetible or inappetible arises.

First, in forming his opinions a man is apt to be swayed by a number of considerations not altogether directed to his impartial judgment; in particular he may allow himself to believe and act simply as others do. A large body of mankind do not form their convictions on independent ground. People are often obliged to decide and act so rapidly and unexpectedly that they have not time to go round the object and survey all sides of it. They lay down inferior rules not universally applicable, though often so, and act at once upon them. How often do they allow themselves to act simply as others act. If there be an assembly of a thousand people in a hall and a crash is heard, and one cries out "the gallery is falling," the more easily terrified rise and rush to the door, and are followed by the whole crowd trampling on each other. We have an example of the same kind in the fear which thrills through a whole army; some are seen to run, having suffered a defeat, and suddenly all flee in disorder. In such cases as these there is often a brief and unnoticed ratiocination: there must be danger when so many are in trepidation. These are cases in which persons have acted rashly. But in how many cases have we all acted wisely in doing as others are seen doing, without waiting for logical proof, as when we see a crowd gathering for the defense of an injured man and we join them. Some in the end give up all independent judgment founded on reasons, and allow one or two persons to lead them, or they follow a multitude to do evil. We have here one way, though by no means the most potent, in which a community may lead the ideas and so the feelings of individuals.

Secondly, a common public sentiment has usually a common appetence producing a common belief and hope, kindling a common enthusiasm, and issuing in a common movement, which individuals join because they are heartily with it. It may spring from an evil which all feel ought to be remedied, from the sense of an oppression from which they would be delivered. Take such events as the Reformation in Europe, the rising against Charles I., in England, the French Revolution, and the Proclamation of Independence in America; in all of these there were universal abuses, and sources of irritation. There were thus seeds sown ready to spring up simultaneously under the first fostering circumstances, as the grain does in spring.

Thirdly, arguments and appeals, fitted to sway our judgments and interest our feelings, float in the very air. These, pressed upon us at all times by dear friends, by ministers of religion, by orators, by patriots, must produce an effect. It was thus that at the starting of the Crusades the people all over Europe, identifying their religion with the Holy Sepulchre, and feeling the disgrace implied in its being in the hands of the infidel, eagerly listened to the preaching of Peter the Hermit, and were carried along with the wave. It was thus that, in the decadence of religion in the middle of the last century, so many were ready to be awakened by the thunders of Whitefield; even Franklin felt the influence, and they said: "Is Saul also among the prophets?"

In this way a common sentiment is created. There is often a family faith, and young people catch the spirit of fathers or mothers, of older brothers and sisters. Every parish, every county, every province, every State is apt to have its periodical excitement about some question, great or small. There are states of society in which

"fears are in the way," and the very air is tremulous, and there is a terror as of overhanging plague or of pestilence. In this sense fear is infectious. There are others in which there is a stimulus given to all by the oxygenated atmosphere which they breathe. Every age has its prevailing faith, and its favored medicine for curing the ills of society or regenerating the world. Ordinary minds are sure to be sucked in by the current, and go willingly along with it. Only the men of independent thought and resolute will are able to resist the swelling torrent. The school boy, who has to oppose the prcatices of a set of wicked companions, shows more bravery than the soldier on the battle-field. There may be as much courage shown in resisting a deluded democracy as in facing the scowl of a despot.

Most of the grand movements for good in our world's history have thus been produced. I am aware that a certain class of writers in Germany, generated of the philosophic pantheism there and followed by literary men like Carlyle, in England, are fond of ascribing all reformations to heroes. And doubtless great undertakings have often been hatched in the brains of our great men. But, as Sir W. Hamilton has remarked, "Woe to the revolutionist who is not himself a creature of the revolution. If he anticipates he is lost; for it requires what no individual can supply, a long and powerful sympathy in a nation, to untwine the ties of custom which bind a people to the established and the old." The leader in a revolution is merely the most energetic man — such was Knox — who has caught the spirit which has begun to pervade the community. If the soil is not so far prepared the workman has, like Wycliff, Huss, or Savonarola, to spend his life in plowing and harrowing, and it is reserved for others to see the seed spring up. But let

us suppose that a public sentiment has been created. Every man's interest in the cause is increased when his wife, his family, and his immediate neighbors all feel as he does, and are ready to carry him along. Each feels confirmed in his own judgment by the judgment of the rest. Were the sentiment confined to the individual the attempt would be hopeless; but the prevalence of it stirs up action with the expectation of success. The river being started is swelled by the confluence of other streams, as when returning spring melts the snows on a hundred mountains, each one of which sends on its swollen waters. The body moves on with the power of a mass, and the momentum increases the heat which is the source of the motion. Each man says to his neighbor, come let us go on together, and they join hand in hand. There is now a jubilation as at a review, and a shouting as when men go forth to battle; the reverberation from every height increasing the sound and imparting farther impulse. The march is now of men in array going on to the battle, the victory, and the triumph.

SECTION II.

REACTION OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT.

It is a fact that after popular opinion has run for a time in one way it is apt to be arrested, and to flow in a very different direction; and this in rural districts, in villages, in cities, in communities, in nations, in continents, in social circles and learned societies, in religious sects, in literature and the fine arts. A period of religious fervor or precisian morals is apt to be followed, as we see in the reign of Charles II. of England, by a time of indifference, or perhaps of infidelity, of scoffing and profanity, or profligate morality. On the other hand an age of wild

skepticism and licentiousness, as we see in the first French Revolution, brings back nations to religion or to superstition and a sober morality. A long reign of conservatism, in which every abuse is protected and every proposed change frowned down, is sure to generate an opposite force going on to reform, which, gathering to excess, bursts in a thunderstorm of political convulsion, which, in its turn, drives thinking men to gather round the cause of order. The world thus moves on, like light and heat, by vibrations, and is kept from stagnation, like the ocean, by flows and ebbs. Even in speculative opinion we see like swingings of the pendulum: in the old earnest schools of Greece, ending in the sophists, who, in their turn, raised up Socrates and Plato in opposition; in the pleasure-loving Epicureans gendering the sternness of the self-righteous Stoics, while the paradoxes of the Stoics strengthened the easier code of the Epicureans; in the formalism of the Schoolmen calling forth the induction of Bacon; in the mathematical school of Descartes and Spinoza, leading to the experientialism of Locke, which degenerated into the skepticism of Hume and the sensationalism of Condillac; which had to be counteracted by the *â priori* forms of Kant, Hegel, and Coleridge, which has sunk into the materialism of the present day. An excess of electric force at one end of a needle does not more certainly produce an opposite force at the other end than an extreme position generates its contrary in all spheres of thought and action.

In an earlier part of this work (p. 84) I have shown how the reaction operates in the individual, and of course it thus operates in all the individuals composing the mass. There may be lassitude produced by long excitement which has spent itself, leaving those who have been under its influence in a state of exhaustion and indisposed to

exertion. The volcano has burst and the lava has cooled and become hardened. At this point the influence of temperament and of race is apt to manifest itself; such peoples as the French and the Irish, like the flax, being seized by the excitement sooner, and losing it sooner; whereas the Scotch, like their heather, catch the fire more slowly, but continue burning for a greater length of time. But this organic wave cresting and then falling will not explain fully the reaction of a whole community or a nation.

The public sentiment has been created by a felt evil to be removed, or a wished-for good to be attained. The enthusiasm continues as long as the good and the evil are felt. But the feeling may die out. Those engaged in the struggle are not always satisfied with the management of it, or they are disappointed with the issue. Very often dissensions arise among them, and they quarrel about the spoils. The movement has agglomerated like a ball of snow as it rolled on, but as it enters a new season it melts away. The soil has yielded its crop, such as it is, and it is not so ready for bearing anything new as men found it in the spring-time of their zeal.

It is frequently urged that these revulsions evince great weakness and contradiction in human nature; a people are mad in favor of enterprise this year, and next year all their interest in it has died down, and perhaps they are bent on something very different. But it may not have been the same people who are engaged in the action and reaction. There may have been numbers who never fell under the excitement, and are not responsible either for its kindling or its extinction; and some of these may be ready to come under "a new control," — as, at the close of the Puritan ferment, Newton and Locke took up science and philosophy, and the shop-

keepers and farmers did not wish to continue any longer the war with their patrons. Nay, there may all along have been people who disapproved of the movement and the movers and saw their failings, and who, though they durst not oppose the tide when it was so strong, are ready now that the ebb has set in to occupy the ground left by the receding waters.

Meanwhile a new generation spring up, who have never entered into the feelings of their fathers, and have feelings of their own formed in new circumstances. The new race sees the excesses of which the victorious party have been guilty; they have grievances of their own different from those of their fathers, indeed, their grievances may refer to the conduct of their fathers. In the reactions of philosophy, idealism or sensationalism is guilty of oversights which the other school has to correct, but in doing so has itself to be corrected by the succeeding age.

As these various causes act there is apt to be a reaction in one age against the prevailing sentiment of the preceding age. This is commonly initiated by youths of from eighteen to twenty-five years of age, but may not be carried by them till they are considerably advanced in life, by which time the seeds of a new crop may be deposited to choke and to kill that which they would reap. It was thus that about the year 1830, when the radical wave in church and state was at the highest in Great Britain, there appeared at the back of it a hollow in the form of a revived ritualism, and a strong political conservatism. At a later date we have seen that in the midst of the Catholic revival at Oxford there was hatched an infidelity which has burst forth like a viper.

SECTION III.

AN UNWRITTEN CHAPTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Political economy inquires into the laws regulating the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Some would say of "national wealth;" but surely religion, geographical science, and the spread of general philanthropy will prepare men to look to the world's wealth rather than a nation's wealth, and lead them to oppose every measure inconsistent with the general welfare, even though it should seem to be favorable to a given state. The science seeks to estimate the influence of physical agents, such as soil and climate, and the operation of such economical relations as labor and capital, looking incidentally at government and laws. But it has scarcely endeavored to estimate the varied motives by which mankind are swayed. It has commonly assumed, in an avowed or in a tacit way, that mankind are swayed merely or mainly by self-interest, some adding, so far as they know what their interest is. But this is not true of human nature. Every man is no doubt largely swayed by a desire to secure happiness, and with multitudes the supreme end of their existence is to secure as many physical indulgences as possible. But the great body of mankind are swayed, less or more, by other considerations. Even general benevolence, especially in Christian countries, is an element of great potency: in awakening human activities in raising hospitals, asylums, penitentiaries, in establishing churches, educational institutions, lower and higher, and in sending out missions to foreign countries to Christianize and to civilize rude and barbarous nations. Patriotism, too, has had a mighty influence in calling forth and directing human energy: it has on the one hand united men in strong bonds, and

on the other led to devastating wars, and both these have been swaying the destinies of the race. Then domestic affection, the love of parents and children, of brothers and sisters, of husband and wife, of relatives and friends, of companions and neighbors, have together had nearly as much influence as a narrow selfishness in leading and guiding the exertions of men, mostly for good, at times for evil, when they lead to jealousies and quarrels. Even selfishness may take a thousand different forms, — it may be the love of money, or the love of sensual indulgences, of showy dress, of good eating, of family aggrandizement, of social position, of a fine dwelling, of large landed property, of beautiful horses, of musical concerts, of theatrical exhibitions, or of the fine arts. All of these and every one of them may tend to accumulate or distribute wealth; but they do so in very different ways; and they call forth very different kinds of activity, and foster very varied callings and professions, to gratify the tastes implied. The desire to have a pleasant beverage, stimulating but not intoxicating, is gratified by tea and coffee, which have to be brought from distant countries, and this leads to the employment of merchants and mariners, which bring the ends of the earth nearer each other.

I have supposed that the motives last named operate selfishly, that we follow them because of the pleasure afforded. But these and other motives act independent of any idea of pleasure, or anything without or independent of themselves, and impel men each to ends of his own, and each end secures activities in a particular line. The craving for excitement fosters theatres, and balls, and gambling, and horse-races, and calls forth a body of men and women who have to get up the amusements. The love of education leads to the institution of schools

and colleges, and thus calls forth a body of teachers whose office it is to spread intelligence. Where there is a general love of art, as in Italy, painters and sculptors spring up and spread around them a refining influence. In all countries religion has had a mighty sway over the character, the tastes, and employments of the people, in some cases fostering only slavish subjection of spirit, and ghostly fears which prostrate the energy; but in others rousing the dormant intellect, and kindling the highest aspiration and noblest affections. In the Church of Rome, in its more exalted manifestations, there is encouragement given to all that may gratify the æsthetic senses and excite the imagination. Among Protestants free thought and intelligence are called into exercise, and these lead to independent action, to industry and perseverance, and all the hardy virtues which spring from these habits.

Now political economists should look to these as well as to other agencies at work. They cannot explain the direction which human activity takes in different countries unless they estimate them. Certainly they will give a very narrow, or rather an utterly perverted view of the causes of the production and expenditure of wealth, if they proceed on the principle that all men are governed merely by self-interest. Not that they may be required to enter on the discussion of human motives metaphysically, or give a refined analysis of their nature, or of the elements involved in them. But they should consider their operation in a general way, observe their sameness and their differences, give some sort of classification of them, and estimate the action and influence of each class in different ages and countries. I am not competent to write this chapter in political science. I must content myself with pointing out the want and leave

others to supply it, giving only such examples as may show what is meant. What a contrast between England, with its love of real comforts and its sense of the binding power of morality, and France, with its love of glory and its restlessness; the character of the one nation has compelled it to seek commercial greatness and internal security, whereas that of the other has impelled it to military exploits and internal changes. What a difference between Scotland and Spain, though Buckle imagined them to be alike because both have had a reverence for religion, — but how different the religion. The faculties of the one people sharpened by great religious conflicts, and the reading of the Word of God, have been exerted in independent thought, in founding schools and colleges, in agricultural and commercial industry, which has overcome the disadvantages of climate; whereas in the other country, the people, with a desire beneath for freedom, have allowed themselves, till of late years, to be trampled on by civil and ecclesiastical despotism. Holland and Switzerland will occur to every one as examples of intelligence awakened and giving a special direction to industries; in the one to a battling with the threatening ocean and to extensive shipping, and in the other to the works of art, which can be performed in winter when the climate does not admit of out-door employments. Every one notices the difference between the United States south and the United States north; in the former the white population looking with contempt on labor, and cultivating social kindness and hospitality; the latter with intellects sharpened to every kind of active pursuit. The wealth of the one is different, both in the collection and distribution, from that of the other.

The prevailing swaying motives of a nation determine its character; they do more, they determine its condi-

tion. That country is in the best state in which the motives have the same place absolutely and relatively that they have in man's original or in his regenerated and restored nature. As the king and governor, lifting his head as a tower above all the rest, should be the moral regulator, issuing commands and subordinating all to itself. This ruling power on earth should point upward to the power in heaven from which it derives its power, and this will prompt to adoration and worship, and the erection of temples with spires pointing to the skies. The individual man, while he has a business to which he must attend, is all the better for possessing tastes which he has pleasure in gratifying, such as music, or painting, or reading.

When this authority rules there is room for every sort of activity and energy. So a nation will prosper the more when, besides its necessary bond of self-defense, it has great causes with which it is identified, say, religion, or education, or literature, or liberty; and it will accomplish great ends by its continued and combined efforts. But while a nation is one, and has a head, it has also many members, and each acts best when it acts in its own way. A community is not in its healthiest state when every one acts as every other acts; the result is a dead uniformity, as in China, a level plain in which there may be fertility, but no fresh air or pleasant variety of hill and dale, of peaks and passes. Individualism should have a place in every advancing community; there should be men who think for themselves, who act for themselves, who follow their own line of thought and investigation. These are the men who make discoveries and produce the highest works of genius, say, in literature, in science, in the fine arts, and in useful inventions. These are the men who give us original thoughts, who

make discoveries and open new paths. At times their path may run out into eccentricities, and they do not adjust themselves to their age, which may combine to crush them. But if there is any spring in them they will resist and compel mankind to give them their place, and if rejected and despised in their own age they will be deified by posterity. It is by a combined centrifugal and centripetal force that a nation is made to take a progressive course.

In the past age there has been a disposition to look exclusively to the intellectual powers, as calling forth the energies of a community. But there is a prior question, What calls the intellect into exercise? An honest answer to this question will bring us to moral causes, probably beyond this, to religious causes, as awakening individuals, or a whole people, into life, and then the intellectual powers carry on and perform the work, and in doing so may, unfortunately, become dissociated both from religion and morality, and may be exercised in clothing vice with all the graces of poetry, or in undermining the foundations of religion. Such men as David Hume and Robert Burns could not have appeared in Scotland unless there had been an awakening caused by the religious struggles of the previous ages. Yet both helped to undermine the faith and the purity by which the reformations were characterized.

The rising generation, trained in homes where religion and morals have been carefully enforced, are apt to complain of the restrictions which have been laid upon them, and to imagine and argue that, under a more liberal system, the good would have been more attractive to them. But they may find as they advance in life that a greater liberty ends in licentiousness in the generation that follow; and the difficulty then is to get back the high

standard which has been lost. A simple, fixed faith and a rigid obedience are essential potences in the training of the youthful mind. Those who abandon their faith, but are still hoping to save morality, may discover that when the religion departs the morality is apt to go with it. But thus the ages swing between belief and unbelief; feeling the creed to be too strict, they give it up, but are made to feel in the next generation that, after all, they cannot do without it, and they have to call it back to their aid. In such circumstances wisdom consists in training the young in law rigid as the bones of our frame, but with love as its life. This requires no reaction, and is every way best for the economic as well as for the moral and religious good of the community.

CONCLUSION.

The emotions may well be carefully studied, for they constitute the main means of our happiness or our misery. They are not to be eradicated, but guided.

> " Yet why so harsh. Why with remorseless knife
> Home to the stem prune back each bough and bud?
> I thought the task of education was
> To strengthen, not to crush, to train and feed
> Each subject towards fulfillment of its nature,
> According to the mind of God, revealed
> In laws congenial with every kind
> And character of man."

The emotions are all good in themselves. They all tend to promote our own welfare or that of others. They attach us to the earth on which we dwell, and to our fellow men, and make us feel our dependence on God.

But they do not contain in themselves any principle of control. So they may lead to evil as well as good. They are to be guided on the one hand by our intelli-

gence, which tells us what things are, and on the other hand by our conscience, which announces what things ought to be. When so ruled they give a high elevation to our nature; and as they have descended like the rains from the sky, so their breathings mount upwards to heaven, and to God.

The Ideas to which the mind of man can rise are said to be the True, the Beautiful, the Good, the three rays with diverse colors which constitute the light. We owe the first of these to the intellect, the last to the moral reason, while it is the office of the emotions to reveal to us the beautiful, or rather, as I call it, the LOVELY, so fitted to render the GOOD and the TRUE attractive.

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