


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
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Yours truly,  
- A. Lincoln

*From Daguerreotype taken May 24, 1861.*

# ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HIS PRESIDENCY

BY  
JOSEPH H. BARRETT, LL.D.

*Illustrated*

*IN TWO VOLUMES*

VOL. II

CINCINNATI  
THE ROBERT CLARKE COMPANY  
1904



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# LINCOLN AND HIS PRESIDENCY.

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## CHAPTER I.

1862.

*Second Stage of the War Initiated — The President Takes a Hand in Affairs at the West — Mill Springs — Stanton Succeeds Cameron as Secretary of War — Grant and Fort Donelson — Roanoke Island — Death in the White House.*

Personally, General McClellan had not been idle. He worked with zeal at his headquarters, and was also much in the saddle, riding rapidly with his staff from post to post of his long line, frequently returning at a late hour of the night. These cavalcades along the malarious borders of the Potomac, added to the never-ending cares of his office, were more than even his robust powers could well endure. Before the close of December he had a violent attack of fever. For three weeks he kept his bed, and was still longer detained from regular duty.

Early in November he had given detailed instructions to the commanders of the two Western armies.

General Buell, in Kentucky, was to occupy Eastern Tennessee and "cut off all railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi," but was ordered to remain on the defensive until the proper time to move his army "by rapid marches, by the Cumberland Gap, to Knoxville." General Halleck, in Missouri, was to extend his lines no farther southward than Rolla, the terminus of railway communication with St. Louis — concentrating his main forces for operations on the Mississippi River. Evidently, McClellan was intending no important movement at the West before spring.

The Confederate lines in Kentucky extended from Columbus in Halleck's department (which included all of that State west of the Cumberland River), through Bowling Green in Buell's, to the head of steam navigation on the Cumberland, near Somerset. Buell in person remained at his headquarters in Louisville, his advance being at Munfordsville. On the last of December the President telegraphed to Halleck, informing him of McClellan's illness, and inquiring: "Are General Buell and yourself in concert?" The answer was that he had "never received a word from General Buell." Yet both, in parts of their lines, were confronted by the same Confederate army. If he should advance on Bowling Green, Buell said in reply to an inquiry from Lincoln, there was nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reinforced from Columbus, unless a military force was brought to bear on the latter place.

On New Year's Day the President wrote to Halleck:

General McClellan is not dangerously ill, as I hope, but would better not be disturbed with business. I am very anxious that, in case of General Buell's moving toward



Nashville, the enemy shall not be greatly reinforced, and I think there is danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real or feigned attack upon Columbus from up the river at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. I wrote General Buell a letter similar to this, meaning that he and you shall communicate and act in concert, unless it be your judgment and his that there is no necessity for it. You and he will understand much better than I how to do it. Please do not lose time in this matter.

Complying with the President's wishes, Buell and Halleck opened telegraphic communication with each other, but there was no hearty accord between them. Halleck disapproved Buell's plan of advancing on Bowling Green, and could not well spare him "any help from Missouri." Buell wanted gunboats and soldiers sent up the Tennessee and the Cumberland, to attack the center of the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, on which "the great power of the rebellion in the West" was arrayed, and said "whatever is done should be done speedily — within a few days."

On the 6th, Lincoln wrote to the Kentucky General regarding his proposed advance:

Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticise your views, and therefore what I offer is merely in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville — first, because it cuts a great artery of communication, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of a loyal people who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I can not see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main object. But my

distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My dispatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard, of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer, which I can not safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign, to go and save their families somehow or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety.

On the next day he telegraphed to Buell: "Please name as early a day as you safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite."

Halleck on the 6th ordered General Grant — at Cairo, in command of the Paducah district — "to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray," in which Captain Foote of the Navy was to assist by gunboat reconnoissances up the Tennessee and the Cumberland. The object stated was, by simultaneously threatening both Columbus and the Confederate works at Dover on the Cumberland and near Murray on the Tennessee, to prevent reinforcements being sent from that quarter to Bowling Green. A battle was to be avoided. On the same day he wrote a letter to the President stating that no troops could then be spared from Missouri, and that he knew nothing of Buell's intended operations. He further said: "If it be intended that his (Buell's) column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will

be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run."

In a letter to Buell on the 13th (of which a copy was sent to Halleck), Lincoln said:

Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen, nor asked to see, General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do.

With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.

To illustrate: Suppose last summer when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forbore to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. . . . Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me,

## 6 LINCOLN AND HIS PRESIDENCY.

and which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

At the end of the second week, this correspondence, urgent on the President's side, seems still near its starting-point. But one positive result had been gained — the "demonstration" ordered by Halleck — that will prove to be of a value beyond computation.

Meanwhile the Confederates at Mill Springs on the Upper Cumberland — where General Crittenden had superseded Zollicoffer, who was defending the direct approaches to East Tennessee — crossed over to the Kentucky side. Buell, on the 29th of December, ordered General Thomas to drive out the invaders. One of Thomas's brigades being prevented by floods from joining the rest of the division, Crittenden ordered an advance near midnight on the 18th of January, hoping to crush the two brigades at Logan's Cross Roads, ten miles away. The movement, led by Crittenden in person, with Zollicoffer as second, was promptly executed, and before sunrise the two armies were within striking distance of each other. The Confederates made a furious onset, seeking to turn the Union left, but were repulsed after a half-hour's contest. Zollicoffer was killed. Then by a dashing bayonet charge on Crittenden's left, his entire line was broken and scattered. The Confederates lost 158 killed, many wounded and prisoners, and two of their guns. On the Union side 39 were killed and 125 wounded.

In spite of rain and mud, General Thomas made vigorous pursuit, bringing up his forces in front of the enemy's works on the river bank before dark. The Confederates fled during the night, destroying their

boats and abandoning their camp equipage and supplies. The spoils included more than twelve hundred horses and mules, as well as wagons, arms and ammunition.

At Washington the news of this victory gave occasion for an inspiring bulletin which auspiciously introduced to the people a new Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton's service in this capacity began January 20, 1862 — the day after the battle of Mill Springs, and before its results were known at Washington. His nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 13th and promptly confirmed.

The statements and counter-statements touching the causes and methods of Mr. Cameron's retirement from the War Department need not be rehearsed. His resignation followed the President's tender to him of the Russian mission, then held by Cassius M. Clay, who wished to return and enter the military service as a Major-General of Volunteers. Lincoln undoubtedly desired a change in the head of the department, not on account of personal differences between himself and Mr. Cameron or any special misdoing, but from motives of public policy. Whether Cameron did or did not wish to leave a position already so burdensome, and promising to become much more so, is not a very essential question; yet it appears that he had for some time past been desirous of taking refuge in a diplomatic station. Secretary Chase, who had come to have a very good opinion of him, though certainly not inclined in his favor, like Mr. Seward, at the beginning, wrote to a Boston gentleman in the previous September: "General Cameron, as I know, wishes to resign and go abroad."

Simon Cameron, our earliest millionaire in politics, was deemed too dictatorial by some Republicans in his own State who did not scorn his aid as an organizer at election time, though they hinted that his pecuniary means had too direct a relation with his political ends. The hostility of the "War Governor" of his own State and opposition in financial circles tended to impair the Secretary's usefulness in a position for which, at the best, he was not specially fitted. At the time he became a member of Lincoln's Cabinet, he had not been accused of improperly using public funds, whatever he had done with his own; yet there were afterwards insinuations of this kind which led to an investigation by the House of Representatives, narrowed down to a single charge, and ending in a resolution of censure. In a special message the President (May 27, 1862), after detailing the circumstances under which the censured action was taken — when Washington was isolated directly after the fall of Fort Sumter, and some informalities occurred in reopening communication with New York — said in conclusion:

It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that, although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the heads of departments were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong or fault was committed in the premises.

This vindication of the ex-Secretary could not be gainsaid, yet public attention was little occupied with the matter after the appointment of his successor.

Edwin M. Stanton was born in 1814. His father, a physician of Steubenville, O., was of Virginia birth

and slaveholding ancestry. The son was for a time a student in Kenyon College, which he left in his nineteenth year, without graduation, and was soon admitted to the bar. He began his professional career at Steubenville and later had law-offices in Pittsburg and Washington. Always hitherto a Democrat in politics, in 1860 he was as positive a supporter of Breckinridge for the Presidency as Jeremiah S. Black, of whom he was in some measure a professional and political disciple. It was largely through Mr. Black's influence that Mr. Stanton became Attorney-General in December, 1860. His patriotic course during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's administration has been already noticed. His private interviews or communications during this period with Mr. Seward, Mr. Sumner and other leading Republicans — improper though such intercourse seemed to his Cabinet colleague, Mr. Black, when afterward disclosed — proved his zealous loyalty to the Union, and helped to win the confidence of Republicans. When his nomination for Secretary of War was reported to the Senate in executive session, Mr. Sumner, as stated by himself long afterward, at once rose and vouched for the soundness of Mr. Stanton's political faith. Secretary Chase, who had known him personally for many years, gave explicit reasons to his friends for believing that Stanton and himself were politically in harmony. As to the vigor and capacity of the new appointee, no one doubted.

Lincoln's recollection of his first meeting with Mr. Stanton would naturally make against such a choice; and even a slight intimation of what Stanton had been writing and saying of the President since his

inauguration would have made matters still worse. In several letters written to Mr. Buchanan after his retirement, and probably in many conversations with others, Stanton manifested violent dissatisfaction with the new Administration for not dealing more efficiently with the rebellion, compared it unfavorably with its predecessor in this respect, and indulged in dismal forebodings. His characteristic outbursts of unseemly impatience on these occasions certainly were neither restrained nor rare. He came to be on quite intimate terms with General McClellan, and in their talk Stanton continued his tirades during the autumn. The two were still on cordial terms when Stanton was tendered the Secretaryship of War, and his acceptance was agreeable to the General.

A few days after the stirring Mill Springs bulletin, appeared the President's noted "General War Order No. 1":

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,  
January 27, 1862.

Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and the naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

That especially the Army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the Army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the Army and Flotilla at Cairo, and a Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief, with all other commanders and



subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

We need not seek any covert purpose or obscure meaning in this peculiar order. Falling into the enemy's hands, however, it was as likely to do him harm as good. It did not arrest any work already going on; it notified Generals everywhere to prepare for early and united activity; and it had other virtues not dependent on its literal execution. There were operations already in hand, however, that had salutary results more definitely visible.

To make the "demonstration in force" which Halleck had ordered in aid of Buell, General Grant, before the middle of January, had put in motion six thousand men under General McClelland (whom he accompanied on this expedition), to menace Columbus, and a smaller force under General C. F. Smith to proceed up the west bank of the Tennessee River, menacing Fort Henry, to the vicinity of which a gunboat reconnoissance was to be made. After marching and countermarching in bad weather and over the worst of roads, for several days, Grant's men went into camp in positions convenient for embarking on river transports. The immediate object of preventing the enemy from reinforcing Bowling Green was effected, and the troops had the benefit of experience in movement. Other and more vital consequences followed.

The Confederates had much satisfaction in securing for the command in this quarter an officer so high in military repute and personal standing as Albert Sidney

Johnston. He was believed capable of doing marvels, and as if to afford him the better opportunity for such glory he was provided hitherto with only ordinary or inadequate means. But was it not the settled purpose of his adversaries to remain on the defensive, prolonging preparation until spring? Two gateways for an assailant were the mouths of the Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers, and these it had been intended by the Confederates to possess when they occupied Columbus. Grant had unexpectedly arrived a few hours before them at Paducah and secured both gateways with a firm hand, and there was now an effective gunboat fleet commanded by Foote. If Buell could be kept at bay and Halleck would busy himself with expeditions down the Mississippi and into Arkansas, Johnston had nothing to fear from that direction. What he specially needed was time. He set about the construction of defensive works on the two rivers more than eighty miles upward from the Ohio, near the line between the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, where those streams, flowing north, approach within eleven miles of each other. Fort Donelson was on the west side of the Cumberland, near the town of Dover, and Fort Henry on the east side of the Tennessee, with a minor work opposite. Johnston also ordered the building of gunboats, two of which were well advanced toward completion before the close of January; and in a few weeks more, if left undisturbed, he would have had a considerable fleet for river service. His chief anxiety seems to have been, hitherto, to guard against an advance by Buell. Had the defensive and "simultaneous" policy continued until spring, Johnston might

possibly have accomplished all that was expected of his military genius.

Grant, while pushing his preparations for the work marked out for him, had not neglected opportunities for observation. When he first occupied Paducah he appreciated the importance of the two rivers passing through the Confederate line; and when his forces and the number of Foote's gunboats were sufficient to warrant serious thought of the matter, he conferred with the naval commander on the expediency of an attempt to take Fort Henry, should his superior give his consent. Foote agreed that the project was feasible, and it was laid before Halleck early in January, but coldly received. Then followed the demonstration which confirmed Grant and Foote in their views, and brought to their support General C. F. Smith, in whose military judgment Halleck had great confidence. But for incidental results of this "demonstration in force," the great opportunity would probably have been lost.

Halleck finally consented, and the movement of fifteen thousand troops on transports and of seven gunboats began on the 2d of February. After severe fighting, in which there were serious casualties to the fleet, Fort Henry was surrendered to Flag-officer Foote on the 6th, and Grant, whose men had been detained by fogs and floods after disembarking, arrived and took possession. Nearly all the garrison had escaped before the surrender, taking refuge in Fort Donelson, against which Grant determined to proceed at once. Additional troops and supplies were ordered from Paducah; the fleet was sent back to the Ohio and around by the Cumberland; and meanwhile all the

forces at hand, after garrisoning the captured works, were as soon as practicable put in readiness for the march.

Fort Donelson was of much greater strength and extent than Fort Henry, occupying a table-land more than one hundred feet above the level of the river banks. The outer works covered the town of Dover and extended northward to Hickman's Creek, a considerable stream at high water. The guns of the river batteries were protected by strong earthworks. Above, on the plateau, there were eight heavy guns in place, commanding both land and water, besides field batteries. The garrison, including reinforcements under Generals Floyd and Buckner, numbered about seventeen thousand.

Grant's main forces from Fort Henry arrived before the outer works of Donelson on the 12th. The night following was cold; there was a light snow on the ground, and the soldiers had a dreary and benumbing bivouac which the morning seemed tardy in relieving. But they had come out to fight, and bore the severe hardship without loss of spirit. These men had gone through no very prolonged drilling in camp, had no perfection of equipment, yet were ready to do their best.

The guns of the *Carondelet* were heard below Fort Donelson on the 13th—the preconcerted signal in advance of the Flag-officer and the rest of his command. Grant had formed his lines that morning, extending a distance of three miles, his right under McClelland, its extreme near the river above Dover, his left under C. F. Smith, touching Hickman Creek

below the fort, and approaching the enemy's outer entrenchments generally within about one hundred yards.

During the day the transports arrived, anchoring out of range of the hostile batteries, and a brigade of soldiers under General Thayer was landed. Other troops from near Fort Henry were joined with Thayer's, constituting a third division under the command of General Lew Wallace (previously commanding a brigade of Smith's division), which took position between McClernand and Smith, closing up the lines more effectually.

On the 14th, Foote moved up and engaged the water batteries. An hour's cannonading drove most of the Confederate gunners from their pieces, on the river bank; but now the *St. Louis* and *Louisville* had become disabled, and began to drift down stream. Not one of the ironclads had escaped injury; there had been a loss of fifty-four men, killed or wounded; the heavy guns of the upper batteries were brought to bear on the assailants with destructive fury; and Foote, himself seriously hurt, withdrew his vessels to a place of security.

General Floyd, now in command at Donelson, after consulting his division and brigade commanders, determined to attack Grant's right next morning, in order to open the road up the river, as a way of retreat to Nashville. Grant was absent conferring with Foote — then in no condition to leave his vessel, several miles down the river — when the fighting on the 15th began. Riding hurriedly to the right of his lines, he found there had been severe losses by McClernand's men, who had been driven back, but Wallace had come effectively to

their support. Quickly comprehending the exact state of affairs, Grant ordered a general advance, bringing into action Smith's division, in whose front the enemy had been weakened to support his left. Smith broke through the enemy's outer works, gaining a commanding position from which he could not be dislodged. Thus ended nine hours' fighting.

Floyd, availing himself of the slight means of river transportation at command, fled toward Nashville that night, taking with him as many Virginia troops as could be carried. Colonel Forrest also got away, with a body of cavalry, by the partly overflowed road from Dover southward.

Buckner, on whom the command now devolved, sent a flag of truce early the next morning (16th), asking a suspension of hostilities in order to negotiate terms of capitulation. Grant returned the memorable reply: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works."

Buckner did not delay his surrender. The entire force remaining—nearly half of Johnston's army—and twenty thousand stand of arms as well as a large amount of stores, with the fort, works and guns, were given into Grant's possession. The numbers here engaged and the losses in killed and wounded on both sides (Union—500 killed, 2,108 wounded; Confederate—466 killed, 1,534 wounded\*) were somewhat greater than on the field at Bull Run. In material fruits to the victor, the two battles are not comparable.

Johnston, by whose order Bowling Green was evac-

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\* War Records.

uated on the 15th, hastened his remaining forces southward. Buell followed up the retreating enemy and took possession of Nashville.

The capture of Roanoke Island by Burnside and Goldsborough belongs to the same awakening period. A large part of the soldiers (over 11,000) were landed on the 6th of February at Ashby Harbor, midway of the western side of the island. The Confederate works, under orders of ex-Governor Wise, who had charge of the coast defenses, had been reinforced after the arrival of the fleet, but a single assault, on the 8th, sufficed to give Burnside possession of the place and full control of Roanoke Island.

The hearts of Union people everywhere were made glad by these military and naval achievements in the East and in the West. Washington's birthday was chosen at the National Capital for a grand illumination. Preparation was duly made; but the February victories were not to have such celebration in Washington. Early in the month, the President's son, Willie, a lad of twelve years, was attacked by typhoid fever. Through many anxious days and nights the father had tenderly watched, hopefully and despairingly by turns, until, on the 20th, the fatal ending came. In the presence of this domestic sorrow, all thought of joyous public demonstration was abandoned.

## CHAPTER II.

1862.

*Halleck and Buell — The Mississippi River — Farragut and Butler — New Orleans.*

After the victory at Fort Donelson and the occupation of Nashville, Halleck's command was extended (March 11th) over the army of Buell and its intended field of operations in Tennessee. In Missouri, the main part of the army which Fremont led to Springfield had already been withdrawn by Pope to the Mississippi, while a smaller force, under General Samuel R. Curtis, had been sent to deal with Price, who was reinvading the State from the southwest.

Curtis set out from Rolla about the middle of February, and on the 23d of that month reached Fayetteville, Ark., having marched 250 miles. Price, who had retired without giving battle, was now joined in the Boston Mountains beyond that town by Ben McCulloch and his Texas forces, and soon after by General Van Dorn, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, who brought a strong reinforcement, to which was added an Indian brigade under General Albert Pike. Far from his base and confronted by greatly superior numbers, Curtis was now in a situation of extreme peril. Ordered by Halleck to take up a strong defensive position, he selected the valley of Sugar Creek, surmounted



by the heights of Pea Ridge, a few miles south of the Missouri line. His entire force available for the field was little more than ten thousand infantry and cavalry, with artillery of forty guns. The four thin divisions, under Osterhaus, Sigel, Davis and Carr, scattered in various directions gathering forage and supplies as they slowly fell back from Fayetteville in separate columns, seemed to Van Dorn an easy prey. On the 5th of March Curtis learned that the enemy was close at hand. After obstructing the roads by which Van Dorn's forces were expected, the soldiers bivouacked on the night of the 6th at Sugar Creek, expecting an early assault. Van Dorn, leaving a few men to feign a direct advance, swung his main force around to the west and north, one wing, under himself and Price, extending to the main road from Fayetteville to Springfield, in Carr's immediate rear. Finding this state of affairs in the morning, Curtis turned to right-about, advancing Carr northward on the road, beyond the Elkhorn Tavern, and aligning Davis in front of McCulloch and McIntosh. All day Carr fought persistently, suffering heavily but maintaining discipline, though obliged again and again to fall back; and, as night closed in, he had given ground for more than a mile. The enemy's fierce pressure upon Davis near Leetown — only relieved after the death of both McCulloch and McIntosh — prevented any reinforcement of Carr. Late in the day, when Sigel's artillery came up to Davis's support, his assailants were thrown into confusion and rout. So ended the conflict of the 7th.

Flushed with his success against Carr, whose retreat into Missouri now seemed to be cut off, Van Dorn

sought to gather all his strength on the next day for a final blow. The encounter proved to be of no long duration. Van Dorn was badly beaten on his right, and presently was found to be retreating through a narrow gorge called Cross Timbers Hollow. Both armies had severe losses, the killed and wounded on the Union side numbering 1,183; on the Confederate side, 1,500. It was a decisive victory, which practically settled the contest for Missouri and brought the war line within the State of Arkansas.

Albert Pike, a native of Massachusetts, who moved in early life to Arkansas, had held official relations with the inhabitants of the Indian Territory, in which slaves were held by some of the wealthier red men, and had used his influence with effect to induce the chiefs of that dependency to look to the Confederates as their political guardians. He thus induced some thousands of savage warriors to join the army of Van Dorn before the battle of Pea Ridge, where they went into the fight with defiant war-whoops, but were so much appalled by the noise and havoc of cannon as to prove worse than useless. The humble submission of the errant chiefs ere long brought the Territory back to order and peace.

In New Mexico slavery had lately been legalized, and in the spring of 1860, Colonel W. W. Loring — a Southern officer whom Secretary Floyd could trust — was sent to supersede the Unionist officer commanding there. Under Loring was Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Crittenden, later heard of at Mill Springs. In the main, however, the forces in New Mexico were true

to their flag. Soon after Lincoln's inauguration, Loring was superseded by Major Edward R. S. Canby, a Kentuckian by birth. The Democratic Territorial Governor, Abraham Rencher, was loyal, and the popular sentiment inclined strongly the same way. On recommendation of Rencher's successor, Henry Connelly, the Territorial Legislature repealed the slave-code by a vote almost unanimous. Before this action, a force for the conquest of New Mexico had been gathering in Northwestern Texas, under Henry S. Sibley, a Louisianian by birth, and lately a Captain in the regular army. Early in January, 1862, he set forward with his Texan rangers; won in a fight near Valverde (February 21st), and occupied Albuquerque, establishing depots there; on the 28th of March defeated a small force under Colonel Slough at Apache Pass, and triumphantly entered Santa Fe. He found his presence unwelcome, however, and soon withdrew, reaching Fort Bliss after a wild, wearisome march, with but a remnant of his original command. Canby issued a proclamation at Santa Fe on the 4th of May announcing the end of Sibley's invasion.

West of Arkansas the strife was now over.

General Pope, breaking camp late in February, moved upon New Madrid, on the west bank of the Mississippi, where the enemy was strongly entrenched, and began siege on the 3d of March, without help from Foote's gunboats, which were detained above by the batteries of Island Number Ten. General Polk, evacuating Columbus after the fall of Fort Donelson, had retired with part of his force to Jackson, Tenn., while

the remainder, under General McCown, occupied New Madrid and Island Ten. Pope took the former place in ten days, McCown retiring to the island at night, with the loss of his heavy guns. Foote having for several days ineffectually bombarded this "little Gibraltar" of the Confederates, Pope urgently requested that a gunboat should be run past its batteries to disperse the wooden fleet of Hollins below. Foote at first insisted that this was impracticable; but the commander of the *Carondelet* (Walke) offered to make the trial, and in a fog on the night of April 4th he succeeded without loss or injury. The *Pittsburg* was equally fortunate two nights later. Under protection of the gunboats, Pope readily effected the desired landing on the east bank of the river, and occupied Island Ten on the morning of the 7th. There and on the Tennessee shore he captured 6,700 prisoners, 123 heavy guns, and a great quantity of supplies. The Confederates now abandoned the river for a long distance below, their next obstruction being the fortifications they had erected a few miles above Memphis.

Meanwhile, Halleck's stronger forces east of the Mississippi were not inactive. General O. M. Mitchel, commanding a division of Buell's army, advanced from Nashville southward, restoring the railway which Albert Sidney Johnston had disabled in his retreat, and early in April captured Huntsville, Ala., with a large amount of rolling-stock of the Memphis and Charleston Railway. There were also demonstrations eastward as far as Bridgeport, menacing Chattanooga.

Albert Sidney Johnston, by tedious and trying

marches over bad roads in winter weather, led his remnant of an army a distance of nearly three hundred miles to the new position he had chosen. He arrived at Corinth, Miss., on the 25th of March, joining Beauregard, who had gathered an army there, consisting of the men he had taken from Manassas; of Polk's force, that retired from Columbus on the fall of Fort Donelson; of the troops so long retained at Pensacola by Bragg in the vain hope of taking Fort Pickens; and of other small commands, besides new levies sent, on urgent appeal, by the Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi and Louisiana. The addition brought by Johnston, chief in command, made a total of near sixty thousand men.

Grant's victory at Fort Donelson brought him a Major-General's commission, yet the command of the Army of the Tennessee was directly after given to General Charles F. Smith, a most worthy and capable officer, who had held a subordinate place. Savannah, on the east bank of the Tennessee River, was chosen by Smith as a depot of supplies, and Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank, nine miles above, as the place for disembarking the army to advance against Corinth, twenty miles distant. Soon after establishing his headquarters at Savannah, General Smith was prostrated by illness — dying (April 25th) without further active command. It was not until the army had gone into camp beyond the Tennessee that (March 13th) Grant was again at its head. Reinforcements, mostly raw troops, had come in rapidly, and the divisions of W. T. Sherman, B. M. Prentiss and S. A. Hurlbut were called

from the Paducah district. Halleck, intending to take the field in person, ordered Buell with the bulk of his army to join Grant. The latter's forces at the beginning of April were in good position but unintrenched, the front extending from Owl Creek on the right to Lick Creek on the left — a distance of about three miles. Three of Sherman's brigades were on the right, near Shiloh Church, more than two miles out on the Corinth road, and his other brigade (Stuart's) was on the extreme left; McClelland's division next Sherman's main force and partly rearward; between McClelland and Stuart's brigade, the division of Prentiss; and behind these three divisions were Hurlbut's on the right and W. H. L. Wallace's (late C. F. Smith's) on the left. Lew Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing and on the road thence to Purdy. For a week there had been an occasional collision of cavalry between the hostile camps on both the Corinth and the Purdy road, but neither Grant nor Sherman believed the enemy would advance to give battle, until the storm actually burst upon them on Sunday morning, the 6th of April.

Johnston began almost with the dawn, and meant, by the impetuous pressure of superior numbers, to drive the Union army back upon the river, turn its left, hem it in between the Tennessee and the swollen waters of Snake Creek, and compel a surrender before sunset. His men advanced in triple lines, extended to cover the Union front. Between two flanking creeks, now in flood, and the great river, on a ground broken by ravines — its ridges and levels mostly covered with woods opened here and there by meadow, field, or orchard, the battle was to be waged. Hardee commanded the

first line, Bragg the second, Polk the third, and there was a reserve under Breckinridge. Each of the four corps was about ten thousand strong.

The pickets of Prentiss and a regiment which had early gone out to their support received the first musket volley from the advancing host. Near the same moment, Sherman's foremost brigade, on a ridge overlooking a ravine to be crossed by the enemy, was made aware of the impending onslaught. In both encampments the alarm was promptly given, and line of battle formed in time to receive the assault. Some of Sherman's regiments gave way in disorder; brigades at length began crumbling; new lines were formed on ridges in the rear; McClellan became engaged, with like experience, and between McClellan and Prentiss the assailants tried to penetrate, seeking to cut the army in two. Prentiss fell back, after protracted resistance; Stuart, with much fighting, eluded Breckinridge's effort to surround him; Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace were busy and persistent, helping to stay the hostile tide. All this was the work of many hours. Some brigades were badly broken, some regiments dispersed; many stragglers and fugitives sought ignoble shelter under the bluffs on the river's brink. Grant, who was at Savannah in the morning, hastened to the scene of action, visited every division, and though compelled by previous injuries to use crutches when dismounted, he kept in the field through the day. Position after position was gradually yielded, ridges and hollows, timber and clearing favoring such retrograde movement and affording fit rallying places. At last a stronghold was occupied,—the "Hornets' Nest," as styled by the enemy,—

which for hours defied all assaults. This was well toward Grant's left, where Johnston was specially concentrating his strength, to the neglect of the now much weakened Union right. Near 3 o'clock Johnston fell, dying from a flesh wound, which severed an artery.

The sun was getting low when the Union line was withdrawn to what seemed to be the best available position between the enemy and the river. Prentiss, not falling back promptly enough, was surrounded and captured in person, with more than two thousand of his men. Grant's front had receded more than a mile since morning. Most of his artillery in the field had been lost, but the reserve, twenty-two guns, had now been promptly massed by Colonel Webster, of his staff, on high ground commanding a ravine which the enemy must cross to deliver the intended final blow. The Confederates recoiled before Webster's destructive fire, which they in vain sought to silence by charges of infantry. About this time Nelson's division of Buell's army began arriving at the landing. The gunboats *Lexington* and *Tyler* improved with telling effect the opportunity which the ravine presented for shelling the enemy. Beauregard, now in chief command, withdrew his front, and the dreaded shells fired at intervals through the night helped to increase the interval between the opposing lines.

The heroic attempt to crush Grant, fighting single-handed, had failed. The crisis was now past. Nelson's division was pushed forward at night on the left. Crittenden's division, also at hand, was sent to the right of Nelson, and McCook's, which reached the field during



the night and morning, took position on the right of Crittenden. Lew Wallace was posted on Sherman's right, in good position for aggressive action. The brunt of the renewed battle was to be borne by these four fresh divisions.

Early on the morning of the 7th Nelson and Wallace began the attack. Crittenden and McCook ere long became engaged as they advanced; the divisions battered in Sunday's struggle also took part as they could. Hard fighting followed at several points until afternoon. For the Confederates, as they might well have foreseen, this was a hopeless contest. The army which had yesterday so vigorously assailed, and had been reduced one-half by death, wounds, or straggling, was to-day without material reinforcements or reserves. Long before night these beaten forces were hurrying toward Monterey.

The evening closed on a two-days' conflict more memorable than any hitherto waged in this war — one on which as much depended, it may be, as on any other of its first two years. The casualties on either side exceeded the entire number of our killed and wounded during the Mexican War.\* The Government losses during the two days were over twelve thousand, including the prisoners taken from Prentiss's command near night on the 6th. Of this total, 1,754 were killed, and 8,408 wounded. Beauregard reported his killed as 1,728, and his wounded as 8,012; but he also stated — for stragglers were abundant — that he was unable to put more than twenty thousand men in the field on the morning of the 7th — half the number he had in line at the beginning of the first day's battle.

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\* Viz.: Killed, 1,557; wounded, 3,420.

These armies were next to meet at the siege of Corinth.

The combined army and navy operations of the previous summer and autumn had caused much concern in Richmond. The capture of Hilton Head and Beaufort, the occupation of the Sea Island cotton districts in South Carolina, of Hatteras Inlet, and later (in February) of Roanoke Island, Newbern, N. C. (March 11th), Fort Macon (repossessed April 26th), and other positions on the Carolina and Virginia coast, were a series of losses disheartening to the Confederates; but these were slight disasters in comparison with another calamity which was to befall them from the joint expedition of Butler and Farragut, of which the military advance landed at Ship Island, off the Mississippi coast, early in December. The real purpose of this movement, for a time well disguised, was the capture of New Orleans and the defenses of the Mississippi River below, and co-operation with the army of Halleck in securing its possession above.

Farragut, having by the 15th of April got as many as possible of his vessels across the bar at the river-mouth most available for the heavier steamers, gave notice of his progress to Butler, who now had eight thousand men on transports, waiting to occupy the forts and the city, when mastered by the navy. Bombardment of Fort Jackson, the stronger work on the west bank, was begun on the 17th by the mortar fleet of D. D. Porter, and continued for three days, the fort keeping up a vigorous response. Farragut then determined to attempt running by the forts; but it was first

necessary to break the obstructions below Fort Jackson — chains, supported by the hulks of sunken vessels, stretching from bank to bank of the river. This was accomplished during the night of the 19th-20th. After further bombardment of Fort Jackson during the next two days, all was ready at sundown for the undertaking planned for the coming night. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th the fleet proceeded in the following order: Farragut, with the three largest vessels, the *Hartford*, *Richmond* and *Brooklyn*, nearest the west bank, firing on Fort Jackson; Captain Bailey, with the *Cayuga*, *Pensacola* and six other vessels, next the opposite bank, engaging Fort St. Philip; and Captain Bell, with the *Scioto*, *Iroquois* and four others, keeping the middle of the stream, with orders to engage only the enemy's fleet which was guarding the river above. Farragut, from the mast of the *Hartford*, kept close watch with his glass, as all moved, about half-past 3 o'clock, to execute his orders — the fleet making only four miles an hour against the current. Both forts promptly opened fire as the craft came within range. Part of Bell's command and all of Bailey's got safely past the forts; and of the three larger vessels, only the *Brooklyn* was mentionably injured. Above St. Philip all had to encounter the attacks of the Confederate gunboats, eighteen in number, among which were the formidable *Manassas* and *Louisiana*, until these were finally vanquished. It was a spirited but brief conflict. Thereafter Farragut cautiously advanced up the river, meeting no further opposition until — before noon on the 25th — he reached the English Turn, seven miles from New Orleans. Here new earthworks, the Chal-

mette batteries on both banks, became visible; but their guns were soon silenced; and at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, in the midst of a thunderstorm, the victorious fleet confronted the levees of New Orleans, on which, for miles, were seen the smoke and flames of cotton and other staples of the South fired by Confederate orders. Evidences of like desperate destruction had already been visible to the ascending victors in the shape of burning vessels floating down the river. The Confederate forces under General Lovell had escaped, flying northward, and the city helplessly though sullenly submitted.

General Butler, having seen from his reconnoitering steamer, the *Saxon*, that Farragut had run his main force past the forts, brought up the army contingent and isolated both, while Porter's mortars continued shelling from below. Fort Jackson was surrendered on the 28th, its garrison having, in defiance of their commander, refused to maintain any longer a useless contest. The other fort capitulated without such interior compulsion. The two important forts thus "re-possessed" were properly re-garrisoned and put under the charge of General Phelps. Butler took possession of New Orleans on the 1st of May. Farragut proceeded up the river; and Baton Rouge, the Louisiana capital, was soon occupied by General Thomas Williams, who commanded a brigade of Butler's army.

The fall of New Orleans, "the commercial capital of the South and the largest exporting city of the world," says a Southern historian, "was a terrible disaster, and more than anything else staggered the confidence of Europe in the fortunes of the Confederacy." \*

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\* Pollard's "Lost Cause," 254.

The series of Western victories, beginning in January and having this brilliant culmination, gave needed consolation for Union reverses of the previous year, and helped to break the force of other disasters soon to follow. Had the earnest intentions and efforts of the President and Secretary Stanton been availing, and had General McClellan's pleasant vision of a campaign "short, sharp and decisive" come true, the fall of Richmond would have closely accompanied the fall of New Orleans, and the summer of 1862 would have outlived the war.

Not such was the divine decree.

## CHAPTER III.

1862.

*Army of the Potomac — McClellan Moves against Richmond — Yorktown — Williamsburg — Fair Oaks.*

The great Union army on which the country chiefly relied was yet far from Richmond when New Orleans fell. Months before Lincoln had said: "I would like to borrow the Army of the Potomac for a while, if I only knew how to use it." On his part there had been no lack of persistent endeavor to get something done. A memorandum in Lincoln's handwriting, indorsed "Without date, but before the 1st of December," (copied by permission in 1864,) contains certain questions submitted to the General-in-chief, and the latter's replies filled into the blanks left for the purpose, showing an attempt to draw him into the collaboration of a plan for disposing of Joe Johnston's army. "How long would it require to get in motion?" was answered: "If bridges and trains ready — by December 15 — probably 25th." The number of troops which "could join the movement" in total was given as 104,000 — "from southwest of the river," 71,000; "from northeast of it," 33,000. The President proposed that part of the troops across the river (blank filled with "50,000" by McClellan) should "menace the enemy at Centreville, and the

remainder move rapidly by the Richmond road from Alexandria to the Occoquan, to be there met by the whole movable force" from the Washington side of the river (33,000), having "landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan," — and so forth. Beyond answering questions in the briefest way, the General was not inclined to collaboration. "Information received recently," he wrote, "leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces *nearly* — and I have now my mind actively turned towards another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people."

December and January passed. The Army of the Potomac, still in extemporized winter quarters, numbered on the 1st of February, 222,196 — present for duty, 190,806. This force included the greater part of the regular army, and volunteers who had been trained in camp, some for more than five months and most through a large share of this period. On the last day of January the President — evidently having the Occoquan plan still in mind — issued the following:

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwest of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the twenty-second day of February next.

The General in a personal interview urged the President to recall this order, and obtained permission to present his own views in writing. The plan of removing

the army by water to a new base, at Urbana or elsewhere on the Chesapeake Bay or lower Rappahannock, was stated somewhat in detail in a letter to the Secretary of War, and on the 3d of February the President wrote to the General:

You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac: yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

McClellan claimed to have "substantially" answered these questions in his letter to the Secretary of War, just mentioned, and maintained that "the most brilliant results" were promised by landing the army at Urbana; or, "should that be found unadvisable," he said, "we can use Mobjack Bay, or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliance of results, up the Peninsula. . . . I would respectfully but firmly advise that I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana. I believe that it can be carried into execution so nearly



simultaneously with the final advance of Buell and Halleck that the columns will support each other.”

The order of January 31st was not at this time revoked, nor was the President convinced that it ought to be. He was very much in earnest about relieving the capital from the Potomac blockade and from the long interruption of direct railway communication with the West. General Lander, defeating Stonewall Jackson, occupied Hancock, beyond Harper's Ferry, on the 14th of February; the division of Banks and two of Sedgwick's brigades were sent across the Potomac, and a strong reconnoitering force was advanced to Charlestown.\* A general movement by the valley—the favorite plan of General Scott at the first—seems to have been momentarily intended by McClellan; but he returned from Harper's Ferry on the 28th, and a week passed without further visible sign of an intended advance. The President sent for the General on the 8th of March—the day of Curtis's victory at Pea Ridge, in Arkansas. At this interview Lincoln indicated that he was as averse as ever to setting this great army afloat on the Chesapeake Bay, but yielded so far as to permit the General to choose his own method of approaching Richmond. An executive order of this date directed that the Army of the Potomac be organized into five corps: the First, of four divisions, under General I. McDowell; Second, of three divisions, under General E. V. Sumner; Third, of three divisions, under General S. P. Heintzelman; Fourth, of three divisions, under

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\* General F. W. Lander, who was wounded in action, died a few days later, and was succeeded in command by General James Shields.

General E. D. Keyes. These four corps comprised "that part of the army destined to enter upon active operations, including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington," under command of General James S. Wadsworth, as Military Governor of the District of Columbia. The divisions under command of General N. P. Banks and General James Shields were to form a separate corps, under Banks. In another order of the same date the President directed:

That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-chief and the commanders of Army Corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. . . .

That any movement as aforesaid, *en route* for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-chief, and which may be intended to move on Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

On the 10th, McClellan moved in force to Centreville, pausing there for the night, and on the next day, with no enemy in sight, he occupied Manassas. Johnston had been for weeks gradually removing his heavy guns, and no spoils were left behind as the last of his army crossed the Rappahannock. On his retreat the Potomac blockade came to an end.

The *Merrimac*, a steam frigate partially destroyed by Commander McCauley when he abandoned Norfolk the previous year, had been reconstructed by the Confeder-

ates, provided with iron armor and a formidable beak or ram, and re-named the *Virginia*. On the 8th of March this sea monster came out from the navy-yard and sank the warships *Cumberland* and *Congress* in Hampton Roads, without receiving any injury from their tempest of shot and shell. The steam frigate *Minnesota*, which came to their aid, retired seriously damaged, and ran aground. This first day's work of the *Merrimac* spread consternation far and wide. For the moment it was dreaded that not only all the craft on James River, but also in Chesapeake Bay and on the Potomac, if not even the navy-yard at Washington, would soon be the victims of a destructive power so invulnerable.

There was no less surprise next day, when the destroyer, steaming out of Elizabeth River again to finish with the *Minnesota*, was met and boldly engaged by a strange little craft, with hardly anything visible above water save a round turret, compared to a cheese-box on a raft. The *Merrimac* was forced to retreat, partially disabled, and without any profit from the second day's onslaught. The marvelous newcomer was Ericsson's *Monitor*. So lightly had the inventor's proposals been regarded by the Navy Department, the year before, that their acceptance was chiefly due to the personal attention given to the matter by the President. These two combatants in Hampton Roads assured a reconstruction of the navies of the world.

The *Merrimac* surprise caused a momentary hesitation about the intended movement of McClellan. The terror did not at once subside, for another battle be-

tween the sea champions in iron armor was expected. But a second encounter between the two, as it proved, was never to occur.

Soon after the Manassas movement began, the President (in his War Order No. 3 — March 11) relieved McClellan from the duties of General-in-chief — “he having personally taken the field at the head of the ‘Army of the Potomac’”; enlarged Halleck’s command in the West, as already noticed; and created the Mountain Department, comprising the country between the departments of McClellan and Halleck, to be commanded by General Fremont. All commanders of departments were ordered to report directly to the Secretary of War. At Fairfax Courthouse, McClellan conferred with his corps commanders on the 13th, and reported that a plan of campaign had been unanimously agreed upon: the operations of the army to be “undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers,” provided that the *Merrimac* could be “neutralized”; that “transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base” could be “ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac,” and that a naval force could be had “to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy’s batteries on the York River.” It was agreed that the force left to protect Washington should be “such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.” The alternative, if these conditions failed, was to move “against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment.”

By direction of Secretary Stanton, the work of providing transportation by water had begun as early as the

middle of February, and had been vigorously pushed. The troops to be taken to the Peninsula, as intended by the General, were: McDowell's corps, 38,454; Sumner's, 31,037; Heintzelman's, 38,854; Keyes's, 37,910; regular infantry, 4,765; regular cavalry, 3,141; artillery reserve, 3,116; provost guards, U. S. engineer forces and headquarters cavalry escort, 1,114; total, 158,419. The force to be left to cover Washington numbered 22,410 (less than 20,000 "present for duty"), and of this number it was proposed that 4,000 be sent to Manassas Junction. This was decidedly less than his corps commanders had lately estimated to be necessary, as reported by himself. Wadsworth having called Secretary Stanton's attention to this matter, it was referred to Adjutant-General Thomas and Major-General E. A. Hitchcock (then on duty at Washington as military adviser) for investigation and report. Their conclusion was that the proposed force to cover the capital was "entirely inadequate." The President thereupon (April 3d) directed that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should be retained until otherwise ordered. The result was that McDowell was sent to Fredericksburg. Blenker's division of Germans was transferred from McClellan's army to Fremont's (on the last day of March), in compliance with urgent appeals which it was deemed unwise to disregard.

During the three weeks following the 17th of March, when the movement of transports began, as reported by Assistant Secretary Tucker, of the War Department, who had charge of this service, there were landed at Fortress Monroe, of McClellan's army, 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambu-

lances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude. Sumner's corps was included in this aggregate. McDowell, at Fredericksburg, was in position to join the main army or to aid in protecting Washington, should that be required.

McClellan arrived at Old Point Comfort on the 2d of April, and the President, knowing that the General already had with him a sufficient force to capture or disperse the small Confederate detachment under Magruder at and near Yorktown, (in fact, only about eleven thousand men in all to hold a line of fourteen miles from the York to the James,) directed him to begin his forward movement from the new base at once. The General issued marching orders for the 4th, and on the evening of that day his advance was within five miles of Yorktown. Magruder had orders from Richmond to fall back immediately, but thinking to gain a few days' time by a deceptive show of strength, he obtained permission to make the trial. There was great apprehension at Richmond at this moment, if not a reasonable expectation that a prompt movement would give the Army of the Potomac possession of the city within ten days. But McClellan cautiously sat down before Yorktown and began a regular siege, giving the enemy full time to concentrate all his available forces, and to strengthen his defensive works. When finally an assault on Magruder's intrenchments was ready to be made, they were found to have been evacuated — just in time to secure a safe retreat.

Meantime the new Department of the Shenandoah was created (April 4th), to be commanded by General

Banks; and at the same date the Department of the Rappahannock, including all of Virginia between the Blue Ridge and the Fredericksburg and Richmond railway, under McDowell. McClellan at once urged a reconsideration of the order detaching McDowell's corps, begging that Franklin's division at least might be sent him. To his "urgent request" for Franklin the President responded, rather pointedly: "You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can." Continued importunities and murmurings of the General drew from the President this amiable but earnest expostulation (April 9th):

Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, . . . and, as I thought, acquiesced in — certainly not without reluctance.

After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction. . . . My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. . . . And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, *via* Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. . . .

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy

will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

At what seemed the earliest day practicable, Secretary Stanton telegraphed to the General, granting his request for Franklin's division. He was also given permission to draw at will upon General Wool, commanding at Fortress Monroe. To later inquiries about McDowell, whose best division had been withdrawn from him, only to linger on shipboard at the mouth of the York, the President answered on the 21st: "Fredericksburg is evacuated and the bridge destroyed by the enemy, and a small part of McDowell's command occupies this side of the Rappahannock opposite the town. He purposes moving his whole force to that point." On the last day of April the General reported his army as numbering over one hundred and thirty thousand men, of whom more than one hundred and twelve thousand were effective. The President was surprised to receive from him at the same time a request for more siege guns, and with sadly wearied patience replied (May 1st): "Your call for Parrott guns from Washing-



ton alarms me — chiefly because it augurs indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

But two days after, on the night of May 3d, Magruder himself relieved the trying tension by silently and safely decamping. On the morning of the 4th McClellan announced a "brilliant success," and promised to "push the enemy to the wall." His dispatches of the next day were less jubilant. It was "raining hard," the "roads infamous," "horrible." At 10 o'clock that night he reported from his "Bivouac in front of Williamsburg" that he had been "urgently sent for," and on his arrival had found Johnston in his front with a strong force, "probably greater a good deal" than his own. Hancock had taken two redoubts, repulsing Early's brigade "by a real charge with the bayonet." The conduct of Hancock "was brilliant in the extreme."

In fact, a serious battle had been fought that day, to the main features of which he made no allusion. Stoneman, with a force of cavalry and artillery, had been sent in pursuit of the enemy on the morning of the 4th, and coming under fire as he neared Williamsburg, a dozen miles from Yorktown, he retired out of range to await the arrival of Hooker's division (Heintzelman's corps), which was following in support. Smith's division (Keyes's corps), marching by another road, reached Stoneman's position in the afternoon, in advance of Hooker, who, being thus obstructed, did not arrive until early the next morning, coming in front of Fort Magruder. This, the principal of the enemy's works extending quite across the Peninsula, here but narrow, was at the junction of the road from Hampton with that

from Yorktown, and had an open space before it about half a mile in width, "dotted all over with rifle-pits." The approaches were obstructed with felled timber, and the enemy's movements were much shielded by surrounding woods. McClellan in person was still at Yorktown, attending to the dispatch of Franklin's and other troops up the river on transports.

Hooker was joined on his right by Smith, whose division formed the center after the later arrival of Hancock's brigade and other forces, extending the line eastward. The divisions of Couch and Casey (Keyes's corps) did not reach the scene until late in the day. Fire was opened at half-past 7 in the morning by Hooker, who advanced his infantry, encountering a deadly hail from the rifle-pits and repeated assaults, repulsed only by desperate fighting. This contest lasted for several hours, Heintzelman anxiously looking for Kearney's division, which had been expected early in the morning, but was delayed by the confusion consequent upon the lack of well-understood marching orders. When Kearney arrived, after 3 o'clock, the ammunition of Hooker's infantry was nearly exhausted, and the men were much wearied. The fresh division now relieved them, and the enemy was finally repulsed. Hancock, on the right, attempted to turn the enemy's flank, but met with such resistance that he was recalled by Sumner, the ranking officer in the field. Some hours later, Smith's division and Naglee's brigade were sent to his support by McClellan, who had arrived between 4 and 5 o'clock; and then came Hancock's brilliant bayonet charge and his occupation of the works in his front.

Johnston (then commander of the Richmond army) abandoned the contest as night closed in.

The brunt of the battle was borne by Hooker and Kearney, as attested by the losses — the former's division losing 337 out of a total of 456 killed, and 902 of the 1,400 wounded. Johnston lost 288 killed and 976 wounded. Six days after his hasty dispatch on the night of the battle, McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War his wish to "bear testimony to the splendid conduct of Hooker's and Kearney's divisions, under command of General Heintzelman, at the battle of Williamsburg, adding: "Their bearing was worthy of veterans. Hooker's division for hours gallantly withstood the attack of greatly superior numbers, with very heavy loss. Kearney's division arrived in time to restore the fortunes of the day, and came most gallantly into action. . . . Had I had the full information I now have in regard to the troops above named when I first telegraphed, they would have been specially mentioned and commended."

Early on the morning of the 7th, Franklin landed his division on the right bank of the Pamunkey River, opposite West Point, which is between that stream and the Mattaponi, at their junction to form the York River. The place was of importance as the terminus of the York River railway to Richmond, and as connected by navigable water with the Chesapeake Bay. Sedgwick's division began arriving, also by water, later the same morning. In the middle of the day there was skirmishing with the enemy's rear guard, which soon

fell back toward Richmond. Later, the divisions of Richardson and Fitz-John Porter also arrived on transports from Yorktown. The other troops, after a brief rest at Williamsburg, marched to join their comrades in camp near West Point.

While the army was getting together in the vicinity of West Point, the President and Secretaries Chase and Stanton visited Old Point Comfort. A Confederate force under General Huger occupied Norfolk, and the reappearance of the *Merrimac*, daily expected, was watched for by the *Monitor*. Lincoln determined that prompt action should be taken for gaining control of the James River and for the possession of Norfolk.

On the 8th of May, Sewell's Point, where the enemy had long had an annoying battery, was bombarded, but though the *Monitor*, the ironclad *Naugatuck*, and four other vessels joined in the attack, the battery was not silenced. Next day, after exploration, a landing-place below the Rip-raps was chosen for an expedition to be sent against Norfolk in the rear. During the night and the following morning six regiments of infantry, a battalion of riflemen, and a battery of the regular artillery — about six thousand men in all — were landed at Ocean View, across the harbor, six miles from Fort Monroe, and put in motion towards Norfolk. Arriving at his destination near night, General Wool received the surrender of the city from its civil authorities, Huger having just before retired with its garrison of three thousand men. Direct communication was thus opened between Burnside (in North Carolina) and Wool; and command was gained of the lower James. Another

consequence was the destruction of the dread *Merrimac* by the act of its own commander. Learning that the Sewell's Point, Craney Island, and other defenses of Norfolk had been abandoned, Flag-officer Tatnall endeavored to lighten the vessel so as to run up the James, but even when thus raised until unfitted for service, it was found that the heavy hulk could not be towed to a place of security. The crew was landed, and early on the morning of the 11th the *Merrimac* was blown into fragments.

Sending Stoneman forward, with infantry and artillery support, to open communication with Franklin, McClellan remained at Williamsburg until the 10th. On the 15th and 16th, Franklin, Smith and Porter advanced to White House, the new base of supplies, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, five miles beyond West Point.

On the 9th, McClellan had telegraphed to Secretary Stanton, then at Fortress Monroe, asking permission to reorganize his army corps, saying "the present arrangement" had "nearly resulted in a most disastrous defeat" at Williamsburg, adding: "Had I been one-half hour later on the field on the 5th, we would have been routed and would have lost everything." . . . Stanton at once replied that by consent of the President, the corps organization might be temporarily suspended and any other adopted at discretion until further orders, and saying: "He also writes you privately." This is what Lincoln wrote from Fort Monroe, May 9th:

I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you relating to Army Corps, which

dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the Army Corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve Generals whom you had selected and assigned as Generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course, I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes — the commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you; but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter, and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of *me* in their places without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with *them*.

But to return. Are you strong enough — are you strong enough even with my help — to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and, of course, I only desire the good of the cause.

Availing himself of the permission granted, the General provisionally formed two additional army corps — the Fifth, under General Fitz-John Porter, comprising

his own division (General Morell succeeding to its command), and that of General Sykes, largely made up of regular troops, to which the reserve artillery was attached; and the Sixth, under General William B. Franklin, consisting of the divisions of Franklin and William F. Smith (General H. W. Slocum succeeding Franklin as division commander). These two corps were allowed, in fact, to continue in permanence. The other three corps present were now left with but two divisions each: Sumner's (the Second), those of Sedgwick and Richardson; Heintzelman's (the Third), those of Hooker and Kearney; and Keyes's (the Fourth), those of Couch and Casey.

On the 19th, the corps of Porter and Franklin were advanced to Tunstall's Station, on the York River railway, five miles nearer Richmond. There were, as before, almost daily reports of bad roads and meteorological obstructions, together with habitual calls for reinforcements, to which importunity the President was becoming seasoned, though not stoically hardened. He said in answer to a dispatch of unusual length, alleging inattention to his requests, among other grievances: "I have done, and shall do, all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of the James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still not willing to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here." On the 18th, McClellan was informed by Secretary Stanton:

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it  
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would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York River, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. . . . The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

The effective strength of Johnston's army before Richmond at this date, as shown by the Confederate records, was 62,696 men of all arms, and under Jackson in the valley there were about 15,000 — making altogether a little over 77,000. McClellan had, as he reported near this date, a total of 156,838 men, of whom there were 105,825 present for duty.

Headquarters were advanced on the 22d to Cold Harbor, and the railway was in running order from White House to the Chickahominy by the 26th of the month. Casey had crossed the river a few days before, and was soon joined by Couch, Heintzelman's corps following, and the enemy was driven from Seven Pines, on the stage road by Bottom's Bridge. The extreme right, under Porter, on the same day (May 24th) occupied Mechanicsville. Sumner, also north of the river, was posted near the railway, and between him and Porter was Franklin's corps. From New Bridge, near Cold Harbor, to Bottom's Bridge, the lowest point held on the Chickahominy at the left, the distance is about ten



miles. Between the two McClellan planned the construction of eleven new bridges. The stream is here ordinarily about forty feet wide, but it is subject to sudden overflows, covering a wide extent of bottom land on each side after heavy and continuous rains. The outer defenses of Richmond, behind which Johnston had withdrawn, extended from nearly opposite Drewry's Bluff, on James River, bending northeastward to the Chickahominy just above the railway crossing, and thence nearly following its right bank about seven miles in radius from the city.

On the 15th a fleet of gunboats, consisting of the *Monitor*, *Galena*, *Naugatuck*, *Port Royal*, and *Aroostook*, under Flag-officer Rodgers, moved up the James, meeting no resistance until within twelve miles of Richmond, at Drewry's Bluff. Here the enemy had strongly fortified against approach by the river; and Fort Darling, his principal work, on such elevated ground as to be little affected by the gunboat fire, forced the assailants to retreat, with severe loss. This experience was deemed conclusive against any nearer advance toward Richmond by the James without army support. McClellan would seem as yet to have concerned himself little about that river. In all his plans submitted in writing before setting out,—whether the movement was to be by Urbana, Mobjack Bay, or (“if worst comes to worst”) Fortress Monroe and Yorktown,—he contemplated the York River and the railway from West Point as his line of communication.

The President had a conference with McDowell at Fredericksburg on the 23d, returning to Washington the same evening. Next day he telegraphed to McClellan

lan: "I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks to some peril. . . . McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely. You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st."

But news from the valley a few hours later caused a suspension of McDowell's intended advance, as the President himself informed McClellan at 4 P. M. the same day: "In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear." McClellan replied: "I will make my calculations accordingly."

The President telegraphed to the General on the 25th: "General Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d, a rebel force of seven to ten thousand fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. General

Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. . . . If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. . . . I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly." The General answered: "Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. . . . I have two corps across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within the same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed."

On the 31st, five days after Beauregard began covertly withdrawing from Corinth,—besieged by Halleck,—a contraband reported the arrival of the Western Confederate General in Richmond "with troops, amid great excitement"; and from Washington McClellan was informed that Corinth was "certainly in the hands of General Halleck."

The truth was that General Johnston, leaving Jackson in the valley to continue what he had so successfully begun, planned a crushing blow on the left wing of McClellan's army, now astride the Chickahominy River. On the 20th, Casey's division had occupied Fair Oaks, on the railway, beyond Seven Pines (farther south, on the Williamsburg highway). Couch followed, taking the same position, when Casey advanced to within about five miles of the city. On the 30th, two of

Casey's brigades were sent one-fourth of a mile beyond Savage's Station, within supporting distance. Kearney was on the same side, not far from Seven Pines, and Hooker about two miles from Bottom's Bridge. During that day and the following night there were heavy rains; the Chickahominy was rising to a flood; the bridges were in great peril; and the roads of this swampy region were made almost impassable.

The Confederates sallied out on the morning of the 31st. Their movements were impeded in consequence of the rains, which had begun after Johnston's plan of battle was made known in orders. D. H. Hill's division took the Williamsburg road. Longstreet, the ranking officer, followed, his division forming the second line. Huger was sent out by the Charles City road, to make a flanking movement while the attack was delivered in front. G. W. Smith was ordered to march his division out the Nine Mile road, on the Confederate left, to make a junction with Magruder, posted in that quarter.

Had these movements been promptly executed, there might have been a speedy end to McClellan's menace of Richmond. But the heavy rainfall, which threatened such disaster by raising the Chickahominy, had a compensating benefit in the obstruction of the enemy's progress. It was near 3 o'clock when Hill fell upon Casey and drove him from his intrenchments. Reinforced by Couch, Casey attempted to recover his ground, but in vain. Both the divisions of Keyes fell back to Seven Pines, where they were supported by Kearney. Here again the Confederates attacked with great fury, forcing the three divisions back along the

Williamsburg road to the intrenchments at Savage's Station — all except two brigades that took refuge in the White Oak swamp. Huger's flanking movement had failed. Smith, on the Confederate left, unexpectedly encountered the corps of Sumner, which had promptly crossed the swollen Chickahominy — having been ready to march at the moment he received the order from McClellan — despite the perilous condition of the bridges on which it had to depend. It was a stubborn fight henceforward about Fair Oaks, the combatants still strongly confronting each other, after severe losses on each side, as night came on.

The battle was resumed next morning, June 1st, and continued heavily through most of the day. The enemy was finally repulsed and pressed back to Casey's first position, five miles from Richmond. Had the remainder of McClellan's army advanced on the way thus opened,— or even, without such help, had the three corps followed up their advantage,— it is possible the Confederate capital might have been speedily captured. But effective pursuit was not allowed; the advance battalions were called in, and the inviting opportunity passed unrecognized. Already the grand army, which had come so far to attack, was acting on the defensive. One wing — whose corps commanders their chief had bluntly disparaged in a letter to the President directly after the battle of Williamsburg — had, without the presence of the commanding General on their side of the river, sustained a vigorous sally from almost the entire available force of the enemy, maintaining the fight bravely through the second day, and driving the assailants back within their fortifications. For days and

weeks thereafter the invading army was still to wait — the enemy meanwhile swelling his ranks from every possible quarter and strengthening his works — until the other wing received the blow with more disastrous effect.

The losses in the two days' battle of Fair Oaks (or Seven Pines), according to the official records, were: Union — killed, 790; wounded, 3,594. Confederate — killed, 980; wounded, 4,749.

In the first day's engagement General Johnston was severely wounded and obliged to leave the field. On the 1st of June he was succeeded by General Robert E. Lee.

## CHAPTER IV.

1862.

### *Seven Days of Battle Near Richmond — McClellan Retires to Harrison's Landing.*

The sickly swamps of the Chickahominy, hard work on intrenchments and bridges, heavy rains and hot weather were not without effect on the sanitary condition of McClellan's army. He had, however, ninety-eight thousand men present for duty on the 1st of June, and to this number was now added the entire command of General Wool, more than fourteen thousand men — that veteran officer having been assigned to other duty. On the 6th, McCall's division was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and there was a continual dispatch of new regiments to that quarter. On the 7th the General telegraphed: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will permit the passage of artillery." But three days later roads and fields were "literally impassable for artillery," the Chickahominy was "in a dreadful state," and there was another rain storm on hand. His "readiness" on McCall's arrival, too, had been swept away. He asked for more men, and he suggested "the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army." Stanton replied that Halleck was to send "a column to operate with

Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee," and that Buell reported Kentucky and Tennessee to be "in a critical situation, demanding immediate attention." "Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. . . . I am urging as fast as possible the new levies." McClellan announced, on the same day: "McCall's troops have commenced arriving."

The roads were bad, but not impassable for Confederate cavalry. Stuart sallied out from Richmond on the 13th; made a tour of reconnoissance quite around McClellan's army; and, crossing the Chickahominy below White Oak Swamp, arrived safe at his starting point on the 15th. McClellan reported: "A general engagement may take place any hour. . . . We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." And on the next day: "There is not the slightest reason to suppose the enemy intends evacuating Richmond. He is daily increasing his defenses. . . . I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the meantime, I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere."

This was certainly an extraordinary request from the commander of an army in the field, on the very eve of an expected battle of great magnitude. The President in all kindness answered (June 21st): "If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the



army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and position of the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can not, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you can not leave your camp, and I can not well leave here."

Still the Government and the country awaited the delivery of the blow so long expected, and for which McClellan himself had, days before, encouraged a belief that he was ready. The 22d of June passed, with no sound of battle. So it was on the day after. Late on the night of the 24th the General became aroused by "a very peculiar case of desertion" (so he termed it) from the enemy; the "deserter" saying that Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell ("fifteen brigades") were at Gordonsville on the 21st, and intended to attack his rear "*on the 28th.*"

On the 25th, McClellan advanced his picket lines on the left, preparatory to "a general forward movement." At 3:15 P. M. he reported: "Kearney's and half of Hooker's men are where I want them. . . . Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. . . . If we succeed in what we have undertaken, it will be a very important advantage gained. . . . On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's

batteries in his front." Again at 5 P. M.: "The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition."

At last, then, something was really getting done. An hour and a quarter later came another dispatch:

Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Courthouse, and that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. . . . I will do all that a General can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

A large-hearted charity could personally forgive this frenzy at such a moment. Stanton replied near midnight (25th): "Your telegram of fifteen minutes past 6 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more reinforcements than has been done have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them. Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division (of Burnside's army) has reached Falmouth; Shields's division and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done." In the morning (26th) the President sent the following:

Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

The later one of 6:15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

P. S.—General Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better toward York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

At the same date McClellan was officially notified of the consolidation of the forces of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, constituting the Army of Virginia, which was to be under the command of Major-General John Pope, called east for that purpose after the occupation of Corinth. The assurance was given that this army would promptly co-operate with that under McClellan, moving southward by land.

According to his official report, McClellan had, on the 20th of June, 156,838 men, of whom 115,102 were present for duty. Lee's army, including Jackson's corps and recent accessions from all sources, as reported on that side, numbered 109,612. The Army of the Potomac was intrenched, its right having a very strong position on Beaver-dam Creek. Lee marched out of his intrenchments, leaving a slender force under Magruder to make a show of still occupying them. About noon on the 26th, Porter's cavalry pickets, advancing

from Mechanicsville on the Meadow Bridge road, were driven in by the vanguard of an approaching column. McClellan at once reported to Stanton: "Jackson is driving in my pickets on the other side of the Chickahominy." In truth, the assailing forces were those of A. P. Hill, who was closely followed by Longstreet and D. H. Hill, all fresh from the Richmond intrenchments. Battle was now on in earnest, but at neither the time nor the place of McClellan's choosing. It was not on his part an aggressive conflict. Abandoning all present thought of taking Richmond, his first concern was to save what he could of the army and its supplies. In the fight of the 26th at Beaver-dam Creek (near Mechanicsville), the enemy was beaten by the brigades of Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour (of McCall's division), those of Martindale and Griffin (of Morell's division), and Berdan's sharpshooters. Again and again the enemy pushed forward to the slaughter, to be every time completely baffled.\*

Before the battle fairly began, McClellan had ordered Quartermaster Ingalls, at White House, to "run the cars to the last moment," loaded with provisions and ammunition, to Savage's Station, to fill all his wagons with subsistence, and send them by way of Bottom's Bridge to the same point; and, if obliged to abandon White House, to burn everything he could not get off, thenceforward sending supplies up the James. As early as the 18th, in fact, he had taken the precaution to have some supplies dispatched by that river. He now ordered his heavy guns near Gaines's Mill, in

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\* Losses : Union — killed, 49; wounded, 207. Confederate—killed, 600; wounded, 1,850.—*War Records*.

the neighborhood of Cold Harbor and New Bridge, to be sent across the Chickahominy, and his victorious forces were withdrawn from Beaver Dam during the night.

The enemy pursued closely, with only slight skirmishing, until about noon (on the 27th), when Porter, having taken up a strong defensive position near Gaines's Mill, prepared to give battle. His lines formed nearly a semi-circle before the bridges across this section of the Chickahominy. Soon after noon firing began along the whole front. Porter was reinforced from across the river by one of Franklin's divisions and two brigades of Sumner's corps. On the left there was a fierce struggle for the possession of a strip of woods nearly at right angles with the river, but the enemy's charges were repulsed, with severe loss to the assailants. On the right there were heavy onslaughts upon Sykes's regulars, with like results. A large part of Jackson's command — which had arrived to-day after unexpected delays — came into action here, while Longstreet assailed the Union left. At half-past 6 o'clock renewed attack was made by the enemy along the whole front, but failed to break the lines at any point. Half an hour later Longstreet charged with fresh troops, and succeeded in penetrating the long-contested woods. An incipient panic followed, but was soon arrested, and pursuit was checked. The enemy retired up the slope as night settled over the battlefield. On the Union side, 894 were killed and 3,107 wounded. The Confederates lost 1,700 killed and 6,728 wounded. Of the killed, 589 were of Jackson's command.

The last of Porter's men crossed the Chickahominy

at an early hour next morning, destroying the bridges behind them, and his entire corps proceeded at once through White Oak Swamp to Turkey Bend, on James River. McClellan, with headquarters at Savage's Station, improved the time in managing his change of base. Soon after midnight he had sent a dispatch to Stanton, complaining of defeat for the want of enough men, and concluding: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." Before night (on the 28th) he left Savage's Station, proceeding directly to the James at Turkey Bend, where he went on board the gunboat of Flag-officer Rodgers, to confer with him as to the best position to be taken by the army on that river.

Lee set his troops in motion on the morning of the 29th, seeking to intercept the retreating army near Charles City Cross-roads, about two miles beyond the White Oak Bridge. Jackson spent the 28th and 29th in burying the dead and caring for the wounded on the late battlefield, and in repairing the bridge by which his men crossed the Chickahominy on the morning of the 30th. Sumner, moving from his old position to take the place assigned him at Savage's Station, repulsed an attack from Magruder, on the morning of the 28th, near Allen's farm; and later in the day they had a more serious encounter near Savage's Station, lasting from 4 o'clock until night, with the advantage on Sumner's side. During the night the swamp was crossed by Sumner and Franklin, the latter remaining to destroy the bridge and to check pursuit. On the evening of the 30th, Heintzelman destroyed the bridge by which

he had crossed at Brackett's Ford, and held the Charles City road. Sumner, with Sedgwick's division, was at Glendale (Nelson's farm), and McCall's division formed across the New Market road, at Frayser's farm. In the afternoon McCall was attacked in overwhelming force, and a hard-fought battle followed. "The battle of Glendale," reported Sumner, the ranking General present, "was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 p. m. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field."

The supply trains and reserve artillery had all arrived at Turkey Bend by 4 o'clock the same afternoon. Porter had taken position on Malvern Hill, on the James, about fifteen miles from Richmond, and was prepared to receive the hostile force, which appeared near 5 o'clock. A concentrated fire of artillery, seconded by the gunboats, sufficed to repress his assailants for the evening. The corps of Keyes was also on the ground, and the corps of Heintzelman, Sumner, and Franklin were at hand in the morning. The hill — a high table-land a mile and a half long, and half as wide, from which the descent to the river is somewhat abrupt, but more gradual towards a wooded plain northward — was nearly clear of timber, affording good opportunity for the use of artillery, which was heavily massed upon the slope, so as to command the approaches from White Oak Swamp and Richmond. The real conflict did not begin until after noon. Near 3 o'clock a heavy artillery fire was opened by the Confederates on Keyes's position, followed by an infantry charge. The latter was awaited by Couch's men, lying on the ground until the

enemy was well up within musket range, when they sprang to their feet. A destructive volley broke the advancing ranks, and the assailants were driven back nearly half a mile, with much slaughter. At 6 o'clock Lee's artillery opened on the Union left, and masses of infantry were ready to attack. Forming under cover of the woods, brigade followed brigade on the run, seeking to cross the open space in order to capture the batteries to which they were exposed; but, terribly swept and broken by cannon and musketry, the assailants were slaughtered, disabled, or driven back to shelter. Futile assaults were renewed with desperation until night darkened the field.

The losses at Malvern Hill were: Union — killed, 397; wounded, 2,093; Confederate — killed, 1,050; wounded, 4,075. According to official records the losses during the seven days beginning June 25th were: Union — killed, 1,734; wounded, 8,062; missing, 6,053; total, 15,849. Confederate — killed, 2,823; wounded, 13,703; missing, 3,233; total, 19,759.

During the second and third days of July the Army of the Potomac took position near Harrison's Landing, below City Point, and intrenched, its flanks being under the protection of the gunboats of Rodgers. From this point the General, on the 4th, sent a long letter to the President, in which he said: "I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require." He summarized events occurring since his last dispatch from Savage's Station, and explained his "change of base." While saying, "I can not now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten," he was not over-sanguine as



to the future: "Our communications by the James River," he wrote, "are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. . . . Send reinforcements as you can; I will do what I can."

A communication was addressed to the President, dated June 28th, signed by the Governors of nearly all the loyal States, suggesting a call for additional troops, and assuring him that the people were desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements he might deem necessary. This expression from the Governors he had in fact wished — and it was quietly but actively promoted by Secretary Seward, who spent some time in New York City on that errand,— before issuing the call, which had become indispensable. Lincoln responded (July 1st), announcing that he would ask a new levy of three hundred thousand men, trusting that they would "be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion."

## CHAPTER V.

1862.

*Departments of Fremont, McDowell and Banks Consolidated — Halleck and Pope Called to the East — Exit Fremont — Lincoln at Harrison's Landing.*

A new department had been created for Fremont, in the hope that he would early occupy Knoxville, or at least effectively break the railway communication between that city and Lynchburg. After two months, however, he was still remote from the intended scene of his main operations. When Jackson was putting Banks to flight in the latter part of May, Fremont was at Franklin, in West Virginia, midway between Beverly and Harrisonburg, with lagging trains forty miles in his rear, at Moorefield. He was ordered on the 24th to "move against Jackson at Harrisonburg," in support of Banks, and was told that the movement "must be made immediately." The distance from his position directly across the mountain to Harrisonburg was comparatively short, and the road, though not of the best, was passable. Fremont, nevertheless, countermarched to Moorefield, and crossed from that place into the Shenandoah Valley well down toward Winchester, spoiling the President's carefully laid plan to corner Jackson. Fremont arrived just too late, though the enemy did not escape without some trouble. Fighting with

Fremont on the 8th of June, and the next day with a brigade of Shields (of McDowell's corps) at Port Republic, Jackson freed himself from his opponents and retired from the valley without serious loss. The President was disappointed and chagrined. On the 9th he ordered Fremont to halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no further, and to await orders, soon to be sent.

The General and some of his subordinate officers, of whom several, as well as a good proportion of the rank and file, were of German extraction, thought the President should send reinforcements and allow pursuit of Jackson — speaking their mind with some freedom in several communications. Lincoln replied to Fremont, June 13th: "We can not afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. . . . He can have no substantial reinforcement so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely you and Banks in supporting distance are capable of keeping him from returning to Winchester."

Later (June 15th) he said, in reply to a letter of Fremont: "I think Jackson's game — his assigned work — now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus, by constant alarms, to keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to allow this." To renewed importunities, the President replied in a plain-speaking letter (June 16th):

. . . Early in March last, when I assigned you to the command of the Mountain Department, I did tell you I

would give you all the force I could, and that I hoped to make it reach 35,000. You at the same time told me that within a reasonable time you would seize the railroad at or east of Knoxville, Tenn., if you could. There was then in the department a force supposed to be 25,000, the exact number as well known to you as to me. After looking about two or three days you called, and distinctly told me that if I would add the Blenker division to the force already in your department you would undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 10,000, and, at the expense of great dissatisfaction of General McClellan, I took it from his army and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled. I have given you all I could, and have given you very nearly, if not quite, 35,000.

. . . On the 23d of May, more than two months afterward, you were at Franklin, Va., not within 300 miles of Knoxville, nor within eighty miles of any part of the railroad east of it, and not moving forward, but telegraphing here that you could not move for lack of everything. Now, do not misunderstand me. I do not say you have not done all you could. I presume you met unexpected difficulties; and I beg you to believe that, as surely as you have done your best, so have I. I have not the power now to fill up your corps to 35,000. I am not demanding of you to do the work of 35,000. I am only asking of you to stand cautiously on the defensive, get your force in order, and give such protection as you can to the Valley of the Shenandoah and to Western Virginia.

Lincoln had certainly not overrated the importance of making the national capital secure, nor had he erred in his judgment of the inadequacy of McClellan's intended provision for its defense. The event proved that the retention of a large part of McDowell's corps in position to aid Banks in case of necessity was a wise precaution. But there were serious embarrassments in making an effective disposal of that force in its double relation, and the difficulty was not relieved by creating an independent department for McDowell, intermediate

between Banks and McClellan — the three Generals having no responsible chief but the President himself. Seeing little hope of Fremont's accomplishing anything in his "Mountain Department," Lincoln had tried to make him useful as a support to Banks in the valley, and thus at length had in hand three small armies, whose operations he did not so well succeed in directing as to encourage further trial. He determined, therefore, to unite the three smaller armies under one commander, and to appoint a General-in-chief over all. In carrying out this purpose he called two Generals from the West.

General Pope in his New Madrid campaign had gained distinction, and proved himself fitted for a high command. He enjoyed the favor of his immediate superior, Halleck; and the President was all the more pleased to give him a well-earned promotion from long acquaintance with his distinguished father, Judge Nathaniel Pope, at Springfield. Unexpectedly summoned to Washington, General Pope learned there on the 24th of June that he had been selected to command the three consolidated armies. It was well known at the time to friends of the General with whom he conversed at all freely that, far from being elated with the offer of such advancement, he greatly desired to be excused from its acceptance. The President, however, insisted, and on the 26th an order was issued constituting the "Army of Virginia," under command of Major-General John Pope, the forces of Fremont, McDowell, and Banks remaining under each respectively as corps commander. At once Fremont asked

to be relieved, which was granted, and Major-General Franz Sigel was appointed in his stead.

General Halleck was later assigned to the position of General-in-chief at Washington. While he remained at Corinth — a key position at the crossing of railway lines with termini at Memphis, Mobile, and Charleston (*via* Chattanooga) — Forts Pillow and Randolph, on the Mississippi, were taken (on the 4th of June), and Flag-officer Davis (successor to Foote, disabled by wounds received at Fort Donelson) beat the enemy's gunboats in a lively contest (on the 6th) before the bluffs of Memphis. That city was immediately surrendered, and soon became the headquarters of General W. T. Sherman, as commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Farragut had ineffectually bombarded Vicksburg early in May, and after cruising a while down the river, he returned with Porter and his mortars, renewing the attack late in June. The mortars proved to be powerless against the batteries on the high bluffs, but after silencing the water batteries, Farragut passed Vicksburg and communicated with Flag-officer Davis above. There remained to the Confederates only that part of the Mississippi River between Vicksburg and Port Hudson (above Baton Rouge) when Halleck transferred his Western command to Grant.

The President had as yet but imperfect information touching the operations around Richmond when he telegraphed McClellan, July 2d: "Your dispatch of yesterday induces me to hope that your army is having some rest. In this hope, allow me to reason with you

for a moment. When you ask for fifty thousand men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington seventy-five thousand men. Now, please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by fifteen thousand. . . . Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."

On the 4th he said in a letter to the General: "To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose,) and about ten thousand I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you *can*; and, secondly, by removal, if you must. . . . If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so."

McClellan replied, three days later: "Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. . . . My men are in splendid spirits

and anxious to try it again. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army."

If not "alarmed," the President continued to be anxious—so much so that he visited the army in person, arriving at the General's headquarters on the 7th. This happened to be the date of McClellan's well-known political letter, ("Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862,") which, notwithstanding previous assurances, began with these words:

*Mr. President:* You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our position or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties.

McClellan had asked and received permission to write such a communication while in front of Richmond, just at the time he reported Franklin as about ready to open fire on the city. It has been plausibly conjectured that this letter, modified only to accord with his military change of base, had then been already prepared, with the aid of advisers skilled in statecraft. Some of its principal passages are all that need now be recalled:

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution of the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure and blood. If secession is successful, other



dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble. . . . The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency. This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. Neither confiscation of property, political execution of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. . . .

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. . . .

Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. . . .

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. . . .

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a Commander-in-chief of the Army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you

may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. . . .

There were in this letter reminders of another high official which must have impressed Lincoln's mind, independently of the views presented. Like the Secretary of State more than a year before, the General informed his superior that he needed a policy; outlined one for him; and offered to carry it out if intrusted with that responsibility. McClellan's letter, delivered in person, was read by the President while at Harrison's Landing, but unlike that of Mr. Seward (of April 1st, 1861,) it did not receive any formal response.

The troops were reviewed by Lincoln on the 8th, and before leaving for Washington, on the 9th, written questions were submitted to the General and to each of his corps commanders, and their answers noted, as thus summarized from the original autograph memorandum put in the present writer's hands in 1864:

*What amount of force have you now?*

General McClellan: About 80,000 — can't vary much — certainly 75,000.

The corps commanders, as to the respective corps of each:

Sumner, about 15,000; Heintzelman, 15,000 for duty; Keyes, about 12,500; Porter, about 23,000 — fully 20,000 fit for duty; Franklin, about 15,000. Total, 81,500.

Questioned as to the aggregate of their "killed, wounded, and missing from the attack on the 26th until now," they severally answered:

Sumner, 1,175; Heintzelman, not large — 745; Keyes, less than 500; Porter, over 5,000; Franklin, not over 3,000.

*What is likely to be your condition as to health in this camp?*

General McClellan: Better than in any encampment since landing at Fortress Monroe.

The corps commanders were asked as to "the present and prospective condition as to health" in their "present encampment," and replied:

Sumner: As good as any part of Eastern Virginia.

Heintzelman: Excellent for health, and present health improving.

Keyes: A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.

Porter: Very good.

Franklin: Not good.

To the inquiry, "Where is the enemy now?" McClellan replied: "From four to five miles from us, on all the roads — I think nearly the whole army — both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson, Magruder, Huger." The other Generals, asked "where and in what condition they believed the enemy to be?" said:

Sumner: I think they have retired from our front; were very much damaged, especially in their best troops, in the late actions, from superiority of our arms.

Heintzelman: Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.

Keyes: Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to Washington.

Porter: Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare not attack us here.

Franklin: I learn he has withdrawn from our front, and think that is probable.

The corps commanders were examined on two other points, as follows:

*If it were desired to get the army away, could it be safely effected?*

Sumner: I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if we do it.

Heintzelman: Perhaps we could, but I think it would be ruinous to the country.

Keyes: I think it could if done quickly.

Porter: Impossible — move the army and ruin the country.

Franklin: I think we could, and that we better — think Rappahannock the true line.

(McClellan had expressed the opinion that “it would be a delicate and very difficult matter.”)

*Is the army secure in its present position?*

Sumner: Perfectly so, in my judgment.

Heintzelman: I think it is safe.

Keyes: With help of General B. (Burnside) can hold position.

Porter: Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin moving forward.

Franklin: Unless river can be closed, it is.\*

If civilians embarrassed him with crude and conflicting views on army affairs, the President, after comparing these opinions, could hardly hope to find any sure refuge in the judgment of the military man. Congress was still in session, and his stay could not be prolonged. He had satisfied himself as to some essential facts, and had found the situation not so bad as he feared. He evidently did not give very earnest attention to McClellan's letter of advice while there; † yet there were two points in it that were already engaging his attention

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\* The answers of Keyes and Franklin to the last question are given differently in “Complete Works,” N. & H., II. 202.

† In “McClellan's Own Story” (p. 487), it is stated that Lincoln read the letter in the General's presence, but made no comment upon it.

and received speedy action. One was the matter of a broader policy regarding slavery (to be noticed later); the other, the appointment of a General-in-chief of all the armies. On the 11th of July the selection of Major-General Halleck for this position was officially announced.

## CHAPTER VI.

1862.

### *Dealing with the "Fundamental Cause"—Three Notable Letters.*

In his message of the previous December the President had plainly enough indicated his conviction that it might become necessary to deal more radically with the fundamental cause of the war. Three months later (March 6, 1862) he sent a special message to Congress, recommending the passage of a joint resolution declaring:

That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.

In favor of this proposal he urged the effect which the "initiation of emancipation" would have upon the insurgents, and as to the financial side of the question, suggested that "very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase at fair valuation all the slaves" in any State. Quoting from his December message the words, "the Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed," he added: "I said this not hastily, but deliberately."

At his request a number of Senators and Repre-

sentatives from the Border slaveholding States met him soon after for conference on the subject. There was respectful attention to his views, with no sympathetic response. When told that Greeley's *Tribune* understood the proposition to mean that the Border States "must accept gradual emancipation on the basis suggested, or get something worse," he disclaimed any intended menace. Mr. Crittenden assured him, as the interview was closing, that, whatever might be the final action of those present, all thought him to be "solely moved by a high patriotism and a sincere devotion to the happiness and glory of his country." \* The question was considered in the House of Representatives the next day (March 11th), and the resolution, after some sarcastic comments by Thaddeus Stevens, was adopted, 97 to 36 — five Southern members voting yea. It was concurred in by the Senate a month afterward, receiving the President's signature on the 10th of April.

An order of General Hunter (May 9th) proclaimed that "slavery and martial law" (which he had established in his department) are in a free country "altogether incompatible," and that the persons "in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free." To Secretary Chase, who advised that this be approved (as he thought Fremont's similar action should have been), Lincoln pointedly answered: "No commanding General shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me." In his proclamation disclaiming

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\* Mr. Crisfield, of Maryland, made an extended memorandum of this interview at the time, which Mr. Crittenden indorsed as correct.

and annulling this part of Hunter's order, the President recited the above resolution adopted by Congress on his recommendation, and made this earnest appeal to the people of the Border States:

The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue — I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

Already slavery had been doomed in the District of Columbia. Senator Wilson's bill for that purpose passed the Senate early in April, and was concurred in by the House of Representatives on the 11th of that month. In announcing his approval (on the 16th), the President stated in a brief message to Congress that he had "never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District," and expressed his gratification "that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act."

In the Senate, Mr. Trumbull's Confiscation bill, and in the House other proposals of kindred character, occu-



pieced much time during the session. Finally a bill which was adjusted by conference and passed (entitled "An act to suppress treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,") was sent to the Executive only a few days before the adjournment. He found it objectionable in some particulars, and prepared a veto message, but this was obviated by the passage of a joint resolution which relieved the measure of his chief objections, so that he signed the two enactments as a whole. In communicating his approval (July 17th), he sent to Congress the message originally prepared in explanation of his position. "There is much in the bill," he said, "to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective, and it touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particulars it is just and proper." To the sections providing for the conviction and punishment of persons who shall be guilty of treason, and persons who shall "incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof," he saw no objection, "especially as such persons would be within the general pardoning power," as well as within the special provision for pardon and amnesty contained in the act. As to the provision of the act that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free, he said:

I think there is an unfortunate form of expression, rather than a substantial objection, in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the ownership of a slave had first been transferred to the nation, and Congress had then liberated him, the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. . . . I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance

that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she is the owner of some slaves by *escheat*, and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it will be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it, which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill.

That to which he chiefly objected (now remedied by the joint resolution) was in other sections extending forfeiture "beyond the lives of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares that 'no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.'" This constitutional provision, he remarked, "put in language borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I understand it, to real or landed estate."

A bill introduced in March by Mr. Arnold, of Illinois, "to render freedom national and slavery sectional," came from the legislative laboratory as "An act to secure freedom within the Territories of the United States"—redeeming a pledge of the Chicago platform lately neglected by the Republicans in organizing three Territories—and was approved June 9, 1862.

On the 12th of July, just after returning from his visit to the Army of the Potomac, he made a last appeal to the Border State members convened at the White House:

I intend no reproach or complaint [he said] when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual emancipation message of last

March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it.

. . . The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion — by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event. . . .

I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go. . . .

Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world; its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness, and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

Twenty of these Senators and Representatives soon after replied, in a courteous address, quite firmly opposing emancipation. The other nine expressed their approval of the President's propositions.

A few weeks later (August 14th) the President made an earnest appeal to a number of colored men whom he invited to the White House with the hope of inducing them to take hold of the colonization work, which was, in his view, an essential part of his gradual emancipation scheme. Congress had made an appropriation of

\$600,000 for the purpose of trying the experiment of founding a new colony of freedmen. There were at length such undertakings actually begun, the details of which need not be here rehearsed. All these efforts ended in partial disaster and complete failure. No general enthusiasm for "deportation" could be excited among the blacks, nor were there individual exceptions of any note.

These days of July and August, with their peculiar trials, were but the prelude to a period which was yet more thoroughly to test the qualities of both President and people. It was hardly a fitting time, certainly, for Union men at the South, who were enjoying the protection of Union soldiers, to murmur over any minor hardships and restraints consequent upon a state of war; yet an incident of this kind, memorable for the treatment it received from the President, occurred in New Orleans. A respectable citizen there, in a communication addressed to a local officer of the Treasury Department, and by him transmitted to Washington, complained of the trade regulations which Secretary Chase had prescribed for that port—too stringent to suit some business men, and also of annoyances which people were suffering in relation to their slaves. In his reply, July 28th, Lincoln said:

. . . The first part of the letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect? Why did they not exert themselves? Why stand passive and allow themselves to be trodden down by a

minority? Why did they not hold popular meetings, and have a convention of their own to express and enforce the true sentiments of the State? If pre-organization was against them, then why not do this now that the United States army is present to protect them? The paralyzer—the dead palsy—of the Government in the whole struggle is, that this class of men will do nothing for the Government—nothing for themselves, except demanding that the Government shall not strike its enemies, lest they be struck by accident. . . .

It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can not get either, in sufficient numbers or amounts, if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. . . .

I think I can perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges, that he would relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade. By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is able to serve himself.

I do not say or believe that to serve the enemy is the purpose of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any purposes other than national and patriotic ones. Still, if there were a class of men, who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages, and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest would be precisely such as his.

He speaks of no duty, apparently thinks of none, resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage, without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers (“dead heads” at that)—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm and safely landed right side up. Nay, more—even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. . . .

The people of Louisiana, who wish protection to person and property, have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith reinaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government conforming thereto

under the Constitution. They know how to do it, and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such government can dispense with its presence, and the people of the State can then, upon the old terms, govern themselves to their own liking. This is very simple and easy.

If they will not do this — if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the Government — it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the Government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do.

What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts, charged with rosewater? \* Would you deal lighter blows, rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied?

I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, but I shall do all I can to save the Government, which is my sworn duty, as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.

On the main features of this letter there is no occasion for comment. Incidentally, were there not other evidence of the fact, it leaves no room for doubt that Lincoln had already made up his mind to strike with all his might at slavery, and that, to close the matter without losing everything at stake, he did not shrink from war's harsh methods to accomplish its ends in the speediest way and really at the least cost to humanity.

About this time he received a letter, written with anxious sympathy, from a distinguished European, one

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\* That's a perilous shot out of an elder gun, etc.

*Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 4, Scene 1.*

of the truest friends of the Great Republic throughout the Civil War — Count de Gasparin, a French Protestant and an author of note,\* who was troubled by the news of McClellan's repulse before Richmond, as reported abroad from Confederate sources. Widely differing in tone from the preceding letter, as befitted the occasion, Lincoln's reply is equally characteristic:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,  
August 4, 1862.

*To Count A. de Gasparin:*

DEAR SIR:—Your very acceptable letter, dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, 18th of July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is certain that he is less able to bear it.

With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that the Government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand. Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service, are nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can have assurance that unwilling persons, similarly situated, will be compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to enter

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\*Two books of his relating to the Anti-Slavery regeneration of American institutions and the war for the Union were reprinted in this country, in translation: "The Uprising of a Great People" (1861), and "America Before Europe" (1862).

newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as valuable.

You ask, "Why is it that the North with her great armies so often is found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man, which I am not, would better answer the question. The fact I know has not been overlooked, and I suppose the cause of its continuance lies mainly in the other fact that the enemy holds the interior and we have the exterior lines; and that we operate where the people convey information to the enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us.

I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles generally.

You are quite right as to the importance to us for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than a hundred thousand square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient.

I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your judgment of propriety and policy. I can only say that I have acted upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of God I shall continue to do so.

Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem.

A. LINCOLN.

The leadership in Republican journalism of the more radical type in those days might fairly be conceded to Horace Greeley. Ardent in working, he was impatient in waiting for things to grow. Perhaps he never thoroughly understood Abraham Lincoln; certainly he was



ignorant of Lincoln's purposes in regard to slavery at this particular juncture. The report of the President's address to colored men in favor of colonization had but just gone through the country when Mr. Greeley — in a temper more wrathful than devotional — indited and published (in the *Tribune*) what he quite gratuitously termed "The Prayer of Twenty Millions," addressed to the President. Its character will be rightly understood from the following samples:

On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion, and at the same time uphold its inciting cause, are preposterous and futile — that the rebellion, if crushed to-morrow, would be renewed within a year if slavery were kept in full vigor — that army officers, who remain to this day devoted to slavery, can at best be but half-way loyal to the Union — and that every hour of deference to slavery is an hour of added and deepened peril to the Union. I appeal to the testimony of your ambassadors in Europe. It is freely at your service, not mine. Ask them to tell you candidly whether the seeming subserviency of your policy to the slave-holding, slavery-upholding interest, is not the perplexity, the despair of all parties; and be admonished by the general answer!

I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation Act. That act gives freedom to the slaves of rebels coming within our lines, or to whom those lines may at any time inclose. We ask you to render it due obedience by publicly requiring all your subordinates to recognize and obey it. . . . We cannot conquer ten millions of people united in solid phalanx against us, powerfully aided by Northern sympathizers and European allies. We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters, diggers and

choppers from the blacks of the South — whether we allow them to fight for us or not — or we shall be baffled and repelled.

The President thought it best to meet this appeal in the same arena. By telegraph he sent the following reply for publication in the *Tribune*:


EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,  
August 22, 1862.

*Hon. Horace Greeley:*

DEAR SIR:— I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the *New York Tribune*. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I “seem to be pursuing,” as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be “the Union as it was.” If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing



hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men, everywhere, could be free.

Yours,

A. LINCOLN.

A response in this way happened "very unexpectedly" to Mr. Greeley, as he afterward said. That it was a very effective answer was not doubtful to any one.

## CHAPTER VII.

1862.

*Pope in Virginia — Halleck and McClellan — "Second Bull Run" — Lee in Maryland — Antietam.*

General Pope issued an address to the Army of Virginia on the 14th of July — a "Western" utterance, more in Stanton's manner than Lincoln's. A bold attitude, with something of audacity in proclamation, was not unprecedented in a commander setting out on an arduous campaign; but jealous Generals were offended by what seemed an invidious comparison of military operations east and west, and by these expressions most of all: "I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them — of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves." In general orders (July 18th) he announced that for the future, "as far as practicable the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on" — vouchers to be given to the owners of property taken and payment to be made at the end

of the war, on proof of loyalty "since the date of the vouchers." An outcry was made against the General in some quarters on account of this and another order aimed to suppress guerrilla disturbances; though he was, in fact, introducing no methods that were novel, and only obeying superior authority.\*

Some days earlier Pope had ordered Banks to send a cavalry force to Gordonsville, breaking the railway communication with Richmond; and McDowell, holding Fredericksburg, was to do like service in his front. The troopers of Banks only got as far as Madison Courthouse, Ewell having come in before them at Gordonsville on the 16th.

On the 3d of August McClellan received this order from Halleck: "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed from your own officers. Your material and sick should be removed first." McClellan's earnest protest was ineffectual. On the 6th he was ordered to send immediately a regiment of cavalry and several batteries to Burnside's command—already withdrawn to Acquia Creek—and was told that Jackson was reported to be moving north with a very large force. Halleck further informed the Gen-

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\* "I will issue to-morrow an order giving my comments on Mr. John Pope. I will strike square in the teeth of all his infamous orders, and give directly the reverse instructions to my army: forbid all pillaging and stealing, and take the highest Christian ground for the conduct of the war."—*General McClellan to his wife, August 8, 1862.* ("McClellan's Own Story," p. 463.)

eral that the order of August 3d would not be recalled, but that he was "expected to execute it with all possible promptness."

The new General-in-chief had visited the camp at Harrison's Landing on the 25th of July, and had given full consideration to the representations made then or since in opposition to removing the army from the James. In a letter to McClellan (August 6th), Halleck gave these substantial reasons for his decision, communicated three days before:

You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then you and others report that they have received, and are receiving, large reinforcements from the South. General Pope's army, covering Washington, is only about forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect; neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack. If General Pope's army be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. . . .

But you will reply, Why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this you said at our interview that you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have some chance of success with twenty thousand. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely reinforced. . . .

To keep your army in its present position until it could

be so reinforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River; and even after you received the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time—perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. . . .

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers—indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me—are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment.

Pope's situation was becoming perilous. On the 8th of August the enemy appeared on the Rapidan, and Bayard's cavalry slowly retired toward Culpeper Courthouse. Crawford's brigade was ordered to Cedar Mountain in support of Bayard. On the 9th, Banks was directed to move the rest of his corps to join Crawford. Towards evening on the 10th, Banks, having advanced two miles from the position occupied during the day, hitherto without discovering any considerable force in his front, encountered Early's brigade, and was soon engaged with a large share of Jackson's command. In the spirited action which followed, Banks was beaten, with the loss of 314 killed and 1,446 wounded. Jackson lost 241 killed and 1,361 wounded.

General King, called from Fredericksburg, brought up his division on the 11th, which day both parties had spent in burying their dead at Cedar Mountain. Reno's division arrived on the 14th, and an advance was made—the right, under Sigel, resting on Rob-

ertson River; McDowell holding both flanks of Cedar Mountain; and other forces extending the line on the left to near Raccoon Ford. Soon an intercepted letter of General Lee definitely disclosed his purpose to mass his main forces against Pope, seeking to engage and crush him before reinforcements should arrive from the Peninsula. More than two weeks had passed since McClellan was ordered to withdraw from the James, but Pope had received no help as yet from that quarter. He retired across the Rappahannock, dexterously and without loss, during the night of the 18th and the day following. Ten days before (August 9th), Halleck had telegraphed to McClellan: "I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity." And again on the 10th: "The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained."

McClellan's plea of want of transportation was thus met in Halleck's dispatch of the 12th: "The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. . . . Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand troops to Acquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All the ves-



sels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten thousand of your men could be transported daily. . . . There has been, and is, the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington." McClellan replied the same day: "If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Acquia."

At length, much other correspondence having intervened, he announced on the 15th: "Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning *en route* for Yorktown — one *via* Jones' Bridge, and the other *via* Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear; and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the whole army in motion."

McClellan himself left Fortress Monroe on the 23d, and reported from Acquia Creek on the 24th. He was at Alexandria on the 27th. Pope, on recrossing the left bank of the Rappahannock, had put his army in good position to maintain the line of that river against a direct advance of the enemy, and was instructed to hold his ground by every effort in his power. Large reinforcements were promised within two days, but up to the 25th Kearney's division and part of McCall's were all of McClellan's men that reached the scene of action. These were soon followed by Hooker's division and the corps of Fitz-John Porter. Leaving at Richmond but a slender garrison, Lee had meantime advanced, and disposed his forces along the right bank of the

Rappahannock from Kelly's Ford to a point beyond the extreme right of Pope, and on the 21st and 22d made — or feigned — attempts to cross the river.

Pope gave anxious attention to the flanking movement threatened, which he ineffectually sought to avert. On the night of the 24th he withdrew his left from the lower fords of the Rappahannock, having in the meantime been apprised of a general movement of the enemy up the right bank of the river. Stonewall Jackson had already begun a dashing march, masked by the Bull Run Mountains, to Thoroughfare Gap, and thence to Manassas Junction. Pope made such disposition of the forces he had as seemed best fitted for the emergency, requesting Halleck to hasten Franklin's corps to Gainesville, and to send to Manassas Junction a strong division from the other troops arriving from the Peninsula. About 8 o'clock in the evening of the 26th, Jackson, having been joined by Stuart's cavalry, struck the railway between Catlett's and Bristoe Stations. Hooker drove back Ewell next day to near the latter place, to which Porter was ordered with his corps of fresh troops, starting at 1 o'clock in the morning of the 28th; but he did not move until several hours later, leaving a wide gap between his men and Hooker's, who had promptly advanced. Franklin was not at Gainesville; the division to occupy Manassas Junction was still wanting; nor was the railway west of that place held as ordered.

Pope's entire force, much of which had been marching or fighting for several days past, numbered only about fifty-four thousand. He tried to effect a prompt concentration near Manassas Junction and

Gainesville. Jackson left Manassas that morning (the 28th), after destroying much property, and hurried across Bull Run. He was now widely separated from Longstreet, who was advancing by way of Thoroughfare Gap to join him, and Pope's army was getting between them. Whether it was the fault of the commanding General or of some of his subordinates in the field, that so promising an opportunity for a decisive blow was lost, is a question on which military critics have not agreed. The indubitable fact is that the "Second Bull Run" conflict, lasting two days (August 29th and 30th), was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and ended in a disheartening Union defeat.\*

As night came on, the second day of battle, Pope's left had been driven back nearly three-fourths of a mile, but without disorder. The Warrenton pike, which the enemy had sought to get possession of, was still open for retreat to Centreville, nor was there immediate pursuit. Here the army remained during the 31st, and was joined by the corps of Sumner and Franklin, whose nineteen thousand men had been expected on the Rapahannock ten days before. On the 1st of September the enemy was found to be attempting a flanking movement in the vicinity of Fairfax Courthouse. His attack at sunset, near Chantilly, was met by McDowell, with the help of Reno, Hooker and Kearney. A lively but brief combat followed, in the midst of a violent thunder storm. The assailants were repulsed. Here the gallant Kearney and another brave General, Isaac I. Stevens, of

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\*Union: Killed, 1,787; wounded, 8,482. Confederate: Killed, 1,558; wounded, 7,812.—*War Records*.

Oregon, gave up their lives. On the 2d, as ordered by Halleck, the army was withdrawn within the intrenchments of Washington.

During the closing days of Pope's campaign McClellan had his headquarters at Alexandria. On the 27th of August he was ordered by the General-in-chief to "take the entire direction of sending out troops from Alexandria," and was informed that the exigency required Franklin's corps to move toward Manassas Junction "as soon as possible." Sumner's corps had begun disembarking at Acquia Creek the day before. Not a man of these two corps reached the scene of action at all. Porter, already there with a large force, preferring his own discretion to Pope's positive orders, had kept out of the fight during the whole of a most critical day. McClellan at this juncture was sending dispatches to General Halleck, the prevailing spirit of which appears in the following examples:

AUGUST 27 — 12:20 P. M.— What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have steps been taken to construct bridges for the advance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat if in trouble? . . . Shall I push the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? . . . Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? . . . I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley? . . . I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac.

Halleck telegraphed early on the 28th, directing that Franklin be sent forward, as had been repeatedly ordered the day before, and McClellan replied a little

after noon: "The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery, he shall go." Three hours later McClellan telegraphed: "General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning." On the 29th — Franklin having now got in motion — McClellan replied to inquiries: "The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe."

Lincoln, not then or later in any panic about the safety of the capital — whatever McClellan may have afterward imagined — promptly answered: "Yours of to-day received. I think your first alternative, to-wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels."

At an interview between the President, General Halleck, and General McClellan, as reported by the latter, the President said he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope; and asked McClellan "as a special favor" to use his influence in

correcting this state of things. The General said he "was sure, whatever estimate the Army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty." The President, "who was much moved," asked him to telegraph to Fitz-John Porter, or some other of his friends, "and try to do away with any feeling that might exist," to which he consented.

The President had abundant reason to be greatly "moved" on account of the late disasters, in any event; and he was evidently not entirely satisfied that McClellan's "influence" had been properly used in aid of his country at a critical moment. Later, General Fitz-John Porter was tried by court-martial for disobedience to Pope's orders; was found guilty, and was sentenced to be dismissed from the service, with perpetual disqualification for holding any office under the Government. The President approved the finding and sentence.\*

On the 1st of September, after Pope had fallen back to Centreville, there was much excitement at Washington, and there was a necessity certainly that both armies should be placed under one commanding General. With nearly all his advisers — especially Stanton, Halleck, and Chase — strongly opposed to what seemed to him the only practicable course, the President adhered to his own judgment as firmly as, under like opposition, he had refused to evacuate Fort Sumter.

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\* Porter had proved himself an able and gallant officer—at Gaines's Mill especially, and under Pope, on the second day at Bull Run. More than twenty years after, under authority conferred by a special act of Congress, he was restored to his former rank in the army and placed on the retired list.

Now, as then, his action was that of a shrewd statesman and a firm master. He wrote with his own hand an order to Halleck, directing all the troops to be put under the control of McClellan for the protection of the capital. Whether the General was to remain on the defensive in the immediate neighborhood of Washington or again take the field aggressively would depend upon his adversary's purposes, not yet definitely disclosed.

The advance of Lee's army had in fact reached the Potomac above the city, near the mouth of the Monocacy, on the day of the encounter at Chantilly (September 1st), and all were over the river by the 5th. At Frederick City, on the 8th, Lee issued a proclamation addressed to the people of Maryland, proposing to aid them in throwing off the burden of Federal oppression. Recruiting offices were opened, and urgent appeals were made to Marylanders to join the Confederate army. But this visitation, in Western Maryland at least, was unwelcomed; of recruits there were almost none; of stragglers from Lee's ranks there were many. Orders looking to an invasion of Pennsylvania were soon issued, involving the crossing of South Mountain and a concentration at Hagerstown, Jackson being charged with the capture of Harper's Ferry and its garrison.

McClellan, leaving Banks to hold the defenses of Washington, took the field with an army of about ninety thousand men. Burnside reached Frederick on the 12th, after Jackson had recrossed the Potomac near Martinsburg, and McLaws had appeared in the immediate rear of Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. On the 13th (McClellan having now information of the

enemy's plans from an order of Lee's that came into his possession at Frederick) Middletown was occupied by Pleasanton's cavalry advance, after skirmishing with the enemy's rear guard. Sumner and Burnside closely followed. To resist Jackson's designs against Harper's Ferry, Franklin was ordered to push forward by Crampton's Pass into Pleasant Valley, in the rear of Maryland Heights. On the 14th, after a three hours' combat in the afternoon, he drove the enemy from the Pass and moved down into the valley; but next morning at 8 o'clock, Miles — in command at Harper's Ferry, with a force of ten or twelve thousand men — surrendered everything to Jackson, save two thousand cavalry, who had cut their way out during the night.

In the meantime McClellan had been busy at Turner's Gap (South Mountain), where a more determined resistance was made than at Crampton's. Cox's division (on the 14th) succeeded in gaining the crest, and was supported by the remainder of Reno's corps, the contest lasting until night. Hooker co-operated on the right, moving by the Hagerstown road, but the brunt of the battle was borne by Burnside's men. Reno was killed about sunset, while reconnoitering in front of his corps. The Pass was carried, with a Union loss of 312 killed and 1,256 wounded. The Confederates lost 260 killed, 1,150 wounded, and 1,500 prisoners. On the next morning McClellan reported: "I have just learned from General Hooker, in the advance, who states that the information is perfectly reliable, that the enemy is making for the river in a perfect panic, and General Lee stated last night publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurry-



ing everything forward to endeavor to press their retreat to the utmost." The President telegraphed to the General: "God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible."

Lee was presently found to have disposed the troops with him on the high ground along the farther bank of Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg. McClellan's entire army was available at a seasonable hour on the 15th, had he chosen to attack. Every hour's delay would bring Jackson, McLaws, and the rest of the Harper's Ferry victors nearer, though now too far away to be of any help to Lee. The old Napoleon would have used the opportunity with crushing effect. Was not the young Napoleon capable of a like exploit? The President indulged such a hope, and the General's dispatches seemed to warrant the expectation. Nevertheless, McClellan waited a whole day within striking distance and delayed the blow.

The battle of Antietam was one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war. The stream from which it is named runs nearly due south between Hagerstown and the Potomac, into which it empties about three miles from Sharpsburg and nearly opposite Shepherds-town. Lee's forces were extended northward from the rear of Sharpsburg near the Hagerstown road, partly sheltered by woods, his left resting on the Potomac at a point from which it sweeps around in a semi-circle to the mouth of the Antietam. McClellan's line, on the opposite heights, fronting Lee, with the Antietam and its narrow valley between them, was about four miles long — the three corps of Hooker, Sumner, and Mansfield on the right, near the upper bridge of the three

that crossed the creek; Porter in rear of the middle one; and Burnside on the left, near the lower one. Heavy batteries were placed at several effective points along the heights. Franklin's corps and Couch's division, on the morning of the 16th, were a few miles away, near Brownsville.

McClellan's plan of battle involved the complete cutting off of Lee's lines of retreat, towards Hagerstown on the one hand, and Shepherdstown on the other, while the Potomac shut him in on the rear. He sent the larger share of his force to turn the enemy's left — Hooker and Mansfield taking the lead, sustained by Sumner, and, if needed, by Franklin. Burnside was ordered to cross the lower bridge, turning the right of the enemy when he became engaged on his left. Porter was held in reserve, ready to attack in his front when the fit opportunity should come. Hooker crossed the Antietam on the evening of the 16th, made a wide circuit to the front of the enemy's advance position, on the Hagerstown road, and camped there for the night. Mansfield followed, bivouacking a mile in the rear of Hooker. Advancing at daylight (on the 17th), Hooker soon found heavy masses confronting him. In fact, Jackson, with a large part of Lee's army, had been sent to turn the Union right — a flanking movement such as he usually executed with brilliant success. The fighting here became desperate and destructive, with varying results for hours. The Twelfth Corps (under Mansfield, soon mortally wounded) came promptly into line on Hooker's left; the three divisions of Sumner (Sedgwick, French, and Richardson) joined in the fray two

hours later. At this time Hooker received a disabling wound and retired, Meade succeeding to the command of the First Corps, and Sumner assuming the chief direction on the right. Sedgwick, severely wounded, was temporarily succeeded by Howard; Richardson, whose division had gained decided advantages, was killed, and Hancock succeeded him in command.

At 1 o'clock all the ground gained from the enemy had been lost, and Hooker's men had fallen back to the ground where they camped the night before. One of the main struggles had been for the possession of a cornfield and of the woods beyond (near the Dunker church), alternately gained and lost, until the open grounds were covered with dead and wounded of intermingled blue and gray. The three corps — Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner — had been engaged along a semi-circular line a mile and a half in arc. Without fresh help the day might well have seemed lost at 1 o'clock; but just then Franklin arrived on the ground; Smith, with a bold dash, led his division quite across the fatal cornfield and into the woods beyond. Slocum's division came up directly after, and the important ground regained was firmly held to the last.

Burnside on the left had not crossed the bridge before him until after noon; and he was then two or three hours in gaining the heights from which his guns were to be made available and his infantry advance to the attack. These purposes had not been accomplished when he was heavily assailed by new forces, and driven back for a distance down the slope. A. P. Hill's division had arrived from Harper's Ferry, and the action in

this quarter, ending without glory to Burnside, kept open a line of retreat for the Confederates. Porter's reserve was given no part in the main affairs of the day.

Darkness arrested what seemed like an unfinished battle. McClellan reported his own losses in killed as 2,010, the wounded and missing bringing up the total to 12,467. The Confederates lost, according to War Records, 1,512 killed, and 7,816 wounded. Lee had a clearer sense of defeat than McClellan had of victory. The next day was given by the latter to burying the dead and caring for the wounded. More Union troops were meanwhile arriving. McClellan had ordered an attack at daylight on the 19th, but the enemy was found to have departed, securely crossing the Potomac near Shepherdstown.

## CHAPTER VIII.

1862.

### *Emancipation — Preliminary Proclamation.*

Returning by steamboat from his visit to the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, the President had many hours for undisturbed meditation. The campaign against Richmond had ended in bitter disappointment. The war was assuming a magnitude quite beyond his earlier anticipations, and another large levy of soldiers had become necessary. The time was evidently at hand when he must use every means permissible to the Commander-in-chief in making war. He saw the possible advantages to be gained by radical and summary dealing with the vulnerable system at the base of the Southern Confederacy as clearly as any of his supporters, without losing sight, as some of them seemed to do, of the difficulties and entanglements in which such a policy might involve him. He abhorred slavery, and would gladly have ended it at once had that depended on his personal feeling or his sense of justice. But official obligation was paramount to individual inclination. It was a question of statesmanship he was now considering. Would a decree of emancipation, as a war expedient, make the Government stronger or weaker? Abolitionists and radical men were among his most earnest friends; they were formidable in numbers and

in their power of influencing public opinion at home through oratory, literature, journalism; and would not a bold anti-slavery advance gain favor with all people abroad? On the other hand, Union slave-owners, the controlling class in the Border Southern States, were also a power not to be lightly regarded; nor could conservative men in general be ignored. The commander of the Army of the Potomac had just written plainly his opinion that slavery should not be meddled with by the army, unless to preserve order,— that is, to protect it,— except in the incidental and unavoidable way already in vogue; and he was but the mouthpiece of a formidable Opposition party about to contest in earnest for the possession of the Government.

How the President reasoned with himself on the subject during the memorable trip may be fairly inferred from his own words to an interviewing committee a few weeks later. The conclusion at which he arrived appears in the fact that before leaving the steamer he had completed the rough draft of his September proclamation, announcing the policy of Emancipation.\* Once promulgated, its maintenance would be an inseparable element of the contest for the Union. As a mere paper manifesto, without being made an express motive in the war, and without the support of military success, it must, as he appropriately said, “necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope’s bull against the comet.” Those who quoted the apt comparison as showing that he had no faith in its efficacy when he issued the proclamation, altogether

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\* This was later stated to the writer by President Lincoln, as noted at the time.

misconstrued his meaning, as the context (in a conversation that will presently be given) plainly shows. The document was prepared to be used on what might seem to him the first fitting occasion, not expected to be remote.

One of the first to be taken into his confidence in this matter, after his return to Washington, was Vice-President Hamlin, to whom he submitted the proclamation as originally written, and who warmly approved the measure. The President invited a conference with the Border State Congressmen almost immediately (July 12th), as before related, to urge them, without declaring his purpose, to prepare for the coming change. Only a few of the members responded with a timely appreciation of the President's regard for the interests of their constituents. At an earlier day he had recommended, and both houses had adopted, a resolution declaring in favor of Government aid, in the way of compensation for slaves, to any State that should voluntarily relinquish slavery. He now went further, sending to Congress, on the 14th of July, a draft of a bill to give legal effect to this expression. The bill would almost certainly have become a law, had the Border State members sustained it with anything like unanimity, or had not a large share of them, on the contrary, actually opposed its passage. But the opportunity was lost, never to return.

To individual members of his Cabinet, the President spoke of his purpose in regard to emancipation as early as the 13th of July, and especially to Mr. Seward, who appears to have regarded it with positive disfavor. About the 1st of August, the proposed proclamation was brought to the notice of the assembled Cabinet.

All were favorable to emancipation, so far as an expression was given, but not all were then agreed as to the policy of issuing the proclamation. Secretary Seward, without objecting now to the measure itself, the President having said he was not asking counsel on that point, thought the fit time for it had not yet arrived; and Postmaster-General Blair apprehended that its effect would be bad in the Border States and in the army, as well as upon the approaching elections. The last consideration did not have conclusive weight in the President's mind, but he thought Mr. Seward's suggestion a good one, and determined to wait for a more appropriate occasion.

How fully he had considered all objections, arguing the opposite side in his own mind, appears in his remarks to a delegation from several of the religious denominations in Chicago, who called upon him, on the 13th of September, to urge more positive and radical action against slavery. After their written memorial had been read to him, Lincoln said:

The subject is difficult, and good men do not agree. For instance, the other day four gentlemen of standing and intelligence from New York called as a delegation on business connected with the war; but before leaving two of them earnestly besought me to proclaim general emancipation; upon which the other two at once attacked them. You know also that the last session of Congress had a decided majority of anti-Slavery men, yet they could not unite on this policy. And the same is true of the religious people. Why, the rebel soldiers are praying with a great deal more earnestness, I fear, than our own troops, and expecting God to favor their side; for one of our soldiers who had been taken prisoner told Senator Wilson, a few days since, that he met nothing so discouraging as the evident sincerity of those he was



among in their prayers. But we will talk over the merits of the case.

What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I can not even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual, that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress [July 17, 1862] which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I can not learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And, suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? General Butler wrote me a few days since that he was issuing more rations to the slaves who have rushed to him than to all the white troops under his command. They eat, and that is all; though it is true General Butler is feeding the whites also by the thousand; for it nearly amounts to a famine there. If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters from reducing the blacks to slavery again? For I am told that whenever the rebels take any black prisoner, free or slave, they immediately auction them off! They did so with those they took from a boat that was aground in the Tennessee River a few days ago. And then I am very ungenerously attacked for it. For instance, when, after the late battles at and near Bull Run, an expedition went out from Washington, under a flag of truce, to bury the dead and bring in the wounded, and the rebels seized the blacks who went along to help, and sent them into slavery, Horace Greeley said in his paper that the Government would probably do nothing about it. What *could* I do?

Now, then, tell me if you please what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire. Understand, I raise no objection against it on legal

or constitutional grounds; for, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion.

Responding to the appeal thus made, a member of the delegation remarked that the policy of Emancipation would give us strength in Europe and justify us in calling upon God to bless our efforts to crush the rebellion. Lincoln resumed:

I admit that slavery is at the root of the rebellion, or at least its *sine qua non*. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act; but they would have been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war; and, then, unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far, we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in the Union army from the Border Slave States. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels. I do not think they all would — not so many, indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago — not so many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride enlisted, and want to beat the rebels.

Let me say one thing more. I think you should admit that we already have an important principle to rally and unite the people, in the fact that constitutional government is at stake. This is a fundamental idea, going down about as deep as anything.

After some further urgent words from the visitors in support of their wishes, the President significantly said in conclusion:

Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and by night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views, I have not in any respect injured your feelings.

The gentlemen thus addressed went their way, favorably impressed with the kindness and sincerity of their reception, though doubtful as to the early realization of their hopes. The President, nevertheless, had a settled purpose, and the opportunity he awaited was near. Hearing that a battle had begun on Antietam Creek, he formed the resolution (as he afterward expressed himself to the writer) that in case of a victory there, he would use the occasion to issue the Emancipation proclamation already prepared. This was done directly after the result of the battle was definitely ascertained. The body of the proclamation, issued on the 22d of September, was in these words:

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore,

the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and the people thereof in those States in which that relation is, or may be, suspended or disturbed; that it is my purpose upon the next meeting of Congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the Slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits, and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the government existing there, will be continued; that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, *shall be then, thenceforward and forever, free*; and the military and naval authority thereof will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for actual freedom; that the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto, at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such States shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof have not been in rebellion against the United States.

[He then called attention to the act of Congress (March 13, 1862) prescribing a new article of war concerning the return of fugitive slaves, and to the ninth and tenth sections of the act of July 17, 1862, confis-

cating slaves of disloyal owners in certain cases, and enjoined obedience to these statutes in the army and navy services.]

And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the constitutional relation between the United States and their respective States and people, if the relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

## CHAPTER IX.

1862.

*Confederates Aggressive at the West — Bragg and Buell — Perryville — Van Dorn and Rosecrans — Corinth — Missouri and Arkansas — Prairie Grove.*

In the West, after the occupation of Corinth and Memphis, Buell returned to his special task in Tennessee. Weeks passed with little progress on his part in approaching Chattanooga. Raids began to be made on his communications; in July, Forrest surprised and captured Murfreesboro; Clarksville, with a large amount of military stores, was taken on the 18th of August; while John Morgan harassed other parts of Tennessee and ranged widely through Kentucky. These were scattering drops preceding the storm. Emboldened by their success at Richmond, the Confederates were everywhere assuming the aggressive, intent upon carrying the war into the borders of their enemy.

Buell had been languidly holding Stevenson, Bridgeport, McMinnville, and Cumberland Gap. Bragg, succeeding Beauregard in command at the West, had occupied Chattanooga, retaining there the two corps of Hardee and Polk, while Kirby Smith was given a separate command at Knoxville. After his cavalry had well scoured the country in Buell's rear, Bragg crossed the

Tennessee above Chattanooga on the 24th of August, and, moving rapidly up the Sequatchie Valley, was across the State line in Kentucky on the 5th of September. Kirby Smith meanwhile advanced from Knoxville by Big Creek Gap, broke up General Nelson's encampment near Richmond, Kentucky, on the 30th of August, and reached Lexington on the 4th of September. Moving thence by Paris, he paused at Cynthiana, menacing both Louisville and Cincinnati, then advanced a force to Latonia Springs, within seven miles of the latter city. On the 12th he retreated, and was pursued as far as Florence by General Lew Wallace, who had been sent to Cincinnati with troops from Grant's command. Bragg, advancing rapidly to the Louisville and Nashville Railway, captured the force guarding the bridge over Green River at Munfordsville on the 17th — the day on which McClellan and Lee were fighting at Antietam Creek. The next day Bragg issued a manifesto calling on the people of Kentucky (after the manner of Lee in Maryland) to make common cause with the Southern Confederates. Meanwhile his foraging parties and those of Kirby Smith, farther north, improved every hour in accumulating supplies of grain and live stock from Kentucky's abundance. Bragg reached Frankfort on the 1st of October; was joined there by Smith; and the weary soldiers were refreshed with the spectacle of inaugurating a "Provisional Governor of Kentucky." Neither the new Governor (Mr. Hawes) nor the army, however, stayed long at the State capital. General Buell, when he found out that his adversary was in his rear, gathered his forces and turned northward also. Starting from Nashville on the 15th of September,— to

“run a race with Bragg for Louisville,” people said,— Buell’s troops began arriving in that city on the 25th.

Mr. Joshua Speed gave the following reminiscence of this period of anxiety and excitement at the West, when Kentucky was overrun by Bragg and Kirby Smith, and “Nelson had been beaten in battle near Richmond, and lay wounded in Cincinnati”:

Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were alarmed, and Kentucky aroused. A self-constituted committee of distinguished gentlemen determined to go and advise with the President as to what was best to be done. I happened to be present at the interview. . . . Senator Lane opened for Indiana, Garrett Davis followed for Kentucky, and other gentlemen for Ohio and Illinois. They all had complaints to make of the conduct of the war in the West. Like the expression in the prayer-book, the Government was doing everything it ought not to do, and leaving undone everything it ought to do.

The President sat on a revolving chair, looking at every one till they were done. I never saw him exhibit more tact or talent than he did on this occasion. He said: “Now, gentlemen, I am going to make you a curious kind of speech. I announce to you that I am not going to do one single thing that any of you has asked me to do. But it is due to myself and to you that I should give my reasons.” He then from his seat answered each man, taking them in the order in which they spoke, never forgetting a point that any one had made. When he was done, he rose from his chair and said: “Judge List, this reminds me of an anecdote which I heard a son of yours tell in Burlington, in Iowa. He was trying to enforce upon his hearers the truth of the old adage that three moves are worse than a fire. As an illustration he gave an account of a family who started from Western Pennsylvania, pretty well off in this world’s goods when they started. But they moved, and moved, having less and less every time they moved, till after a while they could carry everything in one wagon. He said that the



chickens of the family got so used to being moved, that whenever they saw the wagon sheets brought out they laid themselves on their backs and crossed their legs, ready to be tied. Now, gentlemen, if I were to listen to every committee that comes in at that door, I had just as well cross my hands and let you tie me. Nevertheless, I am glad to see you." He left them in good humor and all were satisfied.

The invaders caused a great scare; materially strengthened the Opposition party at the polls in three large States that held elections in October, and — what was of no slight value — they were to take away with them an ample supply of fine horses, mules, neat cattle, corn, and other commodities much needed for the coming winter. The conduct of Buell through the summer, and especially in these later affairs, was so unsatisfactory to the President that, while the army lay at Louisville, an order was issued transferring the command to Major-General George H. Thomas. The latter, however, generously urged the retention of Buell, and made such representations that the order was withdrawn.

While the invaders were having their diversions at Frankfort, Buell was again getting his army in motion. In the evening of October 7th, the advance of Gilbert's corps — pursuing the now retreating enemy — found a body of Confederates (Polk's corps) strongly posted on the hills overlooking the Chaplin River valley, near Perryville. Buell, who was with Gilbert in person, made no attempt to dislodge his opponents that night, but at once ordered McCook and Crittenden to come to the support of Gilbert. In the morning, Jackson's division was furiously assailed by Cheatham. Jackson

himself, a brave Kentuckian, who had lately sat in Congress, fell dead at the first volley. Terrill's brigade, of this division, broke in a panic; its commander, who had succeeded Jackson, was soon after killed; and Rousseau's division was left to bear the brunt of the onset. Mitchell and Sheridan, of Gilbert's corps, were later assailed, but the attack was repulsed, and Sheridan — a man of note henceforward — charged at double-quick and drove his assailants through the town. During the night, Polk securely withdrew to Harrodsburg, where Kirby Smith joined the rest of the army, and all set out on their retreat to Danville and beyond. Buell reported a total loss of over four thousand. Bragg admitted a loss of not less than two thousand five hundred — a moderate estimate, for he left twelve hundred men in hospital at Harrodsburg.\* After a brief pause at Danville, he continued his retreat by way of London, Barbourville, and Cumberland Gap,— Polk in the van, and Wheeler's cavalry in the rear. Buell ordered pursuit; Wood getting as far as Stanford on the 15th, Crittenden halting at London, McCook and Gilbert at Crab Orchard. All were recalled from the nearly fruitless chase, to take the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railway. Much time was necessarily spent in restoring it to running order. At the close of October, the army of Buell was mainly concentrated at and near Bowling Green.

Keeping time with Lee and Bragg, Van Dorn was

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\* Union—killed, 845; wounded, 2,851. Confederate—killed, 510; wounded, 2,635.—*War Records*.

to move against Grant, who had his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, with his left, under Rosecrans, at Tuscumbia. Van Dorn's objective point was Corinth. Iuka, a railway town twenty miles eastward from that place, having been tamely surrendered by the subordinate in command there, was occupied early in September by Price, but soon recovered by Rosecrans. A week afterward Grant directed him to occupy and defend Corinth, where he put in order the old defenses, and threw up a new line of earthworks nearer the town.

Van Dorn appeared before Corinth early in the morning of October 3d. The ground was so well contested by Rosecrans that when night came, his adversary, despite his superiority in numbers, had not secured complete possession of the outer works. He had, however, gained such advantages that in a dispatch to Richmond he announced a great victory. He had yet to make acquaintance with the new defenses prepared for him by Rosecrans. Artillery firing began early the next morning. It was after 9 o'clock when Price's men moved to the attack by the Bolivar road — a massive, wedge-shaped column, bristling with bayonets, division following division with impetuosity, directly in face of the Union batteries. The guns had been trained to meet just such an advance by direct, cross, and enfilading fire. This was opened at once, with terrible effect; but still the column pushed onward, getting near Rosecrans's headquarters, when a regiment, rising from its shelter in a ravine, poured a deadly fire into the ranks of the intruders, charged, and put them to flight. The attack ended in panic and utter rout.

Van Dorn was to assault by the Chewalla road simultaneously with Price, but found unexpected obstacles, and was a little too late. Trusting in the valor of his Mississippi and Texas troops, he nevertheless persisted in a desperate attempt to capture Fort Robinett, but was finally defeated with great loss — his dead alone numbering 1,423, as reported by Rosecrans, who lost 315 killed. The latter's force (18,000 men) was about half that of Van Dorn. In no other battle does the generalship of Rosecrans appear to better advantage.

Beyond the Mississippi there was comparative quiet after the victory of Curtis at Pea Ridge until after mid-summer. Internal troubles, indeed, continued in Missouri, bitter feuds between Unionists and Secessionists, and occasional guerrilla outrages, which called for strong military measures. More regular warfare was resumed in August. A Confederate force under Hughes captured Independence on the 12th, and was soon joined by Coffey, from Arkansas, who aimed to retake Lexington and to invade Northern Missouri. They fled, however, before the approach of Blunt, the Union commander in Northern Arkansas. In September, Hindman, of that State, entering Missouri with a larger Confederate force, was equally unsuccessful, and retired to the Ozark Mountains. A month or two afterward he again made an appearance in his assumed character of deliverer of Arkansas. With as large an army as he could gather, he crossed the Arkansas River, and joined Marmaduke fifteen miles north of Van Buren, intending a blow at the single division retained by Blunt in

that neighborhood, while his two other divisions, under Herron, had retired into Missouri. The latter, however, being recalled, arrived in time to take part in the severe battle at Prairie Grove on the 6th of December, in which Hindman was beaten. This victory, as Blunt claimed in his report, "virtually ended the war north of the Arkansas River."

## CHAPTER X.

1862.

*Army of the Potomac Lingers — Lectures and Opportunities are Unimproved — Exit McClellan.*

Ever since the preceding autumn many of the President's most earnest supporters had thought him too confidently complacent toward the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Time had extended and intensified this discontent. But, though he had not been doing, or even attempting, all that was desired and hoped, might not General McClellan, after all, be preferable to an untried successor? People whose confidence in him had waned — a confidence so universal at the first — were divided in their conclusions about him. Some extravagantly fancied that he was less in sympathy with the President than with Jefferson Davis, and that he would have chosen the Confederate instead of the Federal service had the option been presented. This imputation, sustained only by a groundless rumor, was so manifestly unjust as to do him little harm. Others regarded him as well-meaning, but simply incapable of commanding a large army in the field. He was compared by some, not unkindly, with the great Roman delayer, Fabius.

According to the estimate of others, he was better paralleled by a more recent instance — that of the Duke

d'Urbino, who, "naturally slow and indecisive," was also restrained by partisan enmity from doing anything that might "aggrandize or add reputation" to his civil superior, so that he "overlooked opportunities of attacking the enemy or refused to improve them." Willing to believe McClellan not only a capable organizer, but a commander competent to strike effective blows with the large army he had in camp all the past autumn and winter, they became assured that he had fallen under the control of a political cabal, which aimed to make him a Presidential candidate, and which stimulated him to undertake a mastery over national affairs, civil as well as military — to become an arbiter or mediator between North and South. In all the ups and downs of his war experience, it was noted that the Democratic Opposition ever favored him, kept in relation with him, and charged his failures, if they admitted any, to the lack of support from the Administration. He knew what it cost the treasury to maintain such an army; that every day's delay on his part added millions to a burden that might in no long time become unendurable; and hence was thought by many to be quite reconcilable to a state of things which, without much serious fighting, would incline both sides to make peace on terms that would secure to the South all they cared for, short of recognized separation. Such were believed to be the views of those in the army as well as out of it with whom he was personally most intimate.

That his mind actually settled on a scheme like this and undertook its execution can hardly be presumed of a man of such qualities as McClellan's, yet he appears all the while to have had at least a drifting tendency in

that direction. He was not making war his sole business. "Whoso hath good stomach for fight findeth all times seasonable." When McClellan fought, it was rarely through his own initiative. He was acting on the defensive-offensive even at Antietam. His tactics after that engagement were of much the same order as before he was withdrawn from Harrison's Landing.

The President wanted a good, honest effort made to capture or destroy Lee's army. He did not wish the enemy to retire from his invasion of Maryland without at least an exemplary chastisement. He was much dissatisfied that (as he once said to the writer) "McClellan drove Lee to the river, and then just *shoo-ed* him across." Without earnestly attempting anything more, McClellan established his headquarters near Sharpsburg, on the Maryland side, remaining long quiescent, despite all suggestions from his superiors. Ten days after the battle he reported (September 27th): "This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary."

Disturbed and anxious, the President again visited the General in camp, going to Sharpsburg on the 1st of October, and remaining for some days. Lincoln and the General together went over the battle-grounds of South Mountain and Antietam. The entire occasion was one of kindly intercourse, in the freedom of which there was presumably an earnest effort on the part of the President to persuade, without directly ordering, the General to enter at once upon such active measures as would justify his continuance in a command from which



so large a share of the supporters of the Administration insisted that he ought to be removed.

After Lincoln's return to Washington this dispatch was sent to McClellan by Halleck (October 6th):

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve or fifteen thousand can be sent you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on, before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

Four days after, Stuart, with two thousand cavalry and a battery of artillery, crossed the Potomac, and made another raid quite around McClellan's army, committing depredations and destroying property in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and returning into Virginia without serious loss. On the 13th, a week after the order transmitted by the General-in-chief as above, the President made an urgent personal appeal to McClellan, in the following letter:

*My Dear Sir:*—You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you can not subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation, as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpeper Courthouse, which is just about twice as far as you will have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of *time*, which can not and must not be ignored.

Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is "to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies *against* you, but can not apply in your *favor*. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is behind, all the easier.

Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the route that you *can* and he *must* take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.

You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should permit, and at least try to beat him to Rich-

mond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub towards the rim, and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to-wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running to Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well

as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they can not do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

It is not strange that there were ardent Republicans who thought political rather than military reasons governed McClellan's conduct at this time. State elections were to be held in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana early in October, and in New York and many other States a few weeks later. The Opposition party was now well organized and very active. There had been disappointments in the prosecution of the war; there were criminations and recriminations between the President's adherents and those who still cherished the views prevalent during the Pierce-Buchanan era. The preliminary Emancipation proclamation came out just in time to serve as fresh material for the Opposition in this political canvass. All possible use was made of this, and of its first impression on ultra-conservative minds, to alienate support from the Administration and to crush the party which brought it into power.

A significant incident at this juncture was the dismissal, by the President's direct action, of a military officer who had expressed with indiscreet freedom precisely the views which so many believed to have influenced McClellan. The obnoxious language having been reported to Lincoln, he addressed this note, September 26th, to the officer in question:

*Major John J. Key:*—I am informed that, in answer to the question, "Why was not the rebel army bagged immediately after the battle near Sharpsburg?" propounded to you by Major Levi C. Turner, Judge Advocate, etc., you said: "That is not the game. The object is, that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make

a compromise and save slavery." I shall be very happy if you will, within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this, prove to me by Major Turner that you did not, either literally or in substance, make the answer stated.

Major Key responded in person next day, with what result appears from the following memorandum in the President's own handwriting:

At about 11 o'clock A. M., September 27, 1862, Major Key and Major Turner appeared before me. Major Turner says: "As I remember it, the conversation was: 'Why we did not bag them after the battle of Sharpsburg?' Major Key's reply was: 'That was not the game; that we should tire the rebels out and ourselves; that that was the only way the Union could be preserved, we come together fraternally, and slavery be saved.'" On cross-examination, Major Turner says he has frequently heard Major Key converse in regard to the present troubles, and never heard him utter a sentiment unfavorable to the maintenance of the Union. He has never uttered anything which he, Major T., would call disloyalty. The particular conversation detailed was a private one.

On this paper he indorsed:

In my view, it is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done. Therefore, let Major John J. Key be forthwith dismissed from the military service of the United States.

A. LINCOLN.

The President said of the matter orally that if there was a "game," even among Union men, to have our army not take advantage of the enemy when it could, it was his intent to break up that game.

During these days of delay and depression the Confederate armies at the West, as we have seen, were vigorously active all along the far-extending line of war.

The elections came on when discontent over McClellan's inaction was at the worst. Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana all gave anti-Administration majorities in October. New York, New Jersey, and even Illinois did the same in November. True, in each case the majority was small, but large enough to be disheartening — large enough in the Empire State to make Horatio Seymour Governor instead of the noble-hearted candidate of the Republicans, General James S. Wadsworth. In nearly all the States which still gave Administration majorities, the Republican vote was materially reduced. In the choice of Representatives the change was so considerable as even to portend an Opposition majority in the next House.

On the 21st of October, fifteen days after receiving the President's peremptory order to move, and after having held out the promise of speedily beginning, McClellan telegraphed to Halleck, begging "leave to ask whether the President desires" him "to march at once, or to await the reception of the new horses," etc., and was answered: "He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th inst. . . . The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity." But still there was no movement. Inadequate supplies, insufficient transportation, or some other element of unreadiness was continually alleged. On the 25th came a report as to the sick, lame, and weary condition of the cavalry horses. Lincoln replied: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" The General specified

“making reconnoissances, scouting and picketing,” and forced marches “while endeavoring to reach Stuart’s cavalry.” The President rejoined (on the 26th): “Of course you know the facts better than I. Still, two considerations remain: Stuart’s cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the Peninsula and everywhere since. Secondly, Will not a movement of our army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concentrate instead of ‘foraging’ in squads everywhere? But I am so rejoiced to learn from your dispatches to General Halleck that you began crossing the river this morning.”

Two infantry divisions and a brigade of cavalry crossed the Potomac at Berlin that day. Nearly all the remainder of the army was on the Virginia side by the second day of November. The long waiting had not been for the lack of numbers much superior to those of the enemy, or on account of such destitution of supplies or means of any kind as to compel delay, even had there been no positive orders to advance to positions where everything needed could quite as readily be received. Halleck, a good authority on war matters, discerned a more real embarrassment in what he deemed an excess of baggage and a deficiency of walking exercise on the part of the soldiers. In a dispatch to McClellan (October 7th) Halleck had said:

There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something, but the real difficulty is, they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long. After a hard march, one day is time enough to rest. Lying still beyond that time does not rest the men.

Now that breaking camp was actually begun, in the last days of October and the earliest of November, the good weather so long enjoyed was interrupted, and McClellan reported that "heavy rains delayed the movement considerably." The several corps slowly advanced by way of Lovettsville, Snicker's Gap, and Rectortown, along the southern base of Blue Ridge, until finally massed near Warrenton. Lee promptly retired up the Shenandoah Valley, as he would have done six weeks earlier (if permitted to escape at all), had he been vigorously pursued on his retreat from Sharpsburg. He now made all the haste necessary to keep out of danger until he reached Gordonsville.

A special messenger from the War Department arrived at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the evening of November 7th, with an order to General McClellan, relieving him of the command and designating General Burnside as his successor.



## CHAPTER XI.

1862.

### *'Sunday Proclamation — Lincoln's Religion — Message to Congress.*

Among the many volunteer counsellors of President Lincoln, by letter and in person, there were loyal and good men who expressed concern that Sunday was not more piously regarded in the army and navy; and especially that battles were sometimes fought on that day. The President, who had not found it possible, even at the White House, to keep the day as a Puritan Sabbath, mildly hinted to one of these gentlemen that military movements depended somewhat upon Confederate as well as Union commanders. He desired, however, that the soldiers and sailors should, so far as practicable, enjoy the same benefits of a day of rest as people engaged in peaceful pursuits. On the 16th of November (1862) he issued an order enjoining "the orderly observance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service," saying in conclusion: "The first general order issued by the Father of his Country, after the Declaration of Independence, indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded, and should ever be defended: 'The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as

becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country.' ”

Whether Secretary Seward supplied the rhetoric of Executive proclamations conventionally devout, matters little. Lincoln certainly was not, as to the habit of his life, a strict “Sabbatarian.” His religious faith differed from that of Oliver Cromwell; but was it any less firm and sincere than his? When told by a clerical visitor that no one was ever before so remembered in the prayers of the people, especially of those not praying to be “heard of men,” he replied: “I have been a good deal helped by just that thought.” It was an instant answer from the heart unquestionably; yet not every one will give his words the same interpretation. He “thanked God for the churches” on one public occasion; he appreciated their work for good to the race; he welcomed their organized power in support of a just cause; yet he joined no church. Almost all the “articles of belief and confessions of faith” he once — and probably many times — avowed to be such that he could not consent to them “without mental reservation.” What did he, then, really believe? Those who seek an honest answer will find help from a study of this short letter, written a few weeks later, (February 22, 1863,) to the Rev. Alexander Reed:

*My Dear Sir:*— Your note, by which you, as General Superintendent of the United States Christian Commission, invite me to preside at a meeting to be held this day at the hall of the House of Representatives in this city, is received.

While, for reasons which I deem sufficient, I must decline to preside, I can not withhold my approval of the meeting and its worthy objects.

Whatever shall be, sincerely and in God’s name, devised

for the good of the soldiers and seamen in their hard spheres of duty, can scarcely fail to be blessed; and whatever shall tend to turn our thoughts from the unreasoning and uncharitable passions, prejudices and jealousies incident to a great national trouble such as ours, and to fix them on the vast and long-enduring consequences, for weal or for wo, which are to result from the struggle, and especially to strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being for the final triumph of the right, can not but be well for us all.

The birthday of Washington and the Christian Sabbath coinciding this year, and suggesting together the highest interests of this life and of that to come, is most propitious for the meeting proposed.

These words came from the depths of one of the saddest of human souls. The last three months had been to him a period of such actual calamity and evil portent as might well disturb the stoutest spirit.

In his message of December 1st (1862), the President, after disposing of departmental details, treats chiefly of proposed emancipation with compensation and colonization, to be provided for under constitutional amendments formulated by him, and urgently pressed in a prolonged argument, with this axiom for its starting point: "Without slavery, the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery, it could not continue." To this may be added a "text" quoted by him from his inaugural address: "One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute."

So sagacious a statesman may never have really entertained a hope of consummating a scheme of emancipation and colonization combined; but the following passages show that at least he was terribly earnest in

urging a united endeavor to save the nation by removing the only cause of its deadly danger:

There is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a national boundary, upon which to divide. . . . The fact of separation, if it comes, gives up, on the part of the seceding section, the fugitive slave cause, along with all other constitutional obligations upon the section seceded from, while I should expect no treaty stipulation would ever be made to take its place.

But there is another difficulty. The great interior region, bounded east by the Alleghanies, north by the British Dominions, west by the Rocky Mountains, and south by the line along which the culture of corn and cotton meets, . . . already has above ten millions of people, and will have fifty millions within fifty years, if not prevented by any political folly or mistake. . . . A glance at the map shows that, territorially speaking, it is the great body of the Republic. The other parts are but marginal borders to it, the magnificent region sloping west from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, being the deepest, and also the richest in undeveloped resources. In the production of provisions, grains, grasses, and all which proceeds from them, this great interior region is naturally one of the most important in the world. . . . And yet this region has no sea-coast, touches no ocean anywhere. As part of one nation, its people now find, and may forever find, their way to Europe by New York, to South America and Africa by New Orleans, and to Asia by San Francisco. But separate our common country into two nations, as designed by the present rebellion, and every man of this great interior region is thereby cut off from some one or more of these outlets, not, perhaps, by a physical barrier, but by embarrassing and onerous trade regulations.

Among the friends of the Union, there is great diversity of sentiment, and of policy, in regard to slavery, and the African race among us. Some would perpetuate slavery; some would abolish it suddenly, and without compensation; some would abolish it gradually, and with compensation; some would remove the freed people from us, and some would retain them with us; and there are yet other minor

diversities. Because of these diversities, we waste much strength in struggles among ourselves. By mutual concession we should harmonize, and act together. This would be compromise; but it would be compromise among the friends, and not with the enemies of the Union. These articles are intended to embody a plan of such mutual concessions. If the plan shall be adopted, it is assumed that emancipation will follow, at least in several of the States.

As to the first article, the main points are: First, emancipation; secondly, the length of time for consummating it — thirty-seven years; and, thirdly, the compensation.

The emancipation will be unsatisfactory to the advocates of perpetual slavery; but the length of time should greatly mitigate their dissatisfaction. The time spares both races from the evils of sudden derangement — in fact, from the necessity of any derangement — while most of those whose habitual course of thought will be disturbed by the measure, will have passed away before its consummation. They will never see it. Another class will hail the prospect of emancipation, but will deprecate the length of time. They will feel that it gives too little to the now living slaves. But it really gives them much. It saves them from the vagrant destitution which must largely attend immediate emancipation in localities where their numbers are very great; and it gives the inspiring assurance that their posterity shall be free forever. . . . Doubtless, some of those who are to pay, and not to receive, will object. Yet the measure is both just and economical. In a certain sense, the liberation of slaves is the destruction of property,—property acquired by descent, or by purchase, the same as any other property. . . . If, then, for a common object, this property is to be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge? And if, with less money, or money more easily paid, we can preserve the benefits of the Union by this means, than we can by war alone, is it not also economical to do it? . . . The war requires large sums and requires them at once. The aggregate sum necessary for compensated emancipation, of course, would be large. But it would require no ready cash; nor the bonds even, any faster than the emancipation progresses. This might not, and probably would not, close before the end of the thirty-

seven years. At that time we shall probably have a hundred millions of people to share the burden, instead of thirty-one millions, as now. . . . At the same ratio of increase which we have maintained, on an average, from our first national census, in 1790, until that of 1860, we should, in 1900, have a population of 103,208,415. And why may we not continue that ratio far beyond that period? Our abundant room—our broad national homestead—is our ample resource.

. . . I cannot make it better known than it already is, that I strongly favor colonization. And yet I wish to say there is an objection urged against free colored persons remaining in the country, which is largely imaginary, if not sometimes malicious. It is insisted that their presence would injure, and displace white labor and white laborers. If there ever could be a proper time for mere catch arguments, that time surely is not now. In times like the present, men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and in eternity. Is it true, then, that colored people can displace any more white labor by being free than by remaining slaves? If they stay in their old places, they jostle no white laborers; if they leave their old places, they leave them open to white laborers. Logically, there is neither more nor less of it. Emancipation, even without deportation, would probably enhance the wages of white labor, and, very surely, would not reduce them.

. . . This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but in addition to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union. The subject is presented exclusively in its economical aspect. The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily, and maintain it more permanently, than can be done by force alone; while all it would cost, considering amounts, and manner of payment, and times of payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of the war, if we rely solely upon force. It is much—very much—that it would cost no blood at all.

. . . The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present: The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case

is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We, of this Congress and this Administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we know how to save it. We — even we here — hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free — honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just — a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.

This appeal, for the moment, brought no new support to the Administration. Emancipation in any form was wormwood and gall to men of the Border States in general, and the proposal of compensation for slaves, to be followed by their colonization, was hardly less repugnant to the most earnest emancipationists. Opposition members in both branches of Congress had become bolder and more outspoken since the late elections. On the Republican side there were serious discontents, with a growing inclination to criticise the Executive management. As to the conduct of the war, this state of feeling was aggravated by military events which had their disastrous culmination, soon after the session began, under the new commander of the Army of the Potomac.

## CHAPTER XII.

1862-1863.

*Third Stage of the War — Stone River — On the Mississippi  
and the Gulf.*

The second period of the war may be reckoned as closing with the battles at Antietam, Perryville, Corinth, and Prairie Grove, which arrested the aggressive Northern movements of the Confederates after their repulse of McClellan at Richmond. About the same time — helping to give character to a third period — were the initiation of an Emancipation policy and a change of military commanders.

A few days before McClellan was relieved of his command a like event happened to General Buell. He was ordered (October 28th) to give place to General Rosecrans, who found the army at Bowling Green. It required weeks to complete the restoration of the railway. Bragg had meantime not only returned through East Tennessee to Chattanooga, but had advanced from thence directly toward Nashville, where Rosecrans was at Christmas. Bragg was thirty miles distant, at Murfreesboro, when a southward movement of the Union army began on the 26th of December. McCook reached Wilkinson's Cross Roads, within six miles of Murfreesboro, on the 29th. Crittenden, by the Nash-



ville turnpike, came up to Stone River the same day, and found the bluffs beyond occupied by a strong force of the enemy. On the following day McCook advanced near the river, and was directed to place his men in position, forming the right of the line; and the corps of Thomas, now arrived, was joined to his left, connecting with Crittenden. The three corps numbered altogether a little less than fifty thousand men. Bragg's line, in a crescent, with Breckinridge's corps over the river forming the extreme right, was extended westward by Polk and Hardee to the intersection of the Nashville road with the railway, and thence across Wilkinson pike and the Franklin road.

Rosecrans planned to advance (on the 31st) against Breckinridge, expecting to rout him, and then to assail Polk and Hardee in flank and rear. McCook was to hold his position against all assaults, and to aid this latter work in front. But Bragg had been planning also,—very much after the same fashion—and promptly took the initiative himself. The movement undertaken by Rosecrans, only to be abandoned after loss of precious time, made his adversary's work less difficult. Bragg massed a heavy force for attack on McCook, and before 7 o'clock the onslaught began; Johnson's division, on the extreme right, was scattered, to be captured or driven back upon that of Davis, and all in turn upon the division of Sheridan, who contested the ground with energy and persistence, inspiring his men with his own fire and pluck. The whole of the corps remaining in organized shape had, in three or four hours, been whirled around, falling back with heavy loss to the Nashville turnpike. The battle seemed to be lost. Still

the tempest came rushing on. Negley's division, next in order, having exhausted its ammunition and lost nearly all its artillery horses, also retreated. Thomas, now in the thickest of the fight, drew Negley and Rousseau (whose division had been in reserve) into a better position, out of the low cedar brushwood, and with batteries delivering a concentrated fire from the ridge south of Nashville turnpike, stopped the further advance of the enemy, while the Union lines were readjusted. Rosecrans labored incessantly, freely exposing himself to danger, reassuring his men, and succeeding in the hard task of establishing and confirming a new line of battle, which remained unshaken when night mantled the field. Both parties claimed the victory. Neither seriously resumed the conflict or materially changed position during the next day — the memorable January 1, 1863. On the 2d there was some skirmishing, and a more serious yet profitless attack on the Union left by Breckinridge; but the Confederates began retreating before midnight, on the way to Shelbyville. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro, where he had his headquarters for several months following.

The battle (so important in results) has had few equals in relative carnage. The Union losses were reported as 1,533 killed, 7,245 wounded, and less than 2,800 prisoners — in all, nearly 12,000. Bragg reported a Confederate loss of 10,000 — of whom 9,000 were killed or wounded. (*War Records*: Union — killed, 1,730; wounded, 7,802. Confederate — killed, 1,299; wounded, 7,945.)

On the Mississippi River and the Gulf there had

meanwhile been war vicissitudes and personal changes. General Butler maintained rigid rule in New Orleans. He accomplished a marvel in improving its sanitary condition, keeping out that formidable enemy, yellow fever, on whose aid the Confederates had reasonably counted; provided for the poor by furnishing work, or by charities when necessary, levying upon the disloyal rich for the cost; and found use for the colored folk not only as laborers, but by enlisting and training able-bodied men as soldiers. He discovered cotton that had escaped destruction and needed a market; and he extended his authority into the country, within his department, to secure the raising of more. He was firmly master. Too brusque for a diplomat, he was personally uncongenial to foreign residents who sympathized with secession, and they were willing to embarrass his operations. The French consul made complaining representations, which led to diplomatic correspondence of no vital consequence between the governments at Paris and Washington. Secretary Seward was prudently disposed to think Butler a dangerous man, and desired a change of the military command in Louisiana. The change was made, but not until the authority of the Government had become well established at New Orleans and in the State capital. Banks succeeded Butler in December.

Detachments of Farragut's fleet were busy during the early autumn on the Texas coast. Lieutenant Kirtledge took Corpus Christi, from which small blockade-runners had carried on a considerable trade with Havana; and an expedition under Acting Master Crocker met with a like success at Sabine City. More important was the capture of Galveston by Commander

Renshaw, on the 9th of October. Renshaw remained there, holding the city with an amiable leniency, which the Confederates complimentarily contrasted with Butler's rule at New Orleans. Unhappily, there soon appeared as decided a contrast in the results. On the night of January 1st, when Renshaw was least expecting it, by a combined movement of General Magruder, now military commander in Texas, and Leon Smith, of the Confederate navy, Galveston was recaptured, with the loss of the *Harriet Lane* and other Government vessels. Renshaw, who made a gallant fight, was killed in the action.

Banks had been expected to give effective aid in establishing a loyal government in Texas, under the appointed Provisional Governor, ex-Congressman A. J. Hamilton, of that State, who was still waiting in New Orleans. But the loss of Galveston, and of Sabine City soon after, abruptly shut the doors that had seemed to open a short and easy way to Houston and the interior.

In an address before the Legislature of Mississippi on the 26th of December,—two years after South Carolina led off in the work of Secession.—Jefferson Davis said:

I was among those who, from the beginning, predicted war as the consequence of secession, although I must admit that the contest has assumed proportions more gigantic than I had anticipated. . . . You have no doubt wondered that I have not carried out the policy, which I had intended should be our policy, of fighting our battles on the fields of the enemy, instead of suffering him to fight them on ours. This was not the result of my will, but of the power of the enemy. . . . Vicksburg and Port Hudson are the real points of attack. Every effort will be made to capture

those places with the object of freeing the navigation of the Mississippi, of cutting off our communications with the trans-Mississippi department — of severing the western from the eastern portion of the Confederacy. Let all who have at heart the safety of the country go without delay to Vicksburg and Port Hudson; let them go for such length of time as they can spare — for thirty or sixty, or for ninety days. Let them assist in preserving the Mississippi River, that great artery of the country, and thus conduce more than in any other way to the perpetuation of the Confederacy and the success of the cause.

General Grant, whose department was enlarged, on the 16th of October, to include the State of Mississippi, had planned an attempt against Vicksburg by the rear, part of his army to proceed down the Mississippi Central Railway, under his personal command, and the remainder, under Sherman, to move from Memphis on transports to the mouth of the Yazoo, a few miles above the city, effecting communication by that stream. Each of these forces was about thirty thousand strong. Grant's advance set forward on the 8th of November, and on the 29th his headquarters were established at Holly Springs, where extensive depots of supplies were established. His progress was unopposed as his lines of communication with Columbia and Memphis were lengthened to Oxford. He was at that place when, on the 20th of December, Van Dorn, with the entire cavalry force of the army lately under his command (now Pemberton's), captured Holly Springs, and destroyed stores and supplies of over a million dollars in value. Railway and telegraph communication with Memphis and Columbus were about the same time so thoroughly broken by Forrest's cavalry (from Bragg's army) that speedy restoration was impossible, and Grant was forced

to retreat to Grand Junction, his men marching eighty miles and living on the country. Thence they took the road to Memphis, and went into camp near that city.

Sherman landed his force (December 26th and 27th) on the left bank of the Yazoo, twelve miles from its mouth, in the rear of Vicksburg. Since leaving Memphis he had heard nothing from Grant, whom he supposed to be already near at hand. General Pemberton had advanced from Vicksburg to Grenada to resist Grant, but was back in time to meet Sherman, and confronted him in a strong position between the Yazoo and the city. Unacquainted yet, as were all of his command, with the country immediately before him, Sherman (on the 28th) ordered an assault to be made on the enemy's line. The low, marshy grounds intervening, intersected with bayous,—Chickasaw Bayou being the chief,—were overhung by abrupt bluffs, back of which were miles of broken table-land extending to Vicksburg. Commanders had great difficulty in bringing their men into position for any effective assault. The effort was resolutely made at four different points, by the divisions of Steele, A. J. Smith, G. W. Morgan, and M. L. Smith, each in its own quarter — each to be repulsed with considerable loss. Sherman's transports were loaded and ready to start for Milliken's Bend, when he was apprised that a superior officer had arrived, General John A. McClernand, to whom the command was turned over on the 4th of January.

McClernand, accompanied by gunboats, set forth at once to capture Arkansas Post, fifty miles up the Arkansas River, and landed his men near Fort Hindman on the 10th of January. The next day the enemy's works

were carried by heroic assault. With possession of the key of Arkansas navigation, McClernand reported the capture of five thousand prisoners, and large quantities of arms, munitions, and stores. Having dismantled Fort Hindman, he re-embarked his men, and at the mouth of White River met his superior, General Grant, who landed them (January 21st) at Young's Point, on the west bank of the Mississippi, a few miles above Vicksburg.

## CHAPTER XIII.

1862-1863.

### *Fredericksburg, and After — A Quasi-Crisis — Emancipation Edict.*

After retiring from the field of Antietam, the Confederate General gathered at his ease a rich harvest of supplies in the Shenandoah Valley. Circling around McClellan as he at last moved to Warrenton, Lee halted at Culpeper Courthouse, in front of his adversary. Burnside, on taking command, planned to move quickly down the left bank of the Rappahannock, to cross by pontoons from Falmouth to Fredericksburg before Lee could get there, and with this new base to advance on Richmond. On the 17th of November, Sumner, with the van of the army, reached Falmouth, but no pontoons were there, as they should and easily might have been. When they did arrive, several days later, Lee's army was already at and near Fredericksburg, and preparing with diligence to defend its naturally strong position. The Confederate left, under Longstreet, rested on the river at a bend a mile or more above the city, the line being extended by A. P. Hill from thence along the heights to Massaponax Creek, a distance of about five miles, connecting with Stonewall Jackson on the extreme right. It was not until the night of Decem-



ber 10th that Burnside began laying his pontoons in front of Fredericksburg — completed the next morning. Another bridge was laid two miles below, in front of Hill's corps, where the heights recede much farther from the river. In this quarter was Franklin's command, on the Union left, consisting of Reynolds's corps (the divisions of Meade, Gibbon, and Birney) and the corps of W. F. Smith. In addition, Franklin had at his disposal the old divisions of Hooker and Kearney, swelling his available numbers to nearly fifty-five thousand. On the right, Hooker and Sumner (each now commanding a "grand division" of two corps) completed the line.

The morning of the 13th was foggy and chilly. Under Burnside's general order, Franklin was to move at an early hour, but he only received the order at 7 o'clock that morning; and the mists lifting but slowly, he did not get under way until 9. Meade's division, in the van, in crossing the valley came under a galling artillery fire, which he silenced after some delay. Birney and Gibbon were to support Meade, and Sickles (now commanding one of the divisions sent by Hooker) was in reserve. Meade advanced up the rising ground and into the woods, piercing the hostile line between the brigades of Archer and Lane, forcing them back and taking some prisoners. Meanwhile, heavy reinforcements, under Early and D. H. Hill, were hastened up by Jackson. Meade was driven back, not being closely supported by Gibbon on his right, while one of Birney's brigades was deploying on the left; but they so effectually charged the enemy as to check his advance. Meade retreated to the railway, when he was again

assailed and forced backward. Sickles joined in the conflict, but Smith's entire corps, twenty thousand strong, on the right of Reynolds (guarding the line of retreat towards Franklin's bridge), remained inactive. Properly supported at the right moment, with the means at hand, Meade's spirited attack might have led the way to victory. Whatever the reasons for so notable a shortcoming on the part of some of Burnside's subordinates, the concluding fact was a disastrous failure.

Nor was this the worst part of the battle. On his right, Burnside had ordered Sumner to assail the formidable works in his front, which was done almost simultaneously with the advance on the left. His men were repulsed with terrible slaughter dealt by batteries on the heights and by volleys that poured from the rifle-pits of Marye's Hill. Charge after charge only added fruitless sacrifices of blood. The first assailants were of the two corps of Hancock and French. The heaviest losses fell upon Meagher's Irish brigade, of which only two hundred and eighty out of the twelve hundred engaged appeared at roll-call the next morning. Howard's division supported the advance attacking party; and Hooker, after repeated and emphasized orders, against which his judgment protested, ordered Humphrey's division to continue the attack. The men fought bravely, against hopeless odds, but all ended in utter defeat. On the night of the 15th the army was withdrawn to the left bank of the river. Lee re-occupied the city of Fredericksburg. As officially reported, the Union losses (greatly superior to those on the Confederate side) were 1,152 killed—in Sumner's com-

mand, 480; Franklin's, 338; Hooker's, 327 — about 7,000 wounded, and 3,234 missing; a total of over 11,000.\*

Burnside, chagrined but not broken-spirited, spoke out in a manly way, avowing his own responsibility for a movement which neither the President nor his advisers suggested — they, in fact, leaning to the opinion that the enemy should be engaged where the new commander found him.

It is not an idle legend that has told how Lincoln, in some of the darkest hours following this battle, paced his room in profound melancholy, saying the people would demand of him, as the Roman emperor demanded of Varus: "Give me back my legions!" and declaring in his anguish: "I would gladly be to-night in the place of the humblest soldier of the Potomac army." Yet he was not unbalanced by his accumulating troubles. After receiving General Burnside's report, he issued a brief address to this army (December 23d), saying:

Although you have not been successful, the attempt was not an error, nor the failure other than accident. The courage with which you on an open field maintained the contest against an entrenched foe, and the consummate skill and success with which you crossed and recrossed the river in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all the qualities of a great army, which will yet give victory to the cause of the country and of popular government.

Condoling with the mourners for the dead, and sympathizing with the wounded, I congratulate you that the number of both is comparatively small.

I tender to you, officers and soldiers, the thanks of the nation.

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\* Union—killed, 1,284; wounded 9,600. Confederate—killed, 596; wounded, 4,065.—*War Records*.

The preliminary proclamation of Emancipation had awaited a propitious occasion. The final edict, it was evident as the fixed day approached, would have no such advantage. In truth, the Administration now found itself in what, under other forms of representative government, would have been deemed a grave if not fatal crisis. In Congress there was a violent Opposition, emboldened by recent electoral successes, which showed the existence of a strong political minority — hardly admitting itself to be a minority — in the North. To crown all, a large number of Republican members were themselves inclined, only prudence forbidding, to express a want of confidence in the Administration.

On the Democratic side of the House of Representatives such members as Fernando and Benjamin Wood, of New York, and Vallandigham, of Ohio, now appeared rather as the actual leaders they had aspired to be, than as the exceptional sympathizers with Secession they had been counted. More defiant than ever, Vallandigham, though himself defeated as a candidate for re-election, sought to arrest the prosecution of the war. S. S. Cox (then of Ohio), who had been returned to the next Congress, now seemed happy in the communion and fellowship of his Copperhead colleague, if not covetous of his parliamentary mantle. A day or two after the Fredericksburg battle, Cox recited in the House an elaborate speech, which a Southern historian of the war pronounced a bill of particulars in arraignment of President Lincoln. Arbitrary arrests, emancipation, and the removal of General McClellan were prominent themes of his discourse. A man of much literary faculty, with a spice of wit, which was his special

vanity, Mr. Cox was not a man of great weight in public affairs, his success being disproportionate to his aspiration. He served, nevertheless, as a good indicator of the Opposition attitude at different stages. Early in 1861 he was opposed to Secession, and demanded "re-possession of the forts and other Government property seized by the rebels"; six months later he was bubbling over with something like boyish glee, when talking of Bull Run; in December of the same year, as earnest as any Secessionist at Richmond for a war with England instead of the surrender of Mason and Slidell; in January, 1862, zealously defending the long inaction of McClellan; and in the next December denouncing that General's dismissal, deprecating emancipation, and advocating negotiations for peace. On this last occasion he said, referring especially to the November elections:

The people have raised their voices against irresponsible arrests; . . . have condemned that worst relic of the worst time of French tyranny, *lettres de cachet*; yet this House, with indecorous hurry, rush through a bill of indemnity, which is to confiscate all the rights and remedies of the outraged citizen. . . . The people have condemned the edict of emancipation—an edict which Mr. Seward, on the 10th of March last, in a letter to Mr. Adams, declared would invigorate the declining insurrection in every part of the South; yet we have the Presidential message which proposes to adhere to the condemned proclamation; and in addition thereto proposes a compensated system of emancipation running to the end of the century.

He eulogized General McClellan's "grand movement and splendid fighting before Richmond"; his "superb battles in Maryland"; indeed, "his salvation of Washington"; and asserted that he was made "a sacrifice to appease the Ebony Fetich." "I assert here as

a fact which I do know," he said, "that the President was, about the middle of July, informed distinctly of the mode by which, and the principles upon which, General McClellan intended the war to be conducted and the Union saved." In a note \* he subsequently explained:

This reference is to the famous Harrison Bar letter which afterward appeared, and which General McClellan had before this speech read to Governor Crittenden and myself.

Mr. Cox quoted from a dispatch (July 5, 1862, near the date of the McClellan letter) sent by Secretary Seward to Minister Adams:

It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war — the former by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the Federal Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of saving the Union.


As a leader of the Opposition and a vindicator of McClellan, Mr. Cox was more adroit thus far than when he said, in urging negotiations for peace:

The failures of both armies, notwithstanding the extraordinary and splendid heroism of our soldiers in the field, and the fabulous expenditure of money and men, will assist in the consummation of our hopes.

On the other hand, Republican dissatisfaction found expression in a private conference of Senators on the 17th of December, at which a resolution was passed, with practical unanimity, asking the removal of the Secretary of State. Senators Collamer, Sumner, Fessen-

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\* "Eight Years in Congress" (1865), p. 269.



den, Trumbull, Wade, Harris, Grimes, Howard, and Pomeroy were chosen as a committee to present this demand to the President. At the White House interview which followed, all the Cabinet were present, by Lincoln's desire, except Mr. Seward, who, notified by Senator Preston King of the action of his Republican colleagues, had at once tendered his resignation. Little is known of the details of this unprecedented meeting. Secretary Welles, several years later, stated in general terms that Lincoln "demonstrated to Senators and Cabinet genuine executive ability, tact, and power"; and that, though "surprised and grieved by what was done and what he learned, the President did not submit to Senatorial dictation, nor permit the Executive department of the Government to be overborne or invaded." \*

The controlling reasons for Republican hostility to Mr. Seward were, no doubt, his supposed sympathy with the views of the politicians "surrounding" General McClellan; his alleged disposition to preserve slavery, and to build up a "great Union party" opposed to the Republican organization; a belief that his foremost friends in New York had, in this spirit, as well as for personal and factious purposes, caused the defeat of General Wadsworth for Governor at the late election, preferring the choice of Horatio Seymour; and a conviction, or rather a jealous persuasion, that the Secretary's influence was not only predominant in the Administration, but pernicious abroad and at home.

Secretary Chase held at least this last opinion, and in communicating freely with his friends at Washington

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\* "Lincoln and Seward," p. 84.

and elsewhere, he stimulated rather than allayed the dissatisfaction with his associate of the State Department. But the Senatorial intrusion in its present shape was not countenanced by Mr. Chase, who tendered his own resignation the next day. He could have done nothing more effective to aid the President in maintaining complete mastery of the situation. The Senators had been somewhat mollified, and perhaps better informed, as a result of their peculiar mission; nor in any event did they wish a complete dissolution of the Cabinet — already announced as a certainty in hostile quarters — and least of all the withdrawal of Secretary Chase. In a note addressed to the two resigning Secretaries jointly (on the 20th), the President said:

You have respectively tendered me your resignations as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but after most anxious consideration, my deliberate judgment is, that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your departments respectively.

Both Secretaries complied, and the incident was closed.

On the morning of the new year, after one hundred days' notice,— that precise period being only accidental, and not calculated in making the preliminary announcement,— appeared the famous

#### EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, On the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to-wit:



That on the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be thenceforward and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

That the Executive will, on the 1st day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States, and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the United States.

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day of the first above-mentioned order, designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to-wit:

Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

And by virtue of the power and for the purposes afore-

said, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense, and I recommend to them, that in all cases, when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh.

[[L. s.]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,  
Secretary of State.

This measure, now no surprise, could encounter no new opposition. Public opinion, despite occasional insinuations of doubt, had already adapted itself to the great fact. It was well understood in all the armies; Southern vituperation had made it known to all classes in the slaveholding States; the nations abroad were fully apprised that the fate of slavery was irrevocably involved in the final issue of the war. In all Europe Lincoln's name at once had new renown and the Union

cause a new grandeur. The moral effect was immediately manifest. A great assemblage in Exeter Hall, in London, hailed with enthusiasm the new phase of the contest. There was sympathetic rejoicing among a large share of the industrial people of Great Britain, who seriously suffered from the effects of the war.

Replying (January 19th, 1863) to an address from the workingmen of Manchester (England), Lincoln said: "When I came, on the 4th of March, 1861, through a free and constitutional election, to preside in the government of the United States, the country was found at the verge of civil war. Whatever might have been the cause, or whosoever the fault, one duty, paramount to all others, was before me, namely, to maintain and preserve at once the Constitution and the integrity of the Federal Republic. A conscientious purpose to perform this duty is the key to all the measures of administration which have been, and to all which will hereafter be pursued. . . . I know, and deeply deplore, the sufferings which the workingmen of Manchester, and in all Europe, are called on to endure in this crisis. It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow this Government, which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively upon the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain the favor of Europe. Through the action of our disloyal citizens, the workingmen of Europe have been subjected to severe trial, for the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under these circumstances I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism, which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country."

## CHAPTER XIV.

1863.

*Burnside Succeeded by Hooker — West Virginia, Arizona and Montana — Conscription — Payment for Slaves Freed in the District of Columbia — Missouri Malcontents — The Vallandigham Case.*

General Burnside was eager to retrieve his misfortune at Fredericksburg. Before the close of December he had matters in train for a cavalry raid around his enemy's left to break his communications, and for a feigned flanking movement in force on that side, with a real one in the opposite quarter. Whispers from some of Burnside's subordinates in responsible positions and public criticisms on his generalship in the late undertaking led the President to direct, on the 30th, that the new one be suspended. The General visited Washington at once, and gaining little satisfaction as to the sources or details of the opposition he suspected, returned to Falmouth still in command, though proposing to resign. The President wrote him on the 8th of January: "I deplore the want of concurrence with you in opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Be cautious, and do not understand that the Government or the country is driving you. I do not see how I could profit by changing the command

of the Army of the Potomac, and if I did, I should not wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your commission."

Finding that the details of the proposed cavalry raid were known to Confederate sympathizers in Washington, Burnside changed his plan. Menacing below Fredricksburg, where his real attack was first intended, he now purposed to cross in force at Banks's and the United States fords above. The movement from Falmouth was begun on the evening of January 20th. At 10 o'clock that night a severe storm set in,—snow, sleet, heavy rain,—transforming the roads, hitherto excellent, into weltering mud, through which the tramping soldiers, horses, artillery, and wagon trains for hours dragged tediously on, until further advance became practically impossible. Instead of the quick night march intended, the weary column at break of day was still on the left bank of the river and visible to hostile eyes. The army countermarched, with such energy as remained, to its old camping-ground at Falmouth. Thus ended what was irreverently called, in the army, Burnside's "mud campaign."

The General, without further hopes of immediate action, now occupied himself with inquiring into and, if possible, remedying the insubordinate disposition he thought to be manifested in his command. Presently he determined to dismiss Major-General Hooker, and Brigadier-Generals Brooks and Newton, and to relieve Major-Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith, and some other officers, from their respective commands in his army. An order to this effect was submitted to the President, with the alternative of its acceptance or

Burnside's own resignation from the army. Lincoln accepted neither, but gave the chief command to Hooker, who, on the 26th of January, superseded his accuser. Later, Burnside was pacified by the command of a department in the West.

On the day before his proclamation of Emancipation the President approved the act admitting the State of West Virginia. He had taken the written opinions of the Attorney-General and of the other members of his Cabinet on the constitutionality and expediency of the measure. Judge Bates argued both questions at length, with negative conclusions as to each. Secretary Chase wrote briefly, maintaining the affirmative as to both points. There was also a lack of unanimity on the part of his other official advisers. Acts organizing the Territories of Arizona and Montana were respectively approved on the 24th of February and the 3d of March; and on the latter date—midway of the Presidential term—acts providing for the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal (a power never exercised by the President) and for enrolling and calling into the Federal service those who were made liable for military duty, known as the Conscription Act.

As commissioners to adjust all claims for compensation under the act abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, the President appointed Daniel R. Goodloe, a native of North Carolina, and a resident of Washington; Samuel F. Vinton, ex-Congressman from Ohio, who died soon after the commission began its work, and was succeeded by ex-Comptroller John M. Brod-

head, a Pennsylvanian; and ex-Postmaster-General Horatio King, born in Maine, and lately of President Buchanan's Cabinet. The labors of these commissioners were arduous and complicated, involving the legal title to each slave for whom a claim was presented, the loyalty of the claimant, and the market value of every human chattel included in the final award. In settling the latter question, the aid of slave-trading experts was used. Compensation was allowed for 2,989 slaves, amounting — at an average of \$300 each, as limited by Congress, apportioned *pro rata*,— to \$896,700. As appraised, the aggregate value exceeded two million dollars. The report of the commissioners\* (dated January 14, 1863) having been submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, they called on the President, then in the midst of the troubles following the Fredericksburg battle. He received them cordially, and when informed that their work was finished, he responded in his own manner: "I am glad to know that somebody has got something done."

Missouri had become a source of continual vexation to the President. Of disunionists, open or covert, there was an abundance, and honest Union men were divided into factions that were in relentless wrangle. Among the Germans there was dissatisfaction over the removal of Fremont, and to them had been due, as Lincoln well understood, much, if not most, in saving Missouri at the outset. He had, in the early days of Halleck's military administration there, sought to allay this dis-

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\* Executive Document No. 42, Thirty-eighth Congress.

content, asking the aid of an Illinois friend, Gustav Koerner, one of the foremost Germans of the West, who visited St. Louis bearing a letter to the General, in which Lincoln said (January 15, 1862):

The Germans are true and patriotic, and so far as they have got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding. Without a knowledge of its contents, Governor Koerner, of Illinois, will hand you this letter. He is an educated and talented German gentleman, as true a man as lives. With his assistance you can set everything right with the Germans. . . . My clear judgment is that, with reference to the German element in your command, you should have Governor Koerner with you; and if agreeable to you and him, I will make him a Brigadier-General, so that he can afford to give his time. He does not wish to command in the field, though he has more military knowledge than some who do. If he goes into the place, he will simply be an efficient, zealous and unselfish assistant to you. I say all this upon intimate personal acquaintance with Governor Koerner.

The Germans, however, remained aggrieved. Halleck's dealings with slavery did not please them; and there were complaints that the President did not give prominence enough to General Sigel. Nor were discontented Germans the only source of trouble. General Curtis, Halleck's successor, was regarded as too radical and rigid by Governor Gamble, with whom Attorney-General Bates was in sympathy, as well as by Conservatives generally. There was a strong faction opposed to Gamble. The root of the evil was slavery. Some wished it to be let alone; some favored gradual emancipation; some insisted on immediate abolition. The two parties of Unionists were also quarreling over other men and other matters. The President, constantly appealed to, would not nationalize a local



squabble by giving either side his exclusive approval. Both tried his patience severely. When, in the hope of abating this affliction, he proposed to give General Schofield command of the department in place of Curtis, the turmoil became worse than ever. A public meeting of German citizens, on the 10th of May, 1863, adopted a set of resolutions on the subject which were presented at the White House by Mr. James Taussig. His report, of which the chief points are here given, has a genuine flavor throughout:

1. The President said that it may be a misfortune for the nation that he was elected President. But, having been elected by the people, he meant to be President, and perform his duty according to his best understanding, if he had to die for it. No General will be removed, nor will any change in the Cabinet be made, to suit the views or wishes of any particular party, faction, or set of men. General Halleck is not guilty of the charges made against him, most of which arise from misapprehension or ignorance of those who prefer them.

2. The President said it was a mistake to suppose that Generals John C. Fremont, B. F. Butler and F. Sigel are "systematically kept out of command," as stated in the fourth resolution; that, on the contrary, he fully appreciated the merits of the gentlemen named; that by their own action they had placed themselves in the positions which they occupied; that he was not only willing but anxious to place them again in command as soon as he could find spheres of action for them, without doing injustice to others, but that at present he "had more pegs than holes to put them in."

3. As to the want of unity, the President, without admitting such to be the case, intimated that each member of the Cabinet was responsible mainly for the manner of conducting the affairs of his particular department; that there was no centralization of responsibility for the action of the Cabinet anywhere, except in the President himself.

4. The dissensions between Union men in Missouri are due solely to a factious spirit, which is exceedingly reprehensible. The two parties "ought to have their heads knocked together." "Either would rather see the defeat of their adversary than that of Jefferson Davis." To this spirit of faction is to be ascribed the failure of the Legislature to elect Senators and the defeat of the Missouri Aid Bill in Congress, the passage of which the President strongly desired. The President said that the Union men in Missouri who are in favor of gradual emancipation represented his views better than those who are in favor of immediate emancipation. In explanation of his views on this subject, the President said that in his speeches he had frequently used as an illustration the case of a man who had an excrescence on the back of his neck, the removal of which, in one operation, would result in the death of the patient, while "taking it off by degrees" would preserve life. Although sorely tempted, I did not reply with the illustration of the dog whose tail was amputated by inches, but confined myself to arguments. The President announced clearly that, so far as he was at present advised, the Radicals in Missouri had no right to consider themselves the exponents of his views on the subject of emancipation in that State.

5. General Curtis was not removed on account of any wrong act or great mistake committed by him. The system of Provost-Marshals established by him throughout the State gave rise to violent complaint; that the President had thought at one time to appoint General Fremont in his place; that at another time he had thought of appointing General McDowell, whom he characterized as a good and loyal though very unfortunate soldier; and that, at last, General Schofield was appointed, with a view, if possible, to reconcile and satisfy the two factions in Missouri. He has instructions not to interfere with either party, but to confine himself to his military duties.

I assure you, gentlemen, [said Mr. Taussig in conclusion] that our side was as fully presented as the occasion permitted. At the close of the conversation the President remarked that there was evidently a "serious misunderstanding" springing up between him and the Germans of St. Louis, which he would like to see removed. Observing to

him that the differences of opinion related to facts, men and measures, I withdrew.

Writing to General Schofield (May 27th) directly after he assumed command of the Department of the Missouri, the President said: "I wish you to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise your own judgment, and do right for the public interest. Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invaders and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult *role*, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one party and praised by the other."

A few months later (October 5th) the President replied at much length to a communication from Charles D. Drake and other radicals, setting forth in form and detail their discontents and desires. All these are now well forgotten, but there is no oblivion for words like these in Lincoln's response:

We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and Slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union with, but not without slavery,—those for it without, but not with—those for it with or without, but prefer it with,—and those for it with or without, but prefer it without. Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are for gradual, but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual extinction of slavery.

It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges and murders for pelf proceed under any cloak that will best serve for the occasion.

One curious incident, with a touch of the humorous, occurred the previous year. Provost-Marshal Dick, in his loyal zeal, had suppressed a respectable Presbyterian preacher, Doctor McPheeters, as an open-mouthed Secessionist. This naturally raised a great outcry among the minister's sympathizing friends. When at last, after many months, the matter was brought directly to the notice of the President by a formal petition, he wrote:

The petition prays, in the name of justice and mercy, that I will restore Dr. McPheeters to all his ecclesiastical rights. This gives no intimation as to what ecclesiastical rights are withdrawn. . . . Mr. Ranney's letter says: "Dr. Samuel McPheeters is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, but can not preach the gospel." Mr. Coalter, in his letter, asks: "Is it not a strange illustration of the condition of things that the question, Who shall be allowed to preach in a church in St. Louis? shall be decided by the President of the United States?" . . . I have never interfered, or thought of interfering, as to who shall or shall not preach in any church;

nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority. If any one is so interfering by color of my authority, I would like to have it specifically made known to me. If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. Mc. back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that, too, will be declined. I will not have control of any church on any side.

The "restoration" sought, unfortunately for the Doctor, still lacked one thing — the consent of the Presbytery, which was denied him.

General Burnside was in March (1863) given command of an army destined for East Tennessee. The department marked out for him included the State of Ohio, and for several weeks he had his headquarters in Cincinnati. There was at this time much excitement in some parts of the State in regard to enrollment and draft under the conscription law, and this disturbance was so encouraged and aided by violent speeches of ex-Congressman Vallandigham in various places, in defiance of a specific military order, that he was arrested by Burnside, and brought before a military court, which found him guilty, and sentenced him to imprisonment until the close of the war. The President approved the finding of the court, but modified the sentence by sending the offender South, beyond the lines of the Union army. Application for a writ of *habeas corpus* made on his behalf to the venerable Judge H. H. Leavitt, of the United States District Court at Cincinnati, was refused.

Replying (June 13th) to Erastus Corning and others, representatives of a large Democratic meeting held at Albany, which "resolved" against unconstitutional military arrests and so forth, the President discussed the

whole subject in a masterly manner, with much effect on the public mind. Touching the Vallandigham case he wrote:

Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union, and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertion from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. . . . Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.

The Democratic Opposition in Ohio, having obtained a small majority in the preceding election, were confident that they could elect an anti-Administration Governor in the coming autumn. At their State Convention in June they boldly staked their fortunes on Vallandigham as their candidate. Answering to the letter of a committee asking that their candidate be permitted to return, and arguing the general question, the President invited attention to his Corning letter, and said more directly of their candidate:

We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrollment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is

merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the cause in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged, in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man.

These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his especial friends and adherents. . . . When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent has nominated Mr. Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means; but, . . . unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that, in your opinion, an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union.

Some months later the Federal Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the decision of Judge Leavitt. In October, after a long and exciting canvass, the people of Ohio elected the Administration candidate for Governor, John Brough, by more than one hundred thousand majority over Vallandigham. Of all the decisions in the case, this was the most effectual.

## CHAPTER XV.

1863.

### *Chancellorsville.*

On giving General Hooker command of the Army of the Potomac, the President wrote him privately (January 26th):

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those Generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander,



and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

The two other grand division commanders were at this time relieved, General Franklin being assigned to duty elsewhere. General Sumner, granted leave of absence at his own request, retired in greatly impaired health to his home in Syracuse, New York, where a few weeks later he died.

Hooker, having matured a plan of campaign for the reorganized army, ordered General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, to move, on the 13th of April, against General Fitzhugh Lee's brigade near Culpeper Courthouse; to capture Gordonsville; and to cut the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway near Saxton's Station, in the immediate rear of the enemy, destroying track, telegraph, and bridges from that point towards Richmond. Hooker intended a nearly simultaneous advance of his infantry and artillery forces — about one hundred thousand men — feinting in front, while his real purpose was to turn the Confederate left. Stoneman started off very deliberately, and when at the end of the third day he had one of his divisions across the Rappahannock, he was brought to a check by heavy rains. Lincoln, learning the particulars from Hooker, on the evening of the 15th telegraphed at once in response:

The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days,

two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach his point he has still sixty to go, another river, the Rapidan, to cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.

Stoneman's movement was suspended and his forces returned to their encampment. After remaining quiet for two weeks, Hooker resumed the execution of his plan of campaign. The weather was propitious and the army in excellent condition. The former grand divisions having been dispensed with, its seven corps and their commanders were: First, Reynolds; Second, Couch; Third, Sickles; Fifth, Meade; Sixth, Sedgwick; Eleventh, Howard; Twelfth, Slocum. In the preliminary movements of cavalry, Averill occupied Gordonsville, and Stoneman advanced to strike the railway between Fredericksburg and Richmond, as before designed. Howard's corps, followed by Slocum's, moved up the left bank of the Rappahannock; crossed it at Kelley's Ford during the night of the 27th-28th; and, turning southward, crossing the Rapidan at Germania Ford, advanced in the direction of Fredericksburg. Meade following by way of Kelley's Ford, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's. Hooker announced in a dispatch on the 30th:

The operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.

Anderson, the Confederate General charged with guarding the fords, reported from Chancellorsville (to which place he had fallen back) on the 29th, and continued his retreat five miles farther towards Fredericksburg. As a menace to Lee while the flanking movements were in progress, Sedgwick, before Fredericksburg, had laid a pontoon bridge where Franklin crossed in December; Reynolds laid another a mile farther down, and both commanders made a feint of crossing. Couch, leaving Gibbon's division to guard the camp at Falmouth, moved up the river and crossed at the United States Ford, and Sickles followed later, crossing at Banks's Ford without resistance. After exchanging artillery shots with Jackson's batteries near Massaponax Creek, on the 30th, Reynolds withdrew, and joined the rest of the army across the river. Sedgwick remained in front of Fredericksburg.

Whatever the mystery about Hooker's subsequent conduct, his dispatch of Thursday makes it clear that his original purpose was to await, after crossing, the choice of Lee between retreating or giving battle on ground of Hooker's own choosing. Preparation for one of these alternatives had been made by the work laid out for Stoneman. It was now necessary to be ready for the other. With headquarters at Chancellorsville,—the name given to a cross-roads "tavern stand" eleven miles from Fredericksburg and five from United States Ford,—Hooker placed his six corps present in such position as to cover the fords on which his communications depended, and to repel assault in front and flank. His extreme right was held by Howard, with headquarters at Dowdall's tavern, two miles west of

Chancellorsville. On Howard's left was Slocum, then Sickles, on high ground a mile southwest of Chancellorsville, overlooking a large space of cleared land thereabout, with farm house and buildings — the rest of the country being mainly wooded. Reynolds was posted near United States Ford, and Couch between him and Meade, on the left of Hooker's line, which extended on Friday night (May 1st) from near Banks's Ford, holding the river road, to Chancellorsville, and connecting with Sickles.

On receiving Anderson's first report, Lee hastened to support him with McLaws's division and part of Anderson's, that had been left at Fredericksburg. Jackson was ordered to follow with the divisions of A. P. Hill and Rodes. The two leading Generals were together on Friday, and at the close of the day the combined forces were well up towards Hooker's lines. Lee lost no time in deciding to give battle. Plans were laid and orders were given for the morrow. Longstreet was absent with one of his divisions on detached service at Suffolk, near the Carolina border, and Early, with one of Jackson's divisions, remained at Fredericksburg, confronting Sedgwick; yet Lee took the risk of dividing the forces present, sending Jackson with a large portion to make a detour of many miles around and beyond Hooker's lines, and to strike his extreme right. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Jackson's main force was massing at Wilderness Church, and under forest cover the men were speedily aligned across the Germania road in flank and rear of Howard. It was near 6 o'clock when the assault began. The yelling myriads of Stonewall Jackson came rushing through the woods with such

suddenness and fury that the men in blue were swept away like leaves in a gale. The division of Devens, first struck, was completely broken up, and a third part of its men, with every one of its Generals and Colonels, either killed, wounded, or captured. The division of Schurz scattered before its position was reached by the first fugitives; and all, defying the efforts of Howard and his subordinates, flew on towards Chancellorsville. Steinwehr's division was steadier, but the retreat continued before hot pursuit. Part of Sickles's men were rallied behind a stone wall, and were so effectually aided by batteries commanding the open ground that Jackson was at length brought to a positive check.

Night had come, and in the midst of dark woods there were regiments of pursued and pursuers. Eager to complete the work so well begun, galloping about with his staff in and out among clumps of trees where horses could find way, Stonewall Jackson was fatally wounded by a mistaken fire of his own men. He survived but eight days, never seeing battlefield again, except in the feverish reveries of his last hours.

Fighting was resumed early the next morning (Sunday), the severest part of the engagement centering around the position of Sickles, which had been strengthened during the night. Hooker was at length forced to fall back to strong intrenchments between Chancellorsville and the fords. On the same day Sedgwick captured Fredericksburg, and advanced towards Chancellorsville, from which place Lee promptly moved with reinforcements for Early. Sedgwick, unsustained by Hooker, was met and defeated near Salem Church, with heavy loss, and retreated across the Rappahannock at

Banks's Ford. Lee re-occupied Fredericksburg, and was intending to renew the attack on Hooker, but found that he had re-crossed the river on the night of the 4th. The losses in killed and wounded were nearly equal — about eleven thousand on each side.\* There had been no decisive pitched battle, but great had been the sacrifice of men and means, of opportunities and hopes.

For a short while the President thought an immediate movement on Richmond might be attempted, overestimating the possible execution done on Lee's communications by Stoneman; but this now had to be given up. Nor was the storm of war tending in that direction at all just now. On the 14th, Lincoln wrote to Hooker in a tone neither despairing nor melancholy in terms, yet almost pathetic in its imaginable undercurrent of meaning:

When I wrote on the 7th, I had an impression that possibly, by an early movement, you could get some advantages from the supposed facts that the enemy's communications were disturbed, and that he was somewhat deranged in position. The idea has now passed away, the enemy having re-established his communications, regained his positions, and actually received reinforcements. It does not now appear to me probable that you can gain anything by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock. I therefore shall not complain if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay and out of other mischief, by menaces and occasional cavalry raids, if practicable, and to put your own army in good condition again. Still if, in your own clear judgment, you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you. Bearing upon this last point, I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their

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\* Union—killed, 1,606; wounded, 9,762. Confederate—killed, 1,665; wounded, 9,081.—*War Records*.

entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true, and you should, therefore, first of all ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt.

The latter subject was one that Hooker might not have been eager to revive. Some changes, however, were soon after made in subordinate commands, for reasons not subjected to judicial inquiry.

## CHAPTER XVI.

1863.

### *A Bold and Brilliant Campaign—Vicksburg and Port Hudson.*

Grant's army having gone into camp at Milliken's Bend about the 1st of February, work was resumed on the canal across Young's Point, begun by General Williams the previous summer, with intent to divert the course of the river, so as to avoid the Vicksburg stronghold altogether. This employment gave muscular exercise to the soldiers, without other notable effect. There was, too, an attempted flanking movement by way of Yazoo Pass in February and March. This utterly failed, as did two other devices: one an expedition by the Sunflower River, the other a costly undertaking to open a new water route, including Lake Providence. Successful experiments were made in February and March by Porter's boats in running past the Vicksburg batteries, and in that vicinity the Mississippi was soon clear of Confederate craft. Grant had meanwhile matured a plan for flanking Vicksburg from the south by running transport steamers past the batteries to take his army across from a point many miles below, and boldly striking for the rear of the city, interposing himself between Pemberton, in command there, and the

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Confederate army at Tullahoma, blocking the way of Rosecrans toward Chattanooga. McClernand's corps was started down the west bank of the Mississippi on the 29th of March, McPherson's immediately following. The march was extended seventy miles from the starting point, Milliken's Bend, ending at Hard Times, nearly opposite Grand Gulf, a fortified place just below the mouth of the Big Black River. It was not until the night of April 16th that Porter attempted to run his ironclads and three transports past the Vicksburg batteries. All the gunboats escaped serious injury. Only one of the three transports had like good fortune. Five others made the transit safely on the 22d. Grierson's cavalry had started on the 17th to make a destructive raid between the armies of Pemberton and Bragg. This was effectively done, and Grierson's command, passing by the rear of Natchez, reached the Union camp at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May.

On the 29th of April, Grant being now ready, Porter attacked the batteries of Grand Gulf, but on account of their great elevation, the bombardment, after five hours' trial, proved ineffective. The soldiers were consequently marched to a landing-place lower down, and on the 30th were carried across to Bruinsburg, from which there was a good road to Port Gibson, in the rear of Grand Gulf. Sherman, whose corps had been left behind to make a feigned attack at Haines's Bluff, on the Yazoo, was now ordered to join the other two corps by the route they had taken.

Grand Gulf was occupied by Grant on the 3d of May, after a brisk skirmish near Port Gibson between McClernand and Bowen, who had come from Vicksburg

to resist Grant's invasion. The entire army began, on the 7th, its march up the left bank of the Big Black — McPherson by the river road, McClernand by that along the ridge, and Sherman's men, divided, following both. On the 12th, McPherson's advance met and quickly repulsed two brigades under Gregg, near Raymond, occupying the town that night. He was now well out towards Jackson, the State capital, and near the railway from that city to Vicksburg. Soon after noon the next day, McPherson struck the railway at Clinton, and began destroying the track towards Jackson, on which place Sherman moved directly from Raymond. Both commands entered the city about the same time on the 14th, and the Union flag was hoisted over the Mississippi State House.

Grant was also there. Under his orders, Sherman made prompt and thorough work in destroying the railway and its belongings, together with the manufactories and military stores. McPherson was directed to move westward on Clinton in the morning, and McClernand to Edwards's Station, nearer Vicksburg. Sherman, after finishing his task at Jackson, was to join McClernand. It was known that Johnston, with a large force from Tullahoma, had arrived near the city on the 13th. Pemberton had taken up a strong position at Champion Hills, intending to give battle. Here he received an order to unite with Johnston, but failed to get away; was attacked on the 16th and beaten in a severe engagement; and was afterward rapidly driven back to Vicksburg, being forced from his last stand on the Big Black River on the 17th, where there was another sharp battle. Sherman pressed forward to the right, crossing the river

at Bridgeport, some miles above, and took possession of Walnut Hills and the banks of the Yazoo, in the immediate rear of Vicksburg. McClelland moved to the left; McPherson took position between the two—the three corps forming an approximately complete investing line around the city. Porter promptly reopened communication with Grant's right by the Yazoo, and passed up to Yazoo City, which was soon surrendered—the Confederate navy-yard, mills, and shops having been previously destroyed. Apprehending Johnston's approach, a general assault on the enemy's works was made on the 19th and again three days later, without success and with serious losses. The army now settled down to a regular siege, with the assistance of Porter's gunboats on the river side. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to Grant, who continued to be vigilantly mindful of the enemy in his rear. Johnston, however, made no resolute effort to raise the siege, which his numbers and means would have hardly justified; nor did the enemy try very desperately to cut his way out. Reduced to the last extremity, Pemberton surrendered on the 4th of July. Grant reported the whole number of prisoners taken, including all those captured after he crossed the river, as about thirty-seven thousand. Banks, who had completed his investment of Port Hudson on the 25th of May, assaulted the enemy's works two days later, but was repulsed at every point. Other assaults, with little profit, were made on the 10th and 14th of June. Further resistance being useless after the fall of Vicksburg, the place and its garrison of over six thousand men were surrendered on the 8th of July.

The steamboat *Imperial*, leaving St. Louis on that

day, arrived unhindered at New Orleans on the 16th. The great river was at last repossessed.

In a letter to General Grant (July 13th) the President said:

I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment of the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I write to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong.

## CHAPTER XVII.

1863.

### *Gettysburg.*

In less than a month after his victory at Chancellorsville, General Lee began moving northward, his advance getting near Culpeper Courthouse on the 2d of June. On the 5th, Hooker asked suggestions from Lincoln, who replied:

I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so man for man worst you at that point, while his main force would be getting the advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.

Again, on the 10th, Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker:

Your long dispatch of to-day is just received. If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's

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moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank, and on the inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.

And on the 14th:

So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?

At this date Hooker was at Centreville, having moved from the Rappahannock on the 13th. Here, covering the capital, he was waiting to see what the enemy would do. Two days later, Lincoln replied to a suggestion of Hooker:

Your idea, to send your cavalry to this side of the river [Potomac], may be right, probably is; still it pains me a little that it looks like the defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line, stretched now from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania.

The President was evidently beginning to despair of any fruits from hints like these; and later, on the same day, he added:

To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the General-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but, as it seems to be differ-

ently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders and you to obey them.

Left to the tender mercies of Halleck and Stanton—after all that had happened since the 1st of May—the General might well look with some anxiety for the next “orders” from headquarters.

Lee got across the Potomac without attack from any quarter save on the cavalry guarding his rear at two of the Blue Ridge Gaps. Ewell, crossing the Potomac on the 16th, advanced into Pennsylvania, occupied Carlisle, and pushed forward as far as Kingston, thirteen miles from Harrisburg. Part of his cavalry raided Chambersburg and other places, and another detachment reached the Susquehanna, opposite Columbia. Horses and other property were everywhere taken at will, and large levies of money were extorted from towns. Longstreet and Hill were speedily in Maryland or across the Pennsylvania border, Lee having his headquarters for a time at Hagerstown. Panic was general, and many were the appeals to the President from Harrisburg and Philadelphia for help. Baltimore or Washington might be the first objective point of Lee; but were not Philadelphia and New York also in danger? With a crushing defeat of the great Union army there were unlimited possibilities.

Significant events of about this time were the draft riots in New York (July 13th to 17th), Boston and elsewhere; Morgan's raid through Southern Ohio (July 8th to 26th); the launching of the first Laird ram, built for the Confederates at Liverpool (July 4th); and Dick Taylor's capture of Brashear City, Louisiana, with two

million dollars' worth of stores, followed by an abortive movement against New Orleans. The Quantrell massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, occurred on the 13th of August. Another Laird ram was launched on the 13th of September, on which occasion Mr. Adams wrote to Lord Russell: "This is war." He was then assured that orders had been issued which would prevent the rams from leaving Liverpool.

On the 15th of June the President called into the Government service, for six months, fifty thousand militia-men from Pennsylvania, ten thousand from Maryland, thirty thousand from Ohio, and ten thousand from West Virginia. The Governors of New York and New Jersey voluntarily sent a large number in addition. General Hooker, after tarrying more than a week at Centreville, broke camp, crossed the Potomac, and advanced to Frederick. His army, including fifteen thousand from the defenses of Washington and a brigade from Schenck (commanding at Baltimore), was about one hundred thousand strong, which he estimated to be less in number than the army of Lee, and earnestly urged that French's corps at Harper's Ferry (about eleven thousand) be added to his command. This was denied him, and on the 27th he telegraphed to General Halleck, asking to be relieved. This request was granted, and on the next day a confidential messenger from the War Department (Colonel Hardie) brought Hooker an order to turn over the command to Major-General George G. Meade.

On the 29th, General Lee ordered the concentration of his forces at Gettysburg. On the following day General Meade, with headquarters at Taneytown, and



five of his seven corps at or near Emmitsburg, directed a general movement towards his chosen battle-ground, a dozen miles southeastward from Gettysburg, on the line of Pipe Creek. Before these purposes were completely executed on either side, Buford's cavalry encountered Hill's advance on the Cashtown road, July 1st, three miles from Gettysburg. A stubborn fight ensued, the First Corps (Reynolds) and the Eleventh (Howard) later becoming engaged with forces of Hill and Ewell. There were severe losses on both sides, General Reynolds being among the killed. His corps (under Doubleday) at length fell back to Seminary Ridge. Howard, who was assailed in flank and routed by a division of Ewell, rallied the men of both corps on Cemetery Ridge, which he had before noticed when passing as offering a good position for defense. The enemy made no further attack that evening. Responding to urgent calls, the Third Corps (Sickles) and the Twelfth (Slocum) came up before dark. Hancock, whose corps (the Second) arrived later, had been personally sent in advance to examine the position and to assume temporary command. Meade himself was at hand before 11 o'clock, already determined to make a stand at Gettysburg. All his forces in the field except the Sixth Corps (Sedgwick) — which was thirty miles off when new orders were received — were present in the early morning. The Twelfth was placed on the right of the Eleventh, the Second on its left, the First, Third, and Fifth (Sykes) in this order prolonging the line to the extreme left. The Sixth appearing soon after noon, wearied with its long and rapid march, was held in reserve in the rear of the left. Gregg's cavalry

guarded the approaches on the right and Kilpatrick's on the opposite wing. Meanwhile, Ewell's corps was posted on the Confederate left, in front of Slocum and a little beyond; Hill's in the center, on Seminary Ridge; and Longstreet's on the right; the town and valley extending for miles between the two armies.

The main action of the second day began late in the afternoon. About 4 o'clock Meade, riding to the left of his lines, found that the corps of Sickles, instead of occupying the ridge directly out towards Round Top Hill,— a commanding position, which neither side had yet seized,— was more than half a mile in advance of the place intended in the orders given him, and across the Emmitsburg road, with almost half of Lee's army within striking distance. When Sickles, in reply to remonstrance, proposed to conform to the original orders as explained, Meade responded that the change would hardly be permitted by the enemy. Just then, in fact, the Confederate batteries opened a heavy fire, and after prolonged cannonading, a furious infantry charge was made on the lines of Sickles, who was driven back, with heavy losses at the "Peach Orchard" and the "Wheat Field," as well as around the base and up the slopes of Little Round Top. The enemy was finally repulsed, and Round Top occupied and securely held.

Ewell, who had succeeded in gaining some advantage on the Union right at Culp's Hill, was attacked the next morning by Slocum, and after a brisk conflict the latter re-established his original line. Aside from this affair, there was a pause during the long summer morning of the 3d. At 1 o'clock the Confederate batteries — one hundred and fifteen guns, in front of Longstreet's

and Hill's infantry lines — opened with terrible energy on the Union center, held by Howard, Doubleday, and Hancock. This enormous cannonading and the answering guns of Meade roared and reverberated for nearly two hours. Then the fire from Cemetery Ridge slackened, and presently ceased. The Union infantry, which had meanwhile been well sheltered and suffered little, now prepared to meet the expected charge. The assailing battalions soon appeared, a long array in battle order, preceded by skirmishers and supported by reserves. The vast body of men, rapidly moving over the intervening valley with measured tread, was a grand sight to the men who stood in arms behind intrenchments to meet the onslaught. Pickett's division, with Wilcox's brigade on its right and Heth's division (under Pettigrew) on its left, formed the assaulting line. Reaching the Emmitsburg road, the assailants are met with destructive volleys from infantry posted here behind a stone wall, and with murderous missiles from the artillery on Round Top and eastward along the ridge. The Confederates still sweep forward, driving the opposing infantry from its advance position, and silencing, one by one, the guns that are most annoying in the immediate front. The Union line is broken through and a Confederate flag planted on a captured part of the intrenchments. It is but a momentary triumph. Pettigrew's men, in spite of the frantic efforts of their wounded commander, give way, and are scattered in confusion. One and another brave leader falls in Pickett's command, which is left to contend alone against the masses pouring in to recover the ground he has won. Outflanked, Pickett finally orders a retreat, and his rapidly

thinning ranks are hotly pursued. The charge is over. Lee's repulse is complete. Ought not his entire army to be routed and destroyed? That would have been Napoleonic. But Meade, relieved to have fared no worse and glad to have gained so much, shrank from risking all to gain more.

The Union losses during the three days, as officially reported, were: Killed, 2,834; wounded, 13,709; missing, chiefly prisoners, 6,643 — total, 23,186. Jefferson Davis, in his history, conceded a Confederate loss of nineteen thousand out of a total force of sixty-two thousand, and called this "unfortunate" battle the most "eventful" one of the war. It was in truth one of the bloodiest the world has ever seen.\*

The Fourth of July was a day of great rejoicing in Washington over the victory at Gettysburg, and over the capture of Vicksburg and its whole army, securing control of the Mississippi River from its source to the Gulf.

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*War Records*: Union—killed, 3,155; wounded, 14,529. Confederate—killed, 3,803; wounded, 18,741.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

1863.

*Personal Incidents — Letter to J. C. Conkling — Gettysburg Speech.*

The burdens under which the President had so long and so constantly bent — often in deepest gloom, but never in despair — were greatly lightened by the cardinal victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. From these heights of vantage he looked forward to an end neither uncertain nor distant. Those who met him after this “glorious Fourth,” whether at the White House or in his summer retreat on the hills, could not fail to take some note of the change which this relief had brought.

Among recollections furnished to the writer by Mr. D. R. Goodloe is one relating to a call which he, in company with another North Carolinian, made upon Lincoln this summer. “He was at the Soldiers’ Home, all alone,” writes Mr. Goodloe, “and in the best imaginable humor. He had cut out of a newspaper a letter written by a North Carolina prisoner, who had been captured and taken to Philadelphia. It was addressed to Jefferson Davis, and written in a vein of humor, taking an affectionate leave of him and his Confederacy forever. It was growing dark, and the oil burned dimly in the chandelier, high overhead, so that the President

found it impracticable to read by its light. But he was determined that we should enjoy the fun, and, instead of ringing a bell for a servant to bring him a lamp or a candle, he deliberately went upstairs and brought a candle down, which he held in his hand close to the paper while reading the latter, and laughed heartily as he read." \*

To J. H. Hackett, the comedian, Lincoln wrote a brief letter, on the 17th of August, which, intended to be private though it contained nothing he particularly cared to conceal, very soon got into the newspapers, accompanied by some comments of a playful or sarcastic character from his partisan opponents — indulging the disposition before so often manifested toward its writer and his ways. A letter of explanation and apology thereupon came from Mr. Hackett, and a reply followed from the President. Both these letters of Lincoln have special personal interest, and were made the more memorable by after events. He speaks very modestly of his

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\* The piece was one of the best of its kind inspired by the war. An extract or two will show its quality:

"*Excellency Davis* : It is with feelings of undeveloped pleasure that an affectionate conscript intrusts this sheet of confiscated paper to the tender mercies of a Confederate State mail carrier. . . . He writes on the stump of a shivered monarch of the forest, with the 'pine trees wailing round him' and 'Endymion's planet rising on the air' . . . The Etesian winds sweeping down the defiles of the Old Dominion and over the swamps of Suffolk come moaning through the pines of the Old State, laden with the music, and sigh themselves away into sweet sounds of silence to the far-off South. Your unhappy conscript would go to the far-away North, whence the sound comes, and leave you to reap the whirlwind with no one but your father the devil to reap and bind after you. And he's going."

The whole may be found in *Rebellion Record*, VII., P., and p. 87.

now well-known familiarity with Shakespeare's plays — the tragedies rather than the comedies being his favorites, contrary to what one might have guessed; and reveals how recent and how limited was his acquaintance with the stage:

[August 17th.] — Months ago I should have acknowledged the receipt of your book and accompanying kind note, and I now have to beg your pardon for not having done so.

For one of my age, I have seen very little of the drama. The first presentation of Falstaff I ever saw was yours here last winter or spring. Perhaps the best compliment I can pay is to say, as I truly can, I am very anxious to see it again. Some of Shakespeare's plays I have never read, while others I have gone over perhaps as frequently as any unprofessional reader. Among the latter are "Lear," "Richard III.," "Henry VIII.," "Hamlet," and especially "Macbeth." I think nothing equals "Macbeth." It is wonderful. Unlike you gentlemen of the profession, I think the soliloquy in "Hamlet," commencing, "Oh, my offense is rank!" surpasses that commencing, "To be or not to be." But pardon this small attempt at criticism. I should like to hear you pronounce the opening speech of "Richard the Third."

Will you not soon visit Washington again? If you do, please call and let me make your personal acquaintance.

[November 2d. Marked "Private."] — Yours of October 22d is received, as also was, in due course, that of October 3d. I look forward with pleasure to the fulfillment of the promise made in the former to visit Washington the following winter and to "call."

Give yourself no uneasiness on the subject mentioned in that of the 22d. My note to you I certainly did not expect to see in print, yet I have not been much shocked by the newspaper comments upon it. Those comments constitute a fair specimen of what has occurred to me through life. I have endured a great deal of ridicule, without much malice; and have received a great deal of kindness not quite free from ridicule. I am used to it.

Illinois, which had gone astray in the last autumn, was to be restored to the fold, if possible, and to this end the partisans of the Administration in that State were exerting themselves with zeal; but nothing — aside from the military victories — contributed so much to the pleasing result at the polls as Lincoln's famous letter to Mr. J. C. Conkling (August 26th). Declining an invitation to be present at a mass convention to be held at Springfield on the 3d of September, the President further wrote:

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure that my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life. There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so, plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.

I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military — its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of any terms made by any man or men within that range in opposition to that army is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them. To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing the restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be



used to keep General Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? General Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of General Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from the rebel army, or any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and intimations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of the people, according to the bond of service, the United States Constitution; and that, as such, I am responsible to them.

But to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while you, I suppose, do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied that you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I have not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation, to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-chief with the law of war in the time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that the slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies the world over destroy enemies' property when they cannot use

it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female. But the proclamation, as law, is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think that its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue?

There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know, as fully as one can know the opinion of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important victories, believe the emancipation policy and the aid of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called abolitionism, or with "Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged, that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem to be willing to fight for you — but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare that you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that, in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resist-

ance to you. Do you think differently? I think that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it. Yet not wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The Sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be blamed who bore an honorable part in it; and, while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and better done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the waters' margins they have been present; not only on the deep sea, the broad bay and rapid river, but also on the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic — for the principles which it lives by and keeps alive — for man's vast future — thanks to all. Peace does not appear so far distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear that there will be some white men unable to forget that, with malignant heart and deceitful speech, they have striven to hinder it.

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.

The last Thursday of November was designated as a day of national Thanksgiving, in a proclamation (October 3d), which suggests, in its fluent and pious periods as well as in its optimistic tone, the skilled hand of Secretary Seward, who countersigned the President's signature. These passages are examples:

In the midst of a civil war of unequaled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to invite and provoke the aggression of foreign States, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict, while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union.

The needful diversion of wealth and strength from the field of peaceful industry to the national defense has not arrested the plow, the shuttle, or the ship. The axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than hitherto. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made by the camp, the siege, and the battlefield, and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years, with large increase of freedom. No human counsel hath devised, nor hath any human hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the most high God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverentially, and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and voice by the whole American people.\*

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\* Notice, in this connection, the following passage—genuine

The dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, on the 19th of November, drew to that place a vast assemblage of people. The orator for the occasion was Edward Everett, whose elaborate and classic address was worthy of his fame. Lincoln was present rather for his interest in the occasion than for the purpose of speaking, though he knew some words would be expected of him. His brief speech, uttered in a clear, plaintive tenor, and audible far and wide through the compact and intently listening throng, created profound emotion. To this fact there has been abundant testimony. Many years after, one who was present, and who bore an official and friendly relation to the President (Marshal Lamon), was reported to have spoken of this address as disappointing to some of his friends, even alleging private remarks of Mr. Everett in that vein, and adding: "The real worth of the immortal words uttered by Mr. Lincoln upon the battlefield of Gettysburg was not discovered until after his assassination." Hon. James Speed, Attorney-General at a later

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"Sewardese"—from the President's proclamation (March 30, 1863), for a National Fast, issued at the request of the Senate :

"We have been the recipients of the choicest bounties of heaven. We have been preserved, these many years, in peace and prosperity. We have grown in numbers, wealth and power as no other nation has ever grown. But we have forgotten God. We have forgotten the gracious hand which preserved us in peace, and multiplied, and nourished and strengthened us; and we have vainly imagined, in the deceitfulness of our hearts, that all these blessings were produced by some superior wisdom and virtue of our own. Intoxicated with unbroken success, we have become too self-sufficient to feel the necessity of redeeming and preserving grace, too proud to pray to the God that made us. It behooves us, then, to humble ourselves before the offended Power, to confess our national sins, and to pray for clemency and forgiveness."—*Rebellion Record*, VI., Doc. 490.

date, being questioned as to the accuracy of this representation, gave the following explicit and interesting statement:

From the first publication of Mr. Lincoln's Gettysburg speech, it was admired by all men of taste and culture beyond anything they had ever heard of a like character. . . . After I went to Washington, in speaking to him one night in familiar conversation about his Gettysburg speech, he told me that he had never received a compliment he prized more highly than that contained in a letter from Edward Everett, written to him a few days after that speech was delivered, and commenting upon it. He produced the letter, and allowed me to read it. It was as complimentary as it could possibly have been. I do not remember its expressions, but I remember well the extremely handsome and flattering tone of the letter. . . .

I will say further that a year or two after the death of Mr. Lincoln there were present at my house, in Washington, Senator Sumner, Governor Clifford, of Massachusetts, and others, and Mr. Lincoln's Gettysburg speech became the subject of conversation. Mr. Sumner said, and the others concurred in what he said, that it was the most finished piece of oratory he had ever seen. Every word was appropriate — none could be omitted, and none added, and none changed. He also showed that he had appreciated the great merit of the speech when it was first published, for he said that when he first read it, he had thought the word "proposition" improperly used; but upon reflection, and in the effort to put some other word in its stead, he came to the conclusion that his first impressions were wrong.

It seems to me curious that, in the face of so much that is well known, and so much that has become history in connection with that memorable speech, any man should attempt to say its surpassing merit was not felt and appreciated throughout the country immediately upon its first publication. I know that it was. It produced an instant and deep impression.

Mr. Everett's letter above mentioned (copied from

his autograph letter-book by Mr. H. Sidney Everett) was as follows:

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1863.

*President Lincoln:*

MY DEAR SIR: — Not wishing to intrude upon your privacy, when you must be very much engaged, I beg leave in this way to thank you very sincerely for your great thoughtfulness for my daughter's accommodation on the platform.

Permit me also to express my great admiration of the thoughts expressed by you with such eloquence and appropriateness at the consecration of the cemetery. I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion in two hours as you did in two minutes. My son, who parted from me at Baltimore, and my daughter concur in this sentiment. I remain, dear sir, most respectfully yours,

EDWARD EVERETT.

I hope your anxiety for your child was relieved on your arrival.

And this is, in full, the famous

#### GETTYSBURG SPEECH.

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as a final resting-place of those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have

thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us; that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.



## CHAPTER XIX.

1863.

*Chattanooga Campaign—Chickamauga—Mission Ridge—  
Knoxville—Meade and Lee—Charleston.*

Rosecrans tarried long at Murfreesboro after Bragg's retreat at the beginning of the year. It was late in June when he began a flanking movement which caused the enemy to retire from Shelbyville and Tullahoma. Crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and destroying the railway bridge, Bragg entered Chattanooga. Crittenden's corps, going by way of McMinnville, crossing the Cumberland Mountains and moving down the Sequatchie valley, came within shelling distance of the enemy on the 21st of August. Thomas and McCook were meanwhile busy in restoring communications and getting their troops across the river at points below the city—not fully accomplished until the 8th of September. Bragg had then left Chattanooga, disappearing southward among the hills, valleys, and thick forests that curtained his movements, and managing to create the belief that he was retreating to Rome in Georgia. Without delaying in the city, Rosecrans pushed his army forward in pursuit, and his forces were getting dangerously separated before he learned his mistake. Bragg, who was in the Chickamauga valley pre-

pared to give battle, attacked Rosecrans on the morning of September 19th, and the close of that day found the contest still undecided. The purpose had been to flank Thomas on the left, getting between him and Chattanooga. During the night the Confederate right was strengthened, and reinforcements were sent to Thomas from the Union right, held by McCook, Crittenden being in the center. In the morning (20th), McCook, unable to withstand the furious advance of Hood's superior numbers, suffered a crushing defeat. There followed a hurried rush of officers and men toward Rossville; and Rosecrans in person, among others, continued on to Chattanooga. Not so was it with Thomas or his command. In one of the most gallant actions of the war, against great odds, he repelled all assaults until he was able to retire unmolested. The losses at Chickamauga during the two days show this to have been one of the deadliest struggles of the war. On the Union side 1,656 were killed and 9,749 wounded; and on the Confederate side, 2,389 killed and 13,412 wounded.

Rosecrans withdrew within the fortifications of Chattanooga, and was soon in a condition which caused much anxiety at Washington. Reinforcements were sent him from other Western armies, and two corps from the Army of the Potomac — Howard's and Slocum's — under command of Hooker. These troops marched from the Rapidan to Washington, and went thence by rail *via* Cincinnati and Louisville to the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga — making the entire journey in eight days. Grant took personal command of the army thus constituted, and Thomas succeeded to the command of

the Army of the Cumberland, in place of Rosecrans. Secretary Stanton had a conference with Grant at Louisville while on his way to Tennessee, where he assumed command on the 18th of October. The surrender of Chattanooga or a disastrous retreat had been apprehended by the Secretary before the promotion of Thomas, to whom, immediately after the Louisville interview, Grant telegraphed: "Hold the city at all hazards." Promptly came the reply: "I will hold on till we starve." The soldiers were suffering greatly for lack of food; a large number of animals had died of starvation; ammunition was nearly exhausted. Grant arrived at Bridgeport on the 21st, having previously sent instructions preparatory to the work before him. Hooker was sent across from Bridgeport, to advance by Wauhatchie, threatening Bragg's left, while W. F. Smith seized the heights commanding Brown's Ferry, and laid a pontoon bridge over the Tennessee at that point. These orders were promptly executed, and supplies of all kinds, which had been accumulated at Bridgeport, were now easily available at Chattanooga. This, to the unspeakable relief of the army, was accomplished without the cost of a skirmish.

Bragg, who had seemed to have all Eastern Tennessee securely in his grasp — having sent Longstreet to take Knoxville and Burnside's army — was startled by the discovery of this check. His attempts to regain control of the river communications below Chattanooga were unavailing. Grant patiently awaited the arrival of Sherman's corps, which approached by forced marches, with more or less fighting, across the country from Memphis. As a feint, this force was sent across the

river at Bridgeport, threatening the enemy's left, but all save Osterhaus's division, which ultimately reinforced Hooker, soon re-crossed at Kelly's Ford, and, screened from hostile observation, marched around Chattanooga, taking position beyond the left of Thomas, with the river between them. On the 23d, Thomas advanced at 2 o'clock to gain possession of Orchard Ridge, which was captured at little cost by the divisions of Sheridan, Baird, and Wood. This important elevation, well on towards Mission Ridge, confronted the enemy's center, and was in full view of Bragg's headquarters. Hooker was to attack the extreme left of the Confederates next morning, with the expectation of clearing Lookout Mountain. This was effectually done — Geary's division taking the lead in climbing the steep and rugged slope, the eager soldiers surrounded for a time by thick clouds as they approached the stronghold from which the enemy was driven.

But the main work was not in "the battle above the clouds," or in this quarter. Away on Grant's left, east of Chattanooga, Sherman on the same morning laid his pontoon bridges, and crossed his whole force to the south of the river before noon. At half-past 3 he had gained a foothold on the northern extremity of Mission Ridge, near the Tunnel. Bragg reinforced his right, and made repeated attempts to dislodge Sherman, but without success. Next morning Sherman's advance was so stubbornly resisted that he had made no decided progress before 3 o'clock. Hooker was to have advanced the same morning against Bragg's left flank in the direction of Rossville, but the destruction

of a bridge across Chattanooga Creek delayed him for hours.

At 3 o'clock an assault on the enemy's center was ordered. The divisions of Sheridan and Wood rushed forward from Orchard Ridge, driving before them the hostile forces in the valley; charging the rifle-pits at the base of the mountain; promptly clearing them; and from thence, without stopping to re-form or awaiting further orders, impetuously mounting up the rocky and precipitous heights; pushing on over the works half way up the mountain side, scattering all before them; and never pausing until quite at the summit. There, too, the enemy turned, and was driven pell mell — running in confusion and panic. The masses pressing Sherman held out a little longer, but they, too, caught the contagion, and the whole army of Bragg was soon in rapid retreat. Orders were at once issued for the dispatch of troops to assist Burnside. Sherman rapidly moved his severely taxed forces by Athens and Loudon to Knoxville, where he arrived on the 6th of December. Longstreet promptly retired from before that place, going through the valley to rejoin Lee at Mine Run.

In these operations Grant had less than sixty thousand men. Bragg's inferiority in numbers would seem to have been fully compensated by his superiority in position. The Union losses were about 750 killed and 4,850 wounded or missing. More than 6,000 of Bragg's army were captured, 361 killed, and 2,180 wounded. On the 8th of December the President telegraphed to Grant:

Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you and all your

command my more than thanks — my profound gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all.

To Grant's generalship the people now credited, as one season's work, the freeing of the Mississippi and the securing of Chattanooga and Knoxville, achievements which effectually severed one-half of the Confederacy from the other. Meade was justly applauded for his not less auspicious victory at Gettysburg. Of all the battles of the war, this was in a sense the most critical, if not the most decisive. Its immediate results, nevertheless, fell short of what the President and the people hoped. Lee had little difficulty in re-crossing the Potomac with an army sadly reduced, but not broken, a few days after its vanguard left the battle-ground. There were heavy rains and a swollen river, but Meade, after overtaking him, hesitated to strike, and finally, against the judgment of some of his bolder corps commanders, decided not to take the hazard. Lee moved up the Shenandoah Valley and out by Front Royal to Gordonsville. Learning that he was weakened by sending reinforcements to Bragg, Meade crossed the Rappahannock on the 16th of September, and was, in fact, about to cross the Rapidan for offensive operations, when the corps of Howard and Slocum were ordered to Tennessee. This loss was partially made up, soon after, by the arrival of new troops. On the 10th of October, Buford's cavalry was sent beyond the Rapidan, to clear the way for the First and Sixth Corps to cross by the upper fords. The situation and the movements of Lee at this stage suggested a repetition of the last year's campaign against

Pope. Meade's right flank being menaced, he hastily retreated, re-crossing the Rappahannock on the 11th, and making no pause until he reached Centreville. Altogether it was an inglorious retreat. Meade next planned a dash upon the heights of Fredericksburg, to which Halleck refused his consent. Lee was driven from his position beyond the Rappahannock, with considerable loss, on the 7th of November; fell back that night to Culpeper Courthouse; retreated next day beyond the Rapidan, and remained undisturbed at Mine Run through the winter.

Operations against Charleston proceeded this year with more determined energy than before. What had been so easily done at New Orleans was not to be despaired of at the cradle of the rebellion. During the summer there was wistful hope of the fall of Charleston. General O. M. Mitchel, in command of the department at the time of his death (October 30th, 1862), had planned to break the railway line between Charleston and Savannah. The navy had retaken Fort Pulaski, off Savannah; sunk the *Nashville* and smaller Confederate craft; captured blockade runners, and co-operated in various movements of the army. But Commodore Dupont, like General Hunter (who was restored to the military command after Mitchel's death), had not here satisfied public expectation. Major-General Quincy A. Gillmore replaced Hunter on the 12th of June (1863), and Commodore Dahlgren succeeded Dupont on the 6th of July. Gillmore made an unsuccessful assault on Fort Wagner, one of the Morris Island defenses of Charleston, on the 10th of July, and again a more mem-

orable one eight days after, resulting in heavy losses and another defeat. Then, in the marshes on the western side of the island he built an earthwork manned by a single eight-inch Parrott gun, the "Swamp Angel," and on the 21st of August summoned Beauregard (now again in command at Charleston) to surrender Morris Island and Fort Sumter, on penalty of a bombardment of the city. Beauregard not complying, some shots were fired into Charleston, serving little other purpose than to prove that it could be done. Fort Wagner was finally reduced by siege, and occupied on the 7th of September. After refitting the captured works and erecting others on Morris Island, armed with the most powerful mortars and rifled cannon then in use — a mile or more nearer to Charleston than the Swamp Angel — Gillmore had a large part of the city within range. The inhabitants of Charleston mostly removed; there was an effective bombardment; and blockade-running from that port was decisively closed. The battering of Fort Sumter was renewed, and continued until the already broken walls seemed from without to be little more than a vast heap of brick dust. Still there was no surrender. Once, had the Government as persistently held its own, we know not what might have been.



## CHAPTER XX.

1863-1864.

### *A New Congress — Amnesty and Reconstruction.*

A new Congress (the Thirty-eighth) met on the 7th of December. In spite of unfavorable indications in the earlier elections, the Republicans retained control of the House of Representatives, which chose Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, as Speaker by a majority of twenty votes.

In his annual message the President speaks like one who has emerged from darkness and unrest into the reviving light and air of advancing dawn. One year ago "the war had already lasted nearly twenty months," with "many conflicts on both land and sea with varying results"; the rebellion "had been pressed back into reduced limits, yet the tone of public feeling at home and abroad was not satisfactory"; "the popular elections, then just past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves; while amid much that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores; and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed

to elicit from European governments anything hopeful upon this subject." With the new year came the final Proclamation of Emancipation, "including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation and employing black soldiers gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict." For "a long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to" this military measure; but it "was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that, if it should, the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed," he takes "another review":

The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which, three years ago, would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits.

Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now in the United States military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks, thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are

not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or cruelty, has marked the measures of emancipation and arming the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary with such discussion, the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.

With his message the President sends a copy of the Amnesty Proclamation, just issued, remarking that "the Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities." He proffers that, "if in any of the States named a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States"; but it would be "simply absurd" to attempt this in the case of "a revived government constructed in whole or in part from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected." To separate "the opposing element so as to build only from the sound," there must be a test, and he thinks "that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness." Assent to "the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery" must also be required. "To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. . . . To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I

may add at this point that, while I remain in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress." He says in conclusion:

In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone can we look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated.

The Amnesty Proclamation excepts from its benefits "all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of the said so-called Confederate Government, above the rank of Colonel in the army, or of Lieutenant in the navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and afterward aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than

lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity.”

In regard to reconstruction, the proclamation declares that “whenever in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord 1860, each having taken the oath aforesaid, and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election laws of the State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true Government of the State,” and be protected as such from “domestic violence,” as provided by the Constitution of the United States.

As to the status of freedmen, it is declared that “any provision which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the National Executive.”

Virginia is not named in this proclamation, for both the President and Congress had recognized the government organized at Wheeling, with Francis H. Pierpont as Governor, and the United States Senators elected under it, as representing the entire State. The new

State of West Virginia, subsequently organized, was admitted into the Union on the assumption that the Pierpont government was legitimate, and that its consent to the division of the State fulfilled the constitutional requirement on that subject. The preliminary work of reconstruction elsewhere had during the year been going on substantially according to this beginning — except that no division of a State was thought of — and in general harmony with the President's views as set forth in the Amnesty Proclamation. In Louisiana measures were taken for the formation of a new Constitution, and representatives were sent to Congress in two districts and admitted to seats. Tennessee had continued to have representation in both branches of Congress. If the action in these several cases was to be taken as a precedent, there was little ground for objection on the part of Congress to the reconstruction policy set forth in the Amnesty Proclamation. It is indeed true that at first it seemed to meet with general favor.

In Louisiana an anti-slavery amendment to the State Constitution was adopted by a convention chosen in accordance with a proclamation of General Banks. Michael Hahn, at the same time elected Governor, was by the President "invested with the powers exercised hitherto by the military Governor of Louisiana." Privately, Lincoln wrote to Mr. Hahn (March 15th, 1864):

I congratulate you on having fixed your name in history as the first Free-State Governor of Louisiana. Now you are about to have a convention, which, among other things, will probably define the elective franchise. I barely suggest, for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may not be let in, as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks.

They would probably help, in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty in the family of freedom. But this is only a suggestion, not to the public, but to you alone.

Probably no one to-day, after the experience of a generation, has a profounder appreciation than Lincoln already had of reconstruction troubles from two causes: First, the attempt to put the white and black races on the same footing as citizens; and, secondly, the migration of Northern men into the South to assume political authority after the war. It is doubtful if he ever went farther in any speech or writing in approving negro suffrage at the South than in the above guarded words. As to any pretended representation of Southern people based upon anything but their own free choice whenever the form of an election was gone through, he spoke with impatience and irritation. He wrote to Military Governor Shepley (on the 21st of November, 1862) concerning apprehensions expressed that Federal officers not citizens of Louisiana might be candidates for Congress from that State:

In my view, there could be no possible object in such an election. We do not particularly need members of Congress from those States to enable us to get along with legislation here. What we do want is the conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing to be members of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and that other respectable citizens there are willing to vote for them and send them. To send a parcel of Northern men here as representatives, elected, as would be understood (and perhaps really so), at the point of the bayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous, and were I a member of Congress here, I would vote against admitting any such man to a seat.

Arkansas, which at first refused to join the Secession movement, had now been brought under the control of

Union arms, though the work of reconstruction necessarily began later than in Louisiana. Early in the year 1864 steps were taken which resulted in the establishment of a loyal State government and the election of United States Senators.

A similar attempt was made, but with different result, to reconstruct Florida in the department commanded by General Gillmore, to whom the President wrote (January 13, 1864):

The detail labor will, of course, have to be done by others; but I will be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find consistent with your more strictly military duties.

Under orders from General Gillmore, an expedition under General Truman Seymour set out from Jacksonville for the interior in February. Gillmore stated its objects to be: To procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, and other commodities; to cut off one source of the enemy's supplies; to obtain recruits for colored regiments; and "to inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance, in accordance with instructions . . . received from the President by the hands of Major John Hay, Assistant Adjutant-General." Seymour was a man of intrepid courage, and only too eager to improve an opportunity for effective work. Gathering his available forces from their several posts, he advanced on the 20th, aiming at Lake City. Gillmore, learning Seymour's purpose, had sent a messenger from Hilton Head to arrest the movement, but too late. Near Olustee on the day this advance began, with only about five thousand men, Seymour suddenly found himself entrapped by an overwhelming force brought up from points within easy communication in



Georgia. His white and black soldiers alike fought with persistent courage. It was a bloody encounter, with severe loss and defeat for the Union side.\* Reconstruction was for the time abandoned in Florida.

In Tennessee, Military Governor Andrew Johnson was managing affairs in a more promising field. To Representative Maynard, who had written on the subject, the President telegraphed on the 13th of February:

Of course Governor Johnson will proceed with reorganization as the exigencies of the case appear to him to require. I do not apprehend he will think it necessary to deviate from my views to any ruinous extent. On one hasty reading I see no such deviation in his program, which you send.

There had been hopes of rallying and protecting a considerable Union party in Texas. A Military Governor had been appointed long before, but all plans for establishing him in power with military support had lamentably failed hitherto, and worse failure was coming. In the latter part of March, the Red River expedition, in which Banks had the aid of Admiral Porter's fleet and A. J. Smith's corps from Sherman's command, set out from Alexandria, one hundred and forty miles up the river, destined for Texas by way of Shreveport. In two weeks the expedition met its fate in the battle of Sabine Cross Roads. † It only remained to withdraw the army and the fleet to the Mississippi River, a dangerous work, which was accomplished with difficulty.

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\* Union—killed, 203; wounded, 1,152. Confederate—killed, 98; wounded, 847.

† Banks reported his losses (April 7-9) as 289 killed, 1,541 wounded, and 2,152 missing. War records give the Confederate losses as 350 killed, and 1,850 wounded. On his return to New Orleans, in May, Banks was superseded by Major General E. R. S. Canby.

## CHAPTER XXI.

1864.

*Grant Lieutenant-General—Another Presidential Canvass  
Foreshadowed—The Armed Blacks—The Hodges  
Letter—Prisoners Unexchanged.*

The President, in truth, expected no effectual reconstruction so long as there were resisting armies in the field. Tennessee even, though he had military possession of its capital, of Memphis in the west, and Chattanooga and Knoxville in the east, and of other important points between, was still without a regular and settled government, or the immediate prospect of one. His "main reliance" was always in the "war power," exerted with no less an object and end than the destruction of the Confederate armies as a whole. He hoped this result from another season's campaigning, under a new General-in-chief— one no longer to be sought for or taken on trust, but one who had been thoroughly tested by trial.

Ulysses S. Grant, beginning with the command of a regiment of volunteers, had been gradually advancing toward the highest command— not by influence or favor, but by simply doing his duty as a soldier. Not only had he in good faith sought to do his best in whatever position was given him, leaving all that person-

ally concerned himself to come out as it might, but he had also shown superior capacity for controlling a large army. He was found to have constant self-possession, readiness, tact, pluck, persistence. He was not a man of superfluous words, but had become noted for saying, on occasion, the right thing in the best way. His bulletins and reports, without boast or flourish, were electrifying. He was a General who captured armies as well as places. His victories had fruits. He had a clear understanding of what was wanted of him, and made it his business to get that done. He cared less about the presentable shape of his battalions than about the impression they should make upon the enemy. He had faith in the fighting qualities of his rank and file, who were not regulars unless by rare exception; and he believed they might be taken to the field with but a moderate amount of training — not thinking that soldiers were to be made veterans by mere drill and parade. A graduate of West Point, he did not undervalue military science or what is to be learned about war from books; yet his success depended more on personal character. He had a resolute will, and his inclination for action could be restrained for due preparation without missing the fit moment to strike. Other Generals than Grant had deserved well of the country and been highly applauded, but no other had gained such credit with President and people.

Congress revived the rank of Lieutenant-General by a joint resolution, approved in February, and Grant's nomination for that office was unanimously confirmed on the 2d of March. He was formally presented to the President and Cabinet on the 9th to receive his com-

mission, and by an executive order (March 10th) he was given chief command of the entire army service, General Halleck being assigned to duty as Chief of Staff. General William T. Sherman succeeded to the command of the military division of the Mississippi.

The State elections in New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island, occurring in March and April, were in 1864 highly favorable to the Administration. In each of these States the Republicans had made the canvass under an explicit commitment to the renomination of President Lincoln. The Republican members of the Ohio Legislature had emphatically pronounced for him in February. A like declaration was made in eleven other States, either by convention or by legislative caucus. This popular sentiment had not been developed without some persistent opposition. Local discontents, individual dissatisfactions, and conflicting personal ambitions had not been wanting. Original Abolitionists had thought Lincoln as much too timid as extreme Conservatives thought him too rash. On both sides there was reluctance to own that he had been wiser than either; yet in the main both were coming, or had already come, to that conviction. It had been believed that Secretary Seward entertained hopes for the succession. Some adroit and far-sighted schemers were supposed to be counting on his becoming the head of a Union party with strong following, North and South. An organization there now was, indeed, so friendly to the continuance of slavery as to find favor with the Southern Border States, and not too unconditional in

its Unionism to include the "Peace men" of the North; but it had at length come to be seen that this party would look elsewhere than to Mr. Seward for its candidate. Whatever his thoughts had been, in a speech to his Auburn neighbors on the eve of the November election, in 1863, he conclusively declared for the renomination of Lincoln.

The Secretary of the Treasury was less discreet. Born in New Hampshire (in 1808) and educated at Dartmouth College, he became a teacher in Washington City and a law student under William Wirt. Going to Cincinnati in 1830, Mr. Chase at once began the practice of law. He had not left Washington without political as well as professional aspirations. For three years he had breathed an air infected with politics, and the effects never left his system. It was not until after he failed of a coveted nomination for State Senator that he turned from the Whigs to the "Liberty" men. In 1840 he undoubtedly voted for General Harrison. No evidence is afforded by his diary, his letters, or otherwise, that up to this time he had ever taken to heart the moral or economical evils of slavery, yet in the Republican party, which he prominently helped to organize, he was counted as decidedly radical. Almost from the very beginning of his Cabinet service he had, in private conversation and correspondence, indulged in rather free criticisms of the President — no doubt really apprehending that under Lincoln's guidance or lack of guidance affairs were tending badly. He thought Hunter should have been permitted to abolish slavery in his South Carolina department, and regretted that Fremont

was restricted to fighting the enemy instead of issuing certificates of manumission in Missouri.

The Secretary seemed always willing to be the accepted leader of discontented radicals in and out of Congress; yet somehow he missed securing their general support as a Presidential candidate. There were, however, ardent advocates of his nomination, and a "confidential" circular issued in that behalf — a document quite censorious in its treatment of the President — was soon caught up by the newspapers. This incident caused the Secretary to write (February 22, 1864) to his official superior, disclaiming any previous knowledge of the letter "written by Senator Pomeroy as chairman of a committee" of his friends, though he had reluctantly consented to their submitting his name "to the consideration of the people in connection with the approaching election of Chief Magistrate." He had never wished his "name should have a moment's thought in comparison with the common cause of enfranchisement and restoration, or be continued before the public a moment after the indication of a preference, by the friends of that cause, for another." In conclusion he said: "If there is anything in my action or position which, in your judgment, will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem, and, permit me to add, affection. Differences of opinion as to administrative action have not changed these sentiments; nor have they been changed by assaults upon me by persons who profess themselves the special representatives of

your views and policy.\* You are not responsible for acts not your own; nor will you hold me responsible except for what I say or do myself. Great numbers now desire your re-election. Should their wishes be fulfilled by the suffrages of the people, I hope to carry with me into private life the sentiments I now cherish whole and unimpaired."

The President replied briefly: "Yours of yesterday, in relation to the paper issued by Senator Pomeroy, was duly received; and I write this note merely to say I will answer a little more fully when I can find time to do so."

While the Secretary seems to have ingenuously met the unpleasant issue which he voluntarily assumed to have been forced upon him by an accident, his stately periods betray no consciousness of wrong-doing, or even of impropriety. As to the actual situation, too, certain statements of the avowed author of the circular in question,—Mr. J. M. Winchell, secretary of the "Pomeroy Committee," and not the Kansas Senator himself,—published a decade later, † indicate a confusion of dates or other defect of memory on the part of Mr. Chase or of his supporter, who said: "Mr. Chase had manifested no reluctance whatever to be a candidate against Mr. Lincoln, whom he honestly believed to be totally unfit for the crisis; his only reluctance was to be connected with a failure. The committee worked zealously to rally the war sentiment of the country to his support, but with small success. Mr. Chase was in-

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\* Alluding especially, no doubt, to a recent attack on the Secretary by General F. P. Blair, Jr., in Congress, and to a speech of Postmaster-General Blair, in Maryland, some time earlier.

† In the *New York Times*, September 15, 1874.

formed of this proposed action, and approved it fully. He told me himself that the arraignment of the Administration made in the circular was one which he thoroughly indorsed and would sustain."

After a week's suspense the Secretary received the promised fuller answer, in these words:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, February 29, 1864.

*Hon. Secretary of the Treasury:*

MY DEAR SIR:—I would have taken time to answer yours of the 22d inst. sooner, only that I did not suppose any evil could result from the delay, especially as, by a note, I promptly acknowledged the receipt of yours, and promised a fuller answer. Now, on consideration I find there is really very little to say. My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made *public* came to me only the day you wrote; but I had, in spite of myself, known of its *existence* several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which, I supposed, came from it, and of secret agents who, I supposed, were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more.

I fully concur with you that neither of us can be justly held responsible for what our respective friends may do without our instigation or countenance; and I assure you, as you have assured me, that no assault has been made upon you by my instigation, or with my countenance.

Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

The Republican National Committee seasonably



issued its call for a "Union" nominating convention to meet at Baltimore on the 7th of June. The general sentiment of Republicans everywhere in favor of Lincoln's re-election was unquestionable, yet there were prominent Union men, both radical and conservative, who had other views; and from this quarter came an urgent request that the convention should be postponed to a later day. The time already fixed was some weeks later in the season than the meeting of the Chicago convention four years before, and the committee gave little heed to the demand for delay. Ultimately some of the malcontents held a convention at Cleveland, a week earlier than the Baltimore convention, intent on creating a serious schism. Their chosen candidate was General Fremont. In Missouri, the radicals of the Union party were in the ascendant, as immediate emancipationists; in Kentucky, on the other hand, a majority of the Union State Committee — much disturbed by the President's anti-slavery policy and by the enrollment of blacks as well as whites under the conscription act — decided to ally themselves with the Democratic Opposition. A new organization thus became necessary for President Lincoln's friends in Kentucky, where in 1860, as a Republican, he had received but a few hundred votes.

Experimental attempts at organizing bands of colored soldiers in New Orleans and on the Carolina coast were begun soon after the control of those positions was regained by the Government. With so large a number of "contrabands" within the Union lines, the commanding Generals thought it advisable to place some of

the able-bodied ones under military discipline, to be instructed and armed should they prove to be capable and trustworthy. The President — at first far from zealous about arming the blacks — did not object to these exceptional tests, and was glad to find how well they turned out.

After entering upon his general policy of emancipation, he saw the expediency of organizing bodies of colored troops wherever the circumstances were favorable, yet it was not until the recovery of the entire country on the lower Mississippi that he ordered the work to be undertaken on a large scale.

It is improbable that his decision on this subject was hastened by wearisome importunities, though these were not lacking. Wendell Phillips, in a statement published many years later, alleged that himself, with Senator Henry Wilson, Dr. S. G. Howe, and several others, as late as January, 1863, "had a long interview with Lincoln, trying to induce him to call the negro into the ranks. All night," said Mr. Phillips, "we argued, but he steadily refused to give us any hope." There must have been a mistake, however, as to the time of this occurrence, for in the Emancipation Proclamation of the first day of that year the fervid orator and his companions should have already read the following not at all discouraging passage:

And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

In a general order, under date of April 24, 1863, "previously approved by the President," care was

taken, in view of threats on the other side, to secure protection for colored soldiers, of whom there were many already in the service. Army commanders were instructed that "if an enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any captured persons of their army, it would be a case for the severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint." Later, the President himself directly communicated instructions on this subject to all his commanding Generals, as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, July 30, 1863.

It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism, and a crime against the civilization of the age.

The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered, that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold in slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Soon after the capture of Vicksburg, Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas was required to give his personal attention to the organization of colored troops in the

wide field thus opened, and promptly entered upon this work. On the 9th of August (1863) the President wrote to General Grant:

General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi valley with the view of raising colored troops. I have no doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it a resource which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works doubly, weakening the enemy and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now, I think, at least one hundred thousand can and ought to be organized along its shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Davis understands you as believing that the Emancipation Proclamation has helped some of our military operations, and I am glad if this is so.

The President was now much in earnest about this matter. His estimate of the number of blacks to be enlisted (one hundred thousand) — sanguine as it may have seemed at the time — was destined to be far exceeded in less than a year. Before the close of the March, 1864, the number enlisted had reached one hundred and thirty thousand. A few weeks later, replying to a delegation of Western conservatives who opposed this policy, Lincoln said:

There are now in the service of the United States nearly two hundred thousand able-bodied colored men, most of them under arms, defending and acquiring Union territory. The Democratic strategy demands that these forces be disbanded, and that the masters be conciliated by restoring them to slavery. The black men who now assist Union prisoners to escape are to be converted into our enemies, in the vain hope of gaining the good-will of their masters. We shall have to fight two nations instead of one.

You cannot conciliate the South if you guarantee to them ultimate success; and the experience of the present war proves their success is inevitable if you fling the compulsory

labor of millions of black men into their side of the scale. Will you give our enemies such military advantages as insure success, and then depend upon coaxing, flattery, and concession to get them back into the Union? Abandon all the forts now garrisoned by black men, take two hundred thousand men from our side and put them in the battlefield or cornfield against us, and we would be compelled to abandon the war in three weeks. . . .

There have been men base enough to propose to me to return to slavery our black warriors of Port Hudson and Olustee, and thus win the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Come what will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. My enemies pretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am President, it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the Union. But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the Emancipation policy, and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion.

Late in March, Governor Bramlette, ex-Senator Archibald Dixon, and Mr. Hodges, editor of the old Whig journal at Frankfort, had a personal interview with the President. The character of this conference is well enough indicated by Lincoln's letter to one of these gentlemen, written directly after. In these few and fitting words he reveals in outline the whole course of his thought, purpose, and action touching the great evil which caused the war:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864.

*A. G. Hodges, Esq., Frankfort, Ky.:*

MY DEAR SIR:— You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day, in your presence, to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows:

I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong,

nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel. And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took, that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that, in ordinary civil administration, this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary, abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery.

I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that Government — that nation — of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?

By general law, life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I feel that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that to the best of my ability I had even tried to preserve the Constitution if to save slavery or any minor matter I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution, all together. When early in the war General Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When a little later General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come.

When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor com-

pensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations; none in our home popular sentiment; none in our white military force — no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men, and we could not have had them without the measure.

And now let any Union man who complains of the measure test himself, by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the rebellion by force of arms, and in the next that he is for taking these one hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he cannot face his cause so stated, it is only because he cannot face the truth.

I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

The Sanitary Commission, of which the Rev. Henry W. Bellows was President, has a history of its own that belongs not here. It was abundantly provided with funds for the benefit of wounded or ailing soldiers,

through direct contributions and the proceeds of fairs organized by the ladies, who, with constant zeal, rendered incalculable service in alleviating the miseries of the war. The Christian Commission, of like beneficence and similarly sustained, but with the different aim of affording consolements to dying or suffering soldiers and of communicating with their friends or performing other acts of Christian charity, was organized in Philadelphia, under the presidency of Mr. George H. Stuart. At a fair in Washington, in March, the President responded to a call from the large assembly present, saying impressively:

The war in which we are engaged falls heavily upon all classes of people, but the most heavily upon the soldier. For it has been said, all that a man hath will he give for his life; and, while all contribute of their substance, the soldier puts his life at stake, and often yields it up in his country's cause. The highest merit, then, is due to the soldier. In this extraordinary war, extraordinary developments have manifested themselves, such as have not been seen in former wars; and among these manifestations, nothing has been more remarkable than these fairs for the relief of suffering soldiers and their families. And the chief agents in these fairs are the women of America. I am not accustomed to the use of the language of eulogy; I have never studied the art of paying compliments to women; but I must say that, if all that has been said by orators and poets, since the creation of the world, in praise of women were applied to the women of America, it would not do them justice for their conduct during this war. I will close by saying, God bless the women of America.

At a fair in Baltimore, on the 18th of April, he said in the course of a longer speech:

Calling it to mind that we are in Baltimore, we cannot fail to note that the world moves. Looking upon the many



people I see assembled here to serve as they best may the soldiers of the Union, it occurs to me that three years ago those soldiers could not pass through Baltimore. I would say, Blessings upon the brave men who have wrought these changes, and the fair women who have assisted them. The change which has taken place in Baltimore is part only of a far wider change that is taking place all over the country. When the war commenced, three years ago, no one expected that it would last this long, and no one supposed that the institution of slavery would be materially affected by it. But here we are. The war is not yet ended, and slavery has been very materially affected or interfered with. So true is it that man proposes and God disposes. . . .

After mentioning "a painful rumor afloat in the country, . . . that there has been a wanton massacre of some three hundred colored soldiers surrendered at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, during a recent engagement there," he continued:

There seems to be some anxiety in the public mind whether the Government is doing its duty to the colored soldier and to the service, at this point. At the beginning of the war, and for some time, the use of colored troops was not contemplated; and how the change of purpose was wrought I will not now take time to explain. Upon a clear conviction of duty, I resolved to turn that element of strength to account; and I am responsible for it to the American people, to the Christian world, to history, and on my final account to God. Having determined to use the negro as a soldier, there is no way but to give him all the protection given to any other soldier. The difficulty is not in stating the principle, but in practically applying it. . . . To take the life of one of their prisoners on the assumption that they murder ours, when it is short of certainty that they do murder ours, might be too serious, too cruel a mistake. We are having the Fort Pillow affair thoroughly investigated, and such investigation will probably show conclusively how the truth is.

Fort Pillow, about forty miles above Memphis, on the Mississippi River, was garrisoned by five or six hundred soldiers, nearly half of whom were colored (artillerymen of the regular army), under Major Booth, and the others white, under Major Bradford, of the volunteer cavalry. On the 12th of April, Forrest's cavalry swept down upon the fort before sunrise, but was bravely resisted from the outer line of intrenchments until 9 o'clock, when Major Booth was killed. Then Major Bradford withdrew his men into the works on the bluff, where he was assisted by a gunboat, which gave the enemy a raking fire whenever exposed through one of the ravines on either side of the fort. The conflict went on until after noon, when the enemy, temporarily relieved from the fire of the gunboat, and after a second refusal of Bradford to surrender, made a furious and successful assault. Bradford was killed, and his surviving men fled in haste, seeking shelter in the timber at the foot of the bluff and even in the river. They were closely pursued, and a large share of them mercilessly slaughtered. Forrest reported his own losses as twenty killed and sixty wounded, and stated that he buried two hundred and twenty-eight "Federals" that evening, and a number more the next day.

The voluminous testimony in the case, as taken by a Congressional joint committee, contains horrible details of the slaughter, showing a specially ferocious spirit towards the blacks. The President had promptly brought the matter to the attention of the Richmond authorities, who ordered Forrest's immediate superior, General S. D. Lee, to inquire and report thereon. As a result, it was declared that (contrary to what had been

rumored) "the garrison never surrendered, but retreated under cover of a gunboat, with arms in their hands and constantly using them." It was further maintained that the Confederate officers, "with all the circumstances against them, endeavored to prevent the effusion of blood," and that black as well as white prisoners were taken and still held. In brief, then, it appeared that the case did not call for extreme methods of "retribution." Whatever the effect of the President's action, it was made clear that he intended to exact fair play to all his soldiers alike; and it is a fact that no such incident as this at Fort Pillow again occurred.

The woes of Andersonville or other prisons will not be recounted here; but the interruption of a regular system of exchanges, which led to large accumulations of prisoners on both sides, needs a brief notice in this connection.

The President early appointed two commissioners to visit and care for Union prisoners at Richmond, but they were stopped at Norfolk, an intimation being given that an exchange of prisoners would be agreeable to the authorities there; and a negotiation followed between Generals Wool and Howell Cobb, resulting in a cartel dated February 14, 1862. The contention about captured privateersmen (who had been arrested as "pirates" — the President ultimately yielding, to avert retaliation) caused a suspension of exchanges from March 1st until the 22d of July, when a new agreement was made on the basis of the cartel of the War of 1812. Most of the officers of higher rank having been exchanged under this compact, it was

soon after abruptly suspended. About the middle of August, General Lee wrote to General Halleck, calling him to account for Butler's hanging of Mumford at New Orleans in the preceding May, and for military executions by other Union officers (as specified) "within the Confederacy," and inquiring as to the truth of the allegation that in South Carolina Hunter had "armed slaves for the murder of their masters," as Phelps was said to have done at New Orleans. Halleck replied: "As these papers are couched in language insulting to the Government of the United States, I most respectfully decline to receive them." On the 21st of August, Davis issued a proclamation of outlawry against Phelps and Hunter. Four months later, Butler was in like manner "outlawed," and it was ordered that, if captured, the commanding officer should "cause him to be immediately executed by hanging"; that officers serving under him should be, "whenever captured, reserved for execution"; and that "all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States." A like course was to be taken with officers "found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection."

So matters remained until Meade had met Lee at Gettysburg, and the Confederate garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were at the last extremity. Then, with credentials dated July 2, 1863, Alexander H. Stephens started from Richmond "to seek an adjustment" of the exchange question at Washington. He was stopped at the Union outposts, and reminded that "the customary agents and channels" were entirely

adequate for the purpose avowed. He had, in fact, as he himself disclosed after the war, another design, for which the alleged one was only a mask, namely, to propose negotiations for peace, with the ultimate object of strengthening the Opposition party of the North. Exchanges were still suspended for more than a year after.

## CHAPTER XXII.

1864.

*Grant in Virginia—Sherman in Georgia—Confederate Cruisers—Anxious Days in June.*

“Not expecting to see you before the spring campaign opens,” the President wrote to Grant on the 30th of April, “I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant, and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any restraints or constraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster, or capture of our men in great numbers, shall be avoided, I know that these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would mine. If there be anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you!”

To which the General replied (May 1st):

The confidence you express for the future and the satisfaction for the past in my military administration is acknowledged with pride. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint, have never expressed or implied a complaint, against the Administration

or the Secretary of War for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. Indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and the importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you.

Just before the Lieutenant-General received his appointment, Meade had sent a cavalry expedition under Kilpatrick around Lee's lines by way of Spottsylvania Court-house, striking the Virginia Central Railway at Beaver Dam and cutting communication by that route; crossing the South Anna River and breaking the Fredericksburg Railway in like manner; and approaching (March 1st) within four miles of Richmond. Being forced to retreat down the Peninsula, Kilpatrick was met by an infantry support from Fortress Monroe — again the headquarters of General Butler, who had been assigned, a few months before, to the command of a department including that region and North Carolina. Custer, with a small cavalry force, had meanwhile moved by Madison Court-house to within a short distance of Charlottesville.

The campaign proper was not to open so early as these movements seemed to portend. When May day came, Lee, with headquarters at Orange Court-house and his army behind strong defenses at Mine Run (near Chancellorsville), was still confronting Meade, whose headquarters were at Stevensburg and his army behind the Rapidan. The Army of the Potomac had been reorganized into three corps: the Second, Third, and

Sixth, respectively commanded by Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick. Major-Generals French, Sykes, and Newton had been relieved. The Ninth Corps, which Burnside had been gathering at Annapolis, marched through Washington on the 23d day of April to join Meade. The effective strength of the four corps was about one hundred thousand men.

To General Butler's command were added about ten thousand men from South Carolina — the Tenth Corps, under Gillmore. This and the Eighteenth Corps, under W. F. Smith, constituted the Army of the James. With an available force of thirty thousand men, more or less, Butler was expected to operate with effect against Richmond from Fortress Monroe, simultaneously with Meade's advance from the Rapidan. Grant also sent forces under Sigel and others to break the railway line between Virginia and Tennessee.

Meade began his advance early in the morning of the 4th of May. Warren and Sedgwick crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford; the cavalry, now under Sheridan, and Hancock's corps forded at Ely's, nearer the enemy's position. Both wings, with the greater part of the trains, had crossed before night. Early next morning, while Sedgwick's left maintained communication with the river, Warren advanced to effect a junction with Hancock. To prevent this the enemy kept up a desperate and deadly fight all day in the tangled woods of the Wilderness. Burnside, guarding the railway, was ordered up. Marching more than thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, his men were at hand on the morning of the 6th. All through this day, too, the contest continued,



with terrible losses and little gain of position on either side. During the night, however, the enemy retired behind his Mine Run intrenchments.\*

Grant now determined to place his entire force between Lee's position and Richmond or draw him out of his stronghold. On the night of the 7th, Warren moved out by the most direct road towards Spottsylvania Court-house. Lee, discovering the movement and having a shorter line, reached that place before Warren. On the 9th there was a good deal of artillery firing between the opposing armies without coming to close quarters. A severe calamity of the day was the death of Major-General John Sedgwick, instantly killed while giving personal attention to the management of one of his batteries. He was succeeded in command of the Sixth Corps by Major-General H. G. Wright. On the 10th there was a general assault on the enemy's lines, with some advantage gained by Hancock and Burnside. There was little firing on the next day, but on the 12th there was one of the severest battles of the campaign. At daylight Burnside attacked the enemy's left and center, driving the opposing forces a long distance by a brilliant bayonet charge, and capturing over three thousand prisoners. Warren took part in the general action, and Wright (Sixth Corps) in the afternoon came to the support of Hancock and Burnside. After very severe losses, on both sides, neither could claim a positive victory. †

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\* Losses in the "Wilderness": Union—killed, 2,246; wounded, 12,037. Confederate—killed, 1,630; wounded, 9,120.

† Losses at "Spottsylvania": Union—killed, 2,725; wounded, 13,416. Confederate—killed, 1,300; wounded, 6,700.

For the next six days there was no serious fighting. In another flanking movement, Warren, closely followed by Wright, reached the left bank of the North Anna River on the afternoon of the 23d. Hancock and Burnside were not far in the rear. The enemy was again ahead in the race, and in position on the other side of the river. Warren crossed at once without opposition, and when later attacked, he repulsed his assailants. Sheridan had meanwhile made a raid on Lee's communications, destroying supplies, defeating Stuart (who was mortally wounded) at Yellow Tavern; dashing through the outer line of works at Richmond; continuing from thence to Haxall's Landing, where he communicated with Butler, and returning to the North Anna camp on the 25th. Butler had occupied City Point and Bermuda Hundred on the 5th of May; paused one day to intrench; then attempted to break the railway line between Petersburg and Richmond. He had previously sent a large cavalry force under Kautz to destroy the railway communications southward of Petersburg, but this did not prevent the arrival of Beauregard and his command in season to combat Butler, who inflicted no serious damage on the railway. He had sent a smaller cavalry force to join Gillmore, who was menacing Richmond. During the night of the 13th-14th the first line of the Confederate works at Drewry's Bluff was carried, with but little loss; but it was speedily abandoned, and Butler was driven back within his intrenchments, between the James and the Appomattox, near their confluence. On the 22d Grant ordered W. F. Smith to join Meade with all of Butler's

force available without endangering the possession of City Point and Bermuda Hundred.

Meade was withdrawn from the North Anna on the 26th. On the 30th the army reached Hanover Courthouse and the Cold Harbor road, where it found the enemy in an intrenched position on the left bank of the Chickahominy. An attack along the whole line was at once ordered, but gained no advantage. Sheridan seized a good position at Cold Harbor on the 31st, and held it until Wright and Smith came up—the latter having just completed his march from Bermuda Hundred. The two corps attacked and carried the works in their immediate front on the evening of the 1st of June—Lee meanwhile attacking the other three corps and suffering a repulse. On the 2d, Grant ordered the entire army to be placed in position for a general assault the next morning. The battle of Cold Harbor, fought on the 3d of June, cost heavily in human life and gained nothing. The enemy at its close held his fortified lines unshaken.\*

Here, near the scene of the battle of Gaines's Mill, with secure and convenient communications by way of the Pamunkey and York Rivers, Grant remained for several days. With the prompt co-operation he had expected elsewhere when issuing his orders at the beginning of the campaign, the Lieutenant-General would now have hoped to repeat his Vicksburg exploit by extending his lines north of Richmond to the James, cutting Lee's communications, and capturing his army.

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\* Losses at "Cold Harbor": Union—killed, 1,840; wounded, 9,077. Confederate—killed, 900; wounded, 3,600.

But on the south, Butler had as yet failed in his part. In the Valley, Sigel had been beaten by Breckinridge at Newmarket on the 15th of May, and was relieved from his command. His successor, Hunter, defeated the enemy at Piedmont on the 5th of June, and pushed forward toward Lynchburg. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, had orders to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railway farther west, and sent a detachment of cavalry under Averill, who reached Wytheville on the 10th of May; effected a temporary break of communication; and made good his retreat through rugged and obscure mountain ways, rejoining Crook at Union on the 15th. All were united with Hunter's command at Staunton on the 8th of June, and something effective in that quarter was still hoped.

Sherman's forces comprised the Army of the Tennessee, now under Major-General James B. McPherson, the Army of the Cumberland, Major-General George H. Thomas, and the Army of the Ohio, Major-General John M. Schofield. The Twentieth Army Corps, (the Eleventh and Twelfth consolidated, sent from the East the previous autumn,) under Major-General Joseph Hooker, was attached to the Army of the Cumberland. Among the commanders of the large and well-provided cavalry force were Generals Stoneman, Rousseau, Garrard, and Kilpatrick. The entire army numbered nearly one hundred thousand. Sherman, who began his service in this war at Manassas in 1861, had borne a conspicuous part in most of Grant's Western campaigns, and succeeded him in command of the Army of the Tennessee. His present command had hardly been sur-

passed — in numbers, condition, and zeal combined — by any army as yet brought into the field. His campaign began on the 6th of May.

The opposing Confederate forces, under General Joseph E. Johnston, successor of Bragg, were posted at and near Dalton. McPherson was sent to turn his flank by way of Snake Gap, while Thomas and Schofield threatened in front. Johnston retired to an intrenched position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the 15th, and after a hard battle he retreated during the night. His rear guard was encountered near Adairville on the evening of the 17th. Next morning he was again out of sight, and, though vigorously pursued, was only come up with on the 19th at Cassville, and next morning had fallen back across the Etowah River. Meantime, one of Thomas's divisions had been dispatched to Rome, where there were extensive manufacturing works. The place was taken, with a large quantity of artillery and other property, and the manufactories were destroyed.

Having rested a few days at Cassville, Sherman set his army in motion toward Dallas (on the 23d), in order to turn Allatoona Pass; and on the 25th Hooker, who led the advance, had a sharp encounter with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. There was much fighting in this vicinity during the next three or four days, including a severe engagement on the 28th, in which the enemy vigorously attacked McPherson, and was repulsed with heavy losses.

On the 4th of June, Johnston retreated to positions of great strength on Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains, manifesting a determination at last to make a

stand. Sherman was detained in this vicinity during the remainder of June.

To the work of the navy in maintaining the blockade and in aiding army operations on coasts and rivers was added that of dealing with the enemy's privateering cruisers on the high seas. The first of these vessels was the *Sumter*, Raphael Semmes, which ran out of the Mississippi River (July 1st, 1861), and after capturing in the Caribbean Sea a dozen or more merchant ships, entered the British port of Nassau, New Providence, where she was cordially welcomed and allowed to purchase supplies. After further privateering exploits, the *Sumter* entered the harbor of Gibraltar. Despairing of escape from the *Tuscarora* and the *Kearsarge*, which soon after came up and waited outside, Semmes sold his vessel, and prepared, with his crew, to take charge of another built for like service at Liverpool—the *Alabama*.

The *Nashville*, R. P. Pogram, escaped from Charleston harbor in the summer of 1861, crossed the Atlantic, destroying two merchantmen on the way, and ran into the port of Southampton. Having re-supplied there, she succeeded, thanks to the law which gave her twenty-four hours' start, in escaping the waiting *Tuscarora*, and re-crossed the Atlantic, but her cruising soon ended.

The *Florida*, built in Liverpool, was one of the most destructive of the Confederate cruisers. Captain Maffit took her out from that port in March, 1862, and in the following August she was chased into Nassau, where, on representations of Minister Adams, she was brought before the Admiralty Court, but judicially discharged.

Leaving Havana in September, after a hospitable reception there, the *Florida* evaded the Gulf blockading squadron, and entered Mobile harbor, where she was repaired. Running safely out again, she continued her work in the Gulf and elsewhere; recrossed the ocean; was allowed to repair at the Brest navy-yard, and (Maffit being there succeeded by Captain Morris) continued to make havoc among American private vessels during the summer of 1864. At length the *Florida* entered the Brazilian port of Bahia, where she was captured in November. Though this violence to international law was complained of by the Emperor, it led to no serious trouble with the liberal-minded Dom Pedro, and it ended the career of the *Florida*.

The *Georgia*, built at Glasgow, cruised under command of W. L. Maury in the North and South Atlantic with moderate success, and went as far as the Cape of Good Hope. Her service came to an end in the summer of 1864, after returning to American waters.

The *Shenandoah*, also British-built, was second only to the *Alabama* in her devastations. Her career belongs largely to a later period, not closing even with the disbandment of the Confederate armies, being then in remote Northern seas frequented by whalers, and much belated in getting news from home.

The *Alabama*, built by the Lairds, started from the port of Liverpool, in spite of the remonstrances of Minister Adams, late in August, 1862, and proceeded to a Portuguese harbor of one of the Azores Islands, where Semmes and crew awaited her coming. During the next two years this formidable cruiser captured sixty-three vessels, nine of which were released on ransom

bonds and the remainder burned at sea. The crews of these captures were in the strictest sense non-combatants, of course, yet they were paroled as prisoners of war, and included in the exchange accounts kept at Richmond.\*

Commodore Winslow, of the *Kearsarge*, in quest of the *Alabama*, was not far away when she entered the harbor of Cherbourg, on the 11th of June (1864). No submarine cable brought news from Europe in those days, and it was nearly two weeks before the American public was aware of a situation which at once roused lively interest in England.

One of the most anxious months of the war was this present June. Grant was pausing at Cold Harbor after a destructive and profitless battle—Lee tenaciously holding the line of the Chickahominy between the Union army and Richmond; Hunter moving in the Shenandoah Valley with designs on Lynchburg and the Tennessee Railway; Butler at City Point, with orders calling for effective blows at Richmond and its communications on that side; Banks and Porter recovering themselves as they could after their baffled Red River undertaking; and Sherman halting before Kenesaw Mountain, which was strongly held by Johnston. Government legal-tender notes reached a lower point of depression than ever before. The declension of this

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\* The aggregate damages claimed of Great Britain before the Arbitration Commission at Geneva exceeded \$26,000,000—chiefly committed by the cruisers named in the text. The amount awarded and paid was \$15,500,000. An incalculable loss was the practical ruin of our merchant marine.



currency, gradual in the earlier part of the war, had now been abrupt and startling. After the battles before Richmond in 1862, gold only rose to  $120\frac{1}{2}$ ; after the Fredericksburg defeat in December it advanced to 160; following the Gettysburg and Vicksburg victories it receded at one time (in August) to  $122\frac{1}{2}$ . In January, 1864, its highest range was  $159\frac{1}{2}$ , and it rose only from 164 to 189 in April. There was a change to 252 before the close of June.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

1864.

*Renomination at Baltimore — The Fremont Convention at Cleveland — Thirteenth Amendment in Congress — Winter Davis's Reconstruction Bill — Speech at Sanitary Fair in Philadelphia — Secretary Chase Resigns — Succeeded by Senator Fessenden — "Confidential" Confederates in Canada — Greeley's Mission to Niagara.*

The Republican National Convention met at Baltimore on the 7th of June.\* Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D., of Kentucky, was its temporary president. On taking the chair he avowed his lifelong conviction of the evil and wrong of slavery, and his earnest desire that it should come to an end throughout the land — a declaration which brought very enthusiastic applause. He was equally clear, and was as warmly indorsed by cheers from delegates and spectators, in the expression of his belief that the nation demanded the re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

West Virginia was duly represented, and there was a delegation claiming to represent Virginia—the "Pierpont" commonwealth, which had its seat at Alexandria.

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\* Called by the regular Republican committee, this was formally styled a "Union" Convention, and it included, in accordance with the invitation extended, some members not identified with the Republican party.

The admission of Senators and Representatives to seats in Congress from Arkansas was still pending at Washington, and Representatives from Louisiana had already been recognized by Congress. Both States were treated by the convention as reconstructed, and the delegates from Louisiana and Arkansas were seated. The like hospitality was shown to the delegates from Tennessee — all the more readily, no doubt, that many members of the convention desired to make a citizen of that State the candidate for Vice-President. A growing antagonism between the President and Congress in regard to reconstruction was echoed in the discussions here; and a majority of the convention found it expedient to draw the line on "Virginia," whose delegates were excluded. There were contesting delegations, Radical and Conservative, from Missouri. The Radicals, though less friendly to Lincoln than their rivals, were admitted. Ex-Governor William Dennison, of Ohio, was chosen as the permanent presiding officer.

The convention pledged its members, irrespective of political differences, "to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority," and in bringing "the rebels and traitors arrayed against it" to the "punishment due to their crimes"; approved "the determination of the Government not to compromise with rebels, or to offer any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an 'unconditional surrender' of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States"; called upon the Government "to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor"; affirmed that "slavery was the cause and now consti-

tutes the strength of the rebellion," and that justice and the national safety "demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic"; promised to "uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government, in its own defense, has aimed a death-blow at this gigantic evil," and pronounced in favor of a constitutional amendment to "terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of the United States." There were resolutions giving thanks and promising liberal consideration to soldiers and sailors; encouraging foreign immigration; favoring the speedy construction of the railroad to the Pacific; and insisting that the national faith pledged for the redemption of the national debt be kept inviolate. There were general allusions to the Fort Pillow massacre and to the French invasion of Mexico which were sufficiently explicit. Two resolutions more directly personal were:

*Resolved*, That we approve and applaud the practical wisdom, the unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity to the Constitution and the principles of American liberty, with which Abraham Lincoln has discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office; that we approve and indorse, as demanded by the emergency, and essential to the preservation of the nation, and as within the Constitution, the measures and acts which he has adopted to defend the nation against its open and secret foes; that we approve especially the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the employment as Union soldiers of men heretofore held in slavery; and that we have full confidence in his determination to carry these and all other constitutional measures essential to the salvation of the country into full and complete effect.

*Resolved*, That we deem it essential to the general welfare that harmony should prevail in the national councils,

and we regard as worthy of public confidence and official trust those only who cordially indorse the principles contained in these resolutions, and which should characterize the administration of the Government.

The somewhat indefinite resolution last quoted was construed by radical interpreters to mean that the Cabinet needed reconstruction. One member aimed at was understood to be Postmaster-General Blair. The formula was broad enough to make room for others.

A ballot for the Presidential nomination having been moved, ex-Secretary Cameron proposed instead a resolution declaring the renomination of both Lincoln and Hamlin. This met with so much objection that, after a brief discussion, the amendment was withdrawn, and the original motion prevailed. As the roll was called, the entire vote of every State save one was cast for Lincoln. The exception was Missouri, which gave an undivided vote for General Grant. Having thus obeyed the instructions of their constituents, the Missouri delegates agreed to make the vote unanimous.

Of the votes cast for Vice-President, 200 were for Andrew Johnson, 145 for Hannibal Hamlin, and 113 for Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York. Mr. Johnson had the entire vote of Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Tennessee, Arkansas, West Virginia, Delaware, Connecticut, and a majority of the votes of New York and Vermont. Illinois and Pennsylvania were unanimous for Hamlin.\* Without another roll-call enough votes were changed

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\* As stated by Colonel A. K. McClure, one of the Pennsylvania delegates, this vote for Mr. Hamlin was only complimentary, the majority really preferring Mr. Johnson, for whom they would have voted as a unit on another ballot.

to give Johnson a majority. The nomination of a candidate from Tennessee was especially agreeable to the Secretary of State for its effect abroad, where the possibility of reclaiming any Confederate State was persistently denied. There was, too, a general impression, in which Lincoln shared, that the ticket would be strengthened by the nomination of a Southern Democrat who had persistently adhered to the Union side. Nevertheless, the President felt a strong personal sympathy with his first associate on the Republican ticket—a sympathy that was nothing less than sincere regret for his defeat by the entirely free action of the convention. This sentiment would very naturally be uppermost in Lincoln's mind for the moment. As attested by Mr. Tinker, then of the telegraphic service at the War Department, where the President first received the news, he remarked, as if soliloquizing: "Well, I thought possibly he might be the man. Perhaps he is the best man, but"—The sentence remained incomplete. What he expressed can be readily interpreted, but even with the light of later events, we cannot read his hidden misgiving or the reflections to which it led.\*

The convention having finished its work and dissolved, the committee appointed for the purpose waited on the President at the White House, on the 9th of

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\* Mr. Tinker's reminiscence appeared in the *New York Sun*, in July, 1891. Major Albert E. H. Johnson, who was confidential clerk to Secretary Stanton at the time in question, said of this incident (*New York Evening Post*, July 13, 1891): "The door had scarcely closed upon the President . . . when Mr. Tinker came in and told me the entire story, just as he has now told it in print. I remember it as if it were but yesterday."



June, and officially announced its action. Responding with brevity, he said:

I will neither conceal my gratification nor restrain the expression of my gratitude that the Union people through their convention, in the continued effort to save and advance the nation, have deemed me not unworthy to remain in my present position. I know no reason to doubt that I shall accept the nomination tendered; and yet, perhaps, I should not declare definitely before reading and considering what is called the platform. I will say now, however, I approve the declaration in favor of so amending the Constitution as to prohibit slavery throughout the nation. When the people in revolt, with a hundred days of explicit notice that they could within those days resume their allegiance without the overthrow of their institution, and that they could not so resume it afterward, elected to stand out, such amendment to the Constitution as is now proposed became a fitting and necessary conclusion to the final success of the Union cause. Such alone can meet and cover all cavils. Now, the unconditional Union men, North and South, perceive its importance, and embrace it. In the joint names of Liberty and Union, let us labor to give it legal form and practical effect.

In the evening he was serenaded by a Cincinnati band, a large number of Western delegates and others being present, and in recognition of the courtesy he said:

I am very much obliged to you for this compliment. I have just been saying, and as I have just said it, I will repeat it: The hardest of all speeches which I have to answer is a serenade. I never know what to say on such occasions. I suppose that you have done me this kindness in connection with the action of the Baltimore convention which has recently taken place, and with which, of course, I am very well satisfied. What we want still more than Baltimore conventions or Presidential elections is success under General Grant. . . . Now, without detaining you any longer, I propose that you help me to close up what I am now saying

with three rousing cheers for General Grant and the officers and soldiers under his command.

The cheers were generously given, Lincoln, with hat in hand, taking the lead.

Next day he met in the East Room a delegation of the National Union League, and in a short speech made use of a homely illustration, then greeted with laughter and applause, and since famous:

I do not allow myself to suppose that either the convention or the League have concluded that I am either the greatest or best man in America, but rather they have concluded, like the old farmer, that it is not best to swap horses while crossing a river.

His answer (June 27th) to a written communication, more formally notifying him of his renomination, was very brief, its substance being in these words:

The nomination is gratefully accepted, as the resolutions of the convention — called the platform — are heartily approved. While the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the Western Continent is fully concurred in, there might be misunderstanding were I not to say that the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department, and indorsed by the convention among the measures and acts of the Executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable. I am especially gratified that the soldier and the seaman were not forgotten by the convention, as they forever must and will be remembered by the grateful country, for whose salvation they devote their lives.

For more than thirty years no President had been chosen for a second term. Never, in fact, had a Northern President been re-elected. There were Republicans



who had sought, without great success, to popularize a "one-term principle," and there were malcontents whose voices were heard even at Baltimore, mainly outside the convention, but also in the Missouri delegation, who fortified their opposition with this among other reasons; but in the country at large sagacious politicians were not tardy in discovering that the road to popular favor did not lead in the direction of a new candidate.

No great anxiety had been caused by the scattering "Cleveland Convention," which, on the last day of May, nominated Major-General John C. Fremont for President, and Brigadier-General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice-President, on a platform demanding the preservation of the Union, obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the suppression of the rebellion "by force of arms and without compromise"; that "the rights of free speech, free press, and the *habeas corpus* be held inviolate, save in districts where martial law has been proclaimed"; favoring a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery; declaring for "the one-term policy for the Presidency," also to be "maintained by constitutional amendment," and for the election of President and Vice-President "by a direct vote of the people," to be provided for in the same way; insisting that "the question of the reconstruction of the rebellious States belongs to the people, through their representatives in Congress, and not to the Executive"; and maintaining that "the confiscation of the lands of the rebels, and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers, is a measure of justice." These were the chief declarations of principle and policy — "integrity and economy in administration, the right of asylum

except for crime subject to law," (in evident allusion to the "Arguelles case,"\* about which the Opposition were declaiming somewhat loudly,) and the "Monroe doctrine," making up the remainder. Both the nominees formally and promptly accepted, each, however, taking exceptions to the confiscation clause of the platform.

Three or four hundred persons, very few of them the authorized representatives of any constituency, took part in this gathering — of which Lincoln thought there was a good description in the Scriptural account of a certain assemblage at the cave of Adullam. † If intended to have any effect at Baltimore the week following, its managers were disappointed. For a time, however, this "schism" was to serve as a menace, affording comfort to the Democratic Opposition, to the Southern enemies of the Government, and to their confidential employees over the Canada border.

Much of the first session of the Thirty-eighth Congress was occupied with questions relating to slavery and reconstruction. Senator Trumbull, on the 10th of February, reported from the Committee on the Judiciary a joint resolution proposing the following amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

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\* Mr. Seward had directed that one Arguelles, a Cuban slave-dealer and fugitive from justice, (not a "political refugee,") be surrendered at the request of the Spanish authorities, though not made obligatory by an extradition treaty between Spain and the United States. The "right of asylum" for such men as Arguelles was insisted on a little too warmly in some quarters, as a matter of either principle or policy.

† 1 Samuel, xxii. 2.

ARTICLE XIII.—Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Propositions of like purpose but differing in terms from the above, as shaped by Mr. Trumbull, had been introduced early in the session in both houses. Discussion began on the 28th of March, Senators Trumbull and Wilson speaking at length on one side, and Senators Davis, of Kentucky, and Saulsbury, of Delaware, on the other. On the 5th of April, Senator Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland, took the floor. His speech, awaited by a large audience, was listened to with profound interest. In the course of his remarks he said:

The men who fought through the Revolution, those who survived its peril and shared its glory, and who were called to the convention by which the Constitution of the United States was drafted and recommended to the adoption of the American people, almost without exception thought that slavery was not only an evil to any people among whom it might exist, but that it was an evil of the highest character, which it was the duty of all Christian people, if possible, to remove, because it was a vice as well as an evil. . . . The present incumbent of the Presidential chair was elected—elected by a sectional vote—and the moment the news reached Charleston, where some of the leading conspirators were, and here in this chamber, where others were to be found, it was hailed not with regret, but with delight. Why? Because, as they thought, it would enable them to drive the South into madness, by appealing to the danger in which such an event involved this institution, which the people were made to believe was so essential to their power and to their happiness; and that will be repeated over and over again, just as long as the institution is suffered to remain.

Terminate it, and the wit of man will, as I think, be unable to devise any other topic upon which we can be involved in a fratricidal strife.

After further debate the joint resolution was adopted on the 8th of April — yeas, 38; nays, 6. The latter were the two Senators from Kentucky (Davis and Powell), the two from Delaware (Saulsbury and Riddle), McDougal, of California, and Hendricks, of Indiana.

Discussion on the resolution began in the House of Representatives on the last day of May. On the question of its passage the vote (June 15th) stood: Yeas, 93; nays, 65 — not voting, 23. The majority being less than two-thirds, the resolution was defeated. Before the result was declared, Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, changed his vote to the prevailing side, and his motion to reconsider saved the measure until the next session. Messrs. Griswold and Odell, of New York, were of the less than a half dozen Democrats who voted for the amendment. So zealous was the President for its passage that he used personal persuasion, if not importunity, in its behalf with individual members.

Reconstruction was becoming more and more a thorny trouble. Various projects or theories had been broached and discussed in both houses since the first year of the war, but Congress had failed to take any conclusive action. There were jealousies of the Executive power on the part of Senators and Representatives, some of whom nursed and propagated their dissatisfaction with what Lincoln had felt constrained to do towards restoring loyal civil government in insurgent States. Early in the present session so much of

the Executive message as related to amnesty and reconstruction was referred in the House to a special committee, of which Henry Winter Davis was chairman. Mr. Davis, though representing a slaveholding district, as he had done for several years, was looked upon as almost a Republican before the war. There were many who regretted that he was not given a place in the Cabinet. Mr. Davis himself might naturally have thought his prior services not duly requited, yet he made no unseemly display of discontent. His influence in Congress and his position as chairman of the Reconstruction Committee, however, did not contribute to relieve the variance between the President and Congress.

The spirit of the Winter-Davis Reconstruction bill (reported on the 15th of February) was disclosed in a preamble declaring the so-called Confederates a public enemy waging a war "whose injustice is so glaring that they have no right to the mitigation of the extreme rights of war" accorded to "an enemy who has the right to consider the war a just one," and that none of the rebel States is "entitled to representation in Congress or to take any part in the government of the Union." The bill authorized the President to appoint a "Provisional Governor" in each of said States, and provided that when military resistance should have been suppressed in any such State, its white male citizens should be registered, and after a majority of them should have taken the oath of allegiance, a convention to frame a new constitution should be called — no person to vote for, or be chosen as, a delegate who had held any civil or military office, State or Confederate, while in rebellion, or who had voluntarily borne arms

against the United States; and requiring that the constitution framed by such convention should disfranchise substantially the classes just specified, forever prohibit slavery, and repudiate all debts contracted or sanctioned by the "usurping power," State or Confederate. The bill also formally declared the abolition of slavery in all of said States, providing remedies and penalties. The House passed the bill by a small majority (74 to 66) on the 4th of May, but rejected the preamble by a vote of 75 to 57.

After this bill had gone to the Senate, there was a discussion in that body on the question of admitting Messrs. Fishback and Baxter as Senators from Arkansas, which was opposed by Mr. Sumner, who (June 13th) reviewed in no friendly temper the President's expressed views on reconstruction. His own position was stated in the following resolution, presented in the Senate:

*Resolved*, That a State pretending to secede from the Union, and battling against the General Government to maintain that position, must be regarded as a rebel State, subject to military occupation, and without representation on this floor until it has been re-admitted by a vote of both houses of Congress; and the Senate will decline to entertain any application from any such rebel State until after such a vote of both houses.

Without indorsing these generalities, the Senate resolved (on the 28th) that the rebellion was not so far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle its inhabitants to be represented in Congress; and the House took equivalent action, refusing to seat Representatives-elect from that State.

The Winter-Davis Reconstruction bill did not find immediate favor in the Senate. After it had been pending for some weeks, Senator Gratz Brown, of Missouri, offered, and the Senate adopted, a substitute providing, in substance, that the inhabitants of any insurgent State (proclaimed as such by the President on the 13th of July, 1861) should be incapable of voting for President or for members of Congress until said inhabitants had been declared — “by proclamation of the President, issued by virtue of an act of Congress to be passed hereafter, authorizing the same” — to have returned to their allegiance. The House disagreed to this substitute, and it was only at the last hour of the session — a final adjournment on the 4th of July having been determined upon — that the Senate receded from its amendment by a vote of 18 to 14, thus concurring with the House. No time was left to the President for a careful consideration of the bill, though its general nature, at least, was not unknown to him. Had he sent in ever so brief a veto message, it could not have been acted upon by the two houses successively in the few minutes that remained; nor, had there been time, could the bill have been passed over an Executive veto. The President left the bill unsigned and unreturned. This exasperated the more ardent friends of the measure, who did not spare their outcries, using the offensive term, “pocket-veto” — only applicable, in fairness, under circumstances quite different.

The Bureau of National Currency was created at this session, and Hugh McCulloch, of Indiana, was appointed its Commissioner; also the Bureau of

Military Justice, of which Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, was made Chief.

Of course the war was constantly the main object of public concern. At Philadelphia, on the 16th of June, the President visited a Sanitary-Commission fair, and said in the course of his speech at an evening banquet:

War at the best is terrible, and this war of ours, in its magnitude and duration, is one of the most terrible. . . . We accepted this war — we did not begin it, but we accepted the war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end with the attainment of that object. I hope, under God, it never will without. Speaking of the present campaign, General Grant is reported to have said: "I am going through on this line if it takes all summer." This war has taken three years. It was begun or accepted on the line of restoring the national authority over all the national domain. And for the American people, as far as my knowledge enables me to speak, I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more.

In the Cabinet, after Mr. Stanton succeeded Mr. Cameron in the War Department, there had been but one change until this summer. Secretary Smith having been appointed Judge of the United States District Court in Indiana, his assistant, John P. Usher, of the same State, long known to the President in professional practice, was made Secretary of the Interior in January, 1863.

Secretary Chase had more than once come to the point of writing his resignation, without securing its acceptance. The President, while naturally annoyed in some measure by the Secretary's ambitious ways, preferred to retain his highly valued official services. Mr. Chase no doubt believed an acceptance would be found



embarrassing when — the prospects of the war and of the political canvass being for the moment especially shadowed by passing clouds — he again handed back his portfolio, proposing to retire at the close of the fiscal year. There had been some differences between the President and the Secretary as to the control of certain appointments, that of assistant treasurer at New York especially; but the Secretary had officially survived other instances in which, against his wishes, the President chose to exercise independently his constitutional prerogative in appointing Treasury officers. There were those who surmised that the Secretary expected his resignation would again prove ineffectual. It was, however, promptly accepted.

To fill the vacancy was not a light matter. Whoever supposed the President thought it so when he sent to the Senate the name of ex-Governor David Tod, of Ohio, was certainly mistaken. This nomination conformed as to locality and former political record with the principles which had governed the prior appointment. Lately one of the most efficient "War Governors" during two of the most trying years, Mr. Tod was held in high regard by the President for both executive and personal qualities; he had served abroad in a diplomatic capacity; as a business man he had been much more successful in his private affairs than Mr. Chase; and judging in advance of experience, there was no obvious reason why he might not as ably manage the Treasury Department. He was not, however, a man of such national reputation as the occasion required. His nomination satisfied Lincoln's conscience as to his own rules originally acted upon in selecting his Cabinet;

and if Governor Tod declined,— as he, in fact, at once did,— the way would then be open for pressing into the service another Cabinet officer from New England. Senator William Pitt Fessenden, chairman of the Finance Committee, though reluctant — from the state of his health especially — was prevailed upon to accept the position, in which he fully justified universal confidence and expectation.

The Democratic National Convention had been called to meet at Chicago on the 4th of July. As the day approached, the Opposition leaders — feeling very hopeful as to the prospect, and thinking it expedient to await further developments without offering any new provocation that would divert the attention of their adversaries from their internal contentions — decided to postpone the gathering until the 29th of August. Not long after the armies of Meade and Sherman got well under way, it was given out that advances for negotiation were to be made from the Confederate side. Some of the Democratic managers may possibly have been persuaded that the war could be shortened in this way; and it is certain that they all hoped a political advantage from such a proffer, whether sincere or feigned. Mr. Greeley, too, a malcontent Republican just now, was much impressed with the danger of neglecting to entertain such an advance with alacrity. He was indulging a gloomy humor; and in his dismal moods Mr. Greeley was sometimes credulous and extravagant. His ways were known to a New York politician who had early gone South to exercise his peculiar talents in support of the rebellion at good distance from the battle-

field, and who was made the medium of communication with the Radical editor.

Some weeks before the date in question a group of Confederate statesmen — among whom were ex-Senator Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, ex-Secretary Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders, the New York refugee just alluded to — took passage on a blockade-runner for Bermuda, from whence they duly arrived in Canada. Locating on the border, they remained in the Dominion through the season, were supplied with funds from the Confederate treasury at Richmond, and kept up communication, by way of Niagara Falls and Detroit, or otherwise, with sundry persons and for divers objects on this side of the international line. Sanders wrote a letter to Mr. Greeley from Niagara Falls on the 5th of July, saying that Clay, Holcombe, and himself desired a protecting pass to visit the city of Washington, intimating that they desired to go there on a mission of peace. Confidential assurances were given that the two associates mentioned had authority from Richmond as peace commissioners. Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, and not only urged him to open negotiations with the parties at Niagara Falls, but even volunteered to suggest a “plan of adjustment,” including restored and perpetual union, with “slavery utterly and forever abolished throughout the same”; a national convention to revise the Constitution; and the payment of four hundred million dollars to compensate losses by the abolition of slavery. He believed, as he assured the President, that a just peace was then attainable; that such an offer would “at the

worst prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause," and "might save us from a Northern insurrection." Any offer from the other side, Mr. Greeley was sure, "should be received, and either accepted or rejected." The President promptly authorized him to accompany the applicants to Washington, with a guarantee of protection, on their producing evidence of having such authority from Richmond as represented.

Greeley thereupon went to Niagara Falls, and from the New York side sent (July 17th) a note to Messrs. Clay, Thompson, and Holcombe, across the river, saying that he was informed they were "duly accredited from Richmond, as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace," and desired to visit Washington on that mission. "If my information be thus far substantially correct," said Mr. Greeley, "I am authorized by the President of the United States to tender you his safe conduct on the journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time that will be agreeable to you." On the next day Messrs. Holcombe and Clay (for Mr. Thompson all the while kept discreetly in the background) replied that the safe conduct had been tendered them "under some misapprehension of the facts," and further said: "We are, however, in the confidential employment of our Government, and are entirely familiar with its wishes and opinions on that subject; and we feel authorized to declare that, if the circumstances disclosed in this correspondence were communicated to Richmond, we would be at once invested with the authority to which your letter refers; or other gentlemen, clothed with full powers, would

be immediately sent to Washington with the view of hastening a consummation so much to be desired, and terminating at the earliest possible moment the calamities of the war. We respectfully solicit, through your intervention, a safe conduct to Washington, and thence, by any route which may be designated, through your lines to Richmond."

Still Mr. Greeley had not tired of this adventure. He informed his correspondents that he would make another application to the President in their behalf in accordance with the changed aspect of the case. He did so, and received the following paper:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

*To Whom It May Concern:*

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on substantial and collateral points; and the bearer thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This clear and reasonable response settled the matter. The men "in the confidential employment" of Jefferson Davis had quite other objects in view than they were ready to reveal to Mr. Greeley. Their hope of peace lay chiefly in the division of the Northern people, in promoting insurrection in loyal States, and in defeating the re-election of Abraham Lincoln. They hatched still other and less innocent plots, which were in a little time disclosed.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

1864.

*Fate of the Alabama*—“*Sons of Liberty*” Conspiracy—*Virginia and Georgia Campaigns Continued*—*Washington in Danger*—*Early and Sheridan in the Valley*—*Sherman Approaches Atlanta*.

Late in June came the news, tardily traveling in the olden way, that the pest of American commerce, the *Alabama*, had run into the harbor of Cherbourg. The *Kearsarge* was lying off Flushing when Winslow, her commander, learned of this move of the enemy he was seeking. He promptly came up and awaited the *Alabama's* appearance outside. Semmes ran out in the morning of the 19th (Sunday), with the English yacht *Deerhound* in close company, and steered for the *Kearsarge*, which moved farther out to sea. When seven miles off shore the latter turned and faced the adversary. The two were a mile apart when the *Alabama* opened fire, pouring in three broadsides before receiving any reply. Winslow made directly for his assailant, who sheered off, firing continually, while the less frequent but better aimed shots of the *Kearsarge* were more effectual. Circling around and steadily approaching each other, grapeshot became available after an hour. An eleven-inch shell had already disabled a gun and killed or wounded eighteen men on the *Alabama*.

Now another shell exploded in her coal-bunkers, and so blocked up the engine-room that sails had to be used and steam abandoned. Her sides, too, were by this time badly riddled; and presently, finding the ship sinking, Semmes ran up a white flag, and called for help in rescuing the surrendered crew. Twenty minutes later the *Alabama* sank. Semmes and part of his men were carried off to England by the *Deerhound*, but not a relic of the famous destroyer returned with them to her native shore. Winslow was the hero of the hour.

General Rosecrans had taken command of the Department of Missouri in the latter part of January, with but few troops besides the organized State militia, about twelve thousand in number. In the northwestern part of the State he found there were two or three thousand "provisionally enrolled militia" hostile to the Government, and intent on fighting Abolition instead of Secession. Further investigation by the aid of spies and detectives made him acquainted with the approximate numbers and specific purposes of the secret Order of American Knights, known also as Sons of Liberty, of which, as Rosecrans reported to the Government, Sterling Price was grand commander in the South, and C. L. Vallandigham in the North. Price was preparing to reconquer Missouri, in which undertaking twenty-three thousand members of the order were said to have sworn to join him as he advanced into the State. An invasion of the North was also intended, to be supported by a grand uprising of Sons of Liberty and sympathizers in several of the Northwestern States. Rosecrans caused the arrest of a score or two of the

prominent members of the order in Missouri, among whom was the State commander, then acting consul of Belgium at St. Louis. The release of the latter having been ordered by the Secretary of War, Rosecrans appealed to the President, who approved the General's action and overruled Stanton.

Governor Morton, of Indiana, with his wonted vigilance and energy, obtained ample proof of the existence and designs of the order in that State, and had certain of its leaders — well-known citizens — arrested on the charge of treasonable conspiracy, including plots of assassination. They were tried by the civil court, and some of them convicted and sentenced to death. Though the extreme penalty was ultimately remitted, the blow given the order was effective.

It was among the discoveries reported by Rosecrans that Vallandigham intended to escape from Canada and to attend the Democratic National Convention at Chicago. It is certain that on the 15th of June he suddenly appeared at a convention in his home district, and was chosen a delegate to the national convention. When his presence in Ohio became known, there was an undue interest felt as to the President's treatment of the incident. Some of his friends thought it would be ruinous for him to leave the fugitive at large in defiance of the order of banishment. The enemies of Lincoln, on the other hand, appear to have hoped for Vallandigham's re-arrest, and a great collision following a general uprising of his comrades. The case had no such importance in the President's mind. Vallandigham's presence or absence was a matter of indifference at this stage of affairs, so long as he was guilty of no new offense.



The exposure of the “Knights,” their secret purposes, their signs and forms, with the details of their maturing insurrection, was of real importance. The President did not see fit, for the time, to give complete publicity to these disclosures — which included designs too monstrous for easy belief — but had the voluminous evidence taken in Missouri and Indiana referred to Judge-Advocate General Holt for examination. The report of Judge Holt, Chief of the Bureau of Military Justice (October 8, 1864), showed that the purposes of the “Order of American Knights,” or “Sons of Liberty,” were: To aid desertions from the Union armies; to circulate disloyal publications; to give intelligence to the enemy; to aid recruiting for the Confederates within the Union lines; to furnish the enemy with arms and supplies; to co-operate in Confederate raids and invasions; to destroy Government property; to persecute and impoverish Union men; to assassinate those of special influence or in high authority; and to set up a Northwestern Confederacy.

“While the capacity of this order for fatal mischief,” said Judge Holt, “has, by means of the arrest of its leaders, the seizure of its arms, and the other vigorous means which have been pursued, been seriously impaired, it is still busy with its secret plottings against the Government, and with its perfidious designs in aid of the Southern rebellion. It is reported to have recently issued new signs and passwords, and its members assert that foul means will be used to prevent the success of the Administration at the coming election, and threaten an extended revolt in the event of the re-election of President Lincoln.”

Resuming the narrative of the Virginia campaign — which left Meade at Cold Harbor and Hunter moving toward Lynchburg — it must be said that affairs down to the close of August were not in a condition to afford relief to the public anxiety. After his repulse at Cold Harbor, Grant resumed the plan first contemplated — in which Butler's part had failed — that of taking Petersburg and approaching Richmond from the south. Hunter's movement had caused the withdrawal of a considerable force from Lee, and that detachment was expected to be kept busy at a distance while Meade's army crossed the James. Hancock passed over by ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing on the morning of the 14th of June, and by midnight a pontoon bridge was completed for the remainder of the army. W. F. Smith had orders which were expected to secure prompt possession of Petersburg. He arrived with his corps before the city on the 15th at daylight, but made no attempt on the slight defenses in his front until near sunset, when he easily carried the lines northward of the town, and again paused. The hours of that night, as of the day just closing, were precious to the enemy, who swarmed in Smith's front next morning. Two days of fighting left no hope of gaining the place except by protracted siege.

Hunter appeared before Lynchburg on the 16th of June. He had inflicted much damage on the enemy, destroying manufactories, supplies, and other property on his way up the valley. Part of the forces sent to oppose him had reached Lynchburg before his arrival, and owing to the difficulties of transportation on the route he had taken, he found himself short of ammu-

dition. After skirmishing for two days, he retired in haste into the valley of the Kanawha, and it was some weeks before his men returned within the range of effective service. Butler made another attempt to break the railway between Petersburg and Richmond; but Wright, who was ordered to support him, found on the 17th that Butler had been driven back. Sheridan, on a cavalry expedition, intended to assist Hunter, defeated a cavalry force at Trevillian Station on the 11th, and next day, after destroying the railway between that place and Louisa Courthouse, started for Gordonsville. A short distance from that place he encountered an intrenched infantry force too strong to be attacked, and withdrew without having communicated with Hunter, or learned his situation. On his way back to Meade's lines, Sheridan reached White House just in time to prevent the army depot there from falling into the hands of the enemy; beat the cavalry sent to capture the place, and fought his way through to the main army, arriving on the 25th. The cavalry divisions of Wilson and Kautz (of Butler's army) near the same time made raiding excursions southward, on the Weldon, Southside and Danville roads, destroying many miles of railway, but getting roughly handled in some of their encounters with Wade Hampton's cavalry and his infantry support. Meanwhile, Meade's lines were extended on the south and west of Petersburg. A railway track was laid from City Point, now the depot of supplies for both Meade and Butler, around to the rear of the Petersburg lines. Here, with only an occasional brush, the long, hot summer days wore monotonously on till past the middle of July.

It was otherwise in the region left uncovered by Hunter when he turned aside into the Kanawha Valley with the twenty thousand men who had marched with him from Staunton. General Early, who had defended Lynchburg, was now at liberty to move down the Shenandoah Valley, and did so in strong force. Sigel, guarding Martinsburg, was stampeded, taking refuge on Maryland Heights, near Harper's Ferry. On the 2d of July, Early reached the Potomac, destroyed some miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway track, and created almost as great a panic in Maryland and Pennsylvania as Lee had done by his invasion the year before.

General Lew Wallace at Baltimore gathered what troops he could and proceeded to Frederick, interposing a meager array — chiefly of hundred-days' men and raw volunteers — between Early and the cities of Baltimore and Washington. Wallace had about three thousand men, to whom were presently joined part of Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps (Wright's). Retiring across the Monocacy on the 8th, he took position on the line of that stream. Early approached next morning from Frederick, with his greatly superior numbers, and with an artillery force which included sixteen Napoleon guns. Wallace, by keeping the enemy in check until late in the afternoon, gained a day's time that was precious. A detachment of Early's cavalry struck the railway east of Baltimore on the morning of the 10th, and his main army moved directly toward Washington, his advance reaching Rockville in the evening. His forces were next day well up and within six or eight miles of the capital. He appeared before Fort Stevens, out the

Seventh-street road, early on the morning of the 12th, but he had arrived too late.

As soon as Early's advance down the valley was known, Grant ordered Hunter to send his troops with all possible dispatch to Harper's Ferry — which, it was soon evident, would not be in season to avail for the emergency. From Petersburg Grant sent one of Wright's divisions to Baltimore, and the other two, with the entire Nineteenth Corps (A. J. Smith's), to Washington, their advance arriving on the 11th. It was but a rear guard that the men of the Sixth Corps assailed and routed in front of Fort Stevens next day. Early's main force, already in rapid retreat, was pursued up the valley. Grant having soon recalled Wright, leaving the care of the valley to Hunter, the enemy again moved down the valley, and on July 30th a flying force crossed into Pennsylvania, burned Chambersburg, and then retired towards Cumberland.

Evidently more thorough measures were needed in that quarter. The task was intrusted to Sheridan, in command of all the forces operating against Early. Four brigades were added to Sheridan's cavalry, and orders were given with the intent of putting a final end to troublesome campaigns in the valley.

At Petersburg a mine, which had been for some time in preparation, was exploded on the 30th of July, making a wide breach in the enemy's works in front of Burnside, to part of whose corps was assigned the duty of turning the opportunity to account. The order was not effectually executed, and the failure, attended with heavy losses, was disheartening to the army and depress-

ing to the people, even beyond what was due to a minor incident of the siege.

In Georgia, Sherman had passed many days before Kenesaw Mountain, where Johnston took position upon retreating from New Hope Church on the 4th of June. During an engagement on the 14th, General Polk was killed by a shell while making observations from a distant height. On the 27th an assault on Johnston's lines was repulsed with a loss (in killed and wounded) of three thousand men. Sherman then made another flanking movement (July 2d), and the enemy retired without serious damage to the Chattahoochee River. Sherman, establishing his headquarters at Marietta, sent Schofield over the river above, compelling Johnston to abandon his defenses at the main bridge, and to withdraw his rear guard (on the 11th) to the other side. At this juncture Johnston was relieved of his command, giving place to the more impetuous and dashing Hood.

Rousseau, with two thousand cavalry, had meanwhile gone on a raiding tour around Atlanta, making havoc with its communications in all directions, and returning to camp on the 22d. Ere this date, Thomas had joined Schofield across the river on the left, and McPherson had pushed eastward to the Augusta railway. The main army, being now over and concentrating, menaced Atlanta from the northeast, Thomas crossing Peach-tree Creek on the 19th. Next day Hood made a furious assault on the lines of Howard, Hooker, and Palmer, but was defeated after a stubborn conflict. On the 22d, Hood, who had retired within his strong fortifications nearer the city, made another sally while

Sherman was effecting a closer junction of the corps of McPherson, Logan, and Blair. The general battle which followed was much more destructive than that of two days before, ending in Hood's defeat and retirement within his works.\* The gallant McPherson, one of the most esteemed of the Union Generals, and one of the youngest to obtain so high a command, was killed in this engagement.

Sherman again set his cavalry at work on the enemy's communications south and west, disposing his main forces around the city without making any assault or a close investment. Howard succeeded McPherson as commander of the Army of the Tennessee; Stanley was given command of the Fourth Corps; Slocum took the place of Hooker, relieved at his own request; and Jefferson C. Davis succeeded Palmer in command of the Fourteenth Corps.

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\*Losses at "Peach-tree Creek": Union—killed, 512; wounded, 2,010. Confederate—killed, 1,500; wounded, 6,000.

## CHAPTER XXV.

1864.

*Dreads and Plottings—Democratic National Convention  
Nominates McClellan—Victories of Far-  
ragut, Sherman, and Sheridan.*

Down to the close of August there had been no very inspiring event of the war since the destruction of the *Alabama*. The protraction of the struggle was a sore disappointment. But dark as this immediate period seemed to many Union men, it must have been still darker to the eyes of discerning leaders of the Confederate cause. If gold quotations at the North had reached a perilous height, the paper money of the South had ceased to have a quotable value. The Confederates had been forced, reluctantly but finally, to abandon all hope of foreign intervention or recognition; their spasmodic efforts at invasion were unavailing; the blockade was strangling the Confederate semblance of national life; and two powerful Union armies had made their way, despite all resistance, to the very heart of their two largest States. Already sagacious General Lee foresaw that the end was near.

It is scarcely credible that there should have been, in these August days, such a weariness of heart, such a



flagging of spirits, as some alleged to be widespread among those who had hitherto resolutely supported the Administration. Even optimistic Mr. Seward wrote soon after to a Government representative abroad: "The public mind here was very despondent. A complex campaign, which had been expected to be easy and short, sharp and decisive, had proved to be laborious, long, and sanguinary, without assurance of favorable result. . . . To European eyes our affairs wore at that time exactly the same gloomy and portentous aspect that they presented to our own." \*

To replace the losses in Virginia, from the Wilderness onward, and to supply other needs, the President, with an eye to the salvation of the country rather than to the success of a political canvass over which a new and large call for troops seemed for the moment to cast an ominous shadow, issued a proclamation, on the 18th of July, calling for half a million more volunteers — the respective quotas of the States to be made up by draft, unless otherwise completed by the fifth day of the following September. If no one questioned that there was need of such a call, could any Republican leader who cared for the country seek to turn this act to his disadvantage in the canvass, or fail to stand by him all the more firmly at such an hour?

It was just at this crisis, however, that a number of patriotic gentlemen took counsel together and devised the plan of saving the cause by bringing about another nomination. The Cleveland ticket, headed by General Fremont, still remained in the field. Could not both

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\* Secretary Seward's Works, V., 152.

the Baltimore and Cleveland nominations be annulled and another convention be held that would restore perfect harmony and insure success? With much secrecy this political plot was matured in the city of New York, and a call prepared for signatures, inviting good, loyal people, to whom these presents might come, to send delegates to a national convention to be held at Cincinnati, on the 28th of September, for "friendly consultation," with a view "to concentrate the Union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary." The existence of a scheme of this kind, in which Horace Greeley, Henry Winter Davis, and some others were engaged, was not a close secret at the time, notwithstanding the care taken for concealment. Many of the more interesting details came to light twenty-five years after through the publication of numerous letters of those who were in correspondence on the subject.\*

Of all the gentlemen concerned, Mr. Winter Davis was probably the most ardent and not the least efficient. His real base of operations was opposition to Executive interference in reconstruction. The President had, on the 8th of July, issued a proclamation, accompanied by the text of the Davis bill, stating his reasons for withholding his approval — not particularly as a healing measure, but as a matter of justice to himself and his supporters. He had in December "propounded a plan for restoration," but was then, as now, not prepared "to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration," as he would be "by a formal approval of this

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\* In the *New York Sun*, June 30, 1889.

bill." He was "also unprepared to declare that the free-State constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same, as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the States," though he was "sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted." He was, however, "fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it."

Nearly a month after the publication of this proclamation, Mr. Davis, joined by Senator Wade, issued a spirited manifesto, arraigning the President in strong terms for his course in this matter, charging motives of "personal ambition," and asserting:

A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated. . . . He has already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and defeated the bill to prevent its limitation. . . . But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; . . . and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties,—to obey and execute, not make laws,—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress.

Already there had evidently been some degree of preconcert among those who were later actively plotting for a new convention. On the 9th of August, Lieutenant-Governor May, of Michigan, wrote to Mr. Chase, apparently on this subject, receiving no reply until August 31st, when Chase said: "No such move-

ment as the one you suggest seems to me expedient, so far as I am concerned. Whether it would be expedient or patriotic in reference to some other name, I am not able to judge."\*

A number of persons met at the residence of Mayor Opdyke, in New York, on the 19th, to confer in regard to the proposed new convention. Horace Greeley, who had been invited to this consultation, wrote on the day before (August 18th) excusing himself from attending, but saying with his customary directness: "Mr. Lincoln is already beaten. He cannot be elected. And we must have another ticket to save us from utter overthrow. If we had such a ticket as could be made by naming Grant, Butler, or Sherman for President, and Farragut as Vice, we could make a fight yet. And such a ticket we ought to have anyhow, with or without a convention." Mr. Chase, who was invited to be present, declined on account of a previous engagement, but sent written words of encouragement, saying the country was "never more in need of wise counsel and fearless action by and among patriotic men," and referring more particularly for his views to a friend who expected to be present at the meeting. The "call" for a new convention was formulated at this conference.

On the next day a letter was addressed to General Fremont, sounding him as to withdrawing from the canvass, on condition that President Lincoln should do the like. But the General resolutely refused. Among members of Congress to whom the call was sent inviting

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\* Warden's "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 629.

signatures, Senator Collamer responded with great force and pertinency against the convention project, and Senator Sumner less explicitly inclined the same way; while Representatives Roscoe Conkling, of New York, and Thomas Williams, of Pennsylvania — the latter one of the most radical as well as one of the ablest members of the House — were strenuously negative in their replies; General Butler was wary; and D. S. Dickinson wrote a long letter of sympathy. Outside the circle in which it originated, the undertaking was evidently making little advance. Governor Brough, of Ohio, a personal friend of Mr. Chase, was in vain appealed to by a private message from one of the latter's friends in New York; and while Senator Wade was a power in the State, and the proposed convention was to be held in Cincinnati, influential Western recruits were wanting. In fact, Judge Wade himself, with all his discontent over the loss of the Reconstruction bill, cannot be charged with any active support of the "movement." The month wore away; another meeting of the complotters was held, this time at the house of David Dudley Field, on the 30th of August; and still the call did not publicly appear. Mr. Winter Davis, as late as the 4th of September, was "very anxious at the delay in publishing the call," which he had "fully expected to see in Saturday's *Tribune*." He was loath and late to give in; but the call and all its signatures, so far as possible, were carefully enveloped in secrecy henceforward. The Democratic convention at Chicago fatally blundered; Sherman took Atlanta; and the plot died. Winter Davis and the rest — working for "the cause" now identified

with "the man"—were presently sustaining the action of the Baltimore convention.\*

The postponed Democratic national convention met on the 29th of August. Its mixed components, mistaking momentary languor and superficial discordance for grave symptoms of popular reaction against the administration, were rashly confident as to their one united purpose of defeating Lincoln. The most violent of the Northern sympathizers with the Confederate cause—the kind of people commonly called Copperheads—domineered within and without the convention, and were most applauded when most bold and defiant in their abuse of the President. General McClellan, in spite of some objections to "one of Lincoln's hirelings," was nominated for the Presidency, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for the Vice-Presidency—the latter without dissent. The two nominations, on the whole, were thought to be well joined; only, if McClellan was to be classed as a War Democrat, it seemed more fitting that the last should be first. It was not a War-Democratic convention. It resolved:

That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity of a war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and

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\* Unhappily, Mr. Davis failed to secure a renomination, and his Congressional service ended with the coming session. He died the next year, on the 30th of December.

the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

Passages from the speeches, as reported in the local Democratic organ (the *Chicago Times*), will serve to show the animus of the convention towards President Lincoln; and the course, in general, of the Opposition during the remaining two months of the canvass accorded well with this beginning. One delegate, whom the reporter designated as "Senator Cox," said:

He did not want to use any harsh language toward Old Abe. [Cries of "Give it to him!"] He had attempted in his own city, a few weeks since, to show in a very quiet way that Abraham Lincoln had deluged the country in blood, created a debt of four thousand millions of dollars, sacrificed two millions of lives, and filled the land with grief and mourning. For less offenses than Mr. Lincoln had been guilty of, the English people had chopped off the head of the first Charles.

Another delegate named Dean, then a conspicuous Democratic orator of Iowa, was thus reported in the same journal:

He said in the presence of the force of Camp Douglas and all the satraps of Lincoln that the American people were ruled by felons. Lincoln had never turned a dishonest man out of office or kept an honest one in. . . . Perjury and larceny were written over him as often as was "one dollar" on the one-dollar bills of the Bank of the State of Indiana. [Cries of "The old villain!"] Ever since the usurper, traitor, and tyrant had occupied the Presidential chair, the party had shouted war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt. Blood had flowed in torrents, and yet the thirst of the old monster was not quenched. His cry was for more blood.

“ Benjamin Allen, of New York,” said, according to the friendly report:

The people will soon rise, and if they cannot put Lincoln out of power by the ballot, they will by the bullet. [Loud cheers.]

The convention, notoriously, was very much under the control of the secret organization whose purposes we have seen as summed up by Judge Holt. Its conclaves had many representatives there; and the twenty-three thousand dollars in greenbacks drawn by the Clay-Holcombe party on the Confederate deposits in Canada just before the meeting of this convention were presumably for use in the States. A plot appears to have been entered into for an outbreak at this time in Chicago for the release of the thousands of Confederate prisoners at Camp Douglas — an attempt prevented by a timely discovery and by the vigilance of the officer in command, General Sweet.

The work of the convention, as time proved, was quite maladroitly overdone. Horace Greeley had been under a great delusion if he really believed (as he had lately said) that the stronger party in this canvass would be that which showed the greater eagerness to negotiate for peace. No words in the platform were so fatal as those which pronounced the war a failure and demanded an immediate armistice for negotiation. McClellan, in his acceptance letter — first of the long letters of Presidential nominees — labored in vain to neutralize their effect. The spirit aroused throughout the North recalled the days immediately following the fall of Fort Sumter. Republican dissensions seemed to have van-



ished like light snowflakes of the night under the morning sun. Fremont's drooping banner, which had fluttered aloft for three months, was now promptly hauled down by his own command. Just at this time, too, as if in chorus, Farragut and Sherman electrified the country by brilliant victories on sea and land.

Early in August, Admiral Farragut, with a fleet of eighteen vessels, four of which were ironclad, appeared before the defenses at the entrance of Mobile Bay. Fort Morgan, on the mainland at the right of the eastern channel, was the first object of attack. General Canby, in command at New Orleans, had sent five thousand men under Granger to the rear of Fort Gaines, on the left of the same channel. The unarmored ships, lashed together in pairs — the *Brooklyn* and the *Octorora* taking the lead, followed by the flagship *Hartford* and the *Metacomet*,—moved early in the morning of August 5th. The ironclads had already crossed the bar. One of these, the *Tecumseh* (Commander Craven), when within a mile of Fort Morgan opened fire, which was soon responded to from the fort, and directly all available guns on both sides were brought into play. The *Brooklyn*, on which and the *Hartford* the fort guns were chiefly trained, began firing grape when near enough, dispersing the gunners from the batteries not protected; and almost at the same moment the *Tecumseh*, three hundred yards ahead, struck a torpedo, which exploded under her turret, letting in a rush of water which sunk her so quickly that of her one hundred and thirty men, only seventeen escaped. Her commander was among the lost. Regardless of the demonstrated danger, the

other vessels — Farragut at the mast-head of the *Hartford* — continued their advance. Inside the harbor the enemy had the formidable ram *Tennessee* (commanded by Buchanan) and three gunboats, which presently came into action. One of these was captured after an hour's combat; another, badly injured, was run ashore and burnt; and the third escaped. The *Tennessee* was at length seen bearing for the *Hartford*, and was closed in upon by Farragut's ironclads and strongest wooden vessels. The combat ended in the surrender of Buchanan, himself severely wounded and his vessel disabled. Fort Powell, on the western channel, was evacuated and blown up by the enemy the ensuing night. Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island, between the two entrances of the harbor, was shelled with effect next day, and being invested by Granger's force in his rear, its commander surrendered fort and garrison on the 7th. Two days later, Granger crossed over to the mainland, in rear of Fort Morgan. The siege lasted until the 23d, when the fort was surrendered with its 104 guns and 1,464 men. Thus full control of the passage into the bay was gained, definitely closing the last but one (Wilmington) of the chief Southern ports in which blockade-running had prospered.

The last week of August was a busy one with Sherman in Georgia. Leaving Slocum's corps within strong fortifications to protect the passage of the Chattahoochie, he skillfully used the rest of his army, by swinging it around to the west and south of Atlanta, to draw out and defeat part of Hood's army, to get possession of his chief lines of railway communication, and to force him to the alternative of evacuating the

city or of speedily surrendering it with his entire army. Before daylight on the 1st of September, Hood began destroying his stores and magazines, the explosions of the latter being heard by Sherman twenty miles away. An evacuation of the city was believed to be preparing, and its accomplishment was known on the 4th. Sherman thereupon gathered his army around Atlanta, where they encamped on the 7th, with headquarters in the city.

The capture of Atlanta was an event of which everybody could understand the importance. It was not more lightly appreciated in Richmond than in Washington.

There were soon to be, also, brilliant successes farther north. In the Shenandoah valley, military operations were unimportant for more than a month after General Sheridan took the command there. General Early occupied a strong position at Opequan Creek, in front of Winchester. Sheridan was at Berryville, only a few miles eastward, liable at any time to be attacked, but, with all his impetuosity of character, not eager to bring on a battle at once. Two additional divisions of cavalry, Torbert's and Wilson's, from Meade's army, joined Sheridan in August. While he was studying and preparing for the work before him, several skirmishes, in which his men were usually victorious, helped to pass the time. Grant visited him at headquarters about the middle of September, and found the General's plans so well matured and so promising as to leave no occasion for other instructions than the simple verbal order: "Go in."

In the morning of the 19th, Sheridan attacked the

enemy at the crossing of the Opequan, and after a fierce and destructive battle, which lasted until 5 o'clock in the evening, Early was dislodged from every intrenchment quite up to Winchester, and his army put to utter rout, with the loss of five guns, three thousand prisoners, and nearly as many killed or wounded. Sheridan's losses were large, the killed and wounded in the Nineteenth Corps alone — which suffered the most severely — being nearly two thousand.\* At Fisher's Hill, a few miles beyond Strasburg, Early rallied his forces in a strong position, where he was again attacked on the 20th by Sheridan, and again signally defeated with heavy losses. Continuing his flight through Harrisonburg and Staunton, pursued by Sheridan with unremitting ardor, Early withdrew his sadly reduced army through the gaps of the Blue Ridge. The upper valley, so long the great source of subsistence for Lee's army, was now thoroughly incapacitated by the victors for a continuance of this service. Sheridan then returned to Strasburg, where he advantageously posted his army on Cedar Creek.

Unused to such defeats, Early was ill content to accept the humiliation without another trial. Reinforcements were sent him, and his wits and energies were bent to the task of driving Sheridan out of the valley. A cavalry collision on the 9th of October resulted badly for the Confederate assailants. Early's next movement was in full force, more than a week later, while Sheridan in person was at Winchester, twenty miles distant.

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\* Losses : Union—killed, 697; wounded, 3,983. Confederate—killed, 226; wounded, 1,567.

Crossing the mountain spur between the forks of the Shenandoah on the 18th, and fording the stream which flows at its northern base, Early advanced on the morning of the 19th, curtained by the thick fogs, and by surprise turned the left flank of the army at Cedar Creek, capturing the batteries in that quarter, and putting the entire command to rout. Its hurried and confused flight towards Winchester was arrested between Middletown and Newtown, where Sheridan, who, on news of the disaster, had ridden with all possible speed towards Strasburg, readjusted the lines, infused his own spirit into the ranks, and repulsed the fresh onset soon made by Early. In his turn, Sheridan promptly attacked the enemy with wonted vigor. Early's forces were beaten back with severe loss, and his guns captured, as well as his trains and the spoils he had taken that day.\* He was pursued next day as far as Mount Jackson. For the last time Sheridan sent Early "whirling up the valley," which was now effectually and finally cleared.

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\* Losses : Union—killed, 644; wounded, 3,430. Confederate—killed, 320; wounded, 1,540.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

1864.

### *Presidential Canvass Concluded.*

The Confederates were trying with all their might not merely to maintain a good defensive, but to show a bold, aggressive front down to the very day of the Presidential election. The Government had hoped such crushing blows would be dealt upon the armies of Lee and Johnston ere that date as to bring the war substantially to a close. This larger longing, in spite of all successes on land and sea, was not to be gratified. Lincoln's administration passed the ordeal of a general election unaided by so great an advantage. No administration was ever more bitterly, violently, persistently denounced in an electoral canvass.

In Kentucky the regular Union organization had gone over to the Democratic party, the most forcible reason alleged being a Congressional provision (in the act of February 24, 1864) for the enrollment of all able-bodied male slaves between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, to be subject to military duty, with compensation to loyal owners. The new Union organization in that State, represented in the Baltimore convention, of course sustained the policy of Emancipation. Missouri and Maryland had already gone so far in that direction as to leave their Union men without distraction.

One resolution of the national convention had, in general terms, hinted the need of harmony in the Executive councils. The displacement of one member of the Cabinet was pressingly urged, especially after the retirement of Secretary Chase. This was Postmaster-General Blair. The President considered the selection of his heads of departments as properly his own prerogative, Executive responsibility resting not on his ministers, but on himself. He regarded Mr. Blair as an honest and efficient officer, and did not forget his earnest support in refusing to surrender Fort Sumter, as urgently advised by General Scott and Secretary Seward. Finally, deeming it better to end the disturbance, though the darkest days of the canvass were over, the President wrote to Mr. Blair (September 23d):

You have generously said to me, more than once, that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me, it was at my disposal. The time has come. You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any friend, and while it is true that the war does not so greatly add to the difficulties of your department as it does to some others, it is yet much to say, as I most truly can, that in three years and half, during which you have administered the General Post Office, I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith.

Mr. Blair's resignation bore the same date, and ex-Governor William Dennison, of Ohio, was appointed in his stead.

Three large central States then held elections on the second Tuesday in October. As usual before and since until the October elections ceased to be, these were

eagerly awaited by politicians as foreshadowing the general result in November. This year Pennsylvania elected fifteen Republican and nine Democratic representatives in Congress, to succeed an equally divided delegation, and the new Legislature was strongly Republican. Ohio, which had fourteen Democratic and five Republican representatives in the Thirty-eighth Congress, chose sixteen Republicans to the Thirty-ninth. Indiana re-elected Governor Morton by over twenty thousand majority; chose a Republican Legislature to succeed a Democratic one, and doubled the number of its Republican representatives in Congress, the delegation standing eight to three. The October oracle was not ambiguous.

On the day following these elections a vote even more notable was taken in Maryland on the ratification of a new State constitution which abolished slavery. Emancipation prevailed. In response to a serenading call after the result was finally determined, Lincoln said (October 19th): "Most heartily do I congratulate you and Maryland, and the nation and the world, upon the event. I regret that it did not occur two years sooner, which I am sure would have saved to the nation more money than would have met all the private loss incident to the measure. . . . A word upon another subject. Something was said by the Secretary of State, in his recent speech at Auburn, which has been construed by some into a threat that if I should be beaten at the election, I will, between then and the end of my constitutional term, do what I may be able to ruin the Government. Others regard the fact that the Chicago convention adjourned, not *sine die*, but to meet again if



called to do so by a particular individual, as the intimation of a purpose that if their nominee shall be elected, he will at once seize control of the Government. I hope the good people will permit themselves to suffer no uneasiness on either point. I am struggling to maintain the Government, not to overthrow it. I am struggling especially to prevent others from overthrowing it, and I therefore say, that if I shall live, I shall remain President until the 4th of next March, and that whoever shall be constitutionally elected thereto in November, shall be duly installed as President on the 4th of March, and that in the meantime I shall do my utmost, that whoever is to hold the helm for the next voyage shall start with the best possible chance to save the ship."

In Tennessee a "reorganization" convention, which met at Nashville on the 5th of September, provided for opening the polls in that State on the day of the Presidential election. As requested by the convention, Military-Governor Andrew Johnson issued (September 30th) a proclamation to that effect, reciting all the conditions and restrictions that had been agreed upon by the convention. Election day was near when a Tennessee delegation of supporters of McClellan waited on the President, to present a formal protest against Johnson's action in requiring other qualifications of voters than were prescribed by the Tennessee statutes. Among the signers of the protest were a number of old-time Whigs, such as Bailie Peyton, T. S. R. Nelson, and Emerson Etheridge, who were well seasoned in political conflict with Andrew Johnson before the war. The chief stress of their remonstrance lay against "the most

unusual and impracticable test oath." The President did not listen with quite his customary patience to the rather vexatious visitors. He told them at once that he did not deem it his duty to interfere as required, and said that he might soon reply in writing.

There was a humorous element in the situation that, of course, did not escape him. Had he been disposed to meddle with any of Johnson's methods, it would hardly have done to put the seal of reprobation on the acts of his associate on the Presidential ticket in his own State. On the 22d of October Lincoln replied to the remonstrants, reviewing the case at length, and stating as his conclusion: "I can have nothing to do with the matter, either to sustain the plan, as the convention and Governor Johnson have initiated it, or to revoke or modify it, as you demand. By the Constitution and laws, the President is charged with no duty in the conduct of a Presidential election in any State; nor do I, in this case, perceive any military reason for his interference in the matter. The movement set on foot by the convention and Governor Johnson does not, as it seems to be assumed by you, emanate from the National Executive. In no proper sense can it be considered other than as an independent movement of at least a portion of the loyal people of East Tennessee. I do not perceive in the plan any menace of violence or coercion toward any one."

Directly after the October elections a letter in cipher, which came into the Government's possession in the following year, was sent by the Confederate plotters in Canada to their employers in Richmond, containing the following advice, coupled with a suggestive promise:

We again urge our gaining immediate advantages. Strain every nerve for victory. We now look upon the re-election of Lincoln as certain, and we need to whip the hirelings to prevent it. Besides, with Lincoln re-elected, and his armies victorious, we need not hope even for recognition, much less the help mentioned in our last. Holcombe will explain this. Our friend shall be immediately set to work as you direct.

This message bore the date of October 13, 1864. How Professor Holcombe explained the business in question does not appear. One would prefer to believe that nothing worse was intended than the St. Albans raid, with its chance of creating an international difficulty. Judah P. Benjamin, in the character of Confederate Secretary of State, in his answer to this communication, said on the 19th:

Your letter of the 13th inst. is at hand. There is yet time enough to colonize many voters before November. A blow will shortly be stricken here. It is not quite time. General Longstreet is to attack Sheridan without delay, and then move north, as far as practicable, toward unprotected points. This will be made instead of the movements before mentioned. He will endeavor to assist the Republicans in the collection of their ballots. Be watchful.

It happened that on this very day Sheridan gained his brilliant victory at Cedar Creek.

An undertaking organized in Canada, near the same time, was more successfully carried out. A party of horsemen, crossing the Canadian border into Vermont, surprised the town of St. Albans, plundered its banks, and killed or wounded several of its citizens. Returning across the line, and being arrested and their surrender under the extradition treaty demanded, they were

defended by the "confidential agents," Clay and others, as having acted under military orders from Jefferson Davis, who gave them commissions as officers in his service. Their surrender being refused on this ground, a basis was laid for an international complication such as the movers of the enterprise were desiring to bring about.

Great excitement was kindled in the North; and General Dix, who was in command of the military department including the New York and Vermont frontier, promptly issued an order directing that bands of marauders hereafter coming into the States from Canada should be vigorously pursued, across the border if necessary, and captured or shot down wherever found. This order found a hearty popular approval, but, as in the case of the Mason-Slidell arrest, the policy of moderation was maintained, the President revoking so much of General Dix's order as authorized pursuit across the frontier. A rigid passport system was adopted, such as seemed necessary for protection on a hostile border; and in the following month action was taken for the termination of the Canadian Reciprocity treaty.

The general election occurred on the 8th day of November. Only the States of New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky gave majorities for McClellan. Three Southern States — Maryland, West Virginia, and Missouri — cast their electoral votes for Lincoln. Twenty-five States took part in the election — exclusive of Tennessee, whose vote was rejected in the electoral count. The final reckoning gave Lincoln 212 votes

and McClellan 21 — a proportion of more than ten to one.

On the evening of the 9th a national salute was fired by friends of the President, and a procession, with music, banners and transparencies, marched to the White House, where, in response to cheers and calls, Lincoln, appearing at the usual second-story "tribune," said: "It has long been a grave question whether any Government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies. . . . If the loyal people united were put to the utmost of their strength by the rebellion, must they not fall when divided and partially paralyzed by a political war among themselves? . . . The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. . . . But the election, along with its incidental and undesirable strife, has done good, too. It has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. . . . It shows, also, to the extent yet known, that we have more men now than we had when the war began. Gold is good in its place; but living, brave, and patriotic men are better than gold. But the rebellion continues; and now that the election is over, may not all, having a common interest, reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven, and will

strive, to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am deeply sensible to the high compliment of a re-election, and duly grateful, as I trust, to Almighty God for having directed my countrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result. May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in the same spirit toward those who have?"

He closed by asking "three hearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallant and skillful commanders."

General Grant, in telegraphing his congratulations the same evening, added: "The election having passed off quietly, no bloodshed or riot throughout the land, is a victory worth more to the country than a battle won. Rebeldom and Europe will construe it so."

There were congratulations on every hand, and new inspirations of hope for a speedy end of the war. Yet the President relaxed neither purpose nor effort. Only one road to peace was open. When asked whether he thought his re-election was aided more by the Atlanta victory or by the Chicago peace platform, he answered: "I guess it was the victory. Of the two, at any rate, I would rather have the victory repeated."

## CHAPTER XXVII.

1864-1865.

*Annual Message — Finances and the War — S. P. Chase,  
Chief Justice — Cabinet Changes — Thir-  
teenth Amendment.*

From financial statements in the President's annual message of December 6th, it appears that the Treasury receipts from all sources during the year ending June 30, 1864, were nearly one billion four hundred million dollars, exceeding the disbursements by about one million, and were mainly from loans — the amount from customs being but little over one hundred and two millions, and from internal revenue nearly one hundred and ten millions. The public debt at the same date amounted to over one billion seven hundred millions. The expenditures of the War Department for the year exceeded six hundred and ninety millions, and those of the Navy Department eighty-five millions. Other department details having been disposed of, the President said:

The war continues. Since the last annual message, all the important lines and positions then occupied by our forces have been maintained, and our armies have steadily advanced, thus liberating the regions left in the rear, so that Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and parts of other States have again produced reasonably fair crops.

The most remarkable feature in the military operations of the year is General Sherman's attempted march of three hundred miles directly through insurgent regions. It tends

to show a great increase of our relative strength that our General-in-chief should feel able to confront and hold in check every active force of the enemy, and yet to detach a well-appointed, large army to move on such an expedition. The result not being yet known, conjecture in regard to it is not here indulged.

Important movements have also occurred during the year to the effect of moulding society for durability in the Union. Although short of complete success, it is much in the right direction that twelve thousand citizens in each of the States of Arkansas and Louisiana have organized loyal State governments with free Constitutions, and are earnestly struggling to maintain and administer them. The movements in the same direction, more extensive, though less definite, in Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, should not be overlooked. But Maryland presents the example of complete success. Maryland is secure to liberty and union for all the future. The genius of rebellion will no more claim Maryland. Like another foul spirit, being driven out, it may seek to tear her, but it will woo her no more.

At the last session of Congress a proposed amendment of the Constitution abolishing slavery throughout the United States passed the Senate, but failed, for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives. Although the present is the same Congress, and nearly the same members, and without questioning the patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the consideration and passage of the measure at the present session. . . . It is not claimed that the election has imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes any further than as an additional element to be considered. Their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people now for the first time heard upon the question. . . . Judging by the recent canvass and its result, the purpose of the people, within the loyal States, to maintain the integrity of the Union was never more firm, nor more nearly unanimous than now. The extraordinary calmness and good order with which the millions of voters met and mingled at the polls give strong assurance of this. . . . There have been much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Union



cause; but on the distinct issue of Union or no Union the politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. . . . On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union — precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause, is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept the Union, they can. Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The number of such may increase. They can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. . . .

I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that “while I remain in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.” If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.

Soon after the assembling of Congress, the President sent to the Senate (in his own handwriting) the nomination of Salmon P. Chase for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in place of Roger B. Taney, who died in October.\* The ex-Secretary took the oath of office on the 15th of December.

Judge Bates resigned the office of Attorney-General

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\* Chief Justice Taney died October 12 (1864)—the day on which Maryland ratified the new anti-slavery constitution.

soon after the Presidential election, retiring early in December. He was succeeded by James Speed, of Kentucky, whose nomination to the Attorney-Generalship was confirmed on the 12th of that month. Secretary Fessenden, having been again elected to the Senate, retired from the Treasury Department on the 4th of March (1865), and Hugh McCulloch, of Indiana, then Comptroller of the Currency, was appointed Secretary of the Treasury.

The postponed joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting slavery, came up in the House on the 6th of January (1865); was earnestly discussed for many days; and came to a direct vote on the 31st. Most impressive was the close and silent attention, the evident though restrained emotion, both on the floor of the House and in the crowded galleries, during the call of the roll. Uncertainty gave intensity to anxious suspense almost to the end. The voice of Delaware, now represented by a Republican, was given for emancipation. Maryland cast four votes for and one against the measure. West Virginia's three votes were in the affirmative; Kentucky gave four ayes and five noes; of Missouri's nine votes, all but two were for the amendment. Seven Democratic members from New York, three from Pennsylvania, one from Ohio, one from Michigan, and one from Wisconsin, voted aye. So did every Republican member. It has been tersely said that "war legislates." Certain it is, war educates. The final vote on the thirteenth amendment in the House of Representatives stood: Ayes, 119; noes, 56 — more than two-thirds in its favor. On this announcement, the hitherto sup-

pressed emotion of members and spectators broke forth in grand and joyous applause. With gladness and gratitude the President approved the work. Ratification by the required majority of the States was sure to come.\*

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\*The Legislatures of seventeen States, Illinois taking the lead on the 1st of February, ratified the amendment before the close of that month. Other States followed until the vote of reconstructed South Carolina on the 13th of November completed the full number of twenty-seven required. Other States ratified later, making the whole number thirty-five. Official proclamation of the adoption of the amendment was made on the 18th of December, 1865.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

1864-1865.

*From Atlanta to the Sea — Thomas Defeats Hood in Tennessee — Sherman at Savannah — Capture of Fort Fisher — Hampton Roads Parley.*

Sherman remained at Atlanta until the end of September. Hood, whose main force was intrenched at Jonesboro, soon began operating against the long line of Sherman's communications and his depots of supplies between Atlanta and Chattanooga and thence to Nashville. General George H. Thomas, sent from Atlanta with Morgan's division, arrived on the 3d of October at Nashville. Hood, having swept around to the west of Atlanta, crossed the Chattahoochie, and on the 5th his advance reached Allatoona, where Sherman had one of his main depots, which had been guarded by only three much depleted regiments. Corse's brigade, ordered to the threatened post, had by rapid marching reached the place before its expected assailants. Sherman, leaving one corps to hold Atlanta, moved northward, signaling to Corse that reinforcements were coming, and ordering him to hold the fort. "He will do it," said Sherman; "I know the man." And so it proved. Corse was himself severely wounded, and more than a third of his men killed or disabled.

Again Hood pressed hastily on; crossed the Coosa River after menacing Rome — to which place Sherman advanced on the 11th — and destroyed the railway from Resaca to the Tunnel. Howard was sent westward to Snake Creek Gap, where he was to detain the enemy by skirmishing, while Stanley with his own and Davis's corps should move upon his rear; but Hood could neither be intercepted nor overtaken. Sherman gave up the chase, halting at Gaylesville (Alabama). The small force already sent with Thomas to Nashville was to be the nucleus of a separate army. On learning that Hood had crossed Sand Mountain, and was making for Middle Tennessee, Sherman left the care of the receding foe to Thomas, to whom Stanley and Schofield were ordered to report from Chattanooga. Giving a like destination to other troops, including the greater part of his cavalry, Sherman prepared to move with the remainder of his force in the opposite direction. The plan to "draw Sherman out of Georgia" had not entirely succeeded. Hood, not Sherman, was the one eliminated.

On the 26th, Hood appeared before Decatur, and made secure his possession of Florence, by way of which he was to receive supplies from the South. Sherman's last instructions to Thomas were to follow Hood should he return to Georgia, but at all events to hold Tennessee. The Fourth Corps (Stanley's) and the Twenty-third (Schofield's), with such cavalry as was available, were ordered by Thomas to Pulaski — an army of observation, greatly inferior to the enemy's strength, lately reinforced with infantry from the south-

west, and with additions to the large cavalry commands under Forrest and Buford.

Hood was generally quiescent for more than two weeks. Cheatham's corps at length crossed the Tennessee on the 17th of November, and two days later there was a general advance. Schofield, having before removed the Government property, withdrew on the 23d from Pulaski (seventy-three miles from Nashville), and took position at Columbia, thirty miles nearer the State capital. After much skirmishing during the next few days, he succeeded in eluding the enemy by a night march, and safely reached Franklin, eighteen miles from Nashville, at an early hour on the morning of the 30th. To avoid a serious engagement was no longer possible. During the afternoon furious assaults on his lines along the Harpeth River were made by the two corps of Cheatham and Lee. The conflict was kept up until long after dark, ending in final defeat of the assailants. Hood's losses were much the greater, desperate onslaughts having been made again and again with his characteristic vigor. The killed and wounded on that side numbered over five thousand, among the former being Major-General Cleburne and five Brigadiers. The total Union loss, as officially reported, was less than two thousand.\*

During the night Schofield withdrew securely, his trains having already passed danger, and after a day's march went into camp three miles south of Nashville. Hood followed closely, and began skirmishing in the

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\* Losses according to *War Records*: Union—killed, 1,189; wounded, 1,750. Confederate—killed, 1,033; wounded, 4,500.

evening (December 1st). It was a masterly retreat, Schofield saving all his artillery and trains in a march of more than seventy miles, during which there was much skirmishing, with one severe battle.

Hood, with headquarters six miles from Nashville, on the Franklin pike, advanced his front close to the outer lines of Thomas, and threw up a circuit of counter-intrenchments. His forces were so disposed as also to threaten an advance on Murfreesboro and Chattanooga, and to keep the way open for the expected approach of Breckinridge with a detachment which had been sent into East Tennessee and the Virginia valley beyond. The latter, however, was soon after driven into the mountains of North Carolina. For many days Thomas and Hood remained without actual collision or material change of position.

In the meantime Sherman, returning from his chase of Hood, proceeded to execute his bold plan of marching through the Empire State of the South to the Atlantic coast. His army was organized in two wings: the Fifteenth Corps (Osterhaus) and the Seventeenth (Blair) under the command of Howard, and the Fourteenth (Davis) and Twentieth (Williams) under Slocum — a total infantry and artillery force of about sixty thousand men. Under the chief command of Kilpatrick was a cavalry force about five thousand five hundred strong. On the 11th of November, after sending parting messages to Washington and City Point, Sherman (then at Kingston) cut the wires and set his troops in motion, reaching Atlanta on the 14th. From Atlanta Howard, on the right (Sherman accompanying Blair's

corps, the last to depart, on the 16th), marched by McDonough to Gordon, not far from Milledgeville, arriving on the 23d; while Slocum moved by Covington to the latter place — then the Georgia capital — where he arrived at the same date. Kilpatrick started from Atlanta on the 15th, covering one wing or the other as required, and having only an occasional brush with inferior cavalry forces. The enemy was as yet uncertain — as were the Northern public — whether Sherman intended to venture further than Milledgeville, or, if he did, whether his objective point was the Andersonville prisons, or Augusta, Mobile, or Savannah.

On the 24th and 25th Howard moved to Ball's Ferry, on the Oconee River, the small defensive force there retiring on his approach. Slocum moved at the same time from Milledgeville, Kilpatrick swinging to his left, covering it, and diverging as if to strike Augusta, the great source of Confederate supplies of ordnance and ammunition. Already the Union prisoners had been removed from Andersonville. There was no effective obstruction to the right wing until Hazen's division appeared before Fort McAllister. At Waynesboro, on the 4th of December, Kilpatrick fought Wheeler, while Baird tore up the railway track in that neighborhood. Slocum's two corps came together at Jacksonboro, and then marched rapidly towards Savannah. On the 13th, Hazen carried Fort McAllister by storm — a brief, brilliant action. A summons to surrender the city of Savannah was declined by Hardee, who was in command there with a force of about fifteen thousand men. But Hardee soon evacuated the city at night, and Sherman telegraphed to the President:



I beg to present to you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five hundred bales of cotton.

Lincoln replied:

*My Dear General Sherman:*—Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift—the capture of Savannah. . . . Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And, taking the work of General Thomas into the account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. . . . Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.

In the meantime “the work of General Thomas” in Tennessee had reached its culmination. Hood was in no haste to bring on the expected action at Nashville. That he was so long tolerated in Tennessee began to cause impatience in Washington—a feeling that was shared by Grant. An icy condition of the ground, rendering movement extremely difficult, prevailed for a week prior to the 14th of December, prolonging the inaction beyond the inclination and original intention of Thomas.

On the morning of the 15th he assumed the aggressive. On his extreme right, Wilson’s cavalry, fighting on foot, supported by Fitch’s gunboats, assaulted the enemy’s breastworks, and carried them grandly. The advantage was followed up by the infantry corps of Wood and A. J. Smith—driving the enemy, doubling his left upon his center and right, and pushing him back, at one point and another, from one to three miles. From the river nearly to the Franklin pike, a front

distance of about five miles, Hood's men were swept away. His right was withdrawn from the river during the night, and a new position taken up along the Granny White Hills.

Thomas renewed the action next morning. When the dense fog had lifted enough to disclose the enemy's position, Schofield and Steedman brought up their forces; the newly formed Confederate line was flanked; a charge was made in front; and Hood's advance works were cleared. A general assault followed, by which his left and center were completely broken. Wood and Steedman now heavily assaulted the hostile right, which after a desperate struggle was at length utterly routed. Soon after midday Hood was in full retreat, leaving about three thousand dead and wounded on the field. He lost several thousand prisoners and fifty-three guns. Prompt pursuit largely increased his losses, which were never officially reported in full.\*

West of the Alleghanies there was no longer a formidable Confederate army. Sherman at Savannah had his face set towards Virginia. Breckinridge had retired to the North Carolina mountains, where his force and other army remnants were getting organized under Johnston as their chief. Thomas could well spare Schofield to occupy Wilmington, North Carolina, when the intended reduction of Fort Fisher, in that quarter, should be accomplished. For this object a combined military and naval expedition had been prepared earlier in the season, but was delayed until December. The

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\* On the Union side, 387 were killed and 2,562 wounded.

first attempt, under Butler and Porter, had come to naught, Butler having landed his men on Christmas day and re-embarked them on the day following, after only an indefinite reconnoissance. This excursion closed the military career of General Butler, who was soon after succeeded by General E. O. C. Ord, as commander of the Army of the James. Porter remained off Wilmington, believing, as he informed Grant, that with a proper military leader the fort could be taken. A force was accordingly sent under General Alfred H. Terry, and Fort Fisher, with all its defenders, guns, and supplies, was captured on the 15th of January. General Schofield, whose corps had been ordered from the west, was put in command in North Carolina, his men arriving at the mouth of Cape Fear River just after the fall of Fort Fisher. Sheridan had long since swept the Shenandoah Valley clear of the enemy and closed its gateways; Grant was tightening his grip upon Petersburg and Richmond; all along the sea coast from the Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande a rigid blockade was maintained, and nearly every important port was now in possession of the Government. The resources of the Confederates were greatly straitened and their armies daily dwindling. Why should the struggle, with its terrible cost and its inevitable result, be farther prolonged?

During the holiday season of peace and good-will a veteran politician of the Jackson era, Francis P. Blair, sought permission to pass through the army lines in order to visit the Chief of the Southern Confederacy, with whom, as with many other public men at Richmond, he had long been acquainted. At first the President was disinclined to grant the request — which might

in some way prove less harmless than such a permit as he had given to unknown Colonel Jacques at an earlier day. Finally he gave Mr. Blair a card on which was written:

Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South and return. December 28, 1864. A. LINCOLN.

This self-appointed mediator went to Richmond, was kindly received by the Confederate leader, and came back with a note from him, dated January 12th, stating his (Davis's) willingness "to enter into conference with a view to secure peace to the two countries." The President in turn (on the 18th) gave Mr. Blair a note, saying:

You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th inst., you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with a view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Again Mr. Blair visited Richmond, and on the 21st delivered this note to Mr. Davis, who "read it over twice," whereupon Mr. Blair remarked that the part about "our one common country" related to the part of Mr. D.'s letter about "the two countries," to which Mr. D. replied that he so understood it.

On the 28th, after Mr. Blair had gone home, Davis gave credentials to Messrs. A. H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and J. A. Campbell as commissioners, according to the terms of Lincoln's note of the 18th, and they applied (on the 29th) for leave to pass through the Union lines on their way to Washington. Grant being temporarily absent from City Point, Ord, next in com-

mand, asked instructions from Secretary Stanton, who directed that the commissioners should not be passed until the General heard from the President. After much waiting, there came this dispatch from Grant, to whom the commissioners had meanwhile made direct application:

I have sent directions to receive these gentlemen, and expect to have them at my quarters this evening, awaiting your instructions.

The Lieutenant-General was notified that Major Eckert (chief of the military telegraph service) had been sent to City Point, with orders as to conditions precedent to passing the gentlemen from Richmond. Later on the same day (the 31st), at the desire of the President, Secretary Seward started for Fortress Monroe with the following letter of instructions:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, January 31, 1865.

*Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State:*

You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have.

You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit:

1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States.

2. No receding by the Executive of the United States, on the slavery question, from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress and in preceding documents.

3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government.

You will inform them that all propositions of theirs not inconsistent with the above will be considered and passed

upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they have to say, and report it to me.

You will not assume to definitely consummate anything.

Yours, etc.,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The President telegraphed to Grant (February 1st): "Let nothing which is transpiring change, hinder, or delay your military movements or plans."

Mr. Seward announced his arrival off Fort Monroe on the evening of the 1st, adding: "Richmond party not here; I remain here." The same night Major Eckert reported from City Point that he had communicated with the gentlemen in question, and received a reply that was "not satisfactory." The real difficulty, however, was that they wished "to go to Washington to confer informally with the President personally," while Major Eckert was only authorized to procure them a pass to Fort Monroe, where they would "be met in due time by some person, or persons, for the purpose of such informal conference" as before indicated.

On receiving Major Eckert's report, the President intended to recall Secretary Seward; but before he had done so, the following dispatch to Stanton was received from Grant (early in the morning of the 2d):

Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confidentially, but not officially, to become a matter of record, that I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my own or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an awkward position, which I could have avoided by not

seeing them in the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recommend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch, if not with all three, now within our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated to secure their safe conduct, if they had used the same language to Major Eckert.

On reading this, Lincoln determined to go to meet the commissioners, and telegraphed Grant: "Say to the gentlemen I will meet them at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there." The correspondence shows that Mr. Seward was not justified in connecting his own mission on that occasion (as seemed to be implied in a dispatch to Minister Adams on the 7th) with Grant's report of his conversation with the commissioners. This report was not sent until Seward had already arrived at Fort Monroe. It prevented his recall, but led to the President's taking the matter under his own immediate direction.

Responding (on the 10th) to a Congressional resolution of inquiry — which Thaddeus Stevens had introduced two days before — Lincoln fully reported the circumstance and correspondence which led to this meeting, and continued:

On the night of the 2d I reached Hampton Roads; found the Secretary of State and Major Eckert on a steamer anchored off shore in the Roads, and learned from them that the Richmond gentlemen were on another steamer, also anchored off shore in the Roads, and that the Secretary of State had not yet seen or communicated with them. . . .

On the morning of the 3d the gentlemen, Messrs.

Stephens, Hunter and Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal, and verbal merely.

On our part, the whole substance of the instruction to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while by the other party it was not said that, in any event, or on any condition, they ever would consent to reunion, and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first, which, as some of them seemed to argue, might or might not lead to reunion, but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result.

The Southern official version of this affair was published in the Richmond papers on the 7th, and a large public meeting adopted resolutions indignantly spurning the specified terms of peace, declaring the proffer a premeditated insult. Mr. Davis violently declaimed to the assemblage against "reconstruction"; predicted the triumph of his cause; and solemnly assured his auditors that "with the Confederacy he would live or die"; indeed, "if it were possible, he would yield up his life a thousand times rather than succumb." Said he: "We will teach them that when they talk to us, they talk to their masters."

On the whole, Mr. Blair as a peacemaker was thought to have gained no considerable interest in the Beatitudes.

Mr. Stephens retired to Georgia in silence, for the moment. At Richmond it was alleged that he had gone



to "canvass the State for a more vigorous prosecution of the war." But he made no speeches in that vein. On the contrary, he took into his confidence the leading men, who, since the capture of Atlanta and Savannah, would gladly have seceded from the Confederacy, as Governor Vance, of North Carolina, had earlier been charged with wishing on behalf of his own State. Directly after the war, Mr. Stephens gave to the editor of an Augusta journal a version of the Hampton Roads meeting, more in detail than the report he had signed under a degree of official constraint. Speaking of his preliminary waiting at Grant's headquarters, we are told:

Possibly but for the indorsement of the peace wishes of Stephens and Hunter by General Grant the interview would not have been granted. The reason why the General did not include Mr. Campbell in his indorsement was, that Mr. C. was perfectly satisfied that the country was whipped then, and preferred to take what we could get, and therefore did not talk; while Mr. Hunter, who was not much for reconstruction, talked the most. . . .

Mr. Lincoln stated fairly that the only ground on which he could rest the justice of the war, either with his own people or with foreign powers, was that it was not a war for conquest, but that the States had never been separated from the Union. Consequently he could not recognize another government inside of the one of which he alone was President, nor admit the separate independence of States that were yet a part of the Union. "That," he said, "would be doing what you have so long asked Europe to do in vain, and be resigning the only thing the armies of the Union are fighting for." To that Mr. Hunter replied at length, in rather Congressional style, urging that the recognition of Mr. Davis's power to make a treaty was the first and indispensable step to peace, and referring to the correspondence between King Charles I. and his Parliament as a reliable precedent of a constitutional ruler treating with rebels. Mr.

Lincoln's face bore that indescribable expression which generally preceded his hardest hits, and he remarked: "Upon questions of history I must refer you to Mr. Seward, for he is posted in such things, and I don't profess to be bright. My only distinct recollection of the matter is that Charles lost his head." This settled Mr. Hunter for a while. . . .

Mr. Hunter stated that he had never entertained any fears for his person or life from so mild a government as that of the United States, to which Mr. Lincoln retorted that he also had felt easy as to the rebels, but not so easy about the lamp-posts around Washington—a hint that he had already done more favors for the rebels than was exactly popular with the radical men of his own party. . . .

Mr. Lincoln had almost assumed the tone of argument, and intimated that the States might do much better to return to the Union at once than to stand the chances of continued war and the increasing bitterness of feeling in Congress; and that the time might come when we would cease to be an erring people invited back to the Union as citizens, but looked upon perhaps as enemies, to be exterminated or ruined. Mr. Seward then remarked: "Mr. President, it is as well to inform these gentlemen that yesterday Congress acted upon the amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery." Mr. Lincoln stated that was true, and suggested that there was a question as to the right of the insurgent States to return at once and claim a right to vote upon the amendment, to which the concurrence of two-thirds of the States was required. He stated that it would be desirable to have the institution of slavery abolished by the consent of the people as soon as possible—he hoped within six years. He also stated four hundred millions of dollars might be offered as compensation to the owners, and remarked: "You would be surprised were I to give you the names of those who favor that."

Mr. Hunter said something about the inhumanity of leaving so many poor old negroes and young children destitute by encouraging the able-bodied negroes to run away, and asked: "What are they—the helpless—to do?" Mr. Lincoln said that reminded him of an old friend in Illinois, who had a crop of potatoes and did not want to dig them. So he told a neighbor that he would turn in his hogs and let them

dig for themselves. "But," said the neighbor, "the frost will soon be in the ground, and when the soil is hard frozen, what will they do then?" To which the worthy farmer replied: "Let 'em root!" Mr. Stephens said he supposed that was the original of "Root, hog, or die," and a fair indication of the future of the negro.

Before Mr. Lincoln's death he (Mr. Stephens) thought he was doing a favor to him not to include that offer of four hundred millions in gold for the Southern slaves in the published report, for it would be used to the injury of Mr. Lincoln by those of his enemies who would talk about taxation and the debt. . . . He spoke of Mr. Lincoln as an old friend who had generally voted with him in Congress, and who had a good heart and fine mind, and was undoubtedly honest.

Mr. Stephens must have thought the "four hundred millions" proposition quite hopeless, as viewed from either side. Lincoln only suggested it as a possibility at most. It was a scheme of Mr. Greeley's, and had the quasi-indorsement of Mr. Chase. While Congress was at one time disposed to grant compensation to loyal owners of slaves voluntarily emancipated, it would have been useless to address any argument to Congress in favor of the proposition alleged by Mr. Stephens. Such action was not attempted, or ever more than dubiously contemplated by the President.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

1865.

*Closing Days of Lincoln's First Term — His Second Inauguration — Interviews at the White House and with Generals and Soldiers at City Point — Appomattox.*

“Having served four years in the depths of a great and yet unended national peril,” said Lincoln to the Congressional committee which notified him of the result of the Electoral count in February, “I can view this call to a second term in no wise more flattering to myself than as an expression of the public judgment that I may better finish a difficult work, in which I have labored from the first, than could any one less severely schooled in the task. In this view, and with assured reliance on that Almighty Ruler who has so graciously sustained us thus far, and with increased gratitude to the generous people for their continued confidence, I accept the renewed trust with its yet onerous and perplexing duties and responsibilities.”

As usual, the last hours of Congress were its busiest. The night of March 3d was a bustling, scrambling time, on which depended much to many people; and the President sat with his Cabinet in the Executive room at the Capitol for the more prompt disposal of enactments which were poured in upon him for official approval. Without, rain and darkness had unrelieved

dominion of the night. These were the closing hours of the first term of his Presidency, and for the beginning of the second there was hope of brighter skies in the morning to welcome returning peace. The President, not without a shade of weariness on his face, had cheerful looks and words for those who called on him; conversing with his usual kindness of tone and manner, with ready incident or repartee, and joining in the occasional laughter which his own or another's humor excited. Whenever he bent to write his name or was otherwise isolated in mind, his countenance at once became tragic. The four years now ending had been to him a lifetime to which all the rest of his days had been as but a light prelude. The coming term was pacific in prospect, but with endless troubles still remaining. To bring the war to a close was not to settle all it had unsettled.

Even while thus waiting, during this watch-night, a dispatch came to the President's room, addressed by the Lieutenant-General to the Secretary of War, stating that General Lee had desired to meet him (Grant) with a view to arranging terms of peace. Lee at heart believed further fighting worse than useless, and that to secure the best conditions attainable in consideration of the disbanding of the Confederate armies was all that reasonably remained for their chief commander to do. In his letter to Grant (March 2d), Lee said he was authorized to undertake such negotiation. The scheme of a military convention, or treaty, had been taking shape in the minds of some people at Richmond. Mr. Davis later stated (in his History) that one of his commissioners at Hampton Roads actually made such

a proposition to President Lincoln, who declined to entertain it. Something of the kind had afterward been unofficially talked of by Generals Ord and Longstreet; and later Johnston and Breckinridge succeeded in favorably impressing Sherman's mind with this mode of ending hostilities.

Such was not the President's view. The civil authority must maintain its supremacy. Having read Grant's dispatch, he reflected for a few minutes, and then wrote with his own hand the following reply, which was dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War (March 3d, 12 P. M.):

*Lieutenant-General Grant:* — The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some other minor and purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

A large concourse of people was present to witness the ceremony of Abraham Lincoln's second inauguration and to listen to his address. As he came out on the platform at the east front of the Capitol, the sun broke through the clouds that had veiled the sky all the morning, and the multitude hailed the change as a propitious omen from above. He then spoke these forever memorable words — his second Inaugural Address:

*Fellow-Countrymen:* — At this second appearing to take the oath of the Presidential office there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then, a

statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it; all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war — seeking to dissolve the Union and to divide effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came.

One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses!

for it must needs be that offense come ; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said: "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in ; to bind up the nation's wounds ; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan ; to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

The oath of office was then administered by Chief Justice Chase.

There was a rumor of some defeated purpose against the President's life as he went out on the portico, but as no violence to his person was really attempted and no accident occurred, the story made little impression.

The Senate, called together for executive business, had comparatively little to do. The nominations to office were chiefly promotions in the army and navy.

Lincoln's great power of endurance was visibly nearing its limit. Before the close of March he suspended his wonted daily public audiences. One notable speech



he made on the 17th from a hotel balcony, on the occasion of the delivery to Governor Morton of a flag captured by Indiana soldiers at Wilmington. He said:

*Fellow Citizens:*— It will be but a very few words that I shall undertake to say. I was born in Kentucky; raised in Indiana, and live in Illinois, and I now am here, where it is my business to be, to care equally for the good people of all the States. I am glad to see an Indiana regiment on this day able to present this captured flag to the Governor of the State of Indiana. I am not disposed, in saying this, to make a distinction between the States, for all have done equally well.

There are but few aspects of this great war upon which I have not said or written something whereby my own views might be made known. There *is* one: the recent attempt of our erring brethren, as they are sometimes called, to employ the negro to fight for them. I have neither written nor made a speech upon that subject, because that was their business and not mine; and if I had a wish upon the subject, I had not the power to introduce it or make it effective.

The great question with them was, whether the negro, being put into the army, will fight for them. I do not know, and therefore cannot decide. They ought to know better than we, and do know. I have in my lifetime heard many arguments why the negro ought to be a slave; but if they fight for those who would keep them in slavery, it will be a better argument than any I have yet heard. He who will fight for that ought to be a slave. They proposed at last to take one out of four of the slaves and put him in the army; and that one out of the four who will fight to keep the others in slavery ought to be a slave himself, unless he is killed in a fight. While I have often said that all men ought to be free, yet I would allow those colored persons to be slaves who want to be; and, next to them, those white men who argue in favor of making other people slaves. I am willing to give an opportunity to such white men to try it for themselves.

I will say one thing with regard to the negro being employed to fight for them that I do know. I know he

cannot fight and stay at home and make bread, too. And as one is about as important as the other to them, I don't care which they do. I am rather in favor of having them try him as a soldier. They lack one vote of doing that, and I wish I could send my vote over the river, so that I might cast it in favor of allowing the negro to fight. They have drawn upon their last branch of resources, and we can now see the bottom. I am glad to see the end so near at hand.

It was about this time that his friend Joshua Speed had an interview with the President, of which — the last they were destined to have — this account was given years after by the visitor:

He sent me word by my brother James, then in his Cabinet, that he desired to see me before I went home. I went into his office about 11 o'clock. He looked jaded and weary. I staid in the room until his hour for callers was over; he ordered the door closed, and, looking over to where I was sitting, asked me to draw up my chair. But instead of being alone, as he supposed, in the opposite direction from where I sat, and across the fire-place from him, sat two humble-looking women. Seeing them there seemed to provoke him, and he said: "Well, ladies, what can I do for you?" One was an old woman, the other young. They both commenced talking at once. The President soon comprehended them. "I suppose," said he, "that your son and your husband are in prison for resisting the draft in Western Pennsylvania. Where is your petition?" The old lady replied: "Mr. Lincoln, I've got no petition; I went to a lawyer to get one drawn, and I had not the money to pay him and come here, too; so I thought I would just come and ask you to let me have my boy." "And it's your husband you want?" said he, turning to the young woman. "Yes," said she.

He rang his bell and called his servant, and bade him to go and tell General Dana to bring him the list of prisoners for resisting the draft in Western Pennsylvania. The General soon came, bringing a package of papers. The President opened it, and, counting the names, said: "General, there are twenty-seven of these men. Is there any differ-

ence in the degree of their guilt?" "No," said the General. "It is a bad case, and a merciful finding." "Well," said the President, looking out of the window, and seemingly talking to himself, "these poor fellows have, I think, suffered enough; they have been in prison fifteen months. I have been thinking so for some time, and have so said to Stanton, and he always threatened to resign if they were released. But he has said so about other matters, and never did. So now, while I have the paper in my hand, I will turn out the flock." So he wrote: "Let the prisoners named in the within paper be discharged," and signed it. The General made his bow and left. Then, turning to the ladies, he said: "Now, ladies, you can go. Your son, madam, and your husband, madam, is free."

The young woman ran across to him and began to kneel. He took her by the elbow and said, impatiently: "Get up, get up; none of this." But the old woman walked to him, wiping with her apron the tears that were coursing down her cheeks. She gave him her hand, and looking into his face, said: "Good-by, Mr. Lincoln; we will never meet again till we meet in heaven." A change came over his sad and weary face. He clasped her hand in both of his, and followed her to the door, saying as he went: "With all that I have to cross me here, I am afraid that I will never get there; but your wish that you will meet me there has fully paid for all I have done for you."

We were then alone. He drew his chair to the fire and said: "Speed, I am a little alarmed about myself; just feel my hand." It was cold and clammy. He pulled off his boots, and, putting his feet to the fire, the heat made them steam. I said overwork was producing nervousness. "No," said he, "I am not tired." I said: "Such a scene as I have just witnessed is enough to make you nervous." "How much you are mistaken," said he; "I have made two people happy to-day; I have given a mother her son, and a wife her husband. That young woman is a counterfeit, but the old woman is a true mother."

A few days after this the President, accompanied by Mrs. Lincoln, visited the headquarters of General Grant

at City Point.\* Here he also met Generals Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, and Ord; and held a consultation with these chiefs on the 27th of March, in which the final plans were concerted or reviewed for closing the war. He remained some days in that quarter, watching military movements, and on occasion sending bulletins to Secretary Stanton.

Sherman was back at Goldsboro on the 30th, ready to advance against Johnston, who had collected his forces near Smithfield, to resist a movement on Raleigh or an attempt of his adversary to join Meade. The Lieutenant-General, amid all discouragements and delays which worried impatient people, had held Lee's army in close quarters at Petersburg and Richmond. The means of the Confederates had sensibly shortened day by day; desertions were increasing; an attempt to replenish the rank and file by arming slaves had kindled contention without any gain of soldiers; supplies had become distressingly uncertain and meager. Financially the Confederacy had gone to wreck. Still there was no surrender. Sherman had made no long stay at Savannah. Moving into the interior of South Carolina and across its northern border, he had extended the zone of his devastating march toward Richmond. Johnston, doing his best, rather pursued than resisted the invading army in the broad sweep of its progress. Grant, designing to cut the last communications with Richmond by rail and canal, had no difficulty now in finding the right man for the work. Sheridan, at Win-

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\* Leaving Washington on the 23d of March, he did not return until the 9th of April.

chester, awaited the order to strike. Another branch of the general campaign planned by the Lieutenant-General was an expedition under Canby, aided by Wilson's cavalry and by Thatcher's gunboats, to get possession of Mobile — the city itself, since Farragut's capture of the harbor forts, having still been occupied by the enemy. The operations immediately under the eye of Grant were to culminate before the successful conclusion of the Alabama campaign, which quickly followed.

Sheridan, starting with ten thousand mounted men, had passed through Staunton on the 2d of March, and entered Charlottesville next day without opposition. After spending ten days in this region, destroying Confederate resources,—manufactories, depots of supplies, railway tracks, bridges,—he continued his work elsewhere until Lee's outer communications were all effectually broken save by the Danville and the Lynchburg railways, which cross each other at Burkesville, about fifty miles from Petersburg. On the 25th, Lee had made a desperate but useless attempt to cut a way of exit through the Federal lines at Petersburg, sacrificing Richmond to save his main army and to gain a chance of joining Johnston and crushing Sherman. Already preparations had been made for an advance of Meade's left on the 29th, assisted by two of Ord's divisions, brought across the James. Sheridan, moving still farther out, reached Dinwiddie Courthouse on the evening of that day. Through the night and the following day there was a pouring rain, but Sheridan continued steadily to drive an opposing force until it passed behind intrenchments at Five Forks, where, on the 1st of April,

he gained a brilliant victory. The enemy was vigorously pursued, and more than five thousand prisoners were added to his other severe losses.

The same night Grant issued orders for a cannonade all along the Petersburg lines the next morning, to be followed by a general assault. All was ready at the first dawn of light, and in a few hours the work was done.

At 11 o'clock on that eventful spring morning, Jefferson Davis, sitting in his church pew, was handed a dispatch just sent him from Petersburg by the General-in-chief of the Confederate armies, which said: "My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be evacuated this evening."

Church services were soon over for that day in Richmond. Wild excitement, bustle, confusion prevailed until night. Burning cotton, burning supplies, burning houses cast their dread glare over the city — now abandoned by all that remained of the Confederate government. At an early hour on the next morning General Weitzel, with a force of colored troops, marched into Richmond, to the music of the old national melodies, and took possession.

Lee withdrew quietly from Petersburg during the night, and Davis fled by railway to Danville. There was no such rapid transit possible for his army, whose capture was Grant's objective point. Concentrating at Chesterfield, Lee hastened thence to Amelia Courthouse, where, disappointed at not finding the supplies he had ordered, he stopped to gather provisions during the 4th and 5th from a region already well exhausted. By thoroughfares farther south, Sheridan, with his cav-





*Lincoln Family Group.*



ally and the Fifth Corps, hurried westward, determined to lose no chance of intercepting the fugitive enemy. Defeating and crushing an infantry force at Deep Creek, he struck the Danville railway at Jetersville, where he was joined by two of Meade's corps on the evening of the 5th. Lee set forward after dusk the same evening, swinging clear of Meade and Sheridan, and aiming to reach Lynchburg. Pursuit was pushed from Jetersville in the morning. Ewell, isolated and hotly assailed by continually increasing numbers, surrendered his force of more than six thousand men. The Confederate army that remained after large and small captures was hourly diminishing — weary, hungry, demoralized men continually falling out of the ranks. Its cavalry was worn out. Within a day's march of Lynchburg, Lee was loath to surrender; but the inevitable end came on the 9th of April at Appomattox.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### *Visit to Richmond — Return to Washington — Speech on Reconstruction — Orders to Weitzel.*

On the 4th of April, the day after Weitzel occupied Richmond, Lincoln was the guest of the General at his headquarters, the late Executive Mansion of the now vanishing Confederacy. Going up by steamboat from City Point, the President and a few personal attendants had walked from the landing, apparently without a thought of danger. On the same day he took a drive through the city, and was everywhere respectfully greeted, the colored population being jubilant over the presence of their "liberator." Next day he returned to City Point, and on the 6th and 7th visited Petersburg, examining with lively interest the fortifications as they had been left by the belligerents. Much of the 8th, as some hours of the previous days, he spent in visiting the hospitals. In the evening he started on his return to Washington.

Mrs. Lincoln had suffered much anxiety during the President's prolonged stay on the James. Mr. Seward also had misgivings, and thought the President should be put on his guard, or at least more closely watched over by alert friends. It was of her own motion, however, that Mrs. Lincoln asked the Attorney-General, with others, to join him at City Point. That gentle-

man (Hon. James Speed) gave the writer, many years after, these recollections of the occasion:

Mr. Lincoln, at the advice of personal friends, left Washington in order to get some rest. His wife and a few others went with him. Whilst he was at City Point his wife came to Washington, and addressed me a note requesting me to return to City Point with her. When I received the note, being behind in my official business, I was very loth to go, but determined to consult Mr. Seward, who occupied a room in the same building. I well remember that, upon entering Mr. Seward's office, I found him lying upon the sofa, reading *Montaigne's Essays*. After showing him the note, I stated to him that I did not want to go, because of the pressure before mentioned, and that I did not wish to appear in the city of Richmond, which had been so recently taken by our forces, as such a visit might seem mere exultation over a fallen foe. He arose and walked the floor, and said with great emphasis, the request of the President's wife was equivalent to a command, and I must obey. He said, further, he wanted me to go on another account. The end of our troubles was fast approaching, and the Southern people would feel as though the world had come to an end; many individuals among them would be absolutely crazy; that history and human nature taught him, if there were to be assassinations, now was the time; the President, being the most marked man on the Federal side, was the most liable to attack. He said I was the only man that could warn the President of the danger, and insisted upon this with great earnestness, making me promise to have such a talk with Mr. Lincoln.

The President and party whilst at City Point lived on board of the boat. Every day during my stay the President and myself went ashore visiting the soldiers, but more particularly the hospitals. All during my visit to him he was so occupied by company that an opportunity to have a private talk with him never presented itself, so I was unable to keep the promise made to Mr. Seward until left alone with Mr. Lincoln in the cabin of the boat as we returned to Washington. On the center-table there was a very fine copy of

Shakespeare. He reached the volume and read therefrom several passages, among others :

Duncan is in his grave :  
 After life's fitful fever he sleeps well ;  
 Treason has done his worst; nor steel nor poison,  
 Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing  
 Can touch him further.

I saw my opportunity, and commenced telling him what Mr. Seward had said. He stopped me at once, saying he had rather be dead than to live in continual dread ; any precautions against assassination would be to him perpetual reminders of danger ; expressing at the same time confidence that his only safeguard was that the severe penalties which would be visited upon such a crime would be appalling to any man with an atom of sound sense.

A prominent officer of the Sanitary Commission — Dr. George Mendenhall — gave these particulars of the President's visit in a private letter to the author (May 2, 1865):

On the 8th of April (the day before Lee's surrender), as I was going to the hospital at City Point, I met the carriage containing the President, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Sumner, and Mrs. Lincoln, who were returning from the hospital, where Mrs. Lincoln had been spending the day with the sick and wounded. On arriving there the Medical Director informed me that the President said he came to see the "boys" who had fought the battles of the country, and particularly the battles which resulted in the evacuation of the rebel capital. He wanted to take them by the hand, as it would probably be the last opportunity of meeting them. His will was good to see them in Washington on their return homeward from the war, but it would be impossible to see so many of them again ; he therefore devoted the day to shaking hands with over six thousand soldiers fresh from the bloody fields of battle, and giving such words of encouragement as the circumstances suggested from time to time. It was like the visit of a father to his children, and was

appreciated in the same kindly spirit by the soldiers. They loved to talk of his kindness and unaffected manner, and to dwell upon the various incidents of this visit as a green spot in the soldier's hard life. At one point in his visit he observed an axe, which he picked up and examined, making some pleasant remark about having been once himself considered to be a good chopper. He was invited to try his hand upon a log of wood lying near, from which he made the chips fly in primitive style. The "boys" seemed to worship him, and the visit of the President to City Point Hospital will long be remembered by many a soldier who was only too happy in its enjoyment. The description of this visit made a strong impression on my mind.

The President arrived in Washington on Sunday evening, the 9th. Next morning the capital—as, indeed, the whole North—was wild with joy over the news of Lee's surrender. All through the day restless and excited humanity was drawn toward the White House as by a magnet. In the morning, while cannon salutes, martial music, and a tumult of voices resounded on every side, the President presented himself at the window from which he had so many times before responded to calls from the people. When the storm of welcoming shouts had given place to a listening attitude, he spoke but briefly, promising to say more at some "sort of a formal demonstration," for which he understood that arrangements were being made, for that or the following day:

"I see you have a band," he said. ("Three of them," voices replied.) "I propose now closing up by requesting you to play a certain air or tune. I have always thought 'Dixie' one of the best tunes I ever heard. I have heard that our adversaries over the way have attempted to appropriate it as a national air. I insisted yesterday that we had fairly captured it. I presented the question to the Attorney-

General, and he gave his opinion that it is our lawful prize. I ask the band to give us a good turn upon it."

On Tuesday evening, the 11th, he was serenaded, and to the waiting multitude he made a carefully prepared address — his last public speech — of which the main points were:

We meet this evening not in sorrow, but in gladness of heart. The evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, and the surrender of the principal insurgent army, give hope of a righteous and speedy peace, whose joyous expression cannot be restrained. . . .

By these recent successes the re-inauguration of the national authority, reconstruction, which has had a large share of thought from the first, is pressed much more closely upon our attention. It is fraught with great difficulty. Unlike the case of a war between independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat with. No one man has authority to give up the rebellion for any other man. We simply must begin with and mould from disorganized and discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner and means of reconstruction. . . .

In the annual message of December, 1863, and accompanying proclamation I presented a plan of reconstruction (as the phrase goes) which I promised, if adopted by any State, should be acceptable to and sustained by the Executive Government of the nation. I distinctly stated that this was not the only plan which might possibly be acceptable; and I also distinctly protested that the Executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should be admitted to seats in Congress from such States. This plan was, in advance, submitted to the then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by every member of it. . . .

The message went to Congress, and I received many commendations of the plan, written and verbal; and not a single objection to it, from any professed emancipationist, came to my knowledge until after the news reached Washington that the people of Louisiana had begun to move in

accordance with it. From about July, 1862, I had corresponded with different persons, supposed to be interested, seeking a reconstruction of a State government for Louisiana. When the message of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans, General Banks wrote me he was confident that the people, with his military co-operation, would reconstruct substantially on that plan. I wrote him, and some of them, to try it. They tried it, and the result is known. Such only has been my agency in getting up the Louisiana government. As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest. But I have not yet been so convinced. . . .

We all agree that the seceded States, so-called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the Government, civil and military, in regard to those States is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe it is not only possible, but, in fact, easier to do this without deciding, or even considering, whether these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between the States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether, in doing the acts, he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. . . .

Some twelve thousand voters in the heretofore slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State government, adopted a free State Constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the Legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their Legislature has already voted to ratify the constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the nation. These twelve thousand persons are thus fully committed to the Union, and to perpetual freedom in the States — committed to the very things and nearly all the

things the nation wants — and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good that committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. . . . If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of the twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps towards it than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. . . .

What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and, withal, so new and unprecedented is the whole case, that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible.

In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act, when satisfied that action will be proper.

Ex-Judge John A. Campbell, one of the Hampton Roads conferees, had met President Lincoln while at Richmond, seeking to gain concessions which would serve to break the fall of the Confederacy, and received all the kind consideration possible. After returning to Washington, the President was informed of incipient proceedings in Richmond based on Campbell's misinterpretation of the language used in their interview,



and sent the following dispatch to General Weitzel (April 12th):

I have just seen Judge Campbell's letter to you of the 7th. He assumes, as appears to me, that I have called the insurgent Legislature of Virginia together, as the rightful Legislature of the State, to settle differences with the United States. I have done no such thing. I spoke of them not as the Legislature, but as "gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion." I did this on purpose to exclude the assumption that I was recognizing them as a rightful body. I dealt with them as men having power *de facto* to do a specific thing, to wit: "To withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," for which, in the paper handed to you by Judge Campbell, I promised a specific equivalent, to wit: A remission to the people of the State, except in certain cases, of the confiscation of their property. I meant this and no more. Inasmuch, however, as Judge Campbell misconstrues this, and is still pressing for an armistice contrary to the explicit statement of the paper I gave him, and particularly as General Grant has since captured the Virginia troops, so that giving a consideration for their withdrawal is no longer applicable, let my letter to you and the paper to Judge Campbell both be withdrawn or countermanded, and let him be notified of it. Do not allow them to assemble, but if any have come, allow them safe return to their homes.

Two days after Lee's surrender Lynchburg was occupied by a Union force; Sherman reached Raleigh on the 13th; and the surrender of Johnston's army speedily followed. Canby took possession of Mobile on the 14th; Wilson's cavalry was ranging at will over Alabama and Western Georgia; and Anderson's flag again waved loyally over Fort Sumter.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### *His Last Cabinet Council — Assassination — Borne to His Tomb.*

The fame of Abraham Lincoln was now secure. The carnage of battle had finally ceased. The integrity of the Republic was preserved, and the dark anomaly which had been a reproach and a danger from the first was destroyed. He had succeeded in spite of obstacles which his antagonists at home and sagacious statesmen abroad had deemed insuperable. How much was due to Generals and Admirals, to soldiers and seamen, to Governors and civil subordinates, and to all the loyal people, no one better understood than he. They had done their part. The masterly statecraft was his.

“To one is granted warlike might,  
While in another’s breast all-seeing Jove  
Hath placed the spirit of wisdom, and a mind  
Discerning, for the common good of all :  
By him are States preserved.”

Whether in the power of moral strength or of physical force under his sway as he entered upon his second term, few rulers of nations have been as truly great. Working patiently and persistently, seeking no personal ends, counting his own life as nothing, he had finished the task appointed to him, and lasting rest was near.

On the 14th of April — Good Friday in the Church calendar for that year — General Grant and Robert T.

Lincoln, then on his staff, breakfasted at the White House. They had just come from camp in Virginia, and the President found much satisfaction in free converse with the General on the military events of the last few days. A meeting with the Cabinet followed at 11 o'clock. Secretary Seward was absent, not having recovered from severe injuries received in an accident while out for a drive some days before. His son Frederick, acting Secretary, came in his stead. All the other members arrived before Mr. Stanton, who brought with him certain official papers which were to be the chief subject of the council. General Grant was also present by request of the President.

During the few minutes of waiting an incident occurred which has been lightly regarded by some persons, and to which some may have given undue prominence. Charles Dickens, writing from Washington to John Forster, in 1868, mentioned having dined with Senator Sumner, the only other guest being Secretary Stanton, from whom he had this "curious little story" about the last Cabinet meeting of President Lincoln:

Mr. Stanton, on leaving the council with the Attorney-General, said to him: "That is the most satisfactory Cabinet meeting I have attended for many a long day. What an extraordinary change in Mr. Lincoln!" The Attorney-General replied: "We all saw it before you came in. While we were waiting for you, he said with his chin down on his breast: 'Gentlemen, something very extraordinary is going to happen, and that very soon.'" To which the Attorney-General had observed: "Something good, sir, I hope?" when the President answered very gravely: "I don't know — I don't know. But it will happen, and shortly, too." As they were all impressed by his manner, the Attorney-General took him up again. "Have you received any information, sir, not yet disclosed to us?" "No," answered the President,

“but I have had a dream. And I have had the same dream three times: once on the night preceding the battle of Bull Run, once on the night preceding such another” (naming a battle also not favorable to the North). His chin sank on his breast again, and he sat reflecting. “Might one ask the nature of this dream, sir?” said the Attorney-General. “Well,” replied the President, without lifting his head or changing his attitude, “I was on a great, broad, rolling river — and I am in a boat — and I drift — and I drift — but this is not business,” suddenly raising his voice and looking around the table as Mr. Stanton entered; “let us proceed to business, gentlemen.” Mr. Stanton and the Attorney-General said, as they walked on together, it would be curious to notice whether anything ensued on this, and they agreed to notice. He was shot that night.

Of those who met at this council, one of the latest survivors was the Hon. James Speed, of Louisville, then Attorney-General. His attention having been called to this account from Dickens, its verity was confirmed in a letter to the writer (September 16, 1885), in which Mr. Speed said:

I cannot attempt to give in better words than Mr. Dickens an account of that Cabinet meeting, although it made an indelible impression upon my memory. Even after the lapse of so many years the picture can be recalled to my mind’s eye as clearly as though the circumstances occurred but yesterday; and I fondly cling to the memory of Mr. Lincoln’s personal appearance as I saw him that day, with cleanly shaved face, well brushed clothing, and neatly combed hair and whiskers. In fact, the contrast was so great as to cause each member of the Cabinet to remark it. I well remember that Mr. Stanton said to me as we went down the stairs together: “Didn’t our chief look *grand* to-day?”

The Cabinet was in session for two or three hours. The papers submitted by Mr. Stanton, and approved, seem to have gone no farther than to require the sev-

eral heads of departments to resume their proper Federal functions in all the insurgent States: the Treasury Department to take possession of custom-houses and to collect duties; the War Department to garrison or destroy forts, to secure captured army material, and to preserve the peace; and so on, as to the Navy, Post-office, and other departments. Informally, there were congratulations to Grant and talk of the closed campaign; and there were inquiries as to what should be done with the chiefs of the revolt—whether they should be allowed to find refuge abroad, or whether they should be arrested and brought to trial, and if the latter, what would be the penalty for their offenses. There was a general expression—and on Lincoln's part most especially—in favor of mild dealing, with as little resort to legal process as might be.

Mrs. Lincoln noticed that the President during their afternoon drive, following this Cabinet council, was in unusually good spirits, and remarked to him that he was in a like mood just before the fatal illness of their son Willie. But no kindly premonition warned her of the particular danger to be avoided. They intended to visit Ford's Theatre that evening in company with the Lieutenant-General.

In the joyous excitement of the time even the devotee seemed to forget the wonted associations of Good Friday. All places of amusement were thronged. There were crowds in the illuminated streets. Hours of night had passed when suddenly the cry rang through the capital: "The President has been shot in his box at the theatre!"

The assassin, Wilkes Booth, born in Maryland, had a passionate ardor for the Secession cause, with no disposition to share its battles in the field. He performed with alcoholic courage a chosen or allotted part which suited him better. He had done enough theatrical work to screen his service as a go-between and spy — appearing one while on the boards at Nashville, where he tried to ingratiate himself with Military-Governor Johnson. He even found some admirers in Republican society at Washington, where he chiefly tarried during the summer of 1864, when not with his Confederate friends in Canada. Among the designs cherished in the latter quarter was one for the abduction of President Lincoln, to be carried to Richmond as a prisoner. Booth was made the leader in executing this design — an absurdly impracticable one, unless the real intent was murder. Full preparations were made late in the summer, including the performance of a popular comedy at the Soldiers' Home, at which the President was to have been present. An unexpected detention prevented his attendance, and the kidnapping scheme was given up; but Booth did not disband the gang he had organized for this occasion. He continued to meet them secretly at the house of a Mrs. Surratt, in Washington; and it was finally determined to proceed directly against the life of the President and others in high official positions. Booth alone accomplished the deed undertaken. Secretary Seward, however, was attacked, and narrowly escaped death, being long confined on account of the wounds he received.

“The President and his Lady will be at Ford's Theatre this evening” was advertised on the fatal day

with much repetition through the columns of the afternoon paper. Grant's presence was also intended, but a telegram in the early evening called him northward. Lincoln would have preferred to remain at home, but was unwilling to disappoint an expectation which he had encouraged. Accompanied by Major Rathbone and Miss Harris, daughter of a New York Senator, he arrived late, and was most heartily greeted by the audience. As scene followed scene in his presence for half an hour or more, his attention to the stage was rather seeming than real. Occasionally he talked with his wife — speaking especially of the better days they might hope for now that the great conflict was over, and of his wish that when his official service finally ended they might together visit the Holy Land. These were the last words she remembered of this last conversation.

In the middle of a scene, when only one of the three characters just before in dialogue remained on the stage, there was a pause; a pistol shot was heard; a figure clad in black leaped from the President's box, stumbled, instantly rose, and escaped at the rear. In his hand was a dagger, with which he had cut the arm of Major Rathbone, who sought to detain him in the box. It is uncertain whether he shouted "Sic semper tyrannis!" or "The South is avenged!" — or both, or neither. According to the recollection of an actor who was standing near the assassin as he turned to flee, he said nothing.\*

A surgeon was called; a guard of soldiers marched into the gallery; the theatre was speedily cleared; and

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\* See statement of W. J. Ferguson, in "Lincoln Number" of the *Independent*, April 4, 1895.


the unconscious President was borne to a small dwelling-house across the way. During that indescribable night the dying man was surrounded by his family, his private secretaries, the members of his Cabinet—except the one who was himself lying helpless at home from wounds meant to be mortal; the Vice-President and others, too, were there; medical attendants were carefully watching in utter hopelessness the variations of pulse and respiration, until, after morning light had come (7:20 A. M.), the last heart-beat was recorded.

Pursuit of the fugitive criminals was promptly pushed. Booth, attended by one of his accomplices, was traced through lower Maryland into Virginia; was found (April 26th) secreted in a tobacco-house a few miles beyond the Rappahannock; and, threateningly resisting arrest, was killed by a soldier's shot. The accomplice who fled with Booth, and three others, including Mr. Seward's assailant, were executed a few weeks later under sentence of a military court.

So many utterances of sorrow and sympathy, so many tributes and eulogies from orators, poets, authors, journalists, or such fitting unwritten words from people of all classes, were surely never before called forth by the death of any great ruler. In British America the shock was felt almost as universally as in the United States. From all parts of Great Britain and Ireland, from Germany, France, Italy, and the countries beyond, came words of condolence, with high recognition of the greatness and goodness of the departed.

On Saturday the remains of President Lincoln were





removed to the White House, which was closed during Sunday and Monday. On Tuesday, the dead lying in state in the East Room was viewed by many thousands, the crowded current of people continuing through the entire day. There were funeral services in the same room on Wednesday, followed by a procession which filled from side to side the broad avenue from the White House to the Capitol, where there was a lying-in-state in the rotunda during the following day. On Friday the funeral journey by railway began; there was a lying-in-state at Philadelphia, in Independence Hall, from Saturday evening to Monday morning; in New York, and everywhere else on the route by Albany, Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis, and Chicago to Springfield, there were manifestations of popular feeling beyond measure or precedent. The 4th of May, the day of the final obsequies and of the entombment at Oak Ridge, was observed as a day of national mourning.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### *Review — Memorabilia of Lincoln.*

In our American life, the "poor boy raised on a farm" who comes to be among the foremost men of his time is not so rare as to excite fresh wonder; nor was the early lot of Abraham Lincoln so essentially different from that of others who have thus risen as to reward minute examination in detail. Beyond his unduly decried father, we find a line of ancestors whose worth and respectability cannot be questioned. Aside from the school instruction which enabled him to use the aid of books, his education, like all education that counts for much in the race of life, was chiefly self-directed. A higher course of athletics he had no need of; and few university graduates ever acquired a better knowledge than he of the one language with which he mainly had to do. Apart from every-day experience in the backwoods and what he derived from a few books, the most effective of his earlier training was in his river voyages to New Orleans, and in his campaign as captain of troopers and as scout in repelling an Indian foray. Later, his eight years' service as a member of the Illinois Legislature — beginning as one of the youngest and quietest and ending as the acknowledged leader — was of inestimable value in preparation for his work at the bar and in higher public life.

What at some particular stage on his way upward

he seemed to be to an inexpert observer may occasionally interest us, but we are more especially concerned to know what he had actually become at the time of his entrance upon the broader life following his settlement as a lawyer at Springfield. Here, in a professional practice of varied character, making him acquainted with all conditions of men, and in a single term in Congress, he continued growing and ripening until his supreme opportunity came.

From his youth, for years before the close of his rough Indiana life, it is almost certain that a steady purpose, a persistent ambition, even a stimulating presentiment, began to develop in his mind. As time went on, it took vaguely the form of a wish for a place in history — a record for all time. When defeated in any of the smaller aspirations tending in this direction, there was keenness in his mortification, but he never gave up. "The people may yet find use for me," he said, and waited. He saw his great opportunity in 1854. Henceforward, if not always, law practice was to him of but secondary moment.

Lincoln was now forty-five. His success in politics had fallen short of his hopes. The heavy adverse party majority in Illinois had allowed him little chance. Douglas — not so early chosen to the Legislature as he — had speedily assumed the leadership of the Democratic party in the State, controlling its effective machinery for his own advancement. He had easily distanced Lincoln — a leader, but not without competitors in his own party; had been thrice elected to the lower branch of Congress, surrendering his third term to enter the Senate; and was in his second term in that

body when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, under his lead, threatened the disruption and overthrow of the Democratic party in Illinois. Lincoln entered with all his heart into the consequent "Anti-Nebraska" struggle.

Four years later, Lincoln and Douglas contended for the latter's place in the Senate, and Douglas won. Just two years from the day he was sworn in for the term thus gained, his rival was inaugurated as President of the United States.

Considering the case from this distance, one has little difficulty in discerning that Lincoln, before all others, was the man exactly fitted to win a Republican victory in 1860. Mr. Seward would surely have been beaten if nominated. Mr. Chase, as some of his truest friends soon comprehended — and as later experience reaffirmed — was impossible even as a nominee; Judge Bates could command no new strength in the free States and was practically without following at the South; and Judge McLean, who in 1856 might have carried Pennsylvania and beaten Mr. Buchanan, had lost a last opportunity. But Lincoln fitted the exigency, not only in rescuing the nomination from Mr. Seward, but in saving the election itself, as possibly no other could have done.

But was he really the best conceivable, not to say discoverable, man — at any time, and especially at this particular time — to be placed in power as President? That question will not be discussed in these closing pages. About his methods and measures men may still argue; about his complete success there can be no dispute.

Photography, painting, and sculpture have all been employed to give in their own way an enduring presentation of Lincoln's personal exterior; and the art of description in words has partly supplied what a mute and immobile image cannot reveal. For a long time malicious perversion and satiric caricature unsparingly strove to forestall opinion and to hinder respect; and there were many not unkind people, North as well as South, who took it for granted that, both as to mind and body, great allowance was to be made by his friends and not much forbearance expected from his enemies. Only those who never had any personal association with Abraham Lincoln could think this a justifiable view of the case. The Rev. Phillips Brooks, then rector of a church in Philadelphia — afterwards Bishop of Massachusetts — wrote to his brother, February 25, 1861, just after the President-elect passed through the city on his way to Washington: "I saw 'Abe' on Thursday. He is a good-looking, substantial sort of a man, and I believe he will do the work." This was said on the spur of the moment, with undoubted earnestness and sincerity. Sir Edward Malet, then holding a subordinate diplomatic place in Washington, at the outset of a distinguished career in both hemispheres, said forty years later in his book of recollections: \* "Of all the great men I have known, he is the one who has left upon me the impression of a sterling son of God. . . . I can still feel the grip of his massive hand and the searching look of his kindly eye."

He was indeed a plain man in person, dress, and manner. Without affectation he chose to be classed

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\*" Shifting Scenes," 1901.

with "plain people" in the good old English sense of that term. His success in statecraft was partly due to his care and capacity to conciliate — to be all that is fair and kind to all men and to deserve their confidence. "Fairness" was one of his favorite words. Maintaining dignity without distance — leaving his superior position to have its own effect without self-assertion — he avoided the intrusion of familiarity while manifesting a true sympathy which won complete trust.

"Come with me and see 'St. Louis under the Oak,'" said Charles Sumner to a French visitor one day, alluding to the promiscuous receptions given at the White House to the crowd of applicants or supplicants still waiting after the close of the President's usual hours of audience. Nothing like this, habitually and on so large a scale, had before been known in Washington. There was little spectacular resemblance, certainly, though there was similarity of purpose, between these scenes and the outdoor audiences of the royal saint, listening to the wants and wrongs of his people.

The first forty days of his Presidency were to Lincoln a period of supreme trial. His Secretary of State advised the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and was backed by the military opinion of the veteran General-in-chief; and with but one or two exceptions the rest of his Cabinet concurred. Yet he saw at once that such a surrender at the very outset, no matter how explained, would be an irredeemable blunder. A more suspicious man would have surmised a treacherous purpose in such counsel from a civilian, whatever justification it might seem to have on its military side. All was uncertain for

weeks to anxious watchers. Manifold were the rumors and predictions. The President was charged with weakness, when, in fact, it was only his strength and firmness, with a little judicious waiting, that averted a fatal beginning. He was sensitively aware of the adverse currents of criticism and conjecture, which as yet he could do little to check. A curious reminder of this time was found among the papers left by Senator Collamer in two unexplained notes of Spartan brevity — namely:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 12, 1861.

*Hon. Jacob Collamer:*

MY DEAR SIR:—God help me. It is said I have offended you. I hope you will tell me how. Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MARCH 14, 1861.

*Dear Sir:*—I am entirely unconscious that you have any way offended me. I cherish no sentiment toward you but that of kindness and confidence. Your humble servant,

J. COLLAMER.

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President.

[Returned with indorsement.]

Very glad to know that I haven't. A. LINCOLN.

Like Senator Fessenden, Judge Collamer had earlier lost confidence in Mr. Seward, and now thought him too much in control; while, with their genuine conservatism, neither could closely fellowship the radical wing represented by Chase and Sumner. It was Collamer, as his papers prove, who drafted the anti-Seward resolutions adopted by the Senatorial caucus in December, 1862, and who took the lead in urging the Secretary's displacement.

There is also among the same papers a letter of Secretary Chase to Collamer (May 18, 1861), in which occurs this anti-Seward touch: "When the question of blockade came under discussion, I doubted the propriety of the term. It seemed to me descriptive of a condition arising between belligerent powers, and not between a government and rebels." Like Secretary Welles, he preferred to "close the ports."

Senator Wade — who, like Collamer, had received support in the Chicago convention, and was more distinctly recognized as a "dark-horse" possibility — was another strong man whom Lincoln, without perfect success, sought to conciliate. One incident in this connection is recalled which was the talk of Ohio Congressmen who, with Wade, "messed" at a boarding-house on Pennsylvania Avenue, where the writer happened to be present at the time. On the evening after his inauguration, President Lincoln and Senator Andrew Johnson called together on Wade, and there was a conference between the three men, whose subsequent relations to each other make the event curious enough to interest a student of the occult.

Senator Sumner, who visited Lincoln at Willard's while yet only President-elect, and seemed to him "very much like a bishop," was urgent that the Administration from the start should be "pronounced for freedom." Secretary Chase, less a peace man than Sumner, lamented the lack of an Andrew Jackson as the "forty days" languidly lapsed; and Horace Greeley, not always warlike or always pacific, was just now, with his ardent followers, saying: "So slow — so slow!" At length



war was forced upon the Government by the assault on Fort Sumter, and for a long time there were battles and defeats, without much victory. As the months wore on, two wings of the party became more positively defined, one of which was represented in the Cabinet by Secretary Seward, and the other by Secretary Chase. The latter was in close fellowship with Senator Sumner, whose noble friend, Lord Morpeth (afterwards Earl of Carlisle), discovered and revealed Chase to him away back in the old "Liberty party" days.\* Thereafter the two were more or less associated, especially from the time of their joint Anti-Nebraska onslaught upon Douglas in the Senate, until the urgency of the one helped to place the other on the Federal Supreme Bench as Chief Justice. To the same wing, of course, belonged Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means—"holding the purse strings," and thus the recognized Republican leader on the floor of the House. By his sharp thrusts and sarcastic humor, Mr. Stevens maintained there a certain terrorism, not always personally helpful to the President. On that side, too, was Vice-President Hamlin.

Mr. Sumner, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, was so assiduous in advising the President, and was so listened to by him on matters coming before that committee as well as pertaining to the State Department, that Mr. Seward said playfully, if not also a little jealously, "Lincoln has two Secre-

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\* In May, 1842, Lord Morpeth wrote to Sumner: "I left Cincinnati with regret. I liked its aspect, picturesque and natural, and I liked much a Mr. Chase I met there."

taries of State." \* Seward wished to ignore slavery and fight for the Union. Sumner declared in a letter to the Duchess of Argyll that to him the Union was comparatively unimportant — he had never put "our cause" on that ground. Seward was for the blockade; Sumner wanted a closing of the ports. And so on to the end of the list. One was needed to balance the other, according to Lincoln's way of stating things. Besides these two forces to balance, there were the Democratic party in general and the Border-State Union men to be dealt with and made co-efficient in the national work.

He was not a trimmer or deceiver, whatever some dissatisfied people hastily said. In principle there was no trimming, and there was no duplicity in regard to his purposes and promises. What the sturdy youth practiced in piloting a flatboat on the Mississippi River, — keeping in the channel, which now approached one bank and now the other; looking out for snags, sawyers, and shoals; sweeping around bends that were sometimes so abrupt that he found himself for the moment faced about from south to north or from east to west, yet always steadily pursuing his way to the Delta,— such was the statecraft of the President. And what had not the grand "internal sea" been to him, sleeping or waking, from his first voyage to New Orleans to his last premonitory dream of "drifting — drifting on a great, broad, rolling river"? The Mississippi represented the Union itself. It made Separation impos-

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\* Welles wrote that the President was in the habit of consulting Sumner "on conflicting or troublesome subjects with foreign powers."

J. B. Barrett, Com. of Pen.  
sion, please call and  
see me.

A. Lincoln

April 3, 1864.

Wendy Mary

My dear

Please send to my  
use immediately. The best  
wishes from you

Yours

A. Lincoln

W. Barrett

With sincere regard  
Your friend  
S. Chase

Joseph H. Barrett Esq  
Gazette Office

*From Letter Dated Columbus, May 13, 1859.*

sible. To Lincoln the great river never ceased to be of prime concern if not of paramount care, and by that way approached the train of conclusive victories.

Some additional incidents, personalities, and noteworthy words of Lincoln will better fulfill the purpose of this work than any attempt to analyze a character like his, and to catalogue its elements under psychological names. There were evenings at the White House of which the writer made contemporary notes; and there were other occasions in which interviews with the President are recalled by a card of invitation or other memorial still remaining. One is specially interesting on account of this peculiar note, sent to the writer by Secretary Chase (its date belonging to the first week in May, 1862):

MONDAY MORNING.

*My Dear Sir:*— Please come to my room immediately. The President wishes to see you. Yours,

MR. BARRETT.

S. P. CHASE.

A comparison of the fac-simile of this note with that of the passage from the same hand in regard to John Brown, in Chapter XV., or with another referred to here,\* seems to indicate that the former was written under some degree of excitement — as was undoubtedly the fact. Under date of May 2, 1862, Secretary Seward gave official notice abroad that the Government having now possession of New Orleans, a Collector had been appointed, and the blockade would be modified as affecting that port. Mr. L., the person so promptly decided upon for Collector, who had long been in prosperous

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\* Signature and address of letter of May 13, 1859.

business at New Orleans, happened to have been introduced to Secretary Chase by the writer, with the favorable indorsement which an acquaintance of some years seemed to justify. A bitter warfare followed, in behalf of another applicant, a little belated, who nevertheless so far prevailed with the President that he withheld Mr. L.'s commission. The interview thus invited through the Secretary had no effect, of course, in changing the President's determination, already firm. He wished, however, to explain the motive for recalling his consent to the appointment. He did this candidly, in the kindest manner.

The following card, received by the hand of "Edward" just before the time for going to church, on the Sunday of its date, has a serenity and steadiness about its chirography quite in contrast with that of the foregoing note:

*J. H. Barrett, Commissioner of Pensions:*

Please call and see me.  
APRIL 3, 1864.

A. LINCOLN.

He was found in his office with scattered pieces of manuscript before him, out of which he was making up his noted letter to Mr. Hodges, which bears the date of April 4, 1864. That, however, had little to do with the special object of his note, which related to the attempted movement to postpone the Baltimore convention, called to meet in June. He wanted this scheme defeated, and, in fact, it never gained much headway.

Among "Evenings at the White House," the writer

has preserved these memoranda, under date of October 2, 1864:

Found the President alone, with business papers before him — correspondence mainly, it would seem, asking him, “the merciful, the compassionate,” to grant relief for some one in military duress or doomed to a sterner fate. He had in hand at the moment the letter of a lady begging for the release of her son from Fort Warren (at Boston), to which he had been sentenced “during the war” for writing a treasonable letter to his father in the rebel army, which was intercepted. He had found no reason to doubt the conviction was just and the sentence a mild one, but undoubtedly this appeal to his clemency was effective.

Conversation soon turned, as usual on such occasions, upon the military situation. [The war, it cannot be too strongly stated, was his chief concern from the beginning. He had at hand the needed maps for keeping trace of all his armies, and by well organized telegraphic communication through the War Department he kept informed to a late hour every night when there was any important movement in the field.] Grant had a force within six miles of Richmond, a movement north of the James by part of Butler’s command having taken place two or three days before, as well as another advance of Meade’s lines southwest of Petersburg. Stanton had a dispatch from Grant at 10 o’clock this morning concerning arrangements for soldiers’ voting, but giving no military news. This was in answer to Stanton, the two co-operating in the preparations making on that subject. Maps of the seat of war at the East were referred to with explanations of operations past and in progress.

Coming to speak of the political campaign, as to which the late Republican divisions were no longer a serious disturbance, he related with hearty laughter an incident in connection with Fremont’s withdrawal. Recalling the part which opposition to “arbitrary arrests” had played in the Fremont platform, and the violence displayed by the newspaper organ of that faction, which was the last to surrender, Lincoln said: “Fremont has sent me a verbal message that

if I would shut up his refractory 'New Nation' man in Fort Lafayette, he would balance accounts." (A few days before D. S. Dickinson had written to a friend: "General Fremont's letter reminds me, as Mr. Lincoln would say, of a story: A deacon, churched for fishing on Sunday, confessed that he did fish—that he caught none—and was very sorry.")

There was also talk of Wade and Henry Winter Davis, with no word or sign of resentment against either, though it could not be doubted that he had felt their temporary defection at one of the most trying moments of his administration as a party wrong, if not a personal one. He spoke very kindly of Governor Dennison, who had just taken the place of Montgomery Blair as Postmaster-General.

His son Robert, now at Cambridge Law School, wrote that he had finished the first volume of Blackstone, and wondered that his father should have mastered it without knowledge of Latin. This, Lincoln said, he picked up to some extent as he went along.

Notes of November 14 (1864) relate to an evening interview with the President directly after the writer's return from a visit to Ohio for the special purpose of voting at the Presidential election. There were some personal details to communicate concerning the vote in Cincinnati, where Lincoln had the open support of Archbishop Purcell and other prominent Catholics, and his majority was unexpectedly large. There had been interviews with Governor Chase, who was also there to vote, and with Governor Brough at Columbus—in whose election the President had felt so anxious an interest the previous year—interviews not to be detailed here.

The President was engaged in writing a letter to General S. A. Hurlbut, at New Orleans, taking him to task for his interference against the new (anti-slavery) constitution and its friends in Louisiana, of which positive evidence had been



received. General Canby was also included in the same reproof — a pointed letter.

“Few things since I have been here have impressed me more painfully than what, for four or five months past, has appeared a bitter military opposition to the new State government of Louisiana. I still indulged some hope that I was mistaken in the fact; but copies of a correspondence on the subject between General Canby and yourself, and shown me to-day, dispel that hope. . . . Every Unionist ought to wish the new government to succeed; and every Disunionist must desire it to fail. . . . Every advocate of slavery naturally desires to see blasted and crushed the liberty promised the black man by the new Constitution. But why General Canby and General Hurlbut should join on the same side is to me incomprehensible.”)

The question of filling the vacant District Judgeship in Indiana coming up, he intimated that the candidates were becoming numerous, and the “influences” for one and another multiplying; Julian very earnestly pressing for his brother; Dick Thompson a prominent candidate; Secretary Usher would like the place; Howland seemed to have the fairest showing at present; and McDonald, having been twice before disappointed in a similar aspiration, this circumstance of itself would count in his favor — in view of the strong case made for him. “A man whose disappointment has troubled me — wishing to appoint him, yet feeling it impossible to do so — has an additional advantage with me for that reason.” To the suggestion that there had been some talk of McDonald’s rather “circuitous” record, politically speaking, the President replied that he supposed some of the friends of other candidates might have tried to “bespatter him.” (McDonald got the place.)

Reference was then made to a higher appointment — that of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The conversation turned solely upon Mr. Chase, so far as any person was named. There was a preponderance of expression in the ex-Secretary’s favor, so far. That, he added, was naturally to be expected. He mentioned it as a fact, not as an indication of his purpose. He said, however, that the wing of his (Lincoln’s) supporters having this appointment at heart was too large to be altogether disregarded. “My old friend Dave Davis, on the Supreme Bench, would be displeased with Chase’s appointment. He talked this matter over with me once last winter, and thought

it not best to put a man on the Bench who would still be aspiring to the Presidency." He (Lincoln) expressed his belief that on the more vital questions hereafter to come before the Supreme Court, Mr. Chase might be relied upon to decide aright—meaning particularly, no doubt, on all questions relating to slavery and the rights of those heretofore enslaved. The President evidently inclines to the appointment of Mr. Chase.

On another occasion, in the second year of the war, he spoke of certain highly-colored reports of a victory just gained at the West, and of the flight of the panic-stricken enemy—reminding him of a story. "There was an Eastern chap," he said, "who came out to Illinois on a speculating trip, bringing with him a lot of notions to sell, which didn't go off as well as he expected. About all he could do while his stock lasted was to pay his expenses from day to day. Finally getting strapped, he had some handbills posted up in one of the larger towns, announcing that on a certain evening would be exhibited a living specimen of that wonder of animated nature, the great Guyasticutus. Curiosity was so excited that at the appointed time enough money was collected at the entrance to handsomely fill his pockets. The next thing was to get rid of the crowd and off with the spoils. After a little speech about his wonderful beast, he retired behind the curtain. Pretty soon there was the rattling of a heavy chain, then a terrible crash, and the job was done when the showman stuck out his head, shouting: 'Run, run for life! The great Guyasticutus is loose!'"

One further illustration of both the matter and the manner of his stories is here given from memory, *apropos* to what or whom being left to conjecture: "A

young lawyer in one of the newer counties of Indiana, who had set his heart on going to the Legislature, thought he had things pretty well arranged for his nomination at the county convention, which was to meet twenty miles away from where he lived. Hiring a livery rig, he took an early start on the eventful day, and drove along dreaming over his acceptance speech and the cheerful prospect in life opening before him, while his nag settled down into the gait that never gets there. At last a free use of the whip improved the pace a little, but when he arrived at the courthouse he found the convention just adjourned and the other man nominated. 'That is a very nice horse of yours,' he said to the owner, after getting home again. 'I could recommend him especially to pull a hearse, only I'm afraid he wouldn't get to the graveyard until after the general resurrection.' "

A quivering of the lip announced the coming climax of his stories, at which he always laughed as freely as any hearer. His laugh was genuine and thorough — quite his own — hearty, breezy, unrestrained. There was brevity and no dawdling in his narrative. The ludicrous objective point was to be reached by the shortest cut. The subject-matter was often "ordinary" enough, and the language always more "colloquial," of course, than he would use in writing or public speech. His story-telling celebrity might be easily turned to his disadvantage by perversion or fabrication.\* It rested solely upon his superior skill in an art commonly used

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\* Examining one rather extensive collection of "Old Abe's Jokes," he found about half a dozen only for which he had any responsibility.

among companionable men of every class and profession. Nor was there any respect in which his stories or jokes were less commendable than those of worthy people in general.

Writing of the Trent affair, the Comte de Paris (in his history of the war) said:

To those who represented to him (President Lincoln) the danger which would be incurred in allowing the public to become exasperated, and the impossibility for America to support at once a civil war and a foreign war, he replied with one of those anecdotes he excelled in telling. "My father," he said, "had a neighbor from whom he was only separated by a fence. On each side of that fence there were two savage dogs, which kept running backward and forward along the barrier all day, barking and snapping at each other. One day they came to a large opening recently made in the fence. Perhaps you think they took advantage of this to devour each other? Not at all. Scarcely had they seen the gap when they both ran back, each on his own side, with their tails between their legs. Those two dogs are fair representatives of America and England."

An evasive pleasantry sometimes served his purpose well. To such things Secretary Chase could never take very kindly; yet a characteristic instance occurred at a grave moment when that officer called on the President with a delegation of bankers, saying they wished to have a talk about money matters. "I know little or nothing about money," said Lincoln. "It is considered rather necessary," suggested the Secretary, "in carrying on war." "Well, I don't know about that," was the reply; "we don't hear that Hannibal had any." The interview resulted favorably, perhaps none the less so because the President was not eager to discourse about finance.

Nor could the Secretary fail to appreciate the delicate recognition of his own importance in the administration.

Early in February, 1865, General John M. Palmer, of Illinois (a Kentuckian by birth), afterwards Governor and United States Senator,— one of the five Anti-Nebraska Democrats who, in the Senatorial election of 1855, had stood out for Judge Trumbull, and who gallantly served in the war as Major-General and Corps Commander,— had his last interview with Lincoln. The General had come to Washington on a mission from Governor Oglesby in regard to the pending draft. According to population, it was contended, the State of Illinois had already furnished for the military service eighteen thousand more men than the just quota. Bringing the matter first to the notice of Provost Marshal General Fry, he was informed that the President had “ reviewed these figures and directed the call for the men from Illinois.”

I immediately went to the White House (said Palmer in relating this incident), saw Mr. Lincoln, and explained to him that my errand was from Governor Oglesby to get our quota corrected, when he stopped me by saying: “ Palmer, I can get men more easily in Illinois than some other places. I directed the quota of Illinois myself, and I must have the men, and neither you nor ‘ Dick ’ can make a fuss about it ! ” I said no more, for I knew he meant what he said.

I then said to him: “ Mr. Lincoln, I wrote you a letter last September, saying that ‘ I did not wish to be one of your unemployed Generals, ’ and you answered me on a card, saying: ‘ When I want your resignation, I will tell you. ’ ” He said: “ I have a job for you now, the command of the Department of Kentucky. ” I replied: “ I have commanded troops in the field during my military service, but I don’t want to go to Kentucky and spend my time quarreling with the politicians. ” He said: “ Go to Stanton and get your

orders, and come back here at 9 o'clock to-morrow, and I'll tell you who are our friends and what makes a change in that command necessary."

When I returned in the morning, I saw several persons going in and out of his room, and became slightly impatient; but when the colored doorkeeper came and inquired for me, I entered the room and found him seated in an office chair engaged in being shaved. He said: "You are home folks, and I must shave. I cannot do so before Senators and Representatives who call upon me; but I thought I could do so before you." We then commenced to talk of the affairs of Kentucky. I repeated what I had said the evening before about my reluctance to go to Kentucky and quarrel with the politicians, and he said: "Go to Kentucky, keep your temper, do as you please, and I will sustain you."

Then occurred an incident which affords a key to Mr. Lincoln's policy, and accounts for his successful conduct of the Civil War.

I was silent while the barber was shaving him about the neck, but after he was through with that particular part of his duties, I said: "Mr. Lincoln, if I had known at Chicago that this great rebellion was to occur, I would not have consented to go to a one-horse town like Springfield, and take a one-horse lawyer and make him President." He pushed the barber from him, turned the chair, and said in an excited manner: "Neither would I, Palmer. If we had had a great man for the Presidency, one who had an inflexible policy and stuck to it, this rebellion would have succeeded, and the Southern Confederacy would have been established. All that I have done is, that I have striven to do my duty to-day, with the hope that when to-morrow comes I will be ready for it." This was the last time I saw Mr. Lincoln.\*

Of Lincoln on his literary side, the London *Spectator* said (in 1891):

No criticism of Mr. Lincoln can be in any sense adequate which does not deal with his astonishing power over words.

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\* From "Personal Recollections of John M. Palmer" (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company), pp. 224-5.

It is not too much to say of him that he is among the greatest masters of prose ever produced by the English race. . . . His letters, dispatches, memoranda, and written addresses are even better than his speeches.

What is best among the productions thus mentioned is largely represented in the foregoing pages. If, strictly speaking, "conversations" and "table-talk" in the usual sense of those terms are wanting in this case, something of kindred character is found in detached sayings, "words of wisdom," and occasional expressions suggestive of an embryonic genius lacking only the proper conditions for a normal development. A few illustrations follow:

I hope to "stand firm" enough not to go backward, and yet not go forward fast enough to wreck the nation.

With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions; he makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.

You can fool some of the people all the time; you can fool all of the people some of the time; but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.

No men living are more worthy to be trusted than those who toil up from poverty; none less inclined to take or touch aught which they have not honestly earned.

I am a patient man — always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still I must save this Government if possible. I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.

Free labor has the inspirations of hope; pure slavery has no hope.

Is it not strange that, while the courts declare a man's right to his stolen property to continue unchanged, they hold a man's right to himself, when stolen, to be lost?

Why men should be so eager in the chase for wealth is hard to explain, seeing that wealth is simply superfluity — what we don't need.

Every speech you heard Judge Douglas make on that Nebraska bill was full of felicitations that we were just at the end of the slavery agitation. The last tip of the last joint of the old serpent's tail was just drawing out of view.

It was before the days of competitive examination that he asked Secretary Stanton to commission the man he sent to him as Colonel of a colored regiment, believing him to be a good man for the place, "though he might not be able to tell the exact shade of Julius Caesar's hair."

To an appeal of certain Union men in Missouri for his intervention to put an end to one of their afflicting controversies he answered: "Instead of settling one dispute by deciding the question, I should merely furnish a nestful of eggs for hatching new disputes."

One who knew him in the early New Salem days said Lincoln habitually carried a book with him when at work, and remembered hearing him say: "A fool can learn about as well as a wise man, but the learning does him no good."

At the time of the Senatorial outbreak against Seward, in December, 1862, the Secretary told the President that it would be a relief to be freed from the cares of office. "Oh, yes, Governor," replied Lincoln,



“that will do very well for you, but I am like the starling in Sterne’s story — ‘I can’t get out.’”

He said of race prejudice — addressing a colored delegation on colonization: “A universal feeling, whether well or ill founded, cannot be safely disregarded.”

And again to men of the same race: “It is difficult to make a man miserable while he feels he is worthy of himself and claims kindred to the great God who made him.”

How hopeless he deemed any peaceful abolition of slavery, and how readily he fell into the language of the theology in which he had been brought up, may be seen in this extract from a letter (written in 1855) to Judge Robertson, of Kentucky:

So far as peaceful, voluntary emancipation is concerned, the condition of the negro slave in America, scarcely less terrible to the contemplation of a free mind, is now as fixed and hopeless of change for the better as that of the lost souls of the finally impenitent. The Autocrat of all the Russias will sooner resign his crown and proclaim his subjects free republicans than will the American masters voluntarily give up their slaves.

Of a condition of civil strife like that which was distracting the people of Missouri he said, in a letter to Mr. Drake (October 5, 1863):

Actual war comes on; blood grows hot; and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. . . . Every foul bird comes abroad and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion.

He had a real aversion to calls for a speech that must be merely offhand; yet, unwilling to disappoint the crowds that perhaps too often made such demands upon him, he seldom excused himself altogether. On one occasion, during his journey to Washington as President-elect, at a station where his train made but a brief halt, there was an eager and vociferous throng, whom he gratified by stepping to the door and saying: "I appear just to see you and to give you a chance to look at me — in which, you will admit, I have much the best of the bargain." The writer happened to be alone with him one evening at the White House when his humorous talk was interrupted by the sound of band music, and his countenance suddenly changed, as he inquired its meaning. This was presently announced by an usher. As he arose to go to the front, Lincoln lingered a moment in the room, saying: "These speeches bother me; it is hard work to reply to a serenade. I feel very much like the steam doctor, who said he could get along well enough in his way of practice with almost any case, but was puzzled when it came to mending a broken leg." And with this he began his speech, introduced by "I was just saying," etc.

Considering the part played by newspaper organs and personal champions in advancing party leaders, from time immemorial, and especially in notable instances among his contemporaries, he may be said to have been exceptionally one who paddled his own canoe. During some talk about a Republican organ at Washington, soon after his election, he remarked: "Long John Wentworth once said to me: 'Lincoln, why don't you have a man to run you, as Seward

does?' ” Then, after a good laugh, he plainly enough intimated that he always thought it better not to get entangled in any such way.

One of “Lincoln’s jokes,” current in Boston and elsewhere a generation ago, was to the effect that “Sumner once told a story.” Of course it was doubted by many judicious persons whether so remarkable a statement ever emanated from the White House; but the legend lived and grew. Mrs. Julia Ward Howe has given it historical shape, as follows: “He [Lincoln] said to Governor Andrew, *apropos* of I know not what, ‘I once heard George Sumner tell a story.’” It seems permissible, if not obligatory, to say in this connection that Lincoln was not in the habit of mispronouncing words of ordinary use in conversation, or of blundering as to names. He was so accustomed to use both names in speaking of Charles Sumner that the alleged mistake is simply incredible.

M. Laugel, the French visitant who went with Mr. Sumner to see “St. Louis under the Oak” (as elsewhere related), sat with the President and the Senator at a representation of *King Lear* in 1864, and said of the occasion in a book published the next year:

I was, as may be supposed, more occupied with the President than with the performance. He listened attentively, though he knew the play by heart, following all its incidents with the greatest interest, and talking with Mr. Sumner and myself only between the acts. His son “Tad” was leaning on him nearly all the time, and the laughing or astonished face of the lad was often pressed to his broad chest. One remark of Lincoln was to this effect: “It matters little to me whether Shakespeare is acted well or ill; with a drama of his the thought suffices.”

“Behind the darkest cloud there is always sunshine,” was a ready expression of Lincoln’s in time of special trouble — as in the days following the battle at Fredericksburg.

“It will pass away” was another maxim which came to bear a substantial part in his philosophy of life. In that exact form it had not yet come within his ken, apparently, when he wrote (February 25, 1842) to his friend, Joshua Speed: “Let me urge you to remember in the depths and even agony of despondency that very shortly you are to feel well again.” And a month later: “If your spirits flag down and leave you miserable, don’t fail to remember they cannot remain so.” These seem but variations on the same theme, which we find first distinctly announced — with its source — in his address at Milwaukee, in September, 1859, as follows: “It is said an Eastern monarch once charged his wise men to invent him a sentence to be ever in view, and which should be true and appropriate in all times and situations. They presented him with the words: ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’” Significant — and pathetic withal — is the fact that to him there was never but the one use of this philosophic panacea, namely, as a relief from despondency tending to despair.

Of Lincoln’s visit to Richmond on the day after its occupation by General Godfrey Weitzel, some memorable incidents were furnished by the latter’s brother, Colonel Lewis Weitzel. The General’s headquarters were in the building used as the Confederate “capitol,” and the President, accompanied by several officers, visited the building. On reaching the “Cabinet room,”

General Weitzel said: "Mr. President, this is the chair which has been so long occupied by Jefferson Davis"—pulling it back from the table. The President's face "took an extra look of care and melancholy. He looked at the chair for a moment, and slowly approached and wearily sat down. It was an hour of exultation with us soldiers," said the Colonel. "We felt that the war was ended, and we knew that all over the North bells were pealing, cannon booming, and the people were delirious with joy over the prospect of peace. I looked to see the President manifest some spirit of triumph; but his great head fell into his broad hands, and a sigh that seemed to come from the soul of a nation escaped his lips and saddened every man present. His mind seemed to be traveling back through the dark years of the war, and he was counting the cost in treasure, life, and blood that made it possible for him to sit there. As he rose without a word and left the room slowly and sadly, tears came to the eyes of every man present, and we soldiers realized that we had not done all the work or made all the sacrifices."

A short while before the President started to visit the army around Petersburg and Richmond, the writer was alone with him in the evening for a time in his office at the White House — an occasion forever memorable as a last interview. Never before had he seemed so careworn and weary. The burdens of state still pressed heavily upon him; the capture of Richmond still lingered; while his neglect of nourishing diet and irregularity of sleep were having their inevitable effect. He was, nevertheless, as kindly in manner as ever, and

even cheerful in general tone. The image of that vanishing presence survives, but few of the words spoken are recalled, save the last, as his visitor rose to go: "Sit down and wait here a little until I am gone. I must have rest. There are still persons outside the door; I hear their voices now." He then hastily retired by the private way that had recently been constructed in the rear of the ante-room. The "voices" he either imagined or his hearing must have become preternaturally acute.

More than a third of a century after the entombment at Oak Ridge Cemetery, the Illinois Legislature appropriated one hundred thousand dollars for the reconstruction of the Lincoln monument, the foundations of which appeared to be insecure. The remains of the deceased President and of those of his family laid at his side were temporarily removed to another vault on the 10th of March, 1900, awaiting their permanent place under the renewed and grander monument when completed. Without public ceremony, and purposely avoiding the attendance of a crowd, the transfer was made in the presence of State and other officials on the 24th of April, 1901. There, side by side in the new vault beneath a marble sarcophagus, were laid the remains of Abraham Lincoln, his wife, their three sons who died young, and their only grandson, who bore his grandfather's name. Eloquent eulogy would rather have profaned than honored the occasion; and no formal epitaph would befit the towering monument on which is inscribed the name of LINCOLN.

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