

9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David H. Sutton
FROM : William E. Edwards
SUBJECT: Defense Document #526, IWABUCHI, Tatsuo.

Pursuant to your request of 19 May 1947, I invited General TANAKA, Ryukichi, to appear in my office for the purpose of discussing with him certain of the statements contained in the English translation of excerpts taken from Defense Document #526, which document appears to be an article written by IWABUCHI, Tatsuo. Your long-hand request appeared at the top of the memorandum dated 7 May 1947, which was addressed to you by Mr. Sandusky, and attached to which was the copy of the English translation of the excerpts taken from Defense Document #526. Such memorandum and attachment are being returned herewith.

General TANAKA appeared in my office on the afternoon of 26 May 1947 for the purpose of discussing these statements. Mr. Ogita of the Language Division served as interpreter for the conference. While I appreciate that your particular interest is centered about the last paragraph appearing at the foot of page 1 of the English translation, nevertheless, I deemed it advisable to ask General TANAKA for his comments and opinion with respect to the soundness of the information set forth in the other paragraphs of this document. In order to do so, I invited Mr. Ogita, as interpreter, to acquaint General TANAKA with the essence of each of the various matters covered. I then suggested to Mr. Ogita that he dictate the General's remarks with respect thereto. The paragraphs were taken up for consideration in seriatim and the General's remarks with respect thereto will be found set forth hereinbelow in numerical sequence, in the same order as the paragraphs appear in the document:

1. As stated in the first paragraph of the document, the nickname, "Shut Up", was acquired by SATO in such a manner. However, I believe TATSUO IWABUCHI is not correct when he says that SATO shouted "shut up" to ITANO, Tomozo. I believe SATO shouted "shut up" to a man who was a reserve colonel serving as a Diet member. The man is the younger brother of MITSUGHI, Chuzo, who was then the Minister of Home Affairs. I base my opinion on the fact that I heard the story from this man. His name is not MITSUGHI. It is NIYAWAKI, Chokichi.

2. In regard to the statement in the second paragraph to the effect that there was a general rumor of a plan among the military staff to intimidate discussions in the Diet by giving loud out-bursts

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to speeches made by Diet members; the plan of which SATO was the champion, I say that there was no such rumor and also that there was no such plan. This practice was then solely by SATO. However, there was a plan for a one-party system in Japan. As evidence of my statement, after the outbursts made by SATO, SATO was ousted from the War Ministry by War Minister ITAGAKI and sent to Canton.

3. As regards the third paragraph to the effect that SAKANISHI, Ichiro, was deliberately made drunk by young staff officers and made to attend the meeting of the old generals and admirals for the purpose of intimidating them is false. SAKANISHI, Ichiro, is a friend of mine who loves his drinks. At the time of this alleged incident there was no such plan as stated by IWABUCHI, Tatsuo. Actually, SAKANISHI happened to be drinking with a Chinese named Li-Shi-II before the meeting and became drunk. He suddenly remembered that he had to attend the meeting and went there in an intoxicated condition. He enraged the old reserve generals and admirals by saying to them that they should not be wasting their time playing GO (Japanese chess). Evidence of this is the fact that SAKANISHI was punished by the War Ministry for his disgusting display. It was a severe punishment in that SAKANISHI's pay was reduced to one-fourth and he was fired from his position. This punishment is one step lighter than imprisonment.

4. As regards the fourth paragraph in which IWABUCHI states that irregardless of the validity of the above mentioned episodes they served to prove how minutely the army staff officers planned and promoted the situation. I again say that his statement is incorrect. Actually, there was a plan to change the liberal economic system in Japan to one of controlled economic system. This was for the purpose of enlarging Army appropriations and was not for the purpose of promoting the China Incident. In other words, the Army had this situation with domestic politics.

5. As regards the fifth paragraph to the effect that SATO, Kenryo, was a devoted follower of TOJO since the Manchurian Incident, I will confirm this.

6. As regards the sixth paragraph whereby IWABUCHI claims that I, TANAKA, Ryukichi, was a devoted follower of TOJO and that together with TOJO I was responsible for causing the SUYUWAN Affair, I TANAKA, Ryukichi, strongly deny this. TOJO trusted me but I was not a devoted follower. I frequently gave advice to TOJO, but I never carried out flattery nor acted as a follower. I was not on good terms with TOJO, but I was on very good terms with ANAMI who was Vice Minister of War under TOJO. ANAMI was ousted by TOJO.

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TOJO had no connection with the SUIYUAN Affair. The SUIYUAN Affair was one in which the Mongolian Army under Prince Te fought the Chinese Army under Fu-tso-ii in Mongolia. Prince Te asked the Kwantung Army for help. I went to his help with approximately ¥ 1,000,000, which ITAGAKI gave me and which originally came from the South Manchurian Railway Company. The man who gave me the order to go to Prince Te was General UEDA. This occurred in November of 1936. I was at Prince Te's place for about a month. The Mongolian Army was defeated. UEDA was the Commanding Officer of the Kwantung Army and ITAGAKI was the Chief of Staff. TOJO at the time was the Chief of the KEMPEI TAI of the Kwantung Army and had absolutely no connection with this affair. TOJO became the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in March of the following year and in July of the same year when the China Incident broke out, he went to Mongolia leading an Army. At this time I was no longer staff officer of the Kwantung Army and had become an artillery regimental commander of the Korean Army at Hanan. Since I was well acquainted with Mongolia, TOJO requested me to assist him in contacting Prince Te. This last episode which I mention was not the SUIYUAN Affair and had no connection with it. This was during the China Incident and the Mongolian Army won the war because the Japanese forces participated. As IWABUCHI states, it is true that I came to stand in opposition to MUTO, Akira. The reason was that MUTO, together with TOJO, participated too much in politics. I knew from the very beginning that we would lose the Greater East Asia War. There are many evidentiary records to my last statement. In September 1942, I resigned from TOJO's War Ministry. The reason was that together with the Foreign Minister TOGO, Shigenori, I tried to crush the TOJO Cabinet, and had to resign because of its failure. This is exactly as I stated in the courtroom. I did not write the book for the purpose of exposing TOJO as IWABUCHI claims. I wrote it in order to enlighten the people as to the cause of the defeat because I was in a position to know the true circumstances.

IWABUCHI, Tatsuo, who made these statements was an advocate of the "Imperial Way." IWABUCHI was a good friend of Prince KONOE, General ABASHI, and General MAZAKI, who were central figures of the group advocating the "Imperial Way." When I was the Chief of the Military Service Bureau and Section, I put pressure against the "Imperial Way" group. I also opposed at the same time the "Control" group. I was hated by both of these groups, especially by the "Imperial Way" group. Consequently, it is natural for IWABUCHI to make derogatory remarks about me. His statements are incorrect and do not express the truth.

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10. With respect to paragraph 10, I have never heard of any organization such as the "League of War Veterans" and I have never heard of any organization of that name in the General Staff, KANSAI, etc.

(NOTE: The discussion of Defense Document #526 with General TANAKA was continued until 5 June. On that date, Lt. Eric Fleisher functioned as interpreter and obtained the following information from General TANAKA regarding the statements which appear in the paragraphs of the document as indicated.)

7. With respect to the statement contained in paragraph 7, TOMINAGA returned to Japan as a result of a disagreement with YAMASHITA. TOMINAGA quarrelled with YAMASHITA because YAMASHITA's orders expected too much. At this time TOMINAGA had very few aircraft left and the orders that YAMASHITA issued were far beyond what he had available. I heard that from TOMINAGA, so there is no mistake about it.

8. That is incorrect, as SATO at that time was not in Tokyo. Also at that time, TOMINAGA was in the General Staff and had no connection whatever with the War Ministry. MUTO, on the other hand, favored TOJO as his first choice and ANAMI as his second. TOJO's greatest supporters were ANAMI and HATA. There can be no mistake about this statement because I heard it directly from HATA. I heard this from both HATA and ANAMI. ANAMI told me that he had favored TOJO, but after TOJO became Minister of War he seemed so very narrow-minded. At this time HATA telephoned TOJO, who at that time was in Korea, and told TOJO the conclusions that he and ANAMI had come to, namely that TOJO should become Minister of War. When TOJO heard this, he immediately accepted the suggestion which is contrary to Japanese custom in that by Japanese custom one always refuses and says, "I don't consider myself fit for such great responsibility."

9. The reason for the Army supporting TOJO at this time was because NODA, Kengo, Chief of Personnel Section, and MUTO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, had recommended TOJO and ANAMI to the former Minister of War, HATA. At the time of the appointment of TOJO, the Army was backing TOJO. It was not until later that they did not fully support TOJO. The reason for this at this time was that TOJO was one of the biggest supporters of the Tripartite Pact. The reason for YOSHIDA's resigning was that he had a mental illness at the time and the fact that he was opposed to the Tripartite Pact had nothing to do with it at all. YOSHIDA was neither opposed to nor in favor of the Tripartite Pact.

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10. With respect to paragraph 10, I have never heard of any organization such as the HACHININ GUMI. SATO and MUTO were the greatest advocates of war; and in the General Staff, TANAKA, Shinichi, was a strong advocate. The others had very little connection. The others could not have had very much connection since they did not appear in liaison conferences. In the War Ministry there were many people who were opposed to war, but they could not express themselves because they did not appear in liaison conferences. As for the Navy, whether they would fight or not they left it up to KONOYE and his Cabinet. OKA, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, went to TOMITA, Kenji, and told him what I have just said. And I heard it from TOMITA, Kenji. Of the KONOYE Cabinet, the only minister that directly spoke to him and advocated war was TOJO. OIKAWA, Minister of Navy, made no comment and left it up to the decision of the Cabinet as to war. TOJO alone was responsible for the collapse of the KONOYE Cabinet. KONOYE was in favor of coming to an agreement with the United States even at the risk of breaking the close ties with the Tripartite Pact, whereas TOJO stated that if the ties with the Tripartite Pact should be lessened, the Japanese army would be disgraced and couldn't face the public. I heard this directly from KONOYE, so I am well familiar with it. KONOYE and TOJO fought three times over this problem. At this time TOJO was supported by MUTO and SATO, and as a result the KONOYE Cabinet fell. I heard this from KONOYE at his house in November 1944.

11. There is no such organization as the HACHININ GUMI. However, FUKUTOMI of the Navy General Staff and TANAKA, Shinichi, of the Army General Staff were in favor of war. Of the younger officers that supported war, there later was TSUGI, Masanobu, who at present is in Hanking.

12. There was no such group as the HACHININ GUMI, however, while Japan was winning, all of the army was riding high. There is no such thing as the HACHININ GUMI -- they were all arrogant. It was only I at that time who knew that Japan would be defeated and was worried.

13. That is correct.

14. a. That is correct.

b. That is correct.

c. That is correct.

d. At the time, SATO was head of the Press Section,

MIKUNI was not yet in power. MIKUNI's organization came into being in August 1940. TOJO utilized MIKUNI's organization. The actual head of MIKUNI's organization was commander of the KEMPEI TAI. The objective of MIKUNI's organization was to apprehend foreign spies. However, in reality, this organization was also used to suppress the opposition to TOJO. That SATO and MUTO saw the reports put out by

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the MIKUNI organization is also a reality. However, TOJO used the MIKUNI organization more than anyone else. I strongly advocated abolishing the MIKUNI organization, but TOJO did not listen to me. This was one of the original arguments I had with TOJO. The reason that I was opposed to this organization was the it worked to eliminate some of the best men of the time because they were opposed to TOJO. The MIKUNI organization was most active after TOJO became Prime Minister.

15. a. Things like that were very common. KONOYE probably said that after TOJO had become Prime Minister. At this time KONOYE's wife was taking piano lessons from a Swiss woman and she had been observed by the organization and she had been suspected of trying to make peace with the United States through Switzerland. Very few people knew about the MIKUNI organization, even in the War Ministry.

b. That is doubtful. There is no one mentioned here who would know the true state of this fact.

c. Very few people knew about the MIKUNI organization, not even KIDO. Even the Emperor didn't know about it. That is a fact. SATO's objective was even if TOJO had to resign as Prime Minister he was to be able to retain his position as Minister of War. SATO considered the KOISE Cabinet as a badoglio Cabinet.

16. There were many officers who were in favor of suspending the Constitution and maintaining martial law and continuing the war until the end. ANAMI was opposed to this. At that time, I knew that ANAMI was opposed to martial law, so I met SUZUKI at his house and told him of this. I believe this is the reason that SUZUKI chose ANAMI as his War Minister. As ANAMI was opposed to martial law and also SUZUKI, the Army didn't even put forth the plan.

17. That is correct.

18. That is correct. SUZUKI would know more about this; or SUZUKI's secretary.

19. At that time, there were thoughts of organizing a complete military government and HATA, UMEZU and ANAMI seemed most likely to assume the position as head of the Government. HATA seemed to have the greatest chance for success. However, this was something that was never taken up by the higher military authorities and was

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something that was planned purely in the lower levels of the Army. Both HATA and ANAMI at this time stated that they would not participate in any such coup d'etat. That the planning board had anything to do with this plan is also incorrect. SATO had nothing to do with this plan. SUZUKI was also desirous that ANAMI accept the post as Home Minister. ANAMI refused.

20. There was no struggle for power as is mentioned. ANAMI played his part with complete loyalty to SUZUKI.

21. Only a small part of the Army and a small part of the government favored continuing the war to the mainland. Both SUZUKI and ANAMI, although they didn't say so to their subordinates, favored peace before the war extended to the mainland.

22. This is incorrect. SUZUKI told me himself in the end of March that should the chance come he would make peace. SUZUKI spoke to YOGO in July to use Russia as an intermediary for peace and plans were even made to send KONOYE to Russia to negotiate.

23. KONOYE did a lot of talking and much of what he said is very unreliable. KONOYE's weakest point is that he could never keep a secret. The reason KONOYE failed in the American-Japanese negotiations was that he could not keep a secret. This man when he was arrested was arrested with YOSHIDA, not as an anti-militarist but for working to conclude peace. ANAMI was the one who released both these men -- IWABUCHI and YOSHIDA. The military police were very much annoyed at the release of these men. IWABUCHI happened to be with YOSHIDA at the time when YOSHIDA was arrested and he was arrested with him. The trouble with YOSHIDA was that he talked too much about the necessity for concluding peace.

24. SUZUKI didn't trust KONOYE and didn't tell him too much; therefore, SUZUKI's opinions and plans would not be known to KONOYE.

Attachment

WEE/nob

7 May 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Acting Chief, Investigation Division,
IPS.

FROM : William E. Edwards.

SUBJECT: KAWASAKI, Yutaka

Confirming my recent report to you, during the course of one of the interrogations held in connection with the secret funds investigation, it was brought to our attention that the above named subject is assertedly familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged flight which was made from Tokyo to Shanghai for the purpose of obtaining and bringing back to Tokyo a substantial sum of cash for the defendant TOJO. It has been further reported that such cash had been derived from Japanese controlled opium traffic in China.

In view of the foregoing, it has been deemed advisable to request the appearance of the captioned subject in order that an interrogation may be conducted with respect to the reported incident.

Accordingly, it would be appreciated if your office would send for Mr. KAWASAKI in the usual course. His presence is requested for 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, 13 May 1947.

Our informant was not able to provide a residence address for this subject but did state that he is an executive of the Nihon Fire Insurance Company with offices in mid-town Tokyo.

Distribution:

Mr. David N. Sutton
Mr. Lester C. Danigan
Mr. Arthur A. Sandusky

WEE:nob

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

22 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner

Your attention is invited to the following documents for possible exploitation and use in cross examination of the witnesses mentioned below:

1. IPS Document No. 1494, a book by IKEZAKI, Shuko (or Tadasaki) entitled "IF JAPAN AND AMERICA SHOULD FIGHT", in which the author declares war between Japan and the United States inevitable, advocates lightening strategy, and calls upon Japan to fight this coming war with a firm resolution until victory. The book was published in February 1941. This document has not been introduced in evidence. The author, IKEZAKI, is a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Comyns-Carr, Brown, Woolworth and Dunigan.

2. IPS Document No. 1610, a book by MISHIMA, Yasuo entitled "THE ESSENCE AND THE INSIDE OF THE CHINA INCIDENT", in which the author calls for a New Order in Asia and extermination of European and American influence there. For this purpose he advocates conquest of China and preparations for a long war. This Document is not in evidence. The author, MISHIMA, is a Defense witness assigned to Mr. Sandusky.

3. IPS Document No. 1715, a statement of Lt. Gen. SAKAI, Takashi, regarding the KO-A-IN and Inner Mongolian politics. SAKAI is a Defense witness assigned to General Vasiliev and Colonel Woolworth.

4. IPS Document No. 1833 - an affidavit of General TADA, Hayao (or Shun), a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Robinson and Edwards.

5. IPS Document No. 1839 - an affidavit of Lt. Gen. OYAMA, Fumio, who is a Defense witness assigned to Mr. Dunigan.

The last named three documents have not been used in evidence.

Lt. Kurt Steiner

c.c. Mr. Comyns-Carr
Mr. Brown
Col. Woolworth
Mr. Dunigan
Mr. Sandusky
Gen. Vasiliev
Mr. Lopez
✓ Mr. Edwards

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to

1. Court Exhibit 259, being a part of IPS Document 984. This is a report outlining the control of North Chinese railroads by the Japanese army. It was sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army TADA, Shun, who is a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Robinson and Edwards. Among the recipients was Major General KAGESA, Sadaaki (or Teisho), Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Dunnigan, Lopez, Robinson and Edwards.

2. Court Exhibit 195, a part of IPS Document 1242, being a report on the propaganda program to be carried out by the Kwantung Army in North China, including advocacy of separation from Central China. This report was made by General NISHIO, Juzo (or Toshizo), a defense witness assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Robinson, Edwards, Nye and Ao.

Since IPS Documents 984 and 1242 are official War Ministry files which are likely to contain valuable material aside from the excerpts already introduced, it is suggested that these documents be made the subject of further analysis and study for possible use in cross-examination of witnesses from whom parts of these files originated or to whom they were addressed, or for use in rebuttal.

Copies to: Mr. Lopez
Capt. Robinson
~~Mr. Edwards~~
Mr. Dunnigan
Dr. Ao
Judge Nye

12 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David N. Sutton
Mr. Lester C. Danigan

FROM : William E. Edwards

SUBJECT: Information Regarding Alleged Shipments of Money Derived
from Opium Traffic in China to the Defendant TOJO.

During the course of one of the interrogations conducted in connection with the secret funds investigation, an assertion was made by one of the subjects being interrogated to the effect that a very substantial sum of yen had been flown from Shanghai to Tokyo for the Defendant TOJO. The original informant alleged that this money had been derived from opium traffic in China and had been flown to Tokyo for TOJO's personal use.

In an effort to develop more concrete information, several other Japanese nationals were questioned regarding this matter, including SATOMI, Hajime, who, as you will recall, had served as the Japanese member of the Joint Opium Control Board in China. Unfortunately, this series of interrogations failed to develop anything that I would consider reliable information.

However, I recently discussed the matter with TANAKA, Ryukichi, and while he professed to know nothing about the alleged specific incident, nevertheless, he provided us with some information which, in my opinion, would bear further consideration. In that it is not claimed that the money in question involved secret funds, I have deemed it advisable to refer the matter to your office and to Mr. Danigan for such further disposition as may be warranted.

Mr. Ogita served as interpreter on the occasion of my discussion of this matter with General TANAKA, and at my suggestion he dictated the following quoted remarks in the first person:

"Lt. General SHIOZAWA, Shoji, presently in Russian hands in Russia was TOJO's important follower and during TOJO's premiership was the Chief of the China Affairs Board in Peking. He was also a good friend of Mr. SATOMI. Under Lt. General SHIOZAWA there was Major General SENDA, Moritoshi, who was the Vice Chief. Around this time SHIOZAWA went to Tokyo regularly about once in two months in a privately chartered plane. Mr. SENDA told me in Osaka around September 1944 that each time SHIOZAWA flew to Tokyo he brought back great sums of money for TOJO. SENDA further told me that due to his opposing SHIOZAWA in this connection he was

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fired and consequently returned to Japan where he became instructor at the Kyoto Imperial University. SENDA should probably be in Japan or China at this time. This can be ascertained by asking the Chinese prosecutors. Around the time in question, Lt. General ISHIDA, Otagoro, who is now in Sugamo, was the KEMPEI TAI Chief in Peking.

"2. Lt. General OIKAWA, Genchichi, was the Chief of the China Affairs Board in Shanghai at the time SATOMI was dealing in opium. SATOMI told me last autumn that he brought ten or twenty million yen to OIKAWA in Shanghai.

"3. At the time of the termination of hostilities, ISHIDA, Otagoro, was the Vice Chief of the KEMPEI TAI in Tokyo under Lt. General OKIDO, Sanji. SHIKATA was the KEMPEI TAI Chief in Tokyo until around 1944 and later became the Chief of the KEMPEI TAI in Shanghai. If SHIKATA had made investigation on secret funds, the reports would have been sent to Tokyo. If SHIKATA had investigated the matter in Tokyo, the records should have remained in Tokyo. OKIDO is presently in Kyoto. ISHIDA is presently in Sugamo. SHIKATA should be in Shanghai.

"4. After I quit the position as Chief of Military Service Bureau, I have heard rumors about the transportation of money from Shanghai to Tokyo for TOJO. However, the route between Shanghai and Tokyo was under strict observation at all times. Therefore, if any money were sent from Shanghai to Tokyo the number of trips must have been very small. If TOJO received money from opium dealings, I believe that the money was sent from Shanghai to Peking and, for the most part, SHIOZAWA was the man that transported it. Since the money was allegedly to have been sent to Japan that would have to necessarily have been in Japanese currency. Furthermore, in changing the Chinese money into Japanese money it would have been more convenient to make the transaction in North China since there were many Japanese residents and travelers in North China. It was unlawful for Japanese residents to have a type of currency which can be used in Japan, in China. Only officials were able to exchange the money at the banks. After the commencement of the Greater East Asia War, opium from Persia did not come in. The opium came from Mongolia, and the China Affairs Board in Peking was the organization which handled this opium. This organization handled the opium which was sent to Shanghai, and the organization in Peking was able to make huge profits by selling Mongolian opium in Shanghai. The money derived from this source can be made

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into a secret fund. That is why I say that the money sent from Peking was greater. You can readily find out the names of the men who were serving under SHIOZAWA at Peking. By calling these men I am sure you will be able to find out the amount of money handled and the amount of money sent to Tokyo. My knowledge concerning secret funds is derived from opium is as above."

It is my thought that the foregoing information would be of particular interest to Mr. Dunigan in view of the statements involving the Defendant TOJO. I also am of the opinion that it would be worthwhile to follow through by interrogating some, if not all, of the available persons to whom General TANAKA made reference.

There are now on file in the Investigative Division copies of the transcripts of the interrogations of the following named Japanese nationals who were also questioned with respect to the matter referred to above:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>
HOSOKAWA, Morisada	1 May 1947
KAWASAKI, Yutaka	13 May 1947
	21 May 1947
SATOMI, Hajime	21 May 1947

Particular attention is invited to the fact that during the course of the supplemental interrogation of KAWASAKI, Yutaka, on 21 May 1947, the name of the representative of the Nippon Fire Insurance Company was obtained, who allegedly heard about the specific incident involving money being flown from Shanghai to Tokyo for the defendant TOJO, while in Shanghai in connection with business of the Shanghai Branch of the Nippon Fire Insurance Company. Further details with respect to this matter will be found in the transcript of the supplemental interrogation of KAWASAKI, dated 21 May 1947.

Copy to: Mr. Frank B. Tavenner
Mr. A. A. Sandusky
Judge Che-Chun Hsiang
Mr. Edward P. Monaghan

WEE/nob