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EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 1910.

This Document is not to be checked out.

Information contained in this document can be located in case file or interrogation file. Enclosed is paper listing interrogation by original exhibit number and date.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1910

Date 17 June 46.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogations and Personal Board of Information.  
 History of OGATA, Takekora, ex-~~at~~ President  
 Date: 1945-46 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: Japanese  
 Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
 Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x) English

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Mr. Dir.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: See our Case File 266.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OGATA, Takekora et al.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

GENYOSHA (Society);  
Board of Information.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Includes miscellaneous data  
and correspondence on subject personality.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No.

OGATA, F Taketora

EVIDENTIARY DOC.

Included in this folder is the interrogation for the following date

6 March	#1910 A
8 March	#1910 B

INTERROGATION OF

Taketora OGATA

Date and Time: 8 March 1946, 1400 - 1745  
Place : Room 733, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan  
Present : Taketora OGATA  
Major John F. Hummel, Interrogator  
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Interpreter  
Shogo Nakamura, Secretary to Mr. Ogata  
Kiyooki Koizumi, Interpreter  
Margaret Denny, Stenographer

(Note: Mr. Shimanouchi acted as  
interpreter. No oath was administered.)

Questions by Major Hummel:

Q. We ended our last session on the secret societies. Suppose we go right on from there. Do you know of the Makate Masubi?

A. I do not know.

Q. What do you know of the Aikoku-Sha?

A. I do not definitely know of the Aikoku-Sha, but I think its leader is Ainosuke IWATA and that its purpose is anti-Bolshevism and is somewhat similar to the Kokuhonsha.

Q. Was it composed of the same members as the Kokuhonsha?

A. It was composed of an entirely different membership of much younger elements. I recall that at some time it published a newspaper called the Aikoku Shimbun. A part of the membership consisted of so-called terrorists. The assassin of Premier HAMAGUCHI had connections with this organization.

Q. Did any of the members in that organization take part in the 5-15 or 2-26 Incidents?

A. No.

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OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

Q. Did it remain in existence after the HAMAGUCHI cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it advocate the military aggression in Manchuria and in China later on?

A. As I recall, the organization opposed the London Naval Treaty and for that reason was connected with the assassination of Premier HAMAGUCHI. But since then it has not been active since the Manchurian Incident. At the time of HAMAGUCHI's cabinet the problem of the high command was the major issue of politics. And on this problem there was serious conflict between the high command and the HAMAGUCHI cabinet. This problem continued to be a major question up to the recent war.

Q. Did it contain any military members, as well as civilians?

A. I do not think there were any military members.

Q. What can you tell me about the Shiunoso?

A. The Shiunoso was practically a one-man organization belonging to Tetsuma HASHIMOTO. Through personal writings on political subjects by this man the views of the organization on various political issues were expressed in print. That is, essays and comments written by him were published in newspapers as advertisements. HASHIMOTO was close to the late Kei HARA, and about 1920, when the manhood suffrage question arose and HARA was at that time Prime Minister, HASHIMOTO carried on a movement opposing manhood suffrage, receiving money from HARA. However, HASHIMOTO did not make jingoistic opinions very much.

Q. What about the Mizuho?

A. That I do not know. I know it only by name.

Q. Do you know members of it?

A. No, I do not know.

Q. What can you tell me about the Yamoto Musubi?

- A. It is a rightist movement in Ivaragi Prefecture. But as to its contents I do not know.
- Q. Did it extend beyond the Prefecture?
- A. I think that there are similar movements outside but I do not think that there were any connections with it.
- Q. When the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was formed did it use these societies so as to form a nucleus for the I.R.A.A.?
- A. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was founded primarily on the influence of the political parties. Previously, the rule was that the military could not interfere or participate in politics. But the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was not regarded as a political party as such, and in the view of its originator, Mr. KONOYE, the purpose was to link government and the military, government and political party influence, and the parties and the people, and thus eradicate any friction between and amongst them. And, departing from precedent, even military men on the active list were permitted to participate.

In order to improve the relationship between political parties and the people, it aimed to include elements which, like the military, were opposed to parliamentary politics. Among the elements opposed to parliamentary politics were rightist organizations such as have been mentioned. But the representatives did not represent the Yamato Muzubi and the Aikoko-Sha but in a broader sense. Among such representatives were such men as Yoshihisi KUZUJ, Junichiro KOBAYASHA, Banna IDA, Kozō OTA, Seigo NAKANO, Kengoro HASHIMOTO. NANAKO and HASHIMOTO left the I.R.A.A. very shortly after it was organized.

Major General Sho MOTO was enthusiastic regarding the organization of the I.R.A.A., but the military kept out of the organization when it was formed. He was enthusiastic about it in its preparatory stage but lost interest. The army's reason was that it was for the idea of one country, one party, like the Nazi Party; but KONOYE opposed the idea.

Would you like to hear more about the I.R.A.A.?

- Q. Yes, I would.

- A. In the light of the failure of the first KONOYE cabinet, KONOYE endeavored to bring together both the pro-Diet and the anti-Diet elements into a single group. However, because the whole idea had not been thoroughly considered and thrashed out before it was proposed, many conflicting views were expressed, some supporting parliamentary politics, some opposing it, and some favoring the organization as a functional group that eventually, because the various divergent and conflicting views could not be reconciled, turned out to be somewhat like the deformed child, its only platform being practical application of the way of subjects.

The rightists supposed that if it was to be made a political organization of all elements it would become a powerful organization, somewhat of the nature of the Bakufu, and rob the Emperor of the right and authority to rule, so that when the organization's political character was taken away and made a non-political organization it became a meaningless organization. As a result of the conclusion that the I.R.A.A. was not to be a political organization, the old party elements became very much dissatisfied and, disregarding that they must carry on political movements, withdrew from the I.R.A.A. and found a separate organization, the I.R.A.P.A. The principal effort of the I.R.A.P.A. was devoted to diminishing as much as possible the influence of the I.R.A.A. and, therefore, most of its endeavors were toward cutting down appropriations for the I.R.A.A. Such being the case, the whole organization, which was created for the purpose of grouping together into one body all conflicting elements, was defeated in its entire purpose and, instead, led to an entirely opposite result; that is, increased friction and conflict which developed between the I.R.A.A. and the I.R.A.P.A.

If there was to be any reason for the existence of the I.R.A.A. it was that the anti-Diet elements remained, and it may be considered a peculiar feature of Japanese politics that such a group could be considered handy in that combined with the influences of the military the resulting force could be utilized conveniently by the government. But because the I.R.A.A. was not a political organization and was prohibited from political activity it became meaningless, which fact was common knowledge among the people in general. Therefore, at the time of KOISO's cabinet it was decided that the organization should be dissolved and the dissolution took effect after the inception of the succeeding SUZUKI cabinet.

OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

- Q. The effect of the I.R.A.A., however, was to destroy the political parties?
- A. KONOYE's problem was to bring to-gether the military, the political parties and other influences. The political parties dissolved themselves first and entered the I.R.A.A. and were among the first to enter because it was felt that they would "miss the bus", as it was said.
- Q. Well, the effect then was to destroy the differences of opinion on domestic affairs as well as foreign affairs so that they would become of one mind in both domestic and foreign affairs?
- A. In the beginning, it was KONOYE's idea to unify Japanese public opinion, firstly with respect to the China Incident. According to what KONOYE told me personally, he said that it had been better if the political parties had been combined into one, the reasoning being that it would have been effective in the restraint and checking of the military, which did not necessarily at all times act as the government wished.
- Q. Was there much opposition to Premier KONOYE's ideas in forming this I.R.A.A.?
- A. There was no opposition at the outset when KONOYE initiated the idea, as seen from the fact that the political parties competed among themselves to be the first to join. But immediately after its organization voices of opposition were raised. It was KONOYE's idea to unify public opinion by bringing together and combining the political parties as a means of checking the military. But as it was, the wrong procedure was taken by bringing all the elements of government, military and political parties into one body.
- Q. Why did not the Dai Nippon Sekiseikai fit in with the I.R.A.A. and the I.R.A.P.A.?
- A. That was an organization of which Kingoro HASHIMOTO was leader. It was a sort of fascist organization. Previously, it was known as the Dai Nippon Seinanto, which name was changed to Sekiseika when the organization entered the I.R.A.A. The reason for the change being that it was a "thought society".
- Q. How influential was HASHIMOTO in the I.R.A.A.?



OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

- A. At first, there were about ten permanent directors of the organization, of which HASHIMOTO was one. But his influence was not as great as that of such men as KUZUJ, KOBAYASHA, IDA and he left the organization shortly afterwards.
- Q. Did HASHIMOTO operate after he left the organization in opposition to the I.R.A.A.?
- A. He did not necessarily oppose but carried on movement of the Sekiseika.
- Q. Was that with the full approval of the authorities?
- A. Yes, it was carried on the basis that it was not a political society.
- Q. What was the purpose of the Youth Corps of the I.R.A.A.?
- A. The Youth Corps was not created at first. It was organized in the time of the TOJO cabinet just before the general elections of 1942. The activities of the Youth Corps in its beginning were to assist in the elections, which was known as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association elections (TOJO Election). Outwardly, or publicly, the Youth Corps was not supposed to engage in political activities, but it actually assisted in those elections and, therefore, was criticized for it. Later on the Youth Corps Movement was quite a spiritual movement, which carried out in the practical sense the general program of the I.R.A.A., such as the promotion of national savings, increased food production, increased aircraft production and betterment of war time living.
- Q. Why was there an election in 1942 when there was only one political party and there were no differences of opinion at that time?
- A. It is my impression that the purpose was to defeat candidates which were not considered desirable by TOJO and to elect into office those who were favorable to him. At the time of those elections a system of recommendation was instituted, and for that purpose the I.R.A.A. Election Council was created under General Nobuyuki ~~ABE~~. Candidates who received the recommendation of the council were assisted in their election campaign. Candidates not receiving such recommendation were given no backing. As a result, most of the recommended candidates were successfully elected, and for that reason many unrecommended candidates were defeated.

- Q. What were the functions of the Central Coperative Council?
- A. The principal function was to consider and to decide who should be recommended and who should not be recommended.
- Q. You attended the Washington Arms Conference, Mr. Ogata. Did you personally approve at that time and thereafter of the treaties made there?
- A. I, as well as other members of the Japanese press corps who were assigned to the conference, approved of the Hughes Plan without reservation. We correspondents brought the matter up with the Japanese delegation and the fact is that a conflict of views prevailed on the matter between the delegates and the Japanese correspondents corps. At that time the magazine "Nation" of New York published an account saying that the Japanese press had put up the red flag. I recall having personally written an article in favor of the Hughes Plan in my paper at that time. However, I did not approve of the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to be replaced by the Four-Power Treaty. Before going to Washington I was in London and I recall the general feeling in England in favor of abrogation of the alliance.
- Q. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when it was entered into in 1902, was principally for the purpose of protecting both Japan and England against any Russian encroachment in the Far East. Did you believe that the Russian Encroachment in the Far East still existed in 1921?
- A. Practically speaking, there might not have been an actual Russian menace, but because the alliance had at one time been revised and had continued beneficially so long Japanese opinion, especially among many of the moderate elements in Japan, loathed the idea of terminating that alliance.
- Q. Did you feel that it should have stayed in existence for any possible future encroachment of the United States in the Far East?
- A. There was no such feeling.
- Q. If Russia had been a party to the Four-Power conference regarding the insular possessions would you have felt that it would have been a better substitution for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance?

OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

- A. The reason for the desire to continue the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was mainly sentimental. With the Pacific area looming in importance it was felt that it was desirable to maintain good relations between Japan and the English powers, which were increasing in strength, and it was felt that the continuance of the alliance would be beneficial. To repeat, there were strong advocates of abrogation of the alliance in England and that there were such advocates was considered to be a matter of great regret.
- Q. Do you know why England wanted to abrogate that alliance?
- A. At that time the Irish issue was the major domestic problem in England. The principal advocates of abrogation of the alliance came from Ireland. Therefore, it is my impression that it was to calm Ireland for political reasons that the alliance was eventually terminated. I also think that another reason was the British disfavor of Japanese actions in China at the time of World War I, which contributed to the decision to abrogate the alliance.
- Q. Were the principles expressed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact well known in Japan?
- A. I do not think that they were known to the extent that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was known among the people.
- Q. Was any consideration given to the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact when the Mukden Incident occurred, and the subsequent incidents in China?
- A. From the first part of the year of the Mukden Incident, in 1931, the influence of the military was becoming increasingly great, but the press could not express its opinions freely and on that account the Japanese people were not very familiar with that pact.
- Q. In 1928 did you approve of the Kellogg-Briand Pact?
- A. Approval was expressed through writings in my newspaper.
- Q. What were your reactions to the Japanese army going into Manchuria and China during the 1930's, in view of the Kellogg-Briand Pact?

- A. I regretted very much the Manchurian Incident. Prior to that many travellers returning from Manchuria told me that the conditions in that area were very serious and were such that many Chinese were becoming rich virtually overnight and that Japanese residents there were being oppressed. They said that if such conditions were permitted to prevail the interests which Japan had acquired after the Russo-Japanese War would be lost. From about May of the year 1930 the military increasingly interfered in politics and diplomacy. It was my personal view that if the army were checked and the conduct of diplomacy was left properly in the hands of the Foreign Office there was a means of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the problems in Manchuria. However, because of the army's increasing influence even the then foremost political party, the Seiyukai, cooperated with the military on matters in general, especially on matters relating to Manchuria. At that time the president of the Seiyukai was INUKAI, but having entered the party at a later period he did not have sufficient power and influence over the party. The influential leader in the party was Kaku MORI, who had strong connections with the army. On the night of the Mukden Incident and the matter was reported, I was called by telephone from my newspaper office and I was informed that an incident had broken out. Although I had known that the situation there was acute I had not expected such an incident to occur, and it being my desire to prevent or to check the expansion of the incident, I instructed the editorial staff of the Asahii to follow an editorial policy to minimize the treatment of the story and specifically instructed the staff not to handle it sensationally.

In view of the fact that previously the Asahii had editorially approved and supported the results of the Washington Disarmament Conference, the Asahii was already disliked by the military and because of the very peaceful attitude and policy taken by the Asahii in regard to the Manchurian Incident the military began even more to dislike and hate the Asahii, to the extent the Kwantung Army had entertained an insane dislike for the Asahii. Therefore, in the fall of 1932 when I planned a trip to Manchuria to see the situation there reports were already in circulation that if any senior official of the Asahii should ever visit Manchuria he would be killed. As a matter of fact, I went to Manchuria and returned safely.

Ogata, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

On that trip to Manchuria I continued my travel by way of Jehol and on to Peiping. At that time there were in Peiping HUANG and FU, then chairman of the Hopei Political Council, and a General HO YING-CHIN, chairman of the Military Council, and also NEMOTO, later Japanese Commander in Chief in North China, and SHIBAYAMA, later Vice Minister of War; and the relations between the Chinese and the Japanese representatives there at that time were quite good. During my stay in Peiping SHIBAYAMA called at my lodging and told me that because those relations were good that there were some people circulating the rumor in Japan that he and NEMOTO were being fooled by the Chinese and then requested me to see the Chinese representatives to confirm that the facts were not so. And then after my return to Japan I made known that fact so as to remove such misunderstanding. Shortly after that, however, the relations between Japan and China in that area became worse. When the Chinese Incident broke out in July 1937 I felt extremely regretful that it had occurred.

Q. I think we had better not go further today, but I would like you to read over the notes I took Wednesday to correct any errors.

A.. Mr. Ogata made the following corrections on a carbon copy of the Wednesday interrogation:

Page 1, paragraph 1 - omit "or 1935" and twice change "1926" to "1940".

Page 1, last paragraph - Substitute for "He remained as .... in 1945" "Mr. Ogata became a director of the Domei News Agency in December of 1935 and quit the position in November of 1936."

Page 2, paragraph 2 - "I do not know whether General HONJO, who was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, desired to set up an independent regime in Manchuria or whether he had advance knowledge of the conspiracy. It was the idea and feeling of certain military elements that if the setting up of an independent regime were to the national interest, why should they not go ahead with their program. If they succeeded, according to their way of thinking, it would be all well and good to the national interest. And if they failed, they might just as well commit Hari-Kiri. The Army desired to change the way of life of the Japanese people, and by experimenting successfully in Manchuria could then bring the fruits of their new government to Japan. General ARAKI previously was supposed to be opposed to the program, but later when he became

OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

War Minister he supported it. He believed that better relations between Japan and Russia would improve the Japanese situation in Manchuria. General KOISO had contacts with the Kwantung Army. He was very close to TATEKAWA, but his relations with ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA were not very close."

Page 2, paragraph - correct spelling to KANIAYA and NINOMIYA.

Page 2, paragraph 4 - change "day after" to read "night of".

Page 3, paragraph 1 - insert between "accordingly" and "entered" "After he became premier he". Correct "Koumingtang" to read "Yuan".

Page 3, paragraph 2 - correct spelling to "Mokyo" and "Yoshinao".

Page 3, paragraph 4 - insert between "Manchuria" and "promised" "according to the thinking of many of the military officers of the medium trade, especially after the Manchurian Incident,". Correct spelling to "hara-kiri".

Page 4, paragraph 1 - delete the word "even". For "in the Cabinet itself" substitute "and conflicts within the country".

Page 4, paragraph 3 - for "he began strong press control" substitute "press control became increasingly strong".

Page 5, paragraph 1 - correct spelling to "Sung Che-Yuan" and "Langfang".

Page 5, paragraph 2 - correct spelling to "AKIYAMA, Teisuke". For "assaulted the ..... left Japan" substitute "prevented MIYAZAKI from boarding the ship". For "They were" substitute "He was".

Page 5, paragraph 3 - for "Army" substitute "Naval Landing Party". Insert "Army" between "for" and "reinforcements".

Page 5, paragraph 4 - "It was when SHIRATORI of the Foreign Office attended the New Structure Preparatory Committee as a member that I heard the term "new order" for the first time."

Page 5, paragraph 5 - for "placed men . . . .Army policy." substitute "ignored established private societies and subsidized petty societies and men who were amenable to its views to campaign for army policy."

OGATA, Taketora - 8 Mar 46 cont'd.

Page 6, paragraph 1 - for "the military war lords" substitute  
"YUAN SHI-KAI" and for "Sun Yat Sen" substitute "the revolution".

Page 6, paragraph 3 - for "When" substitute "Before".

Q. Are those all the changes?

A. Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
(name) (Serial Number)  
being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Margaret Denny hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

  
Margaret Denny

Certificate of Interrogator.


I, (i/s) John F. Hummel, Major, 0-296892,

add \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 8 day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (i/s) Mr. Taketora Ogata, and according to Toshiro Shimanouchi, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

8 March 1946  
Date

  
John F. Hummel  
Major, JAGD



INTERROGATION OF

Taketora Ogata

Date and Time: 6 March 1946, 1330 - 1645

Place : Room 733, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Taketora Ogata  
Major John F. Hummel, Interrogator  
T/4 Dave Hoshimiya, Interpreter  
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Interpreter  
Shogo Nakamura, Secretary to Mr. Ogata

(Note: Mr. Shimanouchi acted as interpreter. No oath was administered.)

At the outset it was explained to Mr. OGATA that he had the reputation of being the foremost journalist in Japan, and as such it was believed that he was well acquainted with events that transpired in Japanese politics during the 1920's, the 1930's, and during the war.

Biography

Mr. OGATA graduated from Waseka University in 1911, specializing in political economy. He then entered the Asahii Shimbun. He became chief of the Political Affairs Department for China, and in 1925 was appointed managing editor, which position he retained until 1934 or 1935 when he became editor in chief. In 1943 he became Vice-President of the Asahii Shimbun. Up to 1926 UYENO, Seichi was President. From 1926 to November 1945 MURGYAMA, Nagataka was President. Concurrently with his editorship of the Asahii Shimbun, he was editor of the Osaka Shimbun.

From 1921 to 1923 Mr. OGATA was in London to study economics and political science. While there he went to the United States as correspondent for the Asahii, in attendance at the Washington arms conference.

About 1936 he helped to organize the Domei News Agency and was director of same. The managing editors of all newspapers were directors of the Domei News Agency. He remained as a director until the abolition of the agency in 1945. He was associated with FURENO while the latter was President of the Domei News Agency. The first President of the agency was IWANAGA, Yukichi.

EVID DOC # 1910-A

Chick # 511

OGATA, Taketora - 6 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

The Manchurian Incident

There was a rumor in the summer of 1931 that the Kwantung Army wanted to set up a separate government in Manchuria. On the 16th of September, 1931, Mr. OGATA attended the lecture at the Kazan Kaikan, given by a Colonel NEMOTO. The subject was the Captain NAKAMURA incident. NEMOTO said that Manchuria should be made independent; otherwise Japanese interests therein would be endangered.

~~General HONJO, who was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, desired to set up an independent regime in Manchuria. He had no such orders from the General Staff. However, it was realized that if he was successful it would be of great advantage to Japan, and if not he would have to commit hari-kiri. The Army desired to change the way of life of the Japanese people, and by experimenting successfully in Manchuria could then bring the fruits of their new government to Japan. (General ARAKI was opposed to any such movement in Manchuria.)~~ He believed that better relations between Japan and Russia would improve the Japanese situation in Manchuria. General KOISO had contacts with the Kwantung Army. He was very close to TATEKAWA, but his relations with ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA were not very close.

Two weeks before the Mukden Incident, SHIDEHARA, who was then Foreign Minister, received a telegram from HAYASHI, Kyujiro, Consul General in Mukden, reporting that the Army was contemplating a conspiracy. SHIDEHARA presented the matter at a Cabinet meeting and questioned General MINAMI on it. MINAMI was unable to answer. MINAMI went to KANEYAMA, who was Chief of the Army General Staff, but he was also unaware of the matter. However, the Vice-Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General NINONUMA, Farushige was aware of such a rumor, and he agreed that the matter must be brought under control.

General TATEKAWA was sent to Mukden for the purpose of settling the matter. He had friends in the Army there whom he was to contact. However, the incident broke out the day after his arrival. The offices in the Kwantung Army found out that he was coming, and when he arrived they entertained him. General HONJO was probably in Port Arthur at that time and not in Mukden. TATEKAWA's orders were for him to go to Mukden with instructions to talk over the matter with the staff officers and to use his influence in stopping them from creating any incident.

The military men in Tokyo, who had opposed any incident in Manchuria, nevertheless supported the Kwantung Army after the incident

it was the idea + feeling of certain military elements that if the setting up of an independent regime were to the national interest, why should they not go ahead with their program. If they succeeded, according to their way of thinking it would be all well and good to the national interest. And if they failed they might just as well commit Hari-Kiri

I do not know whether

he had advanced knowledge of the conspiring

General ARAKI previously was supposed to be opposed to the program, but later when he became war minister he supported it.

OGATA, Taketora - 6 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

occurred. They would not permit the Army to be divided. The only person Mr. OGATA knows of who opposed the actions of the military was INUKAI, Tsyoshi. The Wakatsuki Cabinet desired to keep the incident within the narrowest possible limits, and so reported to the throne. INUKAI was consistently opposed to the independence of Manchuria. He favored placing Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, and accordingly, after he became entered into negotiations with Sun Fo, President of the administrative <sup>premier</sup> Yuan Kowmingtang at Nanking.

But the desire of the Army for independence of Manchuria became stronger and stronger. INUKAI sent a letter to Marshal UEHARA asking for a meeting in the Palace on February 11, 1932 to discuss this question of suppressing the Army in Manchuria. Somehow this became known to the Army officers, and the meeting never did occur. This last bit of information was in INUKAI's biography, but it was stricken out in the publication by the censors. The Inukai Mokko Denki Hensen Kai (Biography Compilation Society for Inukai) was formed for collecting the material for INUKAI's biography. WASHIO, Yoshihiko was the person who actually wrote the biography.

Mr. OGATA did not think that HONJO or MIYAKE, Commander and Chief of Staff respectively of the Kwantung Army, had been consulted prior to the Mukden Incident. He doesn't know whether DOIHARA was in it or not. DOIHARA was not on good terms with either ITAGAKI or ISHIWARA.

The Army had all responsibility for the Mukden Incident and the events in Manchuria thereafter. There was no attempt made to place responsibility for the incident. Mr. OGATA explained that success of the Army in Manchuria promised promotions, honors and decorations to the military men, whereas defeat meant they would have to commit hara-kari. Because of the success that they met with in Manchuria, the Army increased its authority in the Government, and after the INUKAI assassination the political parties were almost in a state of collapse. The Army continued to create more and more incidents. Mr. OGATA looks upon the 7th of July 1937 (China Incident) as just another one of these incidents.

according to the thinking of many of the military officers of the medium grade especially after the Manchurian Incident,

The 2/26 incident was the climax in the Army scheming to create a government centering in the Army and without political parties. It went far beyond any previous incident. The Army realized they would have to do something, and they accordingly executed the instigators of the 2/26 incident, whereas the people involved in the

Mr. OGATA is not so well acquainted with the Chinese Incident as with the Manchurian Incident. However, he believes Colonel

OGATA, Taketora - 6 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

5/15 incident were not executed. While it appeared that the situation had calmed down, actually the political parties had been rendered powerless. This totalitarian policy continued. In the First Konoye Cabinet emphasis was placed on even abolishing divisions in the Cabinet itself. *and conflicts within the country.*

Effect on Newspapers

Before the Manchurian Incident, the Army rarely interfered in the newspaper field. War Minister UGAKI had begun to start discussions with the people of the press in 1929 for better military publicity. After the Manchurian Incident, a great change took place. The Army, through its press section, began the issuance of news bans. Newspapers with large circulations, like the Asahi, feared such bans. It is true the newspapers acquiesced to the Army, thereby showing weakness, and eliminated the news items which were derogatory to the Army.

The control of the press became stronger and stronger after the Manchurian Incident. About 1934 when TOJO, Hideki was Chairman of the War Research Council assisted by SUZUKI, Teiichi, he began *press control* strong press control. The climax of press oppression occurred in 1936 (the 2/26 incident) when the Asahi Shimbun was attacked by the revolting troops. *became increasingly strong.*

The press censorship continued to become worse until in November 1941 TOJO proposed one newspaper company. The plan was to pool all the newspaper properties, issuing shares to the member newspapers. Each newspaper was thereafter to rent the equipment and issue separate papers. Mr. OGATA was very much opposed to this plan and so stated quite vehemently at the November conference, and the plan was not adopted.

Censorship became stronger. It was not so difficult to obtain news, but it was very difficult to print the news. All doubtful items had to be censored. A censorship section was established in each newspaper office. After the passage of the National General Mobilization Law in 1938 and the Military Secrets Law after 1941, news items also became difficult to secure. Any news unfavorable to the Army was censored. Criticism of the Government or members of the Government was prohibited.

China Incident

Mr. OGATA is not as well acquainted with the China Incident as with the Manchurian Incident. However, he believes Colonel

OGATA, Taketora - 6 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

Langfang

MUTAGUCHI's regiment started the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge. The Tokyo Government immediately entered into negotiations to settle the difficulty. Colonel SHIBAYAMA, later Vice Minister of War, was sent to North China to negotiate with Sung Ché-Yuan, the Chinese Commander of the 29th Army. He settled the incident and was on his way back to Tokyo when the ~~Langfang~~ (?) Incident occurred, and it began to expand. ISHIWARA, who was Chief of Operations on the General Staff at the time, was opposed to sending reinforcements, but the Government didn't take a strong enough policy to satisfactorily settle the matter. Reinforcements went from Korea to China on orders from Tokyo. KOISO's views (he was Commander of the Korean Army at that time) on operational plans were different from those of the General Staff. KOISO preferred to send his forces out, settle the incident, and withdraw them immediately.

the revolution

Yuan Shikai

AKIYAMA Teisuke

The basic policy of the KONOYE Cabinet was to settle the China Incident. KONOYE accordingly sent AKIYAMA, Teisuke and MIYAZAKI, Ryusuke to Nanking to negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek. The Army objected to this, and the Kempai Tai assaulted the two emissaries before they left Japan. They were arrested. Mr. OGATA did not know who issued the order for their arrest.

prevented Miyazaki from boarding the ship. He was

Naval Landing Party

On the 13th of August the incident spread to Shanghai. There the army requested the Navy for reinforcements. The Navy refused to send any reinforcements, but suddenly the fighting around Shanghai spread and eventually reinforcements were sent in. And then the incident became widespread.

It was when SHIRATORI of the Foreign Office was a great advocate of the

new order. Committee as a member that I heard the term "new order" for the first time.

Secret Societies

ignored established private societies and subsidized small petty societies and men who were amenable to its views to campaign for army policy

Previous to the Manchurian Incident, societies were generally of a cultural nature for the studying of Far East problems. After the Manchurian Incident, the Army placed men in organizations and societies and paid them to campaign for Army policy. The Army furnished considerable money for this purpose. Sometimes the names of organizations changed over night. The people whom the Army placed in these organizations were working in the background with the Kempai Tai.

(1) Genyosha was founded by TOYAMA. He and INUKAI went to China in 1911 to assist Sun Yat-Sen in his revolutionary new government in China. TOYAMA, however, believed that Sun Yat-Sen had made some

OGATA, Taketora - 6 Mar 46 (Cont'd)

*Yuan Shi-kai*

*the revolution*

poor compromises with the military war lords in China, and thereafter withdrew his support from ~~Sun Yat Sen~~. The Genyosha was most active at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. TOYAMA at that time, at the request of the Vice Chief of Staff, took some Genyosha youths to Manchuria and made them leaders of bandit groups, thereby forming the Manchurian Volunteer Army.

(2) Kokuryu-Kai was founded by UCHIDA. It was particularly interested in Siberia before the Russo-Japanese War. UCHIDA became secretary to Prince ITO, who was Governor General of Korea. This social and influential position of UCHIDA made the Kokuryu-Kai well known. It had bad characters in it as well as thinking people. UCHIDA was very intimate with Baron TANAKA. UCHIDA also formed the Seisento, whose purpose was to attack the established political parties. It was a semi political party itself. During HAMAGUCHI's Cabinet, UCHIDA was arrested and investigated. After the Manchurian Incident, the Kokuryu-Kai was non-active. It was not liked by the Army.

(3) Kokuhonsha was composed of Justice Ministry officials and men from the financial world. Baron HIRANUMA was its leader. It strongly advocated protection for the Emperor system. It was frequently criticised as a Fascist organization. It was also called "Judicial Fascists". *Before* Hiranuma became Prime Minister it was disbanded.

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John F. Hummel, Major, JAGD, 0-296892, certify that  
on the 6th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me  
Taketora Ogata, and according to Toshiro Shimanouchi and T/4 Dave  
Hoshimiya, Interpreters, gave the foregoing answers to the several  
questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

Place

7 March 1946

Date

  
\_\_\_\_\_

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DOC. NO. 1910

Date 17 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogation and Personal History of  
OGATA, Taketora, ex-president Board of Information

Date: 1945-46 Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also Witness if applicable)  
Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: See our case file #266

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OGATA, Taketora et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:  
GENYOSHA, (Society) Board of Information

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references)  
Includes miscellaneous data and correspondence on  
subjects personality.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 191 0