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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 20, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 5084 to 5226

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 29

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S. Con. Res. 27

Thursday, December 20, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 Counsel will proceed.

4 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

5 (Resumed)

6 Mr. Mitchell: The Admiral has some minor corrections in
7 the transcript that he would like to suggest.

8 The Chairman: Yes.

9 Admiral Turner: On page 5067, line 5, the date November
10 14 should be October 14.

11 On page 5080, line 12, the word "but" at the end of the
12 line should be changed to "that is", and the word "but" inserted
13 previously in the same line before the phrase beginning "if it".

14 Page 5065, the 4th line from the bottom, insert the word
15 "and" before the words "on August 24, 1943".

16 Page 5083, about the middle of the page, Admiral Wilkinson
17 is shown as being the witness and that should be changed to
18 Admiral Turner.

19 That is all.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Turner, I think my questions last
21 night about the respective duties of ONI and War Plans Division
22 were couched in general terms. Possibly if I make some, pre-
23 sent some specific examples of messages that were sent, we
24 could get a more definite idea of the relations between the
25 two Divisions.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2
3 So I will call your attention first to the message of
4 November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander
5 in Chief Pacific Fleet and others, found on page 32 of Exhibit
6 37. Exhibit 37 is the basic exhibit of the Navy dispatches
7 to and from Honolulu.

8 That message says:

9 "CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN
10 VERY DOUBTFUL PERIOD THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS
11 OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY
12 FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE
13 MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR
14 GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY PERIOD CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS
15 DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADDRESSEES TO INFORM
16 SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS PERIOD UTMOST SECRECY
17 NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION
18 OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION PERIOD GUAM WILL BE INFORMED
19 SEPARATELY PERIOD"

20 Now, the record shows that the authorization for the
21 sending of that dispatch was signed by Admiral Ingersoll.
22 Would that be a dispatch that you had a part in preparing or
23 the duty of getting ready or having to do with?

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I prepared that dispatch and
25 after some changes by the Chief of Naval Operations and by
the War Plans Division of the War Department that was sent

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 in that form. It relates to the over-all picture of the
3 situation vis-a-vis Japan which might lead to war and thus
4 invoke our war plans.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that message did not contain any
6 directive or order for action, did it?

7 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: So that the War Plans Division had a
9 broader function in participating in the preparation and
10 sending of messages to the Fleets involving directions as to
11 operations?

12 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. It had to do with the pre-
13 sentation of advice as to the over-all picture of the inter-
14 national situation which might result in war for the United
15 States. And that was my conception of the function of the
16 War Plans Division. That is, to advise the Chief of Naval
17 Operations on matters of that character.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Well, your function was not to send
19 dispatches direct over your own signature but to take the
20 matter up with the Chief of Naval Operations, make your
21 recommendations and suggest a form of dispatch you ought to
22 send; is that the way it worked?

23 Admiral Turner: That is correct. We practically never
24 sent a dispatch from War Plans without it having been released
25 either by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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I believe on only about one occasion did I release a dispatch and that was after talking over the telephone to Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. Mitchell: These dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Fleets, none of them seem to bear any signature. That is, we have a record of the officer who authorized the release or sending of the message. In this particular case it was Admiral Ingersoll. When these messages reached the addressees did they bear the signature of the officer who had authorized them, or were they generally messages from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Turner: Almost invariably the naval practice is to send the dispatch from the official and not the person. We never mention the name of the sender unless there is some special reason, such as a somewhat personal dispatch from one person to another. That differs from the War Department practice.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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10:15 AM

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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3 Mr. Mitchell: The War Department record shows that some
4 of these dispatches to Honolulu were signed by Marshall,
5 others by the Adjutant General and some by General Miles, and
6 so on. That was not your custom in the Navy?

7
8 Admiral Turner: No, sir. Almost invariably we merely
9 put it as the official, originating from the official.

10
11 Mr. Mitchell: That is, when the various persons to whom
12 these naval dispatches were addressed, - those in exhibit 37,-
13 received their dispatches there were no person's signatures
14 on them and they came with the authority of the Chief of
15 Naval Operations, that was the situation?

16
17 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

18
19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, let us pass on to the warning
20 message of November 27th on page 36 of exhibit 37; that is
21 the message that reads:

22
23 "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning";
24 and among other things it directed that the Commander-in-
25 Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet execute an
appropriate defensive deployment.

26
27 There we have a warning, plus information, plus a direc-
28 tive. Now, what part did you take in preparing that message?

29
30 Admiral Turner: I prepared that message and submitted
31 it in the same manner as the other to the Assistant Chief of
32 Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Operations and General

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department. That
3 message had some changes made in it and this was the final
4 draft as approved. That was also released by Admiral Inger-
5 soll, but Admiral Stark had approved it himself.

6
7 Mr. Mitchell: There is another one on December 3rd, page
8 40 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
9 Commanders in Chief Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet, Commandant
10 of the 14th Naval District at Honolulu and Commandant of
11 the 16th Naval District.

12 That message appears to have been, - the sending of it
13 appears to have been authorized by Admiral Wilkinson, initialed
14 by Ingersoll, and that is the one that says that:

15 "Highly reliable information has been received that
16 categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday
17 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,
18 Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to
19 destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to
20 burn all other important confidential and secret
21 documents."

22 Now, that was not an over-all picture, was it?

23 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: And it did not require any action, that
25 is, any directive for a movement of the Fleet, did it?

Admiral Turner: No, sir, and it did not change the over-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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all picture. That was initiated by 16-F-2 in Admiral Wilkinson's Division and was shown to me and was released, - initialed, that is, by Admiral Ingersoll before sending. It was pure information.

Mr. Mitchell: It was not the type of message that under the arrangements between the War Plans Division and the ONI was your function to prepare?

Admiral Turner: That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell: It is one of the things that passed through your hands so there wouldn't be any conflict, is that the idea?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, I call your attention next to the subject where a message was not sent. Those were the messages that have been referred to as target area messages in Pearl Harbor in Exhibit 2, commencing on page 12 and extending up through page 14, a series of Japanese intercepts, Japanese messages from Tokyo to Honolulu and so on which were intercepted by our agencies and decoded and translated a considerable time before the Pearl Harbor attack.

I am not asking you to express any opinion as to whether that information ought to have been sent at all, but I am just assuming for the sake of argument that those messages were significant and if properly evaluated would have pointed

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 to the fact that the Japs were doing more than just getting
3 ship movements; they were getting up some kind of a bombing
4 pattern for pin-pointed dive bombing in Pearl Harbor.

5 Let us assume that for the sake of argument and let us
6 also assume that if they had been evaluated in that way the
7 information should have been sent to Honolulu.

8 Now, whose business would it have been under the system
9 between ONI and the War Plans Division at that time to bring
10 that message and its evaluation to the attention of the Chief
11 of Naval Operations and suggest a dispatch to the fleet at
12 Honolulu? Whose function would that have been? Do I make
13 myself clear there?

14 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I conceive that to be the duty
15 and function of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As a mat-
16 ter of fact, I have no recollection of ever having seen that
17 dispatch of the 24th of September until I returned here re-
18 cently and saw the dispatch in this book. I would never have
19 initiated a dispatch on that subject. However, our relations
20 with ONI and the other divisions were close and if I had seen
21 that dispatch I surmise that I would have talked it over or
22 brought it specifically to the attention of Admiral Wilkinson.
23 I do not know why I did not see that. I believe that I would
24 have remembered it.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Well, do you not think that this message

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 of the 24th of September on page 12 of this book did change
3 the overall picture that we had up at that time, to-wit, that
4 there was no definite information of any particular animosity
5 toward Pearl Harbor and this changed the picture, - I assume
6 it did, - in that aspect, at least, does it not?

7 Admiral Turner: I think it changed it sufficiently so
8 that if I had seen it I would have taken it up with Admiral
9 Wilkinson or possibly talked it over with Admiral Ingersoll,
10 but I would not have initiated any dispatch on that subject
11 myself.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, as a matter of principle what would
13 have been the difference between that dispatch and the dis-
14 patch about destroying codes of December 3rd, the destruc-
15 tion of the codes?

16 Admiral Turner: There is no difference in principle be-
17 tween the two dispatches in my opinion.

18 Mr. Mitchell: While we are on the subject I will con-
19 tinue with what I was doing on that.

20 Now the diplomatic intercepts in exhibit 1, - there is
21 a whole series of them and I will try and sum up the situa-
22 tion there.

23 There was a dispatch intercepted from the Japs to their
24 Ambassadors here giving a proposal on November 20, 1941 to
25 our government, which we received, the gist of which was that

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1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 the Japs demanded that we cease our aid, - in substance, cease
3 our aid to China, stop our embargoes, the freezing of assets
4 and other economic sanctions, furnish oil to Japan which she
5 would be free to use against China or anybody else, and the
6 record also shows dispatches to their Ambassadors here to the
7 effect that they must by, originally the 25th of November
8 and finally on a dead line of November 29th, obtain from the
9 United States an affirmative agreement agreeing to these
10 things and that the British and the Dutch would have to sign
11 also on the dotted line and that if we did not affirmatively
12 agree to her proposals, the abandonment of China and the
13 furnishing of war materials to Japan, by that date something
14 was going to automatically happen, and there was a further
15 statement in some of those dispatches that the Ambassadors
16 here were not to allow us to prolong this thing or put them
17 off.

18 Now, if I have correctly stated the summary of that situ-
19 ation, and I am assuming that it would have been desirable
20 for any reason to send that information to the commander of
21 the fleet at Honolulu, whose function would it have been to
22 frame a message giving the story of that situation and have
23 it sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

24 Admiral Turner: Those dispatches considered by them-
25 selves were informatory but all of them entered into the back-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 ground from which was derived the reasons for sending the
3 dispatches, first of November 24th and then of November 27th.
4 In other words, the detailed information, if it had been de-
5 sirable to have acquainted the Commander-in-Chief with those
6 dispatches, would have been the function of Office of Naval
7 Intelligence. The effect on the international situation,
8 which was very large, would have been treated by the War Plans
9 Division.

10 I would like to add that it was my belief at that time
11 and it was Admiral Stark's belief that all of these major
12 diplomatic messages, at least in the Pacific, were being
13 decrypted by both Admiral Hart and by Admiral Kimmel and I
14 did not know that Admiral Kimmel did not hold the code for
15 those dispatches until I was so informed at the time of the
16 Navy Court of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, your answer to my specific question
18 would be that the situation exposed by those diplomatic inter-
19 cepts I referred to did have a broad effect on the strategic
20 situation and were a subject which the War Plans Division
21 had a responsibility for and you supplemented that with the
22 statement here that all of the messages which had been sent
23 on November 24th and November 27th represented your evaluation
24 of that information and was sufficient, as I understand?

25 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: Now we are getting a little bit into the
3 question of having seen these and who delivered them, and so
4 on, and I have been trying to avoid that for the present and
5 stick to our question of respective duties between the two
6 divisions. I only have one other question to ask along this
7 line and that is this:

8 On the 6th and the 7th of December 1941 there came in
9 this fourteen parts message and the one P.M. message and I
10 think the record shows now that the thirteen parts of the
11 message were decoded on the evening of the 6th and that the
12 fourteenth part definitely breaking off negotiations and the
13 one P.M. message which followed it, which set the delivery
14 at one P.M., Sunday, came in on Sunday morning.

15 Now, information of that kind coming in suddenly and
16 properly evaluated as General Marshall evaluated it, sug-
17 gesting that there might be a serious significance to the one
18 P.M. delivery, whose business was it in the Navy Department,
19 in the Chief of Naval Operations setup, to get ahold of that
20 message and see that the information about it was dispatched
21 immediately to the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

22 Admiral Turner: I believe that was the duty of the Of-
23 fice of Naval Intelligence. My recollection of the delivery
24 of the thirteen parts and of the fourteenth part is not en-
25 tirely clear but if you wish I will tell you the story of it.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: No, I will go into that shortly.

3

Admiral Turner: All right, sir.

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Mr. Mitchell: I just assumed that the message came in in that way and my question is whose responsibility was it to act on it by giving the information to the fleet, whose responsibility was it to bring it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations and see that a message was sent promptly to Honolulu?

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Admiral Turner: I believe it was the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, when I saw the thirteen parts, which I believe was about 11:30 on the night of December 6th, I inquired from the officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important but as long as those officers had seen it I did not believe it was my function to take any action.

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The question of the one P.M. delivery, I saw that dispatch in Admiral Stark's office about noon, recognized its very great importance, and asked him if anything had been done about it. He told me that General Marshall was sending a dispatch and I did nothing further about it because I considered that would cover the situation.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: Well, in defining that message, - those messages, - as something that the Office of Naval Intelligence and not the War Plans Division had any responsibility for, where do you draw the distinction between that type of message and the one about these diplomatic messages and the deadline that we talked about, which you do think came under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Division as affecting the overall situation or changing it in some way. How do you draw a distinction between the two types in assigning responsibility back and forth between the ONI and the War Plans?

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Admiral Turner: I did not consider that that message
3 and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed
4 the over-all situation in the least degree, because I was
5 certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately
6 between the United States and Japan, and this was merely
7 confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the
8 full picture of the situation had been given to the fleet
9 commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed
10 definitely by the later dispatches regarding the destruc-
11 tion of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders
12 for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Well, of course, the question as to
14 whose responsibility it was would not have any connection
15 with your judgment as to whether or not that responsibility
16 had been discharged. I am not asking about that. Your
17 judgment was that whoever responsibility it was, it was
18 sufficiently taken care of.

19 Don't you think, Admiral, that the relations between
20 the ONI and War Plans Division, as to the over-all picture
21 and whose responsibility it was, was in a very fuzzy con-
22 dition at that time?

23 Admiral Turner: No, sir, I do not. I think the line
24 amongst staff officers -- and that applies to all staff
25 officers -- can never be exactly drawn for every particular

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 and every detail. So long as they have proper relation-
3 ships with each other and keep each other informed as to
4 matters near the dividing line, which we did, I believe
5 that the instructions were adequate.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Do you not think that this interpretation
7 of the Intelligence Division rules that we have been told
8 about, without any formal change in the literal terms of
9 the order, was something more than a change in interpreta-
10 tion? Don't you think it was really contrary to the ex-
11 pressed provisions of the orders prescribing the duties
12 of the Intelligence Division?

13 Admiral Turner: No, sir, I do not.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Now, I have a statement here, Mr.
15 Chairman, presented by Admiral Wilkinson, which he has
16 asked me to have put in the record, and I will do that, and
17 then I will ask the Admiral to present any further ideas
18 that he has on this picture.

19 Admiral Wilkinson presents this letter. He says:

20 "In view of the apparent variance in the testimony
21 of Admiral Turner and my testimony with respect to the
22 responsibility for the development of enemy intentions,
23 and the supplying to the staff of information bearing
24 upon and relating to fleet operations, I respectfully sug-
25 gest, if the committee pleases, the enclosed papers be

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1
2 read into the record. These papers comprise memoranda
3 from my predecessor, Vice Admiral Kirk, regarding his
4 instructions from Admiral Stark, and two dispatches con-
5 taining inquiry on this subject from me to Rear Admiral
6 Janes, now in the Mediterranean, and his reply.

7 "Very respectfully,

8 "T. S. Wilkinson

9 "Vice Admiral."

10 The first thing he presents is a memorandum from Vice
11 Admiral Kirk. I suppose Admiral Kirk can be called directly,
12 but I think there is no impropriety in reading this state-
13 ment into the record.

14 The Chairman: Yes.

15 Mr. Mitchell: (Reading)

16 "NAVY DEPARTMENT

17 "WASHINGTON D.C.,

18 19 December 1945.

19 "Memorandum for Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

20 "1. Confirming my statement to you upon turning over
21 the duties of Director of Naval Intelligence in October,
22 1941, the following represents the gist of the oral deci-
23 sion of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the duties of
24 the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding interpreting and
25 evaluating information concerning intent of possible hostile

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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nations.

"2. In April, 1941, following a discussion in the office of Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, with the Director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself, the three of us entered the office of Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, where the points at issue were reviewed.

"3. It was maintained by me that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for interpreting possible enemy intentions after evaluating information received from whatever source. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was comparable to G-2 in the War Department General Staff in these respects, and should likewise prepare that section of the formal Estimate known as 'Enemy Intentions'.

"4. This position was contested by Rear Admiral Turner who maintained that the War Plans Division should prepare such section of the Estimate, and should interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations from whatever source received. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets, anywhere.

"5. Admiral Stark then approved the position taken by

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Rear Admiral Turner.

"6. I abided thereby and so advised my principal chiefs and subsequently yourself.

"A. G. Kirk

"Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy."

- - - - -

"NAVAL MESSAGE

"NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM COMNAVNAV

CNO

DATE 5 DEC 45

TOR CODE ROOM 1050

DECODED BY CARROLL

TYPED BY CURTIS

ROUTED BY THOMPSON

. 041134

NCR 3435

"FROM ADMIRAL JAMES

REFERS CNO 031500. BELIEVE INFORMATION REGARDING WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS IN ERROR BUT PROBABLY BASED ON FOLLOWING FACTS. DIRECTOR WAR PLANS ADMIRAL TURNER CAME TO MY OFFICE AND REQUESTED THAT ONI MAKE NO ESTIMATE OF PROSPECTIVE ENEMY INTENTIONS FOR CNO BUT FURNISH INFORMATION TO WAR PLANS WHO WOULD MAKE THE REQUIRED ESTIMATES. TURNER WAS INFORMED THAT EXISTING PRINTED ORGANIZATION INSTRUCTIONS OF CNO REQUIRED INTELLIGENCE TO MAKE THESE ESTIMATES. MCCULLUM CAN VERIFY AND PERHAPS ELABORATE. NO WRITTEN OR OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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OF WHICH I HAVE KNOWLEDGE WERE ISSUED.

CHANGE ACTION TO OP1Ø . . . ADD: OP1Ø . . . 2Ø-9C. . (PER 2Ø-9C
171432) BUPERS. . . ACT."

- - - - -

"NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM DCNO

RELEASED BY L. E. DENFELD

DATE 3 Dec 45

COMNAVNAW

TOR CODE ROOM 1632

TYPED BY POINDEXTER /

GRUSKY

ROUTED BY THOMSEN

031500

NCR 7368

"FOR ADMIRAL JAMES.

'QUESTION ARISING PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION REGARDING
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ONI EARLY 1941 BY CNO NOT
TO DISSEMINATE ANY ESTIMATES OF ENEMY OR PROSPECTIVE
ENEMY INTENTIONS. THESE INSTRUCTIONS ALTHOUGH RECALLED
BY OFFICERS OF ONI CANNOT BE LOCATED. DO YOU REMEMBER
INCIDENT AND CAN YOU SUGGEST LOCATION OF THE ORDER OR
MEMORANDUM. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECOLLECTION. REQUEST
REPLY CARE BUPERS. WILKINSON.'

ADD: 2019C. . (PER 20-9C 171432)

ADD BUPERS. . (PER BUPERS SVC NO 63)

OP1Ø. . . ORIG."

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Now, Admiral, did you have a summary of the situation
3 as you saw it, that you wanted to present?

4 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, if I may be permitted to
5 read this memorandum.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, you may read that.

7 Admiral Turner: My principal point is that I did not
8 consider the oral instructions of the CNO, Chief of Naval
9 Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence on this
10 subject to be a change in existing orders, but merely an
11 interpretation of them.

12 The interpretation was that the War Plans Division was
13 responsible for advising the Chief of Naval Operations and
14 preparing papers for dissemination regarding the over-all
15 international situation, which might involve the United
16 States in War, and thus bring the war plans into effect.

17 It was, of course, essential that communications from
18 the Chief of Naval Operations to the fleets be consistent
19 as regards predictions as to the future involvement of the
20 United States in war, and therefore that estimates which
21 might be prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence
22 should be cleared through the War Plans Division.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Now, Admiral, will you please explain
24 to us what the system was in the Navy Department for delivery
25 to you, or your office by the agency in the Communications

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h8

2 Division, which I understand was charged with the matter of
3 decoding and translating these Jap messages, delivery to
4 you of copies of those messages? How would that work in
5 your case?

6 Admiral Turner: The Communications Division delivered
7 copies to the Office of Naval Intelligence. When I first
8 came to the War Plans Division, daily an officer of the
9 Office of Naval Intelligence brought a folder to me, and
10 waited until I had read the various dispatches. As these
11 dispatches increased in number, sometime in the spring,
12 approximately, of 1941, the system was changed, and a daily
13 file of dispatches was delivered to me in a locked pouch.

14 I would then open that pouch and read the dispatches
15 sometime during the day, and on the following day that
16 pouch would be exchanged for another with that day's dis-
17 patches.

18 In this one folder were Japanese intercepts and inter-
19 cepts from other countries of all character.

20 It was customary for the Office of Naval Intelligence
21 to put a paper clip on the dispatches which they considered
22 of importance, because there were many dispatches circuled
23 which had very minor importance. I would always read the
24 ones with the paper clips, and usually would glance through
25 those without paper clips and read those which a glance showed

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h9 2 to be of interest.

3 Mr. Mitchell: In your absence from your office, or
4 being out of the city, who would accept delivery of those
5 documents and make the examination?

6 Admiral Turner: The senior officer remaining in the
7 War Plans Division.

8 Mr. Mitchell: You said that you do not remember ever
9 seeing those intercepts on pages 12 to 15 of Exhibit 2,
10 what we call the target planning division of Pearl Harbor
11 into areas and location of vessels in each section.

12 Admiral Turner: I said I did not see the dispatch on
13 page 12. I saw many dispatches concerning the location of
14 ships in Pearl Harbor, and on the movement of the United
15 States war vessels in and out of other ports.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the one on page 12 says "to
17 divide the waters of the harbor up into areas A, B, C, D,
18 and E, for the purpose of describing the location of ves-
19 sels."

20 On page 13 is another message from Honolulu to Washing-
21 ton that sets up a code system for describing each one of
22 these areas. Then there is one on page 14, which was trans-
23 lated very late, it is true, translated December 6, which
24 speaks of areas in the harbor there.

25 Do I understand you mean it was only the one on page

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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12 that you failed to see and that you did see the others?

Admiral Turner: No, sir, I do not remember these specific dispatches as to locations of ships. There were a good many of them. I saw many of them. I definitely fail to remember the dispatch on page 12.

Mr. Mitchell: Might not your failure to remember be due to the fact that under the circumstances under which you examined it, it did not make any definite impression on you as being important? Would not that make you fail to remember?

Is your recollection affirmative that you did not see it, or are you just in a state of mind that you cannot recollect whether you did or not? That is what I am after.

Admiral Turner: It is rather in between. I definitely do not remember seeing it. I think that if I had seen it I would have remembered it, but that is pure surmise.

Mr. Mitchell: I see.

Do you remember having any discussion with Admiral Wilkinson or any other officer, respecting any significance to be attached to this message, and this series of messages about the division of Pearl Harbor into areas?

Admiral Turner: I do not remember ever hearing that discussed.

Mr. Mitchell: Am I right in thinking that Admiral

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1
2 Wilkinson has testified that according to his recollection
3 he did notice such a thing, and had some discussion with
4 you about it. Do you remember his testimony to that ef-
5 fect?

6
7 Admiral Turner: I did not hear that. But I have no
8 recollection of such conversation.

9
10 Mr. Mitchell: To change the subject, Admiral, I want
11 to go back to this series of joint war plans: One, the
12 American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore; another,
13 the British-American-conversations, called ABC-1 and ABC-2,
14 and the joint Canadian-United States conversations on basic
15 defense plan No. 2.

16
17 In order to make it clear just what I am after, I will
18 say what I am interested in is to find out, if I can, from
19 these documents or any other evidence, whether or not anybody
20 representing the United States, from the President down,
21 made any commitment, or promise, to the British or the Dutch
22 to join in a war against Japan before Japan attacked us,
23 and without prior authority from the Congress. That is
24 what I want to know. I am not interested in the plans in
25 any other respect.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Now you had something to do with all these plans, did
3 you not?

4 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Let us take up first the American-Dutch-
6 British conversations. I call your attention to a document
7 dated December 12, 1940, signed by H. R. Stark, directed to
8 the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, entitled "Instructions
9 Concerning the Preparation of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet for War
10 under War Plan Rainbow 3."

11 Would you look at that document?

12 Admiral Turner: What was the question?

13 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have anything to do with the
14 preparation of that document?

15 Admiral Turner: I prepared it.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Would you read it into the record? It
17 does contain the instructions that were sent out to the
18 United States representatives who were planning to take part
19 in that British-Dutch-American conversation at Singapore, is
20 that not true?

21 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Please read it into the record.

23 Admiral Turner: "Secret. OP-12-Dy

24 "(SC) A16 (R-3)

25 "December 12, 1940.

Witness Turner

1
2 "From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

3 "To The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 8941.

4 "Subject: Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S.
5 Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan 'Rainbow 3'.

6
7 "1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is
8 informed that a plan designed for governing naval operations
9 in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and entitled
10 'RAINBOW 3' has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are
11 forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is
12 not to be considered as the policy of the United States Govern-
13 ment to become involved in war under this plan, such a war
14 appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are
15 requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation
16 of your operating plans, and also to the preparation of your
17 vessels, aircraft, and personnel.

18 "2. The officer messenger carrying this plan, Commander
19 J. L. McCrea, U.S.N., is authorized to remain in the Manila
20 area for about nine days. He is prepared to present you the
21 general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to various
22 political and strategical matters which have influenced the
23 preparation of 'RAINBOW 3'. You are requested to make a
24 study of the plan and to forward to the Department via
25 Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for changes
which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be

Witness Turner

1
2 stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under
3 the existing situation, to effect material changes in the
4 Assumptions of the plan.

5 "3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would
6 be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch
7 Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the
8 British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London
9 and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating
10 plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful
11 staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-
12 Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British
13 and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is be-
14 lieved that you may be able to hold such conversations with
15 the British. There is a considerable doubt as to the extent
16 of the conversations which may become possible with the
17 Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

18 "4. You are, therefore, authorized to conduct staff
19 conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme Commanders,
20 with the specific understanding that you are in no way
21 committing the United States Government to any particular
22 political or military decisions, and that the purpose of the
23 staff conversations is solely to facilitate joint operations
24 should war eventuate under the approximate conditions shown
25 in the Assumptions of 'RAINBOW 3'. It is requested that these

Witness Turner

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conversations be conducted in secret; in particular the most extreme care should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch.

"5. You will note that 'RAINBOW 3' will require agreement between the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and U.S. Fleet, concerning the routing and protection en route of the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement. It might be necessary for the Reenforcement to join you via the south of Australia, but this will depend upon the situation at the time.

"6. Questions as to special personnel or material which should go forward to you via the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement should be settled by direct arrangements between you and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. These arrangements should include all questions concerning the cargoes of the two XAF and two XAK which it is proposed to send you from the East Coast via the south of Africa.

"7. All matters concerning the logistic supply of your forces should be decided by you, with the understanding that, so far as possible, only personnel and technical materials would be supplied from the United States.

"8. It is requested that you take advantage of the presence of Commander McCrea to inform him as to your views concerning various pending matters, and particularly those

Witness Turner

1
2 which require the assistance of the Navy Department in
3 solving the problems which you foresee may arise in war.

4 Specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations desires further
5 light on matters connected with the following:

6 "(a) Your recommendation concerning a further reenforcement
7 of the Asiatic Fleet during peace, due consideration being
8 given to political reactions and to the present capability
9 of existing facilities to care for reenforcements.

10 "(b) It is proposed to send you, probably, in February, four
11 'Bird' class minesweepers fitted for both ordinary and magnetic
12 sweeping, and fitted to lay contact mines. Advise as to
13 whether or not these minesweepers should be sent.

14 "(c) Are additional patrol seaplane squadrons desirable, and
15 can they be supported with present facilities?

16 "(d) It is possible the next reenforcement after the 'Bird'
17 minesweepers may be four 1200 ton destroyers converted to
18 high speed minesweepers fitted for both kinds of minesweeping.
19 Would these ships be desirable?

20 "(e) In view of the fact that the CRETE MAERSK cannot be
21 purchased or chartered, what is the present situation as regards
22 the support of your submarines? Can six more (or a total of
23 23) submarines be supported if a cargo ship with spares and
24 supplies is sent from the United States to the Asiatic to
25 augment the CANOPUS?

Witness Turner

1
2 "(f) Advise concerning sending motor torpedo boats to the
3 Philippines.

4 "(g) There are now in store in San Francisco portable
5 facilities and equipment for establishing advance bases for
6 patrol seaplanes. These facilities are made up in sets capable
7 of supporting either two or four squadrons each. Would you
8 desire to have sent to you one or more sets of these facilities
9 for either two squadrons or four squadrons?

10 "(h) Do you need increases in personnel and material? Under
11 consideration are renewing, or adding to, the machine tool
12 and crane equipment of the Cavite Navy Yard; adding to the
13 facilities of the submarine base; and establishing an airplane
14 overhaul base with a capacity for overhauling two patrol
15 squadrons including engines. Under this heading, would the
16 establishment of minor base facilities for submarines and
17 aircraft in Mariveles Bay in addition to those at Corregidor
18 and Cavite be advisable? Would the establishment of similar
19 facilities near Cebu or Iloilo or elsewhere be desirable?

20 "(i) What is your present view with respect to increases
21 in ammunition, including bombs, mines, and torpedoes? What
22 increase in stowage and upkeep facilities for these items are
23 required?

24 "(j) We desire your recommendations as to booms, nets, loops,
25 etc. This is in connection with your 'front door' problems.

Witness Turner

1
2 "(k) Advise as to the location and adequacy of quantity
3 of gasoline, fuel oil, diesel and lubricating oil stowage.

4 "9. The Chief of Naval Operations has under considera-
5 tion a visit to Australia by two light cruisers, one the cruiser
6 now under your command, and the other the cruiser carrying
7 to Manila the spares and personnel of the patrol squadron.
8 It may be proposed that the MARBLEHEAD would return to the
9 Asiatic Fleet after this cruise, provided you consider that
10 you still need her out there. On the other hand, since the
11 MARBLEHEAD might perhaps be more suitably employed in war in
12 either the Atlantic or the southeastern Pacific, it may be
13 preferable to withdraw her now from the Asiatic. Your
14 advice on these matters is requested.

15 "10. Information is also requested as to whether or not
16 the Chief of Naval Operations should take up with the Chief
17 of Staff, U. S. Army, any of the problems affecting the
18 closure of the 'back door' referred to in one of your letters.

19 "11. It is recognized that the above list is comprehen-
20 sive and that you may be unable at this time to furnish answers
21 to the questions involved or to other items you have in mind.
22 If this should prove to be the case, you are requested to
23 forward them by air mail or dispatch as soon as practicable.
24 If it seems advisable, you should forward your recommenda-
25 tions by dispatch in order to save the time involved in

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Commander McCrea's return to Washington.

3 "H. R. STARK

4 "Copy to: Cincus."

5 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Mitchell, that is from the
6 Chief of Naval Operations to whom?

7 Admiral Turner: To the Commander in Chief, Asiatic
8 Fleet, Admiral Hart.

9 Mr. Mitchell: And Admiral Hart it was, I think, that
10 designated the men who went to that conference.

11 Now, Admiral, you produced a file here from the files
12 of the Navy Department that has something to do with this
13 Singapore business, and I think in that you have a copy of
14 the instructions which the British gave their representatives
15 at that Singapore conference, have you not?

16 Admiral Turner: No, sir, not at that conference. I
17 have instructions which were given for the conference which
18 was held in Singapore in April.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Oh, a later one?

20 Admiral Turner: That is the paper in which the British
21 give instructions to their conferees.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Now there was an earlier conference prior
23 to April?

24 Admiral Turner: I think, in answer to that question,
25 the committee might be interested in a brief resume of all of

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 the conferences that were held between the American authorities
3 and the British and the Dutch.

4 The first contact with the British in Singapore was made
5 by our Naval Attache, Commander Thomas, who was going to
6 Thailand in October, about the 23rd.

7 The Vice Chairman: What year?

8 Admiral Turner: October of 1940. That was merely ex-
9 ploratory. On November 11, in response to a dispatch from
10 the Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Purnell, the Chief of
11 Staff of Admiral Hart, went to Singapore and had exploratory
12 conversations with them, with instructions that no commitments
13 were to be made. There were no written documents issued from
14 those two preliminary conferences.

15 The next conference that was held, - and it was in com-
16 pliance with the letter which has just been read, - was from
17 January 14 to January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the
18 Commander in Chief of the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell.
19 We have in this paper a dispatch summary of the result of
20 those conversations, and I have in my possession the minutes
21 of that meeting, which I believe the counsel has not seen,
22 which I just very recently got. It adds nothing
23 particularly.

(5) 24 Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch
25 were going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch
3 conference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods
4 of command, tentative methods and areas of operations, either
5 jointly or separately, and to the exchange of communication
6 facilities and intelligence, but of course under the instructions
7 that there would be no political or definite military commitments.

8 Nothing very definite came out of that conference.

9 The next conference -- and on which there is another
10 letter directing that this conference be held, and a letter
11 or a dispatch from the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the
12 conference -- was held in Singapore about the 19th of April,
13 1941. Out of that conference was evolved the ADB paper
14 which is here, and which the counsel has just produced.

15 Mr. Mitchell: That is Exhibit 50.

16 Admiral Turner: That paper contained a lot of objection-
17 able features, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief
18 of Staff in the Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the
19 British Joint Staff Mission here, rejected that paper in toto
20 and requested that additional instructions be issued, so that
21 we could get another agreement.

22 In brief, the objections were two: First, there were
23 some political implications in the paper which were not
24 acceptable to us, and one of them was this deadline down in
25 the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The other objection

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 was that the plan was not very realistic and did not seem
3 to advance in many respects the possible cooperative effort
4 between the different countries.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Excuse me for interrupting you, but that
6 document that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3,
7 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff
8 of the British rejecting this Singapore proposal has already
9 been introduced in evidence as Exhibit 65.

10 Go ahead, Admiral.

11 Admiral Turner: As a result of that rejection, and
12 after considerable conversations between our representatives
13 and the British representatives here in Washington, the
14 British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper which was a proposal
15 for a draft of an agreement, and which had the title "ADB-2".
16 The date of that is August, 1941. That paper was not entirely
17 acceptable but was closer to our ideas.

18 Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were
19 proceeding rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral
20 Phillips, the new British Far Eastern Commander in Singapore,
21 in November. Admiral Phillips and some staff officers went
22 to Manila and had conferences there with our authorities,
23 chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart on the 6th of December,
24 his date, which would have been the 5th here, sent a dispatch
25 to us concerning arrangements which he had made with Admiral

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Phillips as to command, and so on, in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.

That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on the 8th.

Hook
Follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 In none of these papers was there ever a political
3 commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was
4 a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on
5 assumptions that should the United States enter the war,
6 then these papers would be effective, provided they were
7 approved by the proper authorities.

8 None of the ADB papers were every presented to either
9 the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to
10 the President, although all of those officers as well as
11 the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations
12 were being held from time to time.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Have you in that file any instructions
14 by the British about this U. S. - British-Dutch conference
15 and the powers of their representatives?

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: If you find any clause there stating
18 the limits of their authority in these matters, will you
19 please read it into the record?

20 Admiral Turner: This appears in a note from the British
21 Military Mission in Washington to the U. S. Chief of Staff,
22 and transmits a copy of the British instructions to the
23 British representatives at the forthcoming conference at
24 Singapore.

25 Mr. Mitchell: What is the date of the note?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2 2 Admiral Turner: The date of the note from the British
3 Military Mission is 13 April 1941.

4 Paragraph 7 of the enclosure, which is the British
5 instructions, reads as follows: -- I beg your pardon. To
6 make it clear, I will read paragraph 6 as well.

7 "6. The conference will be in two parts: Part 1 to
8 be British-U.S.-Dutch staff conversations; Part 2 to be
9 British-Dutch staff conversations with the United States
10 representatives attending as observers, should this be
11 desired.

12 "7. In both cases, the following conditions will
13 apply:

14 "a. No political commitment is implied.

15 "b. Any agreement is subject to ratification by the
16 Government's concerned.

17 "c. Conversations to be conducted in spirit of com-
18 plete frankness."

19 Mr. Mitchell: We will offer in evidence at this time
20 and have it read into the daily transcript, a report from
21 the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief
22 of Naval Operations dated December 7, 1941, which I under-
23 stand is a dispatch report of the discussions that took
24 place at that earliest conference in Singapore.

25 Admiral Turner: That is 1941.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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This is the final conference with Admiral Phillips.

Mr. Mitchell: The very last one?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I think that is one of the documents that Senator Ferguson has asked us to produce.

The other is the reply dated December 7, 1941, released by Admiral Stark and addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Shall I read those, or do you want them transcribed?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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2 The Chairman: I think if they are not very long you
3 might read them.

4 Mr. Mitchell: No, they are not long. The report dated
5 December 7, 1941 coming from the Asiatic Commander states:

6 "This is the first of five parts.

7 "(1) We have met and discussed the problems with
8 which we are faced in the Far Eastern area.

9 "(2) In the early stages of a war with Japan
10 occurring at the present time, the initiative must inevitably
11 rest with the Japanese.

12 "(3) It is consequently not possible for us to
13 draw up definite plans to be carried out by all our forces
14 at the outbreak of war, and the most we can do is to decide
15 upon the initial dispositions that appear to us best suited
16 to meet the probable Japanese actions. Plans for submarines
17 and naval aircraft are definite and ready.

18 "(4) We are agreed that it is of great importance
19 to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay barrier.
20 Part two will follow.

21 "Second part of Ø7Ø327.

22 "(5) We are agreed on the following initial dis-
23 positions:-

24 "(A) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and
25 operate as required from there as a striking force in

1 connection with any Japanese movement in the China Seas,
2 Dutch East Indies and through the Malay barrier.

3 "(B) Cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo -
4 'Surabaya - Darwin' to act as a striking force in connection
5 with air reconnaissance. This force can provide cover, and
6 when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch East
7 Indies and Philippine area or for an occasional important
8 convoy from Australia to Singapore.

9 "(C) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the
10 Australia - New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of
11 raider attack or escort important convoys.

12 "(D) The minimum cruiser force to be maintained in the Indian
13 Ocean to escort important trade.

14 "(6) The actual dispositions of forces to give
15 effect to '5' are contained in Appendix 1.

16 "(Part Three.)

17 "(7) We consider it very important that action in
18 the Far East area should be co-ordinated with the movements
19 of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and we hope we may be informed
20 of the time table vizualized for the movement of this Fleet
21 to Truk in accordance with plan 'Rainbow V'. The release
22 of cruisers from Australia and New Zealand is intimately
23 connected with the movements of this Fleet.

24 "(8) All operations of U.S. Army aircraft which
25 touch the operation of any naval forces to be co-ordinated

1 through CINCAF.

2 "(9) The setting up and use of a joint headquarters
3 is found impracticable at this time.

4 "(10) Strategic Control. Strategic control as
5 between H.M. and U.S. Forces for the present to remain under
6 respective Commanders in Chief and their operation to be
7 co-ordinated under the principle of mutual co-operation.

8 "(11) Tactical Command. The policy in force in
9 North Atlantic will be followed.

10 "(12) We consider that liaison officers should now
11 be exchanged between the United States Asiatic and British
12 Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary action.

13 "(13) We consider that if the above is agreed to
14 in principle by Dutch, Australian and New Zealand authorities
15 in consultation with British Commander in Chief Eastern
16 Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way
17 of conference is the perfection of details by our respective
18 staffs.

19 "Signed Thos. C. Hart and Tom S.V. Phillips.

20 "(Part Four) In addition to the items reported in the
21 first three parts we are also agreed as to the following:

22 "-1- With the growth of our forces in the Far East,
23 it will be important to be in a position to undertake more
24 offensive operations. Such operations are not practicable
25 from Singapore, and we consider that it is necessary to have,

1 in due course, a base further north from which to operate.

2 "-2- Manila is the only suitable base available,
3 and we consequently consider that the necessary measures
4 should be put in hand to enable Manila to be used by the
5 British Battle Fleet. The question of just what action is
6 necessary for this purpose will be discussed by our staffs.

7 "-3- We consider that we should aim at having
8 Manila available as a base by the first of April 1942, if
9 this can be done.

10 "(Part 5) - Appendix 1 - Singapore; Battleships: PRINCE
11 OF WALES, REPULSE, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN; Cruisers: MAURITIUS,
12 ACHILLES, TROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA?) (AND LATER HOBART?)
13 Destroyers: Ten British, 6 Dutch, 4 U.S. (See note).
14 SOURABAYA - DARWIN - EAST BORNEO. HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD,
15 CORNWALL, JAVA, 4 Destroyers (U.S. see note).
16 AUSTRALASIA AUSTRALIA OR CANBERRA, PERTH, LEANDER, THREE AMC.
17 INDIAN OCEAN. EXETER, GLASGOW (20 Knots) Two 'E' Class,
18 3 'D' Class, four 'C' Class, 5 AMC.

19 "FOOTNOTE: Hart's understanding is that we build up
20 destroyer force to operate with the British battleships as
21 they increase in number. At present, the two destroyer
22 divisions are deployed with his cruisers, one division being
23 in full readiness at Balik Papan to proceed to Singapore
24 upon declaration of war.

25 "(CINC Eastern Fleet requests above be forwarded First

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 Sea Lord as personal message from him)."

2 And the reply from the Chief of Naval Operations to
3 Admiral Hart, dated December 7, 1941, reads: --

4 Senator Brewster: Is the time of that shown, the time
5 of day? Was that before the attack or after, does it appear?

6 Admiral Turner: May I answer that?

7 Mr. Mitchell: Have you a copy of this?

8 Admiral Turner: This was actually transmitted on the
9 7th about 8:00 p.m. It had been written, I believe, late on
10 the 6th or early on the 7th, and would have gone out a little
11 earlier except for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

12 Senator Brewster: It was prepared then entirely before
13 the attack and was not changed after that?

14 Admiral Turner: I don't remember that it was changed.
15 It might have been slightly changed. It was still in the
16 process of drafting at the time of the attack.

17 Senator Brewster: Excuse me for interposing.

18 Mr. Mitchell: The original dispatch from the Commander
19 in Chief Asiatic Fleet bears date December 7, 1941. I will
20 ask you what that date is here and if the hour is noticeable
21 there.

22 Senator Brewster: That would be the 6th here, wouldn't
23 it, Admiral?

24 Mr. Mitchell: We want to know when that message was
25 received in Washington, the original.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Turner: It doesn't show the time of receipt. That was sent on noon of their 7th which would have been --

Senator Brewster: That would be the 6th here, wouldn't it?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Are there any heiroglyphics on that photostat that would help you state the hour it was received?

Admiral Turner: That would be about 11:00 p.m. on the 5th. 11:00 p.m. on the 6th. So we did not see that until the next day. I will modify my other answer. I think that was entirely prepared after the attack in the afternoon of the 7th because I know if it had come there at 11:00 o'clock at night nothing would have been done on it that night and I think it came to my attention when I came down to the Department the next morning.

So that I believe now that that was prepared in the forenoon of the 7th. Actually our time of 11:00 p.m., the time of transmission, time of coding out there, time of transmission, decoding, of that long message, it wouldn't have been available for less than 8 or 9 hours after the date that it was started to be coded.

Mr. Mitchell: This reply of Admiral Hart reads as follows:

"The five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment as follows x Part one approved x

Witness Turner

1
2 Part two approved but CNO invites attention to possibility
3 that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come
4 from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be
5 established in Halmahera or Mindanao approximately in accord
6 with ideas expressed in WPL44 x Part three approved para
7 seven make arrangements direct x Para eight approved by
8 CNO and COS x Part four approved when practicable x Regarding
9 paras two and three inform me what additional personnel
10 material and minor forces you require for the projected
11 fleet base in Manila or alternatively in Mindanao x Footnote
12 approved x Question of transfer to you of additional destroyers
13 cannot be decided at this time xx Para 3315 WPL46 provisions
14 are extended to include Army x You are authorized by SECNAV
15 to time charter US and foreign flag merchant vessels of
16 your station as necessary to accomplish this objective suggest
17 possible use of British vessels formerly in service on China
18 Coast x Request prompt information as to loading of supply
19 vessels from US which will be sent you via Indian Ocean
20 approximately in accord WPL44 tables xx Inform Army British
21 and Dutch xx Sent CINCAF for action and CINPAC and SECNAVO
22 for info.

23 "Copy to: BAD
24 WPD, U.S. Army"
25

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, counsel at the beginning,
3 as I understood, said that was a reply of Admiral Hart.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Reply by Admiral Stark, I mean.

5 Senator Lucas: Yes.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I misspoke. It is a reply by Chief of
7 Naval Operations to Admiral Hart, Asiatic Fleet.

8 Now, Admiral, you know also about the ABC conversations,
9 British conversations, 1 and 2. The record so far shows that
10 those conversations never were finally approved.

11 Is that in accord with your recollection? That is,
12 before the war started, anyway. I think there has been
13 correspondence offered here in connection with Rainbow 5,
14 which the President refused to approve, because it was based
15 on the British-American conversations, and they hadn't been
16 approved.

17 What is your recollection about the conferences between
18 the British and United States staff officers here in Washington,
19 called ABC-1 and 2?

20 Admiral Turner: It is in accord with the record except
21 for one curious thing, that the British Chiefs of Staff and
22 the War Cabinet approved ABC-2, which was an appendix of
23 ABC-1. I had been under the impression that the British
24 War Cabinet had approved both but I can find no record of it
25 and the man, then a clerk, now an officer, who had care of all

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 the papers in connection with that, assured me that ABC-1 was
3 never approved by a War Cabinet, by the British nor by the
4 President.

5 Mr. Mitchell: The other joint war plan of that date
6 was the one arranged with the Canadians for the defense of
7 areas in Canada, Alaska, and the United States in case of
8 an attack on this continent. That is covered by Exhibit
9 51. That document was approved, was it not?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: In all your dealings with these war plans,
12 joint conversations, and so on, did it ever come to your
13 attention that anybody in the services of the United States,
14 in the Executive Branch, military or civil, had ever assumed
15 to commit the United States to engage in a war with Japan
16 before we were attacked?

17 Admiral Turner: I know definitely that there never
18 was any such commitment. All instructions that we had
19 from the President and from the Secretary were that, and
20 that was entirely in accord with the views of all of the
21 officers of the War and Navy Departments who were directly
22 concerned, that it was the province of Congress to declare
23 war, and that any agreements that we entered into were
24 provisional, and to a large extent for the purpose of getting
25 our ideas together and for establishing the machinery for

(2)
hl

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2

1
2 cooperation.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Turning attention next, Admiral, to
4 Exhibit 44, which is a document containing extracts from
5 various of our war plans, basic war plans, Army and Navy
6 with special reference to the defense of Pearl Harbor
7 against an air attack, you have seen that document, have
8 you not?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: And you also are familiar with the
11 various basic documents that are listed in the 13 items
12 in the contents?

13 Admiral Turner: Not with all of them. I was familiar
14 with No. 1 "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War
15 Plan - Orange (1938)."

16 No. 2, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic
17 War Plan - Rainbow No. 1."

18 No. 3, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War
19 Plan - Rainbow No. 5.

20 "No. 4 - Extracts from War Department Operations plan -
21 Rainbow No. 5.

22 "No. 5 - Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revi-
23 sion 1940.

24 "No. 6 - Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii.

25 "No. 7 - Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h3 2 Plan, Hawaii.

3 "No. 8 - Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger
4 Agreement)."

5 I was not familiar with No. 9, "Five November 1941,
6 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department." I never
7 saw it until I saw this document.

8 Mr. Mitchell: You are giving now the list of the ones
9 you were familiar with prior to December 7, 1941, that had
10 come to your attention prior to that date?

11 Admiral Turner: I beg your pardon. I thought that
12 was what you wanted.

13 Mr. Mitchell: That is what I do want.

14 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

15 Mr. Mitchell: No. 9 hadn't come to your attention?

16 Admiral Turner: No, sir. That would not come to me
17 normally.

18 I never saw No. 10, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Secur-
19 ity), Hawaiian Department."

20 No. 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan," -- I was
21 familiar with.

22 Familiar with 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter
23 2 CL-41 (Revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating
24 Areas."

25 And also No. 13, which was the Operations Plan No. 1-41.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h4

2 Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District.

3 Mr. Mitchell: The ones you have specified, you
4 did know about prior to December 7, 1941, are plans that
5 you had directly to do with in the War Plans Division?

6 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. Either joint plans made
7 here or out there, or Navy major plans, the basic plans,
8 made here, and major plans which were made out there.
9 Never minor plans, which never even came to the department.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Recently, in preparation for testify-
11 ing here, you have examined the items on this list that
12 you did not know about prior to December 7?

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. Not too carefully.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, what I am leading up to, is
15 this. I asked General Gerow, of the War Plans Division of
16 the War Department to sum up as briefly as he could from
17 these various plans that are listed here, a statement
18 showing the respective responsibilities of the Naval forces
19 and the Army forces at Oahu and in Hawaii in connection
20 with defense against an air raid, limited to that, and he
21 did prepare such a document and it was read into the record
22 here, but I would like to label it Exhibit 89, and have
23 it attached as an exhibit.

24 The Chairman: That will be ordered.

25

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit 89.)

Mr. Mitchell: In which he made a statement in summary fashion as to the separate and joint responsibilities or respective responsibilities of the Naval forces and the Army forces in connection with defense an air raid.

Did you examine that before General Gerow presented it here?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and I agreed with it as to

3

the overall picture.

4

Mr. Mitchell: Now, getting back to the development of

5

the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands against an

6

air attack, the record shows that on November 22, 1940 that

7

a study of that situation was initiated in a letter from

8

Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson in which he asked Richard-

9

son to make a study of the situation. Do you know about that

10

letter, or did you know about it at the time?

11

Admiral Turner: May I examine the letter?

12

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. I think the first part of it is

13

all that relates to this matter.

14

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I saw that letter before Ad-

15

miral Stark sent it to Admiral Richardson.

16

Mr. Mitchell: Did you have anything to do with the pre-

17

paration of it or the making of the suggestion?

18

Admiral Turner: Very little. That was related to mat-

19

ters that had been discussed between Admiral Richardson when

20

he was here in early October, I think, and Admiral Stark. It

21

was before I arrived.

22

Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, the record shows that as a

23

result of that letter Admiral Richardson made a study. He

24

went out himself and examined the Army defenses and all that

25

in connection with or in conjunction with Admiral Bloch, who

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 was Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and it resulted
2
3 in what is known as the Bloch report. Did the Bloch report
4 come to your attention? That is part of exhibit 9.

5 Admiral Turner: Mr. Counsel, there is a letter inter-
6 vening, I believe, of date November 22nd, an official letter
7 on this subject to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
8 Admiral Bloch, which gives specific directions for preparing
9 that report. Is that in evidence?

10 Mr. Mitchell: That is in the file I just handed you,
11 is it?

12 Admiral Turner: No, sir. I have a copy here.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Well, Admiral Stark's letter refers to the
14 fact that he previously asked Admiral Bloch for a report, but
15 it was not quite as complete as he wanted and so he asked
16 Richardson to pursue it. That is in the letter of November
17 22nd. Do you remember that?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I have a copy of that here,
19 if I may refer to it?

20 Mr. Mitchell: Surely. What I am trying to find out,
21 Admiral, is how much you personally had to do with the pre-
22 paration of all these studies and plans for defense against
23 an air attack at the Hawaiian Islands that was generated by
24 this request of Admiral Stark's for an inquiry out there.

25 Admiral Turner: Admiral Stark started the matter of a

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 better defense of the fleet at Hawaii before I arrived here
3 on October 24th and he had some notes on the matter which he
4 turned over to me with a directive to make the matter official,
5 as he had talked it over orally with Admiral Richardson.

6
7 As I recall, I drafted the letter of November 22nd, at
8 least it was drafted in the War Plans Division. I do not have
9 a copy of that here. That went out and then Admiral Stark
10 decided that Admiral Richardson should take a greater part
11 in the reply to that and I believe that was the occasion for
12 his letter of the 28th, personal letter to Admiral Richardson.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Is that the 28th or 22nd? That puzzles
14 me because the very first letter we found from Stark to
15 Richardson raising this issue was the 22nd.

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, that is correct. Well, I am a
17 little confused on that other letter --

18 Mr. Mitchell: Prior to that?

19 Admiral Turner: No. I thought there was a letter be-
20 tween the letter of about that same date to the Commandant
21 of the 14th Naval District.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, maybe there was.

23 Admiral Turner: I think so.

24 Mr. Mitchell: But it is enough for our present pur-
25 poses to call attention to that and my last question was

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

whether you saw the Bloch report in which he made a report about the situation regarding an air attack, dated December 30th, in evidence here, and which bears an endorsement by Admiral Richardson of January 7th. I think I handed that to you, did I not?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I am familiar with it and as a result of these letters here, the one of November 22nd and November 28th I started to get information from the War Department and such information as we had here in the Navy Department on that subject. As soon as the letter came from Admiral Bloch with Admiral Richardson's endorsement, I immediately took that material, added some of our own and drafted the letter of January 24th from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

Mr. Mitchell: So that this letter, exhibit 10, written by Knox to Stimson, in which he labels the dangers at Pearl Harbor in their order of importance and probability:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

you prepared that letter yourself?

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: And took it to the Secretary for trans-
4 mission?

5 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. It was approved by some of
6 the other divisions of Operations, approved by Admiral Inger-
7 soll and Admiral Stark and then sent to the Secretary because
8 it was an official communication of the greatest importance
9 to the War Department and we felt that it should be taken up
10 in that manner rather than informally.

11 Mr. Mitchell: You drafted that letter partially on the
12 basis of the result of Bloch's report, inquiry and report?

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, it is obvious if you drafted it you
15 were at that time of the views expressed in this letter about
16 the possibilities or order of importance, and probability
17 of these various kinds of attacks, were you not?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, except I was of the opinion
19 that the word "probable" ought to have gone in there instead
20 of "possibility" as to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
21 in advance of a declaration of war. However, it was
22 felt, and I was entirely agreeable, that "possibility" was a
23 perfectly good word.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Did you see the letter of Secretary
25 Stimson that came back in reply to the Knox letter that you

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 drafted?

3 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and we made sure that a copy
4 of that letter went to the Commander-in-Chief.

5 Mr. Mitchell: I am showing you a letter that came in
6 from Admiral Richardson from Pearl Harbor, dated January 25,
7 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which has
8 to do with this very problem of defense against an air attack,
9 which is part of exhibit 9. Did you see that letter when it
10 came in?

11 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I judge from this that you had an
13 active part in what happened from that time on in connection
14 with the working out of any sort of plans for defense against
15 air attack at Pearl Harbor.

16 Admiral Turner: Not the working out of the detailed
17 plans; the providing of the material and the providing of the
18 necessary units, the improvement in the defenses and general
19 directives as to individual services and joint preparation
20 and training for such an attack, - joint training in prepara-
21 tion for such an attack. There is a letter of February 10th
22 in reply to the letter of the Commander-in-Chief of January
23 25th which I drafted in addition.

24 Mr. Mitchell: I am not sure that we have had that, have
25 we?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I sent it to the committee some days ago.

Mr. Mitchell: Let me look at it.

Admiral Turner: And received the return of the originals.

Mr. Mitchell: Oh. Well, Admiral, you took some share in the efforts to obtain the action by the War Department towards increasing its anti-aircraft guns and plane equipment?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and also action by the Navy Department on this question of the study on the subject of protective measures in the waters of the harbor and in the entrance, but the actual prosecution of that project was in the hands of the Naval District's Division.

There were a number of letters written to the War Department requesting that they increase their antiaircraft defenses and increase their air defenses and we recognized that the War Department had little equipment and did not have many trained men and they were most sympathetic and cooperative in attempting to supply material and formations. We never had any refusals from the War Department to provide defenses out there where, in our opinion, they could have provided them.

Mr. Mitchell: You stated, I think, that you were familiar with the Martin-Bellinger report, which is contained in

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 exhibit 44 and in which General Martin, commander of the air
3 force there, and Admiral Bellinger, commander of the air
4 force of the 14th Naval District, made a joint report?

5 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. That is an estimate which
6 they used in drawing up their operating plans, joint operat-
7 ing plans.

8 Mr. Mitchell: That is the report in which it says:

9 "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form
10 of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is be-
11 lieved that at present such an attack would most likely
12 be launched from one or more carriers which would prob-
13 ably approach inside of three hundred miles."

14 And then they said:

15 "A single attack might or might not indicate the
16 presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to
17 attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away
18 by the original thrust."

19 They said again:

20 "Any single submarine attack might indicate the
21 presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force
22 probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a car-
23 rier.

24 "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high prob-
25 ability that it could be delivered as a complete sur-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 exhibit 44 and in which General Martin, commander of the air
3 force there, and Admiral Bellinger, commander of the air
4 force of the 14th Naval District, made a joint report?

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10 of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is be-
11 lieved that at present such an attack would most likely
12 be launched from one or more carriers which would prob-
13 ably approach inside of three hundred miles."

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17 attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away
18 by the original thrust."

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21 presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force
22 probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a car-
23 rier.

24 "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high prob-
25 ability that it could be delivered as a complete sur-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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prise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above."-- Which is speaking from the Japanese viewpoint. "After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success."

Now, that was a pretty wise report, was it not?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Turner: That was, indeed. We agreed thoroughly
3 with it, approved it and it was very comforting and gratify-
4 ing to see that officers in important commands out there had
5 the same view of the situation as was held in the War and
6 Navy departments.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Turning to another subject, did you know
8 of the diversion of merchant shipping from the northern ship
9 lanes to the Central Pacific area which occurred in October
10 1941 and later?

11 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. That subject had been under
12 discussion for some little time between Admiral Ingersoll,
13 Admiral Brainard, whose business it was, and myself, whose
14 interest was in War Plans, and we were prepared to execute
15 that when conditions became tense and we believed that war was
16 imminent. That was initiated by Admiral Ingersoll, who talked
17 to me about it before it was sent out and I was heartily in
18 favor of it.

19 Mr. Mitchell: There was a large area up there that even
20 normally had a very slight amount of marine traffic in it, was
21 there not?

22 Admiral Turner: There was very little marine traffic
23 north of Hawaii, except such as was going to Vladivostock and
24 there wasn't very much of that. By no means all, but a large
25 proportion of the maritime traffic that was going from the

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 United States or from Panama to the Far East went via Hawaii
3 and thence going to Japan would go north of Midway, and going
4 to China I think also went north of Midway. The other that
5 went to South China and the Dutch East Indies and the Phil-
6 ippines went rather close to Guam. The composite great cir-
7 cle course from Puget Sound or from San Francisco, that goes
8 south of the Aleutians to Japan or to China, runs very close
9 to Japan itself and approximately parallel to the general
10 trend of the land.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that was the traffic that you
12 diverted, was it?

13 Admiral Turner: We diverted that and also the traffic
14 that went via Honolulu. We sent that down via Torres Straits,
15 so that the track that the Japanese task force actually took
16 would cross the composite great circle course close to Japan
17 and they would be clear of any traffic that would be there
18 in a very short time and that traffic that went on that com-
19 posite course went through the normal operating areas where
20 the Japanese held their maneuvers.

21 Senator Brewster: Mr. Counsel, I wonder if we could
22 have one of the maps of the Pacific put up, which would en-
23 able us to understand very much better this question of the
24 routes, if that map were put up on one of the standards.

25 Mr. Mitchell: I will have it set up. It is twelve

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 o'clock now.

3 The Chairman: We have changed our schedule to 12:30.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Oh, we have?

5 The Chairman: Yes.

6 Admiral Turner: Those routes illustrate exactly what I
7 have just said.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, on the map that has just been
9 placed on the easel south of the Aleutians, going from our
10 northern Pacific coast, there are a number of lines drawn
11 from the United States over to the Japanese area. Are those
12 lines representative of the ship lanes, so-called, for that
13 traffic?

14 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. That is what is called the
15 composite great circle course.

16 Mr. Mitchell: And that is the traffic that by these ord-
17 ers was diverted to a southerly course?

18 Admiral Turner: It was that traffic and also all of the
19 traffic that went westward, that is, all of the merchant
20 traffic that went westward from Hawaii. Now, from Hawaii all
21 traffic except naval traffic was sent down around, too, in
22 that direction; some of it had to go via Suva and the Fiji
23 to get water -- no, it didn't go that far south. It went
24 through the Solomons. Possibly I had better trace it.

25 Senator Brewster: Yes.

2813

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Turner: All of this traffic, this traffic --

3 Senator Brewster: You will have to identify it a little
4 more because in the record that won't be clear.

5 Admiral Turner: I beg your pardon. All of the com-
6 posite great circle routes from San Francisco and from Puget
7 Sound which went to the Asiatic points, either to Japan or to
8 China or even around to the Philippines and Malasia, plus
9 all of the traffic that went from Hawaii to Japan, to China
10 direct, to the Philippines, was diverted south roundabout to
11 go first east, - the Puget Sound and San Francisco ships were
12 sent first to Hawaii and then all ships from Hawaii, merchant
13 ships, went approximately west of Howell and Baker Islands,
14 through the Solomons, then west of the Santa Cruz Islands,
15 thence south of New Guinea and through Torres Strait, which
16 is between Australia and New Guinea. We had Australian
17 pilots to take them through there.

18 We for a time sent some of the naval traffic which had
19 freight for Guam and the Philippines, direct from Honolulu to
20 Guam and thence to the Philippines and that is the traffic
21 that we started escorting at about that time. Shortly before
22 December 7th even that traffic, which included naval freight
23 and freight and passenger vessels, was also sent south and
24 around South New Guinea and thence up to the Philippines.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Well, there is an area on the map, Ad-

2914

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 miral, that lies south of this ship lane, of those ship lane
3 lines from Puget Sound through to Japan and north of the
4 Hawaiian Islands, that does not have any ship lane lines drawn
5 on that. Is that a part of the ocean that was not generally
6 used ?

7 Admiral Turner: Practically never do any ships go
8 through that part of the ocean.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Is that term "vacant sea" a recognized
10 maritime expression?

11 Admiral Turner: I never heard that term before but I
12 think it is a good term.

13 Mr. Mitchell: So that after that diversion took place,
14 according to the map there, there was practically little or
15 no traffic in the areas followed by the Jap fleet which at-
16 tacked Pearl Harbor, as shown in red on that map?

17 Admiral Turner: There was very little traffic there in
18 any case. After the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26th,
19 within a short time there was no Japanese shipping between
20 the United States and Japan and the American flag shipping
21 dropped off to practically nothing. Because those lines are
22 there, it does not show a stream of ships even at any time.
23 When shipping was going full blast even before the war there
24 were very few ships in through there and going between
25 Honolulu and Japan. I have gone that route and the chances

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 are we didn't even see a ship there. That was much quicker
3 than these northern routes. It is very easy to miss a ship
4 if you do not want to be detected because there is only one
5 ship along there every two or three days and sometimes by
6 shifting your course a few miles every few hours, why, it is
7 practically impossible for merchant shipping ever to detect a
8 naval task force that wants to be undetected.

9
10 Senator Brewster: Mr. Mitchell, could I ask the witness
11 a question?

12 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

13 Senator Brewster: What happens to the Russian ships
14 going to Vladivostok that were moving out of Seattle? Was
15 there any change in those?

16 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

17 Senator Brewster: Those continued to move?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Brewster: Those had been going from Japanese
20 ports, had they not?

21 Admiral Turner: No, they did not.

22 Senator Brewster: Did the Japanese have surveillance of
23 those ships?

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, but they went through the
25 Kurile Islands. I think they had no patrol, the Japs had no
patrol. They had surveillance up there but they did not stop

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 them and they would normally have gone through that area up
2 here during the summer. Well, very few of them went into
3 Vladivostok during the winter.

4 Senator Brewster: Now, could you give an approximate
5 difference in distance, for instance, going from Seattle and
6 San Francisco to the Philippines via the two alternate routes?
7

8 Admiral Turner: You mean via the maritime ports?

9 Senator Brewster: The great circles or the Hawaii-
10 Torres Straight.

11 Admiral Turner: Oh, I would say roughly four thousand
12 miles further.

13 Senator Brewster: So that this was a very important
14 change when you re-routed these ships?

15 Admiral Turner: It was extremely important and was taken
16 only because the shipping companies were very much opposed and
17 we ourselves because it meant a longer time to get our produc-
18 tion and our material in the Philippines, very much longer.

19 Senator Brewster: Thank you.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Now, Admiral, I call your attention to
21 a dispatch dated July 25, 1941 from the Chief of Naval Opera-
22 tions to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific and other
23 fleets in the Pacific, found on page 14 of exhibit 37, that
24 has to do with economic sanctions. That is the dispatch that
25 informed them that:

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 "At 1400 GCT July Twenty Sixth United States will
3 impose economic sanctions against Japan," and describes
4 them.

5 Did you have any part in the preparation of that
6 dispatch?

7 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I drafted it.

8 Mr. Mitchell: It says "Do not anticipate immediate
9 hostile acts by Japan through the use of military means,
10 but you are furnished this information in order that you
11 may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible
12 eventuality."

13 You realized at that time that the imposition of these
14 sanctions and embargoes produced very strained relations?

15 Admiral Turner: I believed it would make war certain
16 between the United States and Japan.

17 Mr. Mitchell: When you come to examine the intercepted
18 diplomatic dispatches which showed us Japan was fretting
19 and deteriorating under these embargoes, and her demands
20 and our refusal to remove those embargoes and to keep on
21 furnishing her war materials, what is your judgment as
22 to the extent the embargo and our refusal to stop aid to
23 China and release those embargoes had on compelling Japan
24 to attack us?

25 Admiral Turner: I think it made sure the fall of the

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
h2 2 third Konoye Cabinet, which had begun in the middle of
3 July, and I think that it made sure the going in of the
4 militaristic cabinet. It undermined the Konoye Cabinet
5 which I believe was trying to keep from War with the United
6 States, but not trying to keep out of war with Britain and
7 the Dutch.

8 Senator Brewster: Could I have the question and answer
9 previous to the last one read, please?

10 (The question and answer referred to, as recorded
11 above, was read by the reporter.)

12 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to another dispatch
13 dated October 16, 1941, page 18 of Exhibit 37. Did you
14 have any part in the preparation of that? That is the one
15 that refers to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet.

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I drafted that dispatch.

17 Mr. Mitchell: You say "There is a strong possibility
18 of hostilities since the United States and Britain are
19 held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situa-
20 tion."

21 To what did you refer in the words "desperate situa-
22 tion"? Were you referring to her economic condition?

23 Admiral Turner: Very large to her economic condition,
24 and to the fact that through our action, her trade had
25 been cut off not only with the United States, but with the

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h3 2 British possessions and the Dutch had reduced their com-
3 mitment to furnish oil, a certain amount of oil annually,
4 to something like one-third, or two-fifths of that. That
5 meant that since the United States and the Dutch possessions
6 were the sources of nearly all of the petroleum products that
7 Japan was using, in a comparatively short time her own large
8 stocks maintained in the Empire would be exhausted. She
9 could not get cotton from India, upon which she depended
10 for a large part of her cotton industry, and she also got
11 rice from the Dutch and India.

12 It meant, of course, that her trade with the world was
13 practically stopped and that was a very serious matter for
14 an industrial nation.

15 In addition to that, of course, was her very large ex-
16 tension in China, and the help that the United States and
17 the British were giving to the nationalist government in
18 China.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that message almost amounted to
20 an alert, didn't it? It said the Japs may attack, and "you
21 will take due precautions, including preparatory deployments"
22 and so on.

23 Was it your judgment at the time that you wrote that
24 dispatch on the 16th of October, that the conditions you
25 had spoken of might result in war in a very short time?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Turner: No, sir, not a short time. That is relatively. The new cabinet would have to be formed. It took a certain amount of time to do that, to make their pronouncement, get the approval of the Emperor, and to issue orders to deploy their forces, and to load their ships. So at that time, so far as the United States and the British and Dutch were concerned, I did not believe that there would be any possibility of war for at least a month.

It was somewhat different with respect to the Russians, because there they were close to the Russians. They already had an Army in Manchuria deployed or not, we did not know.

They had a great part of the Navy in her home waters, so that action against Russia could have been taken at an earlier date possibly.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, I notice in Exhibit 38, dated October 18, 1941, it appears that the War Department had their attention called to this message of October 16, 1941, from the CNO to the Pacific Fleet and felt, or maybe gave the impression that the hostilities were very imminent, and so the Army sent this dispatch to their commander out there, "Calling the War Department estimate of the Japanese situation to your attention, tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no rapid, no abrupt

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

2 change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

3 I gather you are really not at all in disagreement
4 with that view, are you?

5 Admiral Turner: No, sir. I saw that dispatch before
6 it went; I did not have any disagreement with it.

7 Mr. Mitchell: The Army dispatch I read is dated
8 October 18, 1941. The dispatch of November 24, 1941,
9 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and
10 Pacific Fleets and others, page 32 of Exhibit 37, we have
11 already referred to this morning. That contains the state-
12 ment "The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with
13 Japan very doubtful," and "Surprise aggressive movement
14 in any direction, including attack on Philippines and Guam
15 is a possibility."

16 That is the dispatch that you say you initiated and
17 that Admiral Ingersoll authorized, is it?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. That was also cleared with
19 Admiral Stark and with General Gerow who cleared it with
20 General Marshall.

21 I have an impression, not confirmed by the minutes of
22 the Joint Board, that that was discussed at a meeting of
23 the Joint Board before it went out.

24 May I say this in addition:

25 Before that went out it was cleared with Mr. Knox, and

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 I think with the President.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Coming down now to the war warning mes-
4 sage of November 27, 1941, appearing on page 36 of Exhibit
5 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and
6 Pacific Fleet, what part did you take in the preparation of
7 that message? Will you state the circumstances as you re-
8 member them?

9 Admiral Turner: The dispatch of the 24th we did not
10 consider required any immediate action, except to get
11 ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another
12 warning.

13 As a result of the Japanese intercept which had post-
14 poned the final date to the 29th, we felt it necessary to
15 put this dispatch out, because we could not tell whether
16 the 29th was to be the day that the attack was to take
17 place, or whether it was to be the day when the expeditions
18 would start from their ports.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 So that this gave two days for deployments, proper
3 deployments to be made, which was enough. I think that
4 one of the immediate reasons for that was our learning,
5 or my learning on the 26th from Captain Scheirman, who
6 was the liaison officer with the State Department that
7 Mr. Hull had decided, or felt, that negotiations were of
8 no further use and that the matter was in the hands of the
9 War and Navy Departments.

10 My recollection is, I am not too sure on this part --
11 my recollection is that Captain Schierman came back from
12 the State Department about 10:30 on the 26th, and immediately
13 told me, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Ingersoll about this
14 matter where the State Department had decided not to send
15 the modus vivendi, but he did not know then that they
16 were going to send the note of the 26th.

17 The scheduled meeting of the Joint Board was for
18 11 o'clock. That was put off by Admiral Stark until, I
19 think, 11:35, while I drafted this, the original form of
20 this dispatch. And I think, without making any particular
21 change that that was taken up and discussed in the Joint
22 Board meeting that morning, which General Marshall attended.

23 There were some objections to the phraseology of the
24 dispatch and it was finally changed almost to this form,
25 partly by the Army and partly by Admiral Stark.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Now, I believe that either that night or early in
3 the forenoon of the 27th, I am not sure which, that dis-
4 patch was then cleared with Mr. Knox and sent to the
5 President and we got it back in the afternoon from the
6 White House.

7 Now, there is a possibility that it was telephoned
8 to the President, but I believe that Admiral Beardall took
9 it to the President himself.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the Joint Board minutes, the
11 minutes of the Joint Board of November 26th are in evidence,
12 and we don't find anything in them at all that mentioned
13 any discussion whatever of any warning messages going out
14 either from the Army or the Navy.

15 Admiral Turner: That is correct, and that was rather
16 customary. It mentions a discussion of the Asiatic situa-
17 tion, or the Pacific situation. Dispatch of this character,
18 while it might be discussed in the Joint Board -- this may
19 be rather a fine point, but it is, I believe, correct, was
20 not the function of the Joint Board to send. It was the
21 business of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The
22 Joint Board, which is a constituted body, consisting of
23 eight people, would give their advice, but the action
24 would be by those two officers.

25 So that customarily when something of that sort came

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 up that required action, it was not put down in the Joint
3 Board minutes, because then it would look as if the Joint
4 Board had decided to do such and such, which would not be
5 the case.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I see.

7 Who was present with you and, I suppose, Admiral Stark,
8 when the terms of this message were finally agreed on, this
9 message of November 27, can you remember who was in the con-
10 ference?

11 Admiral Turner: I think after the Joint Board confer-
12 ence, the only people that were then concerned with that
13 after that, were Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and myself,
14 possibly Admiral Brainard.

15 Mr. Mitchell: On what day was it you met and agreed
16 upon this draft? Was it the 27th?

17 Admiral Turner: We discussed it several times on both
18 the 26th and the 27th, and this was what emerged. I will
19 say that it had some of the thoughts of the Army in it,
20 because we wanted to always try, in anything of this nature
21 to take exactly the same action. As we know, that did not
22 occur in this particular case.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that is one of the things I
24 wanted to mention to you. The record shows that when the
25 Army got up their dispatch, Secretary Stimson telephoned Mr.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h10

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2 Hull about whether negotiations were terminated or not,
3 and Mr. Hull said they were terminated to all practical
4 purposes with only a bare possibility that the Japanese
5 Government might come back, and that was the way their
6 message read.

7 Your message doesn't contain that. It is a flat
8 statement. "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning
9 and negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
10 of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive
11 move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

12 Now, when you drew this dispatch in this form and sent
13 it, did you know that the War Department dispatch had been
14 toned down a little?

15 Admiral Turner: I knew it before the dispatch went
16 but our idea was to make this sharp and clear so there was
17 no possibility of misunderstanding.

18 We also took cognizance of the fact that in one of the
19 magic messages, the Japanese had said even after the 29th
20 to go on and make the motions of continuing to discuss
21 things from the diplomatic viewpoint.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you really then disagreed with the
23 State Department, Mr. Hull's evaluation, if I may use that
24 word of the state of negotiations, did you? A little bit,
25 I mean?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Admiral Turner: I felt that for the military person-
3 nel, stating the matter, the situation in this way, was
4 necessary and was really factual, and realistic.

5 Mr. Mitchell: And it was better to give them a stiff
6 jolt than to be easy under the circumstances?

7 Senator Brewster: You say military personnel?

8 Admiral Turner: I say for the military personnel this
9 was a much more realistic and direct message.

10 Senator Brewster: You mean military as distinct from
11 naval?

12 Admiral Turner: No, no, sir. I beg your pardon. That
13 was a general term.

14 Senator Ferguson: Will you ask him if he was trying
15 to differentiate between civilian and military in that?

16 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, I think when you said "military"
17 you used the term in a broad sense to include Navy and Army
18 and everything in the armed services, did you not?

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 The Chairman: It is not 12:30. The committee will
21 recess until 2 o'clock.

22 (Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:30 o'clock p.m.,
23 to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p.m., of the same day.)
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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

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3 Mr. Clark: The committee will come to order. I will
4 take responsibility for calling the committee to order in the
5 absence of the Chairman and Vice Chairman who, I think, were
6 detained on the floor.

7 Counsel will proceed.

8 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

9 (Resumed)

10 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, when we recessed we were engaged
11 in making some comparisons between the warning message of
12 November 27 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the
13 Pacific Commander and the warning message of the same date
14 sent by War Department Commanding General of the Army Forces
15 at Hawaii.

16 The first difference is this, your dispatch -- withdraw
17 that.

18 Before you finally settled on the form of your dispatch
19 I imagine you had some preliminary discussions with the Army
20 officers who were engaged on similar work as to the form the
21 dispatch should take?

22 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. They saw our dispatch and
23 I am quite sure before they drafted their final form of
24 their dispatch.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, after you had had that con-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 ference you separated, you went to the Secretary of the Navy
3 with yours, and they went to the Secretary of War with theirs;
4 is that the way you understand it?

5 Admiral Turner: I left the draft of the dispatch with
6 Admiral Stark and, as I understand it, he took that up with
7 Mr. Knox, and I think, sent it to the President by the Aide,
8 but he may have talked to the President about it over the
9 White House telephone.

10 Mr. Mitchell: You don't know whether the original draft
11 of the Army dispatch contained the words "This dispatch is
12 to be considered a war warning"?

13 Admiral Turner: No, sir, I do not. I first saw the
14 Army dispatch after it had been drafted when General Gerow
15 came over with it to clear it with Admiral Stark and they
16 called me in and showed it to me.

17 Mr. Mitchell: That was after General Gerow had had it
18 up with Secretary Stimson?

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Your dispatch suggests, or states:

21 "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the
22 organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious
23 expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra
24 Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

25 The Army dispatch mentions no area in which the attack

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 may come. Do you notice that? The Army dispatch is on page
3 7 of Exhibit 32.

4 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Why did you put in a reference to the
6 Philippines, Thai or Kra or Borneo?

7 Admiral Turner: We wanted to emphasize the fact that
8 this was a very important major effort, that there was an
9 amphibious expedition or expeditions en route. We knew that
10 these ships had sailed in convoy from Shanghai and, I believe,
11 from Hainan, and that they had, some vessels had already
12 arrived in the ports of Indochina.

13 Also from the locations of Japanese naval vessels there
14 was a definite movement of a fair-sized force down through
15 the China Sea even at this date. There was no definite indi-
16 cation at that time of a movement towards the Philippines.
17 We could get very little information as to intentions toward
18 the Philippines. We expected the attack to come from Formosa,
19 which it did, but we couldn't get any information from there.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the Fleet at Hawaii wasn't tied
21 down to the Hawaiian Islands, was it?

22 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: It had an interest in the campaign anywhere
24 in the Pacific?

25 Admiral Turner: Not outside of the provisions of Rainbow

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 5 War Plan, and that did not permit them to go out into the
3 Asiatic without directions from the Chief of Naval Operations.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, coming to the next sentence in your
5 message it says:

6 "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory
7 to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46."

8 What is meant by that? In the first place, what is
9 meant by "appropriate defensive deployment", and next, what
10 was WPL46?

11 Admiral Turner: Before coming to the meat of the answer,
12 I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a
13 multiple address. It goes to the Commander in Chief of the
14 Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the Commander in
15 Chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were
16 the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to
17 each, but both in identical terms.

18 A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval
19 deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities.
20 To get into the best positions from which to execute the
21 operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment
22 as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for
23 the defense of Hawaii and of the West Coast of the United
24 States, because one of the tasks of WPL46 is to defend the
25 territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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zones, and to defend our shipping.

Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama.

(2)

The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the West Coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the Commandants of Districts to take precautions against subversive activities, but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii, so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words, if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings.

Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north, because

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 there were no little outlying islands there from which observa-
3 tion could have been made, since there was no possibility of
4 detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and
5 ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have
6 sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to
7 the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors
8 against approach, which the long range reconnaissance could
9 not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have
10 been in considerable danger, but that was what they were
11 there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they
12 are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy
13 and inflict loss on them.

14 Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would
15 not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air
16 fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be
17 in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields
18 and to cover a somewhat wider arc.

19 Another part of the deployment would have been to have
20 sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a posi-
21 tion from which they could exercise either surveillance or
22 could make attacks against approaching vessels.

23 It is to be noted that there was no offensive action
24 ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course,
25 would have been to send them into Japanese waters.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: Well, can you identify for us WPL-46?

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Admiral Turner: WPL-46 was the Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5, derived from joint Army and Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5, which in turn was derived from A-B-C-1 and 2, the American-British Conversations.

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Mr. Mitchell: Well, is WPL 46 involved in any one of these thirteen items on exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?

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Mr. Keefe: Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5?

Mr. Mitchell: That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. Keefe: That is what I would like to get cleared up.

Admiral Turner: Yes. I said that WPL 46 is Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.

Mr. Mitchell; That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. WPL 46 is a war plans number.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, you are familiar with WPL 46 and Rainbow 5. Can you state in a very brief way what the defensive tasks assigned in that plan were?

Admiral Turner: May I see the tasks assigned to the Commander-in-Chief from Rainbow 5? I do not think they are all in here.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, you want the original Rainbow 5, do you, the original document?

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I haven't anything but a summary of cer-
4 tain items.

5 Senator Brewster: You remember that was a question we
6 had when it was up the other day, that that exhibit described
7 the defensive actions but it did not show the affirmative
8 actions of the Fleet. I raised that question at the time. I
9 do not know whether we have ever had the complete plan, have
10 we?

11 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gesell: Not in evidence. We have it in the office.

13 Mr. Mitchell: We have it down in the office, all these
14 plans.

15 Admiral Turner: I believe counsel has that plan, a copy
16 of that plan.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, while we are waiting for it to be
18 brought up I will go on with these questions about this warn-
19 ing message.

20 Now, there is nothing in this message about the Japanese
21 taking, performing or committing the first overt act. The
22 Army had that in there "on direction of the President" and
23 I understand that this message of yours went over to the
24 President. I am not sure whether it was before or after it
25 was sent.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Did you have any directions from the President to say
3 anything about Japan committing the first overt act?

4 Admiral Turner: No, sir. The situation was this: The
5 question was discussed as to whether we would issue an order
6 that if Jap forces came within a certain distance of Hawaii,
7 whether or not we would attack them. Naturally, if strong
8 forces were even within five or six hundred miles of Hawaii
9 their intention would be very apparent.

10 The decision as to when and where to consider that they
11 had committed an attack or were about to commit an attack on
12 us was felt to be within the province of the Commander-in-
13 Chief and that we should avoid any details at all.

14 The Army was in a slightly different situation. We felt
15 that the Navy could not afford, if it were possible to pre-
16 vent it, to let the attack come in and be made without taking
17 action and I am quite sure that if our deployed ships had
18 encountered an enemy task force there would have been no ques-
19 tion whatsoever immediately as to the commission of overt
20 acts by the Japanese. It was not a situation capable of ex-
21 act definition.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you knew when you drafted the order,
23 I assume, that that desire existed in the Administration that
24 Japan should commit the first overt act however you define it?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and if they had brought a task

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 force within five hundred miles of Hawaii, under the circum-
3 stances that most assuredly would have been an overt act.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I notice here at the end of this dispatch
5 you say:

6 "Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures
7 against sabotage."

8 Well, did you have an idea at that time that the only
9 danger that Guam and Samoa were under was a sabotage opera-
10 tion?

11 Admiral Turner: The category of defense of Guam was
12 "E", which meant that no resistance was to be offered; that
13 the only action they would take would be the destruction of
14 military facilities in our possession.

15 We had no force there except a small number of marines
16 and a small number of naval personnel and the defense of
17 Guam was entirely out of the question. Therefore, in order
18 to avoid too much difficulty for the natives, why, the deci-
19 sion had been made previously that no defense whatsoever would
20 be offered for Guam.

21 Samoa, - I have forgotten their category of defense.
22 I think it also was "E". They had a couple of hundred native
23 troops, I think they had three or four emplaced six inch
24 guns, I am not sure as to that, and there was no defense that
25 Samoa could offer that was of any account at all. Therefore,

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 the only measures that they could take effectively were
3 against sabotage.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, on the 27th of November, on page 37
5 of exhibit 37 there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
6 Operations to the Commandants of all the Naval Districts ex-
7 cept the 14th at Hawaii and, - the 16th was in the Philip-
8 pines?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Which read:

11 "Commandants will take appropriate measures for
12 security against subversive activity and sabotage due to
13 critical status of orange negotiations and imminent
14 probability extension orange operation. Publicity to be
15 avoided."

16 Why didn't you warn the Commandant of the Naval District
17 in Hawaii against sabotage?

18 Admiral Turner: Because the Commandants of the Naval
19 Districts in Hawaii and in the Philippines were subordinate
20 officers of the two Commanders-in-Chief and it was the duty
21 of the two Commanders-in-Chief to issue the necessary in-
22 structions to those Commandants. Their existing orders in
23 their war plans were all written out and that was one of the
24 tasks of those Commandants but there were many other tasks,
25 too.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 You will note also that the Commandant of the Navy Yard
3 in Washington and the Governors of Guam and Samoa were also
4 included as action addressees in that dispatch.

5 The reason we did not send a stronger dispatch to those
6 districts was that we did not expect there anything except
7 possible sabotage and we did not want to spread that other
8 war warning throughout all those districts because it would
9 have been in the newspapers half an hour after it got there
10 in most of the places probably.

11 Mr. Mitchell: I notice on November 28th, page 38 of
12 exhibit 37, there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
13 Operations for action of the Commander-in-Chief PNNCP. What
14 is that?

15 Admiral Turner: Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier
16 and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.

17 Mr. Mitchell: That is on the mainland?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: For the information of the Commander-in-
20 Chief of the Pacific Fleet among others.

21 Admiral Turner: And Commander Panama Naval Coastal
22 Frontier.

23 Mr. Mitchell: And Panama.

24 Admiral Turner: Yes.

25 Mr. Mitchell: There you sent them a copy of the warning

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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dispatch that had just been sent out by the War Department to
its commander?

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Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Mitchell: What was the purpose of that?

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Admiral Turner: The purpose was to make sure that those
commanders knew what the Army was doing in their districts.

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The Chairman: Mr. Counsel, may I at this point make an
observation? The First Session of the Seventy-ninth Congress
is about to come to a conclusion, probably tomorrow. There
are important matters of legislation and other matters over
there on the floor of the Senate that require my attention in
connection with the winding up of this session and I am com-
pelled to go to the floor. I wanted the Admiral to know that
my absence is in no sense an indication of my lack of inter-
est in his testimony, but I cannot be in two places at a
time and I feel I must be on the floor, so that I am sure
you will understand and excuse me if I am not here during
the balance of your testimony today.

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Admiral Turner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your cour-
tesy in making that statement.

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